CORRUPTION

Expandingthefocus

EditedbyManuhuiaBarcham,BarryHindessandPeterLarmour

PublishedbyANUEPress

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Title:Corruption:expandingthefocus/editedbyManuhuiaBarcham,BarryHindessandPeterLarmour.

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AcademyoftheSocialSciencesinAustralia

ContributorsManuhuiaBarchamisManagingDirectorofSynexe.

PeterLarmourisProfessorofPublicAdministrationandPolicyattheUniversityofthe South Pacific. He holds an adjunct position at The Australian NationalUniversity.

Barry Hindess is Emeritus Professor in the School of Politics and InternationalRelationsatTheAustralianNationalUniversity.

JohnUhrisProfessorofPoliticalScienceintheSchoolofPoliticsandInternationalRelationsatTheAustralianNationalUniversity.

RichardMulgan isEmeritusProfessor in theCrawfordSchoolofPublicPolicyatTheAustralianNationalUniversity.

Lisa Hill is Professor of Politics in the School of History and Politics at theUniversityofAdelaide.

BruceBuchanisSeniorLecturerintheSchoolofHumanitiesatGriffithUniversity.

JohnClammerisaVisitingProfessorattheUnitedNationsUniversity,Tokyo.

ArleneW.SaxonhouseisCarolineRobbinsCollegiateProfessorofPoliticalScienceandWomensStudiesattheUniversityofMichigan.

AcknowledgementsThe chapters in this book are based on papers presented some years ago at aworkshopinCanberra.WeareextremelygratefultotheCollegeofSocialSciencesandLaw,theCrawfordSchoolofPublicPolicyandtheResearchSchoolofSocialSciences,allofTheAustralianNationalUniversity,andtotheWorkshopProgramof the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, without whose assistance theworkshop would not have been possible. As often happens with edited volumesbased on workshops, versions of some of our contributions have appearedelsewhere and this is acknowledged in the chapters concerned. As often happensalso many participants contributed far more to this collection than our table ofcontents suggests. We are particularly grateful for the energetic participation ofDavid Armitage, J. Peter Euben,Mark Findlay, SeamusMiller and Tim Lindsey,whosecontributionstothiscollectionarenototherwiseregisteredwithinit.Wearegrateful also for the invaluableguidanceof twoanonymous readers, the editorialassistanceofCarolinaCaliabaCrespoandHelenMoore,andtheadviceofMarianSawer.

1.Introduction:Howshouldwethinkabout

corruption?BarryHindess

LikeCaesar sGaul, thecontemporaryliteratureoncorruptioncanbedividedintothreeparts,1withverylittleoverlapbetweenthem.Onepart,bynomeansthelargestormostinfluential,is,likethisbook,largelyproducedbyprofessionalacademics.It is analytic and historical in character, focusing on how corruption has been orshouldbedefined.Theothertwo,whilenotuninterestedinquestionsofdefinition,are more directly related to policy issues. They are produced by a shiftingpopulation of academics, policy professionals and activistswho focus largely onthepublicsectorandviewcorruptionasimproperconductofakindthat,intheonecase,hasdamagingeconomiceffectsand/or,intheother,deviatesfromtheformalduties of public office.Fewof thosewhowrite on corruption contribute tomorethanoneof these literatures (notableexceptionsareEuben,1997; Johnston,2006;Philp,2007),althoughtwoofourcontributorsMulganandSaxonhousemakeapointofrelatingtheirdiscussionsofcorruptioninWesternclassicalantiquitytothecontemporarypublicpolicytreatmentofcorruption.

Muchoftheliteraturethatfocusesonthedamagingeconomiceffectsofcorruptionis sponsored by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD), the Word Bank and international development agencies, and theinternational anti-corruptionnon-governmentalorganisation (NGO)TransparencyInternational (TI). This literature is concerned with the impact of corruption oneconomicgrowthand,accordingly,tendstoseecorruptionasaparticularlyseriousproblemfornon-Westerncountries.Notsurprisingly,thisperspectivealsosuggeststhatanimportantpartofthecorruptiononwhichitfocusesislikelytoinvolvetheconductofWesternbusinessesoperatinginthesecountries.SusanRose-Ackerman,whohasworkedcloselywiththeWorldBankinherstudiesofcorruption,presentsaclear example of this approach in her Corruption and government (1999). Shebegins by asking why so many poor countries have low or negative rates ofeconomic growth even when well endowed with natural resources or a highlyeducated labour force, as some of them are. An important part of her answer iscorruption,which, sheargues, is likely tobeparticularlysevere incountrieswithdysfunctional public and private institutions. In her view, such institutional

CKResaltado

problemsmeanthesecountrieswillbecharacterisedbyapervasivefailure to tapself-interestforproductivepurposes(pp.12).

Rose-Ackerman takes as her benchmark for the identification of dysfunctionalinstitutions the archetypical competitive market, which works to channel self-interestintoproductiveactivitiesthatleadtoefficientresourceuse.Shecontraststheworkingsofcompetitivemarketswithlessdesirableconditionsinwhichpeopleuseresourcesnotonlyforproductivepurposes,butalsotoobtainanadvantageforthemselvesindividingupthebenefitsofeconomicactivitycalledrent-seekingby economists (p. 2). Since rent-seeking behaviour diverts resources fromproductive activities, it serves to restrain economic growth. Corruption andgovernment suggests that, other things being equal, countries with high levels ofpublic sector corruption will be poorer overall. The remedy lies in majorinstitutionalreformsof thekindpromotedbythegoodgovernanceprogramsoftheWorldBankandotherinternationalagencies.

Thisdevelopmentalperspectivecommonlyfocusesonwhatitseesasthelimitationsof non-Western cultures, and especially on cases inwhich conduct that was onceacceptable no longer fitsmodernconditions (p.6)a focusquestionedbyPeterLarmour schapter in thiscollection. Incontrast, theproblems thatconcernpublicregulatory agencies are largely within their own jurisdictions, so these agenciesalso tend to focuson thepracticalproblems involved in theirattempts to regulatetheconductofpublicservantsandpoliticians.Aspartof this focus,suchagenciesclearlyrequireaworkabledefinitionofcorruption.Forexample,Section8of theActthatestablishedtheNSWIndependentCommissionAgainstCorruption(ICAC),whichisitselfmodelledontheHongKongICAC,identifiescorruptionasthetypeof conduct that adversely affects the honest or impartial performance of officialfunctions, involvesabreachofpublic trustor themisuseof informationacquiredbyofficialsinthecourseoftheirpublicfunctions.

Asfortheacademicliteratureonhowcorruptionhasbeenorshouldbeidentified,wecanhardlydobetter than refer to importantpapersbyPeterEuben (1989)andMarkPhilp(1997).First,Eubenpointsoutthattheoriginalandstillverycommonuseoftheideaofcorruptionistoidentifysomedamagingimpurity,intrusionordistortionthatpreventedsomethingfromdevelopingasitshould.Aforeignelementin a chemical compound, stones in a packet of rice or seedsor decay inmeat orvegetables are all examples of corruption. He notes that the Oxford EnglishDictionarygivesseveral relatedmeaningsofcorruption,mostof themhaving todo with decay, degeneration, disintegration, and debasement. Corruption impliesdecay, where the original or natural condition of something becomes infected(Euben, 1989, p. 221). The image of corruption as an infection or damaging

impurityofthebodypoliticappearsthroughoutthehistoryofpoliticalthought,asthecontributionstothisvolumeshow.

Second, a seminal paper byMarkPhilp (1997) offers a closely related argument.After noting that several competing definitions of corruption are in play incontemporarydebate(corruptionisdefined,forexample,asconductthatdamagesthepublic interest,asdeviating fromthe formaldutiesofoffice,as flouting legalnormsorasanabuseofauthoritydesignedtomaximiseanofficialsincome),Philpargues that definitional disputes have obscured the fact that the basicmeaning ofcorruptionisnotindispute:itisrootedinthesenseofathingbeingchangedfromitsnaturallysoundcondition,intosomethingunsound,impure,debased,infected(p.29). If there is a problemwith the definition of political corruption, he argues, itdoesnotlieinanydisagreementaboutthemeaningofcorruptionitselfbut,rather,in thepracticalapplicationof thisunderstanding topolitics.This is theresultofalackofgeneral agreementabout the naturally soundpolitical conditionand thusaboutwhat should count as a deviation from that condition.To address this issuewouldbetoenterafieldofintractabledebatethatmoststudentsofcorruptionhavepreferred to avoid. I should add that Philps point about the basic meaning ofcorruption applies equally well in areas other than politics. Arlene W.Saxonhousescontributiontothisvolumeisacaseinpoint;shediscussestheusesoftheconceptofcorruptioninrelationtoliterarygenres.

Leavingthislastissuetoonesideforthemoment,wecansaythattwoassumptions,whichthisbookaimstoquestion,dominatecontemporarydiscussionofcorruption:first, that corruption is primarily an economic issue, both in its content (theexchange ofmoney for favours) and in itsmost important effects (on economicgrowth,development,andsoon);second,thatcorruptioninvolvesablurringofthedistinction between public and private. These assumptions are often joined by athird,whichwealsodispute:that,whilecorruptionisuniversal,itsmostsignificantimpactislikelytobefoundindevelopingcountries.Corruptionisthuspresentedasif it were a matter of misconduct on the part of public officials who are seen,especiallyinpoorcountries,aspursuingtheirownprivateinterestsandlikelytoactcorruptly in return formoney and other favours, thereby undermining economicdevelopment.

Oursubtitle, Expanding the focus, suggests twoclosely related responses to thisconventionalunderstandingofcorruption.One is that it is far toonarrowand theother is that there is much to be gained from rejecting the view that the mostimportant issuesaroundcorruptionconcern its impactoneconomicactivity2 and,consequently, from taking a broader view of the significance of corruption. The

essays in this book show that viewing corruption as a matter of public officialspursuingtheirprivateeconomicinterestsisconsiderablynarrowerthantheviewofcorruptiontobefoundinearlierperiodsofWesternthought.

