The Korean War:Documents

BACKGROUND INFORMATION: KOREAN WAR The Korean War was a civil war between the nations of North Korea and South Korea, which were created out of the occupation zones of the Soviet Union and the United States established at the end of World War II. The failure to hold free elections after World War II throughout the Korean Peninsula in 1948 deepened the division between the two sides; the North established a communist government, while the South established a capitalist one. The 38th parallel increasingly became a political border between the two Korean states. Although reunification

negotiations continued in the months preceding the war, tension intensified. Cross-border skirmishes and raids at the 38th Parallel persisted. The situation escalated into open warfare when North Korean forces invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950.

It was the first significant armed conflict of the Cold War. In 1950 the Soviet Union boycotted the United Nations Security Council, in protest at representation of China by the Kuomintang / Republic of China government, which had taken refuge in Taiwan following defeat in the Chinese Civil War. In the absence of a dissenting voice from the Soviet Union, who could have vetoed it, the United States and other countries passed a Security Council resolution authorizing military intervention in Korea.

The United States of America provided 88% of the 341,000 international soldiers which aided South Korean forces in repelling the invasion, with twenty other countries of the United Nations offering assistance. Suffering severe casualties, within two months the defenders were pushed back to a small area in the south of the Korean Peninsula, known as the Pusan perimeter. A rapid U.N. counteroffensive then drove the North Koreans past the 38th Parallel and almost to the Yalu River, when the People's Republic of China (PRC) entered the war on the side of North Korea. Chinese intervention forced the Southern-allied forces to retreat behind the 38th Parallel. While not directly committing forces to the conflict, the Soviet Union provided material aid to both the North Korean and Chinese armies.

The active stage of the war ended on 27 July 1953, when the armistice agreement was signed. The agreement restored the border between the Koreas near the 38th Parallel and created the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), a 2.5-mile (4.0 km)-wide fortified buffer zone between the two Korean nations. Minor outbreaks of fighting continue to the present day.

Korea remains divided roughly along the 38th parallel. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between the two nations is still the most heavily-fortified border in the world. There is constant hope among the peoples in both North and South that Korea will again be united under one flag.

Source: www.koreanwar.org

Document 1: A Map of Korean War Strategy and Truce Line

Document 2:Source: Encyclopedia Britannica

Document 3:Truman Doctrine (1947) excerpt: Source: Bernstein, Barton J. The Truman Administration: A Documentary History

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid, which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The world is not static and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Document 4: Excerpt, Secretary of State Dean Acheson- Speech on the Far East, January 12, 1950

Source: TeachingAmericanHistory.org

What is the situation in regard to the military security of the Pacific area, and what is our policy in regard to it?

In the first place, the defeat and the disarmament of Japan has placed upon the United States the necessity of assuming the military defense of Japan so long as that is required, both in the interest of our security and in the interests of the security of the entire Pacific area and, in all honor, in the interest of Japanese security. We have American—and there are Australia—troops in Japan. I am not in a position to speak for the Australians, but I can assure you that there is no intention of any sort of abandoning or weakening the defenses of Japan and that whatever arrangements are to be made either through permanent settlement or otherwise, that defense must and shall be maintained.

The defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to hold. In the interest of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations. But they are essential parts of the defensive perimeter of the Pacific, and they must and will be held.

The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands. Our relations, our defensive relations with the Philippines are contained in agreements between us. Those agreements are being loyally carried out and will be loyally carried out. Both peoples have learned by bitter experience the vital connections between our mutual defense requirements. We are in no doubt about that, and it is hardly necessary for me to say an attack on the Philippines could not and would not be tolerated by the United States. But I hasten to add that no one perceives the imminence of any such attack.

So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack. But it must also be clear that such a guarantee is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationship.

Should such an attack occur—one hesitates to say where such an armed attack could come from—the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by

any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression. But it is a mistake, I think, in considering Pacific and Far Eastern problems to become obsessed with military considerations. Important as they are, there are other problems that press, and these other problems are not capable of solution through military means. These other problems arise out of the susceptibility of many areas, and many countries in the Pacific area, to subversion and penetration. That cannot be stopped military means.

The susceptibility to penetration arises because in many areas there are new governments which have little experience in governmental administration and have not become firmly established or perhaps firmly accepted in their countries. They grow, in part, from very serious economic problems…In part this susceptibility to penetration comes from the great social upheaval about which I have been speaking…

So after this survey, what we conclude, I believe, is that there is a new day which has dawned in Asia. It is a day in which the Asian peoples are on their own, and know it, and intend to continue on their own. It is a day in which the old relationships between east and west are gone, relationships which at their worst were exploitations, and which at their best were paternalism. That relationship is over, and the relationship of east and west must now be in the Far East one of mutual respect and mutual helpfulness. We are their friends. Others are their friends. We and those others are willing to help, but we can help only where we are wanted and only where the conditions of help are really sensible and possible. So what we can see is that this new day in Asia, this new day which is dawning, may go on to a glorious noon or it may darken and it may drizzle out. But that decision lies within the countries of Asia and within the power of the Asian people. It is not a decision which a friend or even an enemy from the outside can decide for them.

