Avoom 7 AugtUrt, 1966

SUBJB'£Ta 25th Division Pacif'ica.t1on OperatioM in HAU NOBIA Prov1noe (u)

ro. See Dietribution

1. (U) PUJ1)08e. The purpose of this study' 18 to provide the'reader with background inf'onnat1on concerning the joint pac1t1oation ::torte of the South VietnMese Goverment and the 25th Infantry Division (US) in HAU mHIA Province.' An abbreviated sketch.of the pl\Y8ical oharacter1st1cs of the province QS well ao a brief' historical summary ot the area are also dao u8sed to in order to proTide a .f'ull appreciation of the inherent pro­blmtB in any pacification endellVOr in this area. The data and 1ntonn.a­tion oontained M%'ItJin represent 11 distillation of studies and after action reports recently prepared by USAID, Advisory Team 43, BAD THAI, the 2d Bds, 25th D1visior~ and the 2,th Division, 02 Section.

2. (C) General I

a. Physical desoription. . HAU NaHIA province is lOCl,ted west northw'est of Saigon and extends fran Oia D1nh province on the QaSt to the Cambodian Border on the west. Its other neighbors are BmH DOONO to the northeast, TAl' 'N!NH to the nortlweet and x:rm TUONO am LONG AN proT1no8 to the. eouth. Most portione on the prov1noe boundary are ill defined and arl1t1eial and even those' stretches demarcated by streams or oM8.l.s ooMt1tute no mean1ngtnl obstacle to p8.8sage. The 27 Idlo-meter frontier with Cambodia. 18 particularly' hard to distinguish for ahtost or its entire length. ftt)st of the province i8 extremelY' nat am low 1y1ng aDi .t1P1cally ~per Mekong Delta in appearance. In the extrane west and 1n southHesf'· the land table 18 ta1rly close to sea level and dan1ns.ted by an e7:paMe of .. INempy torrai~ seneraJ.Ji'referred to as tOO' Plain of Reeds. The oentral portion of the proVince ie slightly higher and. better drained and moving to the north the terrain rises ~er"ept1bl.y to a max:lmum elevation of approx:lmately .30 meters. 'Vegetation oovers 'W"1'1'''ttm''", thA fmtire laM surface of the province with most or the

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b. History. HAU NGHIA was one of the f'1nal. creations of the Diem ~ and e8tablished as a province on 15 October 1963 by P:reEJi.. dential Order. The province was marle up of 4 districte contributed by the neighboring provinces 8.8 followss Due IDA and· DUC HUE Districts tonnerly of' LONG AN Province TRANG BANG of' TAY fUNH Province and CU CHI of' BmH DUONG Province. The province 11M cre~ted pr:1mB.rlly to ooorcl1nate m1l1tar,. aotiv.1tiee on bO+.h eidee of the old boundary between LONG AN am TAr NINH. Thie boun1ary ran lengthwiee through the KlNH TAl' ~ am VC unite operating on d ther side of' thie ewamp. could conduct m111..,.. tar,r operatioM.1n one province and then nee across the border with moet ~ knovledge that t'here would be neither pursuit nor mean1ngtul coordinated response trcrn the neighboring province. HAU NOBIA, although not recognized by' the va as a province oontinues to be of' great jmport-

. anoe to. them •. Catnunio&tion, 8UPP~ and l1a1son routes ~ween the .. Delta and VC redoubts in War Zones C and D and the Iron Triangle p8.Se through HAU mm Province. HAU NGHIA 1s aleo a prime eouroe of paddy rioe ant;l much needed manpower for VC forces. BAa TRAI, the proV'.f..ooe oaptial was se1eoted 'because of' its theoretical capacity to ma1n+Ad,n l1aj son with and render tactical E.'.8tJisUmoe to each of the distriot tolfllS and secondllrlJ.y to avoid eelecting OM of the met,ing d18tr1ct oapita:l.B thereby offending the other t1u:'ee.

