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Editor’s IntroductionComplex crises call for adaptable anddurable capabilities

At the beginning of 2015, defence and security planners

were reecting on a preceding year that added extra

crises to an already increasingly complex and frac-

tured global security environment. European secu-

rity faced its most signicant challenge since the end

of the Cold War with Russia’s annexation of Crimea

and fomenting of instability in eastern Ukraine. In the

Middle East, meanwhile, rapid advances by ISIS in

Syria and Iraq threatened the Iraqi state and led to

greater military extroversion by regional states. The

year ended with the US again commiing to deploy

troops on a training mission to Iraq; at the same time

it was also leading a broad multinational coalition in

oensive operations against ISIS.

The broader, long-term strategic trend of China

and other Asian states’ growing economic and mili-

tary power, and the parallel US rebalance to the Asia-

Pacic, continued. While the US and, to a limited

extent, some other Western states still possessed

dominant military capabilities, there was growing

awareness that in some respects the West was not

only at risk of losing its military-technological edge but could also, with continuing budgetary reduc-

tions, see some military capabilities further eroded or

excised altogether.

Russia’s assertiveness, notably its actions in

Ukraine, refocused aention not just on Moscow’s

policy objectives and military capabilities, but also

on the impact of nancial constraints on Europe’s

armed forces. In real terms, European defence

spending continued the downward trajectory seen

since the 2008 economic crisis. Real European defence

spending in 2014 was cumulatively 7.7% lower than

in 2010. However, there were signs that the morechallenging strategic environment in Europe had

shifted budgetary priorities in some places, particu-

larly in Northern and Eastern Europe. One way that

European states had previously thought of boosting

capability amid budgetary pressure was to do more

together; NATO was at the forefront of such initia-

tives.

Many had expected NATO’s September 2014

Wales Summit to be largely administrative and pre-

ordained – the Alliance would mark the end of its

combat operations in Afghanistan and agree measures

to improve cooperation – but instead NATO’s Eastern

European members pressed the Alliance for reassur-

ance amid concern over Russia’s actions in Ukraine

and more widely. Any earlier hopes that some

NATO leaders might have had of a post-Afghani-

stan ‘strategic holiday’ evaporated. At the same time,

Russia’s assertiveness reinvigorated the Alliance’s

core purpose of collective defence. The eectiveness

of Russia’s actions led some member states to ques-

tion whether NATO would be able to defend them,

should they be the target of actions similar to those

in Ukraine. The Alliance realised this, rearming

the Article V commitment to collective self-defence

and embarking on a range of reassurance initiatives,

including exercises and rotational deployments that

will essentially lead to a permanent, though small, US

presence in Eastern Europe.

Rediscovering ‘hybrid warfare’

The politico-military methods employed by Russiagave NATO and its members pause for thought.

Moscow successfully employed a broad range of

traditional and non-traditional instruments to achieve

its goals in Crimea, and to some degree in eastern

Ukraine. The rst problem for NATO was to dene

the nature of the challenge, and there was some

concern in the West about possible gaps in its ability

to counter Russia’s employment of what was gener-

ally labelled ‘hybrid’ warfare. The methods applied

included the use of military and non-military tools in

an integrated campaign designed to achieve surprise,

seize the initiative and gain psychological as wellas physical advantages utilising diplomatic means;

sophisticated and rapid information, electronic and

cyber operations; covert and occasionally overt mili-

tary and intelligence action; and economic pressure.

Although this problem is not new, some of the

means used by Russia, and potentially others, to

support proxies and subvert governments are inno-

vative. Indeed, operations in Crimea in early 2014

showed that Russian thinking and capacity in these


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6 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2015

areas has matured. Russian forces demonstrated inte-

grated use of rapid deployment, electronic warfare,

information operations (IO), locally based naval

infantry, airborne assault and special-forces capa-

bilities, as well as wider use of cyberspace and stra-

tegic communications. The laer was used to shape

a multifaceted and overall eective information

campaign targeted as much at domestic as foreign

audiences; one where continual denials and rebuals

from Moscow that it was militarily involved, even if

increasingly implausible, had the potential to create

a sense of cognitive dissonance in foreign decision-

making circles. These operations demonstrated some

of the fruits of Russia’s military-reform process,

although too much focus on the new personal equip-

ment, weapons, vehicles, electronic-warfare (EW) and

tactical-communications equipment seen in Crimea

could be misleading when assessing the eects ofmilitary reform on the wider force.

Western responsesFor the West (and, indeed, other states seeking to

preserve the rule of law and the existing interna-

tional order), improving the ability to defend against

these threats applies beyond the challenges posed

by Russia. Policymakers may anticipate that some

current or potential state or non-state adversaries,

possibly including states such as China and Iran, will

learn from Russia’s recent employment of hybrid

warfare. Potential adversaries might discern whattactics worked and what capabilities are required to

eect results; other lessons might derive from percep-

tions of how Western governments and armed forces

react and adapt, politically as well as militarily. These

lessons might not necessarily be applied in conicts

with Western states, but their potential to rapidly

destabilise the existing order could, if applied in other

zones of political and military competition, mean

they have global ramications.

Coping with the threat of hybrid warfare will

require Western and other governments to invest in

relevant capabilities. Investment could be made to bolster long-term strategic-intelligence capabilities,

such that the de-prioritisation of, for instance, broad

language skills that can result from a focus on current

operational requirements is minimised. Some armed

forces are looking to address this problem by region-

ally aligning selected units, but it is also an issue that

could be considered by other government depart-

ments with international interests. Other capabilities

include cyberspace, law-enforcement, information

and nancial tools as well as precision-strike and

persistent ISR; but they still include deployable and

adaptable sea, air and land forces. Meanwhile, the

deterrent eect of high-readiness armed forces and

pre-positioned forces and capabilities should not be

underestimated.

Additionally, Western states and indeed NATO

might perceive that beer coordination of the infor-

mational eorts of member nations and international

organisations, such as strategic communications,

might improve speed of action while amplifying a

common position. However, in many Western coun-

tries these capacities have been reduced since the

Cold War; rebuilding and updating them will take

time and political commitment.

This aspect of hybrid warfare was also evident

in the media operations of ISIS in the Middle East.

Fusing modern social-media savviness with sharp broadcasting techniques and even computer gaming

to recruit, inspire and intimidate in equal measure,

the actions of ISIS in this regard demonstrated some

thematic similarities with the application of hybrid

warfare in Ukraine, even if in another geographical

area and a dierent operational environment. These

similarities required an understanding that, while

traditional military capabilities such as mobility, re-

power and protection remain relevant and impor-

tant, the application of force must also be eective on

the ‘baleground’ of perception, particularly against

enemies that can operate in and among popula-tions and extend operations beyond physical bale-

grounds to the realms of perception and subversion.

Indeed, this hybrid, adaptable nature of ISIS

proved key to its advances: it has been part insur-

gency; part light-infantry; and part terrorist group. In

the areas it captured, it relied on a minimal bureau-

cratic structure at the same time as repressive rule,

enforcing strict codes and ruthlessly eliminating

dissent. It adopted a decentralised structure to create

greater exibility on the ground and strengthen

internal security, and has a core of highly motivated

commanders, some of whom are former al-Qaedaor Sunni insurgents, while in Iraq some are former

Saddam-era military ocers. While ISIS’s advance in

Iraq led to a military collapse in that country’s north,

in Syria it combined with other factors, like the US

decision to call o air-strikes in September 2013 in

exchange for Damascus relinquishing its chemical

arsenal, as well as continuing Western reluctance to

back the armed rebellion. This created a situation

by late 2014 where the position of President Bashar


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7Editor’s Introduction

al-Assad seemed stronger than at any time since

2012.