Document 5: Korea: Historians debunk some popular myths about the Korean warSource: The University Times, University of Pittsburgh

JUNE 22, 2000

On Jan. 12, 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivered a famous speech at the National Press Club in which he failed to include South Korea in America's defense perimeter in the Pacific.Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, campaigning in the 1952 presidential election, charged that Acheson's omission "gave the green light" to a North Korean invasion because it convinced the Communists that America would not defend the south.

Historians and military analysts would debate the charge's merits, but a public consensus emerged that the Truman administration had bungled by signaling North Korea, China and the Soviet Union that the United States considered South Korea to be expendable.

However, recently declassified Soviet documents and Chinese documents available prior to 1989's Tiananmen Square crackdown indicate that Acheson's address "had little if any impact on Communist deliberations," said James Matray, professor of history at New Mexico State University.

Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin "worried about U.S. military intervention until the moment the Korean War began," Matray said. "Moreover, he feared that North Korea could not survive an attack that he was certain South Korea would stage in the future. His approval of [North Korean leader] Kim Il Sung's plan was a mistake, but it derived from a sense of weakness rather than strength."Acheson's speech was, in fact, a judicious statement that enunciated Truman's emphasis on economic assistance in Asia rather than military power, according to Matray. "Outlining the U.S. 'defensive perimeter' was a secondary issue in Acheson's speech that reflected, in part, concern that President Syngman Rhee of South Korea might resort to military aggression against the north to achieve reunification. The secretary of state was attempting to caution the South Koreans that the United States would not guarantee absolutely [South Korea's] military security," Matray said.Acheson was outraged at being blamed for the war. He hadn't specifically included Australia or New Zealand in America's Pacific defense perimeter either, he pointed out in his memoirs, yet no one could have doubted the West's commitment to those countries. The United States' first Asian mutual defense agreement had been with South Korea, something that the Communists could not have overlooked, Acheson wrote.

Acheson's Press Club speech isn't even mentioned in Soviet documents, Matray found in his research. Instead, the voluminous memos, letters and cables show how cleverly North Korea's dictator played his mutually antagonistic allies, Stalin and Mao Zedong, off each other, Matray said. "Kim Il Sung displayed remarkable political talent, as he manipulated his patrons into supporting his plan for invasion. He was able to persuade Stalin and Mao that his forces would achieve victory before the United States could intervene, not because the Americans would not act to save South Korea."

Stanley Sandler, recently a chaired professor at Virginia Military Institute, detailed other Korean War myths in his presentation, including the following:

* U.N. forces fought "with one arm tied behind their backs" — a comforting myth to generals in the Korean as well as Vietnam conflicts, Sandler said.Indeed, U.N airpower was officially restricted to the Korean side of the Yalu River border with China and the Tyumen River border with the U.S.S.R. But Communists planes rarely ventured south of Pyongyang, well north of the 38th parallel, Sandler said."Joseph Stalin was as determined as Harry Truman to confine the Korean War to Korea, and Stalin faced considerably more provocation than did the American president," Sandler said. For example, in October 1950, U.S. jet fighters penetrated 20 miles into Soviet air space and shot up a Red Air Force base. "The Soviet government made the expected strong protests, the Americans expressed their regrets, paid compensation, and the incident was closed," said Sandler — wondering aloud how the United States would have responded if Soviet forces, fighting a war with Canada, had strayed across our border and attacked New York's Rome Air Force Base.

* The United States engaged in bacteriological warfare.It's true that America was testing bacteriological weapons in the 1950s, with a "criminally irresponsible" disregard for safety by today's standards, Sandler said. And the United States had "shamelessly and uselessly" cooperated with the commander of a secret Japanese chemical-biological warfare research unit that had experimented on Allied POWs and Chinese civilians during World War II, he added."The United States was thus at some disadvantage in its flat-out denials" of employing biological warfare in Korea, Sandler stated.But according to Sandler, declassified Soviet security forces memos indicate that the North Koreans obtained plague and cholera bacteria from Chinese corpses and created false "infection regions" to be found by inspectors from international pro-peace organizations. Communist prisoners awaiting execution were purposely infected, then poisoned, so their bodies could be found.In a secret May 1953 resolution, Soviet leaders rebuked Mao Zedong for having misled the U.S.S.R.: "The spread in the press of information about the use by the Americans of bacteriological weapons in Korea was based on false information," the Kremlin complained. "The accusations against the Americans were fictitious."These and other documents provide only fragmentary evidence against U.S. use of biological warfare — but it's a lot more substantial than the contrary evidence, Sandler said.

