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Bachelor Thesis – The Origins of Terrorism

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Colophon Bachelor thesis in completion of the bachelor public administration at the faculty Management and

Governance of the University of Twente.

Title:

The Origins of Terrorism: a comparison between the international anti-terrorism strategies of the USA

and the Netherlands

Supervisors:

dr. Hoogenboom, M.J.M.

dr. De Vries, M.S.

Date:

September 2007

Author:

Chris Jan Geugies

Pathmossingel 174

7513 CM Enschede

(t) 06-23683567

(e) [email protected]

Student number: 0091286

mailto:[email protected]


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Preface Terrorism is by many considered as the greatest challenge of the present-day world. I share this view.

In order to contribute to the contemporary debate on terrorism, I made a comparative research, which

focuses on the anti-terrorism strategies of the United States of America and the Netherlands. This

research has been conducted as part of my bachelor education in public administration at the

University of Twente, and is carried out in the period between June and September 2007.

Conducting research is to a large extent a lonely business. There are nevertheless some people that

sincerely helped in improving the quality of this research. I would therefore like to thank Leonie Geut

and Elleke Bal for their suggestions, corrections and, more in general, for their motivating support.

Furthermore, I am grateful to my supervisors, Marscha de Vries and Marcel Hoogenboom, for their

comments, remarks and constructive critique.

Chris Jan Geugies

Enschede, September 2007


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Summary Introduction

On the 11th of September 2001, when two airplanes crashed in the American World Trade

Centre, everyone became aware of what will be the central theme of this research: terrorism. This

event made politicians aware that action was required in order to prevent similar events. As a result,

fighting terrorism was made top priority. Numerous policies have been taken in order to stop the

terrorist threat, both in international and in domestic perspective. By means of this research, I

investigated the international anti-terrorism strategies of both the Netherlands and the USA. Reason

for doing so concerns the observation that both countries seem to approach terrorism in a different

way. That is, in fighting terrorism, the Netherlands appears to adopt a preventive approach by focusing

at addressing the causes of terrorism, whereas the USA seems more concerned with fighting the

manifestation of terrorism itself (repressive). This research’ objective is to investigate if a different

view these countries have on the origins of terrorism could be at the basis of such a difference. By

investigating this, I made use of the following research question: What are the differences and

similarities between the anti-terrorism strategies of the USA and the Netherlands concerning the fight

against international jihadistic terrorism and to what extent are those strategies of both countries

based on different analyses of the origins of terrorism?

In order to answer the main question, I divided this research in four parts. Chapter 2 dealt with

the meaning of terrorism. By presenting a definition of terrorism, and by distinguishing between

different types of it, I was able to focus on a specific kind of terrorism, and accordingly able to narrow

my research. The next chapter dealt with a theoretical exploration of the origins of terrorism. By

investigating existing research, I made an inventory of the available literature dealing with causes

leading up to terrorism. The following two chapters dealt with the investigation of the measures

proposed in the international anti-terrorism strategies of the USA (Chapter 4) and the Netherlands

(Chapter 5).

Definition

In Chapter 2, I discussed the definition of terrorism, thereby discriminating two core concepts:

its psychological effect of fear (1) and its focus on political objectives (2). Furthermore, I identified

the concept of terrorism in two ways. Firstly, I made a distinction between old- and new-style

terrorism. The latter style has three characterising aspects: a global reach, ruthless ways of violence,

and a network structure. The second way in which I defined terrorism was by identifying several kinds

of it, including religious terrorism. I drove that distinction further by focusing on jihadistic terrorism.

This type of terrorism refers to ‘jihad’, which is Arabic for ‘fight’ or ‘struggle’. Jihadistic terrorists’

ultimate goal is to establish a society which is the reflection of what the original sources of Islam


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prescribe. In short, this chapter provided the opportunity to narrow my study by distinguishing new-

style jihadistic terrorism as the focus of research.

Conceptual model

Chapter 3, named ‘the origins of jihadistic terrorism’, dealt, as its title reveals, with those

factors and conditions that cause terrorism. Such was considered necessary because it would give

structure to the following parts of research. This chapter was divided in two parts. Firstly, I made an

inventory of the literature that is available on the origins of terrorism. Researchers have presented

divergent factors that in a way explain the emergence of terrorism. Such factors could either be

considered as structural (prime movers) or as facilitating. This inventory however proved to be of

inadequate utility, because the factors could not be regarded sufficiently distinctive. Therefore, I

restructured these factors, thereby building a conceptual model in which I identified distinguishable

and comparable causes of terrorism. The purpose of the model is by no means to present a definitive

model. Instead, I merely created a reproduction of existing academic research, modified in a way that

it fits the purpose of this study: providing structure to the investigation of the American and Dutch

anti-terrorism strategies.

The conceptual model as presented in Chapter 3 consists of three phases. The first phase deals

with structural underlying conditions that explain the emergence of terrorism. These conditions can in

turn be roughly divided in three different clusters. The economic cluster is composed of two factors:

‘absolute poverty’ and ‘relative poverty’. The former concerns situations of dependency in which

people are increasingly susceptible to the recruitment of terrorist groups, because such groups can for

example provide stable living. Relative poverty is about the economic equality between groups of

people. Economic inequality can contribute to people’s anger and frustration because they perceive

their unequal situation as increasingly unacceptable. The political cluster accommodates three origins

of terrorism: ‘political voice’, ‘political oppression’, and ‘dissimilarity of power’. Political voice is

about the existing democratic opportunities people get offered, i.e. the extent to which people are able

to express themselves politically. Ability of expression generates political relief, and induces the

formation of responsive governments which are likely to produce desirable social outcomes. In that

way, the need to reach for violent methods in order to get influence decreases. The second factor of the

political cluster, political oppression, concerns the relationship between the individuals (or certain

groups) and the government. In situations where people cannot live their lives in freedom because of

constant interference of the state, to these people, terrorist methods may seem the only way to change

their situation. The third factor of this clusters is called dissimilarity of power. This factor concerns

situations of political, economic, or cultural dominance that could lead people to perceive themselves

as increasingly marginalised. In unbalanced situations, when a certain group is able of making

decisions by its own at the cost of others, such could lead people, when other options are absent, to


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turn to violent methods. The social cluster is the final one, and is composed by two factors:

‘education’ and the ‘diminishment of traditional social patterns’. Education explains the emergence of

terrorism in two ways. It is first to be considered as an underlying cause contributing to absolute

poverty, because insufficient education result in a lack of practical skills, often necessary to guarantee

economic subsistence. Furthermore, the factor education can strengthen the relationship between

relative poverty and terrorism. After all, those that have followed decent specific education are more

likely to have greater prospects of their future. If those people nevertheless have to face a situation of

inequality, this is to be considered as intensifying the relationship between relative poverty and

terrorism.

In the second phase I elaborated on the process of radicalisation, i.e. the process in which

people become increasingly prepared to apply terrorist methods. Three (interconnected) factors can be

distinguished in this phase: ‘individual radicalisation’, ‘alternative organisations’, and ‘terrorist

organisation’. To begin with the first factor, there are roughly two ways in which radical Islam

channels the process of individual radicalisation. Firstly, researchers have stressed that radical Islam

can provide meaning to one’s life. Radical Islam for example provides the idea that one can find its

identity in ‘pure Islam’, by living like ‘pure Muslims’, according to outlined prescriptions.

Subsequently, researchers have identified a second way in which radical Islam channels individual

radicalisation. Radical Islam – and radical ideologies in general – can seriously lower the bar for

turning to violent measures because it can provide religious justification, legitimisation and

glorification. People who have been fully radicalised, and consider violent methods as completely

legitimised and are subsequently willing to commit terrorist attacks, are likely to organise by

establishing organisations with kindred persons, or to join already existing groups which apply

terrorist methods. The third and final factor of this phase concerns alternative organisation that can

play an important role in encouraging and stimulating people to become radicalised. An example of

such an organisation would be groups providing aid as explained when I discussed absolute poverty.

The third and final phase concerns the causes that make it likely that a terrorist attack will

actually occur, i.e. factors that facilitate terrorism. We distinguished between four factor, including

state sponsorship. Support of states can take several forms, such as providing financial means and safe

havens.

Conclusions

Chapters 4 and 5 dealt with the actual investigation of the international anti-terrorism

strategies of the USA and the Netherlands. In the comparing sixth and final chapter, I concluded which

differences and similarities between both countries’ strategies exists and to what extent a different

analyses of the origins of terrorism underlie these strategies. I made this comparison on the basis of the

three phases as distinguished in the conceptual model. The Dutch government recognises the majority


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of origins as distinguished in phase 1 of this model. According to the Netherlands, factors as political

voice, oppression, and a dissimilarity of power, relative poverty, absolute poverty, and the

diminishment of traditional social patterns are all likely to cause terrorism. The Dutch recognition of

this comprehensive set of origins of terrorism underlie the broad range of measures the Netherlands

proposes for stopping the next generation of terrorist from emerging (prevention). In its strategy, the

Netherlands proposes many measures in different fields to prevent future terrorism, such as promoting

good governance, human rights, democracy, economic prosperity, inter-cultural dialogue, long-term

integration, and non-discrimination. In short, at the basis of the Dutch anti-terrorism strategy lie

factors of all three clusters – political, economic, and social – of the conceptual model. The USA does

not identify a similar comprehensive set of origins of terrorism. The Bush Administration solely

emphasises the political cluster, and political voice in particular, of the conceptual model. According

to the Bush Administration, a lack of political voice, that is, the inability of political expression, is the

most important factor in explaining terrorism. This view is at the basis of the actual measures the USA

proposes in its anti-terrorism strategy: to stop the next generation of terrorists from emerging, the Bush

Administration solely stresses the advancement of freedom and human dignity trough effective

democracy. So, in short, whereas all three clusters are at the basis of the Dutch broad range of

preventing measures, the USA solely recognises factors of the political cluster as origins of terrorism,

and has accordingly promoted the advancement of effective democracy as the preventing strategy

only.

Similar to the comparison of phase 1, when one compares the USA and the Netherlands on the

second phase, some remarkable differences emerge. According to the Netherlands, recognising the

process of radicalisation is of vital importance in order to understand the emergence of terrorism. The

Dutch government therefore greatly emphasises the factor ‘individual radicalisation’ as distinguished

in the conceptual model. This specific analysis of the process of radicalisation is likely to be at the

basis of certain particular anti-terrorism measures as the Netherlands proposes in its strategy. The

Dutch government for example stresses that non-discrimination and long-term integration measures

are of importance, because that would prevent certain people from alienating from society, which in

turn makes it less likely that those people radicalise. By contrast, the USA does not consider the

process of radicalisation to be of importance. That is, in its strategy, the Bush Administration does not

give evidence of situations in which one could become increasingly convinced and prepared to use

terrorist methods.

The USA does however put forward two other origins of terrorism, factors that deviate from

the conceptual model as presented in Chapter 3. The first factor concerns the fact that the anti-

terrorism strategy of the USA is largely based on a clear good-wrong perspective. In that context, the

Bush Administration considers ‘evil’ as a factor that explains the emergence of terrorism. This idea of

‘evil’ as an origin of terrorism seems to underlie USA’s strategy for fighting terrorism significantly.


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By recognising evil as a cause of terrorism, the USA seems to embrace the idea that the only way to

evil (terrorism) is by eliminating it, i.e. by conducting harsh repressive measures. The second factor

that deviates from the conceptual model concerns the sponsorship of states. Although researchers

generally consider ‘state sponsorship’ as a factor that facilitates terrorism, the USA sees it as a more

significant origin of terrorism. In fact, the USA seems to consider state sponsorship of such

importance, that it would not only make the occurrence of a potential terrorist attack more likely, but

that it is a structural factor of terrorism as well, conducive to the organisation of terrorist groups as

such. This particular view towards state sponsorship underlies certain specific measures the USA

proposes in its anti-terrorism strategy, such as disrupting financial support and safe havens to

terrorists, significantly.

All in all, I can conclude that the Netherlands and the USA both propose different measures in

their anti-terrorism strategies and present a different view on the origins of terrorism that is at the basis

of those strategies.


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Table of contents Preface p. 2

Summary p. 3

Chapter 1 Introduction p. 10

1.1 Background p. 10

1.2 Jihadistic terrorism p. 10

1.3 Rationale for doing this research p. 11

1.4 Definition of the problem p. 12

1.5 Research questions p. 12

1.6 Structure of research p. 13

1.7 Methodology p. 13

Chapter 2 Terrorism defined p. 15

2.1 Two core concepts p. 15

2.2 New-style jihadistic terrorism p. 16

2.3 Conclusion p. 19

Chapter 3 The origins of jihadistic terrorism p. 20

3.1 Introduction p. 20

3.2 General remarks p. 20

3.3 Exploration of the origins of terrorism p. 21

3.4 Conceptual model p. 30


3.6 Closing off p. 39

Chapter 4 The USA p. 41


4.2 What is the USA fighting? p. 41

4.3 USA’s strategy: two different battles p. 42

4.4 USA’s analysis: the origins of terrorism p. 47

4.5 Translation to conceptual model p. 52


Chapter 5 The Netherlands p. 59



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5.2 What is the Netherlands fighting? p. 59

5.3 The Dutch strategy: a four pillar approach p. 61

5.4 The Dutch analysis: the origins of terrorism p. 64

5.5 Translation to the conceptual model p. 69


Chapter 6 Conclusions p. 77

6.1 Recall p. 77

6.2 Comparison p. 78

6.3 To conclude p. 82

Epilogue p. 83

Literature p. 84

Appendixes p. 87


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Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 Background


Centre, everyone became aware of what will be the central theme of this research: terrorism. Since

then, the world has experienced more terrorist events. An attack in Bali killed over 200 people, bombs

on a train in Madrid had approximately the same effect, and in London 52 people died because of

explosions that took place in underground trains.1 Some authors said that everything has changed since

the ‘outbreak of terrorism’. In this context, Kegley states that the primary product of 9/11 is the

generation of fear: ‘Terrorism was no longer a marginal problem, a nuisance in other countries to be

watched on the evening news. It had become a sadistic assault on the principles a political culture of

the United States and its allies – on their very way of life’.2 As a response, terrorism was raised to the

top of the political agenda. Western states, the United States being the most notorious, have declared

fighting terrorism as their primary objective. Both in international and domestic perspective, fighting

the dangerous threat that terrorism poses has become top priority.

1.2 Jihadistic terrorism

Before I introduce the main questions of this research, it is necessary to define the concept

terrorism first. That is, 9/11 indeed raised the awareness about terrorism, it however did so in a rather

narrow manner. Nowadays, it seems that terrorism is equated with Islamic violence, and Al Qaeda in

particular. Terrorism is however a broad concept that has its origins in the French Revolution.3

Therefore, terrorism is not a phenomenon of recent years and is certainly not exclusively related to

Islam. Schmid’s typology of terrorism illustrates its broad character. He distinguishes between five

types of terrorism: social-revolutionary terrorism (left-wing), right-wing and racist terrorism, single-

issue terrorism, nationalist and separatist terrorism (including ethnic terrorism), and finally, religious

terrorism.4 Within this study, I will focus on the latter: religious terrorism. Reason for doing so lies

partly in the fact that religious terrorism is recently growing: ‘In the years after 1990, communalism –

especially based in religion – reappeared as a major source of dissident terrorism’.5 Within this

investigation, I will even go one step further by focusing on a particular kind of religious terrorism:

jihadistic terrorism, i.e. terrorism that is based on a radical interpretation of the Islam. Reason for

1 Giddens, 2006, Politics, Government and Terrorism, in: Sociology (5th edition), p. 880-881. 2 Kegley, 2003, The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, p. 1-2. 3 Giddens, 2006, p. 881. 4 Schmid, 2005, Prevention of terrorism: towards a multi-prolonged approach, in: Root Causes of Terrorism, New York: Routledge, p. 224. 5 Lutz & Lutz, 2005, Terrorism: Origins and Evolution, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, p. 129.


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doing so concerns the current significance rise in extreme Islamic fundamentalist groups.6 In the next

chapter, I will elaborate more extensively on the meaning of terrorism.

1.3 Rationale for doing this research

This research will not just generally describe the phenomenon of terrorism. More specifically,

it will focus on two countries that have developed anti-terrorism strategies: the Netherlands and the

United States of America. The reason for selecting these two states is because they seem to have a

different vision on global matters. In general, the United States embraces the idea that we live in a

dangerous world, which poses a lot of threats. The USA reacts to those threats by using its power,

preferably military power. The Netherlands (or in a broader context: Europe) on the other hand retains

a vision which prescribes a world that should be trusted. Of course, threats exist, and some of them

indeed have a severe character. However, instead of using brutal violence, the Netherlands (and

Europe more in general) prefers a ways characterised by political dialogue and conflict prevention.7

More specific, when focusing on the problem of terrorism, the Netherlands and the USA seem

to apply a very different approach towards this problem. The USA seems to find it necessary to

conduct harsh measures, and to embrace a violent approach in which tracing, arresting and the

elimination of terrorists appear to have priority.8 ‘Counter-terrorism measures include the sensitive

acts of infiltration, electronic surveillance, interception of mail and phone calls, and the sharing of

information among intelligence services about the characteristics and behaviours of profiled

individuals and groups’.9 The vision of the Bush Administration is one with a great faith in military

solutions. USA’s strategy for fighting terrorism is therefore often called to be a military approach.

Within this context, Hippel argues that counter-terrorism campaigns incorporate both fighting

symptoms and causes of terrorism. She continues by stating that with regard to the US government,

there is a strong determination on the former, and that rooting-out activities will therefore be the

priority in the years to come.10 Or, to put it the way Ehrlich & Liu did: ‘There is much talk on the long

war on terrorism, but little attention (at least in the US government) [on] changing the basic conditions

that generate terrorist acts’.11 The picture that arises from these authors is that the USA seems to fight

terrorism mainly by using actions of repression.

By contrast, the Netherlands (or Europe in general) appears to conduct a different policy. This

approach has a softer character, one in which conflict-prevention plays a central role. With regard to

the problem of terrorism, this means that Europe is mainly concerned with the causes giving rise to

terrorism: a preventive approach. Like Weigand – spokesman of the European Commission – said

6 Wilkinson, 2005, Why Modern Terrorism: Differentiating Types and Distinguishing Ideological Motivations, in: The New Global Terrorism, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, p. 122-123. 7 Speech of Minister Michels (Belgium), the 19th of December 2002. 8 Trouw, the 14th of September 2001. 9 Kegley, 2003, p. 175 10 Hippel, 2002, The Roots of Terrorism: Probing the Myths, in: The political quarterly (3), Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, p. 25. 11 Ehrlich & Liu, 2002, Some Roots of Terrorism, in: Population and Environment (24), p. 183.


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about the different approach between the USA and Europe: our position in the fight against terrorism

is similar, the ways to reach this goal are however not the same.12 The division Bjørgo makes in his

introduction comes close to this notion. He states that on the one hand, some prefer the vision that

terrorism is evil, poses a threat and should therefore be crushed and uprooted. Others argue that

without addressing the conditions that produce radicalisation and (eventually) terrorism, one could

never succeed in fighting terror.13

1.4 Definition of the problem

So, the USA and the Netherlands seem to act differently to the problem of terrorism. Within

this context, Schmid stresses the distinction between two schools of thought: on the one hand those

who are mainly concerned in addressing the causes of terrorism. On the other hand, those who are

more interested in fighting the manifestations of terrorism itself.14

A first investigation would embrace a verification about the truth of this observation: does the

USA mainly focus on terrorism by means of repression, and does the Netherlands merely proposes

anti-terrorism measures aimed at removing the causes of terrorism? If this is the case, a very relevant

follow-up question would be if a difference in vision these countries have on the origins of terrorism

could be at the basis of such a different approach.

In short, on first sight, the USA and the Netherlands seem to deal with terrorism in a different

way. Could a difference in the origins of terrorism these countries put forward in their policies be at

the basis of such a different approach?

1.5 Research questions

The following research question can be derived from what is written above:

What are the main differences and similarities between the anti-terrorism strategies of the USA and

the Netherlands concerning the fight against international jihadistic terrorism and to what extent are

those strategies of both countries based on different analyses of the origins of terrorism?

The following sub-questions can be derived from this main question:

1. The USA

a. What kind of measures does the USA propose in its anti-terrorism strategy aimed at

fighting international jihadistic terrorism?

b. On which analysis of the origins of terrorism is this strategy based (legitimisation)?

2. The Netherlands

12 NRC Handelsblad, the 7th of February 2002. 13 Bjørgo, 2005, Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward, New York: Routledge, p. 1. 14 Schmid, 2005, p. 223.


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a. What kind of measures does the Netherlands propose in its anti-terrorism strategy

aimed at fighting international jihadistic terrorism?

b. On which analysis of the origins of terrorism is this strategy based (legitimisation)?

3. When compared, what are the differences and similarities between the anti-terrorism

strategies of both countries concerning the fight against international jihadistic terrorism and

concerning the analyses of the origins of terrorism that are at the basis of these strategies?

By answering these questions I will try to achieve an objective that is twofold. Firstly, this

research will describe what kind of international anti-terrorism measures both the Netherlands and the

USA propose. Subsequently, I will give insight into the analyses of the origins of terrorism that are at

the basis on the American and Dutch anti-terrorism strategies. The aim of this research is eventually to

find out which differences and similarities could be discovered between the USA and the Netherlands

and if differences and/or similarities in the analyses of the origins of terrorism could be at the basis of

that.

1.6 Structure of research

Before I am able to start with answering the sub-questions, I have to finish two other matters

first. More extensive that I did above, I shall firstly have to describe what terrorism exactly is, what

different kinds of terrorism exist, and on which one I will focus. Chapter 2 is the one dealing with

these matters, and is called ‘Terrorism defined’. Secondly, it would be injudicious to dig into policy

documents in search for factors that explain the origins of terrorism without having any idea of what

kind of explanations could be found. Therefore, I will discuss various theories about the origins of

terrorism that scholars came up with. By distinguishing between several causes that explain the

emergence of terrorism, this research becomes categorised. Using categorised causes of terrorism will

help in placing the view on the origins of terrorism of the Netherlands and the USA, thereby

enhancing the structure of this research. In that way, I am better able to compare the anti-terrorism

strategies of both countries. Chapter 3 is the one which deals with these matters, and is called ‘The

origins of jihadistic terrorism’. Subsequently, the anti-terrorism strategies of the USA and the

Netherlands will be exposed to research. The findings are reported in Chapter 4 and 5. Chapter 6 will

conclude by comparing the anti-terrorism strategies of both countries.

1.7 Methodology

This final section elaborates on the way this research will be held. I shall make use of two

different methodologies. The first part of this research consists of a literature study. I shall not conduct

any empirical research myself, but will found on the work of others. That is, by investigating the work

of other researchers, we shall try to present a clear inventory of factors that give rise to terrorism.


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When we reach Chapters 4 and 5, the methodology will change. As already mentioned, for these parts,

I will investigate policy documents concerning international anti-terrorism measures. Babbie calls this

kind of methodology content analysis and is about ‘[…] the study of recorded human communications

[…]’ (2004, p. 314). With the theoretical findings of Chapters 2 and 3 in mind, I shall deduce analyses

that both countries use in their policy documents on the origins of terrorism. A consequence of taking

the anti-terrorism strategies (policy documents) into account only, is that one does not investigate the

actual policies as conducted. This research shall therefore only elaborate on the ways the USA and the

Netherlands think they can fight international terrorism, i.e. on their policy intensions. While it is fair

to assume that intentions are at the basis of the eventual measures that are taken, other factors are also

likely to determine the policies that are eventually conducted.

