badconscience.greer

Journal of History of the Behavioral Sciences,Vol. 38(3), 303–315 Summer 2002Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI: 10:1002/jhbs.10064� 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

JHBS—WILEY RIGHT BATCH

shortstandard

Base of DF

Top of ID

Base of 1stline of ART

303

SCOTT GREER is currently assistant professor of psychology at the University of Prince EdwardIsland in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, Canada. He received his B.A. from the University ofMemphis, and his M.A. and Ph.D. from York University in Toronto. His current research interests includecritical history and historiography of psychological theory and practice, including most recently a ge-nealogical approach to the measurement of the self and self-esteem. Other interests include qualitativeresearch on questions of identity and moral discourse (e.g., “self-esteem”), especially using phenome-nological and narrative approaches.

FREUD’S “BAD CONSCIENCE”: THE CASE OF NIETZSCHE’SGENEALOGY

SCOTT GREER

This article develops the argument that Friedrich Nietzsche influenced several aspects ofFreud’s later writings by illustrating, in particular, the impact of Nietzsche’sOn the Ge-nealogy of Moralson Freud’sCivilization and its Discontents.The theoretical and con-ceptual schemes represented in Freud’sDiscontentsare found to bear a remarkablesimilarity to Nietzsche’sGenealogyon a number of highly specific points. It is suggestedthat “das Es,” “ Uber-ich,” and “bad conscience,” concepts central to Freud’s moral theoryof mind, are at least partly derived from Nietzsche. Moreover, Freud’s phylogenetic theoryof guilt is based upon premises found in Nietzsche, as are specific details relating to ideason human prehistory and the ancestral family. Based on this evidence, a re-examinationof the moral and social dimensions of Freud’s “structural” model may be in order.� 2002Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

The intellectual relationship between Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud has gainedincreasing recognition in recent years among scholars, but perhaps has yet to become fullyappreciated. It is, of course, widely acknowledged that Nietzsche was a precursor to manypsychoanalytic concepts, a fact about which Freud himself was well aware. It is also becomingincreasingly accepted that Nietzsche was, in all likelihood, a significant influence on Freud.There are some excellent recent examples showing both historical and theoretical connectionsbetween Nietzsche and Freud. For good overviews regarding the conceptual similarities be-tween Nietzsche and Freud, as well as evidence for influence, see: Anderson, 1980; Chapmanand Chapman, 1995; Chessick, 1981; Golomb, 1987; Golomb, Santaniello, and Lehrer, 1999;Holmes, 1983; Lehrer, 1995, 1996; Mazlish, 1968; Roazen, 1991; Rudnytsky, 1985; Scavio,Cooper, and Clift 1993; Waugaman, 1973. This article builds on their evidence and argu-ments, but with a more specific focus on the influence of Nietzsche’sOn the Genealogy ofMorals on Freud’s moral theory and theory of mind. Since most of the more general simi-larities between Nietzsche and Freud have already been documented, I will focus on thoseinstances that point toward viewing the history and conceptual origins of Freud’s theory ofmorality in a new, rather Nietzschean light.

FREUD’S KNOWLEDGE OFNIETZSCHE AND THEQUESTION OFINFLUENCE

Considering the time in which Freud was educated, one might suspect that any similaritybetween his work and Nietzsche’s could be accounted for by certain ideas that were “in theair” during the 1880s and 1890s, since by that time Nietzsche’s ideas were often discussedin intellectual circles. However, a close look at the historical evidence reveals that Freudbecame acquainted with Nietzsche through very direct means.

304 SCOTT GREER

LEFT BATCHJHBS—WILEY

shortstandardlong

Top of RHBase of RHTop of textBase of textThe recent publication of many of Freud’s early correspondences can now help better

establish which of Nietzsche’s works he read and when. Among the more revealing historicalevidence for Nietzsche’s influence are a series of letters, written by Freudbeforethe creationof psychoanalysis (i.e., 1900). In each case, Freud discusses aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophythat show he had far more than a cursory familiarity with Nietzsche’s ideas; in fact, he knewthe material intimately and probably first-hand.

As McGrath (1967) has shown, Freud probably first became acquainted with Nietzschein the early 1870s through the “Reading Group of Viennese German Students,” a “radical”reading society which followed the works of Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and (oddly enough)Richard Wagner. Some of the members wrote letters to Nietzsche, with one member, JosephPaneth, becoming friends with Nietzsche in the 1880s, and, according to one of Freud’s lettersto Arnold Zweig, he “. . . got to know him . . . and had written a lot to me about him”(quoted in E. Freud, 1970, p. 78).

One of Freud’s letters, written to Wilhelm Fliess on 31 May 1897, informed Fliess thata “presentiment tells me” that “I shall very soon uncover the source of morality” (Masson,1985, p. 249). Freud then reflected on the origins of guilt and civilization, and in so doingestablished his recognition of Nietzsche’s contribution to this area when he offered the fol-lowing definition of “Holy”:

“Holy” is something based on the fact that human beings, for the sake of the largercommunity, have sacrificed a portion of their sexual liberty and their liberty to indulgein sexual perversions. The horror of incest . . . is based on the fact that, as a result ofcommunal sexual life . . . themembers of the family remain together permanently andbecome incapable of joining with strangers. Thus, incest is anti-social—civilizationconsists of a progressive renunciation of it. Contrawise the “superman.” (Masson, 1985,p. 252)

Freud’s use of “holiness” or “saintliness” (Heiligkeit) and “superman” (Ubermensch) clearlyindicated a familiarity with Nietzsche’sOn the Genealogy of Morals,where Nietzsche hadsuggested the idea that the origins of guilt and conscience were part of the renunciation ofinstinctual gratification. Freud’s “presentiment” was obviously connected to the notion of the“Holy,” and it is difficult to imagine Freudnot having read and drawn on Nietzsche’sGe-nealogy of Moralsin this regard. Moreover, as noted by Lehrer (1995), earlier in the samemonth Freud wrote some of his earliest material on “sublimation” in a letter to Fliess—aconcept not only very important to Nietzsche, but central to his theory regarding the historicaldevelopment of morality.