3. (C) Baokgro~ I

a. Prior to arrival of the 25th Infantry DiviBion effective gO'f'e~t .control in HAU NOHIA .prov1naJe exteIXioo only t.o t.he max1mtn range ot lupport1ng weapone looated in the Vietnamese m1l1tar,r :l.nBtal­lations immediately .!urrounding the 4 district olpitalt. aM the pro­rl.noe oapital. This MountyetbnUla eM\l1J>atJsed about 2, ,per oent of the population w1t,h {jJ. por cent urrler vq oontrol and. 8llOther 15 per oent living in contested aI"eaa. . . .

. b. Even during the days of the ~rench Ach1mst.~t1on the areA that 18 DOW iWJ RlHIA. Provinoe wJ.s oonsidered poli~ioFJ.ly UIllrt:able beo8.J.l8e ~ ·1te long b1etory of rebel activity •. CU· PHI district, +,btm a part. or BINH DOONO Prov1nc~ WM notorlou'1l.y ~t1-adIn1n1strat1on even before 1961 when it deVeloped into maVert trouble ftpOt. By 1962, most of OOC HUE. District, muoh,of upper Due ~ .a.r1'f.port~OnB . of CU CHI and TRANl BOO were ~er va. oont~,-l. , .. In ma.tlY.' other .. ~as not actuall.., under de facto VC control there riev~r was !Ill effact1v9 politioal P:"e-

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defended and Supported. In epite ot the ilrpressive statistios oanplled during this operations, there was in fact little genuine paoif'1cat1on in tems of root1."1g out the VC infrastructure and replacing it with a viable looal governmental meohmrlB'll. During late 196~, the situation in HAU OOHIA provinoe becan. oritioal and by" early 1904 m1lit8.l7 rever­fUlls were oa'rl1TlOtpJ.ace and prooeeding at an alannbg rate. In June 1964, DUO lIlA W8.S attacked and part1ally overrun and the OOC HUE District oapital ot MY CVI located west of the Oriental River was evacuated rlnoe rlrtual.l.y ill ot district was then urxler 10 control. The capital was transterred to the HIEP II)A Sngar K:ll:i. with .3 villages of DUC IDA Dis­tr10t located east of the river being ceded to OOC HUE am the diBtr1ct bouMar1es real1gMd acoordingly. The aituat1cn contir.ued to deter­iorate until October 1964 when the 25th ARVN Div was transferred to HAU NGHU province tran II Corps. With the arrival of the 2,th the OTerall mUitar,r deoliM WM temporarily arrested m:l the immediate OOC 1m Area reeeoured. In the Spring of 196" the VC renewed their heavy pressure throughout the provinoe gaining ·steadUy until the arrival of the 2d Me, 25th Infantry Division in the CU CHI ares. in JIl'ltUllT 1966. At the time, the Brigooe arrived govel"Qnent oontrol in CO CHI d1etr1ot, out81tl~ the distriot oapital, mmo LAP Ranger Tra1n1ng Centor and 8. few other isolated outposts, WM tenuous even in da;t.l1ght hollr8 and (ll.1 areas were subject to conStant harassment. 'IWo Popular Fdrces poets, TiU MY and vnm CO were little W>r9 than prlsOM in ba.ncally va oontrolled hamlets. OuerrlllM and sappen operating along P.oute 1 in the CAY TIDM - PHUOC HIEP - SUO! SAU area were parti­oularly aot1ve am prone to ambush not only military traffic but o1~1an vehieles of opportunity as well.

