autonomy without paradox kant self-legislation and the moral
TRANSCRIPT
volume19,no.6 february2019
Autonomy Without Paradox:
Kant, Self-Legislation and
the Moral Law
Pauline Kleingeld & Marcus WillaschekUniversity of Groningen & Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main
© 2019 PaulineKleingeld&MarcusWillaschekThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/019006/>
Introduction
The notion of autonomyâfor which the term âself-legislationâ1 isalso usedâis central both to Kantâs ethics and to most contempo-raryversionsofKantianethics.Accordingtoawidespreadview,Kantclaims thatautonomyconsists in theself-legislation of theprincipleofmorality,theMoral Law.2TheMoralLaw(andthustheCategoricalImperative)3isnotgiventousheteronomously,bysomeauthorityex-ternaltoourwillsuchasGod,nature,ortradition.Rather,wegivetheMoralLawtoourselves.Moreprecisely,onthislineofinterpretation,Kantclaims thatour willgives theMoralLaw to itself.This standardreadingissharedbyâconstructivistâandârealistâreadersofKantalike.Ithas inspired recentphilosophicaldefensesofKantian constructiv-ism,accordingtowhichmoralrequirementsaretheoutcomeof(actualorcounterfactual)deliberativeproceduresinternaltopracticalreason(see,e.g.,Rawls1980;Korsgaard1996;OâNeill1989,2004;Reath1994,2013).LeadingdefendersofrealistinterpretationsofKantâsethicsre-sisttheideathatmoralobligationdependsonavolitionalactonthepartoftheagent,buttheytooassumethatKantexplicitly claims thattheMoralLawisself-legislatedinsome(perhapsmerelymetaphori-cal)sense(e.g.,Ameriks2000;Guyer2007;Schönecker1999;Stern2012;Wood2008).
Tobesure,mostcommentatorsregardKantâsconceptionofmoralautonomyasrequiringatleastcarefulqualification,andmanyviewit
1. âAutonomyâ derives from the Greekwords for âselfâ and âlawâ. ThewordαáœÏÏÎœÎżÎŒÎżÏmeansâlivingunderoneâsownlawsâorâindependentâ.Incurrentusage,autonomyisoftenunderstoodasâself-determinationâ,butthisisnotpartofKantâsunderstandingoftheterm,aswillbecomeclearinthediscus-siontofollow.
2. We use capitalizationwhen referring to the highestmoral principle in or-dertodistinguishtheoneMoralLawfromthemanysubstantivemorallaws(lowercase).Wedonotimposethistypographicaldistinctiononquotations,however.
3. TheCategoricalImperativeistheprescriptiveexpressionoftheMoralLaw(singular).KantarguesthatwhiletheMoralLawholdsforallrationalbeings(includingGod),theCategoricalImperativeaddressesonlysensiblebeingswithinclinationsthatcantemptthemtoactcontrarytotheMoralLaw(seeG4:413,454â5).
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Insection1,weintroducethestandardinterpretationaccordingtowhichKantclaimsthattheMoralLawisself-legislated,andwediscussthephilosophicaldifficultiesassociatedwithKantâsallegedthesis.Insection2,weoutlineouralternative interpretationonthebasisofadiscussionofpassagesthatareusuallyregardedasevidencefor thestandardview.Insection3,wediscusspossibleobjectionstoourread-ingbeforeconsidering,insection4,KantâsconceptionoftheapriorityoftheMoralLawandhowthisbearsonthedebateconcerningrealistandconstructivistinterpretationsofKantâsmoraltheory.
1. The âKantian Paradoxâ
1.1. Current interpretations and associated difficultiesLeadinginterpretersdescribeKantasclaimingthattheMoralLawisself-legislated. Jerome Schneewindwrites: â[Kant] held thatwe areself-governingbecauseweareautonomous.Bythishemeantthatweourselveslegislatethemorallawâ(Schneewind1998,6).AccordingtoAllenWood,Kantâsideaofautonomyincludesboththeideaofmoral-ityasobjectivelybindingandtheideaofâtherationalbeingâswillasauthoror legislatorof themoral lawâ(Wood2008,106).Thissetofquotationscouldbeextended,4butevenbetterproofofthepervasive-nessofthisinterpretationisthefactthatitisnotamatteroflivedebate.CommentatorsdisagreeonhowtounderstandKantâsclaimbutnotonwhetherhemadeit.
Many interpreters hold thatKantâs conceptionof theMoral Lawasself-legislatedservestoaccountforitsunconditionalanduniversalobligatoryforce.5Ontheirinterpretation,whatKantmeanswhenhewritesthatâautonomyofthewillisthehighestprincipleofmoralityâ(G4:440)isthatitisthesourceofmoralobligation.OliverSensen,forexample,writes that âKantsees thesignificanceofautonomy in the
4. Also including, forexample,Allison1990,237;Engstrom2009, 149;Reath2006,92.
5. SomeauthorsalsotakeittoaccountforourmotivationtoobeytheMoralLaw:Klemme2013,193;Schneewind1998,483.
ashighlyproblematic.Thisisbecause,onthestandardreading,thereissomethingdeeplyparadoxicalaboutit.IftheobligatoryforceoftheMoralLawdependsonanactofself-legislation, thisseems tobelietheveryunconditionalityandnecessitythatKantregardsasthehall-markofmorality.Notsurprisingly,similarcriticismsarefrequentlydi-rectedagainstcontemporarydefensesofKantianconstructivism.KantscholarsandKantianshavedevelopedawidevarietyofresponsestothesecharges,buttheyhavenotquestionedtheirsharedunderlyingpremise. It is takenforgrantedthatKantsaysthattheMoralLawisself-legislated.
Inthispaper,wewouldliketochallengethisstandardreadingonboth textualandphilosophicalgrounds.Weargue for the followingtheses: (i) Kant never explicitly and unequivocally claims that theprincipleofmorality, theMoralLaw, isself-legislated(noteveninamerelymetaphoricalsense),and(ii)heisnotphilosophicallycommit-tedtosuchaclaimbyhisoverallconceptionofmorality.Inparticular,KantdoesnotclaimthatthebindingforceoftheMoralLawdependsonitsbeingself-legislated.Instead,weargue(iii),inKantâsviewtheideaofmoralautonomyconcernsonlysubstantivemorallaws(intheplural),suchasthelawthatoneoughtnottolie(G4:389)orâthelawtopromotethehappinessofothersâ(KpV5:34).Inaddition(iv),whenKantwritesthattheprincipleofmoralityistheâprinciple of autonomyâ,this phrase indicates not that theMoral Law itself is self-legislatedbutratherthatthehighestmoralprincipleâcommandsâautonomy(G4:440).Moreover(v),Kantâsclaimhereisthatweshouldactâas ifâweweregivinguniversallawsthroughourmaxims.Heneverwritesthatwe,humanbeingsassuch,actuallygivesubstantivemorallaws;rath-er,theselawshavetheirsourceinpracticalreason.Finally(vi),Kantprovidesneitherarealistnoraconstructivistâgroundingâofmorality.Instead,hedefendsa thirdpositionthatcomes intoviewonlyoncewemovepasttheideathattheMoralLawisself-legislated.ThisisthepositionthattheMoralLawisafundamentalaprioriprincipleofpurepracticalreasonthatisnotgroundedinanythingmorefundamental.
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begroundedinotherprocedures(onpainofinfiniteregressorviciouscircularity).7
Inresponse to thesedifficulties,commentatorshaveemphasizedtheimportanceofseveralqualificationswithrespecttotheclaimthatKantviewedtheMoralLawasself-legislated.First,somehavepointedout that thisdoesnot imply that the contentof theMoralLaw is amatterofchoice(see,e.g.,Kain2004,266)sinceKantdistinguishesbetweentheauthor(Urheber)of thecontentofa lawandtheauthorofitsobligatory force(MdS6:227).ThisdistinctionmakesitpossibletoavoidsaddlingKantwiththeviewthatthecontentoftheMoralLawisuptouswhilepreservingasenseinwhichself-legislationappliestothelawâsobligatoryforce.
Furthermore,severalauthorshaveemphasizedthattheâselfâthatlegislates theMoralLaw isnotapersonalor individual self.Rather,whatKantmeansisaformofimpersonallawgivingthatisgroundedinpracticalreasonassuch.Itisself-legislationbythewillquapracticalreason,notquawillofaparticularindividual(Ameriks2000,13â5;Hill1992,88;OâNeill2013,286).AsAndrewsReathputsit,theMoralLawisâthelawthattherationalwillgivestoitselfâ(Reath2006,112).
