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Chapter 2

BANGLADESH ARMY: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION

2.1 Introduction

Army as an organisation for defence and aggression was in existence from ancient

times, but forms of the military in terms of weapons, modes of war, vehicles,

hardware and civil supply, recruitment and training, etc. have been an ever-changing

affair. The size and complexity of the military was contingent on the size of the state.

The socio-political landscape of the state would be a decisive factor in determining

the nature of the armed forces. In most post-colonial states, military’s decisive role in

the independence struggle may induce them to claim for a fare share in the post-

independence nation-building process. As far as Bangladesh is concerned, closeness

to the history and glorification of its combatant spirit made the armed forces

exceedingly popular among the masses of the country. Sometimes, the masses had

found analogy between war heroes and warriors in their folklore narratives. The

situation has provided a windfall of opportunity for the army to interfere in the

civilian affairs of the state in the post-independence period. On the other hand, the

army has successfully used its wisdom and experience of being a central figure in the

war of independence. Therefore, after forty years of the liberation war, it is essential

to re-examine the root causes of the Bangladesh Army’s affinity towards the civilian

affairs of the state. The subject may be discussed—for the sake of convenience—

under the following sub-headings: ancient, medieval, colonial, Pakistani and

Bangladesh periods.

2.2 Ancient Period

History of the Bangladesh Army could be traced back to the Gupta Empire (AD 320-

550). Though the armed forces played a major role in the kingdoms before the Gupta

Empire, it had become an organised force during this time. The pre-Gupta period of

Bengal is shrouded with obscurity. Before the conquest of Samudragupta (AD 335 –

375), Bengal was divided into two kingdoms: Pushkarna and Samatata. According to

the available inscriptions, Chandragupta II (375-415) had defeated a league of Vanga

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kings resulting in Bengal becoming part of the Gupta Empire (Broom, 1850:8). The

prosperity and happiness Chandra Gupta’s empire is attached by the foreign traveller

Fa-Hien, a Chinese Budhist monk who travelled to India in order to obtain authentic

copies of the scriptures. He noted the peacefulness prevailing in India, the rarity of

serious crimes and the mildness of the administration (Basham,1954:65). During

Gupta period, Senapati, or Mahasenapati, was the Commander-in-Chief of the King's

army—the highest military officer of the state. Separate officers under the supervision

of Mahasenapati managed the various divisions of the army viz., infantry, cavalry,

elephants and boats. Horses had to be procured from distant lands in the north-west

and north-east. The phrase Gauda-Malava-Khasha-Huna-Kulika-Karnata-Lata,

which occurs in most of the inscriptions of the Palas, could be interpreted to refer to

the fact that different tribal people and people from different areas of India were

absorbed in the service of the state. Also, there are references in the inscriptions to

some special officers such as Kottapala, in charge of forts, and Prantapala, the

Warden of the Marches (Broom, 1850:11). The list of officials available in the Pala

records, however, shows many other names as well. However, in view of the absence

of sufficient clarity regarding their meaning, their functions cannot be properly

ascertained. The Gupta Empire collapsed in the sixth century AD under the impact of

continues attack by the Hunas and also weakened. This led to another phase of

political disintegration in north India. Bengal also must have taken advantages of the

collapse of the Gupta empire to wrest sovereign power and so it came across two

powerful kingdoms, Gaur and Banga in sixth century AD (Sengupta, 2011:32). As

mentioned earlier, Chinese traveller Fa-Hien travelogue contains descriptions gives a

graphic picture of the imperial Guptas in Bengal.

2.3 Medieval Period

Medieval period witnessed the Mugal invasion in Indian subcontinent. The Mugal

invasion and the rule in Bengal, as in elsewhere in India, depended heavily on the

military strength. The Mugals had a well-organised army. The establishment of

authority over the subjugated but not too submissive population, and the threat of

expansionist policy of the Delhi sultans necessitated the maintenance of strong armed

forces composed of cavalry, artillery, infantry, elephants and navy, of which the

sultan himself was the chief. At the same time, geo-physical climatic conditions

36

prevented the use of cavalry throughout the year in Bengal (Bourchier, 1850:18). The

cavalry was probably the weakest component of the Bengal army. Good quality

horses were not available in this part and the sultans had to depend on the supply of

horses from foreign countries were the chief of the cavalry. The artillery was an

important section and the Mughal ruler Babar characterised it as a very effective part

of the Bengal army.

Mugals utilised military supremacy of the Bengal army over that of Arakan1 and

Tippera2 was largely due to the efficiency of the artillery. The artillery used cannons

and guns of various sizes. The paiks formed the vital part of the Bengal infantry

during this period. There were occasions when the paiks also tackled political

situations. The special battle array of the foot-soldiers who used bows, arrows and

guns, attracted the attention of Babar. The navy had played a significant role in

riparian Bengal during this period. In fact, the cavalry could ensure the hold over this

country for a period of six months whereas the boats backed by the army could

command supremacy over the other half of the year (Majumdar, 1954:17). These facts

somehow substantiate the historical roots of Bengal knighthood and negating the

British and Pakistani martial race theory in Indian subcontinent.

Ikhtiyar Uddin Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar Khilji, one of the Qutb-ud-din-Aybak’s

(AD, 1206) associates and a reckless adventurer, was responsible for bringing Islam

and Turkish rule to Bengal. His men overran vulnerable Buddhist monasteries in

neighbouring Bihar before turning their attention to the northwest part of the Ganges

delta, then ruled by a generous Hindu monarch. Disguising themselves as horse

dealers, Bakhtiyar and his men slipped into the royal city of Nudiya. Once inside, they

rode straight to the king’s palace, where they confronted the guards with brandished

weapons. Utterly overwhelmed, for he had just sat down to dine, the Hindu monarch

hastily departed through a back door and fled with many of his retainers to the

forested hinterland of eastern Bengal, abandoning his kingdom altogether (Eaton,

1993:4). Bakhtiar’s invasions were strongly motivated by the Islamic fervour to

1 Akaran has been an independent kingdom for over four millennium and its relations with Bengal was very intimate, specially Chittagong, the south-eastern part of Bangladesh, which derived its name in consequence of the victory over the local chieftain by King Chula Taing Chandra of Akran in 953 AD. 2 Tippera is the anglicized name of Tripura. It was one of the largest ancient kingdoms of the Bodo-Kachari ethnicity in the north-eastern part of South Asia.

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spread the new religion. Indeed, Bengal, along with the whole of north India, had

become, in the twelfth centaury, a playground for the Turkish-Afghan adventures. It

was in the year 1201 that Bakhtiar made his famous and well-described raid into the

heart of Bengal, then ruled by the aged Lakshmansen. But, he withdrew to reverine

East Bengal, which was beyond the reach of the Turks. Lakshmansen died around AD

1206. His two sons, Bishwarup Sen and Keshav Sen, ruled East Bengal with the usual

imperial titles. Thereafter, no reference to them, although, in general, eastern Bengal

stayed outside Delhi’s rule for nearly half a century (Sengupta, 2011:59). Mughal

invasion in the eastern region often received financial and logistical help from the

predominant trading community in the region called Marwaris. Their economic

interests in the region induced the Marwaris to go along with the invading force.

During this period, East Bengal was another important region for a wide variety of

textiles. In fact, the Marwaris and Mughals collaborated in the conquest of Bengal.

Where the Mughals provided the Marwaris with the political security essential for

business transactions, the latter provided the Mughals with financial capital obtained

through their networks of fellow caste-members residing all over northern India In

theory, imperial officeholders spent only the cash raised from their assigned jāgīrs, or

territorially defined revenue units, to finance their military operations. In fact, though,

officers often needed more money than could be derived from their revenue

assignments, and in such cases turned to moneylenders. (Eaton,1993:87). Such an

economic relation has wide range ramification in the post and pre-colonial Bengal’s,

especially in the east, land and economic relations. That may be discussed in the

forthcoming chapters.

Since the time of Iwaz Khalji, who first organised a naval force in Bengal, the war

boats had been playing an important role in the political affairs of the country. Despite

being an indispensable part of the military department, the efficiency of navy eroded

towards the end of the Hussain Shahi dynasty that ruled during 1494-1538. Apart

from the maintenance of well-trained armed forces, the sultans depended heavily for

their defence on the forts. The soldiers were paid salary, and meals provided. The

paymaster was called ariz-i-laskar (Majumdar, 1954:19).

2.3.1 Battle of Plassey

The Battle of Plassey was a decisive war in which British East India Company

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defeated the Nawab of Bengal and his French allies and resulted in Company’s rule in

Indian sub-continent for the next 190 years. In the battle, a contingent of 800

European regular soldiers faced an army of nearly 50,000 troops from the Nawab of

Banglal’s standing forces. Not only was there numerical superiority on the Bengali

side, but in this instance artillery and the technical supremacy were against the

European force. Nevertheless, ‘in the most miserable skirmish ever to be called a

decisive battle’, the Europeans walked off with a victory which would change the

South Asian history (Woodruff, 1964:100). Literally, the British army was very weak

as an opponent to Nawab’s well-equipped and disciplined army. There never was a

military defeat of the Nawab of the Bengal army. Therefore, the British had to resort

other tactics to subjugate the Nawab. A covert operation carried out by the British

intelligence community toppled the military strength of Bengali forces. The British,

before the Battle of Plassey, had secretly bought off the commander of Nawab’s

armed forces.

Therefore, the history of Bengali armed forces also describes the history of shifting

loyalties of those who deal with their own ambitions for power. The small British

expeditionary force under Robert Clive secured its military triumph by a neat gamble

on prior political arrangement. From the incident at Plassey onwards, the British

waged more or less continues warfare against the Indian people by consolidating their

‘power in India and the conquest of other region, breaking up the old system of self -

sufficient and self-perpetuating villages, and supporting an elite whose self-interest

would harmonise with British rule. This much-discussed story reveals the character of

Bengali armed forces. This story has been time and again repeating the political

spectrum of Bangladesh even today to describe the character of the army. The

shadow/memory of General Mir Jafar’s, the General who betrayed Nawab, has played

a major role in the character formation of the Bengali armed forces. Later, both

Bengali politicians and military echelons were witnessed the betrayal of their fellow

comrades.