Lehrer (1995, 1996) notes that in another letter to Fliess dated 14 November 1897, Freudexclaimed that the “gave birth to a new piece of knowledge. Not entirely new, to tell thetruth; it had repeatedly shown itself and withdrawn again . . .” (cited in Masson, 1985, pp.278–279). Freud then reminded Fliess about his “presentiment” earlier in the summer, wherehe believed he would discover the source of “normal sexual repression (morality, shame, andso forth) and then for a long time failed to find it.” Before Freud discussed his insight, heaverred his originality: “Privately I concede priority in the idea to no one. . . .” He then putforward his idea that as humans began to walk upright “a number of formerly interestingsensations attached to the earth [became] repulsive. . . . (Heturns up his nose� he regardshimself as something particularly noble)” (p. 279). Following this, Freud linked this unpleas-ant sensation with the act of “repression”: “To put it crudely, the memory actually stinks justas in the present the object stinks; and in the same manner as we turn away our sense or-

305FREUD’S “BAD CONSCIENCE”


shortstandardlong

Top of RHBase of RHTop of textBase of textgan . . . indisgust, the preconscious and the sense of consciousness turn away from mem-

ory. This isrepression”(Masson, 1985, p. 280).The connection to Nietzsche, and Freud’s use of theGenealogy,becomes clear when

we find that Nietzsche wrote:

On his way to becoming an “angel” . . . man hasevolved that queasy stomach andcoated tongue through which not only the joy and innocence of the animal but life itselfhas become repugnant to him—so that he sometimes holds his nose in his own presenceand . . . disapprovingly catalogues his own repellant aspects . . . hideous stink, se-cretion of saliva, urine, and filth. (cited in Lehrer, 1996, p. 376)

The case of Nietzsche’s influence on Freud in this regard would seem hard to deny, especiallywhen one considers that Nietzschealsodiscussed “repression” in theGenealogy(just beforethe above passage), and described it in the following way:

Forgetting is no merevis inertiaeas the superficial imagine; it is rather an active and inthe strictest sense a positive faculty of repression. . . . Toclose the doors and windowsof consciousness for a time; to remain undisturbed by the noise and struggle of ourunderworld of utility organs working with and against one another; a little quietness, alittle tabula rasaof consciousness, to make room for new things, above all for the noblerfunctions . . . that is the purpose of active forgetfulness, which is like a doorkeeper, apreserver of psychic order, repose, and etiquette. . . . The man in whomthis apparatusof repression is damaged and ceases to function properly may be compared . . . witha dyspeptic—he cannot “have done” with anything. (1968a, II, sec. 1)1

Freud’s connection to Nietzsche continues when we discover in a third letter (also toFliess) that Freud had not only avidly read Nietzsche, but even looked to him as a source ofinspiration—something that he perhaps felt he needed during his “crisis” period. In Novem-ber of 1899 Freud’sInterpretation of Dreamswas published, but hardly anyone noticed. Asa result, Freud felt unsure about his future, and that, as he wrote to Fliess on 1 February 1900,“Perhaps hard times are ahead, for both me and for my practice.” Then, in a particularlyrevealing statement, Freud wrote, “I have just acquired Nietzsche, in whom I hope to findwords for much that remains mute in me, but have not opened him yet” (Masson, 1985, p.398). This reference most likely refers to Nietzsche’s collected works, which Freud is knownto have bought at some expense in 1900 (Gay, 1988, p. 45). In addition, later that same yearFreud also attended a lecture on Nietzsche given by Georg Brandes, Nietzsche’s first pro-ponent outside Germany (Holmes, 1983).

Even after psychoanalysis was established, Freud’s interest in and pursuit of Nietzschecontinued: when Nietzsche’s final work,Ecce Homo,was published in 1908, Freud purchasedit immediately (Kaufmann, 1980). It was presumably not by coincidence that during that sameyear the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society held two meetings devoted to discussing Nietzsche.

FREUD’S “DENIAL” OF NIETZSCHE

During the early years of psychoanalysis, Freud’s attitude concerning his knowledge ofNietzsche was quite puzzling and, at times, even contradictory. On more than one occasion,Freud denied his earlier interest in Nietzsche, as well as any knowledge about him. Several

1. In light of the many different citations of his works, I follow the standard practice among Nietzsche scholarsof referencing quotations from his works in terms of section numbers, rather than page numbers.

306 SCOTT GREER


shortstandardlong

Top of RHBase of RHTop of textBase of textother writers have noted and discussed Freud’s “denials,” and that the truth about his famil-

iarity with Nietzsche “slipped” out on more than one occasion (see more detailed accountsof Freud’s prevarications in Anderson, 1980; Chapman & Chapman, 1995; Lehrer, 1995;Rudnytsky, 1985; Scavio et al.,1993; and Waugaman, 1973). This was illustrated in a moststriking fashion during two meetings on Nietzsche of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in1908. For example, the first meeting, on April 1, was a discussion that focussed onNietzsche’sOn the Genealogy of Morals(a work central to the argument presented here). From this,many of the participants were struck by the parallels between psychoanalysis and Nietzsche.Alfred Adler stated that Nietzsche’s writings were closer than those of any other philosopherto the tenets of psychoanalysis. Freud responded with the blanket assertion that he “. . . knewnothing of” Nietzsche’s work, and that the attempts he made at reading him were—in awonderfully loaded phrase—“. . . smothered by an excess of interest.” Paul Federn contin-ued by asking, “. . . where has he not come close?” (Federn & Nunberg, 1962, p. 359).After having just denied any substantial knowledge of Nietzsche, Freud retorted, “. . . hefailed to recognize infantilism as well as the mechanisms of displacement” (Federn & Nun-berg, 1962, p. 361). This was quite a succinct deduction for someone who knew nothing ofNietzsche!