The reason why I have chosen the Netherlands and the United States of America for further

research became already clear from what is written above. However, I have not yet emphasised the

selection of the policy documents of both countries. For both countries, it is possible to make a

division between documents that are about international terrorism, and documents concerning

domestic terrorism. With regard to the USA, this comes down to two different kind of policy

documents15: the National Strategy for Homeland Security focuses on fighting terrorism within the

US, while the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism targets the identification and diffusion of

terrorist threats before they reach America. When the Netherlands is taken into account, one could

note a similar separation between international and domestic terrorism measures. That is, whereas the

Ministers of Domestic Affairs and of Integration have written several memoranda about domestic

terrorism, the Minister of Foreign Affairs principally deals with terrorism in an international

perspective. As already became clear from the research questions, I shall focus on anti-terrorism

strategies that are taken in such an international perspective.

To conclude, I shall shortly elaborate on this research’ objective. Geurts states that a research

can be made up in several ways (1999, p. 29). The goal of a research could be either of a descriptive or

an explanatory character, and the procedure of the research could be either explorative or testing. The

research I will conduct will have an explanatory character, with an explorative method of working.

Geurts (1999, p. 29) has called the combination of these two factors ‘the tracing of possible causes’.

This is exactly what I intent to do. By exploring the analyses of the origins of terrorism laid down in

anti-terrorism strategies, I will try to find out if a difference in these analyses could be at the basis of a

different way in which the Netherlands and the USA approach terrorism.

15 Separation is made by Petrosino (2005) in his work document: the United States and counterterrorism: history, measures and lessons.


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Chapter 2: Terrorism defined 2.1 Two core concepts

The concept of terrorism is used to cover many phenomena. Despite the fact that terrorism

recently seems to be equated with violence that is justified by the Islam, the origins of terrorism lie in

a period long before 9/11. Giddens for example states that the word ‘terrorism’ has its origins in the

French Revolution of 1789.16 Also in the 20th century, the world experienced terrorism on large-scale,

Nazi Germany being the most notorious example. A more recent example of terrorism would be the

terrorist methods that are used by separatist movements like the Basque ETA.

The fact that the concept of terrorism covers a broad range of events has resulted in difficulties

when one wants to define terrorism. Scholars have not been able to agree on certain aspects of

terrorism. For example: is terrorism only about attacks on civilians or also about attacks on military

targets under non-war conditions? and, should terrorism also cover state actors as terrorists? More in

general, scientists have claimed the impossibility of defining terrorism by stating that ‘one man’s

terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’. In other words, it would be impossible to agree upon an

objective definition on terrorism, because the defining process ‘[…] depends entirely on the subjective

outlook of the definer […]’.17

However, although researchers have come up with over 200 definitions to describe the

phenomenon of terrorism, there is actually a growing consensus among scientists about its core

meaning.18 Firstly, consensus has been reached with regard to the means terrorist use, their essence of

activities. Terrorism involves violent behaviour, or the threat of violent behaviour, which is primarily

aimed at citizens. In that way, terrorists try ‘[…] to achieve a psychological effect of fear on others

than the immediate victims’.19 The purpose of terrorist attacks is to cause unrest within groups of

people. Therefore, terrorism is not that much about the actual lethal victims it claims, but about the

terrorising effect it has on populations. Or, as Kegley states it: ‘Terrorism is aimed at the people

watching, not at the actual victims. Terrorism is theatre’.20

Secondly, the aim of the activities terrorists exploit are always political, like changing a

regime, changing the people in power, or changing social or political conditions, etc’.21 Some have

added ideological and religious objectives to the list of political aims. However, ‘political aims’ are to

be considered in a broad sense. ‘The motivation – whether ideological, religious, or something else –

behind the political objective is irrelevant for the purpose of defining terrorism’.22 Take for example

Al Qaeda. At first sight, this organisation seems to be of a religious character only: they are using

16 Giddens, 2006, p. 883. 17 Ganor, 2002, Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?, in: Police Practice and Research (3), p. 287. 18 Bjørgo, 2005, p. 1-2. 19 Bjørgo, 2005, p. 2. 20 Kegley, 2003, p. 22. 21 Ganor, 2002, p. 294. 22 Ditto.


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religious language to legitimise their actions and are fighting a holy war (jihad). However, ‘[…] we

should not overlook that Bin Laden’s organisation has a definite political agenda. They want to force

the United States into withdrawing from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region generally. They want to

overthrow what they regard as collaborationist regimes in the Muslim world, which they accuse of

betraying ‘true’ Islam, and they want to unite all Muslims in a pan-Islamic Caliphate that would rule

according to the principles of ‘true’ Islam’.23

So, in short, terrorism is about two core concepts: creating a psychological effect of fear (1) in

order to achieve some political objective (2). The definition that covers these two distinctive

characteristics of terrorism well is the one stated by Kegley: ‘Terrorism is violence or the threat of

violence calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm – in a word, to terrorise – and thereby

bring about some social or political change’.24

Now I have elaborated on two distinctive characters of terrorism, it is possible to differentiate

terrorist occurrences from other political or violent events. Because terrorism is about violence (or the

threat of violence), strikes and peaceful demonstrations could not be considered as terrorist. The same

notion holds for felonies or criminal delinquencies because these do not have a political character. And

finally, guerrilla warfare or civil insurrections are also not cover by the concept of terrorism, because

these phenomena are not primary aimed at civilians but on military targets instead.

2.2 New-style jihadistic terrorism

Despite the fact that I have discriminated between several manifestations of political violence,

I have not been distinctive enough yet. That is, terrorism as such is already a very broad concept: ‘[…]

the label of terrorism is used to cover a wide range of rather different phenomena’.25 Moreover, causes

that give rise to terrorism do not necessarily have to be the same for these different phenomena: ‘Some

root factors may impact differently on various types of terrorist groups […]’.26 Therefore, it is

necessary to separate various forms of terrorism. One could do that in two ways: either by

distinguishing between old-style terrorism and new-style terrorism, or by differing between several

kinds of terrorism.

Let me firstly elaborate on the distinction between the two styles of terrorism. Old-style

terrorism covers terrorism that is mainly linked to nations without states. The name of this style of

terrorism is kind of misleading, because old-style terrorism still exists today. People acting in such

terrorist groups are willing to use terrorist methods in order to establish a state in a specific national

area. Therefore, old-style terrorism ‘[…] is fundamentally local because its ambitions are local’.27 As a

result of that, this kind of terrorism is limited in the use of violence as well. A prototype example of an

23 Wilkinson, 2003, p. 124. 24 Kegley, 2003, p. 16. 25 Bjørgo, 2005, p. 1. 26 Bjørgo, 2005, p. 4. 27 Giddens, 2006, p. 884.


17

old-style terrorist group is the separatist Basque movement ETA, like mentioned earlier. The main

goal of this group is to establish a separate state in the northern of Spain: a local objective.

‘While some terrorists are still patriots and genuine revolutionaries, this pattern is no longer

typical’.28 The current pattern is one that has been called new-style terrorism. In scientific literature,

three distinguishing aspects of new-style terrorism are often stressed: its broader scope of claims, its

ruthless ways of violence, and its network structure. With regard to the first characterising aspect,

Giddens states that new-style terrorism has a global spread because it wants to restructure world

society.29 Together with being global in its ambitions, new-style terrorists use extensive and ruthless

ways of violence as well. From this perspective, Gupta stresses that new-style terrorism increased the

threat of widespread death and destruction because of the development of weapons of mass destruction

and other technologies like communication and transportation.30 Finally, the organisational structure of

terrorist groups is noteworthy when naming distinguishing aspects of new-style terrorism. Terrorist

groups are very comparable to so-called network organisations. ‘There is a lot of autonomy in local

cells and these can reproduce without necessarily having any strong direction from the centre’.31 In

other words, new-style terrorist groups are very loosely connected, something that resulted in ‘[…]

unprecedented levels of communication and coordination’.32 Although these three aspects are being

presented as typical for new-style terrorism, one could doubt about this notion. With regard to the first

aspect, before 9/11 – even before the existence of Al-Qaeda – there were groups aimed at restructuring

world society. Most notorious examples are of course communist-groups trying to establish

communism globally. Also the second aspect of what would be typical for new-style terrorism is only

partial true. Indeed, it is correct that 9/11 was the deadliest terrorist attack. However, the statement that

new-style terrorism is so ruthless because of the development of weapons of mass destruction seems

exaggerated, since these weapons have not been used by any terrorist group until today. Also with

concern to the third aspect of new-style terrorism, one could doubt if this is exclusively typical for

new-style terrorism. The network structure is no invention of new-style terrorists since there have been

communist-groups using this kind of communication in the beginning of the 20th century. In short,

whilst the three named characteristics of new-style terrorism roughly describe what this phenomenon

is about, it is not exclusively typical for new-style terrorism.

The second way in which one can define the concept of terrorism is by differing betweens

several kinds of it. Schmid has made an extensive division of terrorism by using a typology which

distinguishes between five kinds: social-revolutionary terrorism (left-wing), right-wing and racist

terrorism, single-issue terrorism, nationalist and separatist terrorism (including ethnic terrorism), and

28 Laqueur, 1998, Terror’s New Face: The Radicalization and Escalation of Modern Terrorism, in: Harvard International Review, European edition (20), p. 48. 29 Giddens, 2006, p. 886. 30 Gupta, 2005, Exploring roots of terrorism, in: Root causes of terrorism: myths, reality and ways forward, New York: Routledge, p. 29. 31 Giddens, 2006, p. 887. 32 Kegley, 2003, p. 4.


18

finally, religious terrorism.33 Within this study, I shall focus on the latter: religious terrorism.

Religious terrorism can be considered as a weapon for religious persecution and religious warfare.34

Reason for focusing on this kind of terrorism is mainly based on the fact that religious terrorism is

recently growing. Rapoport for example states that terrorism could be divided in four (chronological)

waves.35 The third wave – a revolutionary one – began to ebb away in the 1980s. ‘The religious wave

began in the same decade’.36 Within their study, Lutz & Lutz come to a same observation by writing:

‘In the years after 1990, communalism – especially based in religion – reappeared as a major source of

dissident terrorism’.37

Within this investigation, I will even go one step further by focusing on a particular kind of

religious terrorism: jihadistic terrorism, i.e. terrorism that has its roots in Islam. To be clear, every

religion – may it be Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, or Judaism – has its terrorists. Religious terrorism

should therefore never be equated with Islam in general. ‘However, it is also extremely important not

to underestimate the significance of the rise of groups of extreme Islamic fundamentalists […]’.38

Among other things, this observation resulted in the overriding attention of jihadistic terrorism on the

public agenda.

Religious terrorism is about ideas and ideals that are religiously inspired. Within scientific

research, a definition on the concept of this particular kind of terrorism seems to be lacking. If one

however has to define jihadistic terrorism in a single sentence, it would emphasise its use of terrorism

against enemies of the Islam, in order to realise a society which is the purest reflection of what the

original sources of the Islam (‘true’ Islam) prescribe.39 Jihadistic terrorism refers to ‘jihad’, which is

Arabic for ‘fight’ or ‘struggle’. Both media and politicians often use the term ‘armed jihad’ to clarify

what they are talking about: a holy war against those who threaten Islam. Wilkinson stresses the key

feature every jihadistic terrorist group has: ‘[…] they are bitterly opposed not only to the United States

and Israel, but to all Western countries’.40

The most notorious jihadistic terrorist group is of course the Al Qaeda network. In every TV-

message Bin Laden releases, he quotes verses from the Koran and summons Muslims to step up and

fight in their holy war. At the same time, Al Qaeda is in many ways a prototype of what has been

called new-style terrorism: Al Qaeda is a network type of organisation that has global goals and is – as

experienced on the 11th of September, 2001 – extremely lethal. Because Al Qaeda both reflects new-

style terrorism and jihadistic terrorism, it will be at the centre of attention in this study. However,

important to comprehend is that the jihadistic Al Qaeda network is not the only representative of new

33 Schmid, 2005, p. 224. 34 Wilkinson, 2003, p. 121. 35 Respectively an anarchist wave, an anti-colonial wave, a new-left wave, and finally, a religious wave. 36 Rapoport, 2003, The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11, in: The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, p. 43. 37 Lutz & Lutz, 2005, p. 129. 38 Wilkinson, 2005, 122-123. 39 Definition is used in a letter of the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs on breeding grounds of (international) terrorism. 40 Wilkinson, 2003, p. 123.


19

terrorism. Or, as Morgan states it: ‘[…] Islamic radicalism is not the only form of apocalyptic,

catastrophic terrorism’.41 Take for example the Oklahoma City bombing by American right-wing

militants, which claimed 168 lives and was the most lethal terrorist attack on American soil before

9/11.42

2.3 Conclusion

To conclude, this chapter has served as an introducing one. That is, I elaborated on the

definition of terrorism, thereby discriminating two core concepts: the psychological effect of fear (1)

and the focus on political objectives (2). Furthermore, I defined the concept of terrorism is two ways.

Firstly, I made a distinction between old- and new-style terrorism. The latter kind has three

characterising aspects: a global reach, ruthless ways of violence, and a network structure. This type of

terrorism will be the one this research focuses on. The second way in which I narrowed this research

was by identifying several kinds of terrorism. I stated that jihadistic terrorism will be the focus of

research. This kinds of terrorism concerns people that use terrorist methods against enemies of the

Islam, in order to realise a society which is the purest reflection of what the original sources of the

Islam (‘true’ Islam) prescribe. By identifying new-style jihadistic terrorism as the focus of research, I

shall now turn to the identification of causes that explain the emergence of this kind of terrorism.

41 Morgan, 2004, The Origins of the New Terrorism, in: Parameters (34), p. 30. 42 Ditto.


20

Chapter 3: The origins of jihadistic terrorism 3.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter, I dealt with the meaning of terrorism. Among other matters, I

distinguished between the transformation from old- to new-style terrorism. However, whilst the latter

is different from most other kinds of terrorism the world experienced before, Lutz & Lutz argue that

‘[…] the most important recent change in terrorist activity is not related to underlying causes […]’.43

That is, whereas the manifestation of terrorism has altered, the underlying process that causes people

to commit terrorist attacks could still be considered the same. Based on prevalent scientific research,

this chapter will describe such underlying processes. I will do so in two ways. Firstly, I will make an

exploration of the literature that is available on the origins of terrorism, thereby identifying several

factors that explain the emergence of terrorism. Subsequently, I shall restructure these factors in order

to make them suitable for this research. However, before I get started on that, two general remarks

have to be made in order to understand the origins of terrorism better.

3.2 General remarks

Among scientific researchers, there is overwhelming consensus about the fact that not one of

the major religions produces more terrorism than others. There does not exist any evidence ‘[…] that

citizens of countries with larger share of their population affiliated with any of the major religious

faiths are more or less likely to be involved with international terrorism. None of the religions has a

monopoly on terrorism’.44 Wilkinson comes to the same conclusion by stating that ‘[…] religious

fanaticism and terror are not the exclusive preserve of any single major religion’.45 Although these

scientists are predominantly correct, they forget that – until now – new-style terrorism is mainly linked

to Islam. After all, no other group besides Al-Qaeda has committed such ruthless attacks as those in

the 11th of September. However, next to the manifestations of new-style terrorism, the world has

experienced Christian terrorism (preaching white supremacism and anti-Semitism) and Jewish

fundamentalism as well. Therefore, when turning to the focus of this research, the Islam as such can

probably not be considered an origin of terrorism. Since none of the religions of terrorism has a

monopoly on terrorism, there must be deeper rooted causes that explain the existence of it.

Secondly, as explained, this chapter deals with those deeper rooted causes. One should realise

that there exists ‘ […] no single root cause of terrorism, or even a set of causes’.46 ‘Terrorism occurs in

poor countries as well as in rich ones, in authoritarian societies as well as in democracies. What seems

likely is that certain forms of terrorism are outcomes of certain combinations of factors: some of which

43 Lutz & Lutz, 2005, p. 168. 44 Malečková, 2005, Impoverished terrorists: stereotype or reality, in: Root Causes of Terrorism, New York: Routledge, p. 37. 45 Wilkinson, 2003, p. 122. 46 Bjørgo, 2005, p. 257.


21

may be more fundamental than others’.47 These factors can be divided in two categories: preconditions

and precipitants. Bjørgo explains this division by citing Crenshaw (1990): ‘Preconditions set the stage

for terrorism in the long run. They are of relatively general and structural nature, producing a wide

range of social outcomes of which terrorism is only one. […] Precipitants much more directly affect

the emergence of terrorism. These are the specific events or situations that immediately precede,

motivate or trigger the outbreak of terrorism’.48 Lutz & Lutz seem to agree with the division made by

Crenshaw by stating that the emergence of terrorism could be explained by using both long-term and

short-term components. The former, which are to be considered as more long-term general causes49,

coincides with the concept of preconditions. Because of their specific character, it would be

impossible to draw some general conclusions concerning anti-terrorism strategies of both the

Netherlands and the USA when using precipitants. Therefore, this research will mainly focus on

preconditions that explain the emergence of terrorism. Bjørgo drives its distinction of levels of

causation even further by distinguishing between ‘structural causes’ and ‘facilitator causes’.

‘Structural causes are causes which affect people’s lives in ways that they may or may not

comprehend, at a rather abstract macro level’.50 Examples are demographic imbalances, globalisation,

rapid modernisation, transitional societies, relative deprivation, etc. Facilitator causes are different

from structural causes because they ‘[…] make terrorism possible or attractive, without being prime

movers’.51 Both kinds of causes are relevant in the search for the origins of terrorism. It is to the

exploration of those origins I now turn.

3.3 Exploration of the origins of terrorism

Like explained in the introduction, it would be injudicious to dig into policy documents in

search for factors that explain the origins of terrorism without having any idea of what kind of

explanations could be expected. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to present a clear inventory of

origins that give rise to terrorism. Such will give structure to the following parts of research. Like

written in the preceding section, I shall focus on structural preconditions (i.e. underlying factors with a

long-term character) and on facilitator factors that explain the existence of terrorism. I shall

successively deal with the following structural factors: poverty, democracy, inequality and oppression,

education, globalisation and modernisation, and finally evil. In addition, I will distinguish four

facilitators: state structure, state sponsorship, press freedom in democracies, and finally the radical

interpretation of religion.

47 Bjørgo, 2005, p. 2. 48 Bjørgo, 2005, p. 258. 49 Lutz & Lutz, 2005, p. 13. 50 Bjørgo, 2005, p. 3. 51 Ditto.


22

3.3.1 Poverty

Within scientific research, the concept of poverty as a (root) cause of terrorism is the one

where is most elaborated about. Some researchers seem to logically accept that poverty creates

terrorism. There are two main argumentations that are at the basis of this perception. First, terrorism is

more likely to emergence when people notice their (economic) situation as (increasingly) imbalanced

compared to others. Karen Amstrong for example states that ‘[…] fundamentalist extremism has risen

in nearly every cultural tradition where there are pronounced inequalities of wealth [...]’.52 A sense of

economic inequality could contribute to the anger of people. Poverty is in that respect an underlying

factor contributing to the process of radicalisation. That is, when people see their economic position as

(increasingly) unequal, they can accordingly become more and more prepared to ‘adopt ultimate

consequences’. The second way poverty contributes to the emergence of terrorism concerns the

situation in which people become increasingly susceptible to recruiting methods of terrorist groups.

Such groups – the argumentation goes – can provide a stable economic situation for deprived people.

In this context, Hippel stresses the importance of fundamentalist charities: ‘[…] some Islamic

charities, along with several governments (such as that of Iran) espouse a [...] radical agenda trough

their aid’.53 In other words, people that live in rough circumstances and in need for aid, are

increasingly susceptible to charitable groups. While delivering required aid to deprived people, such

organisations can simultaneously abuse their positions by propagate radical ideas.

Despite these two theoretical arguments, research that is explicitly aimed at revealing a causal

connection between poverty and terrorism does not contain any clear-cut evidence which points in that

direction. A study which is commonly accepted as authoritative on this matter is conducted by

Krueger & Malečková. They come to quite a remarkable conclusion: ‘Any connection between

poverty […] and terrorism is indirect, complicated and probably quite weak’.54 Within their study,

both authors can find no evidence which suggests that terrorists tend to be more impoverished. More

than that, in their investigation about the likelihood to join the Hezbollah militants, ‘[…] the results

suggest that poverty is inversely related with the likelihood that someone becomes a Hezbollah fighter

[…]’.55 They continue by stating that such a contrary relationship actually makes sense. After all,

commitment to issues and efforts relating to terrorism are probably more likely when people have

sufficient ‘[…] income to concern themselves with more than minimum economic subsistence’.56

Although such a hypothesis should be exposed to further research, one can validly conclude that the

findings ‘[…] provide little support for the view that those who live in poverty […] are

52 Amstrong, 2003, Our role in the terror: The West must accept its share of the blame for the growth of fundamentalist violence, in: The Guardian. 53 Hippel, 2002, p. 36. 54 Krueger & Malečková, 2003, Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?, in: the Journal of Economic Perspectives (17), p. 119. 55 Krueger & Malečková, 2003, p. 133. 56 Krueger & Malečková, 2003, p. 142.


23

disproportionately drawn to participate in terrorist activities’.57 Constantino supports this view by

stating that much of the academy unfortunately refuses to acknowledge the fact that ‘hopeless poverty’

and ‘economic deprivation’ are no root causes for terrorism.58

However, within the academic field, no overwhelming consensus exists on this conclusion.

For example, researchers like Tyson (Dean of the Haas School of Business at the University of

California), have written about poverty as being an accepted root cause of terrorism: ‘[we live in] a

world so interconnected that poverty and despair in a remote region can harbour a network of

terrorism dedicated to our destruction’.59 Moreover, researchers have come up with more complicated

connections between poverty and terrorism. For example, Schmid stresses the possibility of an indirect

relationship between the two concepts: relatively well-to-do men and women that feel so strongly

identified with the impoverished class that they act as ‘self-appointed champions’.60 Or consider Sahar

Mohammad who brings up the perceived inequalities of the capitalist system as a possible cause.

Middle-Eastern countries are for example full of economic potential resources, but many well-

educated citizens are left without jobs.61 However, once again, despite a lack of consensus in the

academic world about poverty being a root cause of terrorism, the actual research that is available on

this topic denies a clear-cut causal relationship.

3.3.2 Democracy

When economic considerations do not seem to contribute to the emergence of terrorism, a next

potential factor would be one related to democracy. After all, the definition like stated in the preceding

chapter prescribes that terrorism is eventually about political objectives. Within that context,

Malečková stresses that terrorism is ‘[…] mainly an answer to political complaints and of terrorists

motivated by political involvement and belief in a political causes […]’.62 He continues by stating that

conditions that give rise to terrorism seem to be more of a political nature, rather than of an economic

one. Since terrorists want to bring about some political change – the argumentation goes – democracy

has to be a root cause of terrorism.

However, just as with the concept of poverty, such a relationship is not as clear-cut as it is on

first sight. In fact, researchers have come up with two chains of reasoning: one that suggests that

democracy reduces terrorist incidents, and another that prescribes the total opposite of that. With

concern to the first chain of reasoning, democracy is considered as a tool of conflict prevention and

resolution. Democracy gives people the opportunity to express their preferences, it gives people a

‘voice’. An important form of political expression are free and fair elections. That is, voting enables

57 Krueger & Malečková, 2003, p. 135. 58 Constantino, 2004, Does Affluence Cause Jihad?, in: Frontpage Magazine. 59 Tyson, 2001, It’s time to step up the global war on poverty, in: Business Week. 60 Schmid, 2005, p. 229. 61 Sahar Mohammad, 2005, Roots of terrorism in the Middle East: internal pressures and international constraints, in: Root Causes of Terrorism, New York: Routledge, p. 105. 62 Malečková, 2005, p. 41.