2.4 British Period

The organisation of the military during the British period was basically designed to

promote and perpetuate the colonial interests in India. Like many other colonial

empires, the number of metropolitan soldiers was less in British Indian armed forces

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rather its internal defence and security rested upon the locally recruited forces. For

reasons of cost, and because of the difficulties employing European soldiers in

tropical campaigns Britain sought to recruit from the natives.3 Therefore, Europeans

employed more natives in the armed forces who were both cheaper and healthier. For

instance, during that time, each soldier in Indian army cost approximately one-quarter

that of his British counterpart (Vandervort, 1998:43). The nationalist sentiments

among the armed forces in the colonies began to emerge in 1820s. In Indian scenario,

a widespread disillusionment was obvious within official circle of the Bengal army—

the other two presidency armies were Madras and Bombay. This disillusionment

encouraged a general resentment of the troops which composed this army. This

questioning was based on their actual experiences, namely a war with Burma (1824-

26) and a mutiny amongst Indian troops at Barrackpore in 1824 (Majumdar, 1971:37-

38). Subsequently, a debate which followed the Barrackpore mutiny encapsulated the

three conceptual frameworks which the British devised in order to comprehend their

hybrid military culture, namely, class, race and the European officer.

Of greater importance, and more far-reaching consequences, this sense of

disillusionment in the 1820s reflected a transitory phase in how British observers

chose to interpret indigenous military culture. A language of race partly replaced a

language of class as attentions shifted away from modeling an army on caste to

forming one that rested upon discrete racial characteristics. In reality, the Bengal army

was consciously recruited on caste basis in the initial stage. For many early

nineteenth-century observers the similarities between the two, especially when

considering their functions of social organization, were sufficient to allow them to be

used interchangeably (Robertson, 1858:44). By the 1820s, the army of Bengal had

taken on several characteristics which distinguished it from the armies of Bombay and

Madras. Most obvious of these was its homogeneity for recruitment in Bengal was

almost exclusively from the higher castes. This exclusivity was further refined by the

narrow regional focus of the Company's recruiting efforts. Brahmins and Rajputs

from Awadh and neighbouring areas of Bihar and Rohilkhand made up most of the

Bengal army. Bengal, especially the Ganges-Brahmaputra delta region, was

deliberately excluded. 3 British troops suffered heavy losses from decease in the Asante campaigns, as did French metropolitan troops in the Madagascar Campaign of 1895-96 and Spanish and US troops in Philippines and Cuba.

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In 1825, it was estimated that recruits from these higher castes accounted for 80 per

cent of the army. Another 10 per cent was composed of Muslims, once again largely

recruited from Awadh-Bihar. Muslims were keenly sought after for their cavalry skills

but the British enthusiasm was tempered by suspicions of their alleged cliquishness

and religious fanaticism. The remainder was drawn from an assortment of middle-

ranking and lower castes." In Bombay, British authorities went even further and

deliberately encouraged the recruiting of marginal castes and cultures to create what

one Bombay officer described as a 'most salutary mixture of castes' (Peers, 1991:547).

Bengal sepoys were drawn from the agrarian society and were to English eyes a

sturdy independent peasantry—roughly equivalent to the idealised Scottish

highlander. (Singh, 1976:251)4. Soldiers from Awadh and neighbouring areas were

taller and more masculine than those from Bengal, the Deccan or further south. One

officer complained that the Bengalis were too feminine while those from further west

than Awadh were considered too 'apelike'. It is obvious that the Bengal recruits fitted

neatly into all the categories of soldierly-like appearance that had been devised in

Britain.

After the ‘Sepoy’ mutiny of 1857, the colonial administration devised the notion of

the “martial race” and began to recruit from only those ethnic and caste groups, which

they identified as inherently martial and more war-mongers than others (Cohen,

1990:140-43). The rebellious attitude of Bengali soldiers influenced the British policy

makers to reduce the strength of these groups in their armed forces. The process of

Indianisation of the army was very slow throughout the British rule. The recruitment

of natives was gradually increased in the colonial army to meet the troop scarcity in

the World War II. Among the natives, the number of Bengalis had always been low

and their recruitment was more or less restricted to the technical services.5 By going

through these facts we can assume that the reduction of Bengali citizens in the

colonial forces immediately after the 1857 uprising was not a sudden decision.

It seems to be the culmination of colonial pre-occupation and communal hatred

4 In Bengal, the minimum standards for recruits were 5'8" versus 5'6" in Madras and Bombay. Bengal recruits were also required to weigh twenty pounds heavier than those in Madras. 5 During the World War II, these were about 60,000 Bengalis in various construction units of British Indian army.

41

towards a particular group. At the same time, the reality is that the approximately 35

per cent of the Bengal army in 1830 was composed of men with between 10 to 17

years' service (Spiers, 1980:48-49). Therefore, after the 1857 uprising, the British

Indian Army underwent a few structural changes. The Bengal Army was disbanded

and reorganised in 1861. The Royal Commission of 1858 recommended that the army

be composed of different nationalities and castes, and as a general rule, be mixed

promiscuously through each regiment.

The Indian regiments were thus constituted under four different systems, ie, general

mixture, class company mixture, regimental mixture, and the village system. Before

the revolt, there had been two descriptions of Indian soldiers - the regular and the

irregular. Under the former system, a regiment of Indian Cavalry had 23 European

officers and 13 Indian commissioned officers. The Indian infantry in Bengal consisted

of 26 European officers and 20 Indian commissioned officers. The number of other

ranks varied in the three Presidencies. Under the irregular system, a regiment had but

three to five European officers, generally a Commandant, a Second in Command, and

an Adjutant (Chaudhuri, 1967:47). Authors like J.W Fortesque argue that the British

were pre-occupied with martial race even before the 1857 uprising. They consider

martial race as a determining factor in the Indian military capabilities. He says, the

colonial administrators, both military and civilian, were equally prone to the use of

stereotypes in determining the recruitment base of the armed forces (Fortesque,

1899:122, Mason, 1974:23). One such change was related to the ratio between the

British and Indian elements in the army, and was designed to strengthen surveillance

of the ‘native’ troops by the British soldiers’.

According to Dr. Mahbub Ullah, ‘the British mainly recruited the armed forces from

the martial races such as Pathans and Punjabis in the subcontinent. Bengalis were

rarely considered recruited into the armed forces. The same situation continued even

after independence.”(Mehbubullah,2011) Subsequently, the Bengali representation

has been drastically reduced in the British armed forces. Therefore, at the time of

Indian-Pakistan partition; the representation of East Pakistan was extremely poor in

all three services of the Pakistan armed forces. This is because, in the pre-

independence period, there was neither a single Bengali regiment nor a cantonment in

the eastern half of Pakistan as no troop was permanently stationed there by the

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British.

During the British rule, unlike the other part of India, Bengal witnessed a series of

rebellions against the British Raj specially among working class and indigenous

people. The most notable rebellions are shown in the following Table.

Table: 2:1- Anti-Colonial Rebellions and Uprisings in Bengal

Sl.No. Name Year 1 The Dhalbhum Uprisings 1769-74 2 The Rangpur Rebellion 1783 3 The Bishnupur Rebellion 1789 4 The Chuar Rebellion 1799 5 The Sylhet Insurgency 1799 6 The Movement of Titu Mir at Barasat 1831 7 The Kol Rebellion 1831-32 8 The Bhumij Revolt led by Ganga Narayan

in Manbhum 1832

9 The Pagalpanthi Uprising in Mymensingh 1833 10 The Ferazi Insurgency 1838-47 11 The Santhal Revolt 1855-56

Source:Sengupta, Nitish (2011), The Land of Two Rivers: A History Of Bengal From the Mahabharata to Mujib, New Delhi: Penguin.p.223.

The number and nature of these movements depicts the rebellious character of rural

and urban Bengal, especially the working class. It seems these movements were

actuated by the highest motive of freeing the subaltern people from the exploitative

and capitalist colonial government.

The partition of the Indian sub-continent and the creation of India and Pakistan further

reduced the number of Bangles in the army as non-Muslim Bengali officers and

soldiers opted for India. Therefore, in 1947, the Bengalis constituted only one per cent

of the armed forces in Pakistan (Cohen, 1990:43). The facts on British attitude

towards Bengali armed forces reveal the imperial racist underpinnings coupled with

its predatory instincts. Remarks made by Lord Canning had proved the imperial

attitude in this regard. He says, ‘the people of Bengal are for the most part, less

warlike and turbulent than those of upper India”(Lawrence,1932:36). But later his

observation proved wrong during the 1857 upraise when the Bengal army rose to the

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occasion acting unitedly against political and economic injustices of the British Raj.6

Because of this, Bengali armed forces treated as ‘downgraded’ and ‘incapable of

being a warrior’. After the formation of Pakistan—dominated by the so called

‘warrior classes’—both population and the armed forces of its eastern province were

treated as second class citizens by following these colonial parameters. On the other

hand, Pakistan had failed to overcome the racist notions and prejudices, which was

imposed by the colonial administration against its own people.

2.5 Post 1947 Scenario: Pakistan Phase

Partition of British India also witnessed the partition of armed forces. The partition

had a subsequent affect on the infrastructure and logistical facilities of Pakistan army.

Because of the disparity in size between India and Pakistan, the later naturally

received fewer stores, supplies and facilities. Author Stephen P Cohen says,

“The two domination-shared assets in the proportion of 64:36, which is roughly,

paralleled the communal balance. Pakistan received six armoured regiments (to India’s

fourteen), eight artillery regiments (to India’s forty) and eight infantry regiments (to

India’s twenty one) of the fixed installations. It also received the staff college situated in

Quetta; the royal Indian Academy Service Corps School (at Kakul); and a few other

miscellaneous facilities, as well as several regimental training centres, important naval

facilities at Karachi and Chittagong, and the obsolete defensive infrastructure of the

Northwest Frontier” (Cohen, 1990:7).

Cohen’s analysis reveals that, in short, Pakistan had to begin with limited

infrastructure and resources during the partition.

2.5.1 Bengali Representation in Pakistan Army

However, Pakistan further raised two battalions of East Bengal regiment in 1948.

Even after the formation of the first exclusive Bengali infantry regiment,

representation of Bengalis remained low in the Pakistan armed forces. This is because

of the Pakistani ruling class continued with the British concept of ‘martial race’ and

most of the commanding posts were held by the west Pakistanis. Bengalis were

6 People{soldiers}who triggered the 1857 mutiny were Bengalis{two}. It lifted Bengalis’ image in the eye of the general public. However, it is interesting to note that those Indian troops which mutinied in 1857 were mostly from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.