Despitethesequalifications,however,itisdifficulttogivecoherentsensetoKantâsallegedclaimthatthewillorpracticalreasonitselfissomehowactivelyinvolvedingeneratingtheobligatoryforceoftheMoralLaw.Themoreoneemphasizestheimpersonal,apriori,time-less character of autonomy, theharder it is tomake literal senseofself-legislationasanactoractivity ofthewill.AllenWoodarticulatesaviewheldbymanywhenhewritesthatthereisaâserioustensionin the ideaofKantian autonomyâbecause the idea that rationalbe-ingsarethemselveslegislatorsoftheMoralLawandtheideathattheMoralLaw isobjectivelybindingpull inoppositedirections (Wood2008,106).
In their attempt tomake sense of Kantâs discussion ofmoral au-tonomy, some commentators have proposed different ways of
7. See,e.g.,Enoch2006andLarmore2012fordifferentversionsofthisobjection.
conclusionthatitalonecangeneratemoralobligationâ(Sensen2013,11,270).6
Onthefaceofit,however,thenotionofself-legislationseemsillsuitedtothistask.Ifanactofself-legislationservestoâgenerateâmoralobligation,thisostensiblycontradictsKantâsthesisoftheuncondition-alvalidityoftheMoralLaw,foritsuggeststhatthereisaconditionforitsvalidityafterall:thewillâsactoractivityofself-legislation.Equallyproblematically,ifmoralobligationdependsonanactofoneâswill,itseemsthatonecanreleaseoneselffrommoralobligationbyabolish-ingtheMoralLawinasecondact.Itisclear,however,thatthistypeofvoluntarismisabsolutelycontrarytoKantâsview.Alternatively,iftheactofself-legislationistobenon-arbitrary,itneedstobeguidedbyanormthatprecedesitâinwhichcase,however,themostfundamentalprincipleisnot self-legislated.Thesedifficultieshaveledphilosopherswho are critical of Kantâs account of moralityâparticularly thoseworking in theHegelian traditionâto speakof a âKantianparadoxâ(e.g.,Pinkard2002;Stern2012;seealsoKhurana2013;Pippin2000).AsTerryPinkardputsit:
TheparadoxarisesfromKantâsdemandthat,ifwearetoimposeaprinciple(amaxim,themorallaw)onourselves,thenpresumablywemusthaveareasontodoso;but,iftherewas anantecedent reason to adopt thatprinciple,thenthatreasonwouldnotbeself-imposed;yetforittobebindingonus,ithadtobe[âŠ]self-imposed.(Pinkard2002,59)
NotethatthisallegedKantianparadoxisstructurallysimilartoawell-known objection against present-dayKantian constructivism to theeffectthatnotallnormativerequirementscanbegroundedindelib-erativeprocedures(sinceanysuchprocedureneedstobenormativelyguidedifitistoavoidbeingarbitrary),andthatnotallprocedurescan
6. Forsimilarclaims,seee.g.Klemme2013,193;Reath2013,36;Schneewind1998,6.
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What each of these three interpretive proposals preserves is theideathatreasonis thesourceofboththecontentandtheobligatoryforceof theMoralLaw. Importantly,however,Kantcanexpress this ideawithouthavingtodescribetheoriginofthevalidityoftheMoralLawintermsofself-legislation.Indeed,weshallarguethatKantdoesnotinfactclaimthattheMoralLawisself-legislated.
1.2. Neither autonomy nor heteronomy of the Moral LawAnoften-mentionedphilosophical rationaleforwhyKantmustdescribetheMoralLawasself-legislatedisthatthisisnecessarytoaccountforthepossibilityofunconditionalmoralobligation.ThethoughtisthattheMoralLawmustbeconceivedasself-legislatedbecauseotherwiseitwouldbe (orwouldhave tobe regarded as) an alien (âheterono-mousâ)impositionbysomeexternalauthority,inwhichcaseitsbind-ingforcewouldbeconditionalonourhavinganinterestinobeyingtherelevantauthority(say,inlightoftheprospectofrewardorpunish-ment)(seeAllison1990,237;Hill1992,76â96;Kain2004,288;Tim-mermann2007,104;Wood2008,117).
What is overlookedon this lineof reasoning is that thebindingforceof theMoral Law canbenon-heteronomous inoriginwithout being the result of self-legislation.The thirdoption,which is apos-sibilitytowhichReathâsandWoodâsnon-literalreadingsactuallypoint,isthattheMoralLawisneitherself-legislatednorimposedfromwith-out,sinceitisafundamentala prioriprincipleofpracticalreason(or,sinceKant identifies thewillwithpractical reason,a fundamentalaprioriprincipleof thewill). If theMoralLawisanaprioriprincipleof practical reason itself, the obligatory force ofwhichwe come toacknowledgeinpracticaldeliberation,thissufficestoaccountforits
example, interpretsKantâsnotionof autonomyas an individual and socialgoaltoberealizedthroughadherencetotheCategoricalImperative,namelyasaconditioninwhichindividualandcollectivefreedomispossibletothegreatest extent (Guyer 2007, 10, 68). Karl Ameriks views Kantâs theory ofautonomyasametaphysicaltheoryaboutourstatusasuncausedcauses(atheorywhich,inhisview,suffersfromtheproblemsconnectedwithKantâsdefenseoffreewill;seeAmeriks2000,17).
understandingthenotionofself-legislation.Afirststrategythatsug-gests itself is that of interpreting self-legislation in a nonreflexivesense.Anâautomobileâisâself-movingâinthesensethatitmovesby itself,andanâautographâisself-written;byanalogy,onemightwanttoarguethatmoralâautonomyâsimplymeansthattheMoralLawisgivenbyoneself,inthesensethatitisoneâs own legislation.8Thiscon-ceptionofautonomyavoidsmanyofthedifficultiesmentionedabove,but it retains the problematic element of activity that seems to runcountertotheunconditionalityoftheMoralLaw.
Manyinterpretersinsteadchoosetoweakenthesenseinwhichthewillself-legislates.AndrewsReath,forexample,interpretstheallegedâself-legislationâoftheMoralLawasmeaningâthatthenatureofratio-nalvolition(orpractical reason)supplies itsown internalor formalprincipleâ(i.e.,theCategoricalImperative).Theâelementofactivityâ,ofâgivinglawâ,headds,amountstothefactthatâsubjectsengagedincertain formsof rationalactivityunderstandthemselves tohavecer-tainformalaimsandarenormativelyguidedbytheirself-conscious-nessoftheseformalaimsâ(Reath2013,47).HereâgivingâtheMoralLawtooneselfisunderstoodasrecognizingthatitoriginatesinoneâsownwillandbeingguidedbyitinoneâsrationalactivity.
A thirdstrategy is topointout that thereareseveralpassages inwhichKantwritesthatweshouldâviewâorâregardâourselvesasself-legislating.Onthisbasis,AllenWoodsuggeststhatwedobesttotreatKantâs language of self-legislation as âjust away of considering or re-gardingâtheMoralLaw,andthatwhatKantâreallyâmeansisthatitscontentandauthorityareâindependentofanypossiblevolitionalactwemightperformâ(Wood2008,110).Inotherwords,WoodmaintainsthatwhileKantdescribestheMoralLawasself-legislated,thisisbestinterpretednon-literally,merelyasamannerofspeaking.9
8. Sensenmentionsanotherpossiblenon-reflexivereadingofâself-legislationâ,namely as a law-giving âof its ownkindâ,which,he argues, expresses thattheCategoricalImperativeisâunconditionedbyforeigndeterminantsâ(2013,269â70).
9. Some of those who read Kant as defending a realist position also de-em-phasize the âlegislationâaspect in thenotionofautonomy.PaulGuyer, for
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Lawas self-legislated.There are three sets of passages that are cru-cialforanyunderstandingofKantâsconceptionofautonomyandfordeterminingwhetherhearguesthattheMoralLawisself-legislated:Kantâsdiscussionoftheso-calledFormulaofAutonomy(G4:431â6),alongwithhissubsequentdiscussionofâautonomyofthewillasthesupreme principle of moralityâ (G 4:440), all in Groundwork II; hisidentificationoffreedomofthewillandautonomyatthebeginningofGroundwork III(G4:447);andhisclaim,intheCritique of Practical Rea-son,thatreasongiveshumanbeingstheMoralLaw(KpV5:32),alongwiththeensuingdiscussionofautonomyofthewill(KpV5:33).Inad-dition,wewillconsiderseveralrelevantisolatedformulations.