24

people to express their grievances. This ensures that desirable social changes can be brought, which in

turn reduces the need to resort to violence’.63 From this perspective, democracy is a way to achieve

goals by peaceful means, a non-violent alternative for conflict resolution. When a democratic deficit is

present, people are hampered in expressing themselves. A continuous inability to express one’s

preferences and to address one’s grievances could fuel people’s anger. Therefore, a lack of democratic

opportunities is likely to contribute to the process of radicalisation. In line with this reasoning is

Malečková’s notion of civil liberties. These liberties are inextricably linked to modern democracies.

Civil liberties are those liberties that give freedom to ‘[…] develop views, institutions, and personal

autonomy without interference from the state’.64

The second chain of reasoning is provided by Li in his investigation about the relationship

between democracy and (transnational) terrorist incidents. He states that instead of decreasing the

likelihood of terrorist events, democracy could actually contribute to terrorism. Institutional

constraints on decision-making power of the government are of concern here. Institutional constraints

– also known as institutional ‘checks and balances’ – are a very crucial aspect of democracy because

they balance power in order to prevent tyranny. However, the drawback of these constraints is that

such often result in political inaction and deadlock. More constraints and more balances result in more

veto players, which in turn result in political indecision. ‘Policy inaction and political deadlock,

induced by institutionalised checks and balances, will increase the grievances of marginalised groups,

pushing them toward violence’.65 So, according to Li’s argument, democracy does not decrease the

likelihood of terrorist incidents by definition.

In short, just as with regard to the poverty-argumentation, researchers deny a clear-cut relation

between democracy and terrorism. Democracy can both contribute to and reduce terrorism. Li puts it

like this: ‘Overall, democracy is demonstrated to encourage and reduce transnational terrorist

incidents, albeit via different causal mechanism’.66 Even though such is true, the argumentation that is

at the basis of these causal mechanism is to be considered similar. After all, an inability to express

one’s grievances which hampers the formation of responsive governments, can be brought about both

by a lack of democracy and by institutional constraints resulting in political deadlock. So, although

democracy does not reduce the likelihood of terrorism by definition, the argumentation that is at the

basis of the democracy-terrorism relationship is similar.

3.3.3 Inequality and oppression

This subsection deals with oppression and inequality as contributing factors to terrorism and is

thereby related to the two argumentations of poverty and democracy. That is, when I discussed the

63 Li, 2005, Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents, in: Journal of Conflict Resolution (49.2), Sage Publications, p. 280. 64 Malečková, 2005, p. 41. 65 Li, 2005, p. 283. 66 Li, 2005, p. 294.


25

relationship between poverty and terrorism, I already touched upon the notion that an imbalance

between (groups of) people could contribute to terrorism. However, within that subsection, I merely

spoke about inequality in the context of poverty. Additionally, scholars have come up with reasons

that explain terrorism as being caused by a more general inequality-aspect. In this context, next to

poverty, Armstrong stresses the importance of inequalities of power and status when describing

origins of terrorism.67 Additionally, Friedman stresses that the importance of a ‘poverty of dignity’

instead of a ‘poverty of money’.68 Krueger & Malečková go even further by stating that an imbalance

on non-material matters only contributes to terrorism: terrorism is more accurately viewed as a

response to ‘[…] long-standing feelings (either perceived or real) of indignity and frustration that have

little to do with economics’.69 Furthermore, Bjørgo speaks about inequality of power which could lead

to terrorism: ‘When local or international powers possess an overwhelming power compared to

oppositional groups, and the latter see no other realistic ways forward their cause by normal political

or military means, ‘asymmetrical warfare’ can represent a tempting option’.70 When people perceive a

situation as unequal, such could result in a feeling of oppression. Oppression is in turn likely to be an

underlying factor of the process of radicalisation. Eventually, when oppressed groups can no longer

face a superior other and have no other opportunities to change their situation, they could turn to

terrorist methods. In this context, both Lutz & Lutz71 and Crenshaw72 state that terrorism is ‘a weapon

of the weak’. That is, oppressed and unequally treated groups (i.e. ‘the weak’) are more likely to use

terrorism, especially when other means to change their situation are lacking. So, in short, aspects like

dignity, power, and status determine the level of equality between people. When – because of

indignity, dominant power, differences in status, or whatever kind of other factor – inequality is

present, people start feeling oppressed. Oppression fuels people’s anger and frustration. When other

options are lacking, this could lead such people to employ ‘the weapon of the weak’.

3.3.4 Education

Some researchers state that education – or to put it rightly: a lack of education – contributes to

terrorism. Researchers have brought forward different arguments in which education relates to

terrorism. The first one is offered by Hippel who states that when children do not get decent education,

they will not learn the practical skills ‘[…] that can be used in the global marketplace’.73 Stern notices

the same matter by stating that when children do no learn practical skills – such as maths and science –

they will not be equipped for work in modern society.74 The second way education gives rise to the

emergence of terrorism in the Islamic world concerns the existence of so-called ‘madrasas’: hard-line 67 Armstrong, 2003. 68 Friedman, 2002, The Core of Muslim Rage, in: the New York Times (151), p. A21. 69 Krueger & Malečková, 2003, p. 119. 70 Bjørgo, 2005, p. 259. 71 Lutz & Lutz, 2005, p. 9. 72 Crenshaw, 2003, The Causes of Terrorism, in: The New Global Terrorism, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, p. 97. 73 Hippel, 2002, p. 30. 74 Stern, 2002, Pakistan’s Jihad Culture, in: Foreign Affairs (79.6).


26

Quranic schools which preach a violent interpretation of the Islam. Mostly, these schools are free to

join, thereby attracting many people. According to Stern, the main aim of the madrasas is to recruit

students for the jihad. Beside the lack of practical skills that are being taught, these schools learn to

despise ‘corrupting Western influences’. Especially – but not exclusively – people of an early age are

to be considered susceptible to the indoctrination used in madrasas. Madrasas schooling should

however not be considered as a structural factor of terrorism. For example, the Al-Qaeda members

responsible for the 9/11 attacks were not educated in madrasas.75 From that perspective, one should

consider madrasas as a facilitator rather than being a prime mover. So, equally to other relationships,

consensus about the direction of the relationship between education and terrorism is absent. Education

– both on a structural and a facilitating level – can reduce terrorism by equipping people with

necessary skills, but can promote terrorism as well.

3.3.5 Globalisation and modernisation

Another potential factor that could explain the emergence of terrorism can be found in two

processes that occur worldwide: globalisation and modernisation. Let me firstly elaborate on the

meaning of these two processes. Both are used to cover many sub processes and are therefore used as

umbrella terms. Morgan has defined globalisation as a process that involves the diminution of

boundaries between countries across the world in technological, political, economic and cultural

spheres.76 Globalisation is about worldwide integration and interdependence, about a world that is

turning ‘smaller’. In this line of reasoning, Walters describes globalisation as a ‘[…] social process in

which the constraints of geography on economic, political, social, and cultural arrangements recede

[…]’.77 While researchers are in general capable of presenting definitions and descriptions of

globalisation, scientists who write about modernisation as being an explanation of terrorism do

generally not explain what they think is covered by this concept. If one however has to characterise

modernisation, one would probably stress the transition of societies from feudal, agricultural, and

closed ones to capitalistic, industrial, and open societies.78 Such a transition influences numerous

matters, in economic, social, political and cultural fields.

As becomes clear from their definitions, both globalisation and modernisation have a

‘changing’ character. Globalisation and modernisation bring a process of transformation, thereby

affecting societies. Like Lutz & Lutz put it: ‘[With modernisation and] globalisation come changes in

economic structures, which of course are related to the social and political structures of most

societies’.79 In that way, ‘[ …] globalisation and modernisation can place societies and political

75 Hippel, 2002, p. 30. 76 Morgan, 2004, p. 37. 77 Walters, 2001, Globalization (2nd edition), London: Routledge, p. 5. 78 Vranken & Hendrickx, 2004, Het speelveld en de spelregels: een inleiding tot de sociologie, Leuven: Uitgeverij Acco, p. 337. 79 Lutz & Lutz, 2005, p. 16-17.


27

systems under great stress’.80 Modernisation for example brings the idea of individualised people who

should be able of making own decisions, independently of what others prescribe. Especially with

regard to religious terrorism, ‘the project of modernity’ – pleading for a secular, individualistic, and

technological developed world – could be considered as alien, making religious alternatives

extraordinarily appealing.81 The same holds for the process of globalisation. Take for example

economic globalisation. People could get the feeling that transnational commerce results in an import

of dominant westernised popular culture, which is in their eyes incompatible with their values. For

example, Juergensmeyer states the possibility that American and European music, videos, and films

could threaten ‘[…] to obliterate local and traditional forms of artistic expression’.82 Another example

is provided by Lutz & Lutz who state that ‘[…] rampant consumerism that has come with recent

globalisation can be seen as one factor that undermines the basic values of a society’.83

In short, to put it like Lutz & Lutz did: ‘With [modernisation and globalisation] new ideas,

institutions, products, and forms of organisation encroach on local societies’.84 That is, globalisation

and modernisation can stimulate a breach of highly appreciated values and principles. Such values

could be so sincere and deep-rooted, that the transformation of those values is considered

unacceptable. Religious communal groups are often reacting to such changing circumstances. For

example: ‘Many Islamic groups, including Al Qaeda, have been opposed to the intrusion of foreign

Western values, modernisation, and secularism’.85 In this context, Ehrlich & Liu stress the importance

of religious beliefs, which could be that genuine and sincere that it makes people ‘[…] extremely

resistant to change and may promote a willingness to die for beliefs […]’.86 Morgan explicitly

recognises the fact that the process of globalisation contributes to terrorism by stating that the ‘[…]

intrusion of Western values and institutions into the Islamic world trough the process of free-market

globalisation is an alternative explanation for the growth of terrorism […]’.87

3.3.6 Evil

Some researchers, not many, have stressed the possibility that acts of terrorism stem from

‘evil’. Howell for example states that one of the theories on the causes of 9/11 was that ‘[…] the

attacks were an act of evil’.88 In this reasoning, terrorism is something used by uncivilised people,

barbarians, by people at the wrong side. People are in a way possessed by a power of evil that is to be

considered as the main factor behind terrorism.

80 Lutz & Lutz, 2005, p. 16. 81 Juergensmeyer, 2003, The Religious Roots in Contemporary Terrorism, in: The New Global Terrorism, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, p. 190. 82 Juergensmeyer, 2003, p. 189. 83 Lutz & Lutz, 2005, p. 17. 84 Lutz & Lutz, 2005, p. 16. 85 Lutz & Lutz, 2005, p. 147. 86 Ehrlich & Liu, 2002, p. 187. 87 Morgan, 2004, p. 37. 88 Howell, 2003, Is the New Global Terrorism a Clash of Civilizations? Evaluating Terrorism’s Multiple Sources, in: The New Global Terrorism, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, p. 179.


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3.3.7 State structure

The preceding factors were mainly of a structural character. The subjects I now turn to are

different in a way that they are facilitating, i.e. not prime movers. I will successively deal with state

structure, state sponsorship, press freedom in democracies, and radical interpretation of religion. To

begin with, state structure is another factor that contributes to terrorism in several ways. One can

roughly distinguish between three types of state structures: authoritarian, democratic, and collapsed

states. The latter concerns a state without an effective government ruling over the country.

With regard to authoritarian states, terrorism does not really seem to occur: ‘Domestic

terrorism was almost totally absent from totalitarian societies such as Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s

Soviet Union, or Saddam Hussein’s Iraq’.89 Reason for this lies mainly in the advantages such states

have in dealing with terrorists. ‘The security forces present in such countries deal with suspected

terrorists quickly and effectively’.90 They can make use of a broad range of anti-terrorism measures

which would not be accepted in democracies upholding human rights, such as torture or the capture of

family-members. One should however note that it is difficult to measure terrorist incidents in

authoritarian states, because information flows are heavily controlled and censored by the central

government, resulting in a reporting bias.91

Secondly, Lutz & Lutz note that the state structure of democracy seems more conducive for

producing terrorism since democracies face more constraints in employing anti-terrorism measures.

That is, ‘[…] a country that experiences terrorist attacks often attempts to prevent future attacks by

adopting policies that circumscribe the freedom of terrorists’.92 However, in democratic societies, such

circumscription would ‘[…] restrict civil liberties for society as a whole’.93 Since we value our civil

liberties (like freedom of speech, association, and movement) so greatly, such a restriction is often

considered to be unacceptable. To put it shortly like Crenshaw did: ‘[the] desire to protect civil

liberties constrains security matters’.94

Thirdly, with regard to state structure, weak or collapsed states could contribute to the

emergence of terrorism as well. Bjørgo states this notion pithily: ‘Failed or weak states lack the

capability or will to exercise territorial control and maintain a monopoly of violence. This leaves a

power vacuum that terrorist organisations may exploit to maintain safe havens, training facilities and

bases for launching terrorist organisations’.95 In short, states that lack an effective government to

control things around are often called to be ‘breeding grounds’ of terrorism. Hippel however disagrees

with this by stating that such lawless and ungoverned areas involve difficulties for terrorists as well. In

collapsed states security itself is highly fragmentised, infrastructure is often unreliable, and there are

89 Lutz & Lutz, 2005, p. 15. 90 Lutz & Lutz, 2003, p. 15. 91 Li, 2005, p. 281-282. 92 Li, 2005, p. 282. 93 Ditto. 94 Crenshaw, 1981, The Causes of Terrorism, in: Comparative Politics (13.4), p. 383. 95 Bjørgo, 2005, p. 258.


29

often no local candidates with whom a reliable partnership can be developed.96 These are all

circumstances that can not be considered very conducive when preparing terrorist attacks. Hippel

underpins his argumentation by stating that it was Bin Laden who, when he took refugee in Sudan, did

not settle in the lawless southern parts of the territory, but the northern part where government was

firmly in control. Logically, Hippel rejects the notion that collapsed states are used as safe havens

where terrorists ‘breed’.

3.3.8 State sponsorship

Another distinguishable contributing factor to terrorism is state sponsorship. In this context,

state sponsorship is about the providence of training facilities, financial means, and safe havens to

(autonomous) terrorist groups by governments.97 Some consider state sponsorship as such a crucial

aspect, that they perceive it as a clear root cause of terrorism.98 This conclusion however needs

reconsideration. Richardson gives the example of terrorist groups who have been sponsored by Iran:

‘While each of the groups supported by Iran is significantly strengthened by Iranian support, they are

no sense creatures of Iran’.99 Iran – he continues – has its own interest and is therefore using terrorist

groups in achieving those interests. In that context, state sponsored terrorism is to be considered as an

instrument of foreign policies. Logically, in each state sponsored instance, states have capitalised on

pre-existing conflicts rather than providing a root cause itself. Or, to put it in a different terminology,

state sponsorship is certainly contributing to terrorism, but can not be considered as a structural (root)

cause. It however facilitates terrorism importantly: ‘State sponsorship is clearly an enabling factor of

terrorism, giving terrorist groups far greater capacity and lethality than they would have had on their

own’.100

3.3.9 Press freedom in democracies

Another factor that plays an important facilitating role concerning terrorism is press freedom.

After all, terrorism is about causing fear among populations. ‘Press freedom increases the

opportunities for terrorists to be heard and watched by a large audience and hence their ability to

create widespread fear’.101 In states where the freedom of press is not warranted and hence, news flows

are centrally controlled, information about terrorist attacks is less easily spread among populations.

Therefore, press freedom is an important vehicle for terrorists in reaching their goal: causing fear

among as many people as possible.

96 Hippel, 2002, p. 31. 97 Richardson, 2005, State sponsorship – a root cause of terrorism?, in: Root Causes of Terrorism, New York: Routledge, p. 196. 98 Richardson, 2005, p. 191. 99 Richardson, 2005. p. 193. 100 Bjørgo, 2005, p. 257. 101 Li, 2005, p. 282.


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3.3.10 Radical interpretation of religion

By means of the introducing remarks, I made clear that no single religion has a monopoly on

terrorism. I therefore concluded that there must be underlying causes which explain the emergence of

terrorism. However, this notion does not exclude religion from being a factor that could facilitate

terrorism. The main way in which a radical religious version could facilitate terrorism is by validating

and legitimating terrorist attacks. In this way, religion is an attendant factor making it ‘easier’ to turn

to terrorist matters. It is a facilitating factor, which – under certain circumstances – could lead to

terrorism. Bjørgo phrases this pithily by stating that extremist ideologies can certainly explain

terrorism, ‘[…] although people usually adopt such extremist ideologies as a consequence of more

fundamental political or personal reasons’.102

An important matter related to the foregoing is the notion Post stresses: ‘In contrast to social-

revolutionary and national-separatist terrorists, for religious fundamentalist extremist groups, the

decision-making role of the pre-eminent leader is of central importance. For these true-believers, the

radical cleric is seen as the authentic interpreter of God’s word, not only eliminating any ambivalence

about killing, but endowing the destruction of the defined enemy with sacred significance’.103 So, a

religious leader is able to justify terrorist acts even further. There is no ambivalence concerning the use

of violence because of the hierarchical structure of religious terrorist groups: ‘[…] the radical cleric

provides interpretation of the religious text justifying violence, which is uncritically accepted by his

true believer followers […]’.104

3.4 Conceptual model

In the preceding section, I presented several origins of terrorism as identified in academic

research. Every factor described explains in some way the emergence of terrorism. However, with

regard to my research, these identified factors are not satisfactory useful yet because of two reasons.

First, not every factor is levelled at the same ‘order’. Some factors describe a fairly specific occurrence

(for example education), while others cover a very broad phenomenon (like the processes of

globalisation and modernisation). Partly because of that, there exists some overlap between the

identified factors. For example, at this moment, democracy is used to describe around three or four

different aspects. In other words, it is difficult to make a clear distinction between the identified

factors. This hampers a decent analysis of the international anti-terrorism strategies of the USA and

the Netherlands, because it becomes impossible to validly compare these factors. Therefore, this

section modifies the factors as identified above. It will do so by restructuring the factors to the same

102 Bjørgo, 2005, p. 259. 103 Post, 2005, The social-cultural underpinnings of terrorist psychology: ‘When hatred is bred in the bone’, in: Root Causes of Terrorism, New York: Routledge, p. 58. 104 Ditto.


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‘order’ and by removing overlap, thereby creating distinguishable origins of terrorism. This will result

in the construction of a conceptual model that is better suited for comparison.

Before I elaborate on the contents of the conceptual model, it is of pivotal importance to

discuss the purpose of it first. The following model is by no means a definitive model. It does in no

way claim to be the termination of academic research concerning the origins of terrorism. This model

only presents a description of the works of others. I merely modified the existing views of academic

researchers, thereby restructuring the literature in a way that it suits this study. In short, this conceptual

model is by no means a universal model embracing every conceivable factor relating to terrorism, but

is just a structural reproduction of existing research.

In making such a modification of available literature, three phases will be distinguished. The

first phase deals with the structural causes that explain the emergence of terrorism. The second phase

concerns the radicalisation process in which people become increasingly convinced that terrorist

methods are warranted. The third and final phase is about those factors which make it likely that a

terrorist attack will actually occur. The complete conceptual model is graphically reflected in a causal

model presented in annex 1.

3.4.1 Phase 1: structural social conditions

Phase 1 deals with several distinguishable structural causes which can be considered as the

underlying conditions that explain the emergence of terrorism. I shall successively treat absolute

poverty, relative poverty, political voice, political oppression, dissimilarity of power, the diminishment

of traditional social patters, and finally education. These causes can be divided in three clusters: the

first two belong to an economic cluster, the next three causes to a political cluster, and finally the last

two to a social cluster. Below I will treat every single cause separately.

3.4.1.1 Absolute poverty

Despite the lack of academic evidence that suggests a relationship between poverty and

terrorism, that connection will again be treated here. While it is plausible to reject poverty as being a

cause of terrorism, it could be that policy-makers nevertheless stress that terrorism stems from

poverty. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish this factor once more.

Within scientific literature, scientists use poverty to describe two distinguishable factors which

I call ‘absolute poverty’ and ‘relative poverty’. This subsection deals with the former. Absolute

poverty is about those who live below the poverty line. Such people have to deal with circumstances in

which they have no guarantee for economic subsistence. In this way, these people form a vulnerable

group because of their dependence on certain organisations. For example, it is likely that such groups

come in contact with charity organisations providing aid poor people need for survival. While such

organisations can provide a stable living, at the same time, some of them espouse a radical agenda


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trough their aid. In this way, impoverished people come in contact with certain organisations and their

radical ideas. An example that illustrates the vulnerability of impoverished people would be the

dependence on so-called Quranic madrasas. People who live in absolute poverty are not financially

able to send their children to regular schools. Impoverished people are thereby dependent on these

madrasas for education, the more so since these hard-line Quranic, in which children become

penetrated by a certain version of Islam that justifies and glorifies violent jihad schools, are often free

to join. So, in short, absolute poverty creates a situation of dependency in which people are

increasingly susceptible to radical (recruiting) terrorist groups.

3.4.1.2 Relative poverty

Relative poverty deals with something different. That is, some scholars have considered

poverty in relation and comparison to others. In that way, it is irrelevant if one is able to guarantee

itself survival. Relative poverty is about the economic equality between groups of people. If people

perceive significant inequalities of wealth, and accordingly perceive their situation as increasingly

unacceptable, this is likely to result in feelings of frustration and anger. In this way, relative poverty is

an underlying factor stimulating a process of radicalisation. Eventually, when such people see no other

way out, they can step up and employ the ‘weapon of the weak’. I now turn to the political cluster of

the conceptual model.

3.4.1.3 Political voice

This subsection deals with the main argumentation as explained by the subject of democracy.

Researchers have stressed that democracy can both increase and decrease the likelihood of terrorist

occurrences. However, like explained, the argumentation that is at the basis of this observation can be

considered the same. Such argumentation is covered by the notion of ‘political voice’. Political voice

is about the existing democratic opportunities people get offered, i.e. the extent to which people are

able to express themselves politically. The ability of political voice is a way to gain influence, a way to

have a say in the running of one’s country. Such does not only generate political relief, political

expression also provides people an opportunity to seek resources to their (political) grievances.105 In

this way, political voice induces the formation of responsive governments, which are likely to produce

desirable social outcomes. In short, political voice offers opportunities to address preferences and

grievances, thereby increasing satisfaction and political efficacy. By expressing oneself politically,

non-violent resolution of political conflict can be brought about. In that way, the need to reach for

violent methods in order to have a say in the running of one’s countries decreases. Or, to put it

105 Li, 2005, p. 280.


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inversely: ‘If the opportunities for political involvement are limited, terrorism may appear to

extremists as the only viable means of communication or influence’.106

3.4.1.4 Political oppression

Political oppression is another distinguishable cause of terrorism that is covered by the general

notion of democracy. Political oppression is about the relationship between the individual (or a certain

group) and the government. Oppressed people are those that cannot live their lives without inference

from the state. Civil liberties are of a crucial aspect here because these determine the amount of

freedom individuals have in society. Freedom of speech, religion, association, and assembly are a few

of the main liberties that create personal views and autonomy and determine the rights individuals

posses vis-à-vis the state. Political oppression leads to a state of affairs where people are pushed to

situations in which they see no way out. This result in frustration and anger, which in turn underlie a

process of radicalisation. In situations where people cannot live their lives in freedom because of

constant interference of the state, to these people, terrorist methods may seem the only way to change

their situation.