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considered physically unfit for the military service. From the very beginning, there

was a clear dominance of a particular region within the military or any other

important national institutions. These groups were from the western Pakistan. Bengali

representation in the national bureaucracy remained extremely weak. Nine years after

the creation of Bangladesh, only 51 top level policy-making positions were occupied

by the Bengalis in the Bengal Secretariat out of a total of 741 such position. Bengali

representation of the army was minimal, 98 per cent of the officer corps of the army,

navy and air force was composed of West Pakistanis (Islam, 1981:63).

2.5.2 Beginning of Pakistan Army Rule

Bangladesh, as an eastern province of Pakistan first experienced the army rule in

1958. This intervention was a pre-emptive action that was designed to foil the

Parliament election scheduled to be held in 1959 in order to prevent the autonomist

Bengali middle/lower middle classes from gaining control over the decision making

process by getting elected to the parliament. ‘The dominant sectors of West

Pakistan—the landless elites, the entrepreneurs and the civil military bureaucracy—

viewed the demand for East Bengal’s autonomy as detrimental to their interests and

were not willing to allow them to come to power’ (Maniruzzaman, 1980:10). From

the 1958 coup to 1962, General Ayub Khan ruled Pakistan through a totally closed

system ran directly by the military in collaboration with the civilian bureaucracy.

With the drafting of a new constitution in 1962 he established a “Constitutional

Autocracy”.

Ayub Khan made himself leader of the Convention Muslim League (CML), a faction

of the former ruling party. Meanwhile, the Muslim League which lost its credibility in

East Bengal rapidly after 1947 and was routed in the 1954 provincial elections. The

new constitution of 1962 introduced a controlled political system known as “Basic

Democracy” where power to elect both the president and parliament was vested in an

Electoral College of 80,000 basic Democrats. By providing various kinds of

patronage to the democrats it was easy for Ayub Khan and his hand-picked CML to

‘win’ in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1964 and 1965 respectively

(Jahan, 1980:32). Through this process, the civil military bureaucratic regime tried to

legitimize itself and strengthened its non-military support base. The policy making

apparatus were controlled by the members of the top echelons of the civil and military

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bureaucrats where the Bengalis were virtually left out. In 1963 Bengali presence in

the officer ranks of the Pakistani army was only two per cent and most of who were in

the ranks of Colonel or bellow. In the central secretariat, in 1966, only 20.1 per cent

officers were from East Bengal. Again most of them were in the lower ranks and none

of the secretaries from East Bengal (Sobhan, 2007:143). As far as economy is

concerned, the Ayub regime followed a policy of growth without equitable

distribution. Both Import Substituting Industrialisation (ISI) and infrastructural

investment were given to the West Pakistan than in East Pakistan. The policies

virtually turned East Bengal into an internal colony of West Pakistan. East Bengal

was used as a market for and supplier of raw materials for those industries. Author

Noman says that, by 1968, 22 families, all of whom were West Pakistanis, were the

owners of 66 per cent of the Banks and 97 per cent of the insurance funds in Pakistan.

In contrast, in 1970, the maximum amount of capital owned by any particular Bengali

house was Taka 75 million (Noman, 1988:41).

Such an exclusionary politico economic fiscal situation seriously affected the politico-

military system of Pakistan. The control over the policy making bodies by the top

west-Pakistani civil military bureaucrats and the chronic poverty in the eastern side

gave an opportunity for East Pakistan to brush-up their aspiration for regional

autonomy. For Bengalis this was the high time that they could achieve control over

the decision making process in Pakistan. Military regime’s denial of these demands

radicalised Bengali politics that ultimately culminated into a mass upheaval in 1968-

69 which finally overthrew Ayub’s civil-military regime.

Collapse of the Ayub-system, however, did not bring any civilian government to

power. Instead, an arbiter-type military government led by General Yahya Khan took

charge in Pakistan. The new government agreed to hold parliamentary elections and

transfer power to the elected representatives. The election results, however, made it

impossible for Yahya Khan, the military and the West Pakistani properties section and

the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) led by Zulfikkar Ali Bhutto( which won majority in

Pakistan) to transfer power to the Awami League (AL). Belligerent nature of the

political class and radical forces made a sharp politico-ideological polarisation among

the East Pakistanis.

To protect the interests of the dominant sectors of West Pakistan, the arbiter type

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military government opted for a military solution to the problem of power transfer or

transition to the civilian system and cracked down on East Bengal in late March 1971.

The number of Bengalis was slowly increased in the Pakistan military only after they

performed well in the 1965 war with India. However, there was a strong resistance

within the Pakistan army even to the gradual expansion of East Pakistan’s

representation in the military service. In 1968, East Pakistan had four battalions. Six

more Bengali battalions were also raised in 1968-69. In spite of all these efforts, East

Pakistan had hardly any representation in the higher echelons of the army. In 1970,

there was only one lieutenant general from East Pakistan (Ahmed, 1988:34). In 1971,

the Bengalis constituted five per cent of the total strength of the Pakistan Army. Navy

and air force were 9 and 11 per cent respectively (Bangladesh Documents, Vol.I,

1971:20). The under-representation and ethnic segregation made the Bengali army

personnel more conscious about the regional imbalance in the Pakistan armed forces.

The Bengali military personals also felt that they were discriminated in terms of pay,

promotion and other privileges.

These corporate grievances made the Bengali officers vocal against the West

Pakistani ruling elites. Furthermore, while the civil-military bureaucracy complex was

well entrenched into the power structure in Pakistan, the participation of Bengalis in

the political decision making process was meagre. Under such circumstances, the

Bengali army officers not only agitated for the protection of their corporate interests,

but also sympathised with East Pakistan’s struggle for greater economic and political

share. Meanwhile, many prominent Bengalis implicated in the infamous Agartala

Conspiracy Case of 1968 for their alleged involvement in trying to separate from

Pakistan with the help of India. Apart from civil servants and politicians, a number of

serving and retired army officers were also involved in this case (Bangladesh

Documents, Vol.I, 1971:20). Agartala conspiracy case has played a major role in

igniting the national sentiments of East Bengal.

Moreover, by late 1960s, several Bengali officers developed close contact with the

Awami League—a political party that advocates for free Bangladesh—leadership. All

these developments indicate that the officers from the East Bengal Regiment

maintained a strong sub-national Bengali identity during the Pakistan period. Author

Palit D.K says that, in early 1971, the total number of Bengali armed forces personnel

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stationed in East Pakistan was about 70,000 composed of approximately 6,000 regular

in the East Bengal regiment’s 6 battalions and 15,000 members of East Pakistan

Rifles— a paramilitary force who defends the borders. The rest were lightly armed

civilian forces like the police and the national guards such as Mujahids and Ansars

(Palit, 1972:52).

2.6 Bangladesh Liberation War

When Pakistan's army begins military crackdown against the self-determination

movement in its eastern province in 25 March 1971, the Bengali armed forces'

personnel provided the initial resistance to the Pakistan Army. This political

motivation of the East Bengal regiment personnel had been built during the critical

days of February and March 1971, which eventually prompted them to join the

liberation struggle of Bangladesh. When Mujibur Rahman gave the call for

emancipation from Pakistani rule in East Pakistan on March 7, 1971, the Bengali

population responded overwhelmingly. ‘It was also noticed that the men and officers

of the East Bengal regiment in different cantonment were in a rebellious mood’

(Safiullah, 1989:19-20). According to a former Bangladesh Army officer, “the notion

of ‘self-prevention’ forced the army cadre to transfer their loyalty from Pakistani state

to non-existent Bangladesh. The revolt demands not just the rejection of all beliefs,

but their replacement with nearly opposite ones. Extreme trauma, compressed with

the last week of March 1971, catalysed the transformation of loyal Pakistanis into

rebellious Bengali nationalists” (Ali, 1944:10-11). The Bengali army officers fighting

for the liberation of Bangladesh in different parts of the country strongly felt the need

of co-operating among themselves. Therefore, on 4 April 1971, some of them met in a

conference and formally organised the Mukti Bahini or the liberation force.

Turbulent political scenario and regional compulsions had prevented the East-Bengali

political leadership from effectively coordinating the armed forces during the

liberation war. The leadership crisis had profoundly vitiated the ground realities,

especially among the newly emerged armed groups of having different political

ambitions and loyalties. Therefore, a provisional government of Bangladesh was

formed at Mujibnagar in the Indian state of West Bengal on 17 April 1971 and

Tajuddin Ahmed was appointed as the prime minister. The government was supposed

to liberate Bangladesh from the Pakistani occupation and it immediately devoted itself

48

to organising Mukti Bahini. In order to coordinate the military operations,

Bangladesh was divided into 11 operational sectors and a regular military headquarter

was set up in Calcutta.

Participation of different armed forces was visible during the war of independence.

Though many of these armed militia groups were under different command and

control and shared different loyalties, it shared the common notion that stands for the

independence of East Bengal. However, there are many armed militia groups were

supported the Pakistan army for a unified Pakistan. The role indigenous people, the

Jummas—the term of collective self identification used by the Chittagong Hill Tracts

(CHT) people in recent years—were vital in the freedom struggle. Indigenous people

in the CHT had joined the liberation forces and played an active role in the liberation

of Bangladesh. However, Chakma Raja (King) Tridiv Roy—a member of the national

parliament—had sided with Pakistan, as he thought that this would better serve his

people's interests. This led to a general suspicion of Bengalis toward the indigenous

people in the CHT who were, unjustly, regarded as traitors (Arens and Kirti Nishan

Chakma,2002). Therefore, participation of Chakmas in the national freedom struggle

did not get proper honour and respect by both democratic and military regimes that

came into power in Bangladesh after 1971.

The Bangladesh liberation war was a politico-military struggle against the Pakistani

Army that lasted only nine months. Although the regulars constituted only a quarter of

the total strength of the Mukti Bahini, they in fact formed the core of the armed

resistance against the Pakistan Army. During the Liberation War, the regular forces

took the responsibility of leading most of the military operations, the political leaders

and other freedom fighters tried to motivate the people to lend support and participate

in the liberation war. The provisional government of Bangladesh had attached a

political wing to each army command to coordinate the activities of the regular

numbers of the armed forces and other civilian groups (Safiullah, 1989:255).