The actual and potential threat to international

security posed by ISIS triggered a degree of military

engagement and political alignment by regional and

international states that had not been seen for some

time. Indeed, some Arab states, particularly in the

Gulf, demonstrated their increasing strategic extro-

version. The actions of both the United Arab Emirates

and Egypt over their reported activity in Libya in 2014

marked something of a watershed in regional politics,

illustrating a potential to use force and the capacity

to operate independent of Washington. For all that,

the US remained the strategic guarantor for most

regional states, and still brought to bear unique mili-

tary and political capabilities. The US was successful

in enlisting the political and military support of key

Arab states to join the coalition to defeat ISIS. SomeGulf states calculated that ISIS was becoming an ideo-

logical and security threat; they also believed that

their involvement was essential to shape US strategy

in Syria and to ensure that Iran would not be a prin-

cipal beneciary of the campaign. Bahrain, Jordan,

Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE all contributed

aircraft and other military capabilities.

Wider concernsThe potential for ‘hybrid’ incidents also worried

states in other parts of the world. In Japan, the

government expressed unease at possible ‘grey-zone’ contingencies, short of actual conict and

possibly not involving regular armed forces, with the

Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands a likely area of concern. For

all that, and despite some Asian defence establish-

ments’ continuing concerns with internal security

and a growing interest in improving capacity to deal

with HA/DR and other human-security challenges,

most regional defence programmes were driven by

state-on-state threats and conventional capability

procurements. Aempts to strengthen capabilities

in the Asia-Pacic have focused particularly (though

not exclusively) on the maritime domain, reectingworries about conventional naval threats, as well as

concerns over the need to defend natural resources,

territorial claims and freedom of navigation.

Defence budgets in Asia have continued to rise, by

an estimated 27% between 2010 and 2014. The biggest

spender remained China. By 2014, China’s share of

Asian spending had risen to around 38%, up from

28% in 2010. This increased spending has provided

for growing military procurement, the most news-

worthy being in the maritime and air domains, while

China and some other Asian states have increased

their investment in defence science, and research and

development. These states are making greater eorts

to acquire and absorb foreign technologies and they

are overhauling their existing defence-innovation

systems.

China’s technical advances in the defence sphere

are legion, and are leveraging the resources of

the defence as well as, in some cases, the national

commercial sector – even if gaps remain, such as in

advanced turbofan engines for high-performance

combat aircraft. This rapid progress has led some

in the US defence establishment to claim that the

technology gap that hitherto allowed the US armed

forces technological dominance is closing. Mindful

of the diering trajectories in the two countries’

defence budgets, US ocials emphasise the need forcontinued innovation and the Pentagon is aempting

to minimise potential vulnerabilities in its weapons

systems arising from other states’ technical devel-

opments. For instance, Washington is assessing its

dependence on space, including GPS, and there has

been greater aention to developing more resilient

space systems and satellite constellations, as well as

scrutiny of established technologies (such as inertial

navigation) that could minimise the eects of these

vulnerabilities on weapons systems.

While many countries will only have been aected

tangentially by events in Ukraine, Syria and Iraq,even if there might have been incidents inspired by

events in the Middle East, the lessons that potential

adversaries could draw from these might be of greater

long-term relevance. As such, their military planners

will study these lessons in detail; but there will be as

much interest in how the defence and security estab-

lishments of key states – in the West and the Gulf, as

well as in Russia and Eurasia – react and adapt. For

the US, unanticipated events like these were among

the possible ‘risks’ to the country’s armed forces

highlighted in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review.

Though the QDR, according to the US Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Sta, largely protected certain

capabilities, it also ’takes risk in the capacity of each

service, but particularly in land forces’.

On current trajectories, cuts to land forces will

continue in many states – and US Army chiefs are

reported as saying that personnel strength might

drop to around 450,000. That total, of course, dwarfs

many other armed forces, but calculations change

when the numbers are teased apart. According to


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General Raymond Odierno, 55,000 are deployed

troops, and 80,000 are stationed abroad in 150 coun-

tries; others will doubtless be forming part of the

deployment cycle. Previous strategies had assumed

that the demand for land forces would decline,

but 2014 has seen additional – even if small-scale –

Western land forces deploy to Eastern Europe and

Iraq, and Russian ground forces played a key role in

shaping operations in eastern Ukraine. The complex

nature of some of these tasks might also lead to

further questions about whether armed forces are

even best suited for some of these complex crises,

certainly those that require security aention short of

war ghting; in some cases this might lead to a reas-

sessment of the relative utility of paramilitary forces

like gendarmeries.

It is unlikely that budget realities in the West will

see forces grow once more, but that places a premium

on policymakers and defence planners providing a

suitable force mix and spectrum of capabilities, and

generating adaptive military and security capacities

able to deploy rapidly and operate across all domains.

States also have to ensure nimble EW, IO, cyber and

strategic-communications capacities so that they can

operate in the information realm as well as in military

theatres.


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PAGE 3 OF 4 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2015Press Launch ARUNDEL HOUSE, LONDON 11 FEBRUARY 2015

SYRIA, IRAQ AND ISIS

While a revisionist Russia has challenged the European

security order, the threat from extreme Islamic terrorists

strengthened during the year. The rise of Islamic State ofIraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the ow of jihadists in and

out of various Middle East theatres of war has become

a major pre-occupation for European states. Intelligence

services have to concentrate heavily on the threats posed

to European societies by returning jihadists. Military

successes on the part of ISIS galvanised a US-led coalition

into launching airstrikes against the jihadi movement in

Iraq and also in northern Syria.

The hybrid nature of ISIS – part insurgency, part-light

infantry, part-terrorist group – proved key to its advances.

Its campaigns in Iraq and Syria have shown ISIS to be

an adaptable adversary, demonstrated by its tactical

adjustment in late 2014 to reduce vulnerability to coalition

airpower and ISR capacities.

Since launching an air campaign against ISIS in August

2014, the US-led Operation Inherent Resolve has met with

mixed results in both Iraq and Syria. The strategy of giving

extended air support to local allies has certainly played a

part in breaking the strategic momentum that ISIS created

through the summer of 2014. In Iraq, coalition airpower

was crucial in the retaking of Mosul dam in August, as

well as defending Erbil, the capital of the Kurdish Regional

Government, from an ISIS onslaught. Iran also provided airsupport to Iraq. In Syria, the heavy use of airpower proved

decisive in the defence of the Kurdish city of Kobane. Still,

the US Pentagon had to acknowledge in late January that

the total gains made against ISIS in Iraq add up to only

1% of the territory it holds in that country. It is clear that

American allies on the ground, the Kurdish Peshmerga,

the Iraqi army and the Free Syrian Army, are not yet

strong enough, in spite of US weapons supplies, training

and air support, to win sustainable victories against ISIS.

The upcoming push to retake Mosul, Iraq’s second largest

city, will be a decisive test of whether President Obama’s

strategy of giving extended support to proxy forces on the

ground, can defeat, as opposed to contain, ISIS.

It is likely that long-term training and support for

both Syria’s non-ISIS rebels and Iraq’s security forces and

broader government institutions will be required. That

support will need to be combined with sustained political

eorts to regain the trust of Iraq’s Sunni minority.

Coalition air operations may lead to tactical victories

against ISIS – especially when they enable progress by

ghters opposed to it – but they cannot inict strategic

defeat on the group. Military methods alone cannot

successfully tackle the sophisticated means that ISISuses to recruit and inspire its followers and sustain its

operations Countering ISIS’s information operations

designed in equal measure to intimidate and open

seams in the coalition will also require lasting, whole-of-

government and multilateral aention.

