b 0001 mets land based air power

7/23/2019 b 0001 Mets Land Based Air Power

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3/187

DSCLAIMER

Thi s study represents

t he

vi ews

of

t he

aut hor

anddoes not

necessar i l y r e f l e c t t he o f f i c i a l opi ni on

of

t he Ai r Uni ver si t y

Cent er

f or Aer ospace Doct r i ne, Resear ch,

and Educat i on

(CADRE)

or t he

Depar t ment

of t he

Ai r

Force

.

Thi s

publ i cat i on has been

r evi ewed by

secur i t y

and

pol i cy

r evi ew

aut hor i ti es

and

i s c l ear ed f or

publ i c

r el ease

Thi s document i s

t he

property of

t he

Uni t ed States

gover nment

and

i s

not

t o be

r epr oduced i n whol e

or

i n par t

w t hout

per mssi on of

t he commander, CADRE,

Maxwel l

Ai r Force Base, A abama

I SBN

1-58566-000-0

i i


4/187

Li brary

of

CongressCatalogi ng i n

Publ i cat i on

Data

Mets

Davi d

Land Based

Ai r Power i n

Thi rdWrl d

Cri ses

J ul y

1986

I ncl udes

i ndex

Ai r power

2 Developi ng

countr i es- Str ategi c aspects

3

M l i t ar y

hi story

Modern 20th

century

T i t l e

UG6

.M378 1986

358. 4 03 86 7896


5/187

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK


6/187

J l

mmZ y

Of

CCa

tai uzNovnanfzo

mttz

CU4

: Sogq

954 98


7/187



8/187

CONTENTS

Chapt er

Page

DSCLAIMER

i i

FOREWORD

xi

OUTTHEUTHOR

x

PREF CE

CKNOWEDGMENTS

xvi i

POLITICALOBJECTIVESND

MLITARY

POWER

SOME

RELATIONSHPS

Cri s i s

Def i ned

2

Categor i es and

Characteri st i cs

of

M l i t ar y Force

2

Land-BasedAi r Power

Capabi l i ti es

3

Opt i ons

i n

Sel ect i ng

Land BasedAi r

Power

5

Not es

9

2

THE

THRD

WORLDNDTHE

UNTEDSTATES

PROBLEMS,

ASSUMPTIONS,

NDOUTLOOKS

Pr obl em

and

As sumpt i ons

2

Bl i nd

Al l eys

3

Cri ses

andVi ol ence

6

I nterdependence

16

D f f us i ng Advanced

Arm

t o

Les s Devel oped

Count r i es

LDCs

2

t l t y of M l i t ar yPower

27

Not es

3

3

THE

M Y GUEZ

INCDENT SIMPLECRSIS

35

Scenar i o

35

Genesi s of Cr i s i s

37

Land Based

Ai r Power n

t heRegi on

39

Gather i ng

I nf ormat i on and

Set ti ng

Obj ect i ves

4

Vi i


9/187

Chapt er

Page

Formul at i ng Opt i ons

. . . .

. . .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. . . . . . . 41

Sel ecti ng the Best

Opt i on

. . . .

. .

. .

. .

. . . .

. .

. . .

.

. . .

43

I mpl ement ati on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

Landi ngs

a t

Koh

Tang . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

46

Ret aki ng

the

Mayaguez

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . .

49

Bombi ng the

Mainl and

.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

Land Based

Ai r

Power

andCri si s Resol ut i on

. .

. . . .

.

. . .

51

Not es

.

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

.

.

.

. . . .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. . . . .

.

.

59

4

THEBAYOF

PIGSI NC DENT

I NTERMED TECRSI S . .

65

Devel opi ng

Opt i ons

. . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

65

Doct r i ne andthe

Bayof Pi gs Pl an . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

66

Strategy

Maki ng

. . .

. .

. . .

. . .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. . .

. .

67

Order of

Batt l e

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

71

I mpl ement at i on

. . .

. .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71

P o l i t i c a l

I mpact s

on

the Ai r Pl an

.

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

.

.

73

D1 . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

. . .

. . . .

.

.

73

Dday

. .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. .

. . .

.

.

74

D . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

. .

. . .

.

.

79

D 2 . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . .

81

Not es

.

. .

. . . . . . . . . . .

.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

5

THEYOM

I PPURWRCOMPLEX

CRSIS . . . . . . . . . .

89

Genesi s of the

Cri si s .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. . . .

.

. . . . . 89

The

Arabs Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. .

. . .

. . .

.

.

96

Rever si ng the Ti de on

theGol an . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.

98

Superpower

I nf ormat i on

Gather i ng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.

. .

99

Superpower

Concer ns andI nci pi ent

Cri si s

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . .

99

Sovi et

Concerns . .

. .

. .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

meri can

Concerns

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . . .

. .

. .

. . . . . . . . 100

Condi t i ons

f or

Cease- f i re

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . .

.

102

GrowngSuperpower

Tensi ons

. . .

. .

.

: . .

.

. . . . . . .

103

USAi r Power . . .

. .

. . .

. . . . .

.

.

.

.

.

. .

.

. . .

1 5

TheCrossi ng to

Af r i ca

. . . . . . . . . . . .

.

.

. .

. . .

108

Kosygi n s

EmergencyM ssi on t o Cai ro . . : . . . . . . .

1 9

Cease- f i re

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . 11

Worl dCri si s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Notes

. .

. . .

. . .

. .

.

.

.

. . . . . . . . . . .

.

. . . . . 117

6

CRSES

I N

SUB SAHARANFR C . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

121

TheCongoC r i s i s

196 63

.

. . .

. .

. . .

. . . .

. . .

. . . . . . .

.

121

Dagon

Rouge

The

Stanl eyvi l l e

C r i s i s 1964

.

. . . .

. .

. . .

.

125

Shaba I 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

V i i i


10/187

Chapt er

Page

_

Shaba 978

Notes

7

7

ON LUSIONS

LIMT TIONS

ND

C P ILITIESOF

IRPOWER

THRDWORLDCRISES 9

Characteri sti cs and

Capabi l i t i es 9

U t i l i t y and

L i m tat i ons

4

Strategi c andConcept ual

I mpl i cat i ons

49

I LIOGR PHC L

ESS Y 5

I NDEX

6

i x


11/187

I LLUSTRATIONS

Page

F- 111

39

C 13 Hercul es

4

HH 53

46

OV 1 Br onco

48

B 26

68

C 46

Commndo

andC 54Skymaster

77

F- 4 Phantom

107

A 4Skyhawk

107

B 52

S t r a t o f o r t r e s s

114

T- 28 Tr oj an 126

C- 141 S t a r l i f t e r 134

TABLES

Numers of

Weapons

Del i ver ed

by

Maj or Suppl i er s

t o

Af r i ca Sub- Sahar an

22

A i r l i f t dur i ng t heYom

i ppur

Cri si s,

1973

1 6

PS

Sout heast Asi a

36

TheGul f of Thai l and

37

Koh

Tang I sl and

44

TheCar i bbean and Gul f of

Mexi co

66

The

Bay

of

Pi gs

69

The

Si nai

Deser t and

Suez

Canal

9

The

Gol an

Hei ght s

97

Sub- Sahar anAf r i ca

122

Zai re

123

x


12/187

FOR WOR

The t h i r d wor l d cont i nues t o growi n i t s i mpor t ance t o t he Uni t ed States Of t en