2. An Alternative Reading of Kantâs Conception of Moral Autonomy
2.1. Kantâs introduction of autonomy in Groundwork IIIn the Groundwork, Kant introduces the notion of autonomy afterdiscussing theFormulaofUniversalLaw (FUL)and theFormulaofHumanity(FH),andrightaftermentioningathirdformulationoftheCategorical Imperative,which he initially expresses in terms of theâideaofthewillofeveryrationalbeingasauniversallylaw-givingwillâ(G4:431).Headdsthatthisâideaââwhichhecallstheâthirdpracticalprincipleofthewillââistobeunderstoodintermsofthewillâsbeingâviewedâorâregardedasâself-legislating:
Inaccordancewith this [third]principleallmaximsarerejectedthatcannotcoexistwiththewillâsownuniversallegislation.Thewillisthusnotmerelysubjecttothelawbutsubjectinsuchawaythatitmustalsobeviewedasself-legislating10 [selbstgesetzgebend] andprecisely for thatreasonsubjecttothelawinthefirstplace(ofwhichitcanregarditselfasauthor).(G4:431,orig.emphasis)
10. SomeEnglishtranslatorsgiveâlegislatingtoitselfâorâgivingthelawtoitselfâ(e.g.,AllenWoodandMaryGregor).âSelf-legislatingâisclosertotheGermanoriginalandpreservestheconnotationthatthelegislatingisdoneby theself,withoutsuggestingthattheselfistheprimaryaddresseeofthelaw.Formorediscussion,seeKleingeld2018,172â4.
universality,unconditionality, andnon-heteronomousorigin.And ifitsnormativevalidityissomethingwecometoacknowledgeinpracti-caldeliberation,wedonotfirstestablishitthroughanactofthewill,andthusitsvalidityisnotconditionalonanythingelse.
Inotherwords, the assumption that theoriginof thenormativeauthorityoftheprincipleofmoralitylieseitherinautonomyorinhet-eronomyisbasedonthedisputablepresuppositionthattheobligatoryforceof theMoralLawmustbegrounded in somethingmore funda-mental (be itavalue,asmanyrealistsassert,oraprincipleoractiv-ityrelatedtoagency,asconstructivistsassert).Beyondtheautonomy/heteronomydichotomy liesa third,overlookedpossibilityânamelythat KantâsMoral Law, as themost fundamental practical principle,doesnothaveadeeperâgroundâ.Thatistosay,whatremainsopenisthepossibility that theMoralLawisneitherself-legislatednor legis-latedbysomeone(orsomething)else.
Consequently,ifitturnsoutthatKantdoesnotactuallystatethattheMoralLawisself-legislated,thisdoesnotnecessarilycommithimtoaâheteronomousâconceptionofmorality.IfwecanshowthatKantviewstheMoralLawasanaprioriandfoundationalprincipleofrea-son, thisatoncegets ridof thedifficultiesassociatedwith thepara-doxical idea that theprincipleofmorality isself-legislated. (Wewillreturn toKantâsaccountof theoriginandbindingnessof theMoralLawinsection4.)
Butwhat,then,istheimportofKantâsnotionofmoralautonomy,andhowdoes itrelatetotheMoralLaw?Whatdoes itmeantosay,asKantdoes,thatautonomyisthehighestprincipleofmorality?AndhowshouldweinterpretthetextsthatareusuallytakentoshowthatKantclaimsthattheMoralLawisself-legislated?Inthenextsection,wearguethatKantusestheideaofmoralautonomytoarticulatetheprocedure for determining themoral permissibility of maxims andthusforderivingsubstantivemorallaws;autonomydoesnotconcerntheoriginandbindingforceoftheMoralLaw.
WeshallpresentouralternativeaccountonthebasisoftextsthatareusuallycitedinsupportoftheclaimthatKantdescribestheMoral
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is:Actasifyourmaximweretoserveatthesametimeasauniversallaw(forallrationalbeings).11(G4:438)
Fourth,itisimportanttonotethatKantintroducestheideaofau-tonomycounterfactually:hestatesnotthatthelawtowhichherefersis actually self-legislatedbut that itmust beviewed as self-legislated,thatonemustregardoneselfasitsauthor,andthatonemustactas if oneweregivinguniversallaw.Asmentionedabove,Wood(2008,111)alsodraws attention to these expressions.He interprets them,how-ever,asreferringtoawayofconsideringtheMoral Law.Bycontrast,ontheinterpretationweproposethecounterfactualideaofself-legis-lationconcernssubstantivemoral laws exclusively.
Insum,intheverypassageinwhichKantintroducesthenotionofautonomy,thelawthatispresentedasself-legislatedisnottheMoralLaworCategoricalImperativeitselfbutratherthesubstantiveuniver-sallawmentioned init.Moreover,theideaofthewillasself-legislatingisintroducedasprovidingawayofâviewingâorâregardingâthewill,notasreferringtoagenuineactoflegislation.12
Asecondpassagethatmightbeseentoprovidesupport forthethe-sis that theMoralLaw is self-legislated is the followingdescription
11. Sinceâalllawshemayeverpossiblybesubjecttoâ(inthefirstsentenceofthequotedpassage)arehereviewedasstemmingfromoneâsownuniversalleg-islation,andsinceoneissubjecttotheMoralLaw,thispassagemightseemtosuggestthattheMoralLawshouldalsobeviewedasself-legislated.Theref-erencetomaximsandthewidercontextmakeclear,however,thatitmakesmuchmoresensetoreadthequotedpassageasaddressingonlyuniversallegislationthroughoneâsmaxims,andhenceonlymoral laws in theplural.AnotherconsiderationagainstassumingthattheuniversallawsmentionedinthequotedpassagesincludetheMoralLawitselfisthefactthatKantmen-tionstheMoralLawseparatelyastheâformalprincipleofthesemaximsâ.
12. NotealsothatwhileKantusesthetermâautonomyâ(Autonomie)25timesintheGroundwork,hedoesnotspeakofâself-legislationâ(Selbstgesetzgebung)atallandusesâself-legislatingâ(selbstgesetzgebend)onlyonce(inthepassageatG4:431discussedabove).Instead,Kantgenerallyspeaksofâuniversallegisla-tionâ(e.g.G4:432),atermthatimpliesthattherelevantlawsareself-legislat-edinthesenseindicatedabove,namelyinthesenseofbeinggivenbyoneselftoallandhenceasalsoapplyingtooneself.
IfthelawthatKantmentionshereweretheMoralLaw,Kantwouldbeclaimingthattheprincipleofmoralityisself-legislatedbythewill.Ifwelookmoreclosely,however,weseethatthisisnotinfactwhatheisclaiming.First,thereisnoexplicitindicationthatthelawinquestionistheMoralLaw.Kantdoesnotrefertotheprincipleofmoralityatallintheprecedingpassages.Hencetheexpressionâthelawâinthispas-sagecouldalsorefertoanysubstantivemorallaw.
Second,Kantexplainswhathemeansbyâthewillâsownuniversallegislationâby restating the thirdpracticalprincipleas the âprinciple ofeveryhumanwillas a will that is universally legislating through all its maximsâ(G4:432,orig.emphasis),andhelaterreferstothisprincipleasâtheprincipleofautonomyâ(G4:433).ThefactthatKantformulatestheprincipleofautonomyintermsof(self-)legislating through oneâs max-imssuggeststhatthelawthatisregardedasself-legislatedisnottheCategoricalImperativeitselfbutrathertheuniversallawmentioned in it.Afterall,theCategoricalImperativerequiresthatthemaximofouractionbeabletoholdsimultaneouslyasuniversal law,or,inanalter-native formulation, thatwe regardourselves as givinguniversal law âthroughallmaximsâofourwill (seeG4:433,4:436â7).
Third, because this law is conceived as universal, it includes theagentinitsscope.Thusthislawmustbeviewedasself-legislatedinatwofoldsense:asgivenbyoneselfand,becauseitincludesoneselfinitsscope,asalsoaddressingoneself.ThefactthatImustregardmyselfasauthorofthemorallawstowhichIamsubjectsayssomethingim-portantaboutmyrelationtothoselaws,namelythattheyarenotalienimpositionsbutexpressionsofmyownwill.Kantstressesthisideainmanyotherpassagesaswell,forexamplewhenhewritesthat:
everyrationalbeing,asanendinitself,mustbeabletoregard itself at the same time as universally law-givingwithrespecttoalllawshemayeverpossiblybesubjectto.[âŠ][E]veryrationalbeingmustactasifhewerethroughhismaximsatalltimesalawgivingmemberoftheuniver-salrealmofends.Theformalprincipleofthesemaxims
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Furthermore,whenKant calls theMoralLaw theprincipleof au-tonomy(G4:440),hepresentsitascommandingautonomy,notasre-sulting from it.Sinceourwill isaffectedbysensible inclinationsthattemptustoactonmaximsthatfailtomeetthemoralrequirement,theprincipleofautonomy takesaprescriptive form forus.Hence,Kantwrites,theprincipleofautonomy,asthesupremeprincipleofmoral-ity,isaâcategoricalimperativeâthatâcommandsneithermorenorlessthanthisautonomyâ(G4:440).NothinginthewordingofthepassageunderconsiderationsuggeststhateitherthecontentortheobligatoryforceoftheMoralLawistheresultoftheautonomy(understoodasself-legislation)ofthewill.