Complex security dynamics across the region meant

that regional defence spending was already high, butgrowing insecurity and conict have contributed to a

further acceleration. Spending remains focused on air-

defence and strike systems, particularly in the Gulf,

though some states have invested in rotary-wing, airlift

and tanker capacities, as well as armour and artillery. In

2011, average real defence spending growth in the Middle

East and North Africa region was 3.5%. In each year since,

we estimate it has increased by an average of 10%.

ASIA’S MILITARISATION CONTINUES

In contrast to the continuing decline evident in Europe,

overall defence spending has increased in Asia – since

2010 by more than a quarter in nominal terms, growing

to more than US$340bn in 2014. China’s defence spending

continues to outpace its neighbours’ eorts. In 2010 China

accounted for around 28% of the Asian total; by 2014 its

share had increased to around 38%. In contrast, Japan’s

share of regional military outlays fell from 20% in 2010 to

just less than 14% in 2014.

China’s military procurement programme, supported

by these budget increases, continues to aract aention.Following a urry of new naval programmes, from

the Liaoning carrier to destroyers, more are underway.

Armament has also improved. The 60 frigates and

destroyers in service in 2000 had less than 600 anti-ship

and surface-to-air missile tubes between them; the current

eet has almost triple that number with only 20% more

hulls. The November 2014 Zhuhai air show provided

further insights into China’s military progress. Highlights

of the show included the FC-31 combat-aircraft prototype,

which might be intended for export, a large ramjet-

powered supersonic anti-ship missile design, the CX-1,

and a range of air-to-surface weapons being oered for

use on UAVs.

Japan too has increased its defence budget, and

continues to boost its military capabilities. Tokyo’s defence

plans include acquisition of F-35s, tilt-rotor aircraft and an

expanded submarine eet, including the advanced Soryu-

class. This boat’s advanced propulsion oers a substantial

increase in the time a submarine could spend submerged

at sea. Australia is assessing the Soryu-class as a possible

replacement for its existing submarines. Submarines

remain a key requirement for states across Asia. Vietnam

has started to receive its Kilo-class boats from Russia,and India, South Korea, Indonesia and Singapore are also

upgrading their submarine forces


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PAGE 4 OF 4 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2015Press Launch ARUNDEL HOUSE, LONDON 11 FEBRUARY 2015

CONCLUSION

The West still spent more than half of global defence

outlays in 2014, though this was down from two-thirds

of global totals in 2010. Given this trend, and even thoughsome states have marginally increased their defence

eorts amid heightened security concerns, European

states will have to more seriously weigh the optimum

balance between their defence ambitions, decit reduction

and discretionary spending, such as military outlays.

In contrast, emerging economies have continued to

escalate their defence spending. In 2014 these increases

more than oset Western reductions; overall, real global

defence expenditure in 2014 rose by 1.7% after three

years of reductions. However, this trend may moderate

this year in light of falling oil prices, the stagnation of the

Russian economy and slowing global growth.

Of course spending is only part of the picture.

Military capability like that of the US – still the world’s

largest defence spender – relates to more than simply

the equipment a state might procure. It also relates to the

quality of personnel and decades of accumulated military

training and operational experience; factors like these

inform a more rounded assessment of a country’s military

capability. So while defence investment gaps are closing,

Western states with global defence ambitions must try to

retain that accumulated experience mindful that once a

capability is lost, it is harder to rebuild.

Additionally, Western states will look to retain a

technological edge while aempting to minimise the risks

to their military power from the diusion of previouslyselect technologies to a broader range of state and non-

state actors.

This time last year, we highlighted the challenge to

defence planners from a fractured and complex security

environment. As we enter 2015 this state of aairs is more

threatening. Insecurity, violence and the use of military

force are all increasing; the ‘arc of instability’ is widening,

and military crises do not seem to end, but rather multiply.

Meanwhile, armed forces remain involved not just on

traditional military tasks, but also on missions as wide-

ranging as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and

pandemic response; these missions remain global in scope

and complex in execution.

As policymakers grapple with these issues, the 2015

edition of The Military Balance provides the best available

public information on military capabilities, trends

and defence expenditure across the world. The facts

and analysis concerning national military capabilities

contained in The Military Balance will help signicantly

to inform discussions within government and the wider

public debate.

Top 15 Defence Budgets 2014† US$bn

l l l l l l l l

i i

United

States

Other

top 15countries

Rest

of theworld

US$bn1. United States

581.0

2. China

129.4

7. Japan

47.7

5. United Kingdom

61.8

4. Russia

70.0

8. India

45.2

11. Brazil

31.9

12. Italy

24.3

13. Israela

23.2

14. Australia

22.5

15. Iraq

18.9

10. South Korea

34.4

9. Germany

43.9

6. France

53.1

3. Saudi Arabia

80.8

a Includes US Foreign Military Assistance

Note: US dollar totals are calculated using average market exchange rates for 2014, derived using IMF data. The relative position of countries will vary not only as a result of actual adjustments in defence spendinglevels, but also due to exchange-rate fluctuations between domestic currencies and the US dollar. The use of average exchange rates reduces these fluctuations, but the effects of such movements can be significantin a small number of cases.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700


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THE MILITARY BALANCE 2015Further Assessments ARUNDEL HOUSE, LONDON 11 FEBRUARY 2015

since 2010. By contrast, defence outlays are rising in many

emerging economies, particularly Asia, the Middle East

and Russia.

Nominal defence spending in Asia has increased by

more than a quarter since 2010. However, despite the largeabsolute spending increases in Asia, percentage real-terms

increases in the region have averaged some 3.8% since 2010,

a rate lower than regional growth rates (which averaged

around 6.8% over the same period). In the Middle East

and North Africa , nominal defence spending is estimated

to have risen by almost two-thirds since 2010. Factoring

in exchange rate and inationary eects, this equates to a

40% increase in real defence outlays over the period.

Real Russian defence spending increases have

averaged 10% in the three years to 2014 , with a large

increase in funds allocated to nance Russia’s ambitious

State Armaments Programme. Maintaining this rate of

increase will be dicult given the deterioration in the

Russian economy due to poor economic fundamentals,

falling oil prices and economic sanctions; and will likely

require political prioritisation of defence while focusing

budget cuts on other government spending areas.

NAVAL AND MARI TIME

Research and development was going into new platforms

for the US Navy , including unmanned systems, and planswere emerging to address concerns levelled against the

LCS programme. This led, in late 2014, to the requirement

for a ‘Small Surface Combatant’, to be paired in a 52-strong

eet with an LCS eet retro-ed with systems oering

improved survivability and lethality.

In the last ve years the Chinese People’s Liberation

Army Navy has commissioned more frigates and

destroyers than in any comparable period in its history. It

also now has fewer destroyer and frigate hulls in service

than at any point in the last decade, though the vessels

themselves have increased in size. The 61 hulls in service

in 2000 had less than 600 anti-ship and surface-to-air

missile tubes between them; the current eet has almost

treble that number, with only 20% more hulls.

Russia’s navy continues to focus primarily on two

nuclear submarine projects: eight Borey-class SSBNs due

to be equipped with the troubled Bulava SLBM; and seven

Yasen-class multipurpose cruise-missile-equipped SSNs.

Additional classied ‘special projects’ boats are planned.

It seems unlikely that these ambitious plans will be

implemented on schedule given the diculties already

experienced in building 50 or so major surface warships,

and the time taken to complete submarines that have goneinto service in recent years.