Beforeconsideringthesechaptersdirectly,however,itisworthnotingafewofthewaysinwhichcorruptionhasbeenunderstoodinthehistoryoftheWest.Webeginwith the monumental History of Rome (Ab Urbe Condita Libri), written by theRomanhistorianTitusLivius(Livy)(59BCAD17).AfternotinghowtheRomanshad acquired their empire, Livys preface invites his imagined Roman reader toconsidertheRomansmorals,atfirstasslightlygivingwayhowtheysunkmoreandmore, thenbegantofallheadlonguntilhereachesthepresent times,whenwecanneitherendureourvicesnortheirremedies(2006,p.3).Livysimageofmoraldecay following the accumulation of wealth and power is significant for ourpurposes, not because it offers a new or interesting account of corruption, butbecause it re-emerges, many centuries later, in The history of Florence (1979[1525]b,pp.54874),byNiccolMachiavelli(14691527).MachiavellihadalreadywrittenhisowncommentaryonLivy (1979 [1525]a,pp.167418).3MachiavellisviewsoncorruptionareexaminedmoresystematicallyinChapters4and5ofthiscollection. For themoment the thing to say is thatThe history of Florence turnsLivysstoryof themovefromsuccess tomoraldecay intoanaccountofsocietalcorruptiona dangerous infection of the political community that appears andreappears in a cyclical pattern.Echoing arguments developed earlier by theArabhistorian Ibn Khaldun (13321406 CE/732808 AH),4 Machiavelli stresses thatstatesalwaysdescendfromgoodtobadandrisefrombadtogood:

For ability brings about tranquillity, and tranquillity laziness, and lazinesschaos,andchaosruin;and,inlikemanner,fromruinisbornorder,fromorderability,andfromthisqualitygloryandgoodfortune.Andso,prudentmenhaveobserved that literaturedevelopsafterarms,and that innationsandcity-statesgenerals are born before philosophers. For after an effective and well-organized militia has produced victories, and these victories have ensuredtranquillity, thestrengthofsuchbravemindscannotbecorruptedwithamorehonorable laziness thanthatof literature,norcanthis lazinessenter intowell-organizedcitieswithagreaterandmoredangerousdeceptionthanwiththatofliterature. Cato was well aware of this when Diogenes and Carneades, bothphilosophers,cametoRomeasambassadorstothesenate;whenhesawthattheRomanyouthbegantoadmirethesemen,awareoftheevilthatcouldenterhisnative city as a result of the honorable laziness, he made it a law that nophilosophercouldbereceivedinRome.Nationshavecometoruinbecauseof

this.(Khaldun,2004,pp.5578)

Machiavelli and Kahldun see corruption as a product of the luxury that followssuccess.Itwouldbeeasytoidentifythecorruptioninthiscasewithelitemisconduct,as SyedAlatass (1990) rendering of IbnKhalduns discussion suggests.Yet bothKahldunandMachiavellitreatelitemisconductasanimportantsymptomofbroadersocietalcorruption,notasitscause.Corruptioninthislastsenseasadestructivesocietalconditionhaswhatwewouldnowregardasanobviouseconomicaspectintheformofluxuriousconsumption,butitisfundamentallyapoliticalproblem,aweaknessofthepolitythatmanifestsitselfinvariousforms,includingamilitarilyincompetent elite.Machiavelli offers a powerful view of corruption as a societalcondition seen as neither an economic phenomenon nor amatter of blurring thedivisionbetweenpublicandprivate.RichardMulgansandArleneW.Saxenhousescontributionstothisvolumereinforcethepointthatcorruptiondoesnothavetobeunderstood as a matter of public versus private. Both authors show that, in thepolitical thought ofWestern classical antiquity, the corruption of the body politicwasnotalwaysseenintheseterms.Instead,PlatoandAristotleviewedcorruptionintermsofadualisticworldviewthatcontrastedanidealrealmoftruthandgoodnesswiththeempiricalrealmofchangeanddecay.Totheextentthattheidealprovidedastandardwithwhichtojudgetheempirical,anyexistinggovernmentcouldbeseenasinescapablycorrupt.

Theseexamplesshowthat,inthepoliticalthoughtofWesternclassicalantiquityandlate medieval Europe, corruption was commonly understood, as we believe itshouldbeunderstood, as a conditionof thebodypolitic.Since the late eighteenthcentury this has not been the prevalent view held in the West and amongst theinternational agencies that theWest dominates. In the past two centuries the termcorruptionhasbeenincreasinglyusedtodesignateproblematicbehaviouronthepartofoneormoreindividuals,orbehaviourthatisoftenseenasamatterofusingonespublicofficeforthepurposesofillicitprivategain.Somecommentators(forexample,Euben,1989,1997)havedeploredthisdevelopment,seeingitasresultingfrom the triumphof liberal individualismandas leading to an individualistic andeconomisticviewofcorruptionandacorrespondinglossofconcernwiththepublicgood.

Yet we do not have to return to the classics or to Machiavellis Italy to findinfluential alternatives to the view that corruption is primarily an economicphenomenon.LisaHillsdiscussionofAdamFergusoninChapter6remindsusthat,in his analysis of the problems facing the commercial societies of his time,FergusondrewonthesamepatricianstorythatMachiavellihadusedofthemoraldecayof theRomanpeoplewith theriseof theEmpire.HillpresentsFergusonas

arguing that prosperous empires gave rise to specialisation, overextension andhedonism, which eroded the civic spirit. Although progress and commercialismwere inevitable and natural, their effects should be countered by enhancing civiccompetence and awareness, including political activism. He saw conflict andfactional divisions as providing citizens with the lessons that would underpinongoingreformandpromotethedevelopmentoflibertyandjustgovernment.

I should add that about the time that Ferguson was speculating about the fate ofcommercialsocieties,wefindDavidHume(171176)worryingabouttheimpactofpolitical parties on the conduct of government but without using the termcorruption.HisessayOfpartiesingeneral(1987[1777])maintainsthat:

As much as legislators and founders of states ought to be honoured andrespectedamongmen,asmuchought the foundersofsectsand factions tobedetestedandhated;becausetheinfluenceoffactionisdirectlycontrarytothatoflaws.Factionssubvertgovernment,renderlawsimpotent,andbegetthefiercestanimositiesamongmenofthesamenation,whooughttogivemutualassistanceand protection to each other.Andwhat should render the founders of partiesmoreodiousis, thedifficultyofextirpatingtheseweeds,whenoncetheyhavetakenroot inanystateTheyare,besides,plantswhichgrowmostplentifullyin the richest soil and though absolute governments be notwholly free fromthem,itmustbeconfessed,thattheyrisemoreeasily,andpropagatethemselvesfasterinfreegovernments,wheretheyalwaysinfectthelegislatureitself,whichalonecouldbeable,by the steadyapplicationof rewardsandpunishments, toeradicatethem.(p.55)

Contemporary readers are likely to find that the most striking feature of thispassageisitstreatmentofpartisanpoliticsasakindofinfection.Farfromfocusingontheeconomicimpactofsectsandfactions,Humeisconcernedwithwhatheseesastheirdestructivepoliticaleffects.TheAmericanFederalistJamesMadison(17511836)takesarelatedviewinhisdiscussionoftheproblemoffaction:

ByafactionIunderstandanumberofcitizens,whetheramountingtoamajorityor minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some commonimpulseofpassion,orofinterest,adversetotherightsofothercitizens,ortothepermanentandaggregateinterestsofthecommunity.(Madison,etal.,1987[1788],p.10)

ItisworthnotingthatafactioninMadisonssensemightwellconsistofamajorityofthepopulation.Incontemporaryterms,wemightthinkofafactionasapressuregroup, or simply as a personor organisation that is represented byone ormorelobbyists.Madisons concern seems to be lesswith the overall effects of factions

thanwiththepossibilitythatasinglefactionmightcometodominatelegislationorother government action.Yet, asHacker andPierson (2011) arguewithparticularreferencetotheUnitedStates,therearegroundsforconcern,ontheonehand,thatthe real business of government may be conducted less in cabinet offices andrepresentative assemblies than in private negotiations between the government ofthe day and assorted lobbyists and, on the other hand, that electoral politics andfactional disputes within and between parties may be little more than theatricaldistraction.Wemightregardthisconditionasakindofcorruption,andonethatisnotattributabletothemachinationsofanysinglefactionorinterest.

Ifwewere toacceptMadisonsviewof theproblemof faction,wewouldhave tosay that democracy itself is a significant source of governmental corruption,primarilybecauseitsecuresconditionsinwhichfactionthepartisaninterestsofa popularmajority, or even of a powerful andwell-organisedminoritymay beabletodivertgovernmentfromitspursuitoftheinterestsofthecommunity.

Ontheotherhand,thosewhoputtheirtrustindemocracywouldhavetosaythattheMadisoniandistrustoffactionisitselfalikelysourceofcorruptionbecauseelectedofficialsandpublicservantswhosharedthisviewofthedangerposedbypopularmajoritiesmightbetemptedbothtoignoretheissuesraisedbyHackerandPiersonandtosubvertthemachineryofdemocraticgovernment.

Democracywasoriginallyunderstoodasoneofthreebasicformsofgovernment.Aristotle defined a state as a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life(1988,pp.212)andhewentontosaythatthestatemaybegovernedbytheone,thefeworthemany.Democracywasthelastof thesecases:governmentbythemany.Our contemporary idea of democracy, of government by the people, carries asimilarsense.Itisnotamatterofgovernmentbytheone,akingoradictator,orbythefew,anunelectedrulingpartyoramilitaryjunta.

Aristotlewas far from being an unequivocal supporter of democracy. Like otherGreek philosophers, he regarded democracy as a source of a particular kind ofpolitical corruption (Farrar,1988).Thebasic ideahere isnotverydifferent fromMadisons: thatgovernmentby thepeople is indangerofbeingdominatedby thepoorandpoorlyeducatedmajority,whomightactcollectivelytoformafactioninMadisonssense.Whenever thishappened, theconductofgovernmentcouldbeexpectedtoreflecttheignoranceandprejudicesofthisfactionanditwouldbeopentomanipulationbyunscrupulousdemagogues.Infact,Roberts(1994,p.11)arguesthat this negative perception of the majority dominated Western discussion ofdemocracyuntilwellintothenineteenthcentury.