possessi ng weal t h of v i t l

nat ural

resources or geographi c

posi t i on

astr i de

cruci al

l i n e s

of communi cat i ons

t h i r d wor l d nat i ons have

i n many cases become

t he f ocal

poi nt

of East - West

conf ront at i ons

Addi t i onal l y

t he

f requent

p o l i t i c l

t urmoi l

n econom c

c r i s e s t h t pl ague some of these

t h i rd

wor l d nat i ons often

threaten

t he v i t l i n t er e s t s of t he

West

For

l l of these

reasons

i s

i mperat i ve

t h t

we

underst and t he u t i l i t y

n

l i mtat i ons

of ml i t a ry power

appl i ed

t o

c r i s i s

si t uat i ons

i n t he t h i r d wor l d Land-

based

i r

power i s of

part i cul ar

i mpor t ance

i n rapi dl y devel opi ng

c r i s e s because

of

i t s

range

of acti on and

speed of response r Met s st udy f ocuses on

l and- based

i r

power

i n

vari et y

of

these

si t uat i ons over t he past

three

decades

Cl earl y

t he

subj ect

i s

i mpor t ant

t o

our underst andi ng

of

t he

most

ef f ecti ve

use

of

i r power

t i s

al so cl ear

t h t r

ets

has

made a

si gni f i cant

cont ri but i on

t o t he

l i t e r t u r e

of i r

power n

provi des

mess ge

t h t

we

l l

shoul d

heed


13/187



14/187

OUT

THE

UTHOR

Dr

Davi d

RMets earned

hi s BS from

t he US

Naval

Academy

hi s

M

f rom

Col umbi a Uni ver si t y, and hi s PhD

from

the Uni vers i ty of

Denver

He

compl et ed

a

30- year

career

i n t h e USNavy

and Ai r Force

i n

9 9 Dur i ng hi s career, he

t aught

di pl omati c

andml i t a r y hi story

t

bot h t he Ai r Force Academy

and

West Poi nt and

served

s

t he edi t or of t he Ai r Uni vers i t y

Revi ew

t he

prof essi onal j our nal

of t he Ai r

For ce

He

hol ds

bot h navi gator and

p i l o t

r at i ngs andhi s s er vi ce

l s o i ncl uded

two

f l yi ng tours i n Sout heast As i a The

f i r s t

1968- 70 was as an

i r r f t commander

of

C- 130s

and t he

l t t e r

was i n AC-130s

Duri ng t he

Mayaguez

Cr i s i s

he was

operat i ons

of f i cer

of t he

16t h

Speci al Operat i ons Squadron suppl yi ng

ni ght f i r e

support

f or t he US

f or ces

i n t h e

Cr i s i s

Later

he

t ook

command

of

t he

squadron

As

aM TS

navi gator, Mets has f l own

many

of t he

routes

and vi s i ted many of t he

pl aces

i n

Eur ope,

Af r i ca,

andAs i a t h t f i gur e

i n t hi s

work

He

i s

now

worki ngas a

Hi st or i an t Ai r For ce System Command s Armament D vi s i on

l ocat ed

t Egl i n

F Hi s

f i r s t

book, N TOAn

Al l i ance

f orPeacewas

publ i shed i n 1981 by J ul i an

Messner i n

NewYork

x i i i


15/187



16/187

PREF E

The

basi c t h r u s t

of t h i s

study i s

t o demonst r at e t he u t i l i t y

and

l i m tat i ons of

l and

based

a i r c r a f t

when

used

t o a t t a i n

p o l i t i c a l

obj ect i ves

i n

c r i s e s

occurr i ng

i n

t he

t h i r d

wor l d

Cri ses

when used

i n t he cont ext

of

t h i s

study

are

vi ewed pri mari l y

as

s er i es

of i nt eracti ons etween

or w t h i n

s t a t e s

f or whi ch

there

e x i s t s t he per cept i on

of

ahi gh probabi l i ty of

war

Adm t t edl y

det erm nati on

of per cepti on

i s

a

subj ecti ve

process

one

t h a t

does not

l end

i t s e l f t o qual i f i cat i on but when f e a r appr ehensi on

and

t ensi on

reach l evel that pr ompt s

some

formof conf l i ct behavi or

t hen

per cept i onof

a

hi gh

probabi l i ty

of war can be sai d t o exi st

eyond ny

doubt

our

case

study of t he 1973 Yomi ppur

War

wi l l

cl earl y

i ndi cat e t he

exi st ence

of m j or c r i s i s ndone

t h a t escal ated

t o

danger ous

l evel s

y

contrast

our

case

st udi es

of

t he Mayaguez i n

1975

t he

ongo

nd

t he

ay

of

Pi gs

i n t he

earl y

s i x t i e s nd

Zai re

i n

t he md sevent i es

i ndi cat e

l ower

l evel

of

i n t e n s i t y

Consequent l y

we examne these conf l i cts on typol ogi cal bas i s r angi ng

f r o msi mpl e

t o

a

compl ex

c r i s i s

and

si nce t he

essence

of c r i s i s i s i t s uncer t ai nt y

and unpredi ctabi l i t y these

l a t t e r

case st udi es r emai n sui tabl e f or

our anal ysi s

Col l ecti vel y these i nt eract i ons appear t o provi de mpl eevi dence

of t he u t i l i t y of

l and based a i r c r a f t t o si gnal i nt ent i ons demonst r at e support

modi f y

behavi or nd

termnate c o n f l i c t

y

t he same

t oken

however

these

i nt eracti ons suggest some

l i m tat i ons of l and based

a i r c r a f t

whenempl oyed i n

r emot e areas

di st ant f r o mm i n

operat i ng bases Our case

st udi es

span t he gl obe

t o ex mne

t h i r d wor l d

cri ses

occurr i ng as f ar

away

as

Sout heast

Asi a

nd

as c l ose t o

home

as t he Cari bbean nd

Gul f of Mexi co Thus

t h i s

di scussi on present s geogr aphi cal

sampl e as

wel l

as

t ypol ogi cal study of t h i r d worl d cri ses


17/187



18/187

CKNOWLEDGMENTS

The i rpower

Resear ch n s t i t u t e

was

f ounded as apart

of t he

Ai r

Uni versi t y i n

1980

t o f urt her i nvest i gat i on

of

t opi cs

on

t he

appl i cat i on

of

ai r

power

t o

t he

pr obl ems of achi evi ng

nat i onal

p o l i t i c a l obj ect i ves

The

current

work i s

one

of t he

f i r s t

two st udi es

i n i t i a t e d

by

t he

i n s t i t u t e

t

was i nspi red

i n

p a r t by

two

semnal

books

whi ch l ooked

t o

t he

achi evement

of

p o l i t i c a l

goal s usi ng t he ml i ta r y

i nst rument of

pol i cy

wi t hout war

The

f i r s t of

t hese

was The

L i m t s of Coer ci ve

Di pl omacy

by Al exander George

Davi d

Hal l

and Wl l i am

R

S mons

t

mght

wel l

be

deemed one of t he

cl assi c

works

on t he

s ubj e ct

and t he

l at t ermost

aut hor

had

an i mpor t ant rol e

i n

t he genesi s of

t h i s

st udy

The second Force

W t hout War by Barry

Bl echman

and St ephen S Kapl an

i s

al so a t

t he

head

of

i t s

f i e l d

and

s e t s

a

st andard

t oward

whi ch

t h i s

st udy can

onl y

reach

These

two

c l a ss i c s t hen

appr oached t he

subj ect

wi t h a vi ewt oward i nvest i gat i ng

t he u t i l i t y

and

l i mtat i ons

of

m l i t ar y i nst rument s

i n general i n t he

achi evement of p o l i t i c a l

goal s

wi t hout war

The

ai m

here was t o cont i nue

t h a t

i nvest i gat i on wi t h a more

speci al i zed st udy t h a t

would t ake

a cl oser l ook a t

t he ways t he ai r power

el ement

of

t he ml i ta ry i nst rument

coul d and

coul d not be

used

f or such pur poses

More t han any

ot her i ndi vi dual t he f i r s t

di rector

of

t he i rpower

Research

n s t i t u t e Col

Thomas

Fabyani c US F

gave

purpose

and formt o t h i s

book

He

was at t he

heart of t he i n i t i a l concept ual i zat i on

gave t he

proj ect

di rect i on

as

t

was

devel opi ng

andhadamaj or hand

i n

t he

edi t i ng

t h a t brought t down

from

amass

of

papers

t o what wehope

i s

a

morecoher ent and usabl e form

Thedept h and scope of

h i s i magi nat i on and knowedge

were

especi al l y

cent ral t o

t he f i r s t and l a s t

chapt er s

The

achi evement

of Ms Mary Schenk

MsEdna

Davi s andMs J o nnPerdue i n

suppor t i ng t he

work

dur i ng

t he i n i t i a l

wri t i ng deserves

speci al

recogni t i on

f or t hei r

compet ence coul d not

be

repressed by

t he

conf usi on

at t endant

t he i n i t i a l

organi zat i on

of a

new

n s t i t u t i o n

t he

i rpower

Resear ch n s t i t u t e

I mport ant t o t he

preparat i on of t he

manuscr i pt

was

t he

edi t i ng

of Ms Bessi e

Varner whosework

went beyond

t he mere

c a l l

of dut y

The f i n a l preparat i on of t he manuscr i pt

was

done by

Ms

Dorot hy

McCuski e and

her s t a f f and t h e i r obvi ous

exper t i se

and

unf ai l i ng

good

humor

made

t

a

pl easure

t o

part i ci pat e

i n

t h a t pa r t

of

t h i s

work

There i s

much

t r u t h

i n t he

axi om ha t

a

t r e e

i s known

by t s f r u i t Most of t he

research

f or

t h i s book

wasdone

i n t he

Ai r

Uni versi t y

Li brary

t he di rector of whi ch

s

M

Rober t Lane

Theresul t s of hi s work are

cl ear Hi s expert i se

and

cooper at i ve

x v i i


19/187

s p i r i t

ar e r ef l ec ted t hr oughout hi s s t f f w t hout

except i on

s l i b r a r y oneof t he

best i n

t he

sout heast

Uni t ed States anddoubt l ess t he

l eadi ng i r power

l i b r a r y i n t he

wor l d

For t he r esear cher t her e can beno

more pl easant

worki ngenvi r onment and

I amespec i al l y

gr atef ul t o

M

Laneandhi s

s t f f

f or

maki ng

t so

Fi nal l y

t h i s book

i s

dedi cat ed t o

Capt ai n NormanLeo

Mart el USAF who

di ed

i n

t he l i n e of

dut y

even as

i t

was

bei ng

wr i t t en

When

he

l e f t us he

was

t t he

cont r ol s of

h i s

i rForce MC 130

when

t crashed i n t o

Subi c Bay

knew

hi mwel l

t hough not

l ong

enough He was aChr i s t i an sol di er of t he f i r s t r ank

and

w t h

hi m

t he US i rFor ce and meri ca l o s t oneof our f i n e s t

sons

z v i i i


20/187

CHAPTERI

POLITICAL

OBECTIVESAND

MLITARY

POWER

SOMERELATIONSHIPS

The ex i s t e nc e

of a r e l a t i o n s h i p bet ween t he us e of

m l i t a r y

f o r c e and t he

at t ai nment

of

p o l i t i c a l o bj ec t i v es i s a general l y accepted

premse .

