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Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't.agencies and their contractors;Administrative/Operational Use; 05 MAY1966. Other requests shall be referred toAssistant Chief of Staff for ForceDevelopment [Army], Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY31 May 1978, DoDD 5200.10; AGO D/A ltr, 29Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

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AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

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THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OFTHE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18,U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OFITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BYLAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or otherdata are used for any purpose other than in connection with a defi-nitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Governmentthereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; andthe fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in anyway supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is notto be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensingthe holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rightsor permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention thatmay in any way be related thereto.

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CONFIDENTIA* Z,2 eAD~TrRS 1ST CAVARY IVit WT 60~fBILE) L1 J

APO ~~~ Op0

'T G C5GM 06

.9U1*J.CT 0 erational4 m.t onLessons Learned--.

or artrlyeriod* # pg 66 Apr 66#

TIM Channels

* ~ TO:Assistant Chief of' Staff for For;ce DevelopmentD)epartraent- of the Array

R -C7MCN I C~~1'' ArJ

.11te,1 1;tztointh priod 1Jnay-30

- Aril 1966, the lt Cavalry Divio (Ax1bie oper ted me DalPre,2 of bout 17OIcM by 1701M in the flinh Dinj , pleikut 1 'Ithei n a candI Phli Yen Provinces. Divi3ion opMratione"'eztended from heChnc-)3ea 4o the 'wirbodian bord-ar alon:;, the alis.' oi High, -y 19, f o~ nothLUof B on to rjui IN1on aMonv -the China 3ea Coast arc! fron near Ban

, .e T hout t o flak To P-3on% the Ccibodiran bdrdar.orain were.~J (~) ~.chcxr~ctsrized throushout b-y) hezwy reliance on z'rmobiity. The

Division base retwined at 0,-up Radciff np:.zAn The throushout Athe''si period. Dluring m~ost of the period, two briades operated aviay .Zrom-,~the D~ivisi on base, while the othier brigade .conducted of fensive*:joperations iri the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) and. iraproved.

the security of the base; (For exemple,, during the Bong ;)on campaignfour to si-: of the bi-Asior t8 infar-try battalion6 conducted sustained.operations and maintined co.ni -act -ith the en1ert? for forty-one da~rs i.tan average distrzoe of approntiziately 6 5kyt f romtebs nA a.The Division clearly demonstrated its capability, toconduct o-peration NJ

*f6r' zn extendeO perioO.t against insurrbnt forces in soitO terr- ,in which** previously had been considered totally inaccessible to heliborne'

o,erations. 'Brigade missions during the period ward laigely, .search,and destwol, o arations.leading to the pacification of exeas previouslVcontrolled by the Viet Gong.* *Seciarity of-the TAOR and Division base,construction of barriers around the base and a vigorous base develop-.ment programi con'-inued simultar.eously with tactical opewetions.

61?1~~~~~U 1,7 Me~~ i, h

IDENTIAL.: ~

4,'aroiie' i n

(CONFIDENTIAL&VCCG....

SUBJECTs Operational Report on Lessons Learned

Operations in the TAC were chnracterized by numurous company sized offensiveoperations, daytime saturation patrolling, and night-time ambush patrols.

b. Division organization and key personnel during the reportingperiod were as followst

(1) Division Headquarters

biaj Gen Harry W 0 Kinnard Commanding General

Brig Gen John W Wright 4jsst Div Commander

Brig Gen Richard T Knowles isst Div UomnderColonel William A Becker 15 Jan 66

Col George S Beatty Jr Chief of Staff -'

Lt Col John D 4hite A.CofS, .G 1

Lt Col 3obby h Lang Acof S, G2

Lt Col Fral K Buchan AcofS, G3

Lt Col Benjamin 8 Silver ACofS, G4

lt Col Robert J Craig A1ofS, G5Lt Col Monroe Kirkpatrick 10 Mar 66

(2) 1st Brigade (Airborne) -.

Colonel 'Ivy B Roberts Co, ist Bde ("bn)"

Colonel John J Hennessey 1 Mar 66

Lt Col Kenneth D Nertel 0o, 1/8 Cay Bn

Lt Col Levin B Broughton 2') Mar 66 . jLt Col John " Hemphill 009 2/8 Cav Bn

Lt Col !Lutland .' Beard Jr co, 1/12 Cav Bn

(3) 2d Brigade k

Col William R Ioynch 0O, 2d BdeCol Marvin J Borenzweig 17 Mar 66

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Lt Col marderiolc Acker~son CO, 1/15 C~w DnLt Co . illi,,m '6 .:vc 66