Insum,althoughthesepassagesmightseematfirsttosuggestthatKantarguesthattheMoralLawisself-legislated,noneofthemactu-allyestablishesthis.Rather,Kantusestheideaofmoralautonomytodescribeacounterfactualcriterionfordeterminingthemoralpermis-sibilityofmaximsandtoindicatethatsubstantivemorallawsmustbeviewedasthewillâsownlaws.
2.2. The one Moral Law and the many moral lawsThe passages discussed so far indicate that there are two levels atwhichKantspeaksofmorallaw.14First,Kantusestheexpressionâmor-allawâtorefertotheprincipleofmorality;thesearethecasesinwhichwecapitalizeitasâMoralLawâ.TheMoralLaw,whichforhumanbe-ingstakestheformoftheCategoricalImperative,formulatesthenor-mativecriterionthatoughttoguideouradoptionofmaxims.Whatittellsustodoistoconceiveofourselvesasmorallegislatorswhogiveuniversal laws through theirmaximsâlaws towhich, because theyareuniversal,weourselvesare subjectâand toactonlyonmaxims
Hence,evenifKantwereherereferringtotheMoralLaw,thiswouldindicateonlythatitisapriori,notthatitisself-legislated.
14. Othercommentatorshavealsoemphasizedtheimportanceofdistinguishingbetweenthesetwolevelsofmorallegislation(e.g.,Kain2004;Reath2006),yettheytendtoassociateKantâsconceptionofautonomywithboth.Ontheinterpretationwepropose,bycontrast,Kantspeaksofautonomyonlyatthelevelofsubstantivemorallaws,notattheleveloftheMoralLaw.
ofwhatismeantbyâautonomyofthewillâ,alongwiththecanonicalarticulationoftheFormulaofAutonomy:
Autonomyofthewillisthepropertyofthewillbywhichitis[âŠ]alawtoitself.Hencetheprincipleofautonomyis:nottochooseinanyotherwaythanthus,thatthemax-imsof[thewillâs]choicearecomprehended(mit begriffen)inthesamevolitionasuniversallaws.(G4:440)
Again,however,thispassagedoesnotstateexplicitlythattheprincipleofmoralityitselfisself-legislated.Kantexplainswhatitmeanstosaythatautonomyconsists in thewillâsbeingâa lawto itselfâbysayingthattheprincipleofautonomyrequiresacertainwayofchoosing oneâs maxims.Oneoughttoactonlyonmaximsthatonecansimultaneouslywill(âcomprehendinthesamevolitionâ)asuniversallawsforallratio-nalbeings,includingoneself.TheuniversallawsofwhichKantspeaksherearethosethatareformulatedbyuniversalizingourmaxims.ThisisconfirmedbyanotherpassagewhereKantidentifiesâautonomyâofthewillwiththewillâspropertyofâbeingalawtoitselfâandexplainsthisexpressionasfollows:
[T]heproposition,thewillisinallitsactionsalawtoit-self,indicatesonlytheprincipletoactonnoothermaximthanthatwhichcanalsohaveasobjectitselfasauniver-sallaw.(G4:447)
Here,too,Kantfirstcharacterizesautonomyasthewillâsbeingalawtoitselfandthenexplicatesthisintermsoftheprincipleofactingonlyonmaximsthatonecanalsowillasuniversallaws.Again,thereisnomentionofself-legislationoftheMoralLaw.13
13. Even if the law referred to in these twopassageswere theMoralLaw, thephrase âbeing a law to itselfâwouldnot necessarily imply that this law isself-legislated.Thisphrase,whichwaswidelyusedinphilosophypriortoKant,echoesPaul,who saysof certainheathens that they are âa lawunto them-selvesâ(Romans2.14),meaningroughlythattheyfindthedivinecommand-mentswithin theirheartswithouthavingbeen instructedbydivine revela-tion(thankstoStefanoBacinformakingusawareofthis,seeBacin2013,61).
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[T]hereisindeednosublimityin[thepersonwhofulfillsallhisduties]insofarasheissubject tothemorallaw[dem moralischen Gesetz unterworfen], but there certainly is in-sofarasheisatthesametimelawgiving with respecttoitandonlyforthatreasonsubordinatedtoit.(G4:440,orig.emphasis)
It isunclearfromthissentence,whenreadinisolation,whetherthephraseâthemorallawâreferstotheMoralLaworwhetheritshouldbeunderstoodasagenericsingular,meaningâanymorallawâandthusreferringtosubstantivemorallawsingeneral.Also,itmayseemthatâlawgivingâismeanthereinaliteralsense.
Thecontextmakesclear,however, thatthispassagefitswithourinterpretationofthepassagesdiscussedabove.First,thesentenceim-mediatelyprecedingthequotationshowsthatKantisdescribingnotagenuineactoflawgivingbytheagentbutawayofrepresentingthatagent:hestatesthatundertheconceptofdutywenotonlyâthinkâofsubjectionunderthelawbutalsoârepresentâacertainsublimityanddignity(G4:439â40).Thisallowsforthepossibilitythattheâlawgiv-ingâmentionedinthequotedsentencealsohasthestatusofathoughtorrepresentationinthesensethatthemoralagentregardshimselfas legislating.
Second,KantdoesnotmentiontheMoralLaw(ortheâprincipleofmoralityâ)atallinthepageleadinguptothequotedpassage,whereashedoesmentionâlawsofautonomyâintheplural(G4:439)anduni-versallegislationthrough our maxims(G4:439,440).Thisisindeedthethemewithwhichhe continues in the remainderof the samepara-graph(âapossiblegivingofuniversallawthrough[thewillâs]maximsâ,G4:440).Inshort,whenreadincontext,thesentenceunderconsider-ationdoesnotshowthatKantarguesthattheMoralLawis(orshouldbe regarded as) self-legislated, let alone that self-legislation of theMoralLawistheconditionofitsuniversalandunconditionalvalidity.
Inseveralpassages intheGroundwork,Kantdiscussesthefeelingofrespect.Someof thesepassagesmightalsoseemto lendsupport
thatwecansimultaneouslywillasuniversallaws.Inotherwords,theMoralLawinthesingularisameta-principlethatdemandsthatwere-gardourselvesaslegislating,andself-legislating,universallawsintheplural.Itisaformalprincipleinthatitabstractsfromallempiricalmat-terofthewill(i.e.,fromdesires,inclinations,etc.)andthusdeterminesspecificmoralobligationsonlywhenappliedtoparticularmaxims.Ifamaximfailstomeetthisnormativecriterion,itisimpermissibletoactonit,andinthiswaythemoralcriterionleadstotheformulationofsubstantivemorallawsâmorallawsatasecondlevel.Accordingly,whendiscussingautonomyKant typically speaksof âmoral lawsâ intheplural.Forexample,hewrites: âTheautonomyof thewill is thesoleprincipleofallmoral lawsandtheduties thatcorrespondwiththemâ (KpV5:33).Kantmentionsexamples suchas âthe law topro-motethehappinessofothersâ(KpV5:34), theâethical lawofperfec-tion:loveyourneighborasyourselfâ(MdS6:450;seealsoKpV5:83),andâthe[law]ofintegrityâ(G4:401n.).Whenarguingthatalawcancountasamorallawonlyifitisabsolutelynecessary,heillustratesthiswithâthecommand:thoushaltnotlieâandaddsâandsowithallothermorallawsproperlysocalledâ(G4:389).
Thus,theapplicationoftheformalMoral Law(CategoricalImpera-tive,principleofmorality)toparticularmaximsresultsintheformula-tionofsubstantivemoral laws(moralcommands),suchasâoneoughtnevertolieâ,âoneoughttopromotethehappinessofothersâ,andsoon.If,inlightoftheMoralLaw,acertainmaximturnsouttobemorallyimpermissible,thenthemaximisimpermissiblenotjustformebutforallrationalbeings(includingmyself),whichmeansthatitisamoraldutynottoactonit.Conversely,ifacandidatemaximturnsouttobemorallypermissible,itispermissibleforeveryone.
2.3. Self-legislation and subjection to the lawWecannowturntofurtherGroundwork passagesthatdonotmentionautonomyexplicitlybutthatmightbetakentoindicatethatKantde-fendsthethesisthattheMoralLawisself-legislated.Kantwrites:
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2.4. Reasonâs Grundgesetz for human beingsThusfar,wehaveconsideredtherelevantpassagesfromtheGround-work, but there are also important passages in theCritique of Practi-cal Reason thatcanbetakentosuggestthatKantgroundsthebindingforceoftheMoralLawinitsbeingself-legislated.ThesearepassagesinwhichKantarguesthatpurereasongivestheMoralLawtohumansandinwhichhediscussestheemergenceoftheconsciousnessofmor-alobligationandthefeelingofrespectforthelaw.