Less obvi ous i s

t he na t ur e

of

t h a t

r e l a t i o n s h i p

. Thi s uncert ai nt y

r e s u l t s i n pa r t because of t he

enor mous

po t e nt i a l of m l i t a r y

f o r c e t h a t

permts

i t s

use

a c r o s s a spectrum

of

opti ons

t o achi eve a v a r i e t y of

p o l i t i c a l

obj ecti ves . At

one ext r eme,

f o r exampl e,

t h e r e e x i s t s t he

p o s s i b i l i t y of gai ni ng

i nf l uence i n

domest i c

and

i n t er n at i o na l

p o l i t i c s

mer el y

by

a l l o c a t i n g

l i mted r esour ces

t o

t he

devel opment ,

product i on,

and

depl oyment of weapon

system More

d i r e c t l y ,

a gover nment can at t empt t o s i gna l

concern,

commt ment , or i n t e nt i o ns by i ncr emental

i n cr e a s e s i n t he r e ad i n es s

c o n d i t i o n

of

f o r c e s

and

by a l t e r i n g

t h e i r

depl oyment s t a t u s . Yet anot her exampl e

woul d

be

t o

e s t a b l i s h

a

p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e t h a t

c a l l s

f o r t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of an e x i s t i n g

p o l i t i c a l

e n t i t y ,

i n whi ch

case

maximumm l i t a r y

f o r c e

mght

be r equi r ed f o r

an

extended t i me

.

When t he o bj ec t i ve

i s

t o

destroy a

po l i t i c al ent i t y ,

t he

cause- and- ef f ect

r e l a t i o n s h i p bet ween t he

use of m l i t a r y force and att ai nment of t he

p o l i t i c a l

o b j e c t i v e

i s

c l e a r

enough

But

when t he

p o l i t i c a l

o b j e c t i v e

i s

t o

i n f l uen c e

r a t h e r

than

d e s t r o y ,

provi ng cause and e f f e c t

becomes

a most

d i f f i c u l t t a s k Even i n s i t u a t i o n s

wher e d i s c r e t e p o l i t i c a l

obj ecti ves

a r e sought

by appl yi ng a measur ed degr ee of

m l i t a r y

f o r c e , i t

i s

v i r t u a l l y i mpossi bl e, f o r numer ous r e a s o n s , t o determne

c a s u a l i t y i n exac t

te rm

Nevert hel ess, ana l y s i s

of

t he

use

of f o r c e t o modi f y

behavi or

i n

t he post - Wor l d

War

I I

exper i ence s u g g e s t s

t h a t

t he use of

f o r c e

often

achi eves

d es i r e d p o l i t i c a l

o bj ec t i v es ,

at l eas t

i n t he

near

te rm

Gi ven

t h a t

i mpl i ed

r e l a t i o n s h i p ,

i t

i s , perhaps, wor t hwhi l e

t o

examne

how s p e c i f i c el ement s of

m l i t a r y

power

have been used, s h o r t of wagi ng

war , t o i n f l uen c e t he behavi or of

an

a c t o r

i n

t he

i nt er n at i o na l

arena

More

s p e c i f i c a l l y ,

t he

purpose

here

i s

t o

expl or e

t he

u t i l i t y

and

l i m t a t i o n s

of

US

l and- based

a i r power i n

achi evi ng

p o l i t i c a l o bj ec t i v es

i n

an envi r onment

descr i bed a s

a

c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n

1


21/187

LAND-BASED

AIR

POWR

I NTHIRDWORLDCRISES

CRISISDEFINED

Si nce the t e rmc r i s i s , as used i n

i nt er nat i onal

p o l i t i c s , i s def i ned

i n manyways, i t

i s

necessary t o provi de a t

l east

aworki ng

def i ni t i on

t h a t

can be used f or f ur ther

anal ysi s

For t unat el y,

a

sui t abl e

one

has

been devel oped

by

Genn

H

Snyder

and

Paul

Di esi ng, who

def i ne

i nt er nat i onal

c r i s e s

a s

a

sequence

of

i nteracti ons

bet ween

t he

gover nment s of two or

more

sover ei gn s t a t es i n

severe

c o n f l i c t ,

short

of act ual

war ,

but

i nvol vi ng t he per cept i on of a danger ousl y

hi gh

probabi l i ty

or

war [ emphasi s i n t he o r i g i n al ] . 2

The def i ni t i on speci f i cal l y i dent i f i es a

number of

concepts f or

further anal ysi s,

but

per haps

i t s

greatest val ue i s

t he

i mpl i ed

emphasi s i t pl aces

on unpredi ctabi l i ty

G ven

i t s central r ol e i n

a c r i s i s ,

unpr edi ctabi l i t y

argues t h a t deci si on

maker s, as

much

as they

woul d

l i k e

i t

t o

be

ot herw se,

si mpl y cannot

f u l l y

control

events

.

They

are

forced,

i nst ead, t o

cope

w t h

t he phenomena

of r i s k

and

uncer t ai nt y

as

they affect both t he

p o l i t i c a l

and

ml i t a r y aspects

of

a

c r i s i s

I n br oad

te rm,

r i s k

i s

defi ned as the

degr ee of

probabi l i ty that adesi r ed

p o l i t i c a l

or m l i t a r y outcome

wi l l

not

occur w t h i n ident i f ied par amet er s or

assumpt i ons

Uncert ai nt y,

by contrast,

repr esents the

s t a t e

of

i ncompl et e

knowedge

t h a t

exi sts about t he

p o l i t i c a l

aspects

of

a c r i s i s and t he appl i cat i on

of

force

t o r esol ve

i t

4 Both

r i s k

and

uncer t ai nt y ar e

i nherent i n

c r i s i s , and

they

canbemeasured

or esti mat ed t hrough

t he use

of var i ous

anal yt i cal

processes

The

conf i dence l evel s

one

assi gns t o t he out comes ,

however ,

qui t e

often

are

open

t o

chal l enge

.

Less

debat abl e ar e t he

ar gument s

t h a t c r i s e s

w l l

occur

w t h

a

degr ee of regul ari ty

and

t h a t

t he Uni t ed States

(and

t he USSR

as wel l )

wi l l

use

m l i t a r y force i n

an

at t empt t o r esol ve t he cr i ses on

f avor abl e t er ms Theuse

of

ml i t a r y power short

of

war has been

a

f r equent

occurrence

i n t he post - Wor l d

War I I per i od

f or

both

t he

Uni t ed States and t he USSR

t h i s

f a c t i s wel l documentedandoffers muchevi dence

f o r

t he

u t i l i t y

of m l i t a r y

force

as

a

means of achi evi ng

p o l i t i c a l obj ect i ves . Less

c l e a r , however ,

i s t he u t i l i t y of spec i f ic el ement s of ml i t ar y

power and howt he

changi ng

i nt ernat i onal envi r onment may a l t e r

t h ei r

ef f ect i veness

CATEGORIES

ANDCHARACTERISTICS

OF

MLITARY

FORCE

I n

a c l a s s i c a l sense, ml i t ar y for c es ar e

di vi ded

i n to t he three

separate

cat egor i es

of

gr ound

combat , naval ,

and a i r

forces

. These

f or mal

di sti ncti ons,

however , ar e

cl ouded

by t he

compr ehensi ve capabi l i ty

and

f l e x i b i l i t y

of

US ml i t a r y

or gani zat i ons

.

As exampl es, both t he Uni t ed

States Army

and

Navy

possess

subst ant i al

combat

a i r

power

pot ent i al ,

and t he

Uni t ed States

Mari neCorps

i ncl udes

or gani c gr ound and

a i r

combat

forces

Ot her

l i m t e d r edundanci es e x i s t ,

but

i n

t he

mai n,

US

combat

forces

tend

t o f uncti on i n apr i mar y medi um

The

Army

and t he

Mar i ne Cor ps

basi cal l y ar e ground forces, t he

Navy

pr i mar i l y f unct i ons

at s ea ,

and

t he

Ai r

Force

operates

i n

t he

aerospace medi um Obvi ousl y,

t he

basi c

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s

of

these

forces

d i f f e r , and

a s

a

consequence,

spec i f i c

el ement s

tend

2


22/187

POLITICALOBECTIVES

ANDMLITARYPOWR

t o

be

more appr opr i at e t han others f or use i n cert ai n

c r i s i s

i nt er acti ons

Each force

offers

a

di f f erent type

of

combat

capabi l i ty and

i t s

use

conveys

a di scerni bl e

di pl omat i c andp o l i t i c a l message

Per haps

t he

hi ghest

l e ve l

of

commtment

i n a c r i s i s i s madeby t he

depl oyment

of

gr ound

combat

forces

I n

contrast

t o

ot her t ypes of

force,

consi derabl y

more

e f f o r t

i s r equi r ed t o

depl oy

andwi t hdr aw gr ound combat

forces ;

whi l e

depl oyed they ar e

hi ghl y vi si bl e because

of

one

of

t h e i r

maj or

f unct i ons

of

sei z i ng and

hol di ng

t e r r i t o r y .

Much l e s s

of a

commtment, however ,

i s suggest ed

by t he use

of

naval

power

.

Naval

b a t t l e

gr oups

canbe depl oyed

t o a

c r i s i s area

w t h

r e l a t i v e

ease

and

l ow

cost,

pr i mar i l y

because some

ar e nor mal l y

a t sea anyhow

and

t h e i r

r esponsi veness

t o

a

c r i s i s

mai nl y

i s a f unct i on

of

pr oxi mt y t o

t he

c r i s i s l ocat i on

.