d. During the first thre'3 months in-oountry tho 2d. Br:lgade ,.,,1nlO8f-..... j,.....~-bd on secur.1ng the CO CHI base area and oonducting 'search mxi destroy operations design8d to detrliroy m.a1n am local. Viot Cong forceo am relieve the pressure on the base oaJJp. Subsequent to the arrival. of the Division HHdquartere and as a result of the inoree.sing ooord1.nao­tion with ARVN and ProT.ime off1018ls, it was deoidtd to 1r.o~ the" D1T181on'.s contribution to the Revolutionary Devel.opnent rrogram (ROP).. This program properly ,supported by s("cial., political, eoon'2n1o ~ m111-tar,. aotlonwa8 felt to be the logicru. blue print tor the reetoration of order am. ertab1l1ty to HAU ~1(}HIA. Province. 'nle ooncept beb1D:l the RDP oalls for the gradual extezlsion of the f'nll Bpeot~ ot the g0vern­ment' e inn't2Sl'lOe outward from secure or pacified a..-ea.

/

'tne urn1i, 8e.LOO1ieO wae" 'toe ,Uft JjS:t.va..uon, £ ~n J.nIantry \Wo.unoUIXlS). , Al~o~h thie ~l'8tion ,WI1S t~ pUot proj~t of th18 nature it w1l.1 , be.t!isouesed in relativo detail sinoe it enoompMsee ill the teclm1qooe

8m le~80ne le&~ applied 'to later ope-ratioM. , ' ,

'.3 •. (C,> operation MAlLI. . ,

a. BaokgroU1Xl. One of the critical area.s of HAll NGHIA Wrov1nce . 8Ohedu18d tor 'eeouring in ~966 wae the area astride PrOnno1al Route 8 , ~tween BAD TPAl (XT52~) aOO Ct.' CHI (XT6212) enoanpMSing new ille hamlets " AP 0Jl) (XT5%) DUe CHANH (XT55C5), DUe: HANH "A" (ITS6Q6) and'DOG HANH, "B" (XT51~7). AP CID aM OOC CBANH are usuaJ.1y referred to colleotively' ,M

,'roc tAli. ~~ial Route 8 is the only usable road leading Wo the pro­'vince o":-.lt&l fran Saigon via Route 1 through CU CHI. It W88 essential that the hsmlets along this road be secured in order to '~re the main­ten.a.Me and security ¢ this key route. Route 0, also oute 3.01"'O"S a

,lM.jor Viet Cong 8'..lpply and c~lob corridor leading fran LOOO AN , , ,~,~e to VC base areas in 1'AI NJNH and BINH DtJONG Province,,_ Since

OCtOber 1965, !RVN forces !:lad been repea.tedly attacked and driven away ~ ,their pO,s1tlone along ~ route by the Viet Cong. The result .bad ~ that the prev!01.'8ly thriving hamlets had been almost oompletoly evacuated by thq ree1dents. The road had bean mined or interdiotea with roadblocks almost daily during the seven months prior to MAIL! makiDg travel d1.ff1oult am hazardous. The hsmlet~' in the area up ro 6 ldlo­meters to the northwest ani 80utheast of the roed had. b~en Ul'll1X:)lested sanctuaries for Viet Cong local guelT1:i.laa for month8,~ ,'': Except during' an oeearlonal ineffective sweep by ARVN rorces stationed at BAa TRAI, the peopJ,e ot these hariU.ets iliad e~er1encecCrio contact with the GVN.,' AJ.though not oOn8idered to be active Viet Cong BJ'lTPath1zera, they had neverth81.e~ been forced to make 8Ccamnodat1ons with the VC in order to survive.

b. PreparatioM. Prior to the opera.tion, t,he 00, 1st an, 27th, Inf' mil t'M Sector Advisor discussed in detail the oDjectives cf tho, opera t1on, t!Je area ot opera t16n, am the tactics to be empl~. Tb8 ~ ot, operation wa.s divfded.'1nto sections general1.y following haml~t

., boU7x1~es. Each day the battalion would olear one of the seotions of Viet Cong guerrillas an:l provide aocu...-ity for tim snployment of a oern­'poe1te \t1at.nemes& "00 Tf..AMt' consisting of National Polioe (NF), ps,r-