IntheAnalyticofthesecondCritique,havingestablishedtheâFun-damentalLaw[Grundgesetz]ofPurePracticalReasonâ,KantformulatesthefollowingâCorollaryâ(Folgerung,conclusion):
Purereason ispracticalof itselfaloneandgives (to thehumanbeing)auniversallawwhichwecallthemoral law.(KpV5:31,orig.emphasis)
ForthepurposesofourdiscussionweshallassumethatKantherere-ferstotheMoralLaw,ratherthantothelegislationofsubstantivemor-allaws.15Nevertheless,thereisgoodreasontodoubtthatthispassageprovides support for the standard interpretation.Kant does not sayherethatthevalidityofthislawdependsonanactofself-legislation.Infact,hedoesnotidentifythelegislatorofthelawwiththesubjectofthelaw,sothereisnoâselfâthatisbothlegislatorandaddresseeofthelaw.Rather,byaddingtheparentheticalremarkKantclarifiesthatpure practical reason givesthisâmorallawâto the human beingasabeingthathasarationalandsensiblenature.
TheCorollaryconcernsthequestionofhowwecanbecome aware ofaMoralLawthatissupposedtodetermineourwillindependentlyofanysensiblemotives.Kantâsansweristhatthisawarenessresultsnotfromanyempiricaldatabutfromourownreason:âConsciousnessofthisfundamentallawmaybecalledafact[Factum] ofreasonâ(KpV5:31).TheprimarymeaningofthetermâFactumâinKantâserawasstillâdeedâ or âproductâ, not âmatter of factâ (Willaschek 1992, Kleingeld
15. Eveninthispassagethereisacertainambiguity,anditisnotimpossibletoreadâthemorallawâasagenericsingular,referringtosubstantivemorallaws.
totheviewthatKantclaimsthattheMoralLawisself-legislated.Hewrites,forinstance,thatâ[t]heobject ofrespectisthereforesimplythelaw, andindeedthelawthatweimposeuponourselves andyetasnec-essaryinitselfâ(G4:401n.).
Asintheotherpassagesdiscussedabove,Kantdoesnotexplicitlystate that it is theMoralLawthatwe âimposeuponourselvesâ.Thephraseâthelawâcanalsobereadasagenericsingular, inthesenseofâanymorallawassuchâorâthesubstantivemorallawinquestionâ.ThatthisisindeedthebetterreadingissupportedbythefactthatKantthenaddsthatâ[a]nyrespectforapersonisproperlyonlyrespectforthe law (of integrity and so forth), ofwhich [theperson]givesus theexampleâ(G4:401n.;emphasisadded).Kantâsparentheticalexplana-tionofwhathemeansbyâthelawâânamelythelawâofintegrityandsoforthââshowsthatheisreferringnottotheMoralLawbuttosub-stantivemorallawsingeneral.Thesearethelawsthatwearesaidtoimposeonourselvesaswesubjectourselvestothem.
Finally,atG4:444Kantagainsays that thewillofevery rationalbeing âimposes [a law] upon itselfâ, and here he seems to be refer-ring to theMoral Law. Kant is not using the vocabulary of âlegisla-tionâinthispassage,however.âImposinguponitselfâisnotthesameasâself-legislatingâ,anditmaywellbeunderstoodasavariantofthelanguageof âsubjectingâoneself to theMoralLaw,whichKantusesinotherpassages(e.g.,G 4:449).Inthequotewithwhichwestartedthis subsection (G 4:440), Kant explicitly distinguishes subjection to a law from legislation.Therefore, ifKant isasserting thatwe imposetheMoralLawuponourselves(or,equivalently,subjectourselvestoit) in thepassageunder consideration, this doesnot imply thatweself-legislateit.Instead,KantâsassertionisprobablybestunderstoodasindicatingthathumansacknowledgetheauthorityoftheMoralLaw,notthattheyestablish itsbindingforcebyanactofwill.Thisideaisexpressedmoreclearlyinthefinalpairoftextsweshallconsider,towhichwenowturn.
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ThereisonefinalpassagefromtheCritique of Practical Reason thatmeritsdiscussion,namelythe(ratherdense)passagefromthesecondchapterwhereKantmentions âreasonâs representationâ of a âlawoffreedomthatreasongivestoitselfâ(KpV5:65).IfbyâlawoffreedomâheheremeanstheMoralLaw,thenthispassagecould indicatethatKantconsiderstheMoralLawtobeself-legislatedbyreason.Oncloserinspection,however,thisdoesnotappeartobethecase.Kantgener-allyusestheexpressionâlawsoffreedomâtorefertoethicalandjuridi-callaws,asdistinctfromlawsofnature.16InthepassageatissueKantmentionsthisdistinctionbetweenlawsofnatureandlawsoffreedom,andlaterinthesamechapterhearguesthatâalawofnatureâservesastheâtypeâofâalawoffreedomâ(KpV5:70).Heexplainsthisbysayingthatinordertoassessthemoralpossibilityofoneâsmaximofaction,oneoughttoâtestâthemaximinlightoftheformofalawofnature(KpV5:69â70),toestablishwhetheronecansimultaneouslywillthemaximasauniversallaw(i.e.,asamorallawwiththeuniversalityofalawofnature).Asaresult,byâlawoffreedomâinthepassageatissue,Kantseems tomeanasubstantivemoral law, rather than theMoralLaw(supremeprincipleofmorality).ThepassagethereforedoesnotshowthatKantdescribestheMoralLawasself-legislated.
Takingstock,webelievethattheoverallpicturestronglysuggeststhatKantdoesnotclaimthattheprincipleofmoralityis(orshouldbere-garded as) self-legislated. Although there are passages that, on thefaceofit,couldbereadassayingthattheMoralLawisself-legislated,noneofthesepassagesmust bereadthisway.Moreimportantly,giventheimmediatecontextofthepassages,ouralternativereadingseemsmorenaturalandmakesbetterphilosophicalsenseofthetext.17
16. Thus,hewritesintheMetaphysics of Morals: âTheselawsoffreedomarecalledmorallaws,todistinguishthemfromlawsofnature.Totheextenttowhichtheyconcernmerelyexternalactionsand their conformity to law theyarecalledjuridicallaws;butiftheyalsodemandthatthey(thelaws)themselvesbethedetermininggroundsoftheactions,thentheyareethicallawsâ(MdS6:214).
17. Thus,wedonotclaimtohaveruledoutanonliteralreadingofâself-legislationâ
2010).SotheideaKantexpressesintheCorollaryissimplythatourconsciousness ofmoral obligation stems from reason, not fromem-piricalsources.
NotethattheâgivingâofthelawtowhichKantrefersherecanbereadeitherinthesenseofâlegislationâ(lawgiving)orinthesenseofthe lawâs being made cognitively available or being âpresentedâ tousâthatis,inthesenseinwhichKantsaysinthefirstCritique thatob-jectsareâgivenâtousinintuition.Perhapsthesetwowaysofreadingtheexpressionrepresenttwosidesofthesamecoin.Ontheonehand,iftheMoralLawisafundamentalaprioriprincipleofpurepracticalreason,thenhumans,byvirtueoftheirrationalnature,areindeedpre-sentedwiththisprinciple.KantsaysimmediatelybeforetheCorollarythatourconsciousnessoftheMoralLawcanbecalledaâfactofreasonâbecauseitâforcesitselfuponusâwithoutbeingâbasedonanyintuition,eitherpureorempiricalâ(KpV5:31).Ontheotherhand,iftheMoralLawisafundamentalaprioriprincipleofpurepracticalreason,thenitpresentsitselftohumansasalawwithrationallybindingforce,insofarashumans,duetotheirsensiblenature,donotnecessarilyactinac-cordancewithrationalprinciples:
[I]nordertoavoidmisinterpretationinregardingthislawasgiven, itmustbenotedcarefully that it isnotanem-piricalfactbutthesolefactofpurereason,which,byit,announcesitselfasoriginallylawgiving(sic volo, sic jubeo).(KpV5:31,orig.emphasis)
FromthistheâCorollaryâindeedfollows:theMoralLawisgiventous(humanbeings)bypurepracticalreason.WecanleaveitundecidedwhetheroneshouldreadâgivesâintheCorollaryinthesenseofpurereasonâsâpresentingâhumanswiththeMoralLaworinthesenseofpurereasonâsâlegislatingâtheMoralLaw(orboth).Eitherway,KantisnotstatingthatpurereasongivestheMoralLawtopurereason,orthatthehumanbeinggivesittothehumanbeing.Thus,KantdoesnotclaiminthispassagethattheMoralLawisâself-legislatedâ,letalonethatitsbindingforcedependsonthis.
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reconciledwithitsbeingself-legislated,thenitwouldseemthatthisisequallyproblematicinthecaseofmorallaws.