LAND WARFARE

Numbers of land platforms in Europe have reduced

substantially since the mid-1990s. This reduction has been

driven by changing defence aspirations and procurementplans, as well as nancial considerations. Between 1995

and 2015, numbers of main bale tanks in Europe declined

from around 25,000 to just under 8,000. Over the same

period, armoured infantry ghting vehicles declined from

just over 11,000 to around 7,500.

Some observers of China’s People’s Liberation Army

have talked of ‘brigadisation’ of the ground forces, but

this has not yet been totally realised. About 20 infantry

divisions and one armoured division remain both in the

18 group armies and as independent units. After these

reductions began, many divisions were downsized into

one brigade of the same type. Recently, all armoured

divisions – bar the 6th in Beijing – have transformed into

brigades.

MILITARY AEROSPACE

The coalition air-led campaign against ISIS underscores

both the utility and the limitations of air-power, but

suggestions the air campaign has failed are incorrect. An

air campaign alone was never going to prove decisive

against ISIS. This requires a concerted whole-of-government approach including non-military as well as

military tools.

Armed UAVs apparently in Nigeria and almost

certainly in Pakistan mark the beginning of the provision

of such capabilities other than by the US (Israel is not

known to have exported armed UAVs) – in both cases,

China is almost certainly the provider. The UAV observed

in Nigeria appeared to be ed with two kinds of air-

to-surface weapons that China has been developing for

unmanned platforms.

Underlining the importance of airborne intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance, the US has decided to

retain the U-2 ISR aircraft until 2019. Air power remains

a strategic asset with the US and Russia continuing next-

generation bomber projects – during 2014 the US issued

a request for proposals while Russia is thought to have

completed the basic design of its project. Meanwhile the

US is examining future concepts of combat aircraft to

succeed the current fth-generation programmes while

both the US, Russia, China and others are considering the

optimum mix of manned and unmanned aircraft that will

constitute future force structures. These developments

will be watched by emerging military powers across theglobe.


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Contents

Indexes of Tables, Figures and Maps 4

Editor’s Introduction 5

Part OneCapabilities, Trends and Economics

Chapter 1 Defence-policy trends and analysis ............................. ............................... .............................. ........... 9

Directed energy weapons: finally coming of age? 9; Military space systems: US ambitions to secure space 13; Hybrid warfare: challenge

and response 17

Chapter 2 Comparative defence statistics .............................. ............................... .............................. .............. 21

Defence budgets and expenditure 21; Changes in the global submarine market since 1990 23; Key defence statistics 24; Precision attack

by guided artillery 26; US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific: vessel deployments 2014–20 27; Latin American fixed-wing aircraft fleets, 1994–

2014 28

Chapter 3 North America .............................. .............................. ............................... .............................. ......... 29

United States: defence policy and economics 29; Armed forces data section 37;

Canada: defence policy 36; Selected arms procurements and deliveries 55

Chapter 4 Europe ........................... .............................. .............................. .............................. ......................... 57

Regional defence policy and economics overviews 61; Armed forces data section 72;

France: defence policy and economics 64; Selected arms procurements and deliveries 154

UK: defence policy and economics 68;

Chapter 5 Russia and Eurasia ............................. .............................. .............................. ............................... .. 159

Russia: defence policy and economics 159; Armed forces data section 174;

Central Asia: defence policy 167; Selected arms procurements and deliveries 205

Ukraine: defence policy 168;

Chapter 6 Asia ............................... .............................. .............................. .............................. ....................... 207

Regional defence policy and economics overviews 207; Myanmar: defence policy 225

China: defence policy and economics 212; North Korea: defence policy 226;

India: defence policy and economics 217; Armed forces data section 228;

Japan: defence policy and economics 221; Selected arms procurements and deliveries 296

Chapter 7 Middle East and North Africa ............................ .............................. .............................. .................. 303

Regional defence policy and economics overviews 303; UAE: defence policy and economics 314;

Libya: defence policy 306; Armed forces data section 319;

Israel: defence policy 310; Selected arms procurements and deliveries 360

Chapter 8 Latin America and the Caribbean ........................... ............................... .............................. ............ 363


Brazil: defence policy 369; Selected arms procurements and deliveries 418

Colombia: defence policy and economics 370;

Chapter 9 Sub-Saharan Africa ............................ .............................. .............................. ............................... .. 421


Kenya: defence policy and economics 425; Selected arms procurements and deliveries 480

The Somali National Army 427;

Chapter 10 Country comparisons – commitments, force levels and economics ........................... ....................... 481

Selected Training Activity 2014 482; Selected Non-State Armed Groups:

International Comparisons of Defence Observed Equipment Holdings 491

Expenditure and Military Personnel 484;

Part Two Reference


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Explanatory Notes ................................................................................................................................................................. 493

Principal Land Definitions 497; Principal Naval Definitions 498; Principal Aviation Definitions 499

List of Abbreviations for Data Sections ............................... .............................. .............................. .................. 501

Index of Country/Territory Abbreviations .......................................................................................................... 503

Index of Countries and Territories ............................ ............................... .............................. ............................ 504


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Chapter One: Directed energy weapons: finallycoming of age?

To cite this article: (2015) Chapter One: Directed energy weapons: finally coming of age?, TheMilitary Balance, 115:1, 9-20, DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2015.996336

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and power requirements for the laser systems most

likely to be elded in the near-to-medium term

are more modest than systems such as ABL. While

the ABL programme predates the 1980s Strategic

Defence Initiative it received a major llip from the

Reagan-era initiative.

Laser systems are currently viewed, in the near

term at least, as an adjunct or complement to existing

weapons, rather than as direct replacements. In the

maritime role, for instance, a laser could provide the

ability to engage particular target sets – such as fast-aack craft or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) –

without having to expend a costlier weapon such as

a missile, of which vessels will have limited stocks.

Air-defence missiles could then be saved to engage

more demanding targets, such as high-speed anti-ship

cruise missiles, that remain beyond the power-output

abilities of the lasers most likely to enter operational

service by 2020. There is also interest in using laser

weaponry to counter subsonic cruise missiles – both

at sea and on land – either by degrading the perfor-

mance of or damaging electro-optical (EO) seekers, or

by causing structural damage to the missile airframe.Power requirements in the hundreds of kilowas

would likely be required for this role.

US naval laser research

Even though substantial funds have been invested

into laser research, and the results have so far been

mixed, the projected benets in cost terms remain a

signicant motivation for continued military interest

in the technology. The US Navy’s (USN) Oce of

Naval Research has suggested that a typical 110kW

high-energy laser (HEL) for a multi-second shot

would cost less than US$1 per round. Firing a missileto full a similar role costs substantially more, with

most of this related to the round itself. With lasers, the

costs lie with the engineering architecture required

to generate, point and steer a beam of the required

power for the requisite period of time; so far these

costs have generally been prohibitively high. For

instance, although Israel pursued a counter-rocket

laser system with the US (the cancelled Mobile

Tactical High Energy Laser), it still relies on a kinetic

finally coming of age?

Directed energy (DE) systems have been something

of a chimera for defence planners. From their rst

appearances in science ction, to the ambitious 1980s

United States’ Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), they

have been touted by advocates of the technology as a

means of engaging military targets with, in the case

of lasers, speed-of-light delivery and the possibility

of near-unlimited magazines compared with kinetic-

eect weapons, such as missiles or guns.

The US, several European countries, including

the United Kingdom, Germany and France, as wellas Russia, China and Israel, have all been engaged in

long-standing research and development (R&D) into

DE systems. While there has been limited transition

from the laboratory and related test environments

into weapons systems suitable and ready for opera-

tional exploitation, in spite of considerable levels

of investment since the 1970s, the practical military

employment of DE systems is drawing closer.