, ohological Warfare t~ops~ intelligence troops, and medical personnel. The NP' ",ould search each dwelling and oheck the. credentials of too res1dente. The.~j!jrwar t£)aril, eqtrlpped with bull horns an:I leaflets, would d1seues var!ous"O\1N' dd Dro~ram8 with' the D90019.. The intftlliJranoo trun

auratlon 01" ths opere:tlOn to '8el"'Ve &.8 gulOSe ana to at'ItJl1ni ll'l Ul8 l.a8n'tl­tioe.t10n of VC suspects. Vietnamee6 Counter TSM":>r troops would be ae81.gned to the battal10n·to·8.tJ'e1:8t in night ambu8Me whioh woUld be used fItXten­e1velv throughout the ·Ar(1. "

o. Operations I

(1) Operations got umer way on 27 April m:l in1tiaJ.];', the US troop. appeared to be unerur,y WMn working in close oontact with t.M VietMm888 and thi,. .. ~ +"!.-:' ~,"-,"-1 "_"" the perf.ormance of the V1etnameas. Howover, M the da1l.y operations oontinu&el, both the US 8l'rl Vietnameee troops began to work more effectivelY' together. By tm end or two ~e, the com'b1.n8d toroes hrui envolved a ~ efficient I1modus operandi", md a true eeMe or oanaraderie had deveJ.opM. One rea,eon tor the improvament we due to the oritique and planning eonf'erenoe oem­duoW each 8'I'ell1ng at 1700 hours in a ~roviB1ona1 Joint Operat1orm Cfmter at BAD THAI. At this oonferenoe, 1rirl.eh l:Q8 atten1ed by the 00 am etafi ot the 1st Bn, 27th In!, the Provinoe Chief El'.d h18 ~t I 8M the Sector AdvisoX' and hie staff, the current day's operation WM

~ and oritfqued, am plan!! !!!~e for tOO 'next day' s ~at1on.·

(2) The V1etnam6se and their American advisors parlic1-,pated in evelT pba'Je· ot' operat io ',1 MAlLI'am accanpanied the 25th Division oaoipaniea and pl&toonB into f!J'1'fJry hamlet in the area or operat1one. They proceeded· by helicopter, tank, pereormel carriers, truolaJ, or on ft,ot. On one oeoMion, in response to hard intell.1genos ot a Viet Cong looat1on, US and Vietnameee troops were traneported tram one objeCtive area to another by • oollection ot USAID, National Polioe, am V1etnaneee RegionlJ. Poroe trooka dri "fttn by US adv:1JJore. On ' five ooo&81oD8, bllt talloU8

fran the ARVlf 2Sth IntIUltT"t Di'V:W.on oondooted. openitloM designed to support m:1, oanpU1n.mt the errortf5 of, the 1st Bti~tal.1on, 27th Infantry. On three oOoasior.s,thes9:ARVN batta1icms were umer sector oc:amarxl while on two other cases, thsy lfflI"e mxiar A.RVN 2Sth Div1810n ~.

I (:3) ~ HAItI, mU'fiC1.ent .., uri t7 vas pturl.ded to D'OO, HANH "B" to al1t:N. pl"'CIV'1l1oe to ooMtraot 8. MW ou~oBt near that hamlet. F181ds 'ot t1re·W8re oleared tar the new outpost by the engineer platoon attached to the le~ Bn, 27th Intmrtrr.' '~r me.tiuia18 for the new' outpost . were ealvaged £ran two abmdonoo O't.ltposts in & nearby area whioh were leveled by the engineer platoon at the ~ueet of' the Prov:1roe Chief. ' .

· ... (b) The Viet Cong v.ere discredited in the eyee or

the people l1v1n1l: in the area of infiuenoe of the let Bn, 27th Inrant..r,r task force.

(0) The US 50ldiere danoMtrated that,oontnry to Viet Oong propagama, they are not unf'eal1na, ~lood-th1rsty brutee.