According to Ghopal Das, a veteran freedom fighter in the 1971 Bangladesh

Liberation war, says,

“It was a liberation war that we (the people of Bangladesh) fought against the invaders

with the help of Indian army and a number of East Bengali politico-military movements.

We were students when the war broke out. Initially, we joined with the Special Guerrilla

49

Forces (SPF) led by the Communist Party of Bangladesh. Later we merged with

National Awami Party, Bangladesh Students Union and finally with Mukti Bahini. Then

we jointly launched guerrilla operations against Pakistan's army and caused heavy

damage to the enemy. It is important to note that people from different classes of the

society actively participated in this war. Such an experience—working with the armed

forces to achieve a common cause—largely changed the popular perception about the

native armed forces among the masses from an oppressor to a saviour” (Das, 2011).

Considering people’s participation in the war, many of the rural population were

supported the Pakistan army during the initial stage of war. Contemporary

Bangladeshi cinema clearly points out the rural population’s attitude towards West

Pakistan army.7 For them the uprising in Dhaka and other part of East Pakistan was an

‘attempt’ at to ‘destabilise the idea of Pakistan’. They thought the entire

pandemonium regarding the regional autonomy was a fabricated one. However, this

perception did not had any communal or anti-Indian facets. The peaceful nature of

East Bangalis towards the Pakkistani forces has been lavishly discussed in the

memoirs written by many Pakistani military personnel after the liberation war. After

the war, sadly, many of these people were indicted with the charges of ‘collaboration

with Pakistani army’.

Because of its active participation in the liberation war, the armed forces were

exposed to various political groups and ideas. The war was fought without no strict

control and direction of a central command. The regular forces fought with the

different political groups in fragments under the command of army officers and met

the leaders of various political parties and factions. The military training and logistical

help, which was extended by India to Mukti Bahini also played major role in the

liberation war. Some argue that the militarisation of the refugee camps, irredentist

tendencies of West Bengal government, shared Bengali identity, lack of international

involvement and electoral concern over mandate were heavily politicised the newly

formed armed forces (Murshid, 2011:53). The result was that many army personnel

began to affiliate itself with different political parties. The strategy of guerrilla

7 Contemporary Bangladeshi cinema depicts an altogether different picture about the freedom struggle. For instance, Motir Moina (The Clay Bird), a critically acclaimed 2002 Bangladeshi film, shows the responses of rural population on the liberation war. In the movie, Kazi Saheb—father of the central character Anu, a young protagonist—thinks that the West Pakistan army is the savior of the East Pakistani people. But his perception got changed after the Pakistani forces began their mass murder campaign against Eastern Bengal. For details See, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0319836/.

50

warfare also radicalised a section of the army (Hossain, 1985:41-42). Participation of

different armed group in the liberation war is shown in the following chart.

Figure:2:1: Participation of Different Armed Groups in the Liberation War

*, East Bengal Rifles(EBR) Source: Based on the facts obtained from, A Regime of Thugs and Bigots: An Investigative Report by Murray Sayle, Sunday Times, London-July 11, 1971, Bangladesh Genocide Archive, http://www.genocidebangladesh.org/ , Sharmila Bose (2011), Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War , Columbia University Press and Tom Cooper and Syed Shaiz Ali Khan (2003), India - Pakistan War, 1971; Introduction on Indian-Subcontinent Data Base, http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_326.shtml

51

Another significant development in the liberation war was the participation of college

students in the movement. Large number of them joined the Mukti Bahini. Among

them, 58 were selected for officers training and subsequently commissioned in the

Bangladesh Army in October, 1971. A second batch of 65 cadets was in training.

They were commissioned in the army immediately after the liberation of Bangladesh.

All these newly commissioned officers were more influenced by the war than by the

regimental traditions of peacetime soldiering brought to the army a high degree of

politicisation (Jahan, 1986:61). Therefore, the armed forces converted into a

nationalist army during the liberation war.

The 1971 war put an end to the so-called isolation between the army and civilians that

had existed during the British and Pakistan period. The army officers while working

in close-cooperation with the civilians during the liberation war became aware of the

prevailing state of the weak political leadership and fragile political institutions. These

factors made them very conscious of political power. This led to emergence of a

highly pollicised army in Bangladesh after the Liberation War

Thus, the Liberation War of 1971 put the final addition on the politicisation of armed

forces in Bangladesh and radicalised a section of the freedom fighters so much, so

that they became revolutionary in their ideas. The attitude of the “repatriates” from

West Pakistan (about 28,000 in number (including 1000 officers) were followed a

conservative approach in case of nation building. Comparing with the freedom

fighters, the conservatives did not had any experience of participating in the

Liberation war. These groups were largely a conglomeration youth that politicised

with minimum knowledge about the reality that exists in the country after

independence.

2.7 Post Liberation Scenario (1971-1975)

The armed forces in Bangladesh were not in a completely organised manner during

the liberation movement and aftermath. It consisted of deserters from Pakistan army

and loosely organised freedom fighters. Therefore, the most serious and immediate

issue was how to co-opt several thousand freedom fighters in the various branches of

the armed forces, para-military and police (Jahan, 1986:61). Within a week of its

return to Dhaka the Bangladesh government in exile announced the scheme for

52

forming a ‘national militia’ comprising of all freedom fighters.8 On 2 January 1972,

an eleven member Central Board of National Militia was constituted under the

chairmanship of the prime minister. This scheme was designed to recognise all the

members of the Mukti Bahini so that the unprecedented zeal displayed by the youth

during the liberation struggle could be utilised in the national reconstruction

programme.

On January 10, 1972, Mujibur Rahman returned to Bangladesh and assumed the

leadership of the country. At the same time, Tajuddin’s idea of an integrated ‘national

militia’ began to receive less attention. Muja did not reject the idea of ‘national

militia’, but he emphasised more on disarming the Mukti Bahini members. However,

his call for the surrender of arms did not evoke much response from the freedom

fighters. A chaotic situation has been developed in Bangladesh following to the

surrender of Pakistan army. In the absence of effective administrative mechanism,

several sector commanders possessing vast quantities of arms were running almost

parallel administration. They also went on exerting political influence in every sphere

of administration. This was perceived by Mujib as a direct threat to his regime.

Having failed to deal the freedom fighters, the government had banned Mukti Bahini

on February 24 and all other guerrilla forces on February 27, 1972 (Ahmed, 1983:43).

Nevertheless, unrest soon gripped the army by this time as the military became clearly

divided into two groups; “Freedom Fighters” and “Returnees”.

2.7.1 Freedom Fighters and Returnees9

The rift between Freedom Fighters and Returnees became explicit during the first half

of Mujib’s regime. The division between these two groups became evident from

publication of opinions in an English weekly Holiday, which began a series of articles

in 1972 on problems facing the Bangladesh Army in a newly independent state.10 The

articles revealed the belligerent nature of both groups. It is interesting to note that one 8 The Bangladesh government-in-exile headed by Tajuddin Ahmed returned to Dhaka on December 22, 1971 after the Pakistan army had surrendered to the Allied Forces on December 16, 1971. 9 ‘Freedom Fighters’, who had taken part in the war of independence and the ‘Returnees’ who had been stationed in the West Pakistan in the time of independence and not been repatriated until 1973. 10 The articles appeared under a column named ‘view point’. The regular accompanying note of the ‘’editor stated that “every week in this column VIEW POINT, we print opinions of our readers on subjects we feel are popular interest and concern. The opinions, however, do not always coincide with those of Holiday".

53

of the article stated that, “the biggest of all the asylums which are sheltering Razakras

(Bengali name of collaborators) is the Bangladesh Army headquarters where

shockingly enough, almost all the officers sitting on the revolving chairs are

collaborators” (Holyday, 16 July 1972). The writer also accused the government for

crating frustration among the freedom fighters and warned that freedom fighters “are

only looking for a chance to strike back”.

Nevertheless, the ruling elite did not heed to these looming discontents within the

armed forces. Rather, Mujib’s attitude towards the armed forces was ambivalent to a

certain extent. His bitter experience as a prisoner of war with the Pakistan army

during the war of independence made him tactlessly harsh towards the armed forces.

A Bangladeshi political analyst says that, “on the one hand, he was proud of its

(army) contribution in resisting the aggressors and fighting for its motherland. On the

other hand, his natural suspicion of things military did not allow him to fully trust

them (Choudhuri, 1990:76). According to him, the proposed scheme of forming

‘national militia’ could not be implemented because the regular forces, who

participated in the liberation war, refused to join it. Therefore, the government

decided to raise a regular army, navy and air force; a para-military force—

Bangladeshi Rifles for defending the border; and a national police force for ensuring

law and order in the country. Later, the government announced that a selection board

would be formed for recruiting commissioned and non-commissioned officers. The

government also decided to setup a military academy to train the new officers for the

nation’s defence forces. Meanwhile, ideologically, Mujib government clearly sided

with the ‘freedom fighters’ group. Senior officials, those who upheld the ethos of

Pakistan, dismissed from the army. Instead of following the path of conciliation with

the belligerent groups in the army, Mujib followed a policy of punishing the group,

which had kept allegiance to Pakistan. As a result, a major portion of the armed forces

appeared to be the enemy of his regime.

In short, though the armed forces were marginally small in number it played a vital

role in the independent struggle. The struggle of Bengali armed forces against

Pakistan’s full-fledged army and its subsequent victory had categorically proved the

colonial categorisation of martial race was wrong.

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2.7.2 Bangladesh Army: In Search of Political Role (1971-1975)

Differences were pertinent among armed forces during the early stages of liberation

war over the military strategy had to be adopted during the war. Both the army high

command and the Bangladesh government–in-exile initially tried to follow

conventional military tactics and formations (Khan, 1986: 269-75). However, the

Bengali armed personnel suffered heavy casualties when they decided to confront

Pakistanis in an open conventional warfare. During the course of the war, many times,

the liberation forces defeated by the Pakistan army many times due to the lack of

training, experience and superior firepower. All these factors were necessitated a

change in the operational strategy. Author Maniruzzaman says,

In order to ensure more effective resistance to the occupational army and to mobilise

political support for it, Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed, Colonel (rtd) M.A.G. Osmani,

the commander-in-chief of the liberation forces and other army officers met in a

conference from July 11-17, 1971 at Teliapara in Sylhet district. The military strategy

prepared at this conference popularly known as Teliapara Strategy. The strategy was

with the completion of guerrilla operation, a full-scale military offensive would be

undertaken with the help of best materials available among the units and guerrilla forces

(Maniruzzaman, 1980:108-11).