Mor eover , and

i n contr ast t o

ground

combat forces,

shi ps

a t

sea

offer

t he

pot ent i al

of l i m t e d v i s i b i l i t y i n t he c r i s i s area, shoul d

t h a t be

desi r ed

;

however , i f more

v i s i b i l i t y

i s

r equi r ed, t he

use

of

naval

a i r

power

can

extend

i t

by conduct i ng

appr opri at e a i r oper at i ons . But per haps

of

greatest

i mpor t ance

i s t he a b i l i t y

of naval

forces

t o depar t an

area as

qui ckl y

as

they

arr i ve

Thi s f l e x i b i l i t y canbe amaj or

advant age, part i cul ar l y gi ven t he

p o l i t i c a l and oper at i onal r i s k and

uncer t ai nt y

i nherent i n

c r i s i s . b

LANDBASED

AIRPOWERCAPABILI TIES

Between

these

re l at i vel y

hi gh

and l ow

l evel s

of

commtment

and

v i s i b i l i t y

offered

by gr ound andnaval forces, r espect i vel y, there exi sts

an

i nter medi at e poi nt

i n t he

c r i s i s r esponse spectrum Spec i f i cal l y,

t he uni que charact eri sti cs

and

capabi l i t i es

of l and- based

a i r power ar e t he

factors

t h a t

make

avai l abl e a

w der

r ange of opt i ons f or

use

i n

t he

i nt er acti ons

t h a t

typ i fy

a

c r i s i s

.

I n general , l and- based

a i r power

si gnal s

a l e ve l of commtment

gr eat er t han naval

power

but l e s s

than

gr ound forces, and

a

v i s i b i l i t y factor

l e s s

than gr ound forces

but

greater than

naval

forces

.

W t hout doubt, t he most si gni f i cant uni que

char acteri sti c of l and- based

a i r

power

i s

i t s

r ange,

t he a b i l i t y

t o

travel vast di st ances unimpededby ter rain

Land- based

a i r

power i s

gl obal

i n nature, and i n

t h i s

respect

i t s

per f or mance

i s

unmatchedby other

types

of

a i r

power

.

When

t he r ange

factor

i s combi ned

w t h

t he

payl oad

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c

of l and- based cargo

a i r c r a f t ,

f or

exampl e,

an enormous pot ent i al

becomes

avai l abl e f or

i mmedi ate

use dur i ng

c r i s e s

Rel at i vel y l ar ge vol umes of

mater i al

andper sonnel ,

m l i t a r y

andnonml i t ar y,

can

be

transported t o

and f rom

a

di stant c r i s i s area

f a s t e r by

l and- based

a i r c r a f t

than

byanyother means

.

At h i r d

uni que

aspect

of l and- based

a i r

power ar i ses from

combini ng t he

r ange

char acteri sti cs

w t h an a b i l i t y t o del i ver vast amount s of

convent i onal

or dnance .

Themere exi stence of

t h i s convent i onal str at egi c

bombi ng pot ent i al , t he

a b i l i t y

t o

pl ace

t he

force

at

a

hi gh

l evel

of

a l e r t

status

f or

i mmedi at e

use,

and

t he

actual

depl oyment of i t

t o

more t hr eat eni ng

f orward

bases cl ear l y of f er

t he Uni t ed

States

a

f l e x i b l e

ml i t a r y

opt i on

f or

c r i s i s response Li kew se, t a c t i c a l l and- based

a i r c r a f t ,

despi t e re l at i vel y l i m t e d

r ange,

pr ovi de

yet

anot her

al t ernat i ve

dur i ng

c r i s i s

3


23/187

LANDBASEDAIRPOWR

INTHRD

WORLDCRSES

i nt er acti ons

.

Thei r f orward

depl oyment

to di stant

areas

i n

a

r esponsi ve

manner i s

possi bl e because

of an

ext ensi ve

aer i al re fuel i ng

force .

I n al most

r out i ne f ashi on,

e n t i r e squadr ons

of

t a c t i c al

l and- based

a i r c r a f t

of

var i ous types

ar e

r egul ar l y

depl oyed f r o m t he Uni t ed States t o numerous over seas l ocat i ons, and they can

arr i ve

prepared

t o

per fo rm

i n

t h e i r

assi gned

rol es

.

Yet

anot her

uni que

f unct i on of l and- based

a i r c r a f t

i s i t s

a b i l i t y

t o per fo rm

s t r a t e g i c

sur vei l l ance

and

r econnai ssance

.

Part i cul ar l y

dur i ng

c r i s e s , t he

nature of

the data and i nf or mat i on col l ec ted and

t hei r

i mmedi at e

a v a i l a b i l i t y

t o deci si on

makers makemore

r e l i a b l e

choi ces l i k e l y

.

A

i n a l

uni que

capabi l i ty

of

l and- based

a i r c r a f t

i s

i t s

r esponsi veness

.

I t can posi t i on i t s e l f

and

establ i sh

a presence

i n

di stant

areas more rapi dl y than any other

t ype of

m l i t a r y force ; i t provi des enormous

f l e x i b i l i t y by permt t i ng

depl oyment of

var i ous types

of power

i n s t a n t l y , ei t her en

masse

or

i ncr ement al l y ;

i t

can

r edepl oy

f roma

l ocat i on al most as qui ckl y a s

i t

depl oyed

;

and,

unl i ke

ot her

f or ms

of

a i r

power ,

l and- based

a i r c r a f t

has t he

capabi l i ty to

be pl aced

over vi r tua l ly any geogr aphi cal l ocat i on i n

t he

wor l d

w t h i n

hour s

of

deci si on 7

I n

addi t i on t o those

uni que charact eri sti cs of

l and- based

a i r

power , i t i s

not ewor t hy

t h a t t he a b i l i t y

of

t he Uni t ed States to empl oy i t i s vi r tua l ly unsur passed

i n

t he

i nt er nat i onal

ar ena . Our most

f or mdabl e

compet i t or , t he USSR cannot

match t he

demonst r at ed

a b i l i t y and pr of i c i ency

of

Ameri can

str at egi c

a i r l i f t ,

bombardment, and

r econnai ssance

forces

The

frequency

of

US

l and- based

a i r

power

depl oyment s and

t he r e l a t i v e

ease w t h whi ch they are

conduct ed

permt

one

t o

char act er i ze

them

as

near rout i ne

i n

nature

As

such,

they

cont i nuousl y

i n f o rm

a l l i e s ,

f r i e n d s ,

neut r al s,

and

pot ent i al adver sar i es al i ke of

t he

potency of US

a i r

power proj ect i on forces I n

s h o r t ,

US

l and- based

a i r

power

depl oyment

sends a

steady and r easonabl y cl ear si gnal t o t he i nt er nat i onal communi ty,

whi l e

a t t he

same

t i me

t he

s i z e , f l e x i b i l i t y , and pr of i c i ency of depl oyment s

tend

t o

reduce

t he

l evel s

of

r i s k anduncer t ai nt y t h a t accompany

c r i s i s

responses .

L i ke any ot her

ar m

however ,

l and- based

a i r power

possesses some cl ear

oper at i onal

l i mtat i ons, par t i cul ar l y for cr ises whi ch

occur

i n cert ai n

areas

i n whi ch

combat

i s t o

be

avoi ded

At

t i mes,

t he

combined

p o l i t i c a l and oper at i onal

chal l enges associ at ed w t h

c r i s e s ar e

suf f i c ien t ly severe t o make some

depl oyment s

d i f f i c u l t

or

even i mpract i cal

.

Speci f i cal l y, over f l i ght

of

anot her' s

sover ei gn

t e r r i t o r y

or

t he

use

of

en

route bases f or

a i r c r a f t

mai nt enance, c rew r e s t ,

or

refuel i ng

cannot

al ways be

assured

Thi s

i s especi al l y

t r u e

i f

t he

c r i s i s

i nvol ves

v i t a l

i nt ernat i onal or

r egi onal

concerns

of

a p o l i t i c a l ,

economc,

or i deol ogi cal

nature

.

I ndeed,

t he

cr i sscrossi ng or

overl appi ng

nature of

these currents,

especi al l y

i n

t he

t h i r d

wor l d,

adds t o

t he oper at i onal r i s k anduncer t ai nt y

i nherent i n

t he

depl oyment

of ml i t a r y

power

. Asi de f romen route

basi ng

and

over f l i ght constr ai nt s, t he

most

ser i ous quest i on concerni ng

t he use

of l and- based

a i r c r a f t ,

a t t i mes, i s t he

a v a i l a b i l i t y

of

a

sui t abl e

a i r f i e l d

i n or suf f i c ien t ly near

t he

c r i s i s area

.