(d) GVN 1ntJ.uenoe was ext;tnded to each of the hamlete in the area ot t~ operation. Many of theae had not been ventured into tor e6Veral ye~ by province or~8. . .

J

(e) Med10al tre~t was aan1n1etered to 8)3 adulte and cirl.ldren in the L.'"ell during tbb 19 M:EDCAPS per:fonned in the various MmletB.

(t) The otr.( lite hamlets Along the route between BAD TRAl ard au CHI beg'A showing dat1n1t. signs of lite. In DUC HANH "B" alone, the population approx:1mllt~· iripled by the eOO of the operation, 1ndioating restored oonfidence r.M ,.' '!es1re to live umer OVN oontrol.

(g) The ~ and ettectlvenA88 ot the U .3. 4..roope provided an aDel.ltmt exanple for the mEl'nbere ot the Sector statf. A.t'tfIr twioe being embarraa8ed by the late arrival. ot hie torces at their 1!Ipp01n~d looationa, the Prov1noe Chief oracked'down and required 8. higher stamard of pertonunoe by his tmbordinatea.

(h) The oonoept ot the OCInpOe1te V1etMrltee8 "00 TEAM", OOMi8tiDg ot int8ll1genoe, paywar, J'Mdioal, am na.tlonal pollee troops, WM perteoW am it" fttt.at1voMeA c.hwnomrtrllted. (Thie twanty m8J1 team 18 to be kept intaot an:1 w11l, it ie hoped, ACCCITlpan;y ~ battal.1oM. on future search am olear operat1one.) .

(:S:) TM val't1e or olo~ ooord1..nntion b6tw~ t·~.O US battalion statf am the ~tor SUtff (with 1t~ US ~dv:1.80rft) lI1'~'" ~pdily ~nt. The 1~t13 aft.ernooll da.U.v oo"'1eMnCe~ in. tht' rT'C'v1!'t~.on.-u OpertttioM Center at BAa mAl nwrl~ poseibla an extrf:'!"'lf)l~?" clom~ ooopera­tion between the various part1eipMtS. Probl~~ ~re Wl:)ry:oo out'rurl m1sta.keb were diseussed in an ntrJosphere of g'3n~ und~rst.q.11d.ing. Toward the end of the period, the Province Chief etA.t""'d tMt hA would o~~r hi? ~""?_ at~8eh~ ~ batt1U.ions to conduet operat:torw in ~c>o:rd:t-

1 ....... ,.. Op.nUcm PWLI ftre 1ppl1ed to the .trate£7 aM tflOhniq~" or \",.. .u.. ,..t&ation cper.tioM P'T BHITH, SA.NT1't am P'RESMJ. ("" ",1 •• '" 1 fer ANU or ap.rttion). Tactios wre refined am· ooort1~­.-.... 1ft, .. III'\ett ."t hbHCWr otfu1a18 vu improwd thrOugh dally eor. .... , "'-.H el ,he )lltil.t1-batt&11on aep~t or P'RKSNO m1 SANTA FE I """ LI ... " teM wu .a1ntA1ned·at Seotor He~uarter8 .to taoill­Nt .. \hi ..,. ..., Wo,..tlofl t'l.DW betwM1 the battal.1OM in the t1eld and ~ • • tttaW.. In addition to the result. pNYlouel.y. mDenter:i t-w , dlrinl lWfrA ,n 1M rRKSNO NnraJ. 1M1dents tranBpired vb10h weN WU.ttft 01 the IrowinI IUOO •• S of our pacificAtion effort.