* Communist MiG jet fighters that dueled with U.N. forces were flown by Chinese pilots.Some 67,000 Soviet air and ground personnel served in North Korea, Sandler noted. Stalin was so anxious to protect this "secret" (widely known among U.N. forces) that he ordered his pilots to wear Chinese uniforms and transmit in Chinese — "the latter an obviously impossible requirement," Sandler said.

Sandler concluded: While the United States could freely bomb a fraternal ally of the U.S.S.R. and intrude on Soviet territory, Stalin feared that Americans might be provoked to nuke his country if it became known that Red Air Force pilots were flying MiGs in the war.

* Communist "hordes" over-ran U.N. forces early in the war.The Communists enjoyed overwhelming numerical superiority only in the opening stage of the conflict and during the initial incursion of the Chinese, Sandler said. U.S. and Korean forces actually outnumbered their enemy 2:1 during the desperate fighting in 1950 around the Pusan Perimeter, in which more Americans died than at any other time in the war, Sandler said.

Surprise, better discipline and superior weaponry (particularly the Russian T-34 tank, against which the Allies had no defense) gave the North Koreans the advantage in the war's early stages, according to Sandler.

* MacArthur's behind-the-lines Inchon landing was a "desperate gamble."MacArthur played up this myth, but the main problem that U.N. forces faced was the enormous tidal reach of the Inchon waterway, Sandler said."If MacArthur's planners didn't get it exactly right, the U.N. invasion fleet would be left stranded on the mud flats, sitting ducks," he noted. "But sitting ducks to what? The Korean People's Air Force had been pretty much shot out of the sky by then, and the invasion armada contained several aircraft carriers and their crack pilots. The stranding of an invasion fleet would have been a major embarrassment, certainly, but nothing remotely like a disaster."

*MacArthur's march to the Yalu River triggered Chinese intervention.The Chinese were planning to intervene long before U.S. forces reached the Yalu, declassified documents show. "The famous indirect warnings to the Americans by Foreign Minister Chou En Lai against approaching the Yalu seems now to have been merely a means to justify a course already determined upon by the Chinese," Sandler said.— Bruce SteeleFiled under: Feature,Volume 32 Issue 21

Document 6: Two Strategic Intelligence Mistakes in Korea, 1950

Perceptions and RealitySource: Central Intelligence Agency, Fall 2011By: P. K. Rose

0n 25 June 1950, the North Korean People’s Army of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) swept across the 38th parallel and came close to uniting the Korean peninsula under the Communist regime of Kim Il-sung. American military and civilian leaders were caught by surprise, and only the intercession of poorly trained and equipped US garrison troops from Japan managed to halt the North Korean advance at a high price in American dead and wounded. Four months later, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) intervened in massive numbers as American and UN forces pushed the North Koreans back across the 38th parallel. US military and civilian leaders were again caught by surprise, and another costly price was paid in American casualties.

Two strategic intelligence blunders within six months: yet the civilian and military leaders involved were all products of World War II, when the attack on Pearl Harbor had clearly demonstrated the requirement for intelligence collection and analysis. The answers to why it happened are simple, and they hold lessons that are relevant today.

The role of intelligence in America’s national security is often misunderstood. Intelligence information has to exist within the greater context of domestic US political perception. With the defeat of Japan, our historically isolationist nation moved quickly to look inward again. The armed forces were immediately reduced in number, defense spending was cut dramatically, and intelligence resources met a similar fate. The looming conflict with Communism was focused on Europe, our traditional geographic area of interest.

The war had produced a crop of larger-than-life military heroes, and perhaps the biggest was Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Far East Commander and virtual ruler of a defeated Japan.

While many considered MacArthur brilliant, his military career also contained numerous examples of poor military judgment. He had few doubts about his own judgment, however, and for over a decade had surrounded himself with staff officers holding a similar opinion. MacArthur was confident of his capabilities to reshape Japan, but he had little knowledge of Chinese Communist forces or military doctrine. He had a well-known disregard for the Chinese as soldiers, and this became the tenet of the Far Eastern Command (FEC).

In January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson had publicly declared a defensive containment line against the Communist menace in Asia, based upon an island defense line. The Korean peninsula was outside that line.