Closeness with the political class, both in exile and domestic, made the cadre of

armed forces aware of the strength and weakness of the political parties and

institutions in pre and post-independent Bangladesh.

2.7.3 Factionalism in the Army

Bangladesh government in exile decided to raise the strength of the liberation forces

after July 1971, an extensive programme of recruitment of freedom fighters was

undertaken. The political leadership tried to ensure that only those freedom fighters

that were ideologically loyal to the Awami League would be recruited. Young men

affiliated to other political parties, particularly radical groups, prevented from

infiltrating into the armed forces (Maniruzzaman, 1980:112-13). However, yet

another military strategy initiated by sector commanders like Colonel Abu Taher and

Lt.Colonel M.Ziauddin during this time. They argued that instead of forming regular

battalions, all the experienced armed forces personnel should be dispersed in different

55

parts of the country to raise and train a “people militia” drawn from the peasantry. For

logistics, emphasised capturing enemy’s equipments rather than relying on foreign

help.

Moreover, they insisted that the military head quarters and the sector headquarters

should be shifted inside the Bangladesh territory. It was argued that the Pakistani

forces only be defeated through a form of people’s war based on national mobilisation

and overwhelming support of the Bengali population (Lifschuitz, 1979: 105-106).

Taher’s idea could not be worked out because of the opposition from a section of the

Bangladesh military command. Osmani and Major Safiullah opposed him and Khaled

Mosharraf when he recommended this strategy in a sector commanders’ conference

held at Calcutta in October 1971. The only two-army officers who supported Taher

were Major Ziaur Rahman and Lt. Colonel Ziauddin.

Literally, the political objective of Osmani and some of his military colleagues was to

put Awami League into power in an Independent Bangladesh in the shortest possible

time and with all available means. On the other hand, Colonel Taher’s group devised

a strategy, which was not only aimed at the attainment of independence but also the

socio-economic transformation of Bangladesh in the process of the struggle (Abrar,

1991:182-183). Therefore, the difference, which was existed, previously over the

question of war strategy for the Liberation War took a new form in post independence

period. The freedom fighters held two impeccable views with regard to the future

institutional framework of the Bangladesh armed forces. One groups opted for

continuing the traditional concepts and practices of a conventional military similar to

the pattern followed in the western liberal democracies while the other group

demanded a complete restructuring of the Bangladesh Army. The latter group

proposed that the army should convert into a ‘productive army’ based on Chinese

People’s Army. Both Colonel Abu Taher and Lt. Colonel Ziauddin were the

champions of this idea. They argued that in a poor and underdeveloped country like

Bangladesh, conventional army would only mean a greater economic burden on the

people or dependence on foreign military assistance.

In his testimony, Taher clearly stated that ‘during my career as a soldier, I realised

that a standing army was a burden on the national economies of developing and

underdeveloped countries. This form of an army is an obstacle to the social progress.

56

Such an army will make zero contribution to the national productivity (Lifschultz,

1979:85). The prevalence of antagonistic views regarding the role of the armed forces

in a newly independent country and the inculcation of revolutionary ideas like

Marxism among a section of the army personnel clearly demonstrated a high level of

politicisation of the Bangladeshi armed forces.

2.7.4 Rivalry between Freedom Fighters and Repatriates

After the independence, the newly constituted Bangladesh armed forces were mainly

composed of the freedom fighters. The Bengali military personnel who had been

stationed in West Pakistan and could not participate in the liberation war were

repatriated in 1973. The inclusion of, the repatriated added a new twist to the internal

schism in the Bangladesh armed forces. Three full battalion of the east Bengal

regiment returned from Pakistan with all their men, but were deliberately split up and

dispersed throughout the army. The choice of who was to be incorporated into the

army and in, which rank was decided based on loyalty and closeness to Sheikh Mujib

and the Awami League (Kegan, 1983:38).

In the early seventies, the freedom fighters used to dominate the military decision

making because of their close proximity with the Mujib’s regime. For their role in the

Liberation War, the freedom fighters standing in the society was much higher than

that of the repatriates. After the independence, they were given two years of seniority

in the service by the Awami League government as a gesture of appreciation. The

repatriates, on the other hand, treated as ‘collaborators’ and ‘potential traitors’ (Khan,

1986: 98). They were either retired prematurely or posted to insignificant commands.

Several senior repatriated officers bitterly resented in this regard.

Rivalry between these two groups had an ideological dimension too. The repatriated

armed personnel were already been indoctrinated with anti-Indian and radical Islamic

ideologies from Pakistan military academies. They retained much of the conservative

outlook since they did not undergo the experience of fighting a guerrilla war. The

repatriates remained as professional committed loyal soldiers. They were less

ideologically motivated and were opposed to the establishment of a people’s army and

a socialist state (Jahangir, 1980:16-18). Freedom fighters, on the other hand, were

highly nationalistic because of their active participation in the liberation struggle and

57

a section of them heavily indoctrinated with radical revolutionary ideas.

During the post liberation period, the ruling Awami League regime failed to evolve a

common ideological framework for the armed forces. The political leadership

surprisingly ignored to build a new army as a constructive force, which could have

become a crucial partner in the reconstruction of the state. Instead, the Awami League

regime encouraged internal cleavages by political patronage and sitting one faction

against the other that finally resulted in sharpening the cleavages and further

politicising the armed forces of Bangladesh (Mascarenhas, 1986:36).

2.7.5 Rivalry between Army and Mujibur Rahman

Barring all internal and ideological rivalries, the armed forces personnel had one thing

in common—they were not satisfied with the mode of the civilian regimes of Sheikh

Mujibur Rahman, particularly its handling of the defence establishment. The creation

of a parallel armed force—the Jatiyo Rakhi Bahini (JRB)—owing exclusive

allegiance to Sheikh Mujib and his government annoyed the regular members of the

armed forces. The JRB was supposed to reduce the influence of the Pakistan trained

Bengali military personnel and counter balance those section of the freedom fighters

within the Bangladesh armed forces which affiliated themselves to ideological camps

other than the Awami League. What antagonised the military personnel was Sheikh

Mujib’s preferential treatment of this well-equipped elite para-military force as

compared to the meagre facilities provided to the regular armed forces.

During the post independence Awami League regime, under the leadership of Mujibur

Rahman, Bangladesh had witnessed a systematic weakness and performance failure of

the government. The economic crises had widened, social and political instability

increased in the countryside the influence of radical groups also increased. Therefore,

in 1973-74 Mujib asked the army to control the insurgency in the countryside and

monitor the smuggling and arms transfer. They did fairly well in this regard, but the

government called off the mission half way.

During the operation, the army arrested many Awami League cadres and its affiliated

organisations for their alleged involvement in many heinous crimes. But Mujib’s

regime stood by his followers. Therefore, the army has started to question the Awami

Leagues’ commitment to social justice. Through their active participation in the

58

civilian affairs of the state, the armed forces became aware of the basic weakness of

the Awami League regime, particularly about the people’s lack of faith in the

regime’s ability to govern. Thus, the army that lost its espit de corps in the early years

regained confidence and began to nurse a feeling that the military alone could save the

nation.

Resentments among the army became prevalent when Mujibur Rahman introduced

single party system, BAKSAL ( Bangladesh Krishak Shramik Awami League). Like

many other social groups and institutions, the military was also opposed to the idea of

one party totalitarian BAKSAL. According to the new system, the units of

Bangladesh Army, BDR, JRB and police stationed in the districts would be under the

control of the governor. Therefore, army echelons were began to think that Mujib was

trying to bring the armed forces completely under the control of the one party

government.

2.7.6 Weakening Economy

During the early phase of democratisation both macro and micro economic situation

in Bangladesh was quite volatile and dysfunctional. The economic situation worsened

more in 1973. The democratic regime failed to tackle the economic crises, its

mismanagement of the economy and the continuing high prices of essential

commodities resulted in tremendous economic hardships for the masses of the people.

But when the masses felt the economic meltdown, a small minority gained benefit

from this.11 Unequal distribution of the resources coupled with the alligations of

widespread corruption in the regime, led to popular disenchantment with the

government. The year 1973 proved to be a bad year for Bangladesh economy. The re-

construction works lagged behind the schedule, production in both agriculture and

industry failed to reach the level before liberation, there were shortfalls in imports and

export. According the then Bangladesh Planning commission, the prices and the cost

of living index soared. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1972-1973 was estimated to

be 12-14% lower in the real terms than the GDP in 1969-70 and GDP per-capita was

estimated to be one fifth lower than the GDP per capita of pre-liberation days

(Planning Commission, Annual Plan, 1973:1). 11 In 1973 Bangladesh saw the emergence of a small group of new–rich usually Awami League supporters—who emerged as a new elite as recipients of the regime’

59

Agriculture production has also witnessed a marginal slow down during this period.

Rice production in 1972-73 was about 15% lower than that the normal output of

1969-70. The jute industry’s output was 28% less than the 1969-70 production. As far

as exports are concerned, in 1972-73 was estimated to be 30% lower than the level

achieved in 1979-70 and the import of non-food items was about 30% less than

normal requirement (Planning Commission Annual Plan, 1973:1). The economic

meltdown fuelled the declining of production and led to the price rise. According to a

study, from the base of hundred in 1969-70, the cost of living index of an industrial

worker rose to 200.31 at the end of the 1972 (Bose, 1973:244). Such a volatile

situation has provided a chance for army to intervene in the civilian affairs of the

country.

‘Factionalism, rivalry and hatred’ are the suitable words to describe the history

Bangladesh Army during the initial phase of the state formation. As an active player

in the Liberation War, the army had expected a better treatment from the political

class that took over leadership of the country. Moreover, the belligerent nature of the

different factions within the armed forces had prevented the leadership to maintain the

power and command in a highly concentrated and hierarchical manner. Many of the

factions in the armed forces were not ready to accept the leadership. This has resulted

in a bloody coup that finally toppled the country’s first democratic government and

the army became the custodian of political power.