Whenrepresentativegovernmentbegantodevelopabout theendof theeighteenth

century,itwasnotusuallyseenasakindofdemocracy(inFederalistPaperNo.10,Madisoncalleditarepublic,arguingthatarepublicofthiskindwassuperiortodemocracy)butratherasadefenceagainstthedangersofpopularrule.Tobesure,itdidgivethepeopleasawholealimitedroleingovernment,anditwasseenforthis reason as awayof avoiding thekindsof corruption that hadbeen associatedwithrulebyakingoraristocracy(governmentbytheoneorthefew).Yet,becauseitrestrictedthepeopletotheelectionofthosewhowouldgovernthem,leavingtheactual work of government in the hands of a minority of elected politicians andpublic servants, it was also seen as a way of avoiding the dangers that hadtraditionally been associatedwith democracy. The contemporary identification ofdemocracywith representativegovernment is a resultofnineteenthand twentieth-century developments, and it involved a radical transformation of democracysearliermeaning(Dahl,1989,1998).

I have argued that theviewof corruption as amatter of publicofficials pursuingprivate interests is narrower than the view of corruption to be found in earlierperiods of Western thought. Yet there is no reason to believe that the changingmeaning of the term corruption necessarily reflects any lessening of publicconcernwith the conditionof thebodypolitic.Whilepublic-choice theoristsmaynotdrawexplicitlyontheoldermeaningofcorruption,forexample,itisclearthatthis group of economists and political scientists (Brennan & Lomarsky, 1993;Buchanan, 1978; Buchanan &Wagner, 1977) is very much concerned with whatwouldoncehavebeencalledcorruptionofthebodypolitic;thesameistrueoftheclassical liberalismofFriedrichHayek(Gray,1982).Oragain,asIhavearguedelsewhere (Hindess, 2000), the early arguments in favour of representativegovernment clearly present it as a means of keeping in check the corruption ofgovernmentbyanykindoffactionalpoliticsthatdrewontheshort-terminterestsofthe poor and poorly educatedmajority.Much of the history ofWestern politicalthought since the emergence of this new form of government can be seen asfocusingonthenewsourcesofcorruptioncreatedbytheinstitutionsitrequiredmostespecially,ofcourse,ontheopportunitiesitappearstocreateforpoliticians,public servants and business interests to pursue their own private advantageortheirfactionalviewofthepermanentandaggregateinterestsofthecommunity.

If these claims seemcontentious, Iwould sayonly thatmanyof the concerns thatwere once associated with the idea of corruption still play an important part inpubliclife.Mydiscussionherefocusesontheissuesofimpurity(orcontamination)and faction.Before proceedingwith this discussion, it isworth noting that,whilethereisasenseinwhichdemocracycanbeseenasasourceofcorruption,thereisanother in which corruption is a threat to democracy. Popular control over

government and political equality are central to modern understandings ofdemocracy (International Institute forDemocracyandElectoralAssistance,2008),althoughbothareclearlyopentointerpretation.Yetonalmostanyunderstandingoftheseterms,popularcontrolandequalitywillbothbesubvertedbycorruptioninthepublic sector. If the decisions of public servants are influenced by bribes orimproperinducementsofferedbytheirpoliticalmasters,thereisnosense,howeverindirect, in which they are subject to popular control. Nor does the influence ofbriberyaugurwellforpoliticalequalitybetweencitizens.

Turningnowtotheissueofimpurity,thepoliticallifeofmanycontemporarystatesisorganised,at least inpart,aroundconcernsabout thepresenceofunassimilatedaliengroupswithin the communityIndians inFiji,Muslims inAustralia and thememberstatesoftheEuropeanUnion,ChristiansandMuslimsinIndia.Thesenseofimpurityinvokedinthesecasessuggestsanobvioussetofpoliticalsolutionsintheformof stricter immigrationcontrols, citizenship testsor ethniccleansing.Thislasttermisarecentinventionbutthepracticesitreferstohaveplayedanimportantpartinthehistoryofmostcontemporarystates(Mann,1999).Impurityisatissueinanotherwayintheanti-elitistappealsofpopulistpolitics.Theunderlyingmessageoftheseappealsisthatpoliticalandothereliteseducational,cultural,economicpretendtospeakforthepublicinterestbutinfactrepresentonlythemselves(Sawer&Hindess, 2004). Populism is often regarded as a kind of extremism but it is apervasive feature of modern states whose rulers generally claim to act in theinterestsofthepeople(Schedler,1997).

While the word corruption is not often used in relation to these issues, theconcerns over alien intrusion and elitism both appeal to an underlying idea ofimpurityordistortioninfact, tosomething like theoriginalsenseofcorruptiondiscussed by Euben and Philp. Using the example of New York City, FrankAnechiarico (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996) has argued that attempts to limitcorruptionamongstpublicofficialsmayhavedestructiveeffectson theefficiencyandeffectivenessofthepublicservice.Theexamplesnotedheresuggestthatthereare dangers in taking the concern for purity too seriously. It is not obvious thatcorruption,inthesenseofimpurity,issomethingtobeavoided.

InotedearlierthattheproblemoffactionwasasignificantconcerninthepoliticalthoughtofHumeandMadison. It has sincebeenamajor issue in liberal thinkingaboutgovernment.Indeed,ifrepresentativegovernmentcanbeseenasavoidingonepossible source of governmental corruptionthe misguided enthusiasms of thepeopleitclearlyopensthewayforthecorruptionofgovernmentbyprofessionalpoliticiansandpublicservants.Thislasthasbeentheconcernofpopulistpoliticsontheonesideandofpublic-choicetheoryandotherformsofneo-liberalismonthe

other.

In fact, the history of representative government could be written as a story ofattempts to limit theeffectsof thenewsourcesofgovernmental corruption that itcreates (Hindess, 2000). Populism addresses the issue by offering to replaceconventionalpoliticianswithpoliticiansof adifferentkindthat is,withpoliticalprofessionals who pretend not to be professional politicians. Inheriting the oldertraditionofdistrustingthepeople,liberalismaddressestheissueratherdifferently,throughinstitutionaldesignthataimstodealwiththeproblemoffaction:checksandbalances, rational, bureaucratic administration and codes of conduct for publicofficials (Goodin, 1996). Where, as often happens, these devices are seen to beunsuccessful, itproposesadifferentapproach: reducing the temptationsof,or theopportunitiesfor,corruptconduct.Rose-Ackermansinfluentialstudyquotedaboveis an excellent case in point. Another approach is to reduce the amount ofgovernment responsibilityfor example, by privatising government utilities andpublic servicesorby limiting theareas inwhichgovernments attempt to regulateeconomic activity. Rose-Ackermans discussion focuses on the benefits of suchchanges.Ineffect,theypromisetoreducetheopportunitiesforcorruptconductbyreducing the scope for administrativediscretionon thepart of public officials, ifnecessarybyprivatisingareasofgovernmentactivity.Yetsuch reformsalsohavedisadvantages,anditisfarfromclearthatthepositiveeffectsalwaysoutweighthenegative.Therearewell-knownproblemswiththeprocessofprivatisationitselfdevelopmentsinRussiasincetheendofcommunistruleprovideahostofflagrantexamples (Krastev, 2004). There are equally familiar problems of a decline instandardssafety, security of employment, service provisionas a result ofprivatisationora reduction inadministrative regulation.Mypointhere isnot thatprivatisationisalwaysbadorthatstateregulationandpublicprovisionofservicesare always good. It is simply that minimising the scope for certain kinds ofcorruptionneednotalwaysbethemostimportantconcern.

AnotherofRose-Ackermansrecommendationsisthatprofessionalpoliticiansandsenior public servants should receive salaries that are competitive with those inprivatebusiness.Theassumptionhereseemstobethatthosewhoarewellpaidwillbelesssusceptibletobriberythanthosewhoarenotwellpaid.Yet,evenifthiswerethe case, this remedywould have the effect of creating a significant income gapbetween a cadre of professional politicians, senior public servants and businessfigureson theonehand and the rest of thepopulationon theother. It is likely tolead,inotherwords,toaversionoftheproblemoffaction.

This last point brings us back to the original, and still themost general, view ofcorruption as an infection of the body politic. In contrast with this view, the

economisticunderstandingseemsbothtoonarrowandtoonarrowlytechnical.Itistoonarrowbecauseitsfocusonminimisingeconomiccorruptioncanobscure,andcanevenextend,moregeneralproblems in theworkingsofgovernment. It is toonarrowly technical because the identification of these more general problemsdependsonhowweunderstand thecommon interestanotion that isnotoriouslyopen to dispute. In this respect, to treat the problem of corruption as if it wereamenabletotechnicalsolutionisalsotoignorethecontentiousnessofpoliticallife.

Thesethenaretheissuesthatunderpinthecollectionofchaptersthatmakesupthisbook.Inexploringthemultiplewaysinwhichcorruptionhasbeenconceptualised,thesechapterscollectivelychallengethenarrownessofconventionalunderstandingsofcorruption.Inaddition,explicitlyorimplicitly,theysuggestthatthereismuchtobe gained from taking a broader view of the significance of corruption, and, inparticular,fromrefusingtoacceptthatthemostimportantissuesconcerntheimpactofcorruptiononeconomicactivity.

OutlineofthebookOur principal concern in this book is to show that there is nothing natural orinevitable about a view of corruption either as an economic phenomenon or asblurring thedistinctionbetweenpublicandprivate.Accordingly, fiveofoureightsubstantialchaptersfocusonconceptionsofcorruptionthathavebeeninfluentialinthehistoryofWesternpoliticalthought,mostofwhichviewcorruptionnotsomuchasanindividualfailurebutasasocietalphenomenon.Ourthreeremainingchaptersfocusoncontemporaryissues.

WebeginwithtwochaptersontheGreeksofWesternclassicalantiquity,especiallyAristotle,PlatoandThucydides.InotedearlierthatRichardMulganandArleneW.Saxonhouse locate their contributions in relation to contemporary debates. First,RichardMulganpresentsAristotle,andtoalesserextentPlato, tounderminewhatheseesasthemoralabsolutismofmuchdiscussionofcorruptionbycontemporarypolitical theorists. Aristotle uses the Platonic distinction between ideal forms andmundane realities toargue thatexistingpolitiesare inevitablycorrupt,whereas inmodern thought corruption is seen as remediable, at least at the systemic level.TheGreeks recognised that existing regimeswere always less than perfect. Theydidnotusetheidealofapolitywithoutcorruptiontosetanimpossiblestandardormodelofconstitutionalbestpracticetowhichallstatesareexpectedtoaspireforexample,asaconditionofreceivingloansfromrichercountries.