Still, America viewed Korea as one of several developing democratic nations that could serve as counterbalances to Communist expansion. In March 1949, President Truman approved National Security Council Memorandum 8/2, which warned that the Soviets intended to dominate all of Korea, and that this would be a threat to US interests in the Far East.[1] That summer, the President sent a special message to Congress citing Korea as an area where the principles of democracy were being matched against those of Communism. He stated the United States “will not fail to provide the aid which is so essential to Korea at this critical time.”[2]

….In the 16 July Weekly Summary, the Agency describes North Korea as a Soviet “puppet” regime. On 29 October, a Weekly Summary states that a North Korean attack on the South is “possible” as early as 1949, and cites reports of road improvements towards the border and troop movements there. It also notes, however, that Moscow is in control.

These reports establish the dominant theme in intelligence analysis from Washington that accounts for the failure to predict the North Korean attack—that the Soviets controlled North Korean decisionmaking. The Washington focus on the Soviet Union as “the” Communist state had become the accepted perception within US Government’s political and military leadership circles. Any scholarly counterbalances to this view, either questioning the absolute authority of Moscow over other Communist states or noting that cultural, historic, or nationalistic factors might come into play, fell victim to the political atmosphere.

Fears of another war in Europe against the mighty Red Army and the exposure of Soviet spying against America created an atmosphere in which the anti-Communist fervor and accusations of McCarthyism silenced any debate regarding the worldwide Communist conspiracy. In addition, the Chinese Communists’ rise to internal power created a domestic political dispute over who had “lost”

China. The result was a silencing of American scholars on China who might have persuaded the country’s leadership that China would never accept Soviet control of its national interests.

….On 20 June 1950, the CIA published a report, based primarily on human assets, concluding that the DPRK had the capability to invade the South at any time. President Truman, Secretary of State Acheson, and Secretary of Defense Johnson all received copies of this report.[9] Five days later, at four a.m., the DRPK invaded the South. Both Washington and the FEC in Tokyo were surprised and unprepared. On 30 June 1950, President Truman authorized the use of US ground forces in Korea.

Faulty Perception

The United States was caught by surprise because, within political and military leadership circles in Washington, the perception existed that only the Soviets could order an invasion by a “client state” and that such an act would be a prelude to a world war. Washington was confident that the Soviets were not ready to take such a step, and, therefore, that no invasion would occur.

This perception, and indeed its broad acceptance within the Washington policy community, is clearly stated in a 19 June CIA paper on DRPK military capabilities.[10] The paper said that “The DPRK is a firmly controlled Soviet satellite that exercises no independent initiative and depends entirely on the support of the USSR for existence.” The report noted that while the DPRK could take control of parts of the South, it probably did not have the capability to destroy the South Korean government without Soviet or Chinese assistance. This assistance would not be forthcoming because the Soviets did not want general war. The Department of State and the military intelligence organizations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force concurred.

Washington’s strategic theme also played well in Tokyo, where General MacArthur and his staff refused to believe that any Asians would risk facing certain defeat by threatening American interests. This belief caused them to ignore warnings of the DPRK military buildup and mobilization near the border, clearly the “force protection” intelligence that should have been most alerting to military minds. It was a strong and perhaps arrogantly held belief, which did not weaken even in the face of DPRK military successes against US troops in the summer of 1950. It grew even stronger within military circles in Tokyo as American and UN forces pushed back the DPRK troops in the fall of 1950. By then, it had become an article of faith within the FEC, personally testified to by MacArthur,that no Asian troops could stand up to American military might without being annihilated. This attitude, considered a “fact” within the FEC and constantly repeated to the Washington political and military leadership, resulted in the second strategic blunder—the surprise Chinese intervention in the war.

Military and Diplomatic Moves

On 15 September, US Marines rushed ashore, captured the west coast city of Inchon, and began driving DPRK forces north toward their country. This strategic success was a clear signal that the invasion from the North had not only failed, but also that the DPRK forces could be destroyed by the US-led UN force. Two days later, a high-ranking Chinese delegation of intelligence and logistics officers arrived in North Korea to evaluate the military situation and prepare the battlefield for Chinese military action.[21]

Discounting the Chinese Threat

In the face of these warnings, the JCS instructed MacArthur to continue his advance north to destroy the DPRK armed forces as long as there was no threat of a major Chinese or Soviet intervention. These instructions were based upon a National Security Council decision made before the Inchon landing.[26] The Secretary of State also disregarded these warnings, telling the press that Chinese intervention would be “sheer madness.”

By the end of the month, the US Ambassador in Moscow reported that Soviet and Chinese contacts told both the British and Dutch Ambassadors that if foreign troops cross the 38th parallel, China would intervene.[27] This specific warning was also repeated to various journalists, and on 29 September, the Associated Press in Moscow reported that both China and the Soviet Union would take a “grave view” of US forces crossing the 38th parallel.[28] Finally, at the end of the month, in a major public policy address celebrating the first anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, Zhou En-lai branded the United States as China’s worst enemy and stated that China will not allow a neighbor to be invaded.[29]

Once again, these warnings were ignored, and US-UN forces continued to push the DRPK forces northward. On 2 October, Mao cabled Stalin advising that China would intervene and asked for Soviet military assistance.[30] Three days later, the CCP Central Committee officially decided to intervene.[31] US intelligence, however, continued its reporting theme that while Chinese capability was present, Chinese intent was lacking. On 6 October, the US Joint Intelligence Indications Committee stated that the Chinese capability to intervene had grown, but the Chinese threat to do so was questionable.[32] That same day, the CIA Weekly Summaryadvised that the possibility of Soviet or Chinese intervention continued to diminish. It also restated the belief that Soviet requirements would drive any such decision.