In contrast to his letters to Fliess, Freud was much less forthcoming regarding whom heread and who influenced his thought after psychoanalysis had become established. This pe-culiar change in attitude toward possible sources of influence was demonstrated in a 1909letter to Oskar Pfister. When Pfister asked Freud about the influence of other writers on hiswork, Freud responded by acknowledging that he was probably guilty of an innocent formof plagiarism: “I am really very ignorant about my predecessors. If we ever meet up abovethey will certainly greet me ill as a plagiarist. But it is such a pleasure to investigate the thingitself instead of reading the literature about it” (Jones, 1955, p. 443). This statement is partof the same pattern of twisted logic that is found repeatedly concerning Nietzsche—hisreading of Nietzsche had been “smothered by an excess of interest,” his “not entirely new”“new piece of knowledge,” and so forth.

We may have even further cause to doubt Freud’s innocence here. In an earlier letter toFliess on 8 October 1895, Freud indicated that he had difficulty during the creative processin keeping other, external ideas from intermingling with his own: “I do not want to readanything because it plunges me into too many thoughts and stunts my gratification in dis-covery” (Masson, 1985, p. 141). Indeed, the “gratification in discovery” was extremely im-portant to Freud, and, as some have suggested (e.g., Anderson, 1980; Roazen, 1974, 1991;Rudnytsky, 1985, 1987; Scavio et al., 1993), this may be one of the main reasons for Freud’sequivocal attitude toward his predecessors.2

Freud did finally admit having some knowledge of Nietzsche in his 1914 work,Historyof the Psychoanalytic Movement.However, he clearly intended this recognition to be ac-knowledging conceptual anticipation rather than influence: “In recent times I have deniedmyself the great benefit of Nietzsche’s work, with the express intent that in the gathering of

2. In a remarkable parallel, Nietzsche made almost the exact same comment in a letter to Carl von Gersdorff,“The hundred books on the table in front of me are so many tongs which pinch out the nerve of independent thought”(cited in Rudnytsky, 1985, p. 435). Rudnytsky (1985) argues that Freud’s denial of Nietzsche was an Oedipalphenomenon, meaning that Freud wanted to establish intellectual primacy over any rivals. Rudnytsky also believesthat Freud repressed (or perhaps, suppressed) the memories of reading Nietzsche in his youth, only to find themsurface in his later writings—an idea we find that Freud himself implied. Rudnytsky (1985; 1987) notes furtherparallels between Nietzsche and Freud and their interest in and use of the Oedipal myth. Not only in terms ofphilosophical perspectives, but the biographical background of these twomen also share some interesting similarities.



shortstandardlong

Top of RHBase of RHTop of textBase of textpsychoanalytic impressions I not be impeded by any conceptual anticipations” (Freud, 1914,

pp. 14–15). Note Freud’s qualifier, “in recent times,” which left open the possibility that hehad read Nietzsche when he was younger.

In hisAn Autobiographical Study(1925), Freud went so far as to credit Nietzsche andSchopenhauer with predating him on the concepts of sublimation and repression (respec-tively), although he still claimed that they had no direct impact on his own theory. Freudreiterated his claim to have “avoided” Nietzsche for “a long time,” because he saw Nietzscheas clearly anticipating, “in the most astonishing way,” the findings of psychoanalytic inves-tigations. Freud then added that he was not so concerned with questions of “priority,” butwith “the preservation of my openmindedness” (cited in Kaufmann, 1974, pp. 182–183).

Freud repeated, even more directly, his recognition and appreciation of Nietzsche’s an-ticipation of psychoanalysis in a 1931 letter to Lothar Bickel. In the letter, Freud explainedwhy he had tried to disassociate himself from Nietzsche—yet, again, this perhaps also showswhy he had earlier denied any knowledge of him: “I have rejected the study of Nietzschealthough—no, because—it was plain that I would find insights in him very similar to psy-choanalytic ones” (cited in Gay, 1988, p. 46).

As these tentative and strangely qualified admissions by Freud show, his uneasiness inrecognizing ideas that anticipated his own was quite clear. Each acknowledgment of Nietzschebrought with it a definite sense of discomfort, as if being influenced by or following someoneelse would be a blot on his character or contribution (which I see as clearly supportingRudnytsky’s “Oedipal hypothesis”). Yet, Freud’s later acknowledgement of Nietzsche bringus full circle to the early, crucial, and formative period for psychoanalysis.

In one of his last works, “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1937), Freud sug-gested the possibility that some of his ideas were perhaps the result of “cryptomnesia.” Usingthe example of his theory of “life” and “death” instincts, Freud wrote: “Not long ago I cameupon this theory of mine in the writings of one of the great thinkers of Ancient Greece . . . Ican never be certain, in view of the wide extent of my readings in early years, whether whatI took for a new creation might not be an effect of cryptomnesia” (p. 235). Perhaps this wasFreud’s way of making peace with his own “bad conscience”?