There are two reasons,however, to think that theproblems con-nectedwiththethesisthattheMoralLawisself-legislateddonotaf-fectKantâsconceptionofautonomyasweunderstandit.First,itisim-portanttoemphasizethatalmostallofthepassagesdiscussedintheprevioussectionssuggestthattheideaofself-legislationispartofaprocessof counterfactual reasoning, or a thought experiment. In thepassages discussed above,Kantwrites thatwe should regard or con-siderthewillasself-legislating,orregardourselvesasgivinguniversallaw(G4:431,433,434,438),andthatweshouldproceedas ifwewerelegislatingmembersofarealmofends(G4:438).Hedoesnotclaimthathumansinfactgivemorallaws;rather,wearetocounterfactuallyassumethatwearelegislatinguniversallawthroughourmaximandthenaskwhetheritisstillpossible,onthisassumption,towilltoactonthatmaximwithoutself-contradiction.Ifso,theactionispermitted;ifnot,theactionisforbidden(G4:439).Thus,theideaofautonomyservestoarticulateacriterioninlightofwhichwearetodeterminethemoralpermissibilityofourmaxims.Thisuseoftheideaofautonomydoesnotcomewiththeproblematicimplicationthattheuncondition-alvalidityofmorallawsdependsonanyrealact ofself-bindingonthepartofhumanagents.
Second,thisaccountalsoexplainswhywearenotatlibertytoabol-ishoursubstantivemoralduties.Thebindingforceofmorallawsde-rivesfromthecriterionarticulatedintheMoralLaw,notfromanactofwill.Asmoralsubjects,Kantmaintains,weareboundbytheMoralLaw,sowehavenomoralalternativebuttoactonmaximsthatmeetthe criterion it articulates. At the same time, our account captureswhatmanyhavefoundattractiveaboutKantâsaccountofmoralauton-omy,namely that itavoidscharacterizingmoralobligationsasalienimpositions.IftheMoralLawisafundamentalprincipleofpureprac-tical reasonâapossibilityweexplore inmoredetailbelowâmorallawsthatderivefromitarenotexternalimpositions.Rather,theycan
If the argument of this section is convincing, it invalidates thepremiseunderlyingmuchofthedebateovertheallegedâparadoxicalâfeaturesofKantâsmoraltheoryandtheallegedâdeeptensionsâinhistheoryofautonomy.Histheoryofautonomy,ontheinterpretationwepropose,doesnotcontainanelementofproblematicvoluntarismthatrunscountertotheunconditionalityofmoralobligation.Rather,withthe ideaof autonomyKant formulatesa counterfactual criterion fordeterminingwhethermaxims aremorally permissible and, throughthis,forarticulatingsubstantivemorallaws.Sincethiscriterionisanaprioriprincipleofreason,thesemorallawsaregroundedinreasonitself. In section 4,we spell out the implications of this reading forthequestionofwhetherKantâsmoral theory isbest interpretedasaversionof realismor constructivism.Beforewedo so,however,weconsider several possible problems associated with our alternativeaccount.
3. Problems and Objections
SincewearearguingforanalternativetoadeeplyentrenchedreadingofacentralclaimofKantâsethics,ourreadingofhisconceptionofau-tonomyislikelytogiverisetoseveralworriesandobjections.Inthissection,wewilladdressthreepossibleconcerns.
3.1. Moral autonomy without paradoxFirst,onemightwonderatthispointhowmuchisgained,philosoph-ically,bydenying thatKantdescribes theMoralLaw itself asbeingself-legislated.Itmightseemthatwiththeinterpretationweproposetheparadoxicalfeaturesoftheideaofmoralself-legislationsimplyre-emergeattheleveloftheself-legislationofsubstantivemorallaws.Af-terall,Kantpresentssubstantivemorallawsasunconditionallyvalidtoo.If,ascriticshavealleged,alawâsunconditionalvaliditycannotbe
oftheMoralLaw(asdeveloped,forinstance,byReath2013).Rather,onourview discussing such a reading is unnecessary because Kant nowhere un-equivocallyclaimsthattheMoralLawisself-legislatedinthefirstplace.
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statenewobligationsin addition totheobligationtoactinaccordancewiththeMoralLaw;rather,theyareitsconcreteinstantiations.
3.3. Law without a legislator? 19 OurclaimthattheMoralLaw,accordingtoKant,isafundamentalaprioriprincipleofreason,thenormativeforceofwhichderivesneitherfromitsbeingself-legislatednorfromitsbeinglegislatedbyanyoneor anything else, raises thequestionofwhetherKant can allow fora lawwithout a legislator.On traditional conceptions, both lawsofnatureandmoral lawsareconceivedofas legislatedbyGod.WhileKant turnedawayfromthis tradition,hemaystillhaveretainedtheideathatalllawsneedtobelegislatedbysomeoneorsomething.Forinstance,hewritesthatthelawsofnaturearelegislatedbytheunder-standingandthemorallawsbypracticalreason(seeKrVA840/B868;KU5:174â5),whichmightbetakentoimplythattheMoralLawmustlikewisebelegislatedandhavealegislator.Thisdoesnotfollow,how-ever.First,comparethecaseoftheprinciplesoflogic,whichKantre-peatedlyreferstoasâlawsâ(e.g.,L9:15).Nothingsuggeststhatheheldthatthelawsoflogichavealegislator,soheseemstohaveallowedforthepossibilityof lawswithouta legislator.Second,whenKantdoesdiscussalegislatorofmorallaws,thislegislatorisGod(seeKpV5:129;Rel6:99;MdS6:227).Kantmakes itveryclear,however, thatmorallawsdonotowetheirbindingforcetotheirbeinglegislatedbyGod.Hispointisthatit ispossible(andperhapsevenmorallynecessary)to âconsiderâ or âthink ofâ them as given by God. Importantly, thethoughtofGodas legislator isnotsupposedtoaccount for thecon-tentorthenormativevalidityofmorallaws.AsKantputsit,Godmustbeconceivedaslegislatingonlyâgenuinedutiesââthatis,dutiesthathold independentlyof his legislation (Rel 6:99).Kant argues in thePowalskiLecturesonPracticalPhilosophythatboththeâprincipleofmoralityâandthemorallawsareâoriginalâandâexistinandofthem-selvesâ; theydonotdependonGodâs legislationbut theotherway
19.ThankstoEricWatkinsandananonymousreviewerforpressingthisissue.
beregardedasself-legislated(inthesensespecifiedabove)inaccor-dancewithafundamentalprinciplethatisnotself-legislatedbutvalidapriori.
3.2. One obligation too many?Second,thereistheworrythatourreadingleadstowhatwemightcallâoneobligation toomanyâ.18On theaccountwedefend in thisessay,oneismorallyobligatedtoactinaccordancenotonlywiththeMoralLawbutalsowithmorallawsintheplural.Doesnâtthismeanthatin additiontotheobligation,say,nottolie,oneisalsoobligatedtoactinaccordancewiththeMoralLaw?Itseemsthatoneofthesetwoobliga-tionsmustbeemptyandthussuperfluous.
Inreply,wewouldliketopointout,first,thatifthisreallyisaprob-lem,itarisesforanyreadingofKantâsethics,sincethedistinctionbe-tweentheMoralLaw(orCategoricalImperative)andmorallaws(orduties) isastructural featureofKantâsethicsquiteindependentlyofwhethertheMoralLawisself-legislated.
But,second,fromthisfeatureitdoesnotfollowthattherearetwodistinctobligationshere;thereisonlyone,describedatdifferentlev-elsofgenerality.AsKantpointsout, there isasenseinwhichthereisonlyâasingleâCategorical Imperative(G4:421),but thisdoesnotpreventhimfromspeakingofspecificcategorical imperatives intheplural(e.g.G4:425),suchastheimperativestodeveloponeâstalentsandtohelppeopleinneed(G4:422â3).Infact,Kantsuggeststhatallmoralcommands(âallimperativesofdutyâ)canbeâderivedfromâtheCategorical Imperative as their âprincipleâ (G 4:421). There is there-foreasenseinwhichweonlyhaveonemoralobligation,namelytoactinaccordancewiththeMoralLaw.ButactinginaccordancewiththeMoralLawrequiresustoactonmaximsthatmeetthecriterionitarticulates,suchasthemaximtodeveloponeâstalentsorthemaximtohelpothersinneed.Thesesubstantivemoralrequirementsdonot
18.WethankEricWatkinsforraisingthisworry.
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A priori fundamental principles (GrundsĂ€tze) bear thisnamenotmerelybecausetheycontaininthemselvesthegrounds of other judgments, but also because they arenotthemselvesgrounded(gegrĂŒndet)inhigherandmoregeneralcognitions.(KrVA148/B188)
Such fundamental a priori principles cannot be proven by appealtomore general principles that serve as their grounds.Kant argues,however,thatitisneverthelesspossibletodefendsuchprinciplesintermsoftheâsubjectivesourcesofthepossibilityâ(KrVA149/B188)ofspecifictypesofjudgments.ThatiswhatKantproceedstodoforthetwoâsupremeâprinciplesjustmentioned,byshowingthattheyserveassufficientconditionsofthetruthofanalyticandsyntheticapriorijudgments,respectively(KrVA150/B189âA158/B197).AndwhileKantclaims that âthe lawofnatureâ is âlegislatedâbyhumanreason(e.g.,KrVA840/B868),thereisnoindicationthatheconceivesofthetwoâsupremeâprinciplesaslegislatedbyanythingoranyone.IntermsoftheGroundworkâsautonomy/heteronomydistinction,theseprinciplesareneitherheteronomousimpositionsnortheresultofself-legislation(norare they tobe âregardedâas such).Kantdescribes theseprinci-plesasbeingvalidaprioriandaimstoestablishthisbyprovidingatranscendentalargumenttotheeffectthattheymakepossiblespecifictypesofjudgments.