Two days later, the Soviet position was delivered to the Chinese. Stalin advised Mao that the USSR could not provide the military supplies and air cover over Manchuria that Mao had requested. He also asked Mao not to engage in a large-scale offensive against US troops, because such an action might lead to a war between the United States and the Soviet Union.[33]

On 12 October, CIA Office of Records and Estimates Paper 58-50, entitled Critical Situations in The Far East—Threat of Full Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea, concluded that, “While full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be regarded as a continuing possibility, a consideration of all known factors leads to the conclusion that barring a Soviet decision for global war, such action is not probable in 1950.”[34] So, both the United States and the Soviet Union saw any large-scale Chinese intervention as potentially stimulating a global war, and the US understanding of the Soviet position was, indeed, sound. Internal Chinese priorities, however, continued to be discounted by Washington, which still believed that the Soviets controlled overall Communist actions worldwide.

The next day, the CCP Politburo decided that China should intervene in the war even without Soviet military support. Based on this decision, it was Stalin who relented on his earlier request and agreed to provide military supplies against a Soviet loan extended to the Chinese. He also agreed to turn over Soviet aircraft in China to the PLA and to move Soviet air units into position to defend Chinese territory.[35] Thus, the Chinese not only made a unilateral decision to intervene for nationalistic purposes, but also intimidated the Soviets into supporting them.

Document 7: CIA Files Show U.S. Blindsided by Korean War

Source: NPRJune 25, 2010

Sixty years after it started, the Korean War is not yet officially over, and the story of its origins is still unfolding. A batch of newly declassified CIA documents indicates the United States and the South Korean government were caught unprepared for the conflict, in part because of intelligence failures and mistaken assumptions.

The war began on June 25, 1950, when the North Korean army stormed across the 38th parallel that served as the dividing line on the Korean peninsula between the Soviet-dominated northern half and the U.S.-controlled southern sector. Kim Il Sung, the North Korean leader, intended to bring all of Korea under communist rule.

He nearly succeeded. South Korean forces offered little resistance to the invading North Korean army. U.S. forces had been withdrawn from South Korea the previous year, with only about 400 advisers left behind to assist the South Korean government in the development of its military capabilities.

U.N. RolePresident Truman, upon learning of the North Korean action, decided it was a test case for the United Nations, which had been established just five years earlier. He asked Secretary of State Dean Acheson to ask for an immediate meeting of the U.N. Security Council, and within 24 hours the U.S. ambassador, Warren Austin, was asking the U.N. to come to South Korea's defense.

"The Republic of Korea has appealed to the United Nations for protection," Austin told the council. "I am proud to report that the United States is prepared to furnish assistance."

But help did not come fast enough for the South. The North Koreans were far superior in numbers and weaponry, and the declassified CIA reports tell a story of panic and disarray on the southern side of the 38th parallel.

"Latest official reports indicate that the capture of Seoul is imminent," said a CIA memorandum   dated June 26. "South Korean units, their morale deteriorating, are incapable of resisting the determined artillery-tank-air assaults with the equipment now available."Within days, the North had seized control of the entire peninsula, except for a small area at the southern tip.

The United States, with U.N. support, rushed to South Korea's defense, with the news relayed to the U.S. population through movie newsreels.

"Against the Red invaders from North Korea, U.S. planes and U.S. ships are ordered into action," one announcer dramatically intoned. "Based in Japan, U.S. Air Force jets and Mustangs are within striking distance of Korea."

U.S. ground forces soon joined the fight, but the going was tough. In a radio and television address on July 19, Truman said the attack had taken the United States by surprise, because the "communists" had kept their activities in North Korea a secret.

"It was from that area, where the communist authorities have been unwilling to let the outside world see what was going on, that the attack was launched against the Republic of Korea on June 25th," Truman said. "That attack came without provocation and without warning."

CIA RoleTruman meant that the Soviet and North Korean leaders had provided no warning of their war plans, but neither had the CIA, as the agency's own reporting made clear.

Some U.S. officials saw another intelligence blunder, reminiscent of the failure to foresee the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.

