bangladesh why it happened

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Bangladesh: Why It HappenedAuthor(s): G. W. ChoudhuryReviewed work(s):Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 48, No. 2(Apr., 1972), pp. 242-249Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Institute of International AffairsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2613440 .

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BANGLADESH: WHY IT HAPPENEDG. W. ChoudhuryTnHE immediateauses of thedisintegrationf Pakistan nd the

emergence fBangladeshon December 16, 1971,were themilitaryatrocitiesommitted y thePakistan Army gainstunarmedBen-

galis; the influx f millions of refugees romEast Bengal into Indiasince March 1971; and finally hedirect ndianmilitarynterventionnEast Bengal, backed by the diplomatic upportof the Soviet Union.The rise of Bengali sub-nationalism ithinPakistan,however,had itsorigin n a number ffactors-political, conomic, ultural,ociological,etc.-that had been operating incePakistan was created n 1947. Ofall the provinceswhich constitutedakistan, t was Bengal whichgavethemost solid support o MohammedAli Jinnah n his struggle ortheestablishment f a separateMuslim state in the sub-continent. et,within very hort eriod, heBengalisbegan to have second thoughts.Although heywere the majority roup n Pakistan, hey ufferedroma deep-rooted earof domination y the minorityroup of WestPak-istan. In a democracy, he majorityhouldnot haveany fearofdomina-tion, nor should theyhave to ask for safeguards, uch as regionalautonomy, eservation f places in the civil serviceand the armyandguaranteeshat theeconomicdevelopment f their egionwould notbeneglected or their ulture hreatened. ut for wo decadesthemajorityBengali group did feelobliged to seek theseguarantees; nd whenthey

were notgranted, engali sub-nationalismegan to gathermomentumuntilultimatelyt became a nationalmovement orthe creationof aseparate tate.

Whatwere thefactors hatgave riseto Bengalinationalism?First,the politicalfactor: Pakistanbegan its politicalcareer under a par-liamentary ystemmodelled on Westminsternd under a federalcon-stitution.But neither heparliamentaryystemnor the federation asgenuine. The constitutional ormsand trappings f democracyonly

provided cloak forrulebythefewwhowereable to concentrateowerin their wn hands. Duringelevenyears 1947-58) of so-calledparlia-mentary emocracy, here was not a single generalelection, nd theprovincial lectionswere described s 'a farce,mockery nd a fraudupon the electorate.' Well-organised olitical partiesdid not exist.Withthe declineof theMuslimLeague, therewas no nationalparty;theremaining artiesweremorenarrowly ased than those n the new

I

Report f theElectoralReforms ommission, overnmentf Pakistan,Karachi, 1956.242



BANGLADESH: WHY IT HAPPENED 243

Asian democracies, ot to speak of Western ountries.The failureofparliamentaryemocracy ed to thedevelopment f an all-powerfulndirresponsiblexecutive, ided and supported y a powerful ureaucracy.Pakistanwas dominated ybureaucrats nd soldiers.2

The emergence f thisall-powerfululing lite had a great mpacton the separatistmovementn East Bengal. The ruling lite was com-posed of senior bureaucratsnone of whomwas East Bengali. Up to1958 theywere supported ndirectly y the army; after1958, armysupportwas direct nd open. There was a cabinet and a parliament,but thepolitical order n Pakistan could be called 'an oligarchy ndera democraticonstitution'. t was a 'modernising ligarchy3 in whichBengalis had no share. Except duringthe short interval f thirteenmonthsof H. S. Suhrawardy's abinet in 1956-57, the Bengalis hadhardly any role in national affairs. Every vital decision,whether trelated o political r defence r economicordiplomaticmatters, as inthefinal nalysismade by theruling lite,composed of WestPakistaniciviland military fficers.