Lt Col "4m1ou 1 00 1ee C /5 Ca7 Bn

It Co). :'obea t Lvca C00 2/12 QC.v 3nIt Col ~Ois C itle 23 Feb 66

Lt Col Rar1-o;n J, -ral"3eu 15' J Cui 3n

LColT :ert I,- :"cl'ene, 00, 2/20 Qa :3n~1 t 0 102. ~itl Jr :q'a 1,xv 66

LtCol oBeoke Cot A-st cc, D/2v At*it Col' 'biey J~ Piceue 7. Thn 66. -

LtA Col.201,zfdi J00, O 221 xt" . (As1i el

Lt.Go1 :Tolson -,.-i eJ~r C0; 2/20t S-, .e u nn

14 uJ. "'10 , 7 C. 2~Amc ~

L- t, Col. 6d 227t.

tt-0 '0)2I:t 3t eD

CP i At 0s),\'~r

CONFIDENTIAL-AWVGGSUBJECTs poratinnal Report on LOSsOns Loarnod

()Support Covmid

Col John J Honnessey go, port Commend

Lt 0ol Jamos C Smith 1 Mar 66

Iat Ol Froderiok 0oterhout 00, 15th Bup & Svc Bn

Lt 00l Jueri Svjagintsov COt 15th Med Bn

Lt Col Ghrlos ModIey 00, 15th TO Din ( S)

Lt Col Granville X Stag Got 27 Maint DU

Oapt John f .kdasaf COt 15th Admin Go

Capt Earl D RavJ4Ss 4 Jan 66

(a) Lt Col Robert 1 dhooraier co, 1/9 Ca Sqdn

(9) Lt Col hobcrt J Mallay 0O, 8th E rr BA

(i0) Lt Col Tom 14 Nioaolson 00, 13th Sig DnLt ol Paul N .5imon 1 Jan 66

(11) capt Raul Lewis Jr 0o, 545th 19 Co

(12) Cr.pt Glan 0 Stephens CO, i0C, 1st Cay Div

(13) Special Staff

Lt Col Jonas E Ilo~artY 3urgoon

Lt Col Franois " MoInteo Inspector Gtneral

Lt' ,oI Morris D Hodges Staff Judge .4dvooate

Lt col Chester R Linlsoy 9haplain

Lt Col Ml10,in it Beer Adjutant General

Raj Charles 0 Silver Information Officer

Lt col *,*ne C Campbell Pinanoe Offioer

4

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAVCCGMWGOT& Operational Report c¢n Lessons. Learned

Lt Crl David W Rinsel Jr Chemioal Officer

Lt Col Herbert W Uhland Provost Marshal

(14) Attached Units

Lt Uol Charles L ?oIner G0, 3/18 Arty Dn

Lt Col Harry 0 'mos GO, 2/17 Arty BnLt Col Norman P Chandlo2 15 Mar 66

Capt Gary B Sohultz 00, 3 Btry 29th irty (sit)

Maj Raymon(l D Franklin CO, 11th Avn Co

Ma3 T Z Clark o0, 418 Avn Co (Hvy Hel)

Capt Charles L LeMoro 0O, 586 Sig Co (Spt)

1st Lt Walter ., Jmes CO, 184 Chen Plat (DS)let Lt John J Siffrin 21 .ipril 66

let Lt William V Toney COj Dot I 54th Sig in2na Lt Srnest J Soharpf 23 Fob 66

Maj Gary D Collier C, 191st MI Dot

Maj Roy W Haygood Jr C0, 14th Mil Hist Det

Maj Peter J Samulovich 15 ,pril 66

Capt John M Arnold 00, 10th RRU

Capt Charles Ii"Hill CO, U.Y Weather Tm30th Weather Sqdn

Lt Patrick Murphy -00, '241 Si Det

(15) Supporting Unite

Col.Richard T .u-l CO, 34th q 2a (0S/GS)Lt 0o1 Charles S t7eaook 1 Mar 66.

Lt Col Leonatd &lstoin Co 00, 70th1 D

Lt Col Franoip'O Dimon Jr 00, 2d Su Hop ()

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL4VCCGS7U53 Ts Operational Report on Iessons Leazrned

2. (0) Personnel

a. Strength. .uthorized and assiged strength at the beglimingand olose f reporting period were as followst

(1) B3egin Report Per M_ V0_4 GGMT

Authorized 1180 676 14,099 15,995

mssigned 1202 488 Ij,042 16,732

(e) Close Report Per 0I'1) _ *y.GT

authorized 1180 676 14,099 15,955

Assigned 1293 464 15,490 17,247

b. Replaoementst A total of 3365 enlisted replacements were ree-oeivy6d, During the same period Division losses were 4013, 2074 of whi.h were9RS losses. Some 396 emergency leaves were processed during the period.

c. Morale rind Personnel Services s

(1) Morale throughout the Division and att~ehad elements

reminea excellent*

(2) Decorations aw,-zdeds

Distinguished Service 0ross 1

Silver Star 41

Distinguished Flyin; Cross 34

L 'gon of Merit

Soldierls Meda l 2

Bronze Star with V Device 424

-dr. Modai3. 6064

qAr ~ oLnendation with V Device 37

CONFIDENTIAL .