There is now the potential for DE to be adopted far

more widely than in the niche applications in which

it has been utilised so far, such as vehicle immobilisa-

tion. This is in part because technology has matured, but also because near-term ambitions have been

reviewed by defence planners. DE is now seen as a

disruptive technology that can potentially provide

substantial military benet at the tactical rather than

strategic level – with the proviso that such systems

must be brought to an appropriate level of maturity

for deployment. Two areas, in particular, have long

interested armed forces: laser systems and radio

frequency (RF). These oer the most promise in terms

of tactical application.

Laser weaponsThe development of laser weaponry has had several

expensive false starts. One of the most public was

the US Airborne Laser (ABL) programme. This

exemplied much that was wrong with DE weapons

projects. Irrespective of the technical progress made

during the programme, the project suered from

over-reach with regard to the maturity of the tech-

nology then available, and came in over budget.

Today, the level of ambition, projected target set

Chapter One

Directed energy weapons:

D o w n l o a d e d b

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approach to defeat rockets with its Iron Dome missile

system.

Recent tests by the USN have been illustrative of

the increasing likelihood that DE weaponry will soon

be integrated into military platforms. In April 2014,

the USN announced that the landing platform dock

USS Ponce would carry out trials, during a year-long

operational deployment to the Persian Gulf, with a

Laser Weapon System (LaWS) demonstrator in order

to examine its utility against a range of air and surface

targets. These tests followed others in US home waters

on board USS Dewey , an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer,

where LaWS was used to engage a small UAV.

LaWS is a comparatively low-powered 30kW

‘solid-state’ laser. This modest power level has

limited its notional target set to UAVs and fast

inshore aack craft (usually by targeting the engine

block to disable the craft), particularly when engagedin swarm aacks. Anticipating questions about the

compatibility of LaWS with existing ship systems, the

USN has said that the system could be directed onto

targets from the radar track obtained from a Mk 15

Phalanx Close-In Weapon system or other targeting

source. Indeed, integration with a relatively low-tier

tracking and targeting system such as that used in

Phalanx could, when allied with its relatively modest

power requirement, increase the possibilities of LaWS

being integrated more broadly across eet platforms

of varying sizes.

This deployment forms part of the USN’s Solid-State Laser Quick Reaction Capability work strand,

which it hopes will help inform the Solid-State Laser

Technology Maturation programme (SSL-TM),

which grew originally from the 2011 Maritime Laser

Demonstration. In May 2014, Rear Admiral Mahew

Klunder, the USN’s chief of naval research, told

the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommiee:

‘SSL-TM will help determine the load capacity and

most eective means to integrate a HEL … on surface

ships such as DDG-51 [USS Arleigh Burke] and the

Lioral Combat Ship. The SSL-TM goal is to demon-

strate a 100–150 kilowa Advanced DevelopmentModel … by 2016. The programme will address tech-

nical challenges in rugged laser subsystems, optics

suitable for maritime environments, and capability to

propagate lethal power levels in the maritime atmo-

sphere.’

However, while the USN might have ambitions to

increase the power output of its laser systems, these

are incremental steps towards realising fairly limited

objectives. For instance, the power output of LaWS is

dwarfed by the near-megawa-level power output

required for ABL to damage a ballistic missile at an

operationally valid range. While ABL, housed in a

Boeing 747-400 airframe, was rst used in 2010 to

successfully engage a ballistic-missile target at such a

range, the project was some distance from providing a

system suitable for introduction into general service.

Other defence-related laser research

Naval laser-damage or ‘dazzle’ weapons have already

been developed by various states, including the

former Soviet Union and the UK, with several other

countries – including France, Germany and China –

pursuing long-term R&D into laser dazzle or damage

systems. The UK deployed a naval laser weapon, the

Laser Dazzle Sight, during the Falklands campaign

in 1982, although previously classied documents

suggest it was not used in action.As well as examining the utility of medium-power

lasers for applications such as air defence, the UK has

also pursued – since at least the late 1970s – projects

to defend sensors and personnel against lasers. The

original code name for this activity was Raker , while

development projects arising from the research fell

under the Shingle programme. These included coat-

ings for EO sensors and aempts to develop eye-safe

visors for aircrew. Conversely, the blinding eect of

lasers has also been considered by some nations for

both defensive and oensive anti-satellite purposes,

including China, Russia and the US. Lasers can beused to degrade or disrupt the performance of space-

based EO reconnaissance sensors.

A number of European countries, including the

UK and Germany, also support R&D work into laser

systems for maritime and land-based air defence. In

the UK, there has been ongoing naval interest in laser

systems with work streams examining eects, and

pointing and tracking requirements. In Germany,

MBDA Deutschland has been working under contract

to the German defence ministry to develop and test

a solid-state laser for the Counter-Rocket, Artillery

and Mortar role and against UAVs, either to defeatsensors at extended ranges or to shoot down the air

vehicle. A number of increasingly demanding trials

were carried out in 2012 and 2013 to verify elements

of the system, including the ability to engage a mortar

round and to automatically acquire and track a high-

speed target. Several possible applications are now

being considered including land and naval roles. One

option for the former might be to install a 10–20kW

laser on an armoured vehicle to provide a counter-


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11Directed energy weapons

UAV capability as a complement to existing missile

systems.

The types of EO sensors used by UAVs in the

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)

role are vulnerable to laser damage or blinding. The

USN’s Ground-Based Air Defense Directed Energy

On-The-Move programme is being developed to

address the threat to deployed forces presented by

enemy UAV sensors. The programme is a result of

the need to counter ISR surveillance of ground forces,

as outlined in the US Marine Corps’ Science and

Technology Strategic Plan. While a 10kW laser was

due to be tested before the end of 2014, the aim is to

have a 30kW laser ready for eld-testing during 2016.

But again, there is no monopoly on this technology.

EO sensor countermeasures were examined by the

Soviet Union: the 1K11 Stileo and 1K17 Szhatie were

vehicle-mounted systems intended for baleeld useagainst NATO EO systems, and during the 1980s

work was also carried out on a land-based tactical air-

defence laser system.

Radio-frequency weapons

While lasers have garnered much aention, RF

weapons have also seen both defensive and oensive

research activity. RF systems are more commonly

referred to as high-power microwave (HPM), and

have possible applications across the air, land and

sea domains. They provide the potential ability to

temporarily or permanently disable systems thatrely on computers or electronics by emiing very

high-output, short-duration, electromagnetic bursts.

Initial work into HPM or RF ordnance conducted in

the 1990s by the UK utilised explosive-driven ux

compression generators to produce the required

energy, although this limited output to single shots.

This led researchers to investigate other technolo-

gies, such as Marx Generators, which allow for the

voltage of the output discharge to be far higher than

the input, to deliver multiple bursts of RF energy.

Like laser systems, there have been some niche

applications in terms of counter-personnel (suchas the US Active Denial System, which relies on

the sensation of skin heating), counter-vehicle and

counter-improvised-explosive-device systems, but

the development of ‘stand-o’ HPM or RF payloads

to provide weapons eects has proved more chal-

lenging. Eorts to develop HPM warheads have

been under way for at least three decades, and while

systems have been tested in the laboratory and in

the eld, it remains unclear whether any have been

operationally deployed (although there may be some

applications in the classied realm). In common with

lasers, though, the possibility is growing that an air-

delivered RF weapon might soon be elded.