The notion of political oppression is clearly connected to the one of political voice. That is,

civil liberties are of fundamental importance in democratic societies, since they provide the necessary

space to develop alternative views and ideas in order to express one’s preferences. In this way, a lack

of civil liberties contributes to the inability of expression, which, as explained, in turn contributes to

the emergence of terrorism.

3.4.1.5 Dissimilarity of power

This factor is closely related to the preceding one. However, whereas the previous subsection

treated political oppression, this one concerns situations of power inequality, which do not necessarily

have to result in oppression. The argumentation is very similar to that of relative poverty. That is, the

subsection about relative poverty dealt with economic inequality as a factor that could lead to anger

and frustration. It is likely that the same argumentation holds concerning situations in which one

perceives dissimilarities of power. Situations of political, economic, or cultural dominance could lead

people to perceive themselves as increasingly marginalised. In unbalanced situations, when a certain

group is able of making decisions by its own at the cost of others, such could lead people, when other

options are absent, to turn to violent methods. Bjørgo puts this notion pithily: ‘When local or

international powers possess an overwhelming power compared to oppositional groups, and the latter

see no other realistic ways forward their cause by normal political or military means, ‘asymmetrical

warfare’ can represent a tempting option’.107 In short, when people see no other way out to end a

106 Malečková, 2005, p. 41. 107 Bjørgo, 2005, p. 259.


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situation of inequality, they can eventually step up and employ the ‘weapon of the weak’. I now turn to

the social cluster of the conceptual model.

3.4.1.6 Education

Within scientific research, education is often put forward in explaining terrorism. However, in

doing so, researchers make use of different arguments. Like explained, there is some dispute about the

causal direction between education and terrorism. To structure the relationship between education and

terrorism, one can distinguish between two different categories. The first category is about situations

in which people are under-educated or not educated at all. Like explained, in such situations, children

will not learn the practical skills necessary to be equipped for work in society. In other words, when

people do not have chances to follow decent education, they lack the skills necessary to make a decent

living. In this way, a lack of education is an underlying cause contributing to absolute poverty, which

in turn could lead to recruitment and terrorism.

One could accordingly state that proper education reduces the likelihood of terrorism.

However, the second category is about those who have been decently educated, but are nonetheless

jobless. Schmid stresses that – in such situations – terrorist methods are quite attractive to highly

educated young men: ‘When they see no solution to their situation in the prevailing political and social

circumstances, they become more susceptible to the false promises of those who favour terrorist

methods to bring about social and political change’.108 A connection to the notion of relative poverty

becomes clear from this. That is, it seems likely to accept that the relationship between relative

poverty and terrorism is stronger when the level of education is higher. After all, those that have

followed decent specific education will probably have greater prospects of their future. If those people

nevertheless have to face a situation of economic inequality, such is to be considered as intensifying

the relationship between relative poverty and terrorism.

3.4.1.7 Diminishment of traditional social patterns

The preceding section dealt with the processes of globalisation and modernisation as factors

that contribute to terrorism. One can however not state that these processes cause radicalisation and

terrorism. That is, both globalisation and modernisation cover so many phenomena that the

identification of these processes as a cause of terrorism is not sufficient distinctive. With regard to this

research, the relevance of these processes lies in their changing character. Like explained, with

modernisation and globalisation come changes in economic, social, and political structures.

Modernisation for example brings ideas about individualism, secularism, and developments in

108 Schmid, 2005, p. 228.


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technology. Thereby, ‘[…] globalisation and modernisation can place societies and political systems

under great stress’.109

More specifically, the changing character of both globalisation and modernisation could lead

to the diminishment of traditional socials patterns. After all, it is for good reason that Touraine has

described modernisation ‘[…] as being in opposition to and representing a break from tradition’.110

When traditional certainties fall apart, one could start feeling alienated and estranged. Alienation from

traditional values and certainties may well be felt as threatening to one’s identity. Such a situation can

make people to reach for other certainties to identify with. These could for example be found in radical

Islam, which provides clear prescribed practices and responsibilities. Bjørgo phrases this pithily by

stating that when ‘[…] traditional norms and social patterns crumble or are made to seem irrelevant,

new radical ideologies (sometimes based on religion and/or nostalgia for a glorious past) may become

attractive to certain segments of society’.111 In other words, alienation – produced by the diminishment

of traditional social patters – is likely to contribute to people’s susceptibility for radical ideas of

terrorist recruiters.

3.4.2 Phase 2: the development of potential terrorists

This section deals with the second phase of the conceptual model and is about the

development of potential terrorists. That is, this phase centres on the process of radicalisation, i.e. the

process in which people become convinced that terrorist methods are warranted, and thereby

increasingly prepared to commit terrorist attacks. There are three contributing factors to be

distinguished in this phase which explain terrorism: the radicalisation of individuals, the organisation

of terrorist groups, and finally, alternative organisations that perform a facilitating role. This

separation is a theoretical one, used to comprehend the process of radicalisation. In reality, the

distinguished factors have common characteristics and a delimitated distinction between them is

therefore not present. I shall now turn to the separate treatment of each of these three factors.

3.4.2.1 Individual radicalisation

By means of phase 1, I have merely distinguished several structural causes that are at the basis

of terrorism. These causes do however not directly cause terrorism, but are to be considered as

underlying factors that can stimulate a process of radicalisation. This subsection deals with that

process. One could define radicalisation as the phenomenon by which certain individuals holding

certain points of view, opinions and ideas may be led to commit terrorist acts.112 Two aspects become

clear from this definition. First, radicalisation refers to views, opinions, and ideas, i.e. a certain

ideology. Within the process of radicalisation, people come in contact with such ideas, in this case a 109 Lutz & Lutz, 2005, p. 16. 110 Kivisto, 2004, Key Ideas in Sociology, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc., p. 122. 111 Bjørgo, 2005, p. 258. 112 Definition is presented by the information service of the European Union SCADPlus.


36

particular view on Islam. Roughly, there are two ways in which radical Islam channels the process of

radicalisation. Firstly, researchers have stressed that radical Islam can provide meaning to one’s life.

Especially those that struggle with identity problems are likely to be susceptible to a radical version of

Islam. That is, by associating with such radical ideas, these people assure themselves of another self-

image. Radical Islam provides for example the idea that one can find its identity in ‘pure Islam’, by

living like ‘pure Muslims’, according to outlined prescriptions. Subsequently, researchers have

identified a second way in which radical Islam channels individual radicalisation. Radical Islam – and

radical ideologies in general – can seriously lower the bar for turning to violent measures because it

can provide religious justification, legitimation and glorification. In scientific research, the

legitimation of terrorism is phrased in several ways such as ‘divine validation’113, ‘theological

justification’114, ‘the authority of religion giving moral legitimacy’115, or the ‘justifying of

atrocities’116. Radicalisation is about the increasing faith one has in a certain ideology and its

justification aspect.

3.4.2.2 Terrorist organisation

The second aspect that becomes clear from the presented definition of radicalisation is that this

process occurs prior to terrorism. Radicalisation does not necessarily have to lead to terrorism, but it

could at worst do so. Radicalisation could well lead to situations in which people consider violent

methods as completely legitimised and are subsequently willing to commit terrorist attacks. This is the

point in which people can no longer be considered a faithful follower of a particular version of Islam,

but as people wanting to use ruthless violence, i.e. as terrorists. Such people are likely to establish an

organisation with kindred persons, or to join already existing groups that adopt terrorist methods.

Again, such people have become fully radicalised, and will – if the circumstances are there – commit

new-style terrorist attacks. While I treat this factor among those listed under phase 2, it actually

belongs to the grey area between the second and the third phase. After all, phase 2 is about the

developing process of radicalisation, while ‘terrorist organisation’ deals with those groups that can

radicalise no further since they consider terrorist attacks already completely legitimate, or even

necessary.

Until now, I merely stressed the possible relationship between individual radicalisation and the

organisation of terrorist groups. However, a reversed relationship is also likely to exist. People do for

example never become completely radicalised by one’s own. Those that already are completely

convinced of a certain ideology will persuade people that are not. By using recruiting methods,

terrorist organisations are in that respect likely to have influence on the individual radicalisation

process. 113 Sahar Mohammad, 2005, p. 105. 114 Howell, 2003, p. 178. 115 Juergensmeyer, 2003, p. 186. 116 Bjørgo, 2005, p. 258.


37

3.4.2.3 Alternative organisations

While there are often other fundamental causes that are at the basis of the emergence of

terrorism, certain organisations can play an important role in encouraging and stimulating people to

become radicalised. Some scholars made this for example clear by discussing absolute poverty as a

cause of terrorism. They stressed that those that depend on aid for economic subsistence are more

likely to be susceptible for certain recruiting organisations preaching a radical version of Islam. The

same argumentation applies to the subsection about the diminishment of traditional social patterns.

Those that alienate because of an erosion of traditional certainties could become more susceptible to

those groups advocating radical ideologies in order to obtain some sort of identity. Another example

would be the Quranic madrasas in which children become penetrated by a certain version of Islam that

justifies and glorifies violent jihad. When one repeatedly hears a certain ideology without getting

offered any alternative, such can become an important cause of terrorism. In general, scholars have

stressed that organisations preaching radical ideologies can be considered as important vehicles in

recruiting and radicalising people. However, again, radical ideologies offered by such alternative

organisations are to be considered as an intermediate cause. That is, people usually embrace such

ideologies as a result of more fundamental structural causes.

Again, relationships to the other factors in this phase exist. For example, in the course of time,

certain alternative organisations could develop in such way that they transform to terrorist

organisations. The rise of Hamas can be explained in this way, since that organisation was formerly a

charity organisation operating in the Palestinian territories, establishing hospitals, education systems,

and social services. In general, it seems likely that each of the three distinguished factors relate in

some way to one another. The separation between the factors in this phase is, as already explained, to a

certain extent an artificial one, not completely in line with reality. For example, terrorist organisations

can also provide aid or education like alternative organisation do, and certain people of alternative

organisation are radicalised in such way that they are to be considered terrorist, willing to apply

terrorist methods.

3.4.3 Phase 3: development of a terrorist attack

This third and final phase deals with the facilitating causes that are distinguished in academic

research. Whereas the first two phases dealt with structural causes leading up to radicalisation and

with the radicalisation process as such, this phase is merely about those factors which make it likely

that a terrorist attack will actually occur. That is, this phase deals with the majority of those factors

that researchers have considered facilitating. Again, I shall treat each factor separately.


38

3.4.3.1 Openness of victim societies

In the preceding section, I stressed that scholars often elaborate on state structure as a factor

that influences the likelihood of terrorist occurrences. According to these researchers, democratic

states in general face more trouble in combating terrorism. Like explained, open (democratic) societies

are hampered in their range of anti-terrorism policies compared to close authoritarian societies. That

is, circumscribing terrorists would restrict liberties for societies as a whole, a result which is often

considered unacceptable. To put it shortly like Crenshaw did: ‘[the] desire to protect civil liberties

constrains security matters’.117 In general, the level of ‘openness’ of the potential country of assault is

likely to facilitate the perpetration of a terrorist attack. Take for example the extent to which news

disseminates. Such can be considered larger when a society is ‘open’ because open societies are in

general more likely to respect press freedom and reject censorship. Such large-scale dissemination of

news and information is likely to facilitate terrorism, since it enables terrorist to achieve their objective

to create widespread fear. In short, the level of openness of societies is a distinguishable factor, likely

to facilitate terrorism.

3.4.3.2 ICT and transportation technology

As explained, this research focuses on new-style terrorism. One should realise that a

fundamental process lies at the basis of new terrorism: ‘globalisation’. That is, a world that has not

undergone the process of globalisation would be one without new-style terrorism. In this context,

Giddens stresses that […] ‘new-style terrorism is made possible by the changes in communications

technology that are driving globalisation […]’.118 Such technology provides terrorists for example the

ability to set-up a transnational network organisation, capable of immediate and straight

communication. ICT technology also increases terrorists’ opportunity to create far-reaching fear across

populations. After all, Internet, television, and the like, provide direct and widespread information

about possible attacks. Besides communications technology, transportation technology is another

important facilitating factor of new-style terrorism. In the first place, this enables terrorists to move

quickly around the globe. Moreover, it provides terrorists an opportunity to cause mass damage, like

revealed on the 11th of September when two airplanes crashed in the World Trade Centre. According

to Kegley, the contemporary world is ‘[…] a hospitable environment for the practice of terrorist tactics

and contributed to the transformation of terrorism from an subnational instrument of political change

to one whose methods now almost invariably and inescapably transcend national borders’.119 In short,

ICT and transportation technologies are both causes that enormously facilitate terrorist practices.

117 Crenshaw, 1981, p. 383. 118 Giddens, 2006, p. 885. 119 Kegley, 2003, p. 8.


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3.4.3.3 State sponsorship

The subject of state sponsorship in the preceding section does not need great modification.

Researchers made clear that the sponsorship of terrorism is to be considered as an enabling cause of

terrorism, i.e. as facilitating. Sponsorship can take several forms, such as providing financial means

and safe havens. Furthermore, it would be fair to range the factor ‘failed states’ with state sponsorship.

After all, like already stressed, by their inability to exercise territorial control, failed states provide a

power vacuum terrorist organisations may exploit to maintain safe havens.120 To my concern, such

inability of failed states can be considered as indirect sponsoring.

3.5 Conclusion

Based on prevalent research, this chapter dealt with the origins of jihadistic terrorism. In

section three, I explored the academic literature that is available on this subject. Researchers have

presented divergent factors that in a way explain the emergence of terrorism. Such factors could either

be considered as structural or as facilitating. The fact that these factors could not be regarded

sufficiently distinctive because there existed some overlap between them, turned out to be problematic.

Therefore, in section four, I restructured these factors, thereby building a conceptual model in which I

identified distinguishable and comparable causes of terrorism. The purpose of this model is by no

means to present a definitive model. Instead, I merely created a reproduction of existing academic

research, modified in a way that it fits the purpose of this study.

The conceptual model consists of three phases. The first phase deals with structural underlying

conditions that explain the emergence of terrorism. These conditions can roughly be divided in three

different clusters: a political, a economic, and a social one. In the second phase, I elaborated on the

process of radicalisation, i.e. the process in which people become increasingly prepared to apply

terrorist methods. I distinguished between two ways which could channel the individual radicalisation

process. That is, radical Islam can both provide increasing religious legitimisation for terrorist

methods and can provide meaning to life for those people that feel alienated. In the third and final

phase I discussed the causes that make it likely that a terrorist attack will actually occur, i.e. factors

that facilitate terrorism.

3.6 Closing off

Reason for creating a conceptual model in which several comparable causes are identified is

because of structuralising purposes. After all, the following two chapters will deal with an exploration

of the origins of terrorism as presented by the USA and the Netherlands. In order to provide a

structural analysis of both countries, a model like presented here is of pivotal importance. By using

this conceptual consisting of comparable origins of terrorism, I am better able to place the analyses as

120 Bjørgo, 2005, p. 258.


40

presented by the USA and the Netherlands. I shall do so by converting the origins both countries bring

forward in their strategies to the distinguished causes of the model. In both Chapter 3 and 4, I shall

devote a separate section which deals with such conversion, thereby enabling a valid comparison

between the Netherlands and the USA. In that way, this chapter is to be considered of crucial concern

since it determines the quality of the following parts of this research. Chapter 5 shall deal with an

analysis of the proposed measures of the Netherlands. I shall however firstly turn to the analysis of

USA’s international anti-terrorism strategy.


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Chapter 4: The USA 4.1 Introduction

This chapter will deal with the international anti-terrorism strategy of the USA. The purpose of

this chapter is twofold. Firstly, I will describe what kind of measures the USA proposes in its fight

against international terrorism. In doing this, I will make use of the five pillar strategy the Bush

Administration has constructed. This strategy is laid down in the so-called ‘White House Counter-

terrorism Reports’. The report which is of largest relevance for this research is the ‘National Strategy

for Combating Terrorism’ (2003 and 2006). As the Bush Administration puts it: ‘[…] the National

Strategy for Combating Terrorism focuses on identifying and defusing threats before they reach our

borders’.121 This document is to be considered as the main strategy in the USA’s fight against

international terrorism. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is backed up by several other

relating documents, like ‘The National Security Strategy’. This Strategy has a broader nature in that it

deals with other security dangers besides terrorism. However, it may be clear that – since 9/11 –

(international) terrorism poses the biggest threat to security. Therefore, this document is also of

importance with regard to this research. Furthermore, two evaluation documents will be taken into

account in determining USA’s strategy towards international terrorism: the ‘Progress Report on the

Global War on Terrorism’ and ‘9/11 Five Years Later: Successes and Challenges’. Finally, I will make

use of three different speeches of president Bush, held on different points in time: one just after the

attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon (September the 20th, 2001), the other two more

recently (October the 6th 2005, and September the 5th 2006). The second objective of this chapter is to

identify which origins of terrorism the USA distinguishes in its anti-terrorism strategy. That is, I will

attempt to uncover on which analysis of the origins of terrorism this strategy is based. Thereby, I try to

find out in which way the USA legitimises the measures it proposes for fighting international

terrorism. So, in short, the objective of this chapter is on the one hand to describe which anti-terrorism

measures the USA proposes in its fight against international terrorism, and on the other hand to

identify which analysis of the origins of terrorism is at the basis of those measures.

4.2 What is the USA fighting?

Whilst the focus of this research – jihadistic terrorism – has been stressed several times, it does

not make clear what the USA recognises by that. It could be that the USA and the Netherlands fight a

different kind of terrorism, or have their focus on different kinds of terrorism. Therefore, it is relevant

to determine the terrorists threat the American anti-terrorism measures are aimed at.

To begin with, in its National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the Bush Administration puts

forward a definition of terrorism: ‘[…] premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated

121 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, p. 2.


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against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents’.122 The USA makes clear

that it is primarily fighting jihadistic terrorism by stating that the ‘[…] terrorist enemies exploit Islam

to serve a violent political version. Fueled by a radical ideology [they want to] establish regimes that

rule according to a violent and intolerant distortion of Islam’.123 Subsequently, the USA recognises the

notion of ‘new-style terrorism’ like I did the second chapter: ‘While terrorism is not new, today’s

terrorist threat is different from that of the past. Modern technology has enabled terrorists to plan and

operate worldwide as never before’.124 In other words, the USA recognises that the terrorists they are

fighting are different from others because of their global reach and objectives. Furthermore, the Bush

Administration identifies another characterising aspect of today’s terrorism by stating that the terrorist’

threat is a flexible, transnational network structure characterised by loose interconnectivity.125 In short,

the USA recognises the characterising aspects of new-style terrorism as identified in the second

chapter.

More specifically, the Bush Administration is quite clear about the identification of the

terrorist’ threat by stating that the enemy is Al-Qaeda. However: ‘[…] the enemy we face today in the

War on Terror is not the same enemy we faced on September 11. […] Today, the principal terrorist

enemy confronting the United States is a transnational movement of extremist organisations, networks,

and individuals – and their state and non-state supporters – which have in common that they exploit

Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends’.126

4.3 USA’s strategy: two different battles

Anti-terrorism measures have developed rapidly since the 11th of September 2001. Most

American policy documents concerning terrorism start with the atrocities that occurred on 9/11. The

message behind this is to remember the fact that America is fighting a War on Terror: ‘America is at

war. This is a wartime national security strategy required by the grave challenge we face – the rise of

terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully revealed to the American

people on September 11, 2001’.127 Lots of measures in very different fields have developed since,

including the formation of an entire new department (Department of Homeland Security). A look at

the budget reveals that – only concerning homeland security – terrorism has gained enormous

attention: it raised from $9 billion in 2000 to $32 billion in 2005.

Before getting in the details of the international anti-terrorism measures the USA conducts,

one should recognise the ultimate goal that is behind these measures. To the Bush Administration,

defending the home country is of primary importance. Such is made clear by stating that the ‘[...] U.S.

government has no more important mission than protecting the homeland from future terrorist 122 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, p. 1. 123 Ditto. 124 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, p. 10. 125 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, p. 8. 126 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, p. 5. 127 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, p. i.


43

attacks’.128 Although the protection of the homeland is USA’s main objective, this does not imply that

homeland security measures (such as border controls, extensive security checks in official building,

etc.) is all that counts. On the contrary: ‘The United States can no longer simply rely on deterrence to

keep the terrorists at bay or defensive measures to thwart them at the last moment. The fight must be

taken to the enemy, to keep them on the run’.129 In short, to the USA, a good defence does also

concern offensive matters.

In its National Strategy on Combating Terrorism, the Bush Administration distinguishes two

elements in the War in Terror. According the USA, the War on Terror cannot be considered as an

ordinary war like America has experienced in the past. That is, to the USA, this War is not only a

‘battle of arms’, it is also a ‘battle of ideas’: ‘Our strategy also recognises that the War on Terror is a

different kind of war. […] Not only do we fight terrorist enemies on the battlefield, we promote

freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the terrorists’ perverse vision of oppression and

totalitarian rule’.130 The distinction between a battle of arms and ideas is one between respectively

short-term and long-term objectives: in the short-term the USA wants to eliminate terrorists that have

plans of committing terrorist attacks, in the long-term they want to present an alternative to the

terrorists murderous ideology.

4.3.1 The short-term approach: a battle of arms

Like stated, over the short-term, the USA considers the fight against terrorism as a ‘battle of

arms’. Such a battle is necessary to create the space and time for the long-term solution (see below) to

take root. The battle of arms consists of four distinguishable pillars. Like the Bush Administration puts

it: ‘[…] to win the War on Terror, we will […] prevent attacks by terrorist networks (1); deny

weapons of mass destruction to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them (2); deny

terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states (3); deny terrorists control of any nation they would

use as a base and launching for terror (4) […]’.131 Until now, the Bush Administration pays great

attention to the battle of arms. This can be deduced from a speech of president Bush in which he

declares that ‘[…] the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate

it, and destroy it where it grows’.132 A similar conclusion emergences from the National Strategy for

Combating Terrorism. That is, according to the Bush Administration, ‘[…] the best way to defeat

terrorism is to isolate and localise its activities and then destroy it trough intensive, sustained

action’.133 I now turn to the separate treatment of each of the four (short-term) pillars.

4.3.1.1 Prevent attacks by terrorist networks

128 The White House, Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism, September 2003, p. 2. 129 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, p. 8. 130 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, p. 1. 131 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, p. 1. 132 Bush, G.W., Speech of the President of the United States of America: Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20th of September 2001. 133 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, p. 15.


44

The Bush Administration identifies three important ways of preventing attacks by terrorist

networks. In the first place, the USA shall attack terrorists and their capacity to operate. This is of

primary importance since ‘[…] the hard core among our terrorist enemies cannot be reformed or

deterred; they will be tracked down, captured, or killed’.134 By attacking these terrorists, the USA tries

to diminish their capacity to operate effectively, thereby preventing future attacks by terrorist

networks. ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ is by far the most notorious measure taken within this sub-

pillar. The second way in which the Bush Administration tries to prevent future attacks is by denying

terrorists entry to the United States and disrupting their travel internationally. By impeding terrorist

mobility, the USA tries to inhibit their effectiveness. They have introduced several measures in this

field, such as improving border security and visa screening and improving international information

exchange. Finally, the Bush Administration will defend potential targets of attack. The targeting trend

has been away from hardened sites (such as official government facilities) towards softer targets that

can anyway produce mass casualties, economic damage, or both. Therefore, the USA is determined to

deter and disrupt attacks, thereby protecting critical infrastructures and key resources, such as public

health, energy facilities, and banking and finance services.