A. Dw1.ftc the 1ut w.k in 'Junfl, on rive l'Jepllr8.te oocalrloilft, .,.,..1Jq. ch1l.dren led .Im~na or the ltJt Im1. 2d &u., 21th Infantry to ~ ft!Ilmi.tloft oaoM. 1n the Tioinity of tM1r iumUets •. Theso Obi1dn-n d..,netrated a wide !"IUlIe or &rft1L 1alowlMge IJrl in one 1.nstanoe led tro~e to • OM!» 2 Idlcneten errtr fran their botDeB. TM more ~ortant ittiut ~O'\feNd 1Mlooe<i 31 '6<Bm J'lortV' rotm1 ~ , 39 grenM e ~, 2 155:1I'll arty roUIrl t; and ~r 2100 rotmil of IIdtJOell~U!'J ~ lU'm1'j ~tion.

b. On 30 Jm'l8, a va pl1!:toon It"Ad"r took M"J'lUltrul;e of tM Divi ... ~'I P"8~ in his U'81l to IL~A with loc1l.l officiJUlJ, through hi.ft w:1.t8, t~ US 'oroes to oapt~ him at hin boUf'f't. Ome appnlhetnKl, .~. platoon 18&d..r tUl"'Md. onr.'h:1.s ~ and led a plAtoon to t~ hidinP, p18068 ot DiM otMr fflMm-rs of hi" p1fttoon ltho lml"4'l cpJ:Ytnrtrl on tht- ~ .... Tb8 k8y 1t8tt in th18. action WA."'J th~ :M~n~1\ of p~nc., or!'1cl~,. u;x'n be.r.1.ng ot tlJl d8t8Otor' a wiM. W1ttrl.n . JO mi..r1trI~"', tIS P'oroe~ bad ~ notified ~ re&Oted ·to explo1 t too WO:rl'1Vltl.on.

c. ~ Per80nn"'l IU'ld 1ttuip'n"'"lt LoFt,.",.. for all tour p..c1f1oft.-'. tion operations are IJhown in lnolo~ 2.. . ' .

~. (0) A.8"OCiA+,N] p~iflcn.t1on Act.1vit·1n~. In Addition to tM Mt1Tit1"" 8UtrllM!fnted pl"fWiout!ly tM !Oll~R ~rnt1onl1 hm~ 3U.l'O ~~ e~ otrt in support of, mrl in (\-:-t'lju"t:1M vit, -t~ I"\~in p"c1!1cl\t~_0?'l effort.

a. MJmcAp: A MPDCAP t,...!'!T1 ooMi~~ no~A..lly of' e. docrt,or ~ taur aidmen plo'ldedm~ieal tre~bnent to inhAbltantB or· bmr.1ate M pl"r. of thl!l "00 TEAM" or dudn~"OOtmTr FA:JH' op4llntiontl .. I WMn a haUet VP..~ e~ured by US Foreee, thIt KKDCAP te~ lfOtlld entl'r And provide ~n:tM~nt tor periods of tm-ee or tour houre. nle tefD was al~ W'Ul'T\J.,y aooeptm __ ...:I .... 1... _______ ,,_. _I' ~_",,,"'~"...-+ .. ,..~ .... '- +h ... l.~'ft+ .. ....A 1"IA~

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during the pao1.f'1oat1on operatloM" The pl1.mary objootive waa to irlent1t,r am neutral.1me th8 exiating VC infr8.8truoture in the hclml.ete ani T'....nages. County Fair operations in all hamlets were Quite s:Un1l.ar; tmretore, the tollow1.ng deeorlptton or the aotivitiea of the SO 00 County Fair wil'. illustrate a typioal operation. The operation began at 2~OO Jun 66 when two oanpanj.~s of the 2d an, 21th Infantry 8UrrOunjed