KantsimilarlycharacterizestheMoralLawasafundamentalorsu-premeprinciplethatisvalidapriori.IntheGroundwork, hegenerallyreferstoitastheaprioriâprincipleofmoralityâ(Prinzip der MoralitĂ€t, G4:392;Prinzip der Sittlichkeit,G4:410,426,432,436,440,441,445,447,453;Prinzip aller Pflicht, G4:425).IntheCritique of Practical Reason KantcallstheMoralLawanaprioriGrundgesetz ânamely,theâfundamen-tallawofpurepracticalreasonâ(KpV5:30),andhealsoreferstoitastheâsupremeâprincipleofpracticalreasonandmorality(KpV5:46,83,91,93), suggesting that it grounds specificmoral lawswithout itselfbeinggroundedinanymoregeneralpracticalprinciple.
around(27:135â6).Thus,eveninpassageswhereKantdiscussestheideaofGodasamorallegislator,thecontentandnormativevalidityofthemoralprinciple(theMoralLaw)andmorallaws(intheplural)arepresupposedandviewedasguidingGodâsassumed legislativeactivityratherthanbeingdependentonit.Insum,KantindeedsuggeststhattheMoralLawisalawindependentlyofanylegislator.
4. Beyond Realist and Constructivist Interpretations
4.1. The apriority of the Moral LawAbove,wepointedoutthatanaccountoftheMoralLawasnon-heter-onomousdoesnotentailtheviewthatitisself-legislated.Weclaimedthatthereisanoverlookedthirdpossibility,namelythattheprincipleofmoralityisafundamentalaprioriprincipleofpurepracticalreasonandthatitsauthoritydoesnotderivefromanythingmorefundamen-talatall.Still,withoutanyfurtherdescriptionofthestatusoftheMoralLaw,this thirdpossibilityremainssomewhatmysterious. Inthissec-tion,weexplainwhatitwouldmeanfortheMoralLawtobeafunda-mentalaprioriprinciplethatisnotgroundedinanythingelseandwepresenttextualevidencethatKantindeeddescribesitassuch.
It is instructive to start by looking at other principles in Kantâsphilosophicalsystemthathavethestatusoffundamental,underivedaprioriprinciples,suchastheâsupremeprincipleofallanalyticjudg-mentsâ (KrVA150/B189; that is, the principle of non-contradiction),and the âsupreme principle of all synthetic judgmentsâ, accordingtowhichâeveryobjectstandsunderthenecessaryconditionsofthesyntheticunityof themanifoldof intuitioninapossibleexperienceâ(KrVA158/B197).Kantreferstotheseaprioriâsupremeâprinciplesas âGrundsĂ€tzeâ sincetheyserveastheground(Grund)forotherjudgmentsandderivativeprinciples,butarenotthemselvesgrounded inotherapriori judgmentsorprinciples.Kantexplainsthestatusofsuchprin-ciplesasfollows:
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beingsbecomeâimmediatelyawareâoftheauthorityoftheMoralLawinpracticaldeliberation,âassoonaswedrawupmaximsofthewillforourselvesâ(KpV5:29).Thisconsciousnessofmoralobligation(ourimmediateawarenessoftheMoralLawâsvalidity)isaâfactâ(deedorproduct)ofreasonthatcannotbederivedfromanyâantecedentdataof reasonâ (KpV5:31). In short, theMoral Lawneither requiresnoradmits of any further grounding: it is valid a priori. Kant character-izesonlysubstantivemorallawsasâgroundedâ,namelyasgroundedinpracticalreason(G4:452).
OuraiminthissectionismerelytoindicatehowKantdescribesthestatusof theprincipleofmorality,namelyasa fundamentalaprioriprincipleofpurepracticalreason(andnotasâself-legislatedâ).Giventhisaim,weshallnotengageindetailedcomparisonoftheargumentsintheGroundwork andthesecondCritiqueorindiscussionoftherela-tionbetweentheoreticalandpracticalprinciples. Itshouldbenoted,however, thatKantrepeatedlyemphasizes thestructuralsimilaritiesbetweentherolesoftheoreticalandpracticalprinciples(e.g.,G4:454;KpV5:30,5:42â6).Kantwritesthatthepureunderstandinglegislatestheapriorilawsofnature(Prol4:319â20)andthatpurepracticalrea-soncanbe regardedas legislating theapriorimoral laws,with theMoralLaw functioningas theirbasicprincipleâthat is, as the âfun-damentallaw(Grundgesetz)ofasupersensiblenatureâ(KpV5:42â6).
4.2. Is this a realist or a constructivist reading of Kantâs ethics (or neither)? Intheprevioussections,wearguedagainstthewidespreadviewthatKantâstheoryofautonomyconcernstheoriginoftheauthorityoftheprincipleofmorality(theMoralLaw).OurreadingdoesawaywiththepremiseunderlyingthedebateovertheallegedlyparadoxicalfeaturesofKantâsgroundingoftheMoralLaw,namelythepremisethatitmustbeeitherself-legislatedorlegislatedbyanother.Wenowwanttofur-therclarify theresultingconceptionof theMoralLawby locating itwithrespecttothecurrentdebatebetweenârealistâandâconstructiv-istâinterpretationsofKant,wheretheformertendtoemphasizetheindependenceofmoralobligations fromhuman reasonandhuman
Indeed,Kantarguesthatthebindingforceofthisfundamentallawcannotbeâexplainedâorâjustifiedâ(G4:459â62)inanyway.Heasks,inthethirdpartoftheGroundwork,âHowisaCategoricalImperativepossible?â(G4:453).Sinceanâexplanationâ(ErklĂ€rung)ofthisfunda-mentalprincipleisimpossible,Kantâsanswerproceedsintermsofthesubjectivesourcesofthepossibilityofthevalidityofsuchaprinciple,namelytheinterestthatwetakeintheprinciple(G4:461).Heasserts:
Thismuchonlyiscertain:thatitisnotbecause the law in-terests usthatithasvalidityforus(âŠ),butthatitinterestsbecauseitisvalidforusashumanbeings,sinceithasitssourceinourwillasintelligenceandsoinourproperself.(G4:460â1,orig.emphasis)
Importantly,KantâsargumentheredoesnotappealtotheideathattheMoralLawis(orshouldberegardedas)âself-legislatedâ. IfKantdidthinkthatthebindingforceoftheCategoricalImperativederivedfromanactof self-legislation, the thirdpartof theGroundwork wouldbetheplaceforhimtosayso.Afterall,asheexplicitlynotes,thesecondpartoftheGroundwork, whereheintroducesthenotionofautonomy,isnotconcernedwiththevalidityorbindingforceoftheMoralLaw(G4:440,445);rather,itelaboratesthecontentoftheprincipleofmo-ralitywhile abstracting entirely fromquestions regarding its obliga-tory force (ibid.).WhenKantfinally turns to thesequestions in thethirdpart,however,henowheresuggeststhatthebindingforceoftheMoralLawisduetoitsbeingâself-legislatedâ.Rather,hedescribestheMoralLawasaprincipleofpracticalreasonthatwetakeaninterestinâbecauseitisvalidforusâ(G4:461).
IntheCritique of Practical Reason, moreover,Kantwriteswithrefer-encetotheMoralLawthatanyâjustificationofitsobjectiveanduni-versalvalidityâisimpossible(KpV5:46,47).TheMoralLawistheâfun-damentallawofpurepracticalreasonâitself,anditisimpossibletoex-plainorjustifyâfundamentalpowersâ(Grundvermögen).ButtheMoralLaw âdoes not need any justifying groundsâ, he continues, becauseweareâaprioriconsciousâof it (KpV5:47).Kantclaimsthathuman
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saidtopaintanadequatepictureoftheserealistinterpretations.Evenwithoutfurtherdetail,however,itshouldbeclearthatourreadingofKantianautonomy isnotcommitted to realism ineithersense.First,onourinterpretation,thebindingnessoftheMoralLawisnotground-edinsomevalue,foritisnotâgroundedâatall.Asmentionedabove,Kantdescribesitasaâfundamentalâlaw(Grundgesetz)thatisnotitselfâgroundedâ.Second,denyingthattheMoralLawisself-legislateddoesnotcommitone to theviewthatwereceptivelybecomeawareof itinanintuitiveorquasi-intuitiveway.Indeed,Kantsaysthatweareâaprioriconsciousâof theMoralLaw(KpV5:47)since it isanapriorifundamentalprincipleofpurepracticalreason,andwhenheassertsthatweareâimmediatelyâawareofit,headdsâassoonaswedrawupmaximsofthewillforourselvesâ(KpV5:29).Thisindicatesthat,ratherthanbeingreceptive,ourawarenessoftheMoralLawarisesimmedi-atelyinpracticaldeliberation,ratherthanbymeansofintuition.