In 2012, Boeing carried out ight tests of the

Counter-electronics High-Powered Microwave

Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP) on behalf of

the US Air Force Research Laboratory. The CHAMP

concept, housed within a cruise-missile airframe,

used a compact pulsed-power system to provide

a ‘narrowband’ HPM, with the system capable of

generating multiple pulses to engage multiple targets.

Narrowband sources provide high energy output

over specic frequencies tailored to the systems they

are intended to counter. (‘Broadband’, as the name

suggests, is a less discriminate output of RF energy.)

The US is not alone in trying to exploit the poten-

tial of air-delivered HPM devices. For well over adecade, the UK has been developing and testing

HPM payloads capable of cruise-missile delivery,

while Russia has also considered an RF warhead

for future air-to-air missile applications. The UK has

carried out trials of an HPM payload against a variety

of simulated targets in order to beer understand

the eects of this technology. The UK Ministry of

Defence’s Black Shadow Novel Air Vehicle project was

believed to be related to the delivery of DE payloads,

including HPM.

Challenges to and ramications of RF weapon useThere are, arguably, three basic challenges to the

use of an RF warhead: repeatability, bale damage

assessment (BDA), and second- and third-order

eects. One issue with early HPM systems was that

the burst of energy could dier from one shot to the

next, with this output variation meaning there was

no guarantee the desired eect could be achieved.

Much R&D activity has been devoted to this issue.

BDA during operational use is another problem area

for HPM payloads, particularly if the objective is to

permanently or temporarily disable a surface-to-

air missile system radar or a command-and-controlnode. Monitoring these may enable the detection of

any degradation in capability, but generating such

analysis may take time and serve only to generate

additional intelligence requirements. A conventional

cruise-missile strike, meanwhile – even against hard-

ened structures – will show a penetration point, and

post-detonation indicators may also be available to

provide additional BDA data.

While a multiple-shot HPM payload has the


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obvious advantage of providing the ability to engage

more than one target, as opposed to a conventional

one-hit warhead, it also gives rise to challenges. For

instance, did the HPM payload work as intended or

did the target simply shut down operation coinci-

dentally at around the time of the planned engage-

ment? Furthermore, what should be done with

the cruise-missile airframe once the mission is

completed? The airframe will likely house sensitive

HPM technology – should the weapon be recovered

like a UAV, or should it be ed with an explosive

warhead to try and ensure the RF elements of the

payload are destroyed? Another option would be to

t a multi-shot HPM as part of an unmanned combat

aerial vehicle (UCAV) payload, though this would

require such levels of electromagnetic shielding to

ensure the UCAV itself would not be aected by the

HPM.A further consideration is that of second-order

eects, not least of all in terms of the laws of armed

conict. Legal issues surrounding previous and

current RF and laser weaponry have to be taken into

account in development and integration plans. In the

case of the laer, a protocol on blinding laser weapons

was adopted in 1995, which might need to be revis-

ited as more powerful laser systems enter service.

For HPM systems, meanwhile, there are potential

issues related to unanticipated, follow-on collateral

eects, as opposed to collateral damage. In both tech-

nology areas, a key challenge for policymakers and

legal experts is the speed of developments, which

are, in many cases, outpacing current conceptual and

legal frameworks. These concerns will need to be

addressed as DE systems nally move out of the test

environment and into broader operational service,

instead of the niche applications that have typied

their roles so far.

In the near term, DE systems will be drawn rst

into the wider inventory as complements to, rather

than as replacements for, kinetic weapons. This level

of ambition means that the capabilities deployed

initially will be considerably more modest than some

of the systems envisaged in the 1980s and 1990s. The

defence-technology base was at that time incapableof delivering systems that provided robust and reus-

able operational utility, and was hampered by power-

output and beam-steering demands it could not meet.

This lowering of ambitions – at least initially – means

that DE weapons are nding a path into active service,

and it is only in the course of their elding and use

that the true operational and transformational aspects

of these technologies will become clear.


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US ambitions to secure space

kinetic kill mechanisms, and environmental hazards,

including orbiting debris.

For the US armed forces, the perceived vulnera-

bility of space-based systems is of increasing concern.

In February 2014, referring to a satellite constellation

under construction (the Advanced Extremely High

Frequency satellite, or AEHF), then-Space Command

chief Air Force General William Shelton said: ‘if an

adversary wanted to go after one of our satellites, [an

AEHF satellite] might be the one you’d choose … If

that happened, and one of the four gets knocked out,

we’re left with a big geographic hole in our ability totransmit data around the world and [help] the presi-

dent give the direction that he needs to give.’ Shelton

also highlighted the potential of high-powered lasers

to aect payload operation. Some lasers have the

potential to blind electro-optical reconnaissance satel-

lites (see p. 10).

China’s ASAT test in January 2007 caused alarm

in Washington. Beijing destroyed its own Fengyun

1C polar-orbiting weather satellite with what was

thought to be an SC-19 missile, based on the DF-21

(CSS-5) intermediate-range ballistic missile. This

resulted in a large debris eld, much of which remainsin orbit and has prompted numerous ‘manoeuvres’

by satellite operators in order to avoid secondary

collisions in space.

China has continued to rene its capabilities since

then, and is believed to have executed an aempted

engagement of a ballistic missile in 2010. Another

test, in 2014, was labelled by US ocials as an ASAT

operation. In August, Frank Rose, US deputy assis-

tant secretary of state for space and defence policy,

told the 2014 US Strategic Command Deterrence

Symposium that, ‘despite China’s claims that this was

not an ASAT test … the United States has high con-dence in its assessment, that the event was indeed an

ASAT test’. In contrast, China’s state-run news agency

claimed the test was a missile intercept. Western

analysts believe that Beijing is investing signicant

resources in technologies and techniques to inuence

operations in space. If anything, these discussions

are only illustrative of the concern expressed by the

US government and its allies that space services are

vulnerable.

Once the exclusive domain of the Cold War super-

powers, national space capabilities are now main-

tained by a growing number of countries. Eleven

states have an indigenous capacity to launch satellites,

while 170 operate satellites or have a nancial interest

in a satellite constellation. Along with the established

space-operating nations of the United States, Russia,

France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Israel,

nations such as China and India now possess signi-

cant, and in some cases growing, space capabilities.

While its early uses were dominated by national-

security tasks, space is now of far broader economic,commercial and military importance. For example,

the US Global Positioning System (GPS) provides

precision timing and navigation data, among other

information. Russia’s Glonass oers a similar capa-

bility, and Europe has successfully launched four

of its Galileo timing and navigation spacecraft into

orbit. Recent commercial uses of space include the

earth-observation collections from DigitalGlobe and

others that drive imagery products such as Google

Maps. Satellites providing these services are in low-

Earth orbit (LEO); spacecraft in geosynchronous

orbit (GEO) provide television and communicationsservices.

However, the vulnerability of space systems to

deliberate or inadvertent damage or interference is

an increasing concern, not least in Washington, as

the US seeks to sustain and protect those satellite

systems that are not only central to its commercial

and economic security, but also at the core of its mili-

tary infrastructure.

Military uses of space have grown substantially

in the years since the rst satellite, Sputnik , orbited

the Earth. Over the years, armed forces have increas-

ingly relied on space-based systems for naviga-tion, targeting, surveillance and communications.

Reconnaissance satellites, for instance, typically

operate in LEO – often within 400km of Earth – while

critical ballistic-missile warning and communica-

tions payloads operate in GEO, roughly 35,000km

away from the surface of the planet. However, both

orbital regimes are under threat. There is particular

concern about intentional and inadvertent radio-

frequency jamming, as well as anti-satellite (ASAT) or

Military space systems:


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15Military space systems

of FY2017. For the next SBSS satellite, ocials are

targeting a less complex design than that of Pathnder ,

which featured a two-axis, gimballed sensor and cost

US$823m.