In provincialmatters, he situationwas no betterfortheBengalis.Even in theirown province, ll the key posts in the administrationwereheldbyWest Pakistaniswho had direct ccess to the central ulingclique. The country ad, in theory, federal onstitution,ut in prac-tice the provincialgovernment as entirelyubordinate o the centre,particularlyn financial nd administrative atters.The Bengalisfounda new ruling roup et overthem n place of the former ritish fficials.The civil and military fficials romWest Pakistan stationed n EastBengalneverbothered o develop anyrealbonds with he ocal popula-tion who looked upon themas aliens. Therewere fewsocial contacts;

theWestPakistani fficialsonsidered hemselveso be socially uperiorto the BengaliMuslims,whowere regarded s converts rom ower-casteHindus. The resultwasbitternessnda widening ap.

The Bengali intelligentsia,articularlyt Dacca University,ecameincreasingly onscious of theirunsatisfactoryituation. It must bepointed ut,however, hatat thetime of Independence he Indian civilservice eftbehindbytheBritish aj contained nlyone Bengaliofficer.Similarly,heBengaliswerevery oorlyrepresentedn thearmybecause

the British uthorities ad considered hemto be a non-martial ace.Therewerethereforeome historical easons forthepreponderancefWest Pakistani civil and military fficersn East Bengal. But afterIndependencenothingwas done to rectifyhe situation, nd, in theabsenceof a genuinedemocracy,withthecountry unby an oligarchy

2 G. A. Almond and J. S. Coleman,The Politics of theDeveloping Areas (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityress), p. 572.

3 Almondand Coleman, op. cit.



244 INTERNATIONALAFFAIRS

of civil and military fficials, he Bengalis foundthemselves n theposition f a colonialpeople.

Region rather hanreligion

When Ayub Khan came to power in 1958, therewas completeauthoritarianule n thecountry rom 958 to 1962; then ame a periodof controlled r guideddemocracy, nderwhichthe President nd thesame old rulingelite dominatedthe political scene. What had beenveiledbefore1958 nowbecame moreobvious. The resultwas a furtherwidening f the gap betweenEast and West Pakistan. The political

order s setup by Ayub in his 1962constitutionavehardly ny scopeto theBengalisfor effectivend equal participationn nationalaffairs.Theyhadno share nthedecision-makingrocess. In anyvitalnationalissuethey ouldonlyreact;they ouldnever ct.4

No self-respectingroupcould tolerate his state of affairs.Nation-alismorpatriotism annotbe expected o groworflourishn a vacuum.It is only through articipation nd sharingresponsibilityhatpeopledevelop nationalfeelings.There was hardly nyscope fortheBengalis

to develop commonnational feelingswiththe West Pakistanis, partfrom hereligious ond of Islam. But, as in many otherparts ofAsiaand Africa, theybecame more and more conscious of region ratherthanreligion.The Islamic ideology, n whichJinnahhad based Pak-istan,began to peter away, and regionalfeelingsgrew fast in EastBengal. Regionalism was the raison d'etre for the emergenceofBangladesh.

Henceforth,ast Bengal becamea hotbedforpolitical gitation nd

unrest.Hardly a yearpassed without engalisrevolting gainst llegedmaltreatmenty the centralgovernment;heresultwas shootings ndkillings,whichgave furthermpetus o the growth f Bengali nation-alism. By the 1960s, most of the urban professional engali groupswerebeginning o consider eriouslywhetherhey ould or would ive to-getherwith heWestern artof thecountry. People no longer oncealedtheirhatred f WestPakistan.But thegreatest low toPakistannation-alism came as a result of the Indo-Pakistanwar in September1965.

Neitherndia norPakistan ould claimvictory rbe considered efeatedin the 17-day war. In fact,Pakistan,witha much smallerarmy, irand naval force,did quite well in 1965by comparisonwithwhathap-pened in December 1971. But thewar of 1965 disastrouslyweakenedthenationalbond betweenEast and West Pakistan. Untilthena com-mon fearof external ggressionhad, like the religious ink,been animportantactorn helping hetwo partsofthecountryo livetogether.

4 See the author's ConstitutionalDevelopmenztn Pakistan (2nd edition) (London:

Longman1970), p. 247.