Next,letusturntoconstructivistreadingsofKantâsethics.Again,thesecomeindifferentvarieties.First, thereisJohnRawlsâsKantianconstructivism,accordingtowhichmoralobligationsaretheoutcomeof a hypothetical deliberative procedure definedby theCategoricalImperative(theâCIprocedureâ,Rawls1980).ThisisaclaimnotaboutwhatgroundsthebindingnessoftheMoralLawbutabouthowtoes-tablishparticularmoralobligations.AccordingtoRawls,theCIproce-dureisnotamereepistemictoolbywhichwediscoverwhatismorallyright.Rather,onhisview,moralobligationsaretheoutcomeofthisprocedure.(NotethatthiskindofconstructivismissilentonthestatusoftheCategoricalImperativeandtheMoralLawitself,sinceitneitherclaims nor denies that theMoral Law is self-legislated.)Others de-fendversionsofKantianconstructivismaccordingtowhichthebind-ingnessoftheMoralLawitselfistheresultofâconstructionâofsomekind,whichtheyexplainbyappealingtothenotionofautonomy(e.g.,Korsgaard1996;OâNeill2004;Reath2006).Morerecently,ChristineKorsgaardhasarguedthatthenormativeauthorityoftheMoralLawshould be explained in terms of its necessary role in unifying and
cognitiveactivity ingeneralandthelattercharacterizemoralobliga-tionasbeinggroundedinfactsabouthumanreasonandagency.20Inrecentyears,variousauthorshavedefendedrealistreadingsofKantâsethics(e.g.,Ameriks2003;Guyer2000;Kain2004;Schönecker2013;Stern2010;Wood1999),mostinexplicitoppositiontoconstructivistreadings(e.g.,thoseofferedbyHill1989;Korsgaard1996;OâNeill1989;Rawls1980;Reath1994;Sensen2011).21Inthissection,webrief-lyexplainhowourreadingdiffers frombothtypicalrealistandtypi-calconstructivistinterpretationsofKantâsethics(aswellasrealistandconstructivistversionsofKantianethics),sincewerejectanassump-tionsharedbymostonbothsidesofthedivide.
LetusfirstturntorealistreadingsofKantâsethics,whichcomeintwomainvarieties.Ontheonehand,therearerealistreadingsofKantâsethicsthatholdthattheMoralLaw,andmoralobligationingeneral,isgrounded inoneormoreobjectivevalues thatare independentofanyvolitionalact.AccordingtoPaulGuyer,forexample,theauthor-ityoftheMoralLawisgroundedinthevalueoffreedom;accordingtoAllenWood,itisgroundedinthevalueofhumanity(Guyer2000;Wood2008,109;seealsoStern2012,90).Ontheotherhand,therearewhatwemightcallâintuitionistâreadings(e.g.,Kain2010;Schönecker2013),accordingtowhichourcognitiveaccesstotheMoralLaw(andthustomoralobligationsingeneral)isintuitiveorquasi-intuitiveand,althoughofcoursenon-sensible,isthusunderstoodonthemodelofsenseperception.Onthiskindofreading,ourawarenessofmoralob-ligationistheresultofreceptivelytakinginaprinciplethatholdsin-dependentlyofourreceptiveaccesstoit.Muchmorewouldhavetobe
20.Sincetheredoesnotseemtobeagenerallyacceptedwayofdistinguishingbetweenethical realismandconstructivism,werestcontentwith thisverygeneraldescriptionandrestrictourdiscussiontospecificpositionsthatarecommonlythoughtofasbeingeitherrealistorconstructivist.ForadefinitionofKantianconstructivismastheviewthatreasonsareâgroundedinâaratio-nallyconstrainedpracticalpointofview,seeSchafer2015.
21. For extended discussions of the debate between realist and constructivistreadingsofKantâsethics,seeStern2012(fromamorerealistperspective)andRauscher2015(fromamoreconstructivistperspective).
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pointofKantâsthesisoftheautonomyofthewillisnottogroundtheauthorityoftheMoralLawbuttoindicatethatallsubstantivemorallaws arebased inour ownwill or practical reason.This alternativepositiononlybecomesapparent,however,onceweacknowledgethatKantdidnotregardautonomyasconsistingintheself-legislationoftheMoralLaw.23
Works Cited
ReferencestoKantâsworksaretoKantâs gesammelte Schriften, editedbythePreussische(laterDeutsche)AkademiederWissenschaften(Ber-lin:GeorgReimer,subsequentlyWalterdeGruyter,1900â).Referenc-es includeanabbreviated titleand theAkademievolumeandpagenumber(s).TheonlyexceptionistheCritique of Pure Reason, forwhichthepagenumbersofthefirst(A)andsecond(B)editionsareprovided.Translationsareourown,butwehavemadeuseof the translationsavailableintheCambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cam-bridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1992â2016).
Abbreviations:G=Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals;KpV=Cri-tique of Practical Reason;KrV=Critique of Pure Reason;KU=Critique of the Power of Judgment;L=Logic;MdS=Metaphysics of Morals;Rel=Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.
Allison, Henry E. 1990. Kantâs Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cam-bridgeUniversityPress.
Ameriks,Karl.2000.Kant and the Fate of Autonomy: Problems in the Ap-propriation of the Critical Philosophy. Cambridge:CambridgeUniver-sityPress.
23. Thispapergrewoutofdiscussions in a researchgroupon theemergenceof theKantianconceptionofautonomy(seeBacin/Sensen2018).Forhelp-fulcomments,wewouldliketothankthemembersofthatresearchgroup,audiencesattheTwelfthInternationalKantCongressinVienna,theUniver-sityofAmsterdam, andKeeleUniversity, aswell as JoelAnderson,Alyssa Bernstein,StefanoBertea,JochenBojanowski,andtwoanonymousrefereesforthisjournal.
âconstitutingâ the agent, given the fact thatwemust act (Korsgaard2009).22
OnourreadingofKantâsaccountofautonomy,Kantisnotacon-structivist or constitutivist in these senses. Denying that theMoralLawisaheteronomousimpositiondoesnotcommithimtoviewingitsbindingnessasgrounded initsrelationtoourwillorinthenecessaryconditionsofagency.Afterall,thefactthatwebecomeawareoftheMoralLawinpracticaldeliberationdoesnotimplythatitsnormativevalidityisgroundedinourbeingagentsorpracticaldeliberators,orintherequirementsofagency.Asmentionedabove,Kantindeeddeniesthatitisgroundedinanythingmorefundamentalatall.
Insum,denyingthattheMoralLawisself-legislateddoesnotcom-mitone toa realist interpretationofKantâsethics,anddenying thattheMoralLawislegislatedbyanythingelsedoesnotcommitonetoa constructivist or constitutivist interpretation ofKantâs position onthebindingnessoftheMoralLaw.Theformsofrealismandconstruc-tivismwehaveconsideredsharetheassumptionthattheremustbesomethinginwhichtheMoralLawisgrounded.Onthereadingwepro-poseinthisessay,bycontrast,Kantdefendsanalternativetobothre-alismandconstructivism.ThisistheviewthattheMoralLawisnotgroundedinanything,sinceitisabasicaprioriprinciple,asbasicaspurepractical reason itselfâthat is,asbasicas itgets in the lineofrationalargumentationaboutaction.KantcanmaintainthattheMoralLawisnotgroundedinanythingmore fundamentalwithouthavingtoclaimthattheMoralLawisself-legislatedâaclaimwhich,aswehavesuggested,hedoesnotactuallymake.Wehavearguedthatthe
22.Asmentionedabove,theseapproachescanavoidinterpretingtheauthorityoftheMoralLawvoluntaristically(e.g.,asresultingfromarbitraryenactmentorendorsement)byclaimingthattheMoralLawistheprincipleofself-con-stitution(Korsgaard2009,xiii,213â4),orbyemphasizingthatwhatbindstheagentisnotthemerefactthatsheplaysanactiveroleinmorallegislationbutthefactthatthelegislationisâproperlyenactedâ,whereanecessaryconditionofitsbeingproperlyenactedisthattheagentplaysanactiveroleinthelegis-lativeprocess(Reath2006,95).Theyretaintheidea,however,thattheMoralLawisself-legislatedinthesensethatitsnormativevalidityisgroundedintheroleitplaysinagency.
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