4.3.1.2 Deny weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to rogue states and terrorist allies

The second pillar that makes up the battle of arms is the one that enjoys great attention of the

Bush Administration. In one of his speeches on the global war on terrorism, Bush declares that ‘[the]

greatest threat this world faces is the danger of extremists and terrorists armed with weapons of mass

destruction […]’.135 Therefore, the USA has taken aggressive steps in order to make sure terrorist

organisations do not have the capability of committing attacks with weapons of mass destruction. The

Bush Administration has come up with a comprehensive approach for addressing WMD. First, the

USA tries to determine intentions, capabilities and plans to develop or acquire WMD. Furthermore,

they try to deny, detect, and disrupt access to materials, expertise, and other enabling capacities

required to develop WMD. Subsequently, the USA deters terrorists from employing WMD. If these

attempts do not sort out any effect and the possibility of an attack by weapons of mass destruction

against the United States has been detected, the Bush Administration is determined to ‘[…] contain,

interdict, and eliminate the threat’.136 The invasion of Iraq – starting on the 20th of March 2003 –

showed that the USA is indeed willing to adopt aggressive measures in order to deny weapons of mass

destruction to rogue states. In its National Security Strategy, the Bush Administration again declared

that it will not exclude future military force: ‘Taking action need not involve military force. […] If

134 Ditto. 135 Bush, G.W., Speech of the President of the United States of America: President Discusses Global War on Terror, 5th of September 2006. 136 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, p. 14-15.


45

necessary however, under long-standing principle of self defense, we do not rule out the use of force

before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack’.137

4.3.1.3 Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states

The Bush Administration is determined to thwart states that support terrorist organisation in

every way they can. The USA considers states that support terrorists as equally guilty to murder: ‘The

United States and its allies and partners in the War on Terror make no distinction between those who

commit acts of terror and those who support and harbour terrorists. Any government that chooses to be

an ally of terror has chosen to be an enemy of freedom, justice, and peace’.138 At the moment, the USA

recognises five state sponsors of terrorism: Iran, Syria, Sudan, North-Korea, and Cuba. The Bush

Administration is determined to maintain sanction against these nations and promote their

international isolation until they give up their efforts of supporting terrorist organisations. In that way,

the USA is trying to end the support of states to terrorists as a whole. Furthermore, according the Bush

Administration: ‘[until] we can eliminate state sponsorship of terror, we will disrupt and deny the flow

of support from states to terrorists’.139 Iraq is a good example of what the USA thinks that needs to be

done in order to stop the support of states to terrorists. ‘Trough Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United

States and its coalition partners defeated Saddam Hussein’s regime, effectively eliminating a state

sponsor of terrorism […]’.140 Thereby, the USA has eliminated Iraq as a sanctuary for the Abu Musab

al-Zarqawi network, which helped to establish a training camp in the northern-eastern part of the

country.

4.3.1.4 Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a launching pad for terror

Finally, with regard to the battle of arms, the removal of so-called ‘safe havens’ is of

importance in War on Terror as well. To put it literally: ‘Our terrorist enemies are striving to claim a

strategic country as a haven for terror. From this base, they could destabilise the Middle-East and

stroke America and other free nations with ever-increasing violence’.141 The USA aims at the removal

of such states, so that terrorists are not provided with areas in which that they can prepare and organise

their acts. Again, Iraq can act as an example here: ‘[…] along with our Coalition and the Iraqi

government, we’ll stop the terrorists from taking control of Iraq, and establishing a new safe haven

from which to attack America and the free world’.142 Also Afghanistan illustrates this pillar, since the

USA has ‘[…] deprived Al-Qaeda of safe haven in Afghanistan and helped a democratic government

to rise in its place.’

137 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, p. 23. 138 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, p. 15. 139 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, p. 16. 140 The White House, Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism, September 2003, p. 5. 141 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, p. 16. 142 Bush, G.W., Speech of the President of the United States of America: President Discusses Global War on Terror, 5th of September 2006.


46

Within this pillar, the Bush Administration distinguishes between four different kinds of

launching pads: physical safe havens (geographic territories with for example weak government

control), legal safe havens (legal systems in which effective investigation, prosecution, and extradition

of terrorists is hampered), cyber safe havens (making use of the internet to disseminate propaganda,

recruit new members, raise and transfer funds, etc.), and finally, financial safe havens (fiscal

sanctuaries in which terrorists store and transfer funds). Measures on all these fields are necessary in

fighting terrorism. That is, not only the establishment of firm control in certain areas in of importance

in order to deny physical safe havens, one should also modify legal systems in a way that it makes it

easier to deal with terrorists, deny the internet to terrorists, and secure banking systems.

4.3.2 The long-term approach: a battle of ideas

In the long run, the War on Terrorism is a battle between very different ideologies, and is also

considered as the fifth pillar of the strategy for fighting terrorism. Just as with its short-term approach,

the Bush Administration is very clear and straightforward about its long-term approach as well: ‘The

long-term solution for winning the War on Terror is the advancement of freedom and human dignity

trough effective democracy’.143 According the USA, terrorism will end if a decently functioning

democracy is present. Roughly, the USA distinguishes two manners to establish this: by ensuring

internal stability and external stability. Internal stability can be ensured in different ways. First of all,

an effective democracy includes returning elections: ‘Elections are the most visible sign of a free

society and can play a critical role in advancing democracy’.144 The primary function of elections is to

establish a responsive government, one that listens and submits to the will of the people. But – as the

Bush Administration continues – elections alone are not enough. In a broad sense, democracy is about

honouring and upholding basic human rights, including freedom of religion, conscience, speech,

assembly, association, and press. In this way, democracies are protectors of freedom, limiting the

reach of others – including governments – on people’s lives. Furthermore, effective democracies

maintain order within their borders. That is, democracies are able of addressing causes of conflict

peacefully, can punish crime, and can resist corruption. In other words, the system of democracy

makes sure that jurisdictions are decently governed and that it can function properly. External stability

is the second way which helps in ending terrorism. That is, by establishing a democratic system, one

avoids weak or failed states that become a sanctuary for terrorism and thereby constitute a source of

international instability.145 To the USA, democracies are the most responsible members of the

international system. By establishing democracy, the Bush Administration aims at creating a political

system that lives up to its international responsibilities.

143 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, p. 9. 144 Ditto. 145 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, p. 23.


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4.4 USA’s analysis: the origins of terrorism

Until now, I outlined the international anti-terrorism measures as the USA proposes. In this

section I turn to the next objective of this chapter by describing the underlying conditions that are at

the basis of USA’s international anti-terrorism strategy. That is, this part of research will be used to

investigate USA’s view towards the origins of terrorism: according to the Bush Administration, what

are the factors that give rise to terrorism, i.e. what causes terrorism? Such underlying conditions are

not always explicitly put forward in the policy documents of the USA. Sometimes, I have to deduce

such arguments from the actual measures proposed. This part of research will again be divided in two

parts: one that deals with the short-term approach and one that deals with the approach in the long-

term.

4.4.1 Underlying conditions of ‘the battle of arms’

This subsection will deal with two underlying factors that are at the basis of USA’s short-term

strategy: evil and civilisation, and the support from rogue states.

4.4.1.1 Evil and civilisation

USA’s view towards terrorism is unambiguous: ‘The hard core among our terrorist enemies

cannot be reformed or deterred; they will be tracked down, captured, or killed.146 To the Bush

Administration, these terrorists are ‘evil’, people at the wrong side. This notion is one which Bush

explained several times in his speeches. To name just a few: ‘The question is: Will we listen? Will we

pay attention to what these evil men say?’147, or: ‘History teaches that underestimating the words of

evil and ambitious men is a terrible mistake.’148, or: ‘Recently our country observed the fourth

anniversary of a great evil […]’149, or, finally: ‘They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in

countries around the world to plot evil and destruction.’150 According to the USA, these evil men are

united because they share an ideology consisting of oppression, violence, hate, and fear. They are an

enemy that do not recognise peaceful coexistence with those that do not subscribe their vision and

tolerate no alternative points of view. To the USA, terrorist methods are used by evil men who cannot

be reformed or persuaded. No further underlying causes are put forward by the Bush Administration

when it comes to the short-term approach of terrorism. Therefore, the Bush Administration states that

the fight must be taken to the enemy in order to keep terrorists on the run. Apparently, to the USA,

terrorism is something that exists, and to keep terrorists on the run is the only way to prevent future

terrorist occurrences. The solution to terrorism in the short-term is to eliminate it, either by capturing

146 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, p. 11. 147 Bush, G.W., Speech of the President of the United States of America: President Discusses Global War on Terror, 5th of September 2006. 148 Ditto. 149 Bush, G.W., Speech of the President of the United States of America: President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy, 6th of October 2005. 150 Bush, G.W., Speech of the President of the United States of America: Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20th of September 2001.


48

or killing. Or, like already stated, ‘[…] the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is

to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it wherever it grows’.151

In this line of reasoning, the Bush Administration has repeatedly stated that – no matter what

the conditions might be – acts of terrorism are uncivilised, and that in particular the attack of 9/11 was

one against the very idea of civilised society.152 To put it literally: ‘[…] we have made clear that any

government that chooses to be an ally of terror has also chosen to be an enemy of civilisation’.153

According to the Bush Administration, the War on Terror is a clash between civilisation and those

who want to destroy it.154

4.4.1.2 Support from rogue states and safe havens

The second origin of terrorism the USA distinguishes concerns the support from rogue states.

That is, two out of four of USA’s short-term approach pillars deal with some kind of state support.

With regard to the third pillar, which is about the denial of terrorist support and sanctuary from rogue

states, the Bush Administration considers state sponsors as a critical resource for terrorists. Therefore,

the Bush Administration repeatedly stresses that it makes no distinction between those who commit

acts of terror and those who support and harbour terrorists. The fourth pillar, which deals with the

denial of nations that function as a launching path for terror, is related to the third one, since it deals

with a special kind of support rogue states can grant: safe havens. By distinguishing between four

different kinds of safe havens, the USA appears to see this kind of state support as a critical

contributing factor to terrorism as well. Like already stated in the third chapter of this research, some

have a ‘[…] preference for seeing state sponsorship as such a crucial aspect, if not necessarily the root

cause, of terrorism.155 By identifying state sponsorship as the lifeblood156 of terrorist groups and by

stating that financial support and safe havens are the matters that terrorists need for survival157, USA’s

anti-terrorism strategy is clearly based on such a preference.

In his research, Richardson explicitly turns to the USA by stating that American policy makers

have continued to focus on state sponsorship as a root cause of terrorism. Formerly, it was the Soviet

Union that posed a threat to the USA by sponsoring anti-West terrorist groups. The type of state

support has however changed from Communist to Islamist: ‘Today the threat is perceived to come

from radical Islamic fundamentalists directed by rogue states such as Iraq or Syria rather than

Communists directed by Moscow. The attention on the state continues’.158 According to Richardson,

the reason as to why the USA considers state sponsorship as a root cause of terrorism is threefold. The

first reason Richardson brings forward concerns USA’s simplified view of the world. The USA do not 151 Ditto. 152 The White House, Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism, September 2003, p. 2. 153 Bush, G.W., Speech of the President of the United States of America: President Discusses Global War on Terror, 5th of September 2006. 154 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, p. 29. 155 Richardson, 2005, p. 191 156 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, p. 17. 157 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, p. 8. 158 Richardson, 2005, p. 189


49

eagerly recognise internal complexities of other countries, such as multilateral institutions or nebulous

sub-state movements. Instead, the USA has a ‘[…] preference for perceiving the world in traditional

state-to-state terms with traditional forces such as military […]’.159 Secondly, the USA perceives state

sponsorship as such an important factor because of their concern with weapons of mass destruction:

‘The prevailing fear in the USA is that rogue states will hand over weapons of mass destruction to

terrorists to use against them’.160 The final reason Richardson comes up with has to do with Iraq: ‘For

all the arguments against Saddam Hussein, the only one which called for immediate action was the

link with terrorism’.161 USA’s urge to mobilise support for the war in Iraq resulted in an increasing

focus on state sponsorship as a root cause of terrorism.

The evidence that could be found in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and

related documents points in the same direct as Richardson’s notion. After all, the War on Terrorism

started with the invasion of two states: Afghanistan and – what is contemporary considered to be the

primary battlefield – Iraq. However, some nuances have to be added regarding Richardson’s view.

That is, the Bush Administration has repeatedly stressed that this is a war dissimilar to others: ‘Unlike

conventional enemies, terrorists do not fight on a defined battlefield. They are found throughout the

world, even in countries that are friendly to us’.162 Whilst the USA might have a preference for

perceiving matters in state-to-state terms, such is not entirely true with regard to the War on Terror.

However, USA’s genuine concern of state sponsorship as a root cause of terrorism seems without

dispute.

4.4.2 Underlying conditions of ‘the battles of ideas’

The preceding subsection dealt with distinguishable origins of terrorism the Bush

Administration puts forward in its short-term anti-terrorism strategy. This section deals with the long-

term approach of the USA. Again, my aim is to distinguish underlying factors that according to the

Bush Administration contribute to terrorism. Considering the measures the USA proposes in its long-

term approach, the USA mainly brings democracy-related arguments forward that could explain the

emergence terrorism. However, this section will also concern two other contributing factors: a

murderous ideology, and market economy.

4.4.2.1. Myths according the USA

First of all, the Bush Administration wants to make clear that it does not recognise some

factors which are generally considered as contributing to the emergence of terrorism. To put it literary:

‘To wage the battle of ideas effectively, we must recognise what does and what does not give rise to

159 Richardson, 2005, p. 191 160 Richardson, 2005, p. 190 161 Richardson, 2005, p. 191 162 The White House, 9/11 Five Years Later: Successes and Challenges, September 2006, p. 20.


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terrorism’. 163 First, the Bush Administration stresses that there is no evidence suggesting that poverty

causes terrorism: ‘Terrorism is not the inevitable by-product of poverty. Many of the September 11

hijackers were from middle-class backgrounds, and many terrorist leaders, like bin Laden, are from

privileged upbringings’.164 Subsequently, the USA does not consider terrorism as a result of hostility

to its anti-terrorism measures: ‘The al-Qaida network targeted the United States long before the United

States targeted al-Qaida’.165 Moreover, with special regard to anti-terrorism policy in Iraq, the Bush

Administration clarifies that the USA was attacked on the 11th of September 2001, well before they

toppled the Saddam Hussein regime. Finally, the USA stresses that terrorism is not simply a result of

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: ‘Al-Qaida plotting for the September 11 attacks began in the 1990s,

during an active period in the peace process’.166

4.4.2.2 Democracy: the all-embracing answer

After having elaborated on explanatory myths of terrorism, the Bush Administration continues

by stating four factors that actually give rise to terrorism. To put it literally: ‘The terrorism we

confront today springs from: § Political alienation. Transnational terrorists are recruited from populations with no voice in their own

government and see no legitimate way to promote change in their own country. Without a stake in the

existing order, they are vulnerable to manipulation by those who advocate a perverse political vision based

on violence and destruction.

§ Grievances that can be blamed on others. The failures the terrorists feel and see are blamed both on others

and on perceived injustices from the recent or sometimes distant past. The terrorists’ rhetoric keeps wounds

associated with this past fresh and raw, a potent motivation for revenge and terror.

§ Subcultures of conspiracy and misinformation. Terrorists recruit more effectively from populations whose

information about the world is contaminated by falsehoods and corrupted by conspiracy theories. The

distortions keep alive grievances and filter out facts that would challenge popular prejudices and self-serving

propaganda.

§ An ideology that justifies murder. Terrorism ultimately depends upon the appeal of an ideology that excuses

or even glorifies the deliberate killing of innocents. Islam has been twisted and made to serve an evil end, as

in other times and places other religions have been similarly abused’.167

According the USA, in the long-run, these are the four main factors that give rise to terrorism.

Although these factor are quite diverse in nature, they have in common that each of them could be

countered by the establishment of an effective democracy. According the USA, in place of political

alienation, democracy provides a chance to shape one’s own future. By participating politically, one is

able to determine the future of its country. Voting for example gives people the chance to choose a

163 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, p. 9. 164 Ditto. 165 Ditto. 166 Ditto. 167 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, p. 9-10.


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government near to their preferences. Concerning the second contributing factor the USA

distinguishes, instead of festering grievances, ‘[…] democracy offers the rule of law, the peaceful

resolution of disputes, and the habits of advancing interests trough competition’.168 In this context, the

Bush Administration stresses that promotion of democracy is the most effective measure for conflict

prevention: ‘Effective democracies may still have disputes, but they are equipped to resolve their

differences peacefully […]’.169 With regard to the third distinguished factor, democracy is immune to a

culture of conspiracy, discredit falsehoods and propaganda. That is, democracy provides the freedom

of speech and independent media which are crucial vehicles in producing alternative ideas,

independent from propaganda-makers. And finally, democracy is about valuing and respecting human

dignity, in which murderous ideologies cannot settle. The Bush Administration believes that the

establishment of a democratic system resolves each of these four explaining factors of terrorism.

Therefore, to the USA, the fundamental underlying cause of terrorism is a lack of democracy (and the

matters that spring from such a deficit).

So, in short, to the Bush Administration, democracy is the answer for combating terrorism.

One could accordingly conclude that in decently functioning democracies, terrorism is something that

is absent. The Bush Administration however stresses the possibility that terrorism can also be present

in democratic countries: ‘Democracies are not immune from terrorism. In some democracies, some

ethic or religious groups are unable or unwilling to grasp the benefits of freedom otherwise available

in society’.170 These groups are often referred to as ‘home-grown terrorists’, i.e. terrorism which

developed in (democratic) Western states, like the USA and the Netherlands. Also for these terrorists,

the Bush Administration does not distinguish other possible circumstances that could explain the

emergence of terrorism: ‘Even in these cases, the long-term solution remains deepening the reach of

democracy so that all citizens enjoy its benefits’.171 Clearly, to the USA, a lack of democratic

opportunities is the main origin that is at the basis of terrorism.

4.4.2.3 A murderous ideology

The Bush Administration has repeatedly stressed that the War on Terrorism is a battle of arms

and a battle of ideas. At the same time, they make clear that this war should not be considered as a

conflict between religions: ‘While the War on Terror is a battle of ideas, it is not a battle of

religions’.172 America is not at war with faithful followers of Islam. After all, religions beside Islam

have been similarly abused to make it serve terrorist goals. The same holds here: ‘Islam has been

twisted and made to serve an evil end […]’.173 The problem consists of those who exploit Islam, those

who become so fundamentalist that everyone who is in their eyes a dissident, should die. To the USA, 168 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, p. 10. 169 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, p. 15. 170 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, p. 10. 171 Ditto. 172 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, p. 9. 173 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, p. 10.


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the problem is an ideology that justifies murder. They put this pithily by stating: ‘Terrorism ultimately

depends upon the appeal of an ideology that excuses or even glorifies the deliberate killing of

innocents.’174

4.4.2.4 Market economy

Like stated, the USA does not consider poverty as a (root) cause of terrorism. In its policy

documents, the Bush Administration does however recognise that economic conditions can

nevertheless play a role in explaining terrorism. That is, to the USA, freedom is indivisible: ‘Political,

religious, and economic liberty advance together and reinforce each other. […] Over time, as people

gain control over their economic lives, they will insist on more control over their political […] lives as

well’.175 ‘Economic freedom empowers individuals, and empowered individuals increasingly demand

greater political freedom’.176 In this way, economic freedom reinforces political freedom by expanding

free flows of ideas, limiting the reach of government, and exposure to new ways of thinking and

living.177

To the USA, the way of enhancing such economic prosperity is by seizing the opportunities

the globalised world provides: ‘Globalisation presents many opportunities. Much of the world’s

prosperity and improved living standards in recent years derive from the expansion of global trade,

investment, information, and technology’.178 Therefore, the USA is severely opposed to protectionism

and favouritism. Instead, they want to promote the ‘[…] enduring vision of a global economy that

welcomes all participants and encourages the voluntary exchange of goods and services based on

mutual benefit […]’.179 According the Bush Administration, they have been a leader in promoting

economic globalisation. They have for example worked to create open markets and integrate the global

economy trough launching the Doha Development Agenda. As a result, the global economy is more

open and free, and many people around the world have seen their lives improved in terms of economic

prosperity.180

4.5 Translation to conceptual model

Until now, this chapter has dealt with two objectives. I firstly described the proposed anti-

terrorism measures of the USA. I noticed that among these measures, one can distinguished between

measures relating to a battle of arms and those relating to a battle of ideas. Subsequently, I described

USA’s view towards the origins of terrorism that is at the basis of this international anti-terrorism

174 Ditto. 175 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, p. 4. 176 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, p. 25. 177 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, p. 27. 178 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, p. 47. 179 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, p. 27. 180 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, p. 25.


53

strategy. Among other findings, I concluded that to the USA, democracy plays an vital role in

explaining terrorism.

However, on the basis of these findings, I can still make no meaningful comparison between

the anti-terrorism strategies of the USA and the Netherlands. In order to enable such, I need to convert

USA’s view on the origins of terrorism to the terms of the conceptual model. This section deals with

such conversion. I shall successively deal with each phase like distinguished in the previous chapter.

With regard to phase 1 of the model, I shall both treat political voice and political oppression.

Furthermore, I will treat ‘economic freedom’, a factor that cannot be explicitly placed in terms of the

conceptual model. Subsequently, I will treat both phase 2 and phase 3 in which I will elaborate on two

factors that are of sincere importance to the USA: evil and state sponsorship.

4.5.1 Phase 1 according to the USA

When taking a look at the preceding chapter, one can notice that the USA does mainly

distinguish political factors that are likely to contribute to the emergence of terrorism. Like explained,

to the USA, democracy is the all-embracing answer to terrorism. Also for those that live in (Western)

democracies but nevertheless become convinced of radical ideas (so-called ‘home-grown terrorism’),

deepening democratic benefits is what is considered necessary to the Bush Administration.

Accordingly, the political cluster as distinguished in the conceptual model is the one which enjoys

USA’s emphasis. I shall now turn to the individual treatment of the structural causes of terrorism as

distinguished by the Bush Administration.


Like explained, to the USA, terrorism emerges when a democratic deficit is present. Such

could happen in different ways. The USA starts with its notion of ‘political alienation’ as a main cause

in explaining terrorism. That is, the Bush Administration considers the lack of political expression and

the inability to promote change in one’s country as factors that contribute to the emergence of

terrorism. Such a lack and inability could in turn produce festering grievances. If one does not have a

stake in society, no chance to shape its own future, one cannot alter such situation. However, if one is

able to express itself, peaceful resolution and advancing interests can be brought about.

This argumentation reconciles with the notion of political voice. Like explained, political

voice is about the existing democratic opportunities people get offered. That is, the extent to which

people are able to express themselves is a factor in explaining terrorism. Like stressed, political voice

induces the formation of responsive governments which are likely to produce desirable social

outcomes. In other words, political voice offers opportunities to reduce (political) grievances, thereby

increasing satisfaction and political efficacy. So, in short, according the Bush Administration, a lack of

political voice could lead people to turn to other methods in order to shape one’s own future.