Ground-based supportWashington is also improving the terrestrial radars

used for SSA. A new Space Fence S-band active elec-

tronically scanned array is due to begin operating in

2018. The system, developed by Lockheed Martin,

is intended to be installed at Kwajalein Atoll in the

Pacic Ocean. A possible follow-on site could be in

Western Australia, but that option on the US$914m

contract has not yet been exercised. A C-band radar

formerly in Antigua has already been relocated to

Western Australia, the site of DARPA’s SST. These

radar assets are sited to provide intelligence on

Chinese launches, specically those from the TaiyuanSatellite Launch Centre. Until recently, the US lacked

the ability to conduct continuous tracking of Chinese

payloads launched into certain orbits.

US government ocials have long held that SSA is

only one aspect of the United States’ posture in space.

These radar upgrades will improve Washington’s

understanding of activity in space, making it easier

to aribute actions there. Diplomatic agreements

with space operators to deter irresponsible or hostile

behaviour are known to exist, but only aribution can

allow the US and its allies to properly apply diplo-

matic pressure and, if needed, military force in reac-tion to hostile acts against space assets. At an Air

Force Association conference in 2014, AFSPC chief

General John Hyten said: ‘we have to be prepared to

do all those things the president has told us to do and

if deterrence fails, defeat eorts to aack us.’

Responses to perceived vulnerabilitiesAbsent from the public dialogue are technologies

elded to respond to threats. One is the United

States’ Counter Communications System, designed

to deny an adversary the ability to access friendly

military-satellite communications. Lile has beenrevealed about the technology, but since 2006 it has

been operated by the 4th Space Control Squadron

at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. Another is the

Rapid Aack, Identication, Detection and Reporting

System, the prototype of which began operations in

the Middle East in 2005. This system was designed

to ‘detect, characterize, geolocate and report’ sources

of interference to allied communications systems in

the region and, according to the USAF, consists of a

‘central operating location and a variety of transport-

able antennas’. During operations, data was relayed

to teams that would physically locate, identify and

nullify the interference.

A so-called Counter Surveillance and Recon-

naissance System, which was conceived of more

than ten years ago to impede an adversary’s access

to space-based reconnaissance assets, disappeared

from US budget documents in 2004, suggesting that

it was either terminated or classied so that funding

accounts for continued work could be hidden.

The US has also been exploring alternative

propulsion systems for its workhorse Atlas V two-

stage expendable launch vehicle. Now operated by

the United Launch Alliance (ULA), a joint venture

between Lockheed Martin and Boeing, Atlas V

relies on the Russian RD-180 engine, sold to ULA

exclusively by a US–Russian joint venture. In 2014increased tensions between Washington and Moscow

prompted Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s deputy prime

minister, to state that he would cut o the supply

of engines used for military purposes. Although

the threat had not been fullled by October 2014, it

caused concern in Washington and, after months of

wrangling, Congress was assessing whether to fund

an alternative Atlas V engine.

Headway is also being made by Space Exploration

Technologies (SpaceX). The private company’s Falcon

9 v1.1 rocket, rst own in September 2013, has edged

closer to USAF certication, expanding its potentialmarket beyond NASA and commercial operators.

Once certied, SpaceX can compete against ULA,

which currently has a monopoly on large national-

security launches in the US with its Delta IV and Atlas

V rocket families. In the meantime, a lawsuit regarding

the USAF’s deal with ULA, led by SpaceX in April

2014, is still pending. Rogozin made his threat around

the same time that the lawsuit was led, calling into

question the USAF’s future launch strategy.

The various challenges to US space security, which

range from the increasing congestion of space to

oensive actions by other states, have led Washingtonto see its space-based systems as increasingly vulner-

able. This has prompted the development of a range

of monitoring capacities, both earthbound and space-

based, in a bid to improve SSA. But the US has also

taken other steps. For instance, there has been some

focus on increasing resilience by considering dierent

constellation architectures. This might result in a

move away from ‘the multiple payload, big satellite

construct into a less complex satellite architecture


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with multiple components’, as Shelton said in 2014.

It could mean that payloads are distributed across

multiple platforms. Perceived vulnerabilities are also

leading Washington to assess its level of military

dependence on space, including its ability to operate

in degraded information environments, such as one

in which access to GPS is reduced. As a result, there

has been some scrutiny of established technologies

that could minimise the eects of vulnerabilities on

weapons systems. For example, inertial guidance is

being revisited, including technologies such as terrain

mapping and the miniaturisation of atomic clocks.

There is also a focus on hardening existing tech-

nology to minimise the risk of electromagnetic aack,

and of GPS degradation or spoong, in which false

readings – perhaps imperceptible to the operator –

may be generated by an adversary seeking to degrade

satellite capabilities.


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employing hybrid warfare might evade a response

through ambiguity deliberately calculated to avoid

an early declaration of Article V.

Perhaps most dangerous to NATO, adver-

saries might aack Alliance cohesiveness and

magnify possible political divisions. Campaigns

against NATO states could begin with eorts to

shape the political, economic and social landscape

through subversion, espionage and propaganda.

An example of this tactic could be an appeal for the

protection of ethnic minorities, similar to concerns

expressed by Moscow over elements of the popula-

tion in Eastern Ukraine, and the rapid formation of

pressure groups that might be locally staed, but

externally directed and supported. The urgency for

NATO to develop responses to these threats has

been heightened due to Russia’s aggressive appli-

cation of hybrid warfare, particularly because ofthe fear, among those newer NATO members who

might feel more vulnerable to Russian actions, that

they could be directed against them.

Broader responsesIn developing responses to hybrid warfare, policy-

makers might rst look to the past, and to the history

of the Cold War in particular. Russian conduct of

hybrid warfare is grounded in maskirovka , the Soviet

doctrine of denial and deception, featuring deni-

ability, concealment, deception and disinformation,

to accomplish political objectives. The current incar-nation of maskirovka has received modern updates.

Today, Russia has developed an ability to shape polit-

ical, economic and social environments through divi-

sion, subversion, espionage, information operations

and social tension. As Russia’s Chief of the General

Sta General Valery Gerasimov observed in 2013,

‘the means of achieving political and strategic goals

has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded

the power of force of weapons in their eectiveness’.

These new means include the use of cyber warfare,

entertainment television, business groups and social

media to inuence popular will and perception. Therewas evidence of cyber aacks on Ukrainian systems

in 2014, including the reported insertion of an espio-

nage tool called ‘Snake’, although as an example of

cyber warfare the Ukraine crisis appeared muted in

comparison with previous aacks, such as that by

Russia on Estonia in 2007.

To prevail in what is a psychological and polit-

ical contest supported by military operations, states

– and international organisations like NATO – must

consider how to counter three fundamental elements

of hybrid warfare:

• the use of conventional and unconventional

forces in combination with information

operations to intimidate, coerce and foment

ethnic conict;

• the use of conventional and unconventional

forces to strike rapidly in combination with

cyber aacks;

• the establishment of new political structures,

economic relationships and social structures

to consolidate gains and prevent reverses.

Deterring and countering hybrid warfare will

require states to improve capabilities in the informa-

tion domain as well as strengthening military readi-

ness and forward defence. For NATO, this shouldalso involve building upon recent work on the

‘comprehensive approach’, its recognition that eec-

tive response to crises must combine civilian and mili-

tary instruments. To that end, clause 89 in the Wales

Summit Declaration – referring to NATO’s ‘Defence

and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative’ –

was instructive, as it reected awareness of broader

capacity-building requirements.