A newly declassified CIA memorandum   from Jan. 13, 1950, shows that the CIA had not fully understood what was happening in North Korea in the months preceding the invasion. In that memo, the CIA noted the gradual southward movement of the North Korean army but said it was probably "a defensive measure to offset the growing strength of the offensively minded South Korean Army." That report concluded that an invasion of the South by the North was "unlikely."Whether the CIA should be faulted for its failure to predict the invasion, however, is debatable. At the time, the agency was just three years old and lacked resources.

"They didn't have the human capabilities or the technical collection capabilities to provide that kind of warning," says CIA historian Clayton Laurie. "That was something expected [by] the Truman administration, to prevent another Pearl Harbor, but nobody in the government had that kind of capability at the time."

Whatever the explanation, the consequence was costly in U.S. and Korean lives.

Misreading ChinaThe initial intelligence failure was followed four months later by another one. This time the question was whether China would join the fighting on the North Korean side.

Again, the recently declassified documents are revealing.

In a secret report   prepared for the White House on Oct. 12, 1950, the CIA said it saw "no convincing indication" that a Chinese intervention in the war was forthcoming. Even after Chinese forces began moving into North Korea a few weeks later, CIA analysts failed to understand what that movement meant.CIA historian Laurie says the agency was providing strategic guidance but not "tactical" warning, which is far more specific.

"They know there are Chinese troops in Korea, engaging U.N. forces," Laurie says, "but they do not provide the warning that this is China involved in the war and that this is the precursor of a bigger invasion."

One explanation for the CIA's failure to predict neither the North Korean invasion nor the Chinese intervention in the war is that the agency, along with the rest of the U.S. government, was paying attention primarily to Moscow's actions.

A Kremlin-Centric ViewTruman himself, describing the Korean War in a radio and television address to the nation in April 1951, portrayed it as being instigated from Moscow.

"The communists in the Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to stamp out freedom all over the world," Truman said. "If they were to succeed, the United States would be numbered among their principal victims."

That Kremlin-centered view characterized all CIA reporting from the time. One report, titled Current Capabilities of the Northern Korean Regime and issued just six days before the North's invasion of the South described the North Korean regime as "a firmly controlled Soviet satellite that exercises no independent initiative and depends entirely on the support of the USSR for existence."A candid 2001 summary   of prewar Korea reporting, written by a CIA case officer and published by the agency's own Center for the Study of Intelligence, concluded that the agency's assumption that the Soviets controlled North Korean decision-making "accounts for the failure to predict the North Korean attack."The failure to predict China's October 1950 intervention in the war may also have been due to the agency's assumption that Moscow was calling all the shots in Asia.

The Oct. 12 report, titled Threat of Full Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea, concluded with this statement: "While full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be regarded as a continuing possibility, a

consideration of all known factors leads to the conclusion that barring a Soviet decision for global war, such action is not probable in 1950." [emphasis added]"The belief here is that this is monolithic communism," says CIA historian Laurie, "that things are being orchestrated worldwide by the Soviet Union, and that nothing is going to happen in Asia or Africa without the Soviet Union saying, 'This is permissible,' or 'Go ahead and do this.' "

The situation in Korea appears rarely to have been considered on its own merits.

Still Paying The PriceA key moment had come in January 1950, when Secretary of State Acheson, in a speech, defined "the defensive perimeter" that the United States was committed to protecting. Korea was on the other side of the line.

That thinking may have explained the controversial U.S. decision, a few months earlier, to withdraw its forces from South Korea.

Korea historian William Stueck of the University of Georgia says the issue should have been given more thought and reflected the idea at the CIA and throughout Washington that it was Moscow that mattered, not Seoul or Pyongyang.

"Given the fact that Korea was not high on our list of priorities, it wasn't given the kind of attention at the very top level that could have resolved the bureaucratic conflicts that existed," Stueck says.

Arguably, the United States is still paying the price for the intelligence mistakes of 60 years ago. There was a cease-fire in 1953, but no peace agreement. The United States has long since made peace with both Russia and China, but the Korean conflict continues to this day, with analysts still struggling to understand the Koreans on their own terms.

Document 8 United Nations Security Council Resolution (1950)

Source: www.trumanlibrary.org

Document 9: Republican Senator Robert Taft interviewed on Radio Talk Show (1950)

Source: "Capitol Report" No. 60, Featuring Senator Robert F. Taft June 29, 1950

ANNOUNCER: Senator Taft, as leader of the minority party in the United States Senate, do you approve the action of the President in sending our armed forces to stop this Communist aggression?