the hamlet. 1\10 oh80kpo1nts were eetablisbed, one at eaoh end of the hamlet, &1Xl all per8ol'l.Ml attenpt1ng to leave the &rea were ohecked by the NationAl. Pollee stationed at the oheckpoints. At approximately 0700 hours, the intmt:ry with Mrlstance of three Vietnamese seaMh teana begQll a honee to house search o! the hanlet. Theae teqme oonsisted of one National. Pol1oeman, one ARVN intelligenoe NCO NXl one US Ad?1aor fran Sector. A thorough searoh VM made not only tor inte1l.1genoe information but .al80 tram a population oontrol aspect. Th6 school was chosen as a oolleotJ.Dn and processing center am ill avallahle inhabitants were lIlOV'ed to that area where a ocmplete 06DmlS wtUI ooMuoted. As sooo aa th'3 oel'!­sus WM completed Im1 thA 1nMbitAnte ha.d ~en 8Crfl'ened to detennL~ their true statue the 00 TEAM ~t up the PByWnr IJ..OO MrnCAP temlB at the sohool. The MEDCAP temn tretlt~ II. total of 94 vlllll¥,ortt tor VariOUB

1J1MSfMS and liaS v1.U'Mly ~eived trJ the villEig~re. A mobile identifica­Moo caM team WM aleo provided fran ~tor to M~itrt in prooeBainR in­habit4£lrt.s without identification oa.rda. A cultu.rnJ. UtQrn oon8ilrt.ing of throe mfm am two wanen not only provided ent~rtAim~nt but WO g~ It

ve~ fJubtle peyohological mt)(](]~e to the pooplfll thrt)u~h thAt m~U!TI of fmte~nt. Tho 2d Brigade Br.nd tmn RA"M Il bnrrl oonofllrt am t~ Provinoe Civil Affllir8 Offioer drove II. LIL"nh:retta A-iu1ppfYJ with 11 loud­spealmr through the hJrnl.ftt pl~ rooordfllr J'!1U1910 thUR IVJd~ to tho ovorill rel..axed atlnohphlllI"8 of the CJ;1ernt10nn. Major NHA, tho Provinb" Chief, arr1nd tn:n BID TRAI, m:trlgW with ~M inhAbltAntA and gllva 1m inspirlng pro-gcrrerrlnfmt 8pf9~h. A noon mfllru. \fEiR prepllXOO by US FOroAM aM 88l"'nJd to 350 TillIlP,8r8. Aftrtr thn nmn ,."IlnJ., 25th Divitt10n Ihlpinro: Rand itf.rM donated by tM peapl" of Hmrali lororq i1'!mlMe TM r~n.iJy~nr. ot the afternoon ne w.f'td by tho civio flotion t4l'1If'I\ t.o dit'ltrlbutA U~.ATj), CARE, and CRS oanmod 1 t iJrt" It.l'YJ IHtp pl1 A" to thP9 pnop 1 A • IJ. tl'I"t t '0 M (V'l'l'l­

Mnd"l prov1no8 agrioul. tUTAl pro~", IV'lfJ publlc h,.,t-tl th nli'l"'t71.c'.,. l~.n~

u.o d1etr1.buted. In ehort., All rl)ro~A" Vt'I~ ".,~ in ~n «tt.~t .&..1')

1n!lnenoe thft p80ple· in tte hP..frIl~ ~ ,.t~J:'t th:4J'l"::'..n(., 1-'1"1 t"'m'" or ~! cry.-­trol rather than VC dOl"tination. Infor""Sftion T¥"':;fI"l.....::~ dur:'-~ thi .. Clpc~_ tion led to an OJ)':'rat1on in A. nP'U"~ ~JIII. I"""tI'uJ.tirs; m nlTl~:ro"" VC tun­nAl" a.nd ~ortir1cat1on~ destrc:-<:~d.·

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,lOCte to oo\"ertly mOTe pe~onnel. an1 s~pl1e3 through our TAOR4I Check­pointe are manned by el.emMte of too 3/4 CaT, NatiOnal Polioe e'Xl CI ag8t1€s o~ the 2,th MI Det.. An average ot four APe' 8 are ~oyed to turnish 8ecnrltyo'fn the areA. of oparation. Two checkpoints are thgn eetabli~hed, approxiN.tely 150 I'\~tere apart, enabling trartio ohecke in two d~tions. Three NA.tional Policmum .m one CI agent are located at each oheckpoint. The Cflt'" e Aero r1.ne platoon 1e al80 pr&­pared to a~e18t the ro8dblook Alcment if necos8~ and aeriAl scouts eearoh out the 8UlTOtm:iing area for any other targete of C!lPOrtun1ty.