In any event, the recent consensus among scholars has been that Freudwas influencedby Nietzsche (indeed, wemay even interpret Freud’s own odd denial as an admission). Indeed,we can see why Henri Ellenberger (1970) wrote, “For those acquainted with both Nietzscheand Freud, the similarity of their thought is so obvious that there can be no question aboutthe former’s influence over the latter” (pp. 276–277). This conclusion can be seen even moredramatically in Freud’s later work. Whether through “cryptomnesia” or not, some of Freud’slater works returned to and developed the ideas found in the Freud–Fliess letters noted earlier.This marked a return to Nietzsche’sGenealogy,a work of which Freud had displayed anearly keen interest.

FREUD’S USE OFNIETZSCHE’S IDEAS: THE “STRUCTURAL MODEL”

While there appears to be a more than adequate case for influence, the extent and specificnature of Nietzsche’s impact on Freud, especially regarding Freud’s moral theory and theoryof mind, can now be further and more fully explicated. To do this, it is necessary to addressthese aspects of Freud’s work and the several direct references he made to Nietzsche.

Freud referred to Nietzsche in numerous places in his writings, but the most significantreferences for our purposes begin with a rather curious but subsequently quite revealing“misunderstanding” fromCivilization and Its Discontents(1930). In this work, Freud did not

308 SCOTT GREER


shortstandardlong

Top of RHBase of RHTop of textBase of textcite Nietzsche, but openly employed one of his most basic concepts: “bad conscience.” Freud

referred to “bad conscience” as the first stage in the development of moral judgment: whatis “bad” is what threatens to take a love object away. Freud (1930) then, in an attempt tocorrect the definition, wrote, “This state of mind is called a ‘bad conscience’; but actually itdoes not deserve this name, for at this stage the sense of guilt is clearly only a fear of loss oflove, ‘social’ anxiety” (pp. 71–72). However, Nietzsche’s use of “bad conscience” inOn theGenealogy of Moralsclearly extended beyond a sense of “remorse.” As will be elaboratedbelow, he conceived of “bad conscience” as part of the larger genesis of consciousness andmoral awareness. In short, Nietzsche described “civilized” moral conduct as brought aboutby an “internalization” [Verinnerlichung] of punishment, which has become not only deifiedin Christianity, but recognized in our “soul” as guilt. Hence, Freud’s initial understanding of“bad conscience” was (at least as Nietzsche used it) inaccurate. More to the point, however,Freud (1930) then extended his notion of “bad conscience” beyond “remorse” to include the“internalization” [Verinnerlichung] of authority, which he described as evidenced in the feel-ing of “guilt”:

A great change takes place only when the authority is internalized through theestablishment of a super-ego. The phenomena of conscience then reach a higher stage.Actually, it is not until now that we should speak of conscience or a sense of guilt. Atthis point, too, the fear of being found out comes to an end; the distinction, moreover,between doing something bad and wishing to do it disappears entirely, since nothingcan hide from the super-ego. (p. 72)

With his description of “internalization” (i.e., Freud’s revised conception of “bad con-science”), Freud introduced the concept of the “super-ego” as an internalization of externalauthority. Although Freud dropped the further use of “bad conscience,” Freud nonetheless,in the end, rendered it in a way that was very similar to what Nietzsche had originallyconceived. In other words, Freud’s revised notion of “bad conscience” had a meaning and3

function very similar to that of the “super-ego.” More importantly, the revised notion of “badconscience” bore an unmistakable similarity to the actual original meaning of the term, orig-inally proposed by Nietzsche.

While the concept of the “Uber-ich” (super-ego) appears to have been derived fromNietzsche’s notion of “bad conscience,” it wasThe Ego and the Idin 1923 which first intro-duced the concept along with Freud’s “structural model,” making the influence of Nietzsche’s“genealogy of morals” even more direct for Freud’s theory of mind. However, the conceptof a “super-ego,” or an internalized self-critical faculty, was not new to Freud’s writings.Strachey (1961) noted that the earlier notion of an “ego ideal,” the precursor to the “super-ego,” was first introduced in Freud’s paper “On Narcissism” in 1914. Like the super-ego, theego ideal was a “psychic agency” which, among other things, monitored and evaluated thethoughts and actions of the person. Again, if we recall the 1897 letter to Fliess on “Holiness,”and the “daringly Nietzschean” sound ofUber-ich (according to Kaufmann, 1980), the con-ceptual origin and meaning of these concepts begin to take on a definite “Nietzschean” flavor.

Nietzsche’s relevance to the structural model is further reinforced by Freud’s use of “dasEs” (or “the it,” translated by Strachey into “the id”) inThe Ego and the Id,which wasexplicitly based on Nietzsche’s concept of “das Es.” Nietzsche frequently referred to “dasEs” in his writings as that part of the psyche which is not conscious, yet is its instinctual,

3. Freud evidently borrowed Nietzsche’s use ofVerinnerlichung(“internalization”).



shortstandardlong

Top of RHBase of RHTop of textBase of textdriving force. Furthermore, when we look at the role of “das Es” in Nietzsche’s psychology,

we find that it bore a striking resemblance to that of Freud’s.In Beyond Good and Evil,Nietzsche distinguished between the “ego” and the “it,” ar-

guing that the ego was not the seat of agency, thought, and action that philosophers had longassumed it to be; that role, in fact, belonged to the it: “I shall never tire of emphasizing asmall terse fact, . . . that a thought comes when ‘it’ wishes, and not when ‘I’ wish. . . . Itthinks; but that this ‘it’ is precisely the famous old ‘ego’ is, to put it mildly, only a superstition,an assertion, and assuredly not an ‘immediate certainty’” (1886/1968, sec. 17). Nietzsche’s“it” was obviously very similar to Freud’s. Therefore, when Freud began using this term inhis final structural model, he was continuing and extending “its” role in anextremelyNietz-schean fashion. What is perhaps just as astonishing is that Freud appears to have realizedthis.