TAFT: Well, broadly speaking, yes. Of course, from the past philosophy of the declaration of the Administration it wasn't unreasonable for the North Koreans to suppose that we would do nothing about their attack. The President's statement of policy represents a complete change in the programs and policies he has heretofore proclaimed. I myself have always urged a much more determined attitude against communism in the Far East and China and the President's new policy moves in that direction. Naturally, I don't object to the general policy. It seems to me the time had to come when we would give definite notice to the Communists that a move beyond a declared line would result in war. That has been our policy in Europe and the Atlantic Union. Whether the President in this case, however, has chosen the right time or the right lace to declare this policy certainly is open to question. He knows more about it then I do. I can't be certain. But certainly the new poilcy seems to be adopted at an unfortunate time — and involves the attempt to defend Korea, which is a very difficult military operation indeed. I sincerely hope that the policy won't lead to war with Russia. I do believe the general principle of the policy is right, and I see no choice except to back up wholeheartedly and with every available resource the American men in our armed forces who have been moved into Korea.

ANNOUNCER: Well, we've heard so much about bi-partisan foreign policy in the past few years, I wonder what extent the President consulted with you and the other Republican leaders before making this very drastic decision?

TAFT: Well, the answer is — not at all. The answer is that there hasn't been any

pretense of bi-partisan foreign policy in this move. The leaders of the Republican Party in Congress have never been consulted.

DOCUMENT 10 Statement by President Truman Relieving Gen. MacArthur of his Duties, 1951

Source:www.trumanlibrary.com

IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 10, 1951 STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of his commands and have designated Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway as his successor. Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a vital element in the constitutional system of our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution. In time of crisis, this consideration is particularly compelling. General MacArthur's place in history as one of our greatest commanders is fully established. The nation owes him a debt of gratitude for the distinguished and exceptional service which he has rendered his country in posts of great responsibility. For that reason I repeat my regret at the necessity for the action I feel compelled to take in his case.

Document 11: MacArthur's Speech: "Old Soldiers Never Die..."

Source: PBS American Experience

1951 had not been a good year for Douglas MacArthur: after almost losing a war in Korea it seemed he had already won, he was dismissed by President Truman, making headlines around the world. But for thirty-seven minutes on April 19, he held America in the palm of his hand. MacArthur's address before a joint session of Congress, one of the great moments in the early days of television, offered him a unique opportunity to tell his side of the story. He did not disappoint.

Critics and much of the public soon saw through the holes in his arguments. But his final words, drawing the curtain on an unparalleled military career, surely rank as one of the great exit lines in American history.

Excerpt: General MacArthur's Address to Congress:April 19, 1951

While I was not consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision from a military standpoint, proved a sound one. As I said, it proved to be a sound one, as we hurled back the invader and decimated his forces. Our victory was complete, and our objectives within reach, when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces.

This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders; a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of ail litary strategy. Such decisions have not been forthcoming.

While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old one.

Apart from the military need, as I saw It, to neutralize sanctuary protection given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary the intesification of our economic blockade against China, the imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast, removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal area and of Manchuria, removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa, with logistical support to contribution to-their effective operations against the Chinese mainland.

For entertaining these views, all professionally designed to support our forces in Korea and to bring hostilities to an end with the least possible delay and at a saving of countless American arid allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I called for reinforcements, but was informed that reinforcements were riot available. I made clear that if not permitted to destroy the enemy built-up bases north of the Yalu, if

not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese Force of some 600,000 men on Formosa, if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from without, and if there was to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the command from the military standpoint forbade victory.

We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and in an approximate area where our supply line advantages were in balance with the supply line disadvantages of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign with its terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized its full military potential.

I have constantly called for the new political decisions essential to a solution.

Efforts have been made to distort my position. It has been said in effect that I was a warmonger. Nothing could be further from the truth.

I know war as f ew other men now living know it, and nothing to me--and nothing to me is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition, as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes.

Indeed, the Second Day of September, 1945, just following the surrender of the Japanese nation on the Battleship Missouri, I formally cautioned as follows:

"Men since the beginning of time have sought peace. Various methods through the ages have been attempted to devise an international process to prevent or settle disputes between nations. From the very start workable methods were found in so far as individual citizens were concerned, but the mechanics of an instrumentality of larger international scope have never been successful. Military alliances, balances of power, Leagues of Nations, all in turn failed, leaving the only path to be 'by way of the crucible of war. The utter destructiveness of war now blocks out, this alternative. We have had our last chance. If we will not devise some greater and more equitable system, Armageddon will be at our door. The problem basically is theological and involves a spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human character that will synchronize with our almost matchless advances in science, art, literature and all the material and cultural developments of the past 2000 years. It must be of the spirit if we are to save the flesh. "

But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision.

In war there can be no substitute for victory.

There are some who for varying reasons would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson, for history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier wars. It points to no single instance where this end has justified that means, where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative. Why, my soldiers asked me, surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field? I could not answer.