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CON rF4PI-NT1 AL.VGT-T

J.-'J -Oer&tioncA Ltojoit on Lessons Learni'd

Axr Comendation Mo~dal 77

Rhu~ac Him 6)5ICertif~icate f Acaieve1jent 37

TOTM Awarded 7354

03 Ceb~ Be 4~warded;

OCe:at Inmeat-y j3c.dge 2751

qflk# .edical jr&_- 172

&jrcra -G O ~r-iu Badg'e

k4). ftcent ch~n~es -to A%*y Regt ations authorizes theRivision Coiqmander to award the folloWimg NA2S Mn4 Ubae MasterAviator Badge, Senior AnW Aviator UaOps &mqo 21igbt ftrgema .adge,Pligth Surge~n Bade, JAator AiroraLt Or'fvuami S4~,.enioa' Ai!=et cr..w&E:aBadge and Aircraft Crew4av 3adge.

d. promotionas 4 tvt@l of' 217~9 eai§6ed persanmal were pootduring the reporting perio.

e. Rdmlstolnt$ ..A. total o.f 2 87 rem iid t, or eftensionsotions were comleted. The onhistojenQ/ectnsion briakdovm 4'qv1. fio

toru RA reenlistmente, 200 career reenliatments, 5 AUS reenisitinents, 4,2RA extensions and 8 AS S.extenstons. Counselors Visited =mits in ,tho baseOMP anid-in forward-areas on a continos 'basifs

f. Postal activities for the reportifigpriod'viere as follow.

k \1)Nnyore sales'(,)' Pstl,& Parcel Post fes k i2,;6l.010

(3) nbomizig Mail 110211lb8

paily averw' e 9, 2. ~,507 ribs'

''uutgoill nIaill *920Q5 1,08

)ail r a o (o' 31061.71 lbs'

(5''a.,"e of .Inqoo4 mail .days 97

C.

CO&F4~~~IT1AL'2

ro~ *'L Z;Q,

CONFIDENTIALSU)TF0a Operational Report on Lossons Learned

(6) Number of Outgoina nail days noThe 23 d'iys th t the Division did not reoeive mail was larger

by far than in tiny other reporting p3riod,

g* Spacial " est Durix,; the reporting period a total )f163 movies na TV films wee ciroulate,, throughout the Division* SevenUSO shows played to an estirnatbd rsttendAnoe of A9,Q0O.. A. qrger amountof i quotas wore reoeivdl. during tle peoriodl 370 ino0o ty and 2864out-of-country were fillsed A total of 28841 paperbaok boks andmagazines also wore received.

h. Finanoial Sorvicess The finance data records folders (PDHP)pri )r to March were alphabotized by or,;anization. Therefore, thuro wero114 different alphabetical files. Saoh time an individual was reassitpedwithin the Division, the record would have to be pulled.-and forwarded tothe new unit clerk for fili,;. In view of the numerous reassi4;nentswithin the Division, there was always a novomont of M)is within thefive pay terms. In ndl4tion, al the incoming, correspondence had tobe identified by unit before it could be processe d and subsequently filed.The pullin; of FDRt's for rotation was a slow ;rooess since each of the114 units normally had IU losses. The financial dat %reoords folders ofthe entire Division were aiphabotized on 20 March without regard to unit.The alphabetizing of the FDRFs acoonplished the followings

(1) Accelerated looating and pulling IF's for largeshipmont of personnel such as for rotation, IL, WL. uto (In the event'n assignment for an individual was incorrectly stated on the rostcr, itno longer delayod the looating of the record as was previously the oases

(2) llminated the necessity of obtainirn the unit of asign-ment prior to prooessing antl filing." correspondonoe in FPW,

(3) Wliminatod the constant movement of 1DRBIs because ofDivision reassignments.

(4) Streamlined FM maintenance in prepr tion for thelarge volume of smmer replacements.

(5) 'dill faoilitato the out-jr cossin- of the Divisionpersonnel returnig to CO1MS this summer.

i. Uhpl n iactivitiess

(1) Total service attnabnoe 60,626

Rontz Gatholio 26,258

Protestant 33,969

Jewish 399

0CONFIDENTIAL

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AVOW'

SUJECTs Operational Report on Lessons Learned

(2) lieligious Education

Group instruction - Roman Oatbolio 126

Protestant 534

Private instuotiof.-. jiqma4qatholio 127

Protestant 18

Religious film end film strips 3.