Adeci si on t o

use

force

t o

secure

an

a i r f i e l d

may

be unacceptabl e

i f

combat

i s

not

desi r ed

;

but

i f

such

a deci si on i s

made,

i t i s

probabl e

t h a t

some

t ype of

gr ound force woul d

be

r equi r ed

f or

t h i s pur pose

The net

e f f e c t s ,

of

course, are

an

escal at i on

of

t he c r i s i s ,

a

demonst r at i on of hi gher

commtment,

an i ncr ease i n

oper at i onal

r i s k

and

4


24/187

POLI TICAL

OBECTIVES

AND

MLITARY

POWR

un ce r t a i n t y ,

and a

g r e a t e r

demand

on

t hose l and- based

ai r

power system necessary

t o

suppor t

gr ound

f o r c e s

Another

r e l a t i v e

shortcomng o f

l and- based

ai r power i s t he r e s t r i c t e d

wei ght and

vol ume

of depl oyabl e cargo when

compar ed

t o

s ur f a c e t r a ns po r t a t i o n

Cer tai nl y

t he

f or mer coul d

no t

mat ch

t he

gr oss

l i f t

po t e nt i a l

of t he

l a t t e r ,

y et t he

a b i l i t y

of

l a nd -

based

a i r c r a f t t o

t r a n s p o r t a

l i m t e d

amount

of

cargo f o r t he

c r i s i s at hand,

and

t o

do

s o w th unmat ched s p e e d , may be t he most i mpor t ant consi der at i on .

OPTIONS

I N

SELECTING

LAND-BASEDAIRPOWER

Gi ven

t he

enor mous po t e nt i a l and

r ecogni zed

l i m t a t i o n s

of

l and- based a i r

power ,

i t

c l e a r l y

o f f e r s a number of

opt i ons

s u i t a b l e f o r achi evi ng a range

of

pol i cy

o bj ec t i v es

.

At

one end

of

t he

spectrum

t h e r e

shoul d

be

a v a i l a b l e

t o

t he

deci si on

maker

a l ow l evel o r l im ted m l i t a r y response

mechani sm

t h a t

tends t o convey both

s e r i o us n es s of purpose and c o n t r o l l e d

r e s t r a i n t

A

usual procedure i s t o pl ace one' s

m l i t a r y force

o r pa r t of

i t

i n a

hi gher

s t a t e of r e a di n es s by i ncr easi ng

i t s a l e r t s t a t u s

Such

a move i s not t aken

l i g h t l y ,

however , f o r t wo

d i s t i n c t

r easons

F i r s t , f o r c e s

cannot be

mai ntai ned

at other t han

nor mal

posture f o r

extended

peri ods

I ncr eased

a l e r t

s t a t u s

e x t r a c t s a hi gh c o s t

f r om

personnel

and

equi pment per sonnel , because

they no

l onger can per f or mnecessary

r o ut i ne f u nc t i o n s ,

and equi pment because

i t

u s u a l l y i s

i mmobi l i zed f o r p o s s i b l e

depl oyment

I ndeed,

s h o r t l y

a f t e r

achi evi ng a

hi gher - t han- nor mal al e r t s t at us , t he a c t u a l r ea di n es s of a f orce tends

t o

decl i ne

un l e s s f r e s h

personnel

and

equi pment

ar e

assi gned

t o

i t

But a

mor e

i mport ant

a s p e c t of

i ncr eased a l e r t

i s

t he per cept i on

of t he

di pl omat i c

s i gna l

i t

sends a s seen by

t he

i ntended r e c i pi en t s

A

changed

a l e r t s t a t u s tends t o transmt

a

message

of

concer n, ser i ousness

of pur pose, o r i nt ended

i nvol vement .

But

t he message

can be

ambi guous i n

t h a t

t he r e c i pi en t may no t understand whet her t he

a l e r t

i s t he

l a s t

s t e p i n

an e f f o r t

t o

bri ng

about a

peacef ul sett l emnt

or a f i r s t

s t e p t owar d

war

e

The i mp l i c at i o n her e , of

course,

i s

t h a t deci si on

maker s shoul d s e l e c t f o r c e s f o r

i nc r e as e d

a l e r t

w t h

g r e a t care i n t h o s e s i t u a t i o n s wher e

a

choi ce

of f o r c e s

i s

a v a i l a b l e For exampl e, i f

t a c t i c a l

ai r combat c a p a b i l i t y i s r e qui r ed , one coul d

choose

l and- based

a i r

power ,

i n c r e as e

i t s

a l e r t

s t a t u s ,

and

al l ow

i t

t o

r emai n

at

i t s

nor mal o pe r a t i o n l o c a t i o n

By c o n t r a s t ,

one coul d s e l e c t naval

avi at i on f or t he

i n cr ea s e d a l e r t s t a t u s ;

but

un l es s t he s e l ec t e d ai r w ng i s i n t he pr oxi mt y

of

t he c r i s i s

a r e a , i t

i s

l i k e l y

t h a t

oper a t i o n a l c on s i d er a t i o ns woul d suggest depl oyment

of

t he ai r

w ng, al ong

w th

t he r emai nder of

i t s

b a t t l e gr oup, t o t he

obj ect i ve area

Such

a

move may

wel l convey

t he wr ong message i n a c r i s i s , not onl y because c a r r i e r

a v i a t i o n i nvol ves a depl oyment

move,

but because t he

t o t a l

combat c a p a b i l i t y o f t he

b a t t l e

gr oup

may exceed t he i nt ended l e ve l o f combat power

On t he

other hand

;

l and- based ai r

power c a p a b i l i t y

can

be t a i l o r e d mor e e a s i l y f o r

a

c r i s i s ,

and

i t s

f l e x i b i l i t y

and

r esponsi veness

may

permt

more

p r e c i s e

command

and

control

As

a

consequence,

t he p r o b a b i l i t y

of

de l i ver i ng t h e

i ntended

s i gna l

i s i ncr eased whi l e

t h e y

l i k e l i h o o d of

conveyi ng

an i mpr eci se one i s r educed

5


25/187

LANDBASEDAIR

POWER

INTHRDWORLD

CRISES

Anot her p o l i t i c a l obj ect i ve

t h a t

mght

be est abl i shed

dur i ng

c r i s i s

i nt er acti ons

i s

t o

support

or

r ei nf orce

t he

current

behavi or of

a l l i e s ,

f r i ends,

n e u t r a l s ,

or

adversar i es

.

Thebehavi or

t o

be sust ai ned

coul d be

some deci si on on t he use

of

t h e i r

r espect i ve ml i t ar y for c es,

a c t i v i t y

re l at i ng t o exi st i ng gover nment al

s t a b i l i t y ,

or

ot her t ypes

of

p o l i t i c a l ,

economc,

or ml i t ar y

oper at i ons

I n

such

ci r cumt ances,

any

number

of di f f er ent ml i t ar y force

structures

mght

be

empl oyed t o demonst r at e

support,

pr i mar i l y

because

i t appears

t h a t

behavi or

r ei nf or cement i s easi er

t o

accompl i sh than

behavi or

modi f i cat i on

. Ongoing a c t i v i t y

tends

t o devel op a

momentum

of i t s

own, and

t hus onl y a l i m t e d

amount

of

re i nf orc i ng

acti on

mght

be

r equi r ed

t o sustai n

such

momentum

That

bei ng

t he

case, per haps

t he oper at i onal

r i s k

and

uncer t ai nt y associ at ed w t h an obj ect i ve t hat seeks t o suppor t or re i nf orce

mght

be

smal l , t he

net r e s u l t

bei ng

t h a t

f ewer forces can

be used

I ndeed,

t he

f i ndi ngs

i n

acompr ehensi ve anal ysi s

of

force empl oyment short

of

war suggest

t h a t

t he

hi ghest r a t e of success

f or t he

Uni t ed

States

both

i n t he short and

l ong

t e rm( a f t e r

s i x months and

a f t e r

t hr ee year s

r especti vel y) , occurred when i t s

obj ect i ve was

t o

rei nf orce behavi or

and

when

i t used

mnimum

evel s

of

force . 9 Thi s

l a t t e r f i ndi ng i n

par t i cul ar

and t he

re l at i ve ease w t h whi ch

one can

reduce t he si ze of

l and- based

a i r c r a f t

uni t s

make

themt he preferred i nst r uments

f or

a suppor t i ve

or

re i nf orci ng

oper at i onal

obj ect i ve

Unl i ke t he

suppor t i ve

or re i nf orci ng obj ect i ves, however ,

a

c r i s i s

t h a t

r equi r es

one t o deter anot her i nt er nat i onal actor from

some

acti on i s

f a r

more d i f f i c u l t t o

achi eve Addi t i onal l y, t he measurement

of

success i s not

easy,

part i cul ar l y

i n t he

case

of

adversar i es or

neut r al s,

pr i mar i l y because

r e l i a b l e

i nf or mat i on

concerni ng

t h ei r

i nt ent i ons

may

be

unavai l abl e

.

Mor eover ,

deterrence

tends

t o

be a

dynamc

process,

and what

deters i n

a

gi ven ci r cumst ance may

not deter

i n others

The

nature of

deterrence,

especi al l y

i n

a

c r i s i s , c l ear l y suggest s

t h a t

ml i tar y for c es

used

f o r

t h i s

obj ect i ve

shoul d

be chosen and

empl oyed w t h care Per haps t he

most

i mpor t ant

features

of

forces used i n t hi s manner are

f l e x i b i l i t y and

r esponsi veness,

si nce success

may

depend pr i mar i l y on t he pr eci se nature

of

t he

ml i t a r y

i nst r ument s, t he capaci t y

of

those forces to react qui ckl y,

and

t he

a b i l i t y

of

those

forces t o be changeddur i ng t he empl oyment phase Land- based a i r power appear s

t o

possess t hese

features t o

a greater

extent than

other f or ms

of

a i r power At t he

o u t s e t ,

i t s

s t r a t e g i c

r econnai ssance

can

provi de t he

type

of t i mel y i nf or mat i on

r equi r ed

by

deci si on maker s

and t a c t i c a l

commanders

More

accurate

force

t a i l o r i n g

then becomes possi bl e f or

a l e r t i n g ,

depl oyi ng, or

employi ng

forces

.