Freud stated in a letter to Otto Rank that the adoption of “das Es” in The Ego and theId was in part due to the work of Georg Groddeck, a self-proclaimed “wild analyst” (Gay,1988). Although he differed from Groddeck in the use and meaning of “das Es”, Freud (1923)concurred with his suggestion that themind is “lived by unknown and uncontrollable powers.”Freud, yet again, tipped his hand when he pointed out that Groddeck’s use of “das Es”originally derived from Nietzsche. Freud’s footnote to this effect inThe Ego and the Idindicates that he recognized this fact on his own: “Groddeck himself no doubt followed theexample of Nietzsche, who habitually used this grammatical term for whatever in our natureis impersonal and, so to speak, subject to natural law” (1923, p. 23). Freud hardly seemedaverse not only to adopting this Nietzschean concept, but to emphasizing “it” as such. Inshort, Freud’s use of “das Es” and “Uber-Ich” make his structural theory sound strikinglyNietzschean—especially given the time and cultural context of his work.

However, the area where Freud perhaps borrowed from Nietzsche most heavily anddirectly takes us back to his letters to Fliess and his nascent theory of morality; a gestationperiod perhaps for hisCivilization and its Discontentssome 35 years later. Here, there issome rather clear and dramatic evidence that the major components of Freud’s theory on theemergence of civilization, morality, and conscience can be seen as derived directly fromNietzsche’sOn the Genealogy of Morals.

FREUD’S USE OFNIETZSCHE: THE GENEALOGY OF “DISCONTENTS”

The similarity between Nietzsche’sGenealogyand Freud’sCivilization and its Discon-tentshas been recognized by Anderson (1980), Holmes (1983), Lehrer (1995), and others.As Ernest Jones (1955, p. 283) remarked, the comparisons between their two theories hereare “truly remarkable.” There are indeed numerous general points of comparison, several ofwhich are covered below, but the specific theoretical connections between Freud’s writingsand Nietzsche’sGenealogyhave not been discussed. Nor has there been an account of howdetailed knowledge of such connections might alter our interpretation of Freud’s moral theoryof mind. Based on the similarities betweenDiscontentsandGenealogy,I will argue that notonly is there a clear case for establishing influence, but that Freud’s essay represents his own“genealogy” on the origins of guilt and the birth of conscience.

Holmes (1983) argued that Freud’s interest in human prehistory was first sparked byNietzsche. According to Holmes (1983), “Freud nevertheless became disillusioned with thevaulting ambitiousness of Nietzsche’s philosophy and his anticipation of psychoanalytic con-cepts” (p. 197). Yet, the exposure to Nietzsche in Freud’s youth made a lasting impression.

310 SCOTT GREER


shortstandardlong

Top of RHBase of RHTop of textBase of textHolmes (1983) concluded that, “Essentially, Freud extended Nietzsche’s idea of the archaic

bad conscience into a full-fledged psycho-anthropological theory of phylogenetic guilt” (p.199). A more detailed analysis of the works of Nietzsche and Freud will provide a fullerpicture of this connection.

I would argue that Nietzsche’sGenealogy alreadyconstituted a “theory of phylogeneticguilt,” and Freud did not so much add to Nietzsche’s ideas, as he more or less directlyborrowed them and shifted the emphasis of the analysis. In theGenealogy,Nietzsche’s anal-ysis of contemporary religion and morality traced the development of moral codes from thesocial arena to the internalized “sting” of conscience in the individual. Freud started with the“stinger” itself, the superego, and then, in a “genealogy” of his own through the unconscious,traced its inception to the “internalization” of rules by the “primal horde.” Although Freudwas interested in the person’s “psychic agency” and their personal history as the starting pointfor his own “genealogy of morals,” in the end what Freud shared with Nietzsche was thefocus on the social structure of early humans, the internalization of moral codes, and therepresentation of these codes in memory that can dispense mental pain (i.e., guilt) whenappropriate. Freud’s psychoanalysis, in other words, can be understood as a “genealogy ofmorals” from the perspective of the unconscious and our “ontological guilt” (cf. May,1969).

As early humans became gradually civilized, the primitive human, as Nietzsche (1887/1968a) described, “found himself finally enclosed within the walls of society and of peace.”Our savage instinctual urges had to be restrained in order to maintain a stable social unit.Instead of discharging these instincts outwardly, they were redirected inward:

All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardlyturn inward—this is what Icall the internalization[Verinnerlichung] of man: thus it was that man first developedwhat was later called his “soul.” The entire inner world, originally as thin as if it werestretched between two membranes, expanded and extended itself, acquired depth,breadth, and height, in the same measure as outward discharge wasinhibited. (Nietzsche,1887/1968a, II, sec. 16)

According to Nietzsche, this “internalization” of instinct gave rise to feelings of guilt. “Mo-rality” was born out of these primitive feelings of guilt, as early humans experienced theconflict between their instinctual urges and the restraints placed on them by social standards:“Hostility, cruelty, joy in persecuting, in attacking, in change, in destruction—all this turnedagainst the possessors of such instincts:that is the origin of ‘bad conscience’” (Nietzsche,1887/1968a, II, sec. 16). These primal instincts, which for eons had driven the human animal,now had to be suppressed since they could not be escaped: “This instinct for freedom [ofexpression] forcibly made latent . . . pushed back and repressed, incarcerated within andfinally able to discharge and vent itself only on itself: that, and that alone, is what thebadconscienceis in its beginnings” (Nietzsche, 1887/1968a, II, sec. 17). Through the “internal-ization of instinct,” this state of guilt became a permanent part of the human psyche, referredto by Nietzsche as our “bad conscience.”