There was a deep-rootedmyththat if India attackedEast Pakistan,WestPakistani soldierswould move up to Delhi. The 1965 war shat-tered hatmyth orgood. Mr. Bhutto,Ayub's foreignminister, roudlyclaimed n the NationalAssembly hatEast Pakistanhad been protectedby China. If thatwas so, the Bengalis began to argue,why do we notsettleour own diplomatic nd external elations?Why depend on WestPakistan,whichcouldgive no protection o East Pakistan? Within nehourof thewar,East Pakistanwas cut off, ot onlyfromWest Pakistan,but from he restof theworld. So the old argumenthatthe defence fEast Pakistan ay in WestPakistanno longerheldwater.

It was under these circumstances hat Sheikh Mujibur Rahmanformulated is famous six-point rogramme; ut beforeexamining t,we should look at some economic and culturalfactors n the Bengalseparatistmovement.The Bengalis' most seriouscomplaintwas whatthey alled the economicexploitation' f East Pakistanby the Pakistancentralgovernment. t has been statedby many mpartial conomists,particularly merican nd British xperts, hatthe economic develop-mentof East Pakistanwas sadly neglected nd that something ught obe done about it. The present uthor, who used to believe in one

Pakistan,has pointedout in previous writings hat the most seriouschallengeto Pakistannationalismwas the economic disparity etweenEast and West Pakistan. Many moderateEast Pakistani eaders, ikeNural Amin and otherswho also wantedto live in a unitedPakistan,strongly rgedthegovernmento accelerate heeconomicdevelopmentof East Pakistanand thereby emove he mostseriousgrievance f theBengali separatists.But, unfortunately,his advice was not listened ocarefully r seriously.Nor was similar dvice from heAmericans nd

British. Insteadthegovernmentccused theWesternpowers,particu-larlytheAmericans, f encouragingecession n East Pakistan. Presi-dent Bhutto in particularmade these wild accusations; so did thecontrolledpress in West Pakistan. If the Pakistan government adlistened o thewise counsel of friendly ountries, he tragedy f 1971might ave beenavoided.

But sincepoliticalpowerwas exercisedby a narrow ligarchywholookedat thewhole situation ntirely rom hecolonial angle of main-

taininglaw and order', it was futile o expectany imaginative co-nomic programme r plans. At the time of Independence,giganticefforts eremadeto speedup economicgrowth.But, tragically,herateof economicgrowthn thedevelopment lanswas muchslower n Eastthanin WestPakistan. Many figures ave been published o illustratethisdisparity. ome mayhave been exaggerated orpolitical purposesbut evenmaking llowance forthis,theyconvincingly emonstrateheextent o whichthe East's interestswere neglected.The bulk of the

country'srevenuewas spent in West Pakistan because the federal



246 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

capitalwas there.Moreover, highpercentagef the budgetwas spenton defence,whichwas all concentrated n West Pakistan. A muchlarger hare of developmentxpenditure s well as of foreign id andloans went to the West. East Pakistan earnedmost of the country'sforeignxchangebyexportingts ute; yetmostof theforeign xchangewas spenton the industrialisationf West Pakistan. Whether t wasrevenueor development xpenditure, oreign ssistanceand loans orforeign xchange,East Pakistandid not get its fair share,though hemajorityf thecountry's opulation ived there.

A recent eport y a panel of experts o thePakistangovernment'splanning commissionprovides authoritativedocumentationof the

increasingeconomic disparitybetween the two regions. The moststriking act n thisreport s thewidening ap between he income ofthe average West Pakistani and his Easterncounterpart. n 1959-60,the per capita income n West Pakistan was 32 per cent.higher hanintheEast. Over thenext enyears he annualrate of growth fincomein WestPakistan was 6-2 per cent.while it was only 4-2 per cent. inEast Pakistan. As a result,by 1969-70 the per capita income in theWestwas 61 per cent.higher hanin the East. Thus in ten yearsthe