2.8 Assassination of Mujibur Rahman

The mounting discontents among the army cadre against the democratic regime came

into an abrupt end with the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on 15 August

1975. Disgruntled and hostile political groups carefully exploited resentment against

the regime. This was the first military coup in Bangladesh. A group of army officers

assassinated Mujibur Rahman. This incident brought to a premature end of the

political regime in Bangladesh before its proposed reforms under the BAKSAL

scheme could be implemented (Khan, 1976:123)12 Immediately after the coup, they

made a new government that headed by Khondker Mushtaque Ahmed, the foreign

12 The coup was masterminded by 25 army officers, namely: Lt.Colonels Farooq Rahman,Abdur Rashid, Shariful Huq, Abdul Aziz Pasha, Majors Shariful Hossain, Shashiyar, Bazlul Huda, Rashid Choudhuri, Captain Khairuzzaman, Abdul Majed, Lieutenants Musleuddin,Kishmet Hashem and Nazmul Anwar.

60

trade minister of Mujib’s Cabinet.

The August 15 coup had created a highly volatile situation within the Bangladesh

Army. The incident severely undermined the unified structure of the army. The army,

as a whole, did not involve in the coup and consequent development. The coup was

planned and executed by a small group of junior officers in the army. The senior

officers, those who maintained their control over the troops, wanted the junior officers

to return their barrack and accept the command. The coup leaders, however, refused

to do that and fearing that they would be disarmed and court marshalled.

For two months, an uneasy power struggle continued between the junior officers and

the army high command. The highhandedness of the August coup leaders created a

serious dissatisfaction among a section of the army officers resulting in another coup

on 3 November 1975, led by Brigadier Khaled Musharraf, the Chief of General Staff,

and President Khondker Mushthaq Ahemed was forced to resign. Major General

Ziaur Rahman was succeeded Major General K.M Safiullah as the chief of army staff

after the coup. Brigadier Khaled appointed himself as chief of staff in Zia’s place and

the chief justice of the Supreme Court A.S.M Sayem was sworn in as president on 6

November.

In spite of all his efforts, Brigadier Khaled failed to consolidate his position within the

army and to gain the confidence among the political elites. From the very beginning,

he and his supporters showed themselves to be indecisive and politically inept. From

November 3 to 5, Bangladesh practically did not have a government. The coup

leaders did not form a government immediately after seizing power, which could have

strengthened their base. This created a political vacuum.

Meanwhile, the underground Gono Bahini (people’s army)13 emerged on the scene

and started mobilising the lower ranks of the army. Gono Bahini cadres distributed

thousand of leaflets on November 5 and 6, urging the soldiers to attack their officers

and overthrow the ‘intriguers’, who had seized the power. On November 7, only four

days after capturing power, Brigadier Khaled and his supporters were overwhelmed

by a soldiers uprising. While attempting to escape from the cantonment, Khaled and

13. The irregular forces in the war of independence, generally called Gono Bahini (people's army), were those who were trained more in guerrilla warfare than the conventional one. They were largely left wing militant organization, which clandestinely worked among the army cadre.

61

some of his supporters were killed by the mutinous soldiers. Major General Ziaur

Rahman was reinstated as the Chief of Army Staff. This second mutiny had two major

objectives. First was to remove Brigadier Khaled, free Major Zia from detention and

restore him as chief of army staff. The second and more significant objective was to

establish a revolutionary army—people’s army in the country which would stand as

the armed forces of the ‘poorer class’ against and over the bourgeois echelons of the

officer corps and the bourgeois itself.

Therefore, the revolutionary soldiers put forwarded a ‘Twelve Point’ demand, which

advocated for the establishment of a people’s army and total abolition of British

military rules and regulations that still dominated the military procedures in

Bangladesh. The Twelve Point Demand also argued for the formation of a ‘classless

army’ as the first step towards the establishment of a ‘classless society in

Bangladesh’.

The other demands were equally radical. That included; complete equality between

soldiers and officers in the place of existing system of the recruitment from the elite

groups through the cadet collages and public schools and higher pay for soldiers.

Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) leaders and Colonel Taher, the Commander of the

Gono Bahini (people’s army) tried to capitalise the prevailing class contradictions

within the armed forces. This mutiny brought about far-reaching consequence in the

Bangladesh Army. The animosity between ideologically committed Geno Bahini and

its sympathisers and to a ‘people’s army’ and a Marxist state and the status quoits

eventually took the form of open confrontation between soldiers and officers. The

radical soldier’s revolutionary theory state that the class struggle should first begin

within the armed forces pushed them directly against the officer corps. The mutinous

soldiers killed at least 34 officers in Dhaka cantonment alone and nearly 100 soldiers

lost their lives in another cantonment.

It was reported that Bangladesh remained in a state of virtual anarchy for about three

weeks of the soldiers uprising in November 7, which had spread to the garrisons of

Rangpur in the north, Comilla in the east and Chittagong in the south (Keesing’s

Contemporary Archives, 1976: 27522-23). During this critical situation, Zia took a

determined stand and re-established the chain of command within the shattered army.

Finally, on July 17 Colonel Taher was sentenced to death and Ziaur Rahman become

62

an unquestionable authority in Bangladesh. Zia’s ascendency in power led the country

into a different direction, especially in governance. Before going through the nuances

of military is essential to have a look into the structure of Bangladesh military.

2.9 Structure of Bangladesh Military

The newly formed government led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had an extremely

difficult task in delivering the prosperity that people expected after decades of apathy

and bloodshed. As a new beginning, Mujib pushed through a constitution that was

modelled on the Indian constitution. The constitution enumerates a number of

principles on which the country is to be governed, which include the four pillars of

nationalism, socialism, secularism and democracy. Nevertheless, in the following

years Mujib discarded everything Bangladesh theoretically represented; that is

constitutionalism, freedom of speech, rule of law, the right to decent and equal

opportunity for employment. The situation had largely discoloured his political

charisma among large number of people and armed forces those who actively

participated in the nine-month long war against Pakistan. At the same time, in months

after the war the newly elected government had planned to constitute the armed forces

anew. The new Bangladesh armed forces rose from the former Bengali members of

the Pakistan army, navy and air force who took part in the liberation war. General

M.A.G. Osmani, who was the commander in chief of the combined liberation forces

resigned on 7 April 1972. With his resignation, the post was abolished. Instead,

separate headquarters were established for the three services of the military— army,

navy and air force. The hierarchy of Bangladesh military follows.

63

Figure.2.2- Hierarchy of Bangaldesh Military

Source: Bangladesh Military’s Official website: http://www.bdmilitary.com/ 2.9.1 Bangladesh Army

The army is the strongest and most important among three services of the military.

But at the time of independence, the army was in a state of disarray. The Bangladesh

Army inherited only a few war-ravaged cantonments from the Pakistan army. The

army lacked heavy weapons, transport and communication facilities. Besides, most of

the officers had no previous experience of running of an army headquarter. The

Bengali officers who took part in the war were either junior or middle ranking officers

who had commanded troops just up to the brigade level.14 Moreover, the liberation

war was fought in the most difficult circumstances in which the army officers had to

take the responsibility of recruiting, organising, training and equipping guerrillas.

14 During the liberation war, the regular forces of the East Bengal Regiment and East Pakistan Rifles were reorganized into three independent brigades under the commands of Major Ziaur Rahman (Z Force) Major K M Safiullah (S Force) and Major Khalid Mosharraf (K Force).

64

Despite lack of experience of working in the higher command and staff position, an

army headquarter with divisional command structure soon began to function.

The strength of the army in 1972-73 was only 17,000 (Military Balance, 1973-74:49).

About 2000 surviving members of the East Bengal Regiment and some new recruits

from among the irregulars of the Mukti Bahini constituted the nucleus of the

Bangladesh Army for the first one and half years. These were added 20,000 Bengali

army personal, including 400 officers repatriated from Pakistan in 1973. These

repatriates had been stationed in West Pakistan since 1969 and could not join the

liberation war. Most of them were gradually absorbed in to the Bangladesh Army.

Thus the strength of the army rose to 30,000 in 1975(Military Balance, 1975-76:53).

There were about 1200 officers in the army in 1975. But the number of senior officers

above the ranks of captain and major was not more than 250 (Ahmed, 1982:150).

Following the August 15, 1975 coup, Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini, an elite para-military

force, was integrated with the army. This had resulted in a sharp increase in the size of

the army. In 1976, the total strength of the army was reported to be 59,000 (Military

Balance, 1976-77: 53-54). During the military rule, Bangladesh Army’s strength

increased three fold—from 30,000 in 1975 to 90,000 in 1990. This trend has been

continued even after the democracy reinstated. The present strength of the army is

estimated to be over 250,000 personnel with 50,000 retired reserve personnel

(Military Balance, 1990-2010:157). A steady increase of the armed forces strength

reveals the level of support and patronage given by the state government to military

even after democracy came into power.

Since last 38 years, Bangladesh military has undergone major transformation in its

organisational level. Since most of the coups during the Ziaur Rahman period plotted

by highly politicised freedom fighters, their ranks steadily decline with each purge

that followed an unsuccessful coup. Thus, by 1981, only 15 per cent of the

Bangladesh armed forces were freedom fighters., 25 per cent were repatriates and the

rest 60 per cent had been recruited since 1975 (Kochanek, 1993:61). Presently, the

size and per centage of the three sections of the armed forces clearly indicate the

overwhelming size of the army among the armed forces of Bangladesh.

65

Figure: 2.3- Percentage of Bangladesh Armed Forces

In Numbers: Army:200,000, Air Force-17,000, Navy-24,000

Source:Bangladesh Army’s official website: http://www.army.mil.bd, Bangladesh Military’s official website; http://www.bdmilitary.com/, Ministry of Defence, Bangladesh; http://www.mod.gov.bd/. and facts derived from The Military Balance,2010.

Apart from these three wings of armed forces, Bangladesh has diverse security,

intelligence and paramilitary forces to look after both internal and external security.

The following figure describes the various security agencies that are parallaly

functioning with the conventional armed forces.

66

Figure: 2.4- Intelligence, Security and Special Forces in Bangladesh

Source: facts obtained from http://www.bdmilitary.com.