54


The Bush Administration does not endorse the main argumentation like presented by the

notion of political oppression. That is, the USA does not explicitly put forward a relationship between

the intensity of state interference and terrorism. The Bush Administration does however recognise the

contributing aspect of political oppression to political voice. That is, in the preceding chapter I

explained that civil liberties are of fundamental importance in democratic societies, since they provide

the space to develop alternative views and ideas necessary in order to express one’s preferences. To

the USA shares this view by stating that liberties like freedom of speech and press are important

vehicles in exposing and discrediting falsehoods, prejudices, and dishonest propaganda and stimulate

the development of alternative ideas, independent from propagandists.

4.5.1.3 Economic freedom

Finally, the establishment of a market economy is of great importance to the USA. Like

explained, such system will give people control over their economic lives. When that happens, people

will insist on more control over their political lives as well. Those that are free to live economic lives,

are more likely to insist on ways of political expression. In short, according to the USA, improved

economic lives contribute to political demands, which in turn lowers the likelihood of terrorist

occurrences. In that way, economic freedom is an underlying cause of political voice.

To the USA, the way to reach such economic prosperity is by creating open markets and by

integrating the global economy, i.e. by economic globalisation. Therefore, the USA is severely

opposed to protectionism and favouritism. Such argumentation is to a certain extent in contrast with

the conceptual model. Although not only focussing on economic globalisation, I stressed the

transformational character of this process. Such could lead to the erosion of traditional patterns, which

in turn could be felt as threatening to one’s identity. Such a situation can make people to reach for

other certainties to identify with, including radical ideas. In contrast, to the USA, globalisation can

eventually only decrease the likelihood of terrorism. According to the Bush Administration, economic

globalisation stimulates economic prosperity, which in turn stimulates political prosperity.


Phase 2, which deals with the process of radicalisation, is one the USA does not put great

emphasis upon. The Bush Administration does for example not bring forward a definition of

radicalisation, nor does it emphasise a process that is likely to occur prior to terrorism. In the National

Strategy on Combating Terrorism, the word ‘radicalisation’ is not mentioned once by the Bush

Administration. In short, the Bush Administration does not give evidence of situations in which one

could become increasingly convinced, and accordingly, increasingly prepared to adopt terrorist


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methods. It does for example not recognise that radical Islam can channel individual radicalisation

because it provides meaning to life for those that feel alienated.

The Bush Administration does however recognise the contributing role of a radical ideology.

Like stressed earlier: ‘Terrorism ultimately depends upon the appeal of an ideology that excuses or

even glorifies the deliberate killing of innocents.’181 Phrases like these reveal that the Bush

Administration puts great emphasis on the justification and glorification aspect of (religious)

ideologies. In the preceding chapter, I however treated justifying aspects of radical Islam as a matter

that channels the individual radicalisation process because it can increasingly lower to bar for turning

to terrorist methods, as the process of radicalisation continues. The USA considers this however

differently. To the Bush Administration, the justifying and glorifying aspect of a radical ideology is

not part of a process of radicalisation. Instead, to the USA, the radical interpretation of Islam is a tool

to legitimise terrorist attacks for those people that are already terrorist. In that way, to the Bush

Administration, the use of a radical ideology seem to be intrinsically related to those groups that find

terrorist methods (already) warranted, or even necessary.


While the USA does not distinguish a process of radicalisation prior to terrorism, it does

discern a factor that is not present in the conceptual model as presented in the preceding chapter:

‘evil’. While this factor cannot be explicitly placed in terms of the conceptual model, I nevertheless

deal with that factor here. Furthermore, the USA puts great emphasis on state sponsorship as a cause

of terrorism. I shall therefore treat that origin as well.

4.5.3.1 Evil

Like explained, the USA considers terrorists as evil, irrelevant from whatever condition.

Terrorists are people at the wrong side, people that cannot be reformed or persuaded. Acts of terrorism

are barbaric, uncivilised, and particularly the attack of 9/11 was one against the very idea of civilised

society. According to the Bush Administration, by prescribing hate, violence, and fear, terrorists

threaten USA’s way of life. Terrorists embrace a preserve and murderous ideology which is made to

serve an evil end. By repeatedly stating that terrorists and the ideology they exploit are innately evil,

the USA seems to recognise this factor as one of main importance in explaining terrorism.

In the third chapter, I stated that evil cannot be regarded as a true origin of terrorism. The USA

considers this however differently. That is, the anti-terrorism strategy of the USA is largely based on a

clear good-wrong perspective. This becomes for example clear from phrases that the War on Terror is

a clash between civilisation (i.e., good) and those who want to destroy it (i.e., wrong), or from

statements of Bush’s speech that the USA is fighting evil without any sides of grey. In this context, the

181 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, p. 10.


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Bush Administration discerns evil as a distinguishable factor which can explain the emergence of

terrorism in two ways. Firstly, the USA seems to accept that there just are evil men around the world

willing to commit terrorist attacks. Bjørgo illustrates this by stating that some argue that addressing the

conditions that produce radicalisation is of pivotal importance, while others ‘[...] prefer the vision that

terrorism is evil, poses a threat and should therefore be crushed and uprooted’.182 By giving no

evidence of a radicalisation process that occurs prior to terrorism, and by putting great emphasis on

terrorist being evil, the USA’s anti-terrorism strategy is clearly based on such a vision. Secondly, the

USA stresses that evil can influence and shape people to turn to terrorist methods. The USA makes

this clear by stating that it wants to preserve people from getting into contact with evil ideas. Like

stressed, by the advancement of freedom and human dignity trough effective democracy, the USA

wants to present an alternative for the perverse and evil ideology of terrorist groups. In other words,

the USA considers democracy (political voice) as a underlying cause, that, if sufficiently guaranteed,

can preserve people from turning to evil ideologies and practices.

The factor ‘evil’ is hard to place in terms of the conceptual model. In the first place, it is not a

structural factor leading to a process of radicalisation (phase 1), and it is also not part of the

radicalisation process itself (phase 2). After all, the USA does not recognise such a process. Since the

USA considers evil of fundamental importance, it is also not to be considered as merely facilitating

(phase 3). In fact, ‘evil’ is different from the other factors, because it cannot explicitly be captured by

any of the distinguished phases. Instead, ‘evil’ is to be considered as a kind of background factor,

playing an important role throughout the entire process that leads up to terrorism.

4.5.3.2 State sponsorship

The final origin of terrorism the USA distinguishes is about the support of rogue states that

can provide financial means and safe havens. In the preceding chapter, I named such support ‘state

sponsorship’. Researchers stressed that the sponsorship of states is a factor which can make it more

likely that potential attack will actually take place. State sponsorship is in that respect to be considered

as one of the conditions which produce a conducive environment for new-style terrorist attacks to

occur. The USA however considers state sponsorship as a factor that is more than just facilitating.

Such becomes in the first place clear from the Bush Administration which repeatedly stresses that

those who harbour terrorists are as equally guilty of murder. To the USA, state sponsorship is the

lifeblood of terrorists groups, essential for their survival. Furthermore, I presented an argumentation of

Richardson that explains why the USA does consider the support of rogue states as more than just

facilitating. In fact, the USA seems to consider state sponsorship of such importance, that it would not

only make the occurrence of a potential terrorist attack more likely, but that it is a structural factor of

terrorism as well, conducive to the organisation of terrorist groups as such.

182 Bjørgo, 2005, p. 1


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4.6 Conclusion

This chapter dealt with the analysis of USA’s international anti-terrorism strategy. I did so in

three ways. Firstly, I explored the measures as proposed by the USA in its anti-terrorism strategy.

Secondly, I investigated USA’s view on the origins of terrorism. Subsequently, I translated those

origins to the terms of the conceptual model.

In its anti-terrorism policy documents, the Bush Administration stresses that America is

fighting a War on Terror. This war consists of a short- and a long-term battle. To the Bush

Administration, in the short-run, the fight against terror is a battle of arms. This implies that the USA

is fighting terrorism by destroying terrorists and their sanctuaries, and by eliminating them the

necessary support they need to survive. In the long-run, the USA is fighting a battle of ideas by

presenting an alternative to the terrorists murderous and perverse vision.

Subsequently, with regard to the exploration of USA’s origins of terrorism, I did two

important findings. The first one relates to USA’s focus on the political cluster of structural

conditions. To the USA, the establishment of an effective democracy is the all-embracing answer to

end terrorism. More specifically, according to the USA, a lack of political voice, that is, the inability

of political expression, is an important factor in explaining terrorism. Such a lack produces

irresponsive governments that are unable and/or unwilling to remove people’s grievances, thereby

contributing to the emergence of terrorism. Moreover, a lack of civil liberties – such as the freedom of

speech – reinforces the inability of political expression. In addition, the Bush Administration

recognises another underlying condition of terrorism, one that is not distinguish in the conceptual

model: economic freedom. According to the USA, economic freedom empowers individuals, and

empowered individuals increasingly demand greater political freedom. In that respect, economic

freedom is to be considered as a underlying factor affecting the political cluster.

The second major finding with regard to USA’s view on the origins of terrorism concerns the

fact that the Bush Administration puts little, if any, emphasis on phase 2 of the conceptual model (the

process of radicalisation). In the preceding chapter, I treated ‘radical ideology’ (radical Islam) as a

matter that channels the individual radicalisation process. The Bush Administration does however not

give evidence of situations in which one could become increasingly convinced, and accordingly,

increasingly prepared to employ terrorist methods. The USA does stress that terrorism ultimately

depends on a radical ideology that provides religious legitimisation and glorification for committing

terrorist attacks. However, to the USA, such is not part of a radicalisation process, but is considered as

a propagating tool to legitimise terrorist attacks for those people that are already terrorist.

While the USA does not distinguish a process of radicalisation prior to terrorism, it does

discern a factor that is not present in the conceptual model: ‘evil’. In general, the anti-terrorism

strategy of the USA is pervaded of a good-wrong mentality. In that context, the USA considers evil as

a distinguishable origin of terrorism. On the one hand, the Bush Administration seems to accept that


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this world hosts evil men willing to commit terrorist attacks. It on the other hand stresses that, under

certain circumstances, including political voice, people can be persuaded by evil ideas. The USA

wants the prevent such by presenting an alternative to the terrorists evil ideologies and practices.

Furthermore, the USA considers state sponsorship as an important factor to terrorism. To the Bush

Administration, state sponsorship is the lifeblood of terrorist groups, crucial for their survival.

Accordingly, the USA deems those that harbour terrorists as equally guilty of murder. In short, the

USA seems to consider state sponsorship as such an important origin, that it would not only make the

occurrence of a potential terrorist attack more likely, but that it is a structural factor of terrorism as

well, conducive to the organisation of terrorist groups as such.

The view of the USA on the origins of terrorism, in which it focuses on the political cluster of

phase 1, evil, state sponsorship, and the non-focus on phase 2 (process of radicalisation) is graphically

reflected in a conceptual model as presented in appendix 3.


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Chapter 5: The Netherlands 5.1 Introduction

Whereas the preceding chapter dealt with strategy of the USA, this chapter will deal with the

international anti-terrorism strategy of the Netherlands. Again, the purpose of this chapter is twofold.

Firstly, I will describe what kind of measures the Netherlands takes in its fight against international

terrorism. In doing so, I will make use of several policy documents. Unfortunately, unlike USA’s

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the Netherlands does not have an overall policy strategy

for fighting terrorism. Instead, most appropriate information about Dutch international anti-terrorism

measures is laid down in so-called memoranda (letters) that are written by Dutch Ministers. The

memorandum that is of largest relevance is one written by the former Dutch Minister of Foreign

Affairs and deals with the breeding grounds of international terrorism. This memorandum is largely

based on an advice of the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV). Besides this letter, there

are other memoranda that are written by the former Ministers of Justice and Immigration. Whilst these

are mainly concern with domestic terrorism matters, some arguments that are used in these

memoranda are also to be considered appropriate for this research. Furthermore, in combination with

its fellow member states, the Netherlands also has developed anti-terrorism measures on the European

level. The most important documents in this context are ‘The European Union Counter-Terrorism

Strategy’ and ‘The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to

Terrorism’. Some of the Dutch memoranda contain an explicit reference to these EU policy

documents. Therefore, I can validly use these European anti-terrorism strategies as well. The second

objective of this chapter is to identify which origins of terrorism the Netherlands distinguishes within

its international anti-terrorism strategy. That is, I will attempt to uncover on which analysis of the

origins of terrorism this strategy is based. Thereby, I try to find out in which way the Netherlands

legitimises the measures it proposes for fighting international terrorism. So, in short, the objective of

this chapter is on the one hand to describe which anti-terrorism measures the Netherlands proposes in

its fight against international terrorism, and on the other hand to identify which analysis of the origins

of terrorism is at the basis of those measures.

5.2 What is the Netherlands fighting?

Like explained in the previous chapter, whereas the focus of this research – jihadistic terrorism

– has been stressed several times, such does not make clear what the Netherlands recognises by that. It

could be that the Netherlands and the USA fight a different kind of terrorism, or have their focus on

different kinds of terrorism. Therefore, it is relevant to determine the terrorist threat the Dutch anti-

terrorism measures are aimed at.


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To begin with, the Netherlands recognises two crucial aspects of terrorism by stating that it is

violence aimed at non-combatants, perpetrated in order to influence the political decision-making

process.183 Furthermore, the Netherlands seems to endorse the notion of new-style terrorism. That is,

in his memorandum on the breeding grounds of international terrorism, former Minister Bot stresses

that today’s terrorists are guided by an agenda that has a global reach.184 Additionally, he also

recognises that jihadistic terrorists are willing to use ruthless violent means in order to achieve

maximum effect. Finally, the Netherlands recognises another characterising aspect of new-style

terrorism by stating that terrorists make use of network-organisations and all kinds of information- and

communication technologies.185 In short, the Netherlands recognises the characterising aspects of new-

style terrorism as identified in the second chapter.

More specifically, the Dutch government stresses that globally, the emphasis in the fight

against terrorism is on jihadistic terrorism. They define jihadistic terrorism as the exertion of terrorism

against enemies of the Islam, in order to establish a society which is the purest reflection of what the

original sources of the Islam prescribe.186 Despite its ability to define jihadistic terrorism in one

sentence, the Dutch government considers radical Islam as a plural and dynamic phenomenon. Ideally,

three different kinds of radical Islam can be distinguished. The first one, named radical political Islam,

focuses on the dominant political power of the West. Therefore, the resistance to dominant Western

power is where this type of radical Islam centres on. The second type, radical Islamic Puritanism, is

different from the first one because it emphasises the cultural dominance of the West, instead of on its

political dominance. The focus is on the resistance to the pernicious western way of life, that is to be

considered as a threat to ‘pure Islam’. The third kind of radical Islam is called radical Muslim

nationalism. This type is less religiously inspired, because it does not so much centre on Islam as a

religion, but on ‘being a Muslim’, i.e. belonging to the Muslim community.

To the Netherlands, the plural phenomenon called jihadistic terrorism is the one where its

international anti-terrorism strategy centres on. Especially jihadistic terrorist group Al-Qaeda deserves

great attention: ‘[…] the terrorism perpetrated by Al-Qaeda and extremists inspired by Al-Qaeda has

become the main terrorist threat to the Union. While other types of terrorism continue to pose a serious

threat to EU citizens, the Union’s response […] focuses on this type of terrorism’.187 However, to the

Netherlands, Al-Qaeda is not a very narrowed group of terrorists that threaten their way of life.

Instead, the Dutch government makes an elaborate distinction between different kinds of Al-Qaeda:

Core Al-Qaeda, allied Al-Qaeda, and those that feel inspired by Al-Qaeda. The first kind refers to the

‘old’ organisation around Bin Laden, i.e. those that were responsible for the 9/11-attacks. The second

183 Bot, B.R., Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, 27th of September 2006, p. 1. 184 Bot, B.R., Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, 27th of September 2006, p. 4. 185 Van Aartsen, J.J., Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken: Islamitisch radicalisme in het Midden-Oosten en Centraal Azië, 10th of November 2001, p. 4. 186 Bot, B.R., Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, 27th of September 2006, p. 1. 187 Council of the European Union, The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 24th of November 2005, p. 2.


61

kind is about those cells, groups and networks that are in contact with Core Al-Qaeda, but that are not

managed by it. The final kind refers to those that are not in contact with Core Al-Qaeda, but are

nevertheless inspired by its ideology. Al-Qaeda, as the Dutch government makes clear, has become a

trademark, even for those networks that autonomously operate from Core Al-Qaeda.188

While emphasising jihadistic terrorism, the Dutch anti-terrorism strategy mainly focuses on

domestic terrorism. Until now, the Netherlands has merely experienced terrorism perpetrated by those

that were settled in the country itself. The best-known terrorist group in this context is the Hofstad-

network which assembled regularly in Amsterdam, the capital of The Netherlands. For this reason,

most proposed measures of the Dutch government are about so-called home-grown terrorists. This

explains why most documents about anti-terrorism measures are written by the Minister of Domestic

Affairs and the Minister of Integration. However, despite the fact that this research is focused on

international terrorism, some arguments used in the domestic anti-terrorism policy documents are also

appropriate for this study.

5.3 The Dutch strategy: a four pillar approach

Before getting into the details of the Dutch international anti-terrorism strategy, one should

realise the ultimate goal that is behind this strategy first. The Netherlands considers terrorists and their

indiscriminate murderous activities as a severe threat to the constitutional state. However, not only

terrorist methods are incompatible with the principles of the constitutional state. Also radicalism as

such is to be considered irreconcilable with such principles because of its conviction of own

superiority and inaccessibility for reasonable debate.189 The fight against terrorism is one in order to

protect the constitutional state and its democratic rule of law. It is therefore of genuine importance that

anti-terrorism measures aimed at defending the democratic rule of law do not damage that principle.

That is, throughout the entire period in which terrorism is combated, the Dutch government will make

sure that the measures for fighting terrorism will not undermine respect for fundamental rights.190

Therefore, the fight against terrorism is one that should take place within certain principles: legality,

legitimacy, and proportionality.191 First, anti-terrorism measures should be based on legal

competences. Subsequently, measures against terrorism are to be considered legitimate. In that way,

effectiveness only cannot be the leading criterion to determine which policies will be developed.

Finally, one should be aware that anti-terrorism policies are proportionately conducted and do not

produce overreaction. This means that the battle against terrorism can only be considered effective if

human rights are fully respected and observed. In other words, according to the Dutch government, the

fight against terrorism should not erode that what it is willing to protect.

188 Bot, B.R., Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, 27th of September 2006, p. 3. 189 Donner, J.P.H., Brief van de Minister van Justitie: Terrorismebestrijding, 19th of August 2005, p. 6. 190 Council of the European Union, The European Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 24th of November 2005, p. 4. 191 Donner, J.P.H., Brief van de Minister van Justitie: Terrorismebestrijding, 19th of August 2005, p. 13.


62

As explained, in its anti-terrorism strategy, the Netherlands mainly focuses on domestic

terrorism. The Netherlands nevertheless recognises that jihadistic terrorism poses a global threat as

well, which demands for an international approach. Therefore, by signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam

in 1997, which established an area of freedom, security, and justice, terrorism became part of the first

pillar of the EU. As a result, many of the Dutch international anti-terrorism measures are proposed on

EU-level. These international policies are taken according a four pillar approach. In its Counter-

Terrorism Strategy, the EU stresses that its objectives are ‘[…] to prevent new recruits to terrorism

(1); better protect potential targets (2); pursue and investigate members of existing networks (3) and

improve the capability to respond to and manage the consequences of terrorist attacks (4)’.192 I shall

successively treat each pillar in the following subsections.

5.3.1 Prevent

The first pillar of the EU Strategy has a preventive character. The main objective is to prevent

people from turning to terrorism and to stop the next generation of terrorists from emerging.193 This

pillar consists of a combination of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ measures. To begin with the former measures, the

EU aims at tackling the root causes which lead to radicalisation and recruitment. According to the EU,

there is a divergent range of conditions in society which create an environment in which individuals

can become easily radicalised, such as poor governance, and a lack of political, economic, and

educational opportunities. Among other measures, the Union tries to counter these conditions by

promoting good governance, human rights, democracy, and economic prosperity. Furthermore,

according to the EU, in fighting radicalisation, one has to target inequalities and discrimination and

promote inter-cultural dialogue and long-term integration.194 The last measures – the inter-cultural

dialogue and long-term integration – seem to enjoy special emphasis of the Union. According to the

EU, encouraging the intercultural dialogue – both within and outside the Union – will lead people to

appreciate cultural diversity. It will for example create clarity about the distinction between a radical

version of Islam and the mainstream interpretation.195 Such will stimulate mutual understanding,

respect and tolerance between cultures and religions, thereby producing an environment in which

people become less susceptible to radical ideas and practices. One of the measures the EU wants to

take in this context is to declare 2008 as the European Year of the inter-cultural dialogue.

The second way in which the EU wants to stop the next generation of terrorists from emerging

is by conducting so-called ‘hard’ measures. This means in the first place that the Union is determined

to disrupt activities of networks that draw people into terrorism, thereby concentrating on recruitment

hotspots like prisons and places of religious training and worship. In that context, the Union wants to

establish a strong legal framework to prevent individuals from inciting and legitimising violence. 192 Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 30th of November 2005, p. 6. 193 Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 30th of November 2005, p. 7. 194 Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 30th of November 2005, p. 9. 195 Donner, J.P.H., Brief van de Minister van Justitie: Bestrijding internationaal terrorisme, 24th of June 2003, p. 17.


63

Furthermore, the EU recognises that the Internet is an essential source for terrorists that want to get

support for their radical propaganda. Therefore, the EU is determined to impede terrorist recruiters

using the Internet.

5.3.2 Protect

This pillar deals with the defence of the Union’s key targets. The EU wants to reduce

vulnerability to attack, and also reduce the resulting impact of a terrorist attack.196 In doing so, the

Union distinguishes three areas which demand protection: infrastructure, borders, and citizens. To

begin with, the EU considers the protection of infrastructure of major importance. After all, the

destruction of infrastructure can damage the EU economy severely. Such is becoming increasingly

likely as new technologies (like the Internet) and market liberalisation (e.g. electricity and gas supply)

mean that much infrastructure is part of a larger network.197 The EU also emphasises the necessity to

protect the transport sector, i.e. airports, seaports, and aircraft arrangements. Until now, the measure

that is of greatest importance in this context is the establishment of the European Programme for

Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), a programme which contains a ‘[…] clear definition of

critical infrastructure and which sets out the key principles for protection of critical infrastructure

[…]’.198 Secondly, the Union wants to enhance border protection to make it harder for known or

suspected terrorists to enter or operate within the EU. In increasing the effectiveness of its border

controls, the EU wants to make improvements in technology for both the capture and exchange of

passenger data, and the inclusion of biometric information in identity and travel documents.199 Finally,

the EU distinguishes the protection of citizens. It does so by stressing that it has to develop

methodologies for protecting crowded places and other soft targets from attack.

5.3.3 Pursue

This pillar deals with those measures aimed at pursuing terrorists across borders and

disrupting terrorist activities. The Union distinguished between three phases within this field:: the

identification of a terrorist, followed by pursuing of terrorists, and finally the prosecution of terrorists,

i.e. bringing the terrorists to justice. In this context, the EU adopted the European Arrest Warrant

(EAW), which allows the arrest of criminal suspect for trail or detention valid throughout the EU, and

is thereby an attempt to increase the speed of extraction throughout EU countries.