Aristotle sees the rule of law not asmarking the difference between corrupt andnon-corrupt government, but as a practical, if imperfect, means of restraining

corruptconduct,inhibitingrulersfrommakingad-hocdecisionstosuitthemselves.In many respects, ArleneW. Saxonhouses chapter reinforces Mulgans negativeview of absolute standards while offering a rather different perspective on theGreek view of corruption itself. Using the basic understanding of corruptionidentified aboveas undermining the pure or natural condition of the thingcorruptedsheshows thatPlatoandThucydidescorruptedexisting literaryformsto establish what they saw as a new grounding for knowledge, a knowledge thatwouldbeapossessionforever .ForbothPlatoandThucydides,theincorruptibleisnot tobefoundinworldlypoliticsbut inthe intellectualaccess to the truths towhichtheirnovelliteraryproductsleadus.

SaxonhouseaddsatwistofherowntoMulgansdistinctionbetweentheGreekviewofcorruptionasinevitableandmodernthoughtinwhichitisseenasavoidable,atleast inprinciple.ShedescribesPlatoandThucydidesas politicalpessimistsandcontraststhemwithHobbesapoliticaloptimistwhobelievedthatthescienceofpolitics as he taught it could lead to an incorruptible polity. All three sawknowledge as rising above the corruptibleworld but viewed this relationship inradically differentways. Hobbess legacy to themodernworldwas a dream ofunitybetweenknowledgeandpolitics,whereastheseancientGreeksofferedtoolstounderstandandassessthecorruptible,politicalworldbutmadefewclaimsaboutthecapacityofknowledgetotransformit.

Beforeproceeding,letmemaketwofurtherpointsaboutthesetwochapters.First,itis temptingtoseeSaxonhousesdistinctionbetweenoptimistsandpessimistsasanexampleofthemoralabsolutismthatMulganwarnsagainst.Tosaythatcorruptionis inescapable is not to say that all forms of corruption are equally bad or thatnothingcanbedoneaboutanycaseofcorruption thatoneencounters. In fact, farfromsuggesting that there isnothing tobedone,MulgansAristotleoffers soundadviceonhowacommunitymightavoidthemostextremevarietiesofcorruption.Inthisrespect,heisfarfrompessimistic.Second,Iwillhavesomethingtosaylaterabouttheuseofthewordmodernintheseandafewofthelaterchapters.

The next two chapters move us on from the world of Western antiquity to themedieval West. In Chapter 4, Manuhuia Barcham identifies two EuropeanperspectivesoncorruptionthatwereinfluentialintheyearsbetweenthefalloftheWesternRomanEmpireand theRenaissance.First,AugustineviewedpoliticsasaformofrestraintonhumanitysearthlylifenecessitatedbytheFall,andthussawnointrinsicvalueinpoliticallife.Fromthisperspective,itmadelittlesensetothinkofpolitics as something that might or might not become corrupted. Second, theEuropean rediscovery of a number of classical texts about the beginning of thesecondmillenniumCEresultedinarenewedinterestinclassicalunderstandingsof

bothpolitical lifeanditscorruption.Ineffect, themedievalChristianfocusontheimportanceofmoralvalueswasbroughttogetherwiththeclassicalemphasisonthevalueofreasonwiththeresultthatpoliticalandmoralreasonwerereadilyseenasindistinguishable.

If, as Philp (1997) maintains, political corruption means a departure from thenaturallysoundconditionofpolitical life,weshouldexpect theemergenceof thisnovel view of political life to be accompanied by a correspondingly novelperceptionofcorruption.Politicalcorruptionwasthusperceivedlargelyintermsofthe adverse consequences of conduct that were contrary to natural reason: theexerciseofpowerforotherthanmoralendsandespeciallytheruleoftyrantswhopursued their own interest rather than the common good. Barcham shows, inconclusion, how thismodel of politics and its corruption eventually collapsed inresponse to the emergent late-medieval belief that different aspects of human lifepossessed theirownintrinsicformofreasonabelief thateffectivelynegated thepossibility of appealing to an overarching natural reason as a guide for humanaction.

BruceBuchansChapter5tracesadifferentpaththroughthesamehistoricalperiod,beginningwith a view of corruption as both a personal vice and a failing of thepolity, and thenguidingus through the interplaybetween contrastingnotions, forexample, ofprivate, individualmorality andcollective, socialmorality, thebodypolitic and the political community, and the loss of virtue and the decay ofphysicalbodies.Hebringshisstorythroughtopartsofseventeenth-centuryEurope,andEnglandinparticular,wheretheappearanceofcommerceandtradeasnewandinfluential political forces bedevilled late-seventeenth-century British politicalthought. In this period, he detects expansive understandings of corruptionalongside narrower modern understandings. The metaphor of the body politicbecame increasingly anachronistic, while the political community came to bedefinedintermsoftherequirementsforaflourishingmarketandsolventstate.

WemightquibblewithBuchansuseofthetermmoderninthiscontextjustaswemightwithMulgans,SaxonhousesandHillsusesoftheterminChapters2,3and6 respectively. I turn to this issue below. We might also wonder whethercommentators in seventeenth-centuryEngland understood themarket and solventstateintermsthatwouldbefamiliartoustoday(Walter,2008).

Thesepointsaside,theconclusiontoBuchansnarrativeleadsusdirectlyintoLisaHillscarefulexaminationofthecontributionsoftheScottishEnlightenmentstwoAdams, Ferguson and Smith, whose work, she argues, marks a transitionalmoment in late-eighteenth-century understandings of the term corruption. Both

saw a danger of corruption in the rise of commercialism and its accompanyingchanges.Thedifferencesbetweenthemlayintheiraetiologiesofprogressandthecommercialage.Fergusonwasdeeplyambivalentaboutprogress,whichhesawas inducing corruption. In his analysis of the problems of his own time and inproposing remedies for them, Ferguson draws on the patrician account of thedecline of Republican Rome, which we noted above in Livy and again inMachiavelli.Thisleadshimtothefamiliarconclusionthatprosperousempiresgiverise to specialisation, overextension and hedonism, all of which erode the civicspirit. Although progress and commercialism were inevitable and natural, theireffects should be countered by enhancing civic competence and awareness,including political activism.He saw conflict and factional divisions as providingcitizenswith lessons that could promote ongoing reform and the development oflibertyandjustgovernment.

Incontrast,Smithwasessentially optimisticabout theeffectsofcommercialism.Hilldescribeshisideasaseccentricinhisowntime,butasneverthelessworkingtowards a modern conception of corruption in defending the now conventionalliberal values of impartiality, universalism, neutrality, formal equality ofopportunity and rule of law. She describes Smiths approach as classical in itsconceptionofcorruptionasencompassingnotonlytheconductofpublicofficials,but also features of whole societies, and in adopting the old dichotomy of thehealthy or corrupt republic. Yet, in contrast with the classical view, what heactuallysawashealthandvirtuerelatedtocommercialratherthancivicvalues:thegoodpolity is thenaturalmarketeconomyofself-regarding, lawfulandmutuallyforbearing agents. Rather than imagining an ideal polity as a standard againstwhichcorruptioncouldbejudged,Smithenvisagedthenatural,spontaneousorderofthesystemofnaturallibertyandthemarket:agentsmustbepermittedthefreestpossibleuseoftheirbodies,mindsandpropertiesprovidedtherearenoviolationsof either thepublic interest or the systemofnatural liberty.Both individuals andsocieties could be corrupted by relics of the pre-commercial age: laws andregulations, slavery,dependency, religious fanaticismandpolitical factionalismallofwhichobstructprogress.

Thedivisionoflabour,inSmithsview,wasoneofthefewcorruptingfeaturesoftheneweconomicorderbut,weighingthisagainstthewealthitproduced,ityieldedmore rather than less human happiness all round. His remedy for all forms ofcorruptionwasmoreprogress,includingeducationtoinculcatepatternsofcivilitysuitable for people who participate in market society. Thus, while Fergusonidentified hedonism (Epicureanism), privatisation, civic quiescence and thebreakdown of exclusivist social categories as corrupting elements that inhere in

progress and modernity, Smith saw these elements as possible solutions to thepotentiallycorruptstate.Conversely, theelements thatFergusonsought torecovernational identity,social intimacyandcivicvirtuewere those thatSmithsawasremnants of a pre-commercial age that ought to be purged in order to preventcorruptionandpromotethefloweringofanatural(broadlyliberal)freestate.

InotedearlierthatonecouldquibblewithBruceBuchansuseofthewordmoderninhischapter.ThesamemightbesaidofRichardMulgansandLisaHillschapters.Christine Helliwell and I have argued elsewhere that modern and related termsmodernity, modernising, pre-modern or postmodern, and so onareproblematic, not least because, unless their use is very carefully qualified, theyinvokeaEurocentric ideologyofprogress,suggesting that inhabitantsofWesternEurope, along perhaps with America, Japan and a few other places, are morerational than and, in other respects, some distance ahead of the rest of humanity(Helliwell&Hindess,2011;Hindess,2008).Asa result, it isdifficult touse theseterms without implying the disparaging judgment that, while much of thecontemporary world and many of our contemporaries are indeed rational andmodern like us, the remainder have yet to reach this exalted condition. Similarly,whenthemodernormodernityissaidtobefoundatsomeperiodinthepast,thesuggestionis thatasmallpartof theworldsharedsomeof thecharacteristics thatwenowregardasmodernandthattherestoftheworldinthatperioddidnot.

Of course, modern is often used without any disparaging intent, as it is, forexample, in the chapters noted here. In most of the instances where it appears,modern could be replaced with a term that is less obviously loadedrecent,contemporary, post-reformation, and so onwithout any serious loss ofmeaning. Yet, even when there is no disparaging intent, the progressivistconnotationsofmodernarehardtoescape.