The number of repatriate personnel has also reduced to large extent as most of them

retired in the 1980s and early 1990s. Therefore, the cadre those who recruited after

1975 constitute the majority of the army ranks today. The erstwhile army chief Moeen

U Ahmed, who turned around the political landscape of Bangladesh during the

political mayhem that crippled the country since 2007, was a post-1975 product. Since

1990s, these new generation officers were occupied the middle and lower strata in the

army. “The total strength if the officer corps in 1989 was almost 4,000. At the top

ranks it had one lieutenant general, 20 major generals, 80 brigadiers, 100 colonels,

200 lieutenant colonels. The rest of the officer corps consisted of major and lower

ranks”(Hussain, 1991:52). In short, the Pakistani trained and influenced sections in

the armed forces slowly began to retire during the 1990. This generation shift, from

Pakistani to Bangladeshi, has played a major role in the history of Bangladesh

military’s after 1990. That may be discussed in the forthcoming chapters.

Despite several resource constrains, the successive military regimes in Bangladesh

attempted to expand and modernise the army, during the Mujub period, the army had

only five divisions, but after the establishment of military rule two more divisions

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were raised. At present seven infantry divisions of the 101,000 infantry is located in

Dhaka, Comila, Bogra, Chittagong, Rangpur, Mymensingh and Jessore. The army is

organised into 17 infantry brigades (26 Infantry battalions), 1 armed brigade (2

armoured regiments), one artillery division (6 artillery regiments), one engineering

brigade and one air defence brigade (Hussain, 1991:52). When it is comparing with

other south asian counterparts the strength of Bangladesh Army is seems to be above

Sri Lanka, which is a country that has been waging a protracted war against its rebels

over last thirty years. See the following table.

Table:2.1-Army Man Power in South Asia 2010

India Pakistan Burma Bangladesh Sri Lanka

Active 1129.9 550 375 126.153 117.9

Reserve 960 NA NA NA 1.1

Source: Asian Military Balance, 1990-2010 (In 1,000s)

The above-mentioned table shows Bangladesh has comparatively better infrastructure

in defence. It is interesting to understand that how Bangladesh Army’s direct rule

since 1975 to 1990 have expanded its reach to the nook and corner of the country. The

army, paramilitary and other security agencies are having almost 21 cantonments

across the country. Interestingly, maximum numbers of cantonements are situated in

the Chittagong and Rajashahi region. See the following figure.

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Source: Bangladesh Military’s official portal: http://www.army.mil.bd/ and other defence forces websites.

The above-mentioned figure indicates army’s real role in the militarisation of the state

by establishing maximum number of military cantonment across the country. It also

reveals the high profile status, which the army is enjoying in present Bangladesh even

after twenty years of democratisation. Such grassroots expansion of the army will

have serious implication in the social life of Bangladesh. That will be discussed in the

* Dhaka

Bandarban*

*Chittagong

*Mujhira

*Jahanabad

*Jessore

Jahangirbad* * Jalalabad

*Khagrachari

* Mirpur

Moynamoti*

*Mymensingh

* Army Cantonments

*Quadirabad Rajendrapur* *Dayarmpur

Rajashahi*

*Rangamathi

Rangpur*

Syedpur*

*Sever

*Shahid Salahuddin

Fig:2:5: BANGLADESH: ARMY CANTONMENTS

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forthcoming sixth chapter.

2.9.2 Bangladesh Navy

The Bangladesh Navy was formed in November 1971. It included 860 naval

commandos raised mainly from the Bengali naval personal that had defected from the

Pakistan navy and newly recruited freedom fighters. The navy played a heroic role

during the liberation war in the port areas of Chittagong, Mongla,

Chalna,Narayanganj and Chandpur by organising commando attacks (Hussain,

1991:58). In the post 1971 scenario, the Awami League leadership rebuilded the navy.

The navy headquarters was set up in Dhaka. By the end of 1974, Chittagong emerged

as the country’s first fully fledged naval Base.

However, the Bangladesh Navy remained very weak in the early seventies due to

resource crunch. The navy was poorly equipped and could not perform even the

routine petrol of the Bangladesh coastline. In 1973, the strength of the navy was only

500(Military Balance, 1976-77:54). The Bangladesh Navy has retained the basic

structure and disciplinary code of the Pakistan navy. Its rank pattern is derived from

Royal Indian Navy (Goldric, 1993:68). Bangladesh has four naval bases— Dhaka,

Chittagong, Khula and Kaptai. During the military rule, the human resources of the

navy increased from a meagre 500 in 1975 to 4,000 in 1980 (Military Balance,

1980:66). The absorption of about 2,700 repatriate naval personnel including 30

officers into the Bangladesh Navy largely contributed to this increase. Since 1975, the

Bangladesh Navy has also recruited several thousands of new officers, sailors and its

current strength is 28,000.15

The navy’s principle duties are, a general police function for customs, fishery

protection, search and rescue and a military transport function to assist the military

with internal security and disaster relief. Besides, it is the responsibility of the

Bangladesh Navy to ensure proper exploration, preservation and utilisation of the

potential maritime resources in the 40,000 square nautical mile of the exclusive

economic zone in the Bay of Bengal. However, in the absence of adequate maritime

vassals, the Bangladesh Navy’s low enforcement surveillance in the last 25 years has

been less effective (Bangladesh Observer, 13 January, 1996).

15 Bangladesh Navy, http://www.bangladeshnavy.org/

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2.9.3 Bangladesh Air Force

The Bangladesh Air Force was established in 28 September 1971 with a few armed

helicopters and light aircraft. About 45 Bengali officers and 673 airmen who had

escaped from the Pakistan air force contributed significantly to the liberation struggle

(Bashar, 1990:55-57). Since immediate acquisition of aircraft was difficult, its officers

and men fought on the land together with the members of the Mukti Bahini. It was

only in December 1971, when a full-scale war broke out the Bangladesh Air Force

launched its first serial attack on Pakistani positions.

After the liberation, Bangladesh faced enormous difficulties in reorganising the air

force. According to a freedom fighter “Bangladesh Air Force, inherited from the

enemy nothing but shambles, destroyed aircrafts, damaged runways, looted stores,

neutralised maintenance facilities—in short, a disorganised mess (Bashar, 1990:57).

Following the induction of repatriate personal in 1975, the navy’s strength increased

to 5,000 (Military Balance, 1990:68). During this time, all that Bangladesh Air Force

had very few Soviet-supplied MIGs, helicopters and operational bases only in Dhaka,

Chittagong and Jessore.

On October 2, 1977, a series of mutiny had taken place in the Bangladesh Air Force.

The revolt originated in a conflict between the air force rank and the senior officers

over the pay and service conditions (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives,

February,1978). The revolt was immediately crushed by the troops loyal to Ziaur

Rahman. The trials of the mutineers began before military tribunals On October 7,

1977. It was officially announced on October 18 that 460 air force personal had been

tried of whom 37 were executed, 20 sentenced to life imprisonment and 60 acquitted,

the remaining 340 had been sentenced to shorter terms of imprisonment (Keesing’s

Contemporary Archives, February,1978).

This abortive coup had a catastrophic effect on the Bangladesh Air Force. In

December 1977, 11 air force officers resigned when the then Air vice-Marshal A.G.

Mohmud was superseded as Chief of Air Staff by group captain Saruddin, who was

promoted to Air Commodore. As a result, there were 11 officers left in the entire

service, of which only three were capable of piloting an aircraft. In 1979, the total

strength of the air force was reduced to 3,000. However, several new officers were

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recruited since 1980s. At present, the total strength of the Bangladesh Air Force is

11,000 personnel plus 200 more aircrafts (Military Balance, 2009:47).

Despite the resource constrains, the Bangladesh Air Force has made considerable

progress over these years. Some new air force bases have been constructed in Ishurdi,

Saidpur, Sylhet and Cox Bazar. The air force has also procured advanced fighters and

helicopters. The air force academy was established in 1982. The primary

responsibility of the air force is to defend country’s air space. In addition to this, it has

been actively engaged in containing insurgency in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and

relief and rescue operations for the past three decades.

Table: 2:2: Bangladesh Military: Fact Sheet

Army No Navy No Air Force No

Air Defence [Guns&Surface to-air- Missile]

Aircraft [Reconnaissance, Transport and Utility]

Anti-Tank [Guns, Missiles, Anti-tank and Ramped craft Logistics] Artillery[Multiple Rocket Launcher, Self-propelled, Towed and Mortar] Personnel carrier [Armed Infantry Fighting Vehicle, Armed personnel Carrier] Tank [Light and Main Battle]

184

6

1060

238 226 240

Aircraft Aircraft Carrier Amphibious Destroyers Frigates Landing Craft Mine Warfare, Counter [Mine Hunter Coastal, Mine Sweeper Ocean & Inshore] Patrol and Coastal Combatants [Fast Petrol Craft, Coastal]

NA NA NA NA 5 4 5 39

Aircraft [Air defence, surface-to-air missile] Aircraft Fighter Aircraft Fighter, Ground Attack Aircraft, Transport Helicopter [Attack, Support and Utility]

74 8 59 7 30

Source: The Military Balance 2010 , International Institute for Strategic Studies, London: Routledge, 2010.

72

Overwhelming size and the capacity to wage full-scale war—even if it is relatively

smaller in the region—make the Bangladesh Army as an elite force in the country. Its

premier role in the freedom struggle made them as most reputed and popular state

machinery after the state formation.

2.10 Socio-economic Composition of Bangladesh Army

As stated in the Figure 2:3, The Bangladesh Army’s current strength is estimated to

be over 200,000 personnel with 50,000 retired reserve personnel (Military Balance,

2009:47). There were only five battalion of the east-Bengal regiment, with about

6,000 soldiers and 100 officers, which were stationed in east-Pakistan. From these

forces, about 4,000-4,500 are believed have survived the initial resistance against the

Pakistan army’s brutal crackdown on Bengalis. More than half of the total Bengali

soldiers in the Pakistan army, about 28,000, were stranded in west-Pakistan and,

therefore, could not participate in the war. Most of them later joined the services after

returning home from Pakistan camps, so that the repatriates outnumbered the freedom

fighters.

In the initial phase, Pakistan era, the class combination of Bangladesh Army was not

equal. During this period, 1947-71, few Bengali officers were recruited into the army.

This small group represented the relatively small ranks of the upper middle class

strata of the Bengali Muslim society. The situation was changed after the 1975 coup.

The post-1975 situation showed a striking decline in the relatively high social origins

of the army.