The second cluster of measures is about the disruption of terrorist activities, which could

happen in different ways. First, according to the EU, terrorists must be deprived of the means by

which they mount attacks, i.e. weapons and explosives.200 The EU considers all interested parties, in

196 Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 30th of November 2005, p. 10. 197 European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/terrorism/protection, retrieved in the 1st of August 2007. 198 Ditto. 199 Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 30th of November 2005, p. 10. 200 Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 30th of November 2005, p. 13.

http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/terrorism/protection


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particular the industry (like producers, transporters, researchers), responsible for the reduction of the

possible misuse of weapons. Furthermore, the ability of terrorists to communicate and plan undetected

should be impeded by the retention of telecommunications data and limiting the opportunities offered

by the Internet.201 Finally, to the EU, tackling terrorist financing is of importance in combating

terrorism. According to the Union, terrorist financing covers two distinctive aspects: ‘[…] on the one

hand the financing of terrorist attacks and on the other the financing of terrorist networks, including

recruitment and promotion of terrorist causes’.202 The EU aims at impeding money transfers by

terrorists, in which tackling the misuse of the non-profit sector is a priority.

5.3.4 Respond

The fourth and final pillar concerns responding measures. The EU stresses that it cannot

reduce the chance of a potential terrorist attack to zero. Therefore, when prevention fails, it is of

importance to prepare, manage, and minimise the consequences of a terrorist attack.203 Of course,

solidarity, assistance, and appropriate compensation to the victims of terrorism and their families is of

largest importance here. Furthermore, the EU aims at consolidating alert-systems, which is guaranteed

by setting-up ARGUS: a central crisis coordination system which links all specialised EU systems for

emergencies. The final key element of response planning is the necessary processes for decision

making in the event of a crisis, as established by the EU.

5.4 The Dutch analysis: the origins of terrorism

Until now, I outlined the international anti-terrorism measures as the Netherlands is

conducting. In this section I turn to the next objective of this chapter by describing the underlying

conditions that are at the basis of the Dutch international anti-terrorism strategy. That is, this part of

research will be used to investigate the Dutch view towards the origins of terrorism: according to the

Netherlands, what are the factors that give rise to terrorism, i.e. what causes terrorism? Such

underlying arguments are not always explicitly put forward in the policy documents of the

Netherlands. Sometimes, I have to deduce such arguments from the actual measures proposed.

To the Dutch governments, there does not exist something like breeding grounds of terrorism.

Such notion would suggest that it is understandable that some people turn to terrorist methods.

However, according to the Netherlands, terrorism is unjustified under every single circumstance.

Therefore, the Dutch governments rather speaks in terms of ‘factors that contribute to terrorism’.204

Former Minister Bot stresses that one is able to distinguish three kind of factors: structural (prevailing

201 Ditto. 202 European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/terrorism/prevention/fsj_terrorism_prevention_disrupt_en.htm, retrieved on the 1st of August 2007. 203 The Council of the European Union, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1195&lang=en&mode=g, retrieved on the 1st of August 2007. 204 Bot, B.R., Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, 27th of September 2006, p. 3.

http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/terrorism/prevention/fsj_terrorism_prevention_disrupt_en.htm

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1195&lang=en&mode=g


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conditions), motivating (the way individuals interpret and perceive structural factors), and trigger

factors (incidents that can accelerate a terrorist process).

According to the Dutch government, until now, the factors that contribute to the emergence of

terrorism can be covered by four broad categories: political and social marginalisation and exclusion

(1), perception of Western society as an enemy (2), local and regional conflicts (3), and finally,

poverty (4).205 These categories are distinguished in a memorandum about the factors that give rise to

international terrorism. The conclusions like presented are to a large extent derived from an advice of

the Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV).

5.4.1 Political and social marginalisation and exclusion

To the Netherlands, marginalisation and exclusion of certain communities in a quickly

evolving world has produced an important, maybe even the most important factor contributing to the

emergence of terrorism. In his memorandum, Bot firstly elaborates on social marginalisation. With

regard to that, the Dutch government stresses that large social changes are of importance here. Many

of the Middle-East countries find themselves in a process of transition.206 These processes can involve

modernisation, rapid economic growth, or the transition from an autocracy to a democracy. Such can

lead to fundamental changes in society, like increasing cleavages between social classes, or a growth

of Western influences. Those that do not want to keep up with such changes because they perceive

them as a threat to their traditional norms and their identity, could start to feel misunderstood, i.e.

marginalised.207 In this context, former Minister for Development Cooperation Van Ardenne stresses

that changing processes like modernisation and globalisation are likely to play a role in the emergence

of terrorism. According to the Minister, both processes inevitably influence traditional religious

convictions and practices, which in turn could be felt as a threat of one’s identity. Van Ardenne

stresses that the fear for loosing one’s own identity in a globalising world is undoubtedly one of the

main causes behind each kind of fundamentalism.208 In that way, the desire to preserve traditional

norms could lead to violence resistance.

In his memorandum, former Minister Bot continues by elaborating on political

marginalisation. That is, according to the Dutch government, large parts of the population in Islamic

states do not have opportunities to participate in the decision-making process and have no say in the

development of their countries. The combination of a lack of democracy, civil liberties, good

governance, and the rule of law is at the basis of such inability.209 People that encounter situations in

which they have no influence on the decision-making process and additionally have no chance to

enjoy any perspective or resolution, are more likely to be susceptible to radical ideas and methods.

205 Bot, B.R., Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, 27th of September 2006, p. 5. 206 Bot, B.R., Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, 10th of April 2006, p. 2. 207 AIV, Terrorismebestrijding in mondiaal en Europees perspectief, September 2006, p. 13. 208 Van Ardenne, A.M.A., Niet om zieltjes te winnen, maar om levens te redden, 12th of September 2005. 209 AIV, Terrorismebestrijding in mondiaal en Europees perspectief, September 2006, p. 14.


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Clearly, to the Dutch government, structural factors like political and social marginalisation

are at the basis of terrorism. This however does not mean that structural factors directly cause

terrorism. Factors like political and social marginalisation can lead to situations in which people

become increasingly susceptible to extremist groups and their ideologies. Such ideologies are

therefore to be considered as a motivating factor to terrorism because they stimulate a process of

radicalisation. The reason why so many people feel attracted to radical Islam is because other

ideologies, such as socialism and pan-Arabism, have lost their attractiveness since, despite their

promise, they did not bring about any social or economic development. Therefore, it was necessary to

find a new ideology that was not discredited yet and could fill up the vacuum. According the Dutch

government, susceptibility among people as a result of structural shortcomings in society provides

opportunities for recruiting organisations. Political marginalisation has for example contributed to the

attractiveness of ‘pure Islam’ as a way to end one’s grievances, i.e. as an option for improvement. In

short, the search for solutions in the radical Islam for problems that have become structural factors in

society, is to be considered as a motivating factor of terrorism.210 According to the Dutch government,

radical Islam can in turn provide opportunities to legitimise and propagate terrorism. Core Al-Qaeda

for example claims to represent pure Islam, thereby abusing religion to justify their role as warriors for

Islam.

5.4.2 Presenting Western society as the enemy

The next distinguished Dutch factor that contributes to terrorism is the following. The Dutch

government stresses that in substantial parts of the Islamic world, people have an ingrained image of

the West as the ultimate enemy. According to the Netherlands, many Muslims embrace the idea that

the fight against terrorism primarily consists of a battle against the Islam as such. In that context, the

Dutch government stresses that radical activists often refer to certain incidents in order to demonstrate

that Islam itself is under fire. For example, radical Muslims continually proclaim that Muslims living

in Europe are being discriminated and discourteously treated, thereby reinforcing the feeling that

Muslims are not accepted in Europe.211 Many in the Middle-East are convinced of certain stereotyped

and degraded views about the Western world and its outlooks and interests. The Dutch government

has identified this as ‘Occidentalism’ and stresses that certain concrete events of anti-terrorism

policies, like the incidents of Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, are likely to reinforce such.212 To a

lesser degree, same convictions towards the Muslim population exist in Western societies. The attack

on 9/11 for example caused negative stereotypes about Islam, and an increasing suspicion among

210 Bot, B.R., Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, 27th of September 2006, p. 6. 211 Donner, J.P.H., Brief van de Minister van Justitie: Bestrijding internationaal terrorisme, 24th of June 2003, p. 6. 212 AIV, Terrorismebestrijding in mondiaal en Europees perspectief, September 2006, p. 15.


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Western people towards Muslims.213 This development gave Muslims the feeling that they are indeed

not welcome in Europe, thereby pushing some of them towards radical Islamic groups.

The ideas and images about the Western world are often imposed by either governmental or

religious leaders and have sometimes resulted in explicit feelings of hatred towards Western society.

To these people, the West is the cause for everything that is wrong in one’s country or region. Besides,

some in the Arabic world see their culture and religion as superior and have great problems in

accepting Western political and economic dominance. This, in combination with popular conspiracy

theories and familiar accusations against the West, contributes to a sphere in which (support for)

terrorism is likely to thrive. In short, according to the Netherlands, the negative perception in the

Arabic world towards the West can become an important motivating factor of terrorism.

5.4.3 Local and regional conflicts

The next category that provides a contributing factor to terrorism is covered by the notion

‘local and regional conflicts’. To the Netherlands, it are not conflicts as such – like Kashmir,

Chechnya, the Israel-Palestine conflict, and Iraq – that provide an distinguishable cause of terrorism.

Such conflicts often take place in similar situations in which certain people of a population do not

consider themselves as part of that population as a whole. Instead, they believe to have a distinctive

identity, one that is insufficiently recognised by those outside their own group. To the Netherlands,

such a neglected position in combination with a lack of political means to end such a situation could

lead certain people to reach for terrorist methods.

Again, radical Islam can play an important motivating role here. That is, radical Islam has

caused these conflicts to become characteristic examples of the inferior positions of Muslims

throughout the world. To these people, such conflicts prove the existence of a distorted balance of

power, i.e. a situation in which Muslims are suppressed and harassed. Of course, such visions contain

an element of truth. The Dutch government stresses that the Islamic world has experienced great

periods in which it has been leading in world history. Nowadays, it is the Western world that is to be

considered dominant in political, economic and cultural sphere. According to the Netherlands, such

can be perceived as an unfair situation of power dissimilarity in which people feel dominated by

foreign rule. However, the vision of inferiority clearly presents a perception of reality. For example, in

the view of those that cherish radical Islam, other conflicts – such as NAVO-interference in Kosovo –

in which Western countries stepped up to protect the Muslim population, are not taken into account.

According the Dutch government, these perceptions of reality can become an important motivating

cause of terrorism.

213 Donner, J.P.H., Brief van de Minister van Justitie: Bestrijding internationaal terrorisme, 24th of June 2003, p. 6.


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5.4.4 Poverty

The Netherlands states that poverty (social-economic deprivation) is often brought forward for

explaining terrorism. The Dutch government conversely stresses that it is convinced of the

incorrectness of this notion. After all, many terrorists throughout the world came from prosperous

middle-classes. The Dutch government however continues by stating that social-economic positions

can contribute to terrorism, because they offer opportunities for certain radical organisations. That is,

in situations where governments are unable to offer elemental needs, radical organisations can provide

the necessary charitable activities. Such organisations can for example offer education and health care,

thereby providing a social safety net. In providing such essential needs, these organisations are likely

to gain support for their radical views and actions among the population. According the Dutch

government, some even succeed in actively recruiting people to participate in terrorist activities. In

short, underlying social-economic conditions can provide opportunities for certain radical

organisations, thereby contributing to the emergence of terrorism.

Furthermore, the Dutch government stresses that in Islamic countries, differences in affluence

are likely to occur. This could for example be the result of increased oil revenues, leading to the

enrichment of certain groups of people. According to the Netherlands, because of such internal

inequality, excluded persons are likely to become susceptible to terrorist ideas and methods.214 For that

matter, the leaders of certain terrorist groups do often not turn out to be very disadvantaged

themselves. They however claim to represent those that are poor and marginalised.

5.4.5 Alienation: a crisis of identity

Like explained, in its anti-terrorism strategy, the Netherlands largely focuses on domestic

terrorism. In those policy documents, the major argument that is used to explain the emergence of

terrorism is covered by the concept of integration. To put it literary: ‘[…] if integration fails it can

provide fertile ground for violent radicalisation to develop.215 In general, according to the EU, violent

radicalisation is a mixture of both negative feelings, and positive (mobilising) feelings about becoming

part of a group.216 Negative feelings cover those matters that can alienate people from the existing

system. Such could happen when people perceive their situation as iniquitous, because they have the

feeling of being excluded or discriminated. According to the EU, this is likely to happen to certain

people of immigrant groups. Especially young people born to immigrant parents and raised in Europe

can face such situations. That is, many of these people do not longer feel great fidelity to their parents’

countries of origin. Therefore, they can only really become part of the country where they have been

raised and where they live. However, some of them can have the feeling that they are not completely

accepted because they encounter discrimination on the basis of for example cultural, linguistic, or

214 AIV, Terrorismebestrijding in mondiaal en Europees perspectief, September 2006, p. 14. 215 European Commission, Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation, 21st of September 2005, p. 6. 216 European Commission, Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation, 21st of September 2005, p. 14.


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religious differences. Such alienation from both parental roots and the society they live in, makes these

people susceptible to other matters they can identify with. This is where, according the EU, positive

feelings start to contribute: ‘It is this crisis of identity that can be seen as being a strong motivating

force for many to become involved in organisations with strong beliefs who wish to avenge certain

people or society in general, through terrorist acts’.217 In short, when people are not sufficiently

integrated and thereby encounter the feeling that they are not fully accepted in society, they can start

feeling alienated. This can make it ‘[…] more likely for a person to look for a sense of identity and

belonging elsewhere such as in a powerful extremist ideology’.218

While the presented argumentation above is concentrated on domestic matters, the same

reasoning can be used with regard to this research about international terrorism. That is, apart from the

alienation of both parental roots and the society in which one lives, it is perfectly possible that other

developments lead to similar situations in which one feels uprooted. According to the EU,

globalisation can for example result in situations in which one feels its identity is being threatened.

Again, such experiences can result in alienation, frustration, and anger, thereby making it more likely

for some to look for a sense of identity, something radical Islam can provide.

5.5 Translation to conceptual model

Until now, this chapter has dealt with two objectives. I firstly described the proposed anti-

terrorism measures of the Netherlands. I concluded that the Dutch government wants to prevent new

recruits to terrorism, to protect potential targets, to pursue terrorists, and finally, to respond to the

consequences of a terrorist attack. Subsequently, I described the Dutch view towards the origins of

terrorism that is at the basis of this international anti-terrorism strategy.

However, on the basis of these findings, I can still make no meaningful comparison between

the anti-terrorism strategies of the USA and the Netherlands. In order to enable such, I need to convert

the Dutch view on the origins of terrorism to the terms of the conceptual model. This section deals

with such conversion. I shall deal with each phase like distinguished in the third chapter. With regard

to phase 1 of the model, I shall successively treat absolute poverty, relative poverty, political voice,

political oppression, dissimilarity of power, and diminishment of traditional social patterns.

Subsequently, I shall turn to phase 2 in which I will elaborate on the individual process of

radicalisation, and on alternative organisations. This section concludes by elaborating on phase 3.

5.5.1 Phase 1 according to the Netherlands

When taking a look at the preceding section, one can notice the broad range of structural

factors the Dutch government distinguishes. The Netherlands recognises that every cluster as put

217 European Commission, Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation, 21st of September 2005, p. 14. 218 European Commission, Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation, 21st of September 2005, p. 6-7.


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forward in Chapter 3 is likely to contribute to the emergence of terrorism. Besides the measures the I

discussed above, such is also emphasised in a memorandum by former Minister of Foreign Affairs

Van Aartsen. Among other things, he stresses that the yawning gap between the poor and the rich

(economic), the inability to organise politically (political), and the introduction of lifestyles

irreconcilable with traditional values (social) are likely to create a conducive environment for

becoming radicalised.219 I shall now turn to the individual treatment of every structural cause of

terrorism as distinguished by the Dutch government.

5.5.1.1 Absolute poverty

Like explained, the Netherlands does not consider poverty as a root cause of terrorism.

However, it subsequently stresses that social-economic positions could play a role in explaining

terrorism. That is, according to the Dutch government, social-economic circumstances could in certain

cases provide opportunities to radical organisations. Such organisations can offer elemental needs,

thereby obtaining support among the population for their radical ideas and actions.

In the third chapter, I brought forward the same argumentation by the notion of ‘absolute

poverty’. I stressed the vulnerability of people living below the poverty line, because they are

dependent on aid for survival. Subsequently, I stated that it is likely that such vulnerable groups come

in contact with charity organisations. While such organisations can provide a stable living, at the same

time, some of them espouse a radical agenda through their aid. In other words, those that cannot

guarantee themselves full economic subsistence are increasingly susceptible to radical ideas of certain

groups.

5.5.1.2 Relative poverty

Besides recognising absolute poverty, the Netherlands distinguishes ‘relative poverty’ as a

factor that can contribute to terrorism as well. While not elaborately discussing this matter, the Dutch

government stresses that internal inequality, caused by a yawning gap between the poor and the rich

elite, contributes to the susceptibility of these excluded groups to turn to radical ideas and terrorist

recruiting organisations.

In chapter 3, I stressed the same argumentation. Researchers have explained that relative

poverty is about the economic equality between groups of people. If one perceives significant

inequalities of wealth, this could contribute people’s frustration. In that way, relative poverty is an

underlying cause that could lead people to become radicalised. So, in short, the Netherlands

distinguishes both absolute and relative poverty as underlying causes that explain the emergence of

219 Van Aartsen, J.J., Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken: Islamitisch radicalisme in het Midden-Oosten en Centraal Azië, 10th of November 2001, p. 6.


71

terrorism. Thereby, the Netherlands recognises the entire economic cluster as brought forward in the

conceptual model.


As already stressed in the introduction of this subsection, to the Netherlands, the inability to

organise oneself politically could be considered a factor contributing to the emergence of terrorism.

More specifically, according to the Dutch government, large parts of the population in Islamic states

do not have opportunities to participate in the decision-making process and have no say in the

development of their countries. This could lead to situations in which one experiences a lack of

perspective and resolution to one’s grievances. In this context, the Dutch government stresses for

example that if one perceives himself in a neglected position and lacks the political means to end that

situation, this could lead certain people to reach for violent methods. In short, according former

Minister of Foreign Affairs Bot, a freedom deficit – a lack of democracy, good governance, and

respect for human rights - is likely to play a role in explaining terrorism.

By these comments, the Netherlands recognises that a lack of ‘political voice’ is a

distinguishable contributing factor of terrorism. After all, if people could organise and express

themselves politically, participation in the decision-making process would be established, thereby

giving people a say in the running of their countries. In that way, the need to turn to other methods in

order to get influence, diminishes. Furthermore, political voice increases political efficacy and

satisfaction, thereby producing responsive governments. Governments that honour the preferences of

citizens can actually provide perspective and a resolution to one’s grievances. In that way, good

governance can be established.


Only marginally stressed, in its policy documents, the Netherlands brings a lack of ‘civil

liberties’ forward as a potential cause of terrorism. That is, by stating that some Islamic countries do

not provide people the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, the Dutch

government stresses that this is likely to be the result of a lack of civil liberties, democracy, and the

absence of a constitutional state. Such a phrase comes close to the argumentation that political

oppression, as defined in the third chapter, is related to the factor of political voice. That is, civil

liberties are of fundamental importance in democratic societies, since they provide the necessary space

to develop alternative views and ideas in order to express one’s preferences. It is however fair to state

that the Dutch government does not extensively elaborate on this matter. Therefore, I cannot with full

certainty conclude that the Netherlands perceives political oppression as an indirect of terrorism,

because it would hamper political voice.

5.5.1.5 Dissimilarity of power


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As explained in the preceding section, nowadays, it is the Western world that is to be

considered dominant in political, economic and cultural sphere. According to the Netherlands, for

some in the Arabic world, this can be perceived as a distorted situation. Such is especially considered

so, because the Islamic world has experienced great periods in which it has been leading in world

history. To the Dutch government, in considerable parts of the Islamic world, the dominance of the

West is conceived unjust, unfair, and unreasonable, thereby generating an environment in which

terrorism is likely to thrive.

In the conceptual model, this argumentation is covered by the notion of ‘dissimilarity of

power’. That is, researchers explained that inequalities as a result of unbalanced situations of power

are likely to contribute to the emergence of terrorism. I for example cited Bjørgo by stating that if

some possesses overwhelming power compared to others, the latter can be pushed to situations in

which it sees no realistic ways to improve its position. According to the Dutch government, this is

likely to occur in the Arabic world, because of their relative powerlessness and the resulting

resentment towards Western society.

By fully appreciating ‘political voice’ and ‘dissimilarity of power’ as causes that explain the

emergence of terrorism, and by briefly mentioning political oppression as a potential indirect

contributing factor, the Netherlands put great emphasis on the distinguished political cluster of the

conceptual model as well. I shall now turn to the social cluster, by elaborating on the diminishment of

traditional social patterns.

5.5.1.6 Diminishment of traditional social patterns

As already stated in the introduction of this section, to the Dutch government, the introduction

of lifestyles irreconcilable with traditional values is likely to contribute to the emergence of terrorism.

Such new lifestyles can come about by social changes in society, like rapid modernisation. To the

Netherlands, those that do not want to keep up with such changes because they perceive them as a

threat to their traditional norms and their identity, could start to feel misunderstood, i.e. marginalised.

Like explained, former Minister Van Ardenne stresses that the fear for loosing one’s own identity is

undoubtedly one of the main causes behind each kind of fundamentalism.220

In the conceptual model, this argumentation is covered by the notion of ‘diminishment of

traditional social patterns’. That is, I explained that such diminishment can lead to situations of

alienation. Alienation from traditional values and certainties could in turn be felt as threatening to

one’s identity. If the resulting identity crisis is severe enough, such can lead people to turn to other

certainties offered by radical ideas.

In addition, the Netherlands stresses the same argumentation in its domestic anti-terrorism

policy documents. Like explained, people born to immigrant parents are more likely to be susceptible

220 Van Ardenne, A.M.A., Niet om zieltjes te winnen, maar om levens te redden, 12th of September 2005.


73

to radical ideas: ‘[…] alienation from both the country of origin and the host country can make it more

likely for a person to look for a sense of identity and belonging elsewhere such as in a powerful

extremist ideology’.221 Despite the fact that it is not the diminishment of traditional social patterns that

is at the basis of this argumentation, the causal reasoning is similar to that notion.


As explained in the third chapter, phase 2 deals with the process of radicalisation, i.e. the

period that covers the development of potential terrorists. The Dutch government stresses that such a

process of radicalisation is generally prior to terrorism. Or, to put it differently, according the Dutch

government, the process of radicalisation could at worst lead to terrorism.222 The Netherlands has

defined radicalisation as the ‘[…] increasing preparedness to accept the ultimate consequences of ones

views regarding the change of the existing system and putting it into action, which generates an

uncompromising attitude towards those who think differently’.223 To analyse this process, the Dutch

government created a so-called ring model in which it distinguishes four different rings, each

representing a different group of people. The exterior ring covers the population in general. The next

one consists of those that have sympathy with terrorist acts and that are therefore susceptible for

recruitment. The third ring covers those that actively support terrorist networks in diverse ways. And

finally, the interior ring consist of the actual terrorists that are willing and able to apply terrorist

methods. To the Netherlands, centripetal motions are to be considered as processes of radicalisation.224

I shall treat two of the factors as put forward in the conceptual model: individual radicalisation and

alternative organisations.

5.5.2.1 Individual radicalisation

As explained, the Dutch government distinguishes between structural and motivating factors.

Whereas phase 1 dealt with the structural aspects, this subsection covers the motivating factors that,

according to the Netherlands, are at the basis of terrorism. To the Dutch government, radical Islam can

provide a motivating factor in three ways. Firstly, radical Islam can provide meaning to one’s life.