Hybrid warfare entails the pursuit of psycholog-

ical eects both on the target nation and internation-

ally, and so Western states and NATO might improve

their ability to clarify intentions; counter enemy disin-formation and propaganda; bolster the resolve and

cohesion of the nation or nations under aack; and

expose the actions and duplicity of the enemy. For

instance, quick action to counter Russia’s narrative of

its right to protect pro-Russian and Russian-speaking

populations seems particularly important. Because

deception has been employed to foster confusion

and achieve deniability, it will be important for intel-

ligence eorts to establish the foundation for infor-

mation campaigns. Compelling intelligence products

will help deny the enemy’s ability to use ambiguity

to avoid sanction. Intelligence will also be a criticalcomponent of countering eorts to sow dissen-

sion, doubt and division within and among nations.

Inuence agents working on behalf of adversaries

could be systematically and publically exposed.

For NATO, beer coordination of the informational

eorts of member nations, as well as those of inter-

national organisations such as the European Union,

might improve speed of action while magnifying the

Alliance’s voice, but in many Western countries these


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19Hybrid warfare

capacities have been reduced since the Cold War;

rebuilding and updating them will take time and

political commitment.

Military aspectsThe most important focus for NATO, to deter Russia

in particular, might lie in strengthening the readi-

ness of its military forces. That is because the Russian

application of hybrid warfare in Ukraine is essentially

an eort to wage limited war for limited objectives.

Moscow believes that those limited objectives are

aainable at an acceptable cost. If the cost of poten-

tial oensive action against a NATO member is high

due to capable military forces ranged in opposition,

Russia may well conclude that it cannot rapidly

achieve its objectives in this way. While the develop-

ment of the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task

Force is an important initiative, strengthening mili-tary forces on NATO’s periphery and the forward-

positioning of US or European forces may be more

important to deterring future aggression. That is due,

in part, to the often slow response by Western policy-

makers, particularly when aggressors are successful

in preserving ambiguity. Conicts in Georgia, Crimea

and Eastern Ukraine demonstrated that Russia was

able to act more quickly than international organisa-

tions could react. Hybrid warfare, like all warfare, is

a contest of wills; the positioning of capable forces

forward along a frontier remains a compelling way to

communicate the determination to confront aggres-sion.

Deterring and defending against a sophisticated

campaign demands a comprehensive approach

and the integration of military, diplomatic, infor-

mational, economic, cyber and law-enforcement

activities. NATO has a well-developed focus on inter-

operability and integration across these and other

domains, which could be applied to the problem of

hybrid warfare. Contingency planning and training

could be orientated to the hybrid model, and lessons

could be applied from experiences in Afghanistan

against networked insurgent and criminal organisa-tions. Defence planners might look for asymmetrical

advantages that could be applied to this problem.

A potential advantage, often under-utilised, is the

ability to take law-enforcement and nancial action

against enemy organisations so that their sources of

strength and support are exposed and prohibited.

International and non-governmental organisations

may be mobilised to expose illicit nancial ows

and to sanction individuals and companies that aid

and abet adversaries. The French, Italian and Dutch

models of blending military and law-enforcement

actions overseas might be applied at the operational

and strategic levels. All of these eorts should add

the dimension of cyberspace as a critical element in

understanding hybrid warfare, defending against it

and, if necessary, taking oensive action.

As NATO and many Western states look beyond

the long war in Afghanistan, there has been a

tendency to return to the orthodoxy of the 1990s

Revolution in Military Aairs, and especially the

belief that complex land-based problems can be

eectively addressed by technology and precision-

strike operations conducted at stand-o range. In

hybrid warfare, exclusive use of stand-o capabili-

ties leaves decisions in the hands of enemies who

operate in and among populations and extend oper-

ations beyond physical balegrounds to realms ofperception and subversion. A signicant aspect of

Russia’s hybrid warfare is the use of conventional

forces, capable of mobilising quickly and massing

to intimidate the target nation while shielding and

supporting (directly and indirectly) unconventional

forces employed inside that nation. The combination

of tactics and capabilities employed in Ukraine, and

the deniability professed by Moscow, even saw the

insertion of conventional forces into Eastern Ukraine

in mid-2014.

States wishing to respond eectively to hybrid-

warfare threats are likely to have to apply greaterinvestment in special operations and conventional

land forces, irrespective of whether the threat mani-

fests itself in the Baltic States, Eastern Europe, the

greater Middle East or the broader Sahel. In particular,

land forces should have the ability to deploy rapidly

and transition to both oensive and security opera-

tions. Combinations of conventional and special-

operations forces must have the ability not just to

take direct action but to defeat hybrid enemy organ-

isations, secure territory and isolate populations from

enemy subversion as well. Traditional army capabili-

ties such as mobility, protection and repower willremain relevant and important, but forces must also

be eective on the ‘baleground’ of perception while

integrating military operations with broader eorts,

including in the areas of counter-threat nance and

law enforcement.

Hybrid warfare represents a grave threat to

NATO’s collective security. However, improving the

ability to defend the Alliance and its member states

from hybrid-warfare threats applies beyond those


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Chapter Two: Comparative defence statistics

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Chapter Two

Comparative defence statisticsTop 15 Defence Budgets 2014† US$bn

2014 Top 15 Defence and Security Budgets as a % of GDP*

*Analysis only includes countries for which sufficient comparable data is available. Notable exceptions include Cuba, Eritrea, Libya, North Korea and Syria.

† At current prices and exchange rates.

†Figures do not sum due to rounding effects

UnitedStates

Other top 15

countries

Restof theworld

US$bn1. United States

581.0

2. China

129.4

7. Japan

47.7

5. United Kingdom

61.8

4. Russia

70.0

8. India

45.2

11. Brazil

31.9

12. Italy

24.3

13. Israela

23.2

14. Australia

22.5

15. Iraq

18.9

10. South Korea

34.4

9. Germany

43.9

6. France

53.1

3. Saudi Arabia

80.8

a Includes US Foreign Military Assistance

Note: US dollar totals are calculated using average market exchange rates for 2014, derived using IMF data. The relative position of countries will vary not only as a result of actual adjustments in defence spendinglevels, but also due to exchange-rate fluctuations between domestic currencies and the US dollar. The use of average exchange rates reduces these fluctuations, but the effects of such movements can be significant

in a small number of cases.

Algeria

5.3%

Myanmar

3.9%

Bahrain

3.9%

Yemen

4.2%

Azerbaijan

4.5%

Republicof Congo

5.1%

Angola

5.2%

Afghanistan

14.6%

SaudiArabia

10.4%

Jordan

4.3%

Iraq

8.1%

Oman

12.0%

Israel

7.6%

Armenia

4.3%

SouthSudan

8.8%

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

North America37.1%

Europe17.8%

Russia and Eurasia5.1%

Asia andAustralasia

21.4%

Middle East andNorth Africa

12.6%

Latin America and the Caribbean

4.6%Sub-Saharan Africa

1.5% Sub-Saharan Africa1.5%

United States36.1%

United Kingdom3.8%

France3.3%Germany

2.7%Other NATO

7.6%

Non-NATO Europe, 1.4%

China, 8.0%

Japan, 3.0%

India, 2.8%

South Korea, 2.1%

Other Asia andAustralasia, 5.4%

Russia, 4.4%Other Eurasia, 0.7%

Saudi Arabia, 5.0%

Other Middle Eastand North Africa, 7.6%

Latin Americaand the Caribbean, 4.6%

Planned Defence Expenditure by Country 2014†Planned Global Defence Expenditure by Region 2014

balance military 2015

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