incomegap doubled in percentage erms; it increasedeven more inabsoluteterms.5

No East Pakistani,whetherhe was a regionalist r a nationalist,could watchthissituationwithequanimity.The economicdisparity, reconomicexploitation, s it was called by the regionalists, rovidedthemwithpowerfulweapons to win popular support. The situationcould be compared to that whichprevailed n undivided ndia whenJinnah onvincedtheMuslim intelligentsiand the masses that their

rights nd interestswere not safe underCongressrule in India. Hecataloguedthe list ofMuslimgrievances nderCongressrule;whethertheseallegationswereall true or not,theimportanthingwas that theMuslims believed n Jinnah's ersionof theirplight.Similarly,heikhMujib and his partywere highly uccessfuln convincinghe emotionalBengalis that their nterests nd rightswere not safe witha govern-ment ontrolled nd directed romWestPakistan. This led theyoungerand more militant ectionsof theAwamiLeague to start movement

for secession. SheikhMujib himselfhas confessed n a recent nter-view witha British ournalist hathe had been working orthe estab-lishmentfBangladeshfor ometime ; the flagof the newnationwasalreadythere; the slogan 'Jai Bangla' (Victoryto Bangladesh)washeard ong before hetragic vents f March 1971.

5 Quoted fromEdward S. Mason, Robert Dorfman nd StephenA. Manglin, Conflictin East Pakistan: Background and Prospects London: BangladeshAction Com-mittee. 971), artrIr, . 4.

6 SheikhMujib's televisionnterviewwith David Frost (London Weekend Television,January 6, 1972).




Now turningo cultural actors,t should enoted hatwhenJinnahdeclared hatby every efinitionnd standard he Muslims f Indiaconstituted separate ation rom he Hindus,7 is two-nationheorywas probablymore pplicable oNorthernndia than o Bengal.TheBengaliMuslims nd Hindushad manydifferences;heMuslims fundivided engalhad many rievancesgainst heupper-classengaliHindus, rBhadralokfBengal, s theywere alled. ButthemajorityofBengaliMuslims nd Hindus lso had many hingsn common:theirway of life,social customs, ehaviour-patterns.he BengaliMuslims'upport f Jinnah'semand or he stablishmentf Pakistanwasbasedon a negativettitude. heBengalisrenoted or negativeand destructivettitudeatherhan forhard workand constructiveprogrammes.hey lso havea tremendousendencyoputtheblameon others. n pre-Independenceays, theyblamedthe British ndthen heHindus,withwhom hey ouldnotcompeten any sphere flife. Jinnah's emand or state ppealed otheBengaliMuslims, otbecauseofthe two-nationheory,ut because heyookedupon t asa protectiveall gainsthewealthyndprivilegedindus.

Language n emotivessueButwhen,with heestablishmentfPakistan, hey ound hat he

privilegedosition ftheBritish nd theupper-classindushadgoneto the WestPakistanis,hey tartedtressingheir ultural nd lin-guistic ffinities ith the Bengalis of West Bengal. The Pakistanauthoritiesegarded his as a seriousmenaceto the existence fPakistan nd tried o impose cultural niformityased on Islam.TheBengalis eacted harply. heyfelt-just s theMuslims fun-dividedndia had felt-that heir herishedulturend way of lifewere hreatened.he firstusslewas overthe anguage uestion. n1948 theBengalisreacted iolentlyo Jinnah's roposal hatUrdushouldbe theonlynationalanguage.On February 1, 1952,threestudentsf Dacca Universityerekilledna riot ver his ssue.Sincethen, ebruary1 has beenobserveds a day ofmourningorthecherishedanguageftheBengalis.

ThePakistan overnmentailed o appreciatehefact hatnationsaremadeup ofhuman eingswhosedeep feelingsbout such ques-tions s theiranguage annot e safely gnored.A federal nion anbe strengthenedy giving ultural reedomnd autonomy. ut Pak-istan'sattempt o impose uniformityherediversity as desirablehad unfortunateonsequences. very ttemptmade by the Pakistangovernmento encouragend foster cultural niformityased onIslamic ulturen East Pakistan roduced sharpreaction;heBen-

7 See M. A. Jinnah's orewordn M.R.T.: Pakistan& MuslimIndia (Bombay. 1942).



248 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

galis began to look more and more to West Bengal for cultural ffinityand bonds. The Indians, who also had notbeen happyabout Jinnah'stwo-nation heory, ave encouragementnd sympathyo the growingseparatistmovementn East Bengal. The BengaliMuslim ntelligentsiaweremore at homewiththeBengaliHindus in WestBengal thanwiththeirfellow-countrymenromWest Pakistan. Culturally,nd perhapspsychologically,hecountrywas divided ongbefore he recent risis nPakistan.