That is, those who alienate from society can feel a strong attraction to a powerful extremist ideology

with which they can identify. Radical Islam can provide solutions for identity problems by offering

plain objectives, duties, and certainties to hold on to. In the third chapter, I stressed the same

argumentation by stating that radical Islam provides the idea that one can find its identity in ‘pure

Islam’, by living like ‘pure Muslims’, according to outlined prescriptions.

221 European Commission, Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation, 21st of September 2005, p. 14. 222 Ministry of Domestic Affairs, Van dawa tot jihad: De diverse dreigingen van de radicale islam tegen de democratische rechtsorde, December 2004, p. 6. 223 Donner, J.P.H., Brief van de Minister van Justitie: Terrorismebestrijding, 19th of August 2005, p. 2. 224 AIVD, Contraterrorisme in Nederland, June 2003, p. 7.


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Secondly, the Dutch government thinks a process of radicalisation is channelled by the

legitimising power of radical Islam. That is, according to the Netherlands, religious convictions can

both increase the preparedness and reduce the reticence to commit violent acts.225 Such is for example

realised by glorifying martyrdom. In the third chapter, I came to a similar conclusion by stating that

(radical) ideologies can seriously lower the bar for turning to violent matters because they can provide

religious justification and glorification.

Finally, contrary to the conceptual model, the Netherlands distinguishes a third way in which

radical Islam channels the process of radicalisation. The Dutch government stresses that (radical)

ideologies offer people an option for improvement by providing both solution to and explanations of

one’s grievances. According the Netherlands, such explanations are often provided by depicting the

Western world as an ultimate enemy, responsible for everything that is wrong in one’s country or

region. In short, according the Dutch government, radical Islam offers people an explanation for

grievances and an outlet for anger by propagating a supposed proof of a clash between the West and

Islam.226

5.5.2.2 Alternative organisations

As stated in the third chapter, certain organisations can play an important role in stimulating

people to become radicalised. I explained that organisations preaching radical ideologies are important

vehicles in obtaining support and in recruiting people. The Netherlands stresses the same notion. That

is, just like the argumentation as presented in the third chapter, the Dutch government stresses that

those that live in rough social-economic circumstances are likely to come in contact with charitable

organisations which espouse a radical agenda trough their aid. In providing essential needs, these

organisations are likely to gain support for their views and actions among the population. Furthermore,

similar to the notion of Quranic madrasas, the Netherlands endorses that in situations where hatred is

the only matter that is being thought, such can become contributive to terrorism.227 In other words,

similar to the conceptual model, the Dutch government recognises the facilitating character of these

(alternative) organisations.


This subsection treats the third and final phase as distinguished in the conceptual model, i.e.

the conditions which make it likely that a terrorist attack will actually occur. The Dutch government

indicates the transition from phase 2 to phase 3 by stating that among those that accept an extremist

225 AIV, Terrorismebestrijding in mondiaal en Europees perspectief, September 2006, p. 15. 226 Council of the European Union, The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 24th of November 2005, p. 4. 227 Van Ardenne, A.M.A., Niet om zieltjes te winnen, maar om levens te redden, 12th of September 2005.


75

ideology, only few actually turn to terrorism.228 The Netherlands however seems to put little emphasis

on this phase because it does not distinguish many conditions that make such a turn more likely. The

Dutch government does for example only marginally mention that supporting organisations can help

terrorists in performing their acts, and it does not at all stress that rogue states could play an important

role in making a potential terrorist attack more likely. The only factor on which the Dutch government

largely elaborates is what researchers distinguished as ‘ICT’. The Netherlands stresses that

communication technology have increased the opportunities for terrorist organisations to correspond,

plan, and organise. In this context, the Dutch government seems to regard the Internet as an important

matter, since the government stresses that it can be used both for preparation and recruitment

activities. On the one hand, Internet provides a way for anonymous and sheltered communication,

thereby enhancing terrorist planning. On the other hand, Internet offers opportunities for recruiting

organisations since it has a great reach for spreading radical propaganda.229

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter dealt with the analysis of the Dutch international anti-terrorism strategy. I did so

in three ways. Firstly, I explored the measures as proposed by the Netherlands in its anti-terrorism

strategy. Secondly, I investigated the view of the Dutch government on the origins of terrorism.

Subsequently, I translated those origins to the terms of the conceptual model.

In its fight against international terrorism, the Netherlands does not make use of a

comprehensive strategy that singles out its focus. The Dutch government however indicates that

jihadistic terrorism is a global threat, which needs to be combated on an international level. Therefore,

since 1997, when the member states of the EU put their signature under of the Treaty of Amsterdam,

terrorism belongs the supranational first pillar of the EU. The Union does have a comprehensive

strategy for fighting terrorism. This strategy is based on four pillars. The EU aims at preventing new

recruits to terrorism, protecting targets of attack, pursuing terrorists, and responding to the

consequences of a terrorist attack.

Subsequently, with regard to the Dutch view on the origins of terrorism, I did two important

findings. Firstly, I became aware of the broad range of structural factors the Dutch government

distinguishes. In terms of the conceptual model, the Netherlands fully recognises the economic cluster

of phase 1 by stressing that both absolute poverty and relative poverty are likely to contribute to

terrorism. Secondly, the Dutch government largely recognises the political cluster as distinguished in

the conceptual model. According to the Netherlands, both political voice and a dissimilarity of power

are factors that explain the emergence of terrorism. Besides, it marginally states that political

oppression could contribute to a lack of political voice. Finally, with regard to the social clusters, the

228 Council of the European Union, The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 24th of November 2005, p. 2. 229 NCTb, Jihadisten en het internet, December 2006, p. 8-10.


76

Dutch government recognises that diminishment of traditional social patterns could contribute to the

emergence of terrorism, since alienation from traditional certainties can stimulate people to turn to

ways to adopt some other sort of identity, something radical ideologies can provide.

The second key finding relates to the motivating factors the Dutch government distinguished.

In terms of the conceptual model, this means that the Netherlands puts great emphasis on phase 2, the

individual process of radicalisation in particular. Roughly, the Netherlands distinguishes three ways in

which radical Islam channels individual radicalisation. First, radical Islam can provide meaning to

one’s life, because it prescribes that one’s true identity can be found in ‘pure Islam’ by living

according to outlined prescriptions. Secondly the Netherlands realises that radical Islam provides

religious justification and – perhaps even more important – glorification, for example by praising

martyrdom. The Dutch government recognises that this can seriously lower the bar for turning to

violent methods. Finally, the Netherlands distinguishes a third way in which radical Islam channels

radicalisation. According to the Dutch government, radical Islam provides explanations to one’s

grievances by depicting the Western world as an ultimate enemy, responsible for everything that is

wrong in one’s country or region. That is, according the Dutch government, radical Islam offers

people an explanation for grievances and an outlet for anger by propagating a supposed proof of a

clash between the West and Islam.

The view of the Netherlands on the origins of terrorism, in which it recognises divergent

structural conditions that are at the basis of terrorism (phase 1) and in which in puts great emphasis on

the individual process of radicalisation (phase 2), is graphically reflected in a conceptual model as

presented in appendix 3.


77

Chapter 6: Conclusion 6.1 Recall


Centre, everyone became aware of what will be the central theme of this research: terrorism. This

event made politicians aware that action was required in order to prevent similar events. As a result,

fighting terrorism was made top priority. Numerous policies have been taken in order to stop the

terrorist threat, both in international and in domestic perspective. By means of this research, I

investigated the international anti-terrorism strategies of both the Netherlands and the USA. Reason

for doing so concerns the observation that both countries seem to approach terrorism in a different

way. That is, in fighting terrorism, the Netherlands appears to adopt a preventive approach by focusing

at addressing the causes of terrorism, whereas the USA seems more concerned with fighting the

manifestation of terrorism itself (repressive). This research’ objective is to investigate if a different

view these countries have on the origins of terrorism could be at the basis of such a difference. By

investigating this, I made use of the following research question: What are the differences and

similarities between the anti-terrorism strategies of the USA and the Netherlands concerning the fight

against international jihadistic terrorism and to what extent are those strategies of both countries

based on different analyses of the origins of terrorism?

In order to answer the main question, I divided this research in four parts. Chapter 2 dealt with

the meaning of terrorism. By presenting a definition of terrorism, and by distinguishing between

different types of it, I was able to focus on a specific kind of terrorism, and accordingly able to narrow

my research. The next chapter dealt with a theoretical exploration of the origins of terrorism. By

investigating existing research, I made an inventory of the available literature dealing with causes

leading up to terrorism. The following two chapters dealt with the investigation of the measures

proposed in the international anti-terrorism strategies of the USA (Chapter 4) and the Netherlands

(Chapter 5). I shall shortly recall the contents of both Chapters 2 and 3 first.

In Chapter 2, I discussed the definition of terrorism, thereby discriminating two core concepts:

its psychological effect of fear (1) and its focus on political objectives (2). Furthermore, I identified

the concept of terrorism in two ways. Firstly, I made a distinction between old- and new-style

terrorism. The latter style has three characterising aspects: a global reach, ruthless ways of violence,

and a network structure. The second way in which I defined terrorism was by identifying several kinds

of it, including religious terrorism. I drove that distinction further by focusing on jihadistic terrorism.

This type of terrorism refers to ‘jihad’, which is Arabic for ‘fight’ or ‘struggle’. Jihadistic terrorists’


78

ultimate goal is to establish a society which is the reflection of what the original sources of Islam

prescribe. In short, this chapter provided the opportunity to narrow my study by distinguishing new-

style jihadistic terrorism as the focus of research.

Chapter 3, named ‘the origins of jihadistic terrorism’, dealt, as its title reveals, with those

factors and conditions that cause terrorism. Such was considered necessary because it would give

structure to the following parts of research. This chapter was divided in two parts. Firstly, I made an

inventory of the literature that is available on the origins of terrorism. Researchers have presented

divergent factors that in a way explain the emergence of terrorism. Such factors could either be

considered as structural (prime movers) or as facilitating. This inventory however proved to be of

inadequate utility, because the factors could not be regarded sufficiently distinctive. Therefore, I

restructured these factors, thereby building a conceptual model in which I identified distinguishable

and comparable causes of terrorism. The purpose of the model is by no means to present a definitive

model. Instead, I merely created a reproduction of existing academic research, modified in a way that

it fits the purpose of this study: providing structure to the investigation of the American and Dutch

anti-terrorism strategies. The conceptual model as presented in Chapter 3 consists of three phases. The

first phase deals with structural underlying conditions that explain the emergence of terrorism. These

conditions can roughly be divided in three different clusters: a political, a economic, and a social one.

In the second phase I elaborated on the process of radicalisation, i.e. the process in which people

become increasingly prepared to apply terrorist methods. There are two ways in which this could

happen. Radical Islam can channel the individual radicalisation process both by providing increasing

religious legitimation for terrorist methods and by providing meaning to life for those people that feel

alienated. The third and final phase dealt with the causes that make it likely that a terrorist attack will

actually occur, i.e. factors that facilitate terrorism.

6.2 Comparison

The following two chapters (Chapters 4 and 5) dealt with the actual investigation of the

international anti-terrorism strategies of the USA and the Netherlands. In those chapters, I both

described the actual measures that are proposed in these strategies and I discussed the view of both

countries on the origins of terrorism. This conclusion provides room for the final part of this research:

a comparison between the USA and the Netherlands. In this section, I compare both countries by

discussing the similarities and differences of the actual anti-terrorism strategies and by discussing the

(different) analyses of the origins of terrorism that are at the basis of those strategies.

Both the USA and the Netherlands have laid down their anti-terrorism tactics in a national or

common strategy. In its National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the USA distinguishes between a

battle of arms (the short-term approach towards terrorism), and a battle of ideas (the long-term

approach). Although the Netherlands itself does not provide an anti-terrorism strategy, it refers to the


79

strategy of the EU as the leading approach for combating terrorism. The strategies of both countries

are very broad, involve numerous measures and plans, and therefore contain considerable similarity.

There are however also notable differences between the approach of both countries. The next

subsection deals with those measures of both countries that contain considerable similarity. By

contrast, the subsequent subsections shall successively compare the Netherlands and the USA on each

of the three phases, and will discuss some considerable differences, both with regard to the anti-

terrorism measures proposed and the underlying origins of terrorism these countries distinguish.

6.2.1 Non-distinctive measures: respond and protect

Policies that both the USA and the Netherlands find necessary in the fight against international

terrorism concern responding and protecting measures. These are measures that do not differ greatly

between both countries. I also did not expect to find such a difference in these fields. After all, to

adequately respond to a future attack, and to protect certain areas in order to reduce the consequences

of a future attack are such rational actions to take, that probably any country facing the threat of

terrorism would find it necessary to develop such measures. I will therefore just shortly compare the

strategies of the USA and the Netherlands in this fields.

When prevention fails, the Netherlands is determined to prepare, manage, and minimise the

consequence of an attack, i.e. to respond to a (future) terrorist attack. One of the proposed measures in

this field is the establishment of a central crisis coordinating system. Similarly, despite its best efforts

to prevent future terrorist attacks, the USA considers preparedness and response of importance as well.

Therefore, it does also stress the necessity of a national system to bring together and coordinate all

required response. So, responding measures are both to the Netherlands and the USA considered

necessary in the fight against international terrorism.

Another set of measures that contains considerable similarity concerns the protection of

possible targets. In this context, the Netherlands has developed measures aimed at reducing both the

vulnerability to be attacked, and the resulting impact of an terrorist attack. In doing so, the Netherlands

distinguishes three areas which demand protection: infrastructure, borders, and citizens. The USA also

considers defence of potential targets of attack necessary. It is determined to deter and disrupt attacks,

thereby protecting critical infrastructures and key resources, such as public health, energy facilities,

and banking and finance services. So, also protecting measures are both to the Netherlands and the

USA considered necessary in the fight against international terrorism.

6.2.2 Phase 1

Whereas the responding and protecting measures of the USA and the Netherlands can largely

be considered similar, other parts of their anti-terrorism strategies contain substantial differences. Let

me start with prevention measures. Although the objective, stop the next generation of terrorists from


80

emerging, is the same, the actual measures that both countries propose in this field are to be

considered dissimilar. In its strategy, the Netherlands proposes many measures in different fields to

prevent future terrorism, such as promoting good governance, human rights, democracy, economic

prosperity, inter-cultural dialogue, long-term integration, and non-discrimination. At the basis of this

broad range of measures lies a similar comprehensive set of origins of terrorism as distinguished in

phase 1 of the conceptual model. According to the Netherlands, factors as political voice, oppression,

and a dissimilarity of power, relative poverty, absolute poverty, and the diminishment of traditional

social patterns are all likely to cause terrorism. In short, at the basis of the Dutch anti-terrorism

strategy lie factors of all three clusters – political, economic, and social – of the conceptual model.

Compared to the Netherlands, the USA has not developed a broad and divergent range of

preventing measures. To stop the next generation of terrorists from emerging, the Bush Administration

solely stresses the advancement of freedom and human dignity trough effective democracy. In

different ways, it argues that democracy and political opportunities are the key matters that need to be

promoted in order to prevent future terrorism. At the basis of this preventing strategy lies the

American focus on the political cluster, and political voice in particular, of the conceptual model.

According to the Bush Administration, a lack of political voice, that is, the inability of political

expression, is the most important factor in explaining terrorism. Such a lack produces irresponsive

governments that are unable and/or unwilling to remove people’s grievances, which in turn is

contributing to the emergence of terrorism. Other factors, such as political oppression and economic

freedom, are also likely play a role in explaining terrorism, although both of these factors relate to

political voice. So, in short, whereas all three clusters are at the basis of the Dutch broad range of

preventing measures, the USA solely recognises factors of the political cluster as origins of terrorism,

and has accordingly promoted the advancement of effective democracy as the preventing strategy

only.

6.2.3 Phase 2

Similar to the comparison of phase 1, when one compares the USA and the Netherlands on the

second phase, some remarkable differences emerge. As explained, phase 2 of the conceptual model

deals with the process of radicalisation. According to the Netherlands, recognising this process is of

vital importance in order to understand the emergence of terrorism. The Dutch government therefore

greatly emphasises the factor ‘individual radicalisation’ as distinguished in the conceptual model. By

stressing that radical Islam can provide religious legitimation, meaning to life, and a solution to one’s

grievances, the Dutch government discerns three ways in which one could become increasingly

convinced, and accordingly, increasingly prepared to employ terrorist methods. This specific analysis

of the process of radicalisation is likely to be at the basis of certain particular anti-terrorism measures

as the Netherlands proposes in its strategy. The Dutch government for example stresses that non-


81

discrimination and long-term integration measures are of importance, because that would prevent

certain people from alienating from society, which in turn makes it less likely that those people

radicalise. Furthermore, the Dutch government stresses that the process of radicalisation is about the

intolerable idea that the Western world is the cause for everything that is wrong in one’s country.

These kind of experiences has increased suspicion among Western people towards Muslims in general.

The Dutch government responds to this situation of polarisation by for example promoting the

intercultural dialogue. Such should stimulate mutual understanding, respect and tolerance between

cultures and religions, thereby producing an environment in which people become less susceptible to

become radicalised. In short, phase 2 of the conceptual model seems to be largely at the basis of

particular measures the Netherlands proposes in its anti-terrorism strategy.

By contrast, the USA does not consider the process of radicalisation to be of importance. That

is, in its strategy, the Bush Administration does not give evidence of situations in which one could

become increasingly convinced and prepared to use terrorist methods.

6.2.4 Phase 3

The USA does however put forward two other origins of terrorism, factors that deviate from

the conceptual model as presented in Chapter 3. The first factor concerns the fact that the anti-

terrorism strategy of the USA is largely based on a clear good-wrong perspective. In that context, the

Bush Administration considers ‘evil’ as a factor that explains the emergence of terrorism. On the one

hand, the Bush Administration simply seems to accept that this world hosts evil men willing to

commit terrorist attacks. It on the other hand stresses that, when democracy and freedom are absent,

people can easily become persuaded and attracted by evil ideas. This idea of ‘evil’ as an origin of

terrorism seems to underlie USA’s strategy for fighting terrorism significantly. By recognising evil as

a cause of terrorism, the USA seems to embrace the idea that the only way to evil (terrorism) is by

eliminating it, i.e. by conducting harsh measures. Compared to the Netherlands, the USA noticeably

proposes such repressive measures with a harsh character. Take for example the prosecution of

terrorists. While the Netherlands merely speaks of bringing terrorists to justice within a framework in

which legality, legitimacy, and proportionality are guaranteed, the USA expresses itself in terms of

attack, eliminate, capture, and kill. According to the Bush Administration, the best way to defeat ‘evil

terrorism’ is to isolate and localise its activities and then destroy it trough intense, sustained action. In

short, the USA does not recoil from proposing harsh and far-reaching measures, including military

force, in order to disrupt terrorist activities. On the contrary, by means of its battle of arms, the USA

actually emphasises the necessity of such repressive measures.

The second factor that deviates from the conceptual model concerns the sponsorship of states.

Although researchers generally consider ‘state sponsorship’ as a factor that facilitates terrorism, the

USA considers it as a more significant origin of terrorism. To the Bush Administration, state


82

sponsorship is the lifeblood of terrorist groups, crucial for their survival. In fact, the USA seems to

consider state sponsorship of such importance, that it would not only make the occurrence of a

potential terrorist attack more likely, but that it is a structural factor of terrorism as well, conducive to

the organisation of terrorist groups as such. This particular view towards state sponsorship underlies

certain specific measures the USA proposes in its anti-terrorism strategy significantly. That is, by

means of its battle of arms, the USA elaborates on the divergent ways states can support terrorism.

The Bush Administration has accordingly devoted three pillars of its strategy that should deal with

state distribution of weapons of mass destruction (1), the financial support of states (2), or the

provision of safe havens (3). The USA stresses that, if necessary, the USA will use military force to

eliminate the threat WMD expose, and to deny terrorists the necessary support and sanctuary of rogue

states.

6.3 To conclude

This research has been an exploration of the anti-terrorism strategies of the USA and the

Netherlands. The reason for doing this study concerned the general image that both countries approach

terrorism differently. Whereas the USA would mainly deal with the manifestation of terrorism itself

(repressive approach), the Netherlands would be more concerned with addressing causes of terrorism

(preventive approach). By investigating the proposed anti-terrorism measures, I have been able to

conclude that such an image is largely warranted. That is, in its strategy, the Netherlands does indeed

propose various divergent measures to prevent future terrorism, and seems less concerned with

repressive methods. By contrast, half of USA’s strategy is composed of a ‘battle of arms’, with which

the Bush Administration proposes a variety of such harsh repressive measures. The USA is however

not exclusively concerned with fighting the manifestation of terrorism. It in fact developed a ‘battle of

ideas’, with which it proposes preventive measures, though in a more narrow way than the

Netherlands.

By observing this difference in approach, I subsequently wondered if a different view these

countries have on the origins of terrorism could be at the basis of that. By investigating the analyses

of the origins of terrorism both the USA and the Netherlands bring forward in their anti-terrorism

strategies, I have been able to conclude that both countries indeed do consider different factors to be

causes of terrorism. Whereas the Netherlands sees political, economic, and social factors, in

combination with a process of radicalisation to be at the basis of terrorism, the USA does solely

emphasise political factors, evil, and state sponsorship to be causes of terrorism. In fact, every phase as

distinguished in the conceptual model presents considerable differences between the USA and the

Netherlands. All in all, I can conclude that the Netherlands and the USA both propose different

measures in their anti-terrorism strategies and present a different view on the origins of terrorism that

is at the basis of those strategies.


83

Epilogue

In exploring the Dutch and American view on the origins of terrorism, I noticed a discernible

difference in delicacy between both countries. On the one hand, there is the Netherlands recognising

terrorism as a multiform phenomenon, characterised by its intricacy. One can identify such a notion

throughout the entire Dutch analysis of the origins of terrorism. For example, instead of speaking of

jihadists in general, the Netherlands discriminates between different movements of radical Islam, such

as radical political Islam and radical Islamic Puritanism. Furthermore, like already extensively

stressed, the Dutch government considers different factors, which are divergent in nature (political,

economic, and social), to contribute to the emergence terrorism. Moreover, the Netherlands regards the

process of radicalisation and its various ways that can lead to the emergence of terrorism as a matter of

importance as well. To my mind, the Dutch view on the origins of terrorism is based on a profound

analysis, in which it recognises the complex process that terrorism is, and the diverse relationships

leading up to it.

The USA on the other hand lays out the emergence of terrorism differently. In general, USA’s

anti-terrorism strategy is typified by its populist characteristics, and is therefore less subtle. This

mainly concerns USA’s solicitude with ‘evil’ as an origin of terrorism and the central role the USA

devotes to it for explaining terrorism. Although the Bush Administration constantly stresses the

importance of this factor in its anti-terrorism strategy, it does not elaborate on how evil should to lead

to the emergence of terrorism. The USA merely stresses that a lack of political opportunities and

freedom can cause people to turn to ‘evil ideas’, but why this exactly happens, and how that

subsequently should results to a terrorist attack remains far from clear. In this respect, to emphasise

evil as a origin of terrorism seems more a way of mobilising public support, than of proper analysing

efforts. In short, compared to the USA, the way the Netherlands presents terrorism is in my opinion

one of a more sophisticated character.


84

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Appendixes

Appendix 1: Conceptual model


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Appendix 2: The USA


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Appendix 3: The Netherlands

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