d. Roadrunner. Concurrent with the OOMl'-ct of the paci!1cI.Uon operations, the division uso employed Wlored task forces travere1ng m.ain md 1geOoMll"Y' roade in HAU OOHIA Provinoe to demoMtn.te our inten­tion to use and keep open these WC' e. During June, the d1v1rlon ooi'lduotAd 86 of theee "roadrunners" tra~ &. total of 1540 kilar"ttb:-: a7rl oln.r­ing 35 road obeuol@'A.

6. (C) Ev81Wltion. The HAU NOIIIA Province Adrleory Team in the Special Report on ~lut1.orl1ll7 Devglopnent, dated 1 July 1966, rrtatOO the follo~ concerning our pacification erfortfJ II AfJ I. res,.ut or con­tin')ed operatlona by the US 25th Division in VC controlled areM and the prodig-'J.Oue effort being made by the US in pacification work, a poeit1ve change in th~ 8.t,t1t~e of the ~le in VC oo~trolled al"8M

1e being made. In the ~T1ltioM1 areae of "FRESNO" aM "SANTA Ji"Etf the people are freely providing the forces with infonnatlon concerning the lcoA.t1one of mineA, booby trnpo, mnll cltchotJ 0f AT."I"'1unlt1on, lUld the 1'WI'ee am hanefJ or local Vi~t Cong. Th'3 US 1e countf\r1.ne the VC propagandll by their ext4'!Mi7e MEDCAP progrrun, by improvi"lg roade marle impaeeable by the ve, and by M~ able to live And operate rlth relative impunity in ve controlled arnM. TM contin'J~ pAcific.Ilt1on opertltiorut provided the US torcee with ,.n undorstAnding of tM problf\"B in rural construction am aleo the U8~ of me:lBured torce whflrn dealing with t.~ guerrillA who 18 1ImO~ t~ pAOplA, 1.A., l'f"ru~1l1 to "'hoot Artillery ealvcd on a tmiper, thue p~nt inP, tlvl de"truotion of loctU. houI'!eI'J And

. the k:11.1.1ng of innocf5nt p~l~. '.rho d.rdly r.t ...... tirUl," r.nd oontinul\l cc)O­tAct b~tw'J~n the US and VN forc'J~ prond~~ for 1\ olo~ 14'Orldng l."f'tll\tio'1-Ah1.p whioh 1e flts'(tntiA1 in combinAd o~nt1on!!'. Tm~1) J!leatingtJ I\lf?O provide an opp<:>rtllnity to point out t~ adva.ntae~tJ of US m~thod6 of op~~­tion, which are cba.ract-9r17.~ by tbt:)ir nfl'rlbU1ty IU'd rapid ronctlon t1.JTl--. "

l"eVer!5&J.6 ~ ~ VW oAt-'uv "V'oA -.~~~ -r - - -- - _

TiOtory O~ ARVN am FWMA1 in South Vl~tnam. VC Main FOl'O&fII and tbe1r

b~. &r8&., mofJt obviousl1' be oonetantly sought and destroyed oonoun'eTlt

with thes~ pacifioation f'ttorta in order to prevent. thel!e force!! trcm

exerting t.'-~lr 1:.tlc:ne~ i.9'! the ~':'if1EY.! L~~. With proper dlotr1butlon

of n11ttalY roro&~ and &ssets, paoifioation and search and dest~ opera­

tioM oan be urdertakftn 81mult8.neeusly to win the war on both fronts.

2 Inol

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