SheikhMujib'ssixpointsWhen heikhMujiburRahman ormulatedis six-pointrogramme

soon after hewar of 1965, large ection f his followerseemed ohaveoptedfor a separate tate. The six pointswere mbiguousndcapableof more han ne interpretation.he first aid thatPakistanshouldbe a truly ederal tate,which mplied, o doubt, unitedPakistan.But it is verydoubtful hetherheprogrammes a wholecouldbe describeds a scheme or true ederal nion; t was moreveiled cheme or ecession. he powers f the entral overnment,orinstance, ere trictlyimited o twoor three-defence,oreignffairs,and,withmany eservations,commonurrency.

But themost mportanteaturefSheikhMujib's programme asthatwhatheproposed o givethecentre ith ne hand,he tookfromit with heother.The centre as given efence, utno money o dis-chargetsdefence bligations;twould have to depend n the con-tributionsf theprovinces. imilarly,oreign ffairs ere giventothe entre,utnot xternalconomic elations.t is difficulto see howto make neat distinctionetweenhepoliticalndeconomic spects

ofexternalelations,articularlyn a developingountryikePakistan.When he ix-pointrogrammeasformulatedarlyn1966,Mujib

might ave beenwillingo makesomeadjustmentsnd amendments,but Ayub preferredo meet the challengewith the languageofweapons' rather hanby politicalnegotiations.8hat was a fatalmistake.But the worstmistakewas to implicateMujib in a highlycontroversialonspiracyaseknowns theAgartalaConspiracyase'whenhe was already nder rrest. eople asked,howcould he be a

party o the onspiracyincehewasalreadynprison?After hefallofAyub,General ahiyamadea numberfgestures

totry owintheconfidenceftheBengalis.He allowed ree nd fairelectionsn the basis of 'one man,one vote', and Mujibwon anabsolutemajority. ahiya lsoacknowledgedhefact hat heBengalishadno share n thedecision-makingrocessesnd that hisstateofofaffairs ust e ended.But thesemeasures ere oo late. Another

8 Pakistan Times,February17, 1966.




analogycan be made with the period of British rule. In the 1940s,theCongress ried o make a number f concessions o Jinnah nd theMuslims. But by that time theMuslims had alreadydecided to havea separate state. Similarly, he scheme for a transfer f power asformulatedy Yahiya in 1969 was too late; theBengalishad alreadydecidedto have a state of theirown. Just s Jinnah sed the electionof 1946 to establishhis credentials s the sole spokesman nd leaderof Muslim ndia, so Mujib used Yahiya's electionon thebasis of oneman, one vote' to establish his credentials s the spokesman of theBengalination.

It was most unfortunatend tragic that the politicaldynamics n

Pakistan n 1969-71 were notfully ppreciated. Once theelectionwasover, twas not only futile ut most unwiseto challenge heikhMujib.The resultwas a colossal loss of human ives and one of thegreatesthumantragedies f modemhistory. ndia, no doubt,playeda partinthe disintegration f Pakistan,but the real responsibilityies in thehistory f the last two decades of Pakistan, when a majority f thecountry's opulationwas treated ike a colonial people. The civil andmilitaryuling lite s solelyresponsible or hetragedy.

Now thatBangladeshhas been established,t is to be hoped thatits people's long sufferingnd miserywill come to an end. The bigquestion s whether he Awami League leadership,whichwas fosteredon negative hinking, ill be equal to the great constructivehallengesfacing heunfortunateengalinationof 75 millionpeople.

bangladesh why it happened

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