Group parish aotivities partioipated in

itomrz Catholic 163

Pro testant 535

(3) Pastoral Visits Xo of Viii"

Hospital 640

Disciplinary Gonfiriement 25t OunseiinS/Intdrvlows 5694

Brraoks/quarters 1315

(4) 4acranents mid Ministrations No of -Ocoasion

Baptism Dedication/Chri tehin4; 12

Sonf essidn' ' 736% Oommion .. 528

Funeral 12

Oonfirrnationitocoived into" ,u zbh Iembershi]" -'", 2

Others 27

C)ientAi6" .'. 22,

CONNCONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIALSU23STI perational -Repo on Lessons Lear* d

Instructions 7

(6) Off Post Comuity itelations

Other 107

(7) The effectiveness of religious pro Taks was outstanding.During combat operations the unit chaplains made every effort to minioterto th) men in the field, the man at medical stations and the hospitals.During the period ooied byj this report there was a concerted effort toerect semi-permanent or permanent chapels. Chapels were being construotodto a lerge extent by funds donated by the men. Within three months everyarea will have an adequate chapel.

(8) In the month of January Chaplain (Captain) Dilly R. Lordwas awarded the Silv iStar for her6io duty in the Ploikli Capaign.

J. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and. Order

(1) Discipline s 4 total of 564 inoidoents were reported to

the Provost Niarshl's Offtco',Iuring the reporting period,

(2) Military Justices

(a) Genera Courts, Mrtial: 15

(by) Special Coitts MArtial ~ 8

(o) Sunmary orts 1rtial ,57

(3) The Division's low peroontage of occurts-martial wasindicative of the low rato of serious incidents and offenses beinecommitted by nembo., s of this oozmand.,

k, Inspector General Acti*i'os-

(1) Normal Inspector General aotifitios were conductedduring the reporting period. To IG invostigations were direoctea and com-pleted and a staff visit by the Military Assistance Qc& & Vfio* In pector General was otndwted. One IG inquiry was completed. No sicnificmttrenfs in complaints end/or requests were kioaled

CCONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIALSU2J XTt Operational heport on Lessofls Learned

le * .i'lio Linforrnati.,n Office

(1) Darin,; the reporti. period the Division's InformattionOffice activities were as follows a

(a) Direct support was given to flaws media representativeso

(b) ".rtiolos were written and released to "Fifteen Nations,"lthe North ,tlantic Treaty Orgazization mjagazine.

(c) During all combat operations a field edlition of thedivision's newspaper was published primarily for the skytroopersparticipatind in the opevration.

(d) Zin article, "Trial by Fire,"t the story of the 1st OCvaltyDivision (AixrnobiJle), by'newsman Charles B~lack was published in 4rgosMagazine in March 1966.

weewite e) Two arti~clesylie by 1a jor General Harry W 0 Kinnaid

(f.) Th'e US &my &chibit Unit was furnished with~ photographs

d~piotiA... activitiw of the Division from its arzivalin Vietnam to thepresent,'for im: exhibit entitled, "Tho Airn6bile Soldier."

(g) Th rm I~nf~ormation Ditest was furnisned with photo-graphs depiotin& activities of, the- Division, which appeared in the Februaryand March editifns.

*(h) The office answered numerous quiries from throughoutthe U~tdStates as a result of the news interest that this Division"has created sand the'. ctiva' role it is playing -in the Vietnam conflict.

to IAC or Jint brie figs sumaized and reported" si6nifica-nt Actions

* (J) Th-e Hometown New aRele*ase and Command Information'progran~a we6re :continued* .

a. 02 Organization., During the reporting period the G2 Sectionwas reorga~nized to increase responsiveness to operational planning require-mentsi posed by th~e conduct of &irmobila Operations thro~ughout a cor~s tact-ioal zone. 4Lion pesnl(6Off, 3 211)x.wre authorized which willperm1.t 24 hour operations in tho DTQC's Forwagd and Baseo, the ostabliq'4pent

CONFIDENTIAL

• CONFIDENTIAL

AVOOGSU3Ji0Ts OperAWtiM ROpOt On Lossbns Learned

of a plans element, and the formation of a reports and analysis sectionWith,)ut ounaloilizinti, other activities within G2,

b.e Operations.

(1) Operation 1vAT&D0 was conducted during the period 1 - 17January 1966" in Western 4leiku anK Kntum itor44ceg. No mohor units werebelieved to be in the areal with the possible exception of an infiltration6TOUp. No sianifioant eneqr contact was made., but good detailed knowledgeof infiltration routes and way stations was gained and a number of largecaches uncovered, One new unit was ideatified (13th .4. 23n - IT"- locatedin Cambodia).

(2) O.eration MUSMWEiIT3 ING was conduoted duriri, theperiod*25 January - 6 4=ho~ 1966, in N~ortheasten Jinh Dinh erovinceo Oneconfirmed regiment was believed to be in the area. Uontact was made withwith two previously confirmed re~iments (2d VU, 18th *qV) aind one now NV.%rei;iment ('*et Tam or 22d Ae~t)& Interroaation of pxisoners