As means of enforcing order became necessary, “punishment” came into existence as asocial practice. As Nietzsche explained, punishment, to be effective, had to play on the pre-disposition of people to feel guilt: “Punishment is supposed to possess the value of awakeningthe feeling of guilt in the guilty person; one seeks in it the actualinstrumentumof thatpsychical reaction called ‘bad conscience’” (1887/1968a, II, sec.14). The capacity for guilt,that “instrument” of “bad conscience,” was the internal development in human history thatallowed for some measure of social control and, subsequently, the emergence of civilization.



shortstandardlong

Top of RHBase of RHTop of textBase of textFor both Nietzsche and Freud, “bad conscience” and guilt have developed phylogenet-

ically in the human species, and therefore represent a state of ontological guilt or a sense ofbeing “born into sin.” Freud’s writings inCivilization and Its Discontentsabout “guilt” andits role in governing behavior mirror Nietzsche almost exactly:

Thus we know of two origins of the sense of guilt: one arising from fear of an authority,and the other, later on, arising from fear of the super-ego. The first insists upon a re-nunciation of instinctual satisfactions; the second, as well as doing this, presses forpunishment, since the continuance of the forbidden wishes cannot be concealed fromthe super-ego. . . . Thus, in spite of the renunciation that has been made, a sense ofguilt comes about. (Freud, 1930, p. 74)

As both Nietzsche (1887/1968a) and Freud (1930) have pointed out, our “bad conscience” isthe price—and the illness—of civilization.

InCivilization and Its Discontents,Freud also echoedNietzsche’s depiction of theoriginsof conscience so precisely it hardly seems coincidental:

What means does civilization employ in order to inhibit the aggressiveness which op-poses it . . . ?What happens in him to render his desire for aggression innocuous? Hisaggressiveness is introjected, internalized; it is, in point of fact, sent back where it camefrom—that is, it is directed towards his own ego. There it is taken over by a portion ofthe ego, which sets itself over against the rest of the ego as super-ego, and which now,in the form of “conscience,” is ready to put into action against the ego the same harshaggressiveness that the ego would have liked to satisfy upon other, extraneous individ-uals. The tension between the harsh super-ego and the ego that is subjected to it, is calledby us the sense of guilt; it expresses itself as a need for punishment. (1930, p. 70)

The sadistic nature of the human “bad conscience” was also clear to Nietzsche (1887/1968a): “. . . crueltyconstituted the great festival pleasure of more primitive men and wasindeed an ingredient of almost every one of their pleasures; and how naively, how innocentlytheir thirst for cruelty manifested itself, how, as a matter of principle, they posited ‘disinter-ested malice’” (II, sec. 6).

As with Nietzsche, Freud’s genealogy found that conscience and guilt have their seedsin the social nature of human conduct. Freud traced the “internalization” of instinct back tothe primeval family, where instinctual urges were suppressed by the father, who acted as theexternal authority. The “internalization” of the father was, according to Freud, a result of theOedipal conflict within primeval families. Before the existence of conscience, the sons oftenrose up against their father (as head of the family) and killed him. Freud argued that the sonsfelt an “ambivalence” toward their father, and after his death, their love for him replaced theirhatred. This caused the image of the father to become internalized, thus instilling the eternalconflict between the forces of love (Eros) and death (Thanatos) within the individual. A senseof loss and a feeling of remorse have thus become the paradigm for all feelings of guilt—which are brought about from the internalized father image, the superego.

As social relations spread beyond the family, the standards of the father, now carriedwithin the superego, were generalized to other situations. On this, Freud (1930) wrote:

This conflict is set going as soon as men are faced with the task of living together. Solong as the community assumes no other form than that of the family, the conflict isbound to express itself in the Oedipus complex, to establish conscience and create thefirst sense of guilt. When an attempt is made to widen the community, the same conflictis continued in forms which are dependent on the past; and it is strengthened and resultsin further intensification of the sense of guilt. Since civilization obeys an internal eroticimpulsion which causes human beings to unite in a closely-knit group, it can only achieve

312 SCOTT GREER


shortstandardlong

Top of RHBase of RHTop of textBase of textthis aim through an ever-increasing reinforcement of the sense of guilt. What began in

relation to the father is completed in relation to the group. (pp. 79–80)

In another remarkable “parallel,” Nietzsche, in somewhat more detail, described theprecise origins of guilt and conscience in terms of the association between “guilt” and “debt.”Nietzsche (1887/1968a) argued that the origins of conscience began with the human ability“to promise.” If one is capable of making a promise, then one becomes “calculable, regular,necessary.” This maker of promises also exercises a “free will” and accepts theresponsibilityof making choices. Nietzsche (1887/1968a) wrote:

The proud awareness of the extraordinary privilege ofresponsibility,the consciousnessof this rare freedom, this power over oneself and over fate, has in his case penetrated tothe profoundest depths and become instinct, the dominating instinct. What will he callthis dominating instinct, supposing he feels the need to give it a name? The answer isbeyond doubt: this sovereign man calls it hisconscience. (II, sec. 2)

Nietzsche then asked how do werememberpromises? How does our “conscience”—“that dominating instinct”—remind us of our responsibility? The answer is, quite simply,pain. According to Nietzsche (1887/1968a), “’If something is to stay in memory it must beburned in: only that which never ceases tohurt stays in memory’—this is the main clauseof the oldest (unhappily also the most enduring) psychology on earth” (II, sec. 3). Nietzsche(1887/1968a) drew upon several examples of how “pain” is used as a form of social practiceto inscribe a memory, and in so doing foreshadowed Freud’s critique of religion:

Man could never do without blood, torture, and sacrifices when he felt the need to createa memory for himself: the most dreadful sacrifices and pledges (sacrifices of the first-born among them), the most repulsive mutilations (castration, for example), the cruelestrites of all the religious cults (and all religions are at the deepest level systems of cru-elties)—all this has its origins in the instinct that realized that pain is the most powerfulaid to mnemonics. (II, sec. 3)

According to Nietzsche, the regulation of behavior through pain was once physical andexternal in origin. As our conscience developed and we internalized our aggressive instincts,pain and its effects also became internalized, and became embodied in the “stinger” of our“bad conscience.”