Some, may say to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war with China, Others, to avoid Soviet intervention. Neither explanation seems valid, for China is already engaging with the maximum power It can commit, and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy, will more likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity of military and other potentialities is in its favor on a world-wide

basis.

The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that its military action was confined to its territorial limits. It condemns that nation, which it Is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment while the enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and devastation.

Of the nations of the world, Korea alone, up to now, is the sole one which has risked its all against communism. The magnificence of the courage and fortitude of the Korean people defies description. They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery. Their last words to me were: "Don't scuttle the Pacific.î

I have just left your fighting sons in Korea. They have done their bust there, and I can report to you without reservation that they are splendid in every way.

It was my constant effort to preserve them and end this savage conflict honorably and with the least loss of time and a minimum sacrifice of life. Its growing bloodshed has caused me the deepest anguish and anxiety. Those gallant men will remain often in my thoughts and in my prayers always.

I am closing my 52 years of military service. When I joined the Army, even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all of my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I took the oath at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have all since vanished, but I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barracks ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that old soldiers never die; they just fade away. And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away, an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty. 

Good Bye.

Document 12: Why did President Truman dismiss General MacArthur?Source: The Harry S. Truman Library

In 1951, President Truman and his advisors were preparing to engage North Korea and China in peace negotiations, in an attempt to resolve the ongoing conflict. General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of the U.N. forces in Korea, issued an unauthorized statement containing a veiled threat to expand the war into China if the Communist side refused to come to terms. When MacArthur continued to support an expansion of the war, communicating directly with a like-minded Republican congressman, Truman, with the backing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the Secretaries of State and Defense, felt they had no alternative but to replace MacArthur with a military commander who would act in concert with the administration’s foreign policy. On April 11, 1951, President Truman relieved MacArthur of his command.

The members of the Joint Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, who conducted an inquiry in the spring of 1951 into the dismissal of MacArthur and the military situation in the far east, acknowledged that, "the removal of General MacArthur was within the constitutional power of the President." However they also complained that, "the circumstances were a shock to the national pride (and) the reasons assigned for the removal of General MacArthur were utterly inadequate to justify the act." (Individual Views of Certain Members of the Joint Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, May 3, June 27, 1951, p 46).

Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., however, in their contemporary account of the MacArthur dismissal, questioned MacArthur’s Korean policy, noting General Omar Bradley’s belief that, "it would have involved us in the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time against the wrong enemy." Further, they stated that it would have, "wrecked our global strategy in the hope of achieving a magnificent success in a local engagement," whereas then current American foreign policy recognized, "as MacArthur did not, that time is on our side, and sought in Korea to play for time to mobilize, time to rearm ourselves and our allies, time to bring into production new weapons and equipment and test their use, time for Europe to recover and rearm, time to build an ever-widening circle of allies and friendly neutrals, time for discontent to ferment within the sphere of Soviet power." (The General and The President and the Future of American Foreign Policy, 1951, p 244).

Later historians, such as Robert Smith, contend that, "[c]rudely, deliberately, with complete understanding of what would ensue, MacArthur undertook to sabotage Truman’s effort, in March 1951, to open peace negotiations with the Chinese (and that) no one not blinded by hero worship

could overlook the arrogance and contempt with which MacArthur deliberately flouted Truman’s directive." (MacArthur in Korea, 1982, p 155).

Truman’s mistake, according to Rovere and Schlesinger, was not the dismissal of MacArthur, but rather was, "a failure in political education. He made all the necessary decisions with great and simple courage; but he lacked the gift of illuminating them so that the people as a whole could understand their necessity." (ps 248-249).

DOCUMENT 13: POLL-VIEWS OF KOREAN WAR BY PARTY AFFILIATION (1952)

Source: Gallup Poll

DOCUMENT 14 TEXT OF THE KOREAN WAR ARMISTICE AGREEMENT July 27, 1953

Source: National Archives

Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's volunteers, on the other hand, concerning a military armistice in Korea.

Preamble

The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great toil of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful

settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following articles and paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea:

Article I

Military Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zone

1. A military demarcation line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a demilitarized zone between the opposing forces. A demilitarized zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

DOCUMENT 15:CHART ON U.S. DEFENSE SPENDING (1900-2010)

Source:www.usgovernmentspending.com

There were two major peaks of defense spending in the 20th century: World War I and World War II.

Chart 2.31: Defense Spending in 20th CenturyAt the start of the 20th century, defense spending averaged about one percent of GDP. Then it spiked to 22 percent at the end of World War I. Defense spending in the 1920s ran at about 1 to 2 percent of GDP and in the 1930s, 2 to 3 percent of GDP.In World War II defense spending peaked at 41 percent of GDP, and then declined to about 10 percent during the height of the Cold War. Thereafter it declined to 3 to 5 percent of GDP, with surges during the 1980s and the 2000s.