Mor eover ,

t hr oughout

t he

execut i on of

t he

sel ected cour se of act i on,

t he

s t r a t e g i c

r econnai ssance forces

can

at t empt t o ident i fy responses

from

t he t ar get

a c t o r ,

t hus

pr ovi di ng

f eedback f or possi bl e

new

deci si ons Other

l and- based

a i r c r a f t

w t h

compar abl e

s t r a t e g i c

reach,

such a s

command

and control assets, a i r l i f t , and

combat forces,

then

can be

empl oyed sel ect i vel y i n

response

t o

changed

ci r cumt ances .

Thi s pot ent i al

not w t hst andi ng, a cause- and- ef f ect

r el ati onshi p

bet ween

appl yi ng

force

and

det er r i ng

a

target

actor

may

not

become

obvi ous

.

I ndeed, i n

many i nst ances, where

t he obj ect i ve

i s t o

deter,

c r i s e s

may

be r esol ved

w t hout

anycl ear

evi dence of successf ul

deterrence

Never t hel ess, t he

probabi l i ty

of a posi t i ve outcome i n

such

at t empt s cl ear l y i s enhanced when maxi mum

f l e x i b i l i t y and r esponsi veness exi st i n t he m l i t a r y force structure .

6


26/187

POLITICAL

OBECTIVES

ANDMLITARY

POWR

Amore d i f f i c u l t

obj ecti ve dur i ng cr ises i s t o force achange

i n

ongoi ng

events-

t h a t

i s , t o

compel a target s t a t e

t o

modi fy

i t s act i ons Par t i cul ar l y

when

a

target

s t a t e

has

embarked

onacourse

of acti on

i ndi cat ed by

careful anal ysi s,

i t i s

unl i kel y

t h a t

forced

behavi or

modi f i cat i on by

m l i t a r y

means

coul d

be accompl i shed

w t hout

consi derabl e

e f f o r t

By

contrast,

however ,

target

s t a t e

act i ons

t aken

more

capr i ci ousl y are more suscept i bl e

t o

modi f i cat i on, al t hough

a t

t i mes tw st ed l ogi c

or

t he

sheer

momentum of an acti on coul d

l ead

t o an

unwar r ant ed

l evel

of

steadf astness- par t i cul ar l y

i f nat i onal

emot i ons

are i nvol ved

.

The l evel

of commtment

bya

target s t a t e t o a

course

of acti on asi de, t he ml i t ar y

forces

used

t o compel

or

modi f y

t h a t

behavi or must not

convey an ambiguous i nt ent

or capabi l i ty .

I f t he force chosen appear s

t oo r obust

i n

t he

eyes of

t he

target s t a t e , i t

mght s t i f f e n

i t s r esol ve

.

By contrast, i f

a

l ack

of

force c r ed i b i l i t y i s

per cei ved,

behavi or

modi f i cat i on i s

l e s s

unl i kel y . The

d i s t i n c t

advant ages

possessed by l and-

based

a i r c r a f t

i n such i nt er acti ons

are t he

bal anced message i t emts and

i t s

a b i l i t y t o

change

i t s

composi t i on

i n a

r esponsi ve

manner Wth regard t o t he f ormer , l and-

based

a i r c r a f t

probabl y

si gnal s a

l evel of

deter mnat i on t h a t

exceeds

naval

power

but

t h a t i s l e s s than

t h a t

of

gr ound combat

power

Thi s si gnal

tends

t o s t r i k e a

bal ance

bet ween

what

mght be cons i der ed as

overl y

di r ect

on t he one

hand and

t oo

l a t e n t on

t he

other

. The

capabi l i ty

of l and- based

a i r

power t o

modi fy

i t s

composi t i on

i s per haps

of

greater i mpor t ance because

of

t he

i nteracti ve

nature of

a

c r i s i s

. That

i s ,

one can

expect

a

degr ee

of

acti on

and

r eacti on

i n a

c r i s i s

;

thus,

t he

a b i l i t y

of

forces

t o

cope

w t h

escal at or y

or

de- escal at or y

si t uat i ons i s hi ghl y desi r abl e

The

obj ect i ves

of si gnal i ng,

suppor t i ng,

deterr i ng,

and compel l i ng descr i be t he

r ange

of

opti ons

t h a t

mght

be

r equi r ed

f or

behavi or

modi f i cat i on dur i ng

cr i ses

Under

cert ai n condi t i ons

i t

mght

be

possi bl e

f or one

t o

choose

an

obj ecti ve, empl oy

forces

appr opr i at el y,

and br i ng

about an acceptabl e sol ut i on

However,

i t i s

concei vabl e

t h a t

i t mght

be

necessary i n a c r i s i s t o sel ect

each

of

t he

obj ecti ves

sequent i al l y andmodi fy t he force

structure accor di ngl y

.

Mor eover , i f

more

than

a

pr i mar y

target s t a t e

i s

i nvol ved,

one mght need t o

pursue

several di f f erent

obj ecti ves

si mul t aneousl y

Under such

ci r c umtances, f or c e structure f l e x i b i l i t y

and

ef f ect i ve

command

and

control

ar e v i t a l

Never t hel ess, asi de from

t s

use

as

a

means

t o

s i g n a l ,

support,

d e t e r , andcompel ,

t he

uni que

char acteri sti cs

and

capabi l i t i es

of l and- based

a i r power

al so

permt

i t s

use

i n efforts t o

s t a b i l i z e and termnate

cr ises

.

As

ar gued

e a r l i e r ,

t he

essence of

a

c r i s i s i s

i t s unpr edi ctabi l i t y

.

One of

t he

greatest danger s,

therefore,

i s

t h a t a

c r i s i s

wi l l get

out

of control and devel op a

momentum

of

i t s

own

But

a

c r i s i s t h a t

cannot

be

contr ol l ed obvi ousl y possesses

i ncr eased l evel s of

r i s k and

uncert ai nt y,

and

thereby l eads

t o

a danger ousl y

hi gh

probabi l i ty

of

actual

war

rather

than

t he mere

percept i on

of t he

r i s k

of war , a s

descr i bed

i n

our def in i t ion

of a c r i s i s

The a b i l i t y t o

s t a b i l i z e a

c r i s i s woul d

seemamost

val uabl e

a s s e t , exceeded

onl y

by t he a b i l i t y

t o

termnate a c r i s i s on accept abl e

t er ms

The

use of

ml i t a r y

force

t o

s t a b i l i z e

or

termnate

a

c r i s i s

on

accept abl e

t er ms

presents

a

f or mdabl e chal l enge, but

t he

very nature of

a

c r i s i s

offers oppor t uni t i es

f or

i t s

r esol ut i on As i mpl i ed by our def in i t ion

of a

c r i s i s ,

i t i s

a

sequence of

i nt er acti ons

t h a t

conti nues

onl y so l ong

as uncer t ai nt y e x i s t s . I f

each

party knew

what the ot her i ntended

t o

do-i n

si mpl e

te rm, yi el d,

stand f i r m or f i ght-and

7


27/187

LANDBASED

AIRPOWERIN

THRD

WORLD

CRISES

a l s o

knew

i t s own i n t e n t i o n s i n t he

l i g h t

of

t h a t

know edge,

t h e r e

coul d be

no

c r i s i s

.

1

M l i t a r y force,

of

course,

cannot

be

used

t o determne

t he

i nt ent i ons

of

others, but cert ai n el ement s of t he

m l i t a r y

i nst r ument can obt ai n some

of

t he data

and i nf or mat i on upon

whi ch

j udgments are

made concer ni ng

the i ntent i ons

of

anot her actor

.

The

i nteracti ve nature of

a

c r i s i s suggest s,

mor eover ,

that di scr et e

events

bet ween

or

among actors

occur over

t i me and t h a t

each event tends t o el i c i t

a

response

Thus,

act i on,

r eact i on, post ur i ng, and bar gai ni ng become part

of

t he

c r i s i s

i nteracti on

process, al t hough at t heoutset t he mai n e f f o r t s

may

consi st

of at t empts

t o

r educe

t he

l e ve l

of

uncer t ai nt y

by

gat heri ng i nf or mat i on Shoul d the resul t i ng data

suggest

t he

i mbal ance

of ml i t a r y

force, then

t he

most l i k e l y

step for the

weaker actor woul d

be

t o reestabl i sh

a

bal ance, thus creat i ng

better condi t i ons f or

c r i s i s

s t a b i l i t y .

Among

t he choi ces, l and- based

a i r power

appear s

part i cul ar l y wel l sui t ed t o

cont r i bute to

c r i s i s s t a b i l i t y .

F i r s t ,

t he

r ange, r esponsi veness,

and

capabi l i ty of i t s

r econnai ssance

syst ems

are

unmatched

and

thus are abl e

t o

provi de

t he

prompt and

accurate i nf or mat i on necessary t o make i n i t i a l c r i s i s j udgment s

.

Shoul d

t he

data

i ndi cat e t he need

f or t he Uni t ed States

or

i t s

c l i e n t ( s )

t o bol st er

t h e i r

force

s t r u c t u r e s , then

l and- based

a i r

power ' s gl obal

r ange

andcapaci t y f or

f i r epower

and

cargo

del i ver y

become

r esponsi ve t ool s f or establ i shi ng fo rce

symmetry

as an

essent i al

and

i mmedi at e step

t owar d s t a b i l i t y .