During the early years of independence, although there were different groups of

factions in the Bangladesh armed force, the officer corps generally came from

somewhat similar socio-economic backgrounds. Those who entered the official

positions and the highest levels in the years before and after the war of liberation were

a cross-section of a middle and lower-middle classes. There are similar socio-

economic backgrounds of the officer corps in neighbouring India, Pakistan, Myanmar

and Thailand, although the social context of each country would be different (Grover,

2000:23).

As far as the term ‘middle class’ in Bangladesh is concerned, it is a social group,

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which “somewhere in the middle between the tiny upper class of wealthy

entrepreneurs, large land owners and highly successful professionals on the one hand,

and the huge lower class of employed and unemployed workers, small land holding

peasants, tenants farmers and landless agricultural labourers on the

other”(Nordinger,1997:32) The middle class is thus rather diverse, including teachers,

civil servants, lawyers, technicians’, shop-owners, traders, small and medium

entrepreneurs and landowners along with military officers

In the initial phase, the three-quarters of the officers of the Bangladesh armed forces

were from the middle class, about 15-20 per cent in the upper class and about 10-15

per cent in the lower classes. These 100 students who were recruited as officers

during the liberation war and preferred to stay in military service are a cross section of

the middle class and the lower middle class and lower middle class groups with

origins in small towns and rural areas. The leaders of the coup in August 1975 were

sons of government officials, affluent farmers and other professionals of the mid-

income group. These 32 military officers, who served as ministers during the military

regimes of General Ziaur Rahman and Ershad, were sons of landed class and

government officials (Grover, 2000:24).

When we look into the third world scenario, Brazil shows the cadets who entered the

military academy between 1941 and 1943, 20 per cent came from traditional upper

class families, 75 per cent from middle class families and four per cent from lower-

class families. In the 1960s, upper class recruits had dropped to 6 percent, lower class

recruits had risen slightly to nine per cent, while the middle class continued to

predominant with 78 per cent of the new officer recruits (Stepan, 1971:30-33). In

case of Pakistan, though there were a significant number of officers recruited from

aristocratic or landed gentry groups at the time of independence, the internal politics

and pressure towards professional recruitment have largely eliminated or diluted these

upper-class elements (Janowitz, 1977:126:27). The military officers in Pakistan

represent ‘middle class’ groups in the society. The majority of the officers in the

Indian armed force also came from middle class backgrounds (Bukri, 1980:202).

The leaders of the Egyptian coup in 1952 were also from the middle class. They were

largely sons of civil servants, soldiers and grandsons of peasants. Turkey is a striking

74

example of a traditionally independent nation whose military is more socially

representative than other professional groups.

The liberation struggle of Bangladesh also attracted the upcoming business class,

bureaucrats and other professional groups. However, after independence, military

service did not appeal much to the upper strata of the society. About 125 students,

those who recruited as officers during the Liberation War finally opted for military

service and they came from middle and lower-middle class families. For the last two

decades, it had observed that the wards of top military officials, high-ranking

bureaucrats and big businesspersons have developed a negative attitude towards the

army. They rather prefer to go abroad for higher studies or to seek employment

either in corporate houses or in civil services. One study shows that 75 per cent of the

officers commissioned in the Bangladesh military after 1975 were born in middle

class families, about 15-20 per cent in the upper classes and about 10.15 per cent in

lower class (Hossain, 1985:56). Thus, presently, the representation of the upper class

in the Bangladesh armed forces is considerably low.

Like the upper class, the representation of lower class in the officer corps is also

limited, but for different reasons. Most of the poor families in Bangladesh cannot

meet the educational expenditure of their children. Besides, the labour of young

members is very essential for an average lower class family. Therefore, they do not

get quality education, which could have enabled them for getting entry to the branches

of any armed forces. Under such circumstances, the participation of officers of lower

class origin has always been modest (Hossain, 1985:56).

Since Bangladesh is predominantly rural, the officers and other ranks generally

recruited from countryside. Only a small section of officer corps comes from big

cities like Dhaka and Chittagong. The majority of the officers recruited into the

Bangladesh Army after 1975 are rural or small town origin. Officers coming from

rural areas belong to the land owing class. The privates on the other hand, are either

landless or marginal farmers. Unlike the army, navy and air force personnel drawn

from mostly urban areas. Both the services accept only fully literate personnel and

almost everyone in the ranks will be a secondary school graduate.

The occupational background of parents is also an important factor in this regard. A

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vast majority of them are middle ranking officers in various ministries, government

undertaking and private sectors, urban professionals like doctors, lowers, teachers,

petty businessman, small and medium entrepreneurs, land owners and retired military

officers (Hossain, 1985:56). Given the fact, suggest that the social base of officer

recruitment has broadened in Bangladesh after 1975. Young Bangladeshis from urban

professional groups and rural affluent families have shown a keen interest in joining

the military services, which provide good salary and social status. Moreover, an army

career offers excellent opportunities for higher studies, particularly in the medical and

engineering corps. Presently, Bangladesh is the only country who sends maximum

number of troops to UN peace-keeping operations across the world. Therefore, for

Bangladeshis, especially the middle and lower middle class origin, the military

profession has become an avenue for upward social mobility.

Like the army officers, the political elites in Bangladesh are coming from more or less

similar socio-economic background— the middle and upper- middle class composed

of civil servants, affluent farmers, urban professionals, emerging business, and

industrial groups. Many army officers have family ties with these groups and as in the

most of the traditional societies, primordial loyalties are very strong in Bangladesh.

This situation often promotes the merger of political and economic interests between

military and other dominant socio-economic forces. In Bangladesh, nearly 75 per cent

of the army officers came from middle class families while this class makes up only

12-13 per cent of the total population. As members of this tiny middle class by birth,

the Bangladeshi officer corps has always tried to protect and promote its interests.

Successive military regime’s economic policies—favouring the rich peasantry and

upper strata of the urban middle class—largely approved by the officer corps. During

Zia regime, the idea of restoration of Islam, in place of secularism was also fully

accepted by the Bangladesh Army (Franda, 1981:365).

Class and social composition of the modern armed forces in Bangladesh considerably

changed during the second phase of democratisation. The army became more

professional than the erstwhile one by following general recruitments into its cadres,

in which all qualified/eligible candidates can participate in the recruitment process. As

per the new system, every male citizen, irrespective of caste, class or religion is

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eligible for recruitment in the armed forces.16 Though some recent report (Wazed,

Sajeeb and Carl Ciovacco, 2008), points out thriving nature of the Islamic

fundamentalism and the growing number of Islamists in the army will have an impact

on the social structure of the armed forces. However, infiltrating into the highest level

of the armed forces are still a herculean task for the fundamentalists.

2.11 Arms Procurements

The Bangladesh military has been largely depending on import in arms. Bangladesh’s

arms import seems to have remained more or less constant from 1995 to 2005 as a

percentage of all imports.17 But the rapidly changing regional power balance has

pushed Bangladesh into the fiefdom of China for defence procurement after 1990s.

India had championed as a major arms supplier to Bangladesh in the initial phase of

Bangladesh, China has emerged as the largest source of import for Bangladesh

replacing India for the first time in 2005. According to the statistics of Chief

Controller of Import and Export (CCIF), Bangladeshi import from China amounted to

32.14 billion taka ( $494.5 million) during the July-September period of the July 2005

to June 2006 against 27.08 billion taka ($416.6 million) import from India during the

same period of 2004 (Kumar, 2006). China is also the largest supplier of military

hardware to Bangladesh. Bangladesh's air force has 65 fighter planes and 39

helicopters, mostly a mix of Soviet-era and Chinese aircraft. To modernise this air

force, Bangladesh has decided to purchase 16 fighter aircraft from China for $94

million. Hafizuddin Ahmed, the country's water resources minister in 2006, who was

also the acting minister of defence, told the national parliament as reported by The

Daily Star on 24 February 2006: “Each fighter plane will cost $5.85 million and (an)

agreement to this effect was signed last year. Lieutenant-Colonel Nazrul Islam, a

spokesman for the country's armed forces, identified the planes to be bought as F-7

fighter jets.”

16 For more details see, the Official Website of Bangladesh Army, http://www.army.mil.bd/.The army recruitement is carried out on quareterrly basis by Headquarters Recruitment Unit/Branch Recruitment Unit/Area Recruitment Team and training Centres. 17 For details see, Table-II, Arms Transfer Deliveries and total Trade, 1995-2005,by Region, Organisation and Country in World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers, 2005. Available at: http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/2005/index.htm.

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2.12 Conclusion

Politicisation of the armed forces began in the British period as the armed forces

began to split in accordance with the different loyalties and power structures.

Colonisation has a legacy in asserting the army’s role in the newly-independent third

world countries. In most of the post-colonial countries, the concept of nation state was

‘air-lifted” by the colonial powers to uphold the western liberal values within the

hierarchically divided and socially plural societies of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

All these nations were actually the conglomeration of various sub-nationalities

temporarily brought together by the colonial powers for administration. According to

author Kalim Bahadur, “under the long history of colonial rule and oppression most of

the new nations were left with a heritage full of well-entrenched feudal classes, an

under developed capitalist class with close links with the metropolitan bourgeoisie.

The imperialist rule had also promoted national strife, caste conflicts, linguistic,

religious clashes, and economic disparities between classes and regions. The uneven

economic development led to social, political and economic tensions and conflicts

(Bahadur and Chopra, 1986:7). The politicisation of the armed forces and weaknesses

of the democratic institutions made the army more aware about the political system

and such situation induced the army to interfere in the civilian affairs of the state.

Evolution of the Bangladesh Army from the Chera Empire to 1975—the first military

takeover—indicate the role of armed forces in the creation of a new nation and how

that experience made them to interfere in the civilian affairs of the state. The political

class in Bangladesh confused in its own goal by asserting how and by whom it wants

to be led and how to develop a war-ravaged country and its economy. The misgivings

created by the political class have induced the army to intervene in the civilian affairs

of the state in the early stages of democratisation. The army’s transformation form

“an active contributor for the freedom struggle” to “a complete political actor” seems

to be its response to the dysfunctional political system—run by the political elite—

that had prevented the interests of the armed forces after the state formation.

Therefore, the army had dictated the course of politics, redefined the character of

democracy and repeatedly sought to destabilise the democratic movements and

aspirations since the end of Mujib Rahaman’s reign in 1975.