Nietzsche made this point clear when he revealed that the etymological origin of theconcept of “guilt” is the same as the notion of “debt.” In English, we cannot immediatelyappreciate this association because the former is derived from an Anglo-Saxon root and thelatter from Latin. In German, however, both “guilt” and “debt” are denoted by the sameword,die Schuld.Nietzsche suggested that the origins of conscience, guilt, and morality itself layin the balancing of social relationships. Nietzsche argued that early in human history guilthad a very materialistic meaning, and was more a description of your economic or “contrac-tual” relationship with an individual (or sovereign) rather than some remorseful psychologicalstate. Therefore, if you were in “debt” to someone, you were also, in a very literal sense,“guilty” and physically liable to that person for repaying the debt.

In describing how this sense of guilt, or debt, became “internalized” into our “bad con-science,” Nietzsche (like Freud) looked to the primeval family. For Nietzsche, the earliestsense of “Schuld” comes from the relationship of present generations to their ancestors.Nietzsche (1887/1968a) wrote:

Within the original tribal community—we are speaking of primeval times—the livinggeneration always recognized a juridical duty toward earlier generations, and especially



shortstandardlong

Top of RHBase of RHTop of textBase of texttoward the earliest, which founded the tribe . . . Theconviction reigns that it is only

through the sacrifices and accomplishments of the ancestors that the tribeexists—andthat one has topay them backwith sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognizesadebtthat constantly grows greater, since these forebears never cease, in their continuedexistence as powerful spirits, to accord the tribe new advantages and new strength. (II,sec. 19)

Nietzsche concluded that as the tribe becamemore successful, their debt to their ancestorswas perceived to increase. Thus, the more successful a tribe became the more “guilty” and“indebted” they felt towards their now idealized forebears. This process, argued Nietzsche,was how “gods” were first created. “The advent of the Christian God, as the maximum godattained so far, was therefore accompanied by the maximum feeling of guilty indebtednesson earth” (Nietzsche, 1887/1968a, II, sec. 20).

As a final note on the theme of “guilty indebtedness,” let us return to Freud and the verypeculiar circumstances in which he developed his notion of “superego” from “bad conscience”in Civilization and its Discontents.As discussed above, Freud “mis-understood” the Nietz-4

schean concept of “bad conscience” as “a sense of loss,” and introduced as a “correction” hisown “original creation,” the “superego.” However, Freud’s “superego” has an almost identicalmeaning to Nietzsche’s “bad conscience.” This mis-understanding turns out to be quite sym-bolic in that Freud “found words for what lay mute in him.” Yet, Freud’s inability to ac-knowledge Nietzsche created a sense of guilt within himself, which preyed upon his own“bad conscience,” resulting in a Nietzschean-inspired “Uber-ich,” which stings us with guilt.(One cannot help but succumb to the thickness of the irony!) Although he tried, Freud couldnot truly escape Nietzsche or his own sense of indebtedness and obligation to him. Thus,with “das Es” and the “Uber-ich” perhaps Freudwasin his own (and probably unconscious)way crediting Nietzsche after all! What can we now conclude from this genealogy, which isfraught with guilt and indebtedness on so many layers?

DISCUSSION ANDCONCLUSION

Based on previous research and the detailed analysis presented here, it becomes apparentthat not only did Nietzsche influence Freud, but that many aspects of Freud’s theories of mindand morality, especially fromCivilization and its Discontents,were a reworking of Nie-tzsche’s genealogical analysis. Through his ironic relationship with Nietzsche, Freud himselfrepresented a living example of his own concept of bad conscience. To review the mainfeatures present in both Nietzsche and Freud: the early conflict between living as socialanimals and yet having individual, instinctual impulses; the gradual suppression of thoseimpulses for the good of the community and the “internalization” of aggressive drives; theincorporation of ancestral ideals as part of the “internalization” process, thus founding internalgoals, standards, and codes of conduct; the emergence of a “conscience” from the “internal-ization” process that governs behavior through a sense of guilt; a sense of guilt, indebtedness,and obligation which is strongly connected with one’s ancestors (whether a father or a groupof tribal founders); the evolution and creation of “gods” out of the idealized ancestors ofsuccessful tribes; and finally, the modern notion of a “bad conscience” (or super-ego) whichafflicts civilized society, leaving people in a state of perpetual guilt and ambivalence (or, forNietzsche, “re-sentiment”). Given Freud’s apparent knowledge of Nietzsche’s work, there are

4. I use the Derridian-inspired prefix “mis” in this context to illustrate the un-intentionality involved, and thateven an “incorrect” understanding has meaning.