C r i s i s t er mnat i on, obvi ousl y,

i s

muchmore d i f f i c u l t

t o achi eve

.

Yet,

l i k e

c r i s i s

s t a b i l i t y ,

i t s at t ai nment i s

i nver sel y

re l ated

t o

t he

l evel

of uncer t ai nt y I n t h i s

respect,

t he use

of l and- based

a i r

power

may

l ower t he l evel s

of

uncer t ai nt y because

of

i t s

response

c r ed i b i l i t y

and

known l i mtat i ons

.

I t s

i nherent

char acteri sti cs

enabl e

t he deci si on maker t o di rect

i ncr emental

force

modi f i cat i ons

dur i ng

cr i ses i n order

t o

reduce

uncer t ai nt y by

maki ng

US i nt ent i ons

r easonabl y

cl ear . Decr easi ng t he

l e ve l

of

uncer t ai nt y by

maki ng

i nt ent i ons more

obvi ous

cont r i but es not

onl y

t o t he

enhanc ement

of t he

bar gai ni ng

at mospher e

i nherent i n

a

c r i s i s

but

t o i t s

t er mnat i on

a s wel l

.

But usi ng l and- based a i r

power

t o achi eve

c r i s i s

t er mnat i on c l ear l y r equi r es an

ampl e

measur e

of

ment al dext er i t y by

those

who

concei ve

opti ons f or

i t s

use

.

Therefore, t he

f i r s t

task f or

m l i t a r y

pr of essi onal s

i s t o concei ve force structure

empl oyment

opt i ons

f or

cr ises

by

t hi nki ng

beyond

cl assi cal

modes

of

force

use

The

l i kel i hood

of

a c r i s i s ,

i t s

i nher ent

unpr edi ctabi l i t y,

and

i t s

re l at i onshi p t o t he

outbreak

of

war ,

cl ear l y make t he taskan urgent one

8


28/187

POLI TICAL

OBECTWS

AND

MLITARY

POWR

NOTES

CHAPTER

1

1 . BarryMBl echmanandSt ephen

S

Kapl an, ForceW t hout War

:

US . Armed

Forces as

a

Pol i t i cal

I nst r ument

( Washi ngt on

D

C :

Br ooki ngs

I n s t i t u t i o n , 1978), 67-71and515-19

2 G enn

H

Snyder and Paul Di esi ng,

Conf l i ct Among Nati ons :

Bargai ni ng

and

Deci si on

Maki ng i n

I nternati onal

C r i s i s (Pr i nceton, NJ . : Pr i ncet on

Uni versi t y

Press, 1977) , 6-9

3

Thomas

C

Schel l i ng, Arms and

I nf l uence

(NewHaven Yal e

Uni versi t y Press,

1966) , 92-99

4 Thomas

A Fabyani c, Concept ual

Pl anni ng

and

t he

Rapi d

Depl oyment

J oi nt

Task For ce, Armed

Forces and

Soci ety 7, no 3 (Spr i ng 1981) :

355 .

5 For a f u l l e r di scussi on, see

BechmanandKapl an, Force W t hout War

; and St ephen S Kapl an et

al

. ,

D pl omacy

of

Power :

Sovi et

ArmedForces as a

Pol i t i cal I nst r ument

( Washi ngt on,D

C . :

Br ooki ngs

I n s t i t u t i o n ,

1981) .

6 For a f u l l e r descri pti on

of r e l a t i v e force capabi l i ty i n c r i s i s i n t e r a c t i o n s ,

see Bl echmanandKapl an,

Force

W t hout

War ,

38

,

49 .

7 For a

f u l l e r

di scussi on of c ha r a ct e r i s t i c s and c a p a b i l i t i e s

of l and- based a i r c r a f t ,

see

AFM1-1,

Funct i ons

and

Basi c

Doct r i ne

of

t he

Uni t ed

States

Ai r For c e, 14 February 1979,

2-6

t o 2-30 and3-1 t o

3-4

8

J oseph

T

Kr nzel , M l i t ar y

Al ert s

and

Di pl omati c

Si gnal s, i n

The

L i m t s ofM l i t a r y

I nterventi on,

ed . El l en

P

Stern

( Beverl y

Hi l l s ,

Cal i f

. :

Sage, 1977),

84

9 Bl echmanandKapl an, ForceW t hout

War ,

86- 108 .

10 Snyder and

Di esi ng, Conf l i ct Among Nati ons, 8

9


29/187



30/187

CHAPTER2

THE

THRD

WORLDANDTHE

UNTED

STATES

PROBLEMS, ASSUMPTIONS,

AND

OUTLOOKS

TheUni t ed

States

has

r ecent l y

been bui l di ng her f or ei gn pol i cy on

a

wor l d vi ew

t h a t descri bes

an envi r onment that

never

exi sted

.

Ameri can f or ei gn pol i cy

di scounts

t he i mpor t ance of

power ,

escal ates the si gni f i cance of economc

f a c t o r s , and

emphasi zes

Nor t h- Sout h

r el at i ons

over

t he

East - West

bal ance Further,

US

f or ei gn

pol i cy

has

of

l a t e been

t oo

t i m d t o

t r y

t o accommodate

t he i n t e r e s t s

of

Ameri ca

t o

change

t he l ess- devel oped

count r i es

(LDCs~--whether

or

not

t h a t

change

wer e

good I t i s not

t h a t

t he per cei ved

pr obl ems

ar e not r e a l

and

t h a t

cr i ses

wi l l not

occur

i n

gr eat

numbers

;

t he

error

i s

i n

t he not i ons

t h a t

t he Uni t ed States

cannot

use her

power t o shape

events and t h a t

ml i t a r y power

has l o s t

i t s

u t i l i t y

.

Fut ur i sts

ar e sayi ng

that popul at i on

gr owt h

i n LDCs i s l i k e l y to vast l y

exceed t he

t h i r d

wor l d' s capac i ty t o t ake car e of i t s peopl e,

and t h a t

i s goi ng t o mean

bi g

t r oubl e f or

t he

Uni t ed States

. The economc

and

soci al

pr obl ems,

many

say,

cannot

be

overcomeby p o l i t i c a l

means, f or t he

League

of Nat i ons

and

t he Uni t ed Nat i ons

have

shown

t h a t

a

vi gorous

worl d

gover nment

i s j ust not i n

t he

cards I f there i s

l i t t l e hope

t h a t

strong wor l d

gover nment

w l l

evol ve

t o force sol ut i ons to these

pr obl em, there

i s

even

l e s s

prospect that

cul t ur al

di vi si ons

w l l

permt

suf f i ci ent

cooper at i on

t o per mt es cape

from

t he di l emma I t

does

not

seem

probabl e

t h a t

anot her

Al exander

or

Napol eonwi l l come

al ong t o

t r y

t o

i mpose uni t y

on

t he wor l d .

Even

i f

one d i d , power

i s

t oo

di f f used t o permt

devel opment

i n

t he areas t h a t need

i t t he

most .

Thus,

even

skept i cs woul d agr ee w t h t he

modern-day

Cassandr as'

assumpt i on

t h a t

i nt er nat i onal cr i ses w l l recur w t h

i ncreasi ng

frequency

and

vi ol ence Further, t hough

t he

Uni t ed States hoped t o l essen her i nvol vement w t h

the thi rd wor l d

i n

t he af t er mat h of Vetnam

w t h

t he

Nxon

Doct r i ne, i t seem t h a t

she

cannot so

di ssoci at e hersel f .

Her i n t e r e s t s

i n some parts

of

t he wor l d are t oo

v i t a l

and

( as I r an

showed)

surrogates

are

t oo

unre l i abl e

f or

her

t o

t r u s t

her

f at e t o

them Evi dent l y,

US

i nt er dependence w t h

t he t hi r d

worl d i s

bound t o

conti nue,

t hough per haps

not

as

much

as we

may f e a r .

I f

t he

vi ol ence

and c r i s e s

are

t o

cont i nue

and

i f t he

Uni t ed

States

cannot

avoi d i nvol vement , then

how

i s

she

t o

mai nt ai n

her

i nterests?

1 1


31/187

LANDBASEDAIR

POWERINTHRD

WORLD

RISES

O

course, any vi abl e f or ei gn pol i cy f or t he

t h i r d

wor l d must be

a

bal anced one

dependi ng on

al l

the i ns t r uments

of

f or ei gn pol i cy :

p o l i t i c a l , economc,

psychol ogi cal ,

and

m l i t a r y

But our pr i nci pal

f ocus here i s

on

t he

u t i l i t y and

l i mtat i ons of t he ml i t ar y i nst r ument ,

and

l and- based

a i r power

i n par ti cul ar, as

cont r i but i ng factors i n

c r i s i s

r esol ut i on The pur pose of

t h i s chapter, then,

i s

t o

examne

i n some detai l t he

spec i f i c pr obl ems

and assumpt i ons on

whi ch we

base

our r e l a t i o n s

w t h the thi rd

worl d

PROBLEMSANDASSUMPTIONS

Accor di ng

t o

The

Gl obal 2000Repor t t o t he Presi dent , Bar r i ng

r evol ut i onar y

advances

i n

t echnol ogy,

l i f e

f or

most

peopl e on

earth

wi l l

be

more

pr ecar i ous

i n

2000 . . than i t i s now-unl ess t he

nat i ons

of

t he wor l d act deci s i vel y t o a l t e r

current

trends .

z

The

same

study goes on t o say

t h a t

t he

popul at i on

wi l l

have

i ncr eased

by

more

than

50

percent i n t he

l a s t quarter of

t he t went i eth

century

and

t h a t most

of t he

gr owt h

w l l

come

i n

those

parts of t he

wor l d l e a s t abl e

t o

handl e i t .