Alongwith the progressivist connotations of the modernwe find the belief thatanythingmodernwilloftenbeeccentriccomparedwithwhathasgonebefore, ifonlybecausethemodernworldtakesearlierdevelopmentsjustalittlefurther.This,indeed, would be one way to interpret our claim in this book that the modernunderstanding of corruption is out of line with the history of Western views ofcorruption:Yes,ofcourseitseemstobeeccentric,butthatisbecauseitismodernandthereforemoreadvanced!Yetthisinterpretationisfarfromwhattheeditorsofthisbookandourcontributorshaveinmindwhenwecontrastcontemporaryviewsofcorruptionwithwhathasgonebefore.Ourpoint,toreiterate,istoshowthatthesecontemporary views are seriously deficient: it is to insist that what from onemodernist point of view might seem to be the most advanced perspective is notnecessarilysuperiortoitspredecessors.

Inotedearlierthatcontemporarydiscussionofcorruptionoftenreflectsanalltoocommonviewof the differences betweenWestern and non-Western societies: thatthelatterarelaggingsomewaybehindtheformer.Withregardtocorruption,thissuggeststhatwhilecorruptionisuniversal,itsmostsignificantimpactislikelytobefound in developing countries. The assumption here is that modernthat is,alreadydevelopedcountrieshaveadvancedwellbeyondthelevelofcorruptiontobefoundincountriesthatarenotyetmodern.

Leaving this issue aside, however, the three contributions that follow the fivehistoricalchaptersdiscussedaboveaddressissuesthatareentirelycontemporaryincharacter. First, responding indirectly to the Smithian celebration of the marketoutlinedbyLisaHillandadoptingalessthanentirelypositiveviewofmodernity,John Clammer views corruption from the standpoint of a sociologist with aninterest in recent developments in social systems analysis. Clammer sees ourglobalised worldmodernitynot simply as a collection of many discretesocieties whose responses to the threat of corruption can be compared andcontrasted to producemeasures of success or failure, but rather as a large-scalesystem held together, inter alia, by networks of national and international trade.Fromthisperspective,corruptionappearsaslessaproductofparticularsocietiessomething to be managed by better policing, moral education or institutionaladaptationthanasystemicproblemarisinginlargepartfromdysfunctionsinthesocialsystemitself. Itcanbeseenasan indexoranoutcomeof theentropyofaparticular form of socioeconomic system (globalised neo-liberal capitalism).Modernity itself generates forms of social disorganisation which, in turn,generatecorruption.

In Clammers view, social subsystems of the contemporary global order interactwitheachothertoproducethreekeyelementsincurrentformsofcorruption:mal-(ordistorted)development,violenceandcapitalist-ledglobalisation.Corruptionisthusbuiltintothesystemitself.Distorteddevelopmentandglobalisationareexpressions both of one another and of the underlying philosophy of neo-liberalism.

Our collection closes with two contributions that, directly or indirectly, addresswhat, in a different context, might be seen as the link between culture andcorruption. I say a different context because the concept of culture has had achequeredhistoryinthesocialsciences(Bennett,1998).Cultureisnormallyseenasan ideational unity, a more or less coherent collection of beliefs, injunctions,norms, values and other ideas that is shared by members of a community. Acommunitys culture is thus thought to both unify it and distinguish it fromcommunitieswithothercultures(Helliwell&Hindess,1999).Culture,inthissense,

canbeseenasprovidinganumberoftoolsthatmembersofacommunitycanuseindeciding on a course of action, yet it is often understood in a more directlyprescriptive sensethat is, as requiring, justifying or excusing particular actions.This last understandingof culture has beenperhaps themost important sourceofobjectionstotheconceptbecauseitsuggests thatpeopleareculturaldopesthatthey are pushed around by their culture (Hall, 1981; Phillips, 2007).A distinctiveversionoftheconcept,politicalculture(Almond&Verba,1963),wasinfluentialfor a time in political science. The concept was originally designed to capturedifferences in attitudes towards political authority between relatively stabledemocracies (the United Kingdom and the United States) and other less-stablecountries, on the assumption that differing attitudes towards political authoritywould account for significant and observable differences in patterns of politicalbehaviourbetweenthesecountries.Thisnotionofpoliticalcultureispredicatedontheassumptionthatculturaldifferenceswould,infact,bereflectedinconduct.Theconceptwaslateraccusedof lackingobjectivitythat is,offavouringtheUKandUS experienceand has since fallen out of favour (Elkins & Simeon, 1979;Somers,1995).

Accordingly, we have made limited use of the concepts of culture and politicalculture in thiscollection.Withoutdirectly invoking the termculture, JohnUhr schapterfocusesontheattitudesandvaluesofelectedpoliticians,whichcouldeasilybe viewed as important components of a societys culture. Attending to theseelements,ratherthantheprivateinterestsofofficials,Uhraimstoshiftourconcernsaway from corruption in the conventional sense. Rather than offer an alternativeaccountofcorruption,hepromotestheidealofanethicalpolitics,ofakindthatwould strengthen democratic processes, particularly the public discussion ofpolitical responsibilities. Uhr argues that analyses of corruption are generallypremised on distrust of office-holders. They seek to show how externalaccountabilitymechanismscanbeused to regulate thebehaviourof thoseholdingpolitical office. In contrast, ethics analysis focuses on office-holders sense ofpersonalresponsibilitythatis,ontheircapacityforself-regulation.Itbuildsontrust rather than its contrary and seeks to stimulate the praiseworthy politicalmanagement of official relationships of power ; however, in contrast with thetreatment of officials corrupt conduct as a personal failing, the focus on ethicalself-regulation is not simply individualistic. The determination of standards in ademocracy requires responsible public deliberation about the conduct ofrelationships between all those sharing political power, including the basicorganisingofficesofcitizenandgovernment.

UhrbuildshisargumentthroughtheexampleoftheAustralianchildrenoverboard

affair , inwhichministersandotherelectedofficialsmisrepresentedfacts inwhatthey seemed to thinkwere the interestsof the rulingparty (acting, that is, inwhatDennis F. Thompson [1995] calls their political rather than their privateinterests). Uhr uses this example to illustrate tendencies that, in his view, arecorrupting the relationshipsbetweengovernmentandcitizen. In thiscase,no lawswere broken or openly subverted and the personal decency of the politiciansinvolved was not in question. Nevertheless, the government practised a form ofdeception that many Australians saw as undermining the norms of the variouspolitical offices constituting Australian democracy, thereby demonstrating thatpolitical corruption can advance in many guises. The chapter concludes that arelationship-centred approach, rather than a rule-centred approach, requiresdisputes over standards to be managed through collective political deliberationoverappropriaterelationshipsofpower .

Finally,PeterLarmourconsidersthewaytheconceptofculturehasbeenusedinarecentseriesofstudiesofcorruptioninislandstatesoftheSouthPacific.Cultureisofteninvokedintheprescriptivesensenotedearlierasanexplanationforeventsinthe region, which echoes complaints by the anti-corruption NGO TransparencyInternational that the mythof culturehasbeenusedasanexcuse for corruption.Yet culture is sometimes seen as the thing that is corrupted. Just as the wordcorruption in English carries a strong sense of decline, so its use seems topresuppose a pre-corrupt golden age. In thePacific Islands, for example, there istalk of the corruption of traditional cultures and of a loss of standards that hadbeenupheldinthepast.Thuschiefstodayaresaidtobehavemorebadlybecauseofthe influence of Western culture, institutions or opportunities. At the same time,PNG officials today are thought to behave more corruptly than their colonialpredecessors.

Oneofthedifficultiesfacedbythestudiesdiscussedinthechapteristhatsomeofthemcould findnoexact translation for theword corruption in local languages.For example, in Kiribati there were several words with proximate meanings butpeople used thephrase the corruption. InTonga the closestwordwasangakovi,whichdenotesunkindness. InMarshall Islands theoppositewaskien jimwe inmoi,whichtranslatedasuprightness.

Larmourarguesthattherearedifferencesinthesalienceandscopeofcorruptioninthesecountries.ThereportonVanuatufoundverylittleoutcryaboutit.InNauru,bycontrast,issuesofgovernanceandcorruptionwerewidelytalkedabout.There,peopledefinedcorruptionverybroadlytoincludeleaderswhodonotgotochurchandwhopartyandtraveloverseasfrequently.Similarly,inSolomonIslandsstreettalk the word korapt was often applied to personal as well as official

indiscretions.EarlypublicityfortheleadershipcodeinPapuaNewGuineashowedcartoons of politicians dancingwith their girlfriends aswell as receiving cash inenvelopes.SalienceandscopeseemedtobethemostextremeinSolomonIslands,wheresystematiccorruptiongrowingoutoftheforestindustryhadledtowhatthereportcalledinsidioustolerancenamely,itisassumedboththateveryofficialiscorrupt and that nothing could be done about it.The chapter goes on to considerthreecrosscuttingthemesinempiricalstudies:thecontrastbetweengiftsandbribes,petty corruption and the presumed role of ethnic minorities in corruption. Thechapterconcludeswithadiscussionoftheproblematicroleofculturalrelativismindiscussionsofcorruption.

ConclusionAt the beginning of this introduction, I noted that recent discussion of corruptionhas been dominated by two assumptions: first, that corruption is largely aneconomicissueinbothitscontentanditsmostimportanteffects;andsecond,thatitinvolvesablurringof thedistinctionbetweenpublic andprivate. I alsonoted thatthesetwoassumptionsoftengotogetherwithathirdthatreflectsanalltoocommonview of the differences between Western and non-Western societies: that whilecorruption is universal, its most significant impact is likely to be found indevelopingcountries.

At thispoint, it is time to sketch the conclusions that the editorsbelievemightbedrawnfromthisbook.Thefirstandmostimportantpointtomakehereisthat,takentogether,theassumptionsjustnotedproduceaviewofcorruptionthatisnarrowerinscopethanalmostanyoftheearlierviewsexaminedinthisbook.Ihavearguedthat broader understandingsof corruption, such as the ideaof corruptionbeing aformofdecayofthebodypolitic,stillresonatestronglywithcurrentconcerns.

Neither the editors of nor the contributors to this book would argue that earlierviews of corruption are superior to later views simply by virtue of their comingfirst. Butwe do claim that the differences between earlier and later views shouldgive pause for thought. It is at leastworth consideringwhat has been gained andwhatmayhavebeenlostinthechangefromoneperiodtotheother.TheimageofcorruptionasoneormorepeoplebehavingbadlypalesincomparisonwiththeviewadvancedbyMachiavelliandIbnKhaldunamongstmanyothersthatcorruptionisadiseaseofthebodypoliticthatmaybothencourageimproperbehaviouronthepartofmanyindividualsanddiscouragethosewhorecognisethisbehaviourtoholdtheperpetratorstoaccount.Thisisnot,ofcourse,tosuggestthatweshouldnotbeconcerned about people behaving badly. There is much to be said for RichardMulgansargumentthatwhileitmaybeappropriatetoapplymoralabsolutestothe

conduct of individual public officials, where individual corruption appears to bewidespread,theproblemisbestviewedasasystemicissueanabsenceoftheruleoflaworanaccountabilitydeficitratherthanasoneofmanybadapples.

If the understanding of corruption as men or women behaving badly is anunfortunatenarrowingofanearlier,morerobustview,thesamecanbesaidoftheviewthatcorruptionisbestunderstoodasaneconomicissue,inbothitscontentandits effects. One familiar problem with the view that corruption is best seen as amatterofindividualspursuingtheirownprivateinterestsisthatittakesnoaccountofwhatThompsonsEthics incongress calls institutional corruption, amodeofcorruptioninwhichthebenefitgainedispoliticalratherthanpersonal(1995,p.7).Thompson also acknowledges that institutional corruption may be difficult toidentifybecauseitissocloselyrelatedtoconductthat[it]isaperfectlyacceptablepart of political life (ibid.). If it is hard to distinguish between corrupt andperfectlyacceptableconductthencurrentviewsofwhatisacceptablewouldseemto be problematic and to indicate that there is more to corruption than a fewindividualsbehavingbadly.

Atanotherlevel,theargumentsofBruceBuchanandLisaHillsuggestthattheriseofaneconomisticorliberal-individualisticviewofcorruptionshouldbeseenasaby-productoftheemergenceofcommercialsocietyorperhapsasthesubtitleofAlbertHirschmansThepassionsand the interests (1977) has itof the politicalargumentsforcapitalismbeforeitstriumph.Itgoeswithoutsaying,ofcourse,thattheexistenceofsuchaprovenanceshouldhardlybeseenassufficienttounderminetheeconomisticview.Onceagain, it isworthaskingwhathasbeen lost, andwhathas been gained, in the shift from a structural/political view to an economistic,market-basedviewofcorruption.

Thechaptersinthiscollectionshowthatbroaderunderstandingsofcorruption,suchastheideathatitisaformofdecayofthebodypolitic,stillresonatestronglywithcurrentconcerns.Moreoftenthannottheseconcernsaresubsumedundertherubricofdiscoursesotherthancorruption,suchastheroleoffactionalisminpoliticallife.

By expanding the focus of conventional understandings of corruption, thiscollection aims to bridge the gap between two literatures: first, the large andextremely diverse practice-oriented literature devoted to identifying the causes ofcorruption,assessingits incidenceandworkingouthowtobringitundercontrol.Second, the somewhat smaller literature produced by social theorists andintellectual historians that explores the rich tradition of social thought aboutcorruption in theWest and inotherpartsof theworld.The lattergroupofworksseescorruptionnotonlyasamatterofillegalorimproperbehaviouronthepartof

individuals,butalsoasasocietalissueforexample,adiseaseofthebodypolitic.By opening up discussion of what it is that constitutes corruption we hope tochallenge conventional, largely economistic understandings of corruption. Thepapersincludedinthisvolumeaimtoraisebroaderquestionsconcerningtheabilityofcitizenstoparticipateinpublicandpoliticallifeandtoopenthevocabularyofthehealthofthebodypolitictopractitionerswhoworkontheissueofcorruption.

Letmeconcludethisintroductionwithtwofurtherpoints.Thefirstistosuggestthatoneimportantresultofthenarrowfocusofconventionaldiscussionsofcorruptionis the restricted senseof its political significance.Business scandals in theUnitedStates, the European Union and Australia suggest that corruption in the privatesector canhavepublic consequences thatgowellbeyond the familiarproblemofthecaptureofregulatorsbytheregulatedtoaffectthefundingofpoliticalpartiesandoffactionswithin them; theAmericanenergyandservicescorporationEnronwas reported to have contributedmassively to theUSDemocratswhile PresidentClintonwasinofficeandlatertohavecontributedtoGeorgeW.Bushscampaignfunds.Inthiscase,whatseemsatfirstsighttobeeconomiccorruptioncouldalsobeseenasadiseaseofthebodypolitic.

Second,itisworthnotingthestrikingresultsofasurveyconductedafewyearsagoonbehalfofTI,whoseviewsoncorruptionareamongthetargetsofthisbook.TheTIsurveyexaminedpublicopinionin47countriesaroundtheworldandfoundthat,inthreecountriesoutoffour,peoplesingledoutpoliticalpartiesastheinstitutionsfromwhichtheywouldmostliketohavecorruptionremoved(TIPressRelease,3July 2003). It seems, and this is my final point, that while the contemporaryinternational anti-corruptionmovements treatment of corruption as primarily aneconomic issue addresses important questions relating to economic developmentand the eradication of poverty in much of the world, it nevertheless avoids thesubstanceofwidespreadpublicconcernsabouttheconductofpoliticallife.

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1 Caesars remarkably self-serving account of the Roman subjugation of the Gauls between 58 and 50 BCdividesGaulintoregionsinhabitedbytheBelgae,AquitaniansandCelts(whomtheRomanscallGauls).Regionscloser to Rome that were inhabited by Gauls, most of which had been brought under Roman control beforeCaesarbeganhiscampaigns,arenotcoveredbyhisclassification.2TheeconomistJeffreyD.Sachs(2006)arguesthattheimpactofcorruptiononeconomicdevelopmenthasbeenmuchoverrated.3ItiseasytoreadMachiavellisHistoryofFlorenceasifitwerestructuredbyhisinterpretationofLivy,butthis,in turn,mayhavebeenstructuredbyhisreadingofBook6ofPolybiussThehistories (Hexter,1956),writtensome200yearsbeforeLivyswork(2006).4See IbnKhaldun(Kalpakian,2008;Katsiaficas,1997),especiallyChapters18 (headedSedentaryculture isthegoalofcivilization.Itmeanstheendofitslifespanandbringsaboutitscorruption)and30(Arefutationofphilosophy.Thecorruptionof the studentsofphilosophy).TheparallelsbetweenMachiavellisandKhaldunscyclicalaccountsofthehistoryofstatesareundeniable,butitisnotclearwhetherMachiavelliknewoforwasinfluencedbyKhaldun.

2.AristotleonLegalityandCorruptionRichardMulgan

DefiningcorruptionFor most people in public policy circles, one suspects, the main problemssurrounding corruption are practical. The concept itself is comparativelystraightforwardandconcreteinconnotation,referringtocertainspecificpracticessuchasbribery,cronyismandnepotism.Theharmfulnessofsuchpracticesistakenasself-evidentbecausetheyareobviousabusesofpower.Theonlyquestionishowtostampitout.

Forapoliticaltheorist,however,corruptionisastrikingandperplexingterm.Inthefirstplace,ithasprovedremarkablydifficulttodefineingeneralterms,beyondasetofleadingexamplessuchasbribery,favouritismandnepotism.Wemayknowthat it iswrongbutwearenotquite surewhat it is.Expertsdisagreeaboutwhatactivitiesaretocountascorruptandaboutwhetheractivitiescondemnedascorruptin one political context should be seen as functional in another. Secondly,corruptionisatermofunqualifiedethicalcondemnation.Tolabelanypersonorpracticeascorruptistostigmatisethemasbeyondthemoralpale.Itcombinesthemoralismofwordssuchas sin, evilor wickednesswithaddedpsychologicalimplicationsofpersonaldepravityanddebasedcharacter.

This chapter explores the incongruity between these two aspectsbetween thecontextualismandthemoralisminherentincorruptioninpartthroughahistoricalcomparison of the use of similar terms by the Greek philosophers, particularlyAristotle.

The problems of defining corruption have been well explored by others (forexample, DeLeon, 1993; Heidenheimer, 1970; Heywood, 1997; Philp, 1997). Inbrief,definitionsdifferdependingonwhethertheyfocusontheresponsibilitiesandduties of public office and office-holders, on compliance with law and legallydefined standards or more broadly on the clash between illegitimate personalinterestandthepublicinterest.Whilethisquestioncanhardlybesaidtobeclosed,themostcompellinganalyseswouldseemtobethosethatrelycentrallyonactingcontrary to the common or public interest because it involves the illegitimatepursuitofaprivateinterest(DeLeon,1993;Philp,1997).Definitionsthatdependoncompliance with the particular duties of an office or with existing legal rulescertainlyhighlightkeyfactorsinidentifyingcorruptpoliticalactionsbyindividual

CKResaltado

politiciansorofficials.However,bytakingexistingdutiesandrulesasgiven,suchdefinitions are too closely tied to a particular institutional context. They do notprovide an external standard by which to assess whether the duties or rulesthemselvesprohibitactions thatshouldberegardedascorrupt. If thedefinitionofcorruptioniswidenedtoincludetheillegitimatepursuitofaprivateinterestthenitallowsan independent judgmentofpreciselywhatprivate interestsexistingethicalstandards and rules ought to preclude. Admittedly, the use of a term such asillegitimate is itself question-begging and does not provide an uncontestedcriterionforrulingselfishactsinorout,whichiswhythedefinitionofcorruptionissocontested.

Corruption needs to be understood in terms of its opposite: the condition ofsoundnessorhealth that eitherhas subsequentlydegenerated intocorruptionoratleast provides a standard against which the corruption can be identified (Philp,1997). In J. L. Austins (1962) colourful description applied to the term real,corruption is a trouser word, being filled and shaped by its complementarycounterpart.Ifwewanttogiveanaccountofpoliticalcorruption,weshouldalwaysbeginbyaskingwhatuncorruptthatis,soundorhealthygovernmentlookslike.

On the definition given above, uncorrupt politics implies that personal or privateinterestsdonotillegitimatelyoverridethepublicinterest.Atthesametime,thoughthe public interest should prevail, private interests are not necessarily ruled outaltogether,especiallyinaliberalpluralistpolity.Liberaldemocraticpolitics,whichprovides themoral standardagainstwhichcorruption is typicallycharacterised inpresent-day discourse, is based on the legitimate pursuit of self-interest, both byindividualsandbysectionsofthecommunity.True,theritualsofpoliticaldiscoursedemand thatdeliberationaboutpublicpolicybecast in the languageof thepublicgood and that individual or sectional self-interest be suppressed as a reason foracting. At the same time, no-one doubts both the actuality and the legitimacy ofpolitical self-interest in liberal democratic politics. To outlaw all self-interestedpoliticswould ruleoutmuchof the electioneering, lobbying,pork-barrelling andlog-rollingonwhichdemocraticpluralistpoliticsispremised.

Not that anythinggoes in the liberalpursuitof self-interest.Liberalpluralismhasalways adopted some independent, public-interest standards. Some standards areprocedural, guaranteeing the politicalmechanismsbywhichprivate interestsmaycompete; others are substantive, limiting the decisions that may be imposed onmembers of the citizen body. Constitutional and legal rules lay down limits andconstraints that competing playersmust respect.Questions then arise aboutwhichtypes of procedure overstep the line between the legitimate and the illegitimatepursuit of private interests.When does lobbying become bribery and when does

bargaining become collusion? When does redistributing resources to onessupporters become an infringement of other peoples rights? Opinions differsignificantlyaboutwhattypesofself-servingactionaretobeclassedasillegitimateandthereforecorrupt.Significantexamplesofsuchcontestedareasincludemakinggovernmentappointments forpartisanadvantage (as in theNSWMetherallaffair)orreceivingpaymentforaskingparliamentaryquestions(asintheUKscandalcitedbyPhilp,1997).Atamoremundanelevel,publicservantsareclearlyatoddsoverwhat typeofgiftmaybe legitimately received fromapublic client (ICAC,2001).Possibilities for disagreement are multiplied when concepts of corruption areapplied cross-culturally, for instance in countrieswheregift-givingor preferenceforonesownkinorethnicgroupisconsideredappropriateandlegitimate.

Forpresentpurposes,theimportantpointisnotsomuchthedifferencesinopinionover corruption in liberal democracies but the premises that underlie suchdisagreement.Any realistic notion of corruption applicable in present-day liberaldemocraticpoliticshastorecognisethatpoliticians(andcitizens)cannotreasonablybe expected to be motivated solely by concern for the common good or publicinterest.Instead,theconceptofthepublicinterestisinstitutionalisedmoreasasetofminimalsideconstraintstoadoptNozicks(1974)usefultermonthepursuitofprivateinterests.Aconditionofsoundthatis,non-corruptpoliticsisnotapolitywhere everyone pursues the public interest but one where the pursuit of privateinterests isnotallowed to transgresscertainminimalpublic-interest limits.Wherepublic-interestconstraintskickinandforceprivateintereststogivewayisamatterof dispute. As already noted, the boundary between the legitimate and theillegitimate pursuit of private interests is blurred and contested. Morefundamentally, however, the judgment is essentially a balance struck betweencompetingvalues: thepursuitof individualor sectional interestson theonehand,andconcernforthecommongoodontheother.

Ifsoundpoliticsisidentifiedasacompromisebetweenselfishnessandconcernforthecommongood,corruptionthenbecomesamatteroftippingthebalancetoofarinthedirectionofselfishness.Suchanuancedviewofwherethelineistobedrawnbetween non-corruption and corruption may sit awkwardly with the highlymoralistic implications of the term itself. Corruption, as already noted, carriesvery strong moralindeed, moralisingovertones, redolent of evil and sin,suggestingbothuniversalisticstandardsofrightandwrongandasenseofrighteousoutrageatthepracticesinquestion.Tolabelapracticeascorruptistocondemnitunequivocallyinthestrongestpossibleterms.Andyet,wenowdiscover,corruptionisnotsomuchafesteringdiseaseinthebodypoliticasapossiblyminorimbalancebetween two legitimate forces in thecommunity. Corruptionhasconnotationsof

moralabsolutism(comparewithswearoffthedemondrink)whereas,inpractice,itseemstorefertostrikingtherightbalance(drinkbutnottoexcess).

CorruptionintheGreektraditionAn historical digression can help us explore this issue further. In the history ofEuropean thought, discussion of corruption in politics and the possibility ofachieving non-corrupt politics immediately suggests the Greek philosophers,particularly Socrates and Plato, but also their immediate successors in the late-classical and Hellenistic periods, all of whom agonised about the corruption ofpolitics and the corruptibility of politicians. Socrates rejected the life of thepolitician as incompatible with the pursuit of knowledge and thus provided theinspiration for subsequent philosophies of quietist withdrawal, such as Cynicism,EpicureanismandthemoreextremeversionsofStoicismthatweretoflourishintheHellenistic age. Plato, in turn, while never renouncing the world of politics,nonetheless located it in the inferior realm of his dualistic universe. Politicswasrelegated to the world of the senses, the world subject to inevitable change anddecay (literally: the world subject to corruption). Aristotle, though lesscontemptuous of the sub-lunarworld of change and contingency than Plato, alsonever abandoned his Platonic commitment to the superiority of an eternalunchanging realm accessible only to pure reason. Human society was inevitablycontingentandliabletovariation.

These theorists, then, all held to some form of ontological dualism, in which aworldofpuretruthandgoodnessstoodopposedtoaninferiorworldofuncertaintyandevil. In termsof theirapproach togovernmentandpolitics, thisdualism tookoneoftwoforms.Themoreradicalanddeliberatelyparadoxicalpath,suchasthatof theCynics, involved a total rejection of all government, and by implication arejection of all human society, as irredeemably flawed; the less radical approachfollowed by Plato and Aristotle was to devise an ideal form of government thatwould in someway incorporate the other-worldly values of unqualified truth andgoodness.Thisideal,inturn,providedastandardagainstwhichtheperformanceofeveryday regimes could be judged and improvements recommended. For Plato,suchanidealistheruleofphilosophers,asdepictedinTheRepublicandrecalledinlaterpoliticaldialoguessuchTheStatesman(293)andTheLaws (7112,875).ForAristotle, the political ideal is similarly the rule of the ideallywise and virtuous(Pol. IV 2, 1289a302), whether through an outstandingly virtuous individual orfamily(absoluterule)orthroughabroaderaristocracyoftrulyvirtuousmen.

Plato,inTheRepublic,describesthecontrastbetweentheidealandinferiorstatesinterms of an imagined decay or destruction, using thewordpthora (546a), the

Greek term later regularly Latinised as corruptio. The ideal state undergoes anumber of stages of such decay, through timocracy, oligarchy and democracy,culminating in tyranny, which is theworst regime of all. Elsewhere, the contrastbetween idealand inferior isexpressed indifferent images. InTheStatesman, forinstance,inferiorregimesaresaidtomimicorcopytheidealconstitution(301a,303c), an image often used by Plato in his epistemology to represent therelationship between the inferior objects of the senses and the objects of trueknowledge. Aristotle, in The Politics, uses different terminology again, correct(orthos) for the good forms of government and deviations or perversions(parekbaseis) for the inferior. The implication is in all cases the same: the idealformofgovernmentisconceivedaslogicallyprior,andinferiorconstitutionsaredefinedinrelationtoit,asbeinginsomesenselackingordeficient.

There is thus a close parallel with the modern concept of political corruptionunderstood in terms of the absence of sound or non-corrupt politics. In Greek,however, the equivalent term to corruption (pthora) retains more of its literalmeaning and implies actual decay or disintegration. In Aristotle, pthora is thestandard philosophical opposite of genesis or coming into being and in ThePolitics its main use arises in connection with the destruction of particularconstitutions(Bonitz,1955).InmodernEnglish,ontheotherhand,themetaphoroforganic decay is less prominent.We talk of corrupt regimes without necessarilyimplying that they have degenerated from a former healthy condition. In thisrespect,corruptioniscloserinmeaningtodeviant,thetermAristotlehimselfusestodescribeinferiorconstitutions.

For both Plato and Aristotle, the key feature that the ideal regimes possess as aresult of their wise and virtuous rulers is that they are governed in the commoninterest. Conversely, the leading characteristic that distinguishes deviant regimesfromtheidealisthattheirrulersruleintheirowninterestratherthanthecommoninterest. InThe Republic, the guardians training and communal living lead themtotallytosuppressanynotionofself-interestandtofindtheirpersonalfulfilmentinthehappinessofthewhole(420b421c).Theimaginedcorruptionoftheidealstateand itsdecline to tyranny throughdescending stagesofmoraldegradationcanberead as a gradual assertion of individual self-interest and a retreat fromcommitment to the common good. Aristotle gives even more prominence to thecontrastbetweenpursuitofthecommoninterestandself-interest,makingittheonlycriteriondefiningthedifferencebetweencorrectanddeviantconstitutions:

Thecorrectformsofgovernmentarethoseinwhichtheone,thefeworthemanygovernwithaviewtothecommoninterest:butthegovernmentswhichrulewithaview to the private interestwhether of the one, or of the fewor of themany are

deviations(Pol.III7,1279a2832)

Aristotleinitiallyallowsthreetypesofcorrectconstitutionnamelykingship(ruleof one), aristocracy (rule of few) and polity (rule ofmany)all in the commoninterest. Later, however, he concentrates on two varieties: absolute kingship, the(largely hypothetical) rule of one outstandingly able man, and aristocracy, theregimewherepowerlieswithacitizenbodyconsistingofvirtuousmenofproperty.Thethirdcorrectoption,polityrulebyavirtuousmajorityquicklyslipsdownthe ranking. A majority of citizens are capable of only a limited, military-stylevirtue(Pol. III 7, 1279b12) and polity becomes a somewhat deviant constitution,better than oligarchy and democracy but not fully correct and therefore, byimplication,notfullygovernedinthecommoninterest(Pol.IV8,1293b227).Rulein the common interest rather than in the interest of the rulers remains thetouchstone of a correct regime. Aristotles account of political deviance thusresonatesagainwithmodernanalysesofpoliticalcorruption:bothestablishanexusbetween political deviance and the rulers pursuit of their own private interestagainstthecommoninterest.

However,despitethisconceptualparallel,theancientandmodernviewsofpoliticalcorruption exhibit important differences. One such difference concerns thepracticalityofachievingnon-corruptpolitics.Inthemodernconception,corruptionisseenasremediable,atleastatthesystemiclevel;thebestexistingregimes,suchasthose at the top of theTransparency International (TI) table, are considered to belargely free of corruption. Though corruption, like crime, will never be totallystampedout, itcanberelegatedto themarginsas ithasbeeninmanypresent-daypolities. In particular, from the perspective of developed donor countries likeAustralia, political corruption ismainly a problem for messy or failed states,suchasIndonesiaorPapuaNewGuinea.Evenwheremoresystemiccorruption isevident, as in Australian State police forces, such practices can be interpreted asintolerablepocketsofcorruptiontobestampedoutbyanti-corruptionagenciesandmercifullyabsentfromotherbranchesofgovernment.

For Aristotle, however, as for Plato, all existing regimes fall on the corrupt ordeviant side of the corrupt/non-corrupt line. Plato certainly considered hisphilosopher s city to be beyond practical reach; he may have intended it to beimpossibleeveninprinciple.HisidealstateinTheLawsmakesmoreconcessionstohumanfrailtybutisstillclearlyanunachievedidealthatismostunlikelyevertobeputintopractice.Inasimilarvein,Aristotleconsidersabsoluteruletobepracticallyimpossible (Pol. VII 14, 1332b, 2207). Even his ideal aristocracy,which containseverything one could wish for but nothing impossible (Pol. VII 4, 1325b3840),thoughinprincipleattainable,isanimaginedidealnotarealisticpossibility.The

function of the ideally best constitutionwas to provide amoral contrastwith theinferior specimens of everyday experience, not to provide some model ofconstitutionalbestpracticetowhichstrugglingnationsandfailedstatesshouldbeexpectedtoaspireasaconditionofreceivingloansfromrichercountries.

Thisdifference inpracticality isalsoreflected indifferencesover themeaningofcorruption. Modern notions of corruption, as already noted, concentrate on theillegitimate pursuit of self-interest in preference to the common interest. In thisrespect, theyestablishabalancebetweenthepursuitofpublicandprivate interestsand do not require governments (or citizens) to be completely dedicated to thecommon interest. By contrast, Aristotle, like Plato before him, did require suchcomplete dedication. Ideal, non-corrupt states are governed by ideally virtuousrulerswhoarewholly focusedon thecommon interestandwouldneverconsiderpursuingtheirowninterestsattheexpenseofthegoodofthecommunity.Aristotlesrulingaristocratshad theirownprivate livesandpersonal interests,but insofarastheyactedpoliticallytheywouldbewhollydevotedtothegoodofthepolis.Inthisrespect,theancientaccounts,thoughmoreutopian,maybesaidtobemoreintunewith the moral absoluteness implicit in the concept of pure, non-corruptgovernment.

Ontheotherhand,ifthestandardofnon-corruptgovernmentisplacedsohighastobeunachievable,itcouldbearguedthatsuchconceptualpurityisboughtattoohighaprice.Inparticular,ifallregimesareessentiallycorruptbecauseallareruledinthe interest of the rulers, what becomes of the distinctions that we want tomakebetweencorruptandnon-corruptregimes,betweenFinlandandNigeriaorbetweenNew Zealand and Indonesia? If all are corrupt, what is the point of condemningcorruption?

ForAristotle,asforPlato,thefactthatallexistingregimesaredeviantbecauseallaregovernedintheinterestoftherulersdoesnotmeanthatallareequallydeviant.Such a categorical conclusion may have been drawn by the more radical anti-politicalphilosophers,suchas theCynicsandStoics.ButbothPlatoandAristotle,andparticularlythelatter,wereinterestedindistinguishingbetweenvaryingdegreesofdeviance ineverydaypolitics.That is, themodelof the ideal, correct statewasusednotonlytocriticisealleverydayregimesasfundamentallyflawedbutalsotoprovide a standard against which everyday regimes could be assessed and foundmoreorlessdeviant.

Herethekeyfactorwastheruleoflaw.Rulersmightallbeself-interested,whetherthey were single rulers (tyranny), the rich few (oligarchy) or the poor majority(democracy).But their rule could be better orworse, depending onwhether they

were constrained to act within the law or whether theywere free to follow theirwishes.PlatomakesthecasemostcompellinglyinTheStatesman inthecontextofanargumentintendedtohighlighttheweaknessesaswellasthestrengthsoftheruleoflaw(291300).Lawisdeficientbecauserulesarebluntandcircumstancesvaried.Thetrueprofessional,suchasaskilleddoctor,isnotboundbytheinstructionsleftforsubordinatesbutassesseseachcaseonthebasisofindividualjudgment.Sotoothetruepoliticiansthephilosopherrulerswillnotbeboundbygenerallawsbutwill judgeeachissueonitsmerits.However,whiletheconstraintof lawcurbsthewisdomofthephilosopher,italsoservestorestraintheselfishnessoftheordinaryruler.Amongstinferiorregimesthatlackthebenefitofhavingphilosophersastheirrulers,thosegovernedinaccordancewithlawareallsuperiortothosewhererulerscanruleastheywish.Thethemeofthevalueoftheruleoflawincurbingtheself-interest of rulers is developed inmuchmoredetail in thedialogueTheLaws andwasalsotakenoverbyAristotle,whousesitasamajorcriterionindistinguishingbetweenmoremoderateandmoreextremeversionsofinferiorconstitutions.

Aristotle,too,recognisesthatthebluntnessoflawcancreateproblemsandalsothatlawsthemselvesmaybeunjustiftheyaretheproductofanunjustregime(Pol. III11, 1282b12).Yet lawful rule is on thewholebetter than lawless rule, because alllawsaregeneral and therefore to someextent impartial anda curbon the rulersself-interest. Ordinary people who are called on to make decisions in particularcasesaretoolikelytobecarriedawaybyfeelingsoffriendshiporhatredandtobeblindedbypersonalpleasureandpain(RhetoricI1,1354a34b11).Thisargumentissummedupinthefamousepigramthatlawisintellectwithoutdesire(Pol.III16,1287a32).Thus,ineachcase,themostextremeandworstformsofoligarchy(Pol.IV6,1293a301),democracy(Pol.IV6,1293a810),andtyranny(Pol.IV10,1523)arecharacterisedbytheabsenceoftheruleoflaw,whereasthemoremoderateandmorestableareruledinaccordancewithlaw.

Aristotlesargumentfortheruleoflawdoesnotdependonthecontentofthelawssomuchasonthenatureofanylaw.Lawsthemselvescanbepartialandunjust intheir intent. Indeed, all laws in deviant regimes are inevitability skewed in theinterestoftherulinggroup.Whatmakestheruleoflawsuperior(orlessinferior)is that any law impartially applied must reduce, though it will not eliminate, thepersonal benefits that rulers derive from decisions. For instance, laws in anoligarchywill always favour thewealthy andpropertied andwill always penalisethepoorandproperty-less.Butatleastthewealthywillbetreatedequallywithoneanother and in accordancewith legal precedents; rulerswill not be able tomakeunpredictable,ad-hocdecisionstosuitthemselves.

Again there isaparallelwithmodernaccountsofcorruption inwhich legalityor

theruleoflawissometimestakenasadefiningfeature.Corruptionisoftenequatedwithbreakingthelawforthesakeofsecuringapersonaladvantage.Anti-corruptioncampaignersarethereforealwaysputtingtheirweightbehindgreaterrespectfortheruleoflaw.However,asalreadynoted,suchaconceptionofcorruptionisquestion-begging in that it does not stipulatewhat types of self-interested action shouldbeconsideredcorruptandthereforeillegal.Forinstance,acasecanbemadethatsomelawful activities, such as corporate contributions to campaign funds, involve anillegitimate pursuit of self-interest and should therefore be outlawed as corrupt.That is, a conception of corruption that is grounded in existing law is open tochargesofcircularityormoralrelativismbecauseitoffersnoindependentstandardofwhatshouldcountascorrupt.

Aristotle, however, avoids this difficulty because he is assuming that all regimes,lawfulandlawless,aredeviantandunjust,thoughtovaryingdegrees.Heisnot,atthispoint,tryingtodrawalinebetweensoundandcorruptregimesorbetweenjustand unjust laws. He therefore does not face the issue of an independent ethicalstandard implicit in themodern use of corruption. That issue has been dealtwithelsewhere,intheconceptionofthecorrect(andunattainable)constitution.Here,hehasamoremodestaim:simplytomarkoutameansbywhichtheharmfuleffectsofself-interested (and corrupt) rule may be mitigated. Self-interested rulersconstrainedbylawwilldeviatelessfromthestandardofgoodgovernmentanddoless harm than the same rulers unconstrained by law.The rule of law is thus notoverburdened with any moral connotations of being linked with the concept ofuncorruptgovernment.Inthiscase,thequestionofwhetherparticularlawsaregoodorbadcanbemoresafelylefttooneside.Themainpointisthatkeepingwithinanylaw, whether good or bad, will be better and less corrupt than allowing self-interestedrulersthefreedomtodisregardthelawatwill.

Aristotleissimilarlypragmaticinhisadviceabouthowbesttoensurethatmembersoftherulinggroupsruleinaccordancewithlaw.Generalcommitmenttothevaluesoftheregimeisakeycomponent,tobeachievedthroughpubliceducation(Pol.V9, 1310a1418). But equally important are socioeconomic factors. Citizens whomustgivemostoftheirenergytomakingalivingwilltakelittleinterestinpoliticsandwillthereforebecontenttoletthelawtakeitscourseratherthantrytoimposetheirownsolutions(Pol.IV6,especially.1293a1719).Hence,themostlaw-abidingformofdemocracyisonewherethepeoplearepredominantlyagriculturalwithoutthetimeorincentivetocomeintotowntoattendmeetings.Theruleoflawisundermost threateither fromthe idle rich,with the leisure tousegovernment toenrichthemselves still further, or from the indigent urban poorwho also have both thetimeandtheincentivetomakedecisionsintheirowninterests.Thoseofmoderate

wealth, on theother hand, cangenerally be trusted to be law-abiding (Pol. IV11,1295b234).

Aristotlesinsistenceontheimportanceoflawanylawinreducingtheincidenceof political corruption does not provide a defining mark for corruption.Nonetheless,itmaybeinstructiveformoderndebatesaboutcorruption.Itresonates,atleast,withthepracticalfocusinmuchanti-corruptionworkontheimportanceofpreventinggovernmentofficialsfrombreakingactuallawsforpersonalgain.Mostanti-corruption campaig