314 SCOTT GREER


shortstandardlong

Top of RHBase of RHTop of textBase of textmany compelling reasons to believe that Nietzsche’sGenealogyfound its way into Freud’s

writings—indeed, Freud’s own ironic denials of Nietzsche support this!Naturally, the specific areas of interest for Nietzsche and Freud were different. Nietzsche

was writing a philosophical work, a “genealogy of morals,” while Freud had a more specificfocus, the psychological development of prehistorical people. Freud also clearly disagreedwith Nietzsche on several points: for example, Freud believed pleasure-unpleasure (Lust-Unlust) was the most basic drive, while Nietzsche flatly rejected hedonism in favor of power(i.e., the will to power); Freud believed that re-directing our sexual and aggressive instinctsthrough “sublimation” was the best we could hope for, and while Nietzsche also referred tosublimation, he believed that there could be a creative synthesis (i.e., as found in the Uber-mensch) that would enable us to go beyond common place morality, “beyond good and evil.”

Did Freud consciously realize his theoretical debt to Nietzsche? It is impossible to say—at least with any real conviction. I am not arguing that the evidence here suggests Freud wasa plagiarist. Even if Freud was covertly relying on a knowledge of Nietzsche, this does notnegate Freud’s contribution, but simply places him within an historical and philosophicalcontext.

What wecan conclude is that Freud agreed with Nietzsche on many points, and thereis now ample reason to believe that he was, perhaps “cryptomnesically,” influenced in somevery specific ways by his ideas on the moral origins and makeup of humanity. Although hepublicly equivocated about his knowledge of Nietzsche, he was apparently never at a loss fora Nietzsche quotation. Thus, I believe there are grounds for re-examining Freud’s later “struc-tural” theory of mind, with its emphasis on the social and moral phylogenetic developmentof the species. In the end, it seems fair to say that in spite of (or, more so, because of) Freud’sdenial, Nietzsche had a far greater effect on him than he wanted to admit, or perhaps evenrealized.

REFERENCES

Anderson, L. (1980). Freud, Nietzsche. Salmagundi, 47–48, 3–29.Chapman, A. H., & Chapman, M. (1995). The influence of Nietzsche on Freud’s ideas. British Journal of Psychiatry,

166, 251–253.Chessick, R. D. (1981). The relevance of Nietzsche to the study of Freud and Kohut. Contemporary Psychoanalysis,

17, 359–373.Ellenberger, H. (1970). The discovery of the unconscious. Basic Books: New York.Federn, E., & Nunberg, H. (Eds.). (1962). Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society (Vols. 1 and 2). New York:

International University Press.Freud, E. (Ed.). (1970). The letters of Sigmund Freud and Arnold Zweig (Elaine and William Robson-Scott, Trans.).

New York: Basic Books.Freud, S. (1923). The ego and the id. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), The standard edition of the complete psycho-

logical works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. XIX). London: Hogarth Press.Freud, S. (1925). An autobiographical study. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), The standard edition of the complete

psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. XX). London: Hogarth Press.Freud, S. (1930). Civilization and its discontents. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), The standard edition of the complete

psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. XXI). London: Hogarth Press.Freud, S. (1937). Analysis terminable and interminable. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), The standard edition of the

complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. XXIII). London: Hogarth Press.Gay, P. (1988). Freud: A life for our time. New York: Norton & Company, Inc.Golomb, J. (1987). Nietzsche’s enticing psychology of power. Ames: Iowa State University Press.Golomb, J., Santaniello, W., & Lehrer, R. (Eds.). (1999). Nietzsche and depth psychology. Albany: State University

of New York Press.Holmes, K. R. (1983). Freud, evolution, and the tragedy of man. Journal of the American Psychological Association,

31, 187–210.Jones, E. (1955). The life and work of Sigmund Freud. (Vol. 2). London: Hogarth Press.Kaufmann, W. (1974). Nietzsche: philosopher, psychologist, antichrist. Princeton: Princeton University Press.



shortstandardlong

Top of RHBase of RHTop of textBase of textKaufmann, W. (1980). Discovering the Mind: Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Buber. Vol II. New York: McGraw-Hill

Book Company.Lehrer, R. (1995). Nietzsche’s presence in Freud’s life and thought. Albany: State University of New York Press.Lehrer, R. (1996). Freud’s relationship to Nietzsche: Some preliminary considerations. Psychoanalytic Review, 83

(3), 363–394.Masson, J. (Ed. and Trans.). (1985). The complete letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887–1904. Cam-

bridge: Harvard University Press.Mazlish, B. (1968). Freud and Nietzsche. Psychoanalytic Review, 55, 360–375.McGrath, W. J. (1967). Student radicalism in Vienna. Journal of Contemporary History, 2, 183–201.May, R. (1969). Love and will. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc.Nietzsche, F. (1961). Thus spoke Zarathustra. R. J. Hollingdale (Trans.). New York: Viking Penguin Inc. (Originally

published in 1885)Nietzsche, F. (1968). Beyond good and evil. In The basic writings of Nietzsche. W. Kaufmann (Trans.). New York:

Random House. (Originally published in 1886)Nietzsche, F. (1968a). On the genealogy of morals. In The basic writings of Nietzsche. W. Kaufmann (Trans.). New

York: Random House. (Originally published in 1887)Roazen, P. (1974). Freud and his followers. Washington Square, NY: New York University Press.Roazen, P. (1991). Nietzsche and Freud: Two voices from the underground. Psychohistory Review, Spring, 327–

349.Rudnytsky, P. L. (1985). Nietzsche’s oedipus. American Imago, 42, 413–439.Rudnytsky, P. L. (1987). Freud and Oedipus. New York: Columbia University Press.Scavio, M. J., Cooper, A., & Clift, P. S. (1993). Freud’s devaluation of Nietzsche. Psychohistory Review, 21, 295–

318.Strachey, J. (1961). Introduction to The ego and the id. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), The standard edition of the

complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. XIX, pp. 3–11).Waugaman, R. (1973). The intellectual relationship between Freud and Nietzsche, Psychiatry, 36, 458–467.

badconscience.greer

Documents