The

earth,

t he

report

says, wi l l

become

more

product i ve

but the

greater part of

t he

gr owt h

i n per capi t a i ncome w l l

come

i n

t he devel oped

part of

t he

wor l d

Some

economc gr owt h w l l come i n Lat i n

Amer i ca,

but

the per

capi t a i ncome i n

Af r i c a

and

Asi a

wi l l

actual l y decl i ne Food product i on

shoul d

go

up consi derabl y, but

agai n t he i ncr ease

wi l l

be

i n those

pl aces

where

t he d i e t

i s al r eady ampl e I n

t he

LDCs, t he

pover t y of

t he pl aces

wi l l

pr event t he use

of

s o i l enr i chment t o i ncr ease

yi el d- t hi s

i s

somet hi ng

t ha t wi l l

become

ever worsebecause

of

t he r i s i n g pr i ce

of

t he

energy

t h a t

i s r equi r ed t o

manuf act ur e

f e r t i l i z e r As i f

t h a t wer e not

enough, i n

some

p a r t s

of t he under devel oped wor l d, t he r i s i ng

pr i ce

of

o i l

w l l cause

a

r ever si on tothe use of

wood

f or cooki ng

and

heat i ng Theuse

of

wood, i n

t u r n ,

w l l

cause

a

r api d deforest at i on, whi ch w l l l ead

t o s o i l sal i ni zati on,

wat er shortages,

even

l e s s

f ood,

and t he

cr eat i on of deserts

on

once- f er t i l e l and

.

The

Gl obal 2000

Repor t

i s

not

even

t he

most pessi msti c

of i t s type

For exampl e, a study doneby

Guy

J

.

Pauker

pr edi cts

t h a t we

ar e headed

f or

popul at i on

di saster

and

t h a t

t h e r ew l l

be

t h i r d

wor l d

food

r i o t s

a s

ear l y

as

t he

1980s

.

One of t he

most

ser i ous

obst acl es

t o

a

sol ut i on to f ood

pr obl ems

i s i n

t he

very

nature of

t hi ngs

Most

of

t he

LDCs

have

gai ned

t h e i r i ndependence from

col oni al

s t a t u s

i n

t he

past

few years

A

part of

t he

ant i col oni al r hetori c

t h a t l ed

t o

t h e i r

i ndependence

was t h a t t hese count r i es

coul d

do

better i n an

economc

sense under

nat i ve l eader shi p than

was

possi bl e i n a col oni al status

Many

of

them

have now

f ound

t h a t

t he pr obl ems

are

more

i ntr actabl e

t han t hey

t hought , and they have had t o

devel op new

t heor i es

t o

j u s t i f y t hemsel ves i n

l i g h t

of

t he

cont i nui ng

poverty

.

The

l eaders cannot admt

t h a t

a part

of

t he probl ema r i s e s fromdomest i c sources,

so

they

have

t o

s e l l

t h e i r

peopl e

on

the not i on

of

neocol oni al i sm

or

dependency

theory

.

I t i s

r e a l l y amore

sophi st i cat ed

way

of

i nvent i ng a

f or ei gn bogey than

was

used

by t he

pol i t i c i ans of

t he ear l y

days of t he Ameri can

Republ i c

when they

tw st ed t he

l i o n ' s

t a i l

and

bl amed

t he

Br i t i s h

f or

al l

s o r t s

of i l l s I n f a c t , t he

tendency

i s t o be

f ound i n al most a l l newy i ndependent soci et i es

.

I n

t he t h i r d

wor l d

12


32/187

THETHIRD

WORLD

AND

THEUNTED

STATES

t oday,

t hough

t he

f ore i gn l egi ons

ar e

gone,

t he l eaders say t he Wst i s

mai ntai ni ng

i t s

hegemony

t hr ough

means

of

unf ai r

p r i c i ng

of commodi t i es

and manuf act ur ed

goods

i n wor l d

trade

.

Al l of

t h i s serves

them

as

j ust i f i cat i on

f or t he

creat i on

of

c a r t e l s , t he

return t o pr ot ect i oni sm

and

t he demands

f or massi ve transfer of

weal t h

from

t he

f i r s t

wor l d

t o

t he

th i rd

worl d

When

t he

effects

of

nat i onal i sm

or

even

xenophobi a,

are

addedt o the equat i on, t he obst acl es seem

f or mdabl e

i ndeed

.

BLIND

ALLEYS

Some

experts

hope

f or peacef ul sol ut i ons

t o t he

pr obl ems

of

t he LDCs

t hr ough

t he

bui l di ng

of

i nt er nat i onal

i n s t i t u t i o n s

i f a

stronger Uni t ed Nat i ons cannot

be

b u i l t . b

However ,

t he maj or i t y seem

t o

f ee l t ha t t he

oneworl d

t h a t was

such

a

bri ght

dream

f or

many

opt i msts

a t

t he

end

of

Wrl d

War

I I

has

become

ever

more

i mpr obabl e

. O

course,

t he Uni t ed Nat i ons has

achi eved

some

wor t hwhi l e t hi ngs i n

t he

t echni cal

and soci al

r eal m

and

even has per f ormed

some usef ul

secur i t y

f unct i ons

S t i l l ,

whenever t he

super power s

have hadavested i n t e r e s t

i n

a

di sput e,

or

even when

they

wer e

t o t a l l y

di si nt er ested,

t he Uni t ed

Nat i ons

has been

unabl e

t o

mai nt ai n

t he

peace .

Thus,

onemust assume

that

t he Uni t ed

Nat i ons

andal l other

i nt ernat i onal

or gani zat i ons

wi l l

r emai n i mpot ent

t o

i nt ervene

i n th i r d

worl d

di sput es .

I f

c o l l e c t i v i s t

p o l i t i c a l sol ut i ons do not offer

much hope, what

of

economc

measur es?

Ameri ca

came

out

of

Wrl d

WarH

onvi nced

t h a t

poverty

i s

t he

root

of

al l

e v i l ,

especi al l y Communi st e v i l ,

and

her f i r s t appr oach

t o

t he

gr owi ng

Sovi et

threat i n t he l a t e

f o r t i e s was an

economc

one t he

Mar shal l Pl an At

t he outset,

even

t he ml i t a r y

a l l i a n c e ,

NATO was

meant

t o be

a

compl ement

t o

t he mai neconomc

i nst r ument

The

Mar shal l Pl an was t o

have been

t he shi el d

behi nd

whi ch t he

economc

mrac l e coul d

be

worked

Some,

l i k e

Dean

Acheson, f e l t

t he

al l i ance

was

more i mpor t ant because i t gave t he

Eur opeans

t he

conf i dence they

needed

t o

br i ng

t h e i r

c api t a l back home than

because

of i t s

m l i t a r y pot ent i al . Thus, even

t he

ml i tary al l i ance was, i n

away, an

economcmeasure

The

Mar shal l

Pl an worked

l i k e

acharm

n

Eur ope, and

s im la r

measur es appl i ed

i n J apan

worked

equal l y

wel l -too

wel l , per haps, f or some Ameri can busi nesses

t h a t

now

have

t o

compete

For a

l ong

t i me, Ameri cans have assumed t h a t

si m l ar

economc ai d woul d hel p pul l

t he t h i r d worl d out

of i t s t r a v a i l ,

but t he

si tuati on

there i s not

t he

same

Though both Germany

and

J apan

hadeconomes

t h a t were

i n

r u i n s

i n 1945,

t he basi c human

and

mater i al capi t al

was

there

and

coul d

serve

as

f oundat i ons f or

an

economc reb i r th

.

Those

f oundat i ons are not present i n

most

areas of t he

t h i r d

wor l d .

Thehope

of c l os i ng

t he economc gapbetween t he

f i r s t and

t h i r d

wor l ds

i s

now

a

f adi ng

one

f or many

Ameri cans

Agood

bi t of

f or ei gn

ai d has been sent to t he LDCs

and

t he

resul ts

have been

di sappoi nt i ng

.

Lat el y,

f or ei gn

ai d

payment s

t o t he

LDCs

have

been

decr easi ng,

and

many

exper t s bel i eve

t h a t

onl y

a

massi ve

f or mat i on of

c api t a l f r omw t h i n

t he

th i r d

worl d i t s e l f wi l l

sal vage i t s

economy

9 Sucha

massi ve

c a p i t a l i z a t i o n

seems unl i kel y

.

I t cannot

be

t aken

out

of

t he

hi des of

t he worki ng

13


33/187

LAND-BASED

AIR

POWRI N

THIRD

WORLD

CRISES

peopl e

as i t

was

i n t heUSSR

and t he

Wst because i n t he LDCs they

ar e

l i v i ng so

cl ose to t he subsi st ence l evel

t h a t

they do not have i t t o gi ve The b i r th

r a t e

r emai ns

so hi gh

a l l over t he t h i r d wor l d

t h a t

t he gr owt h i n

f ood

product i on and t he

i ncr ease

i n

b 0001 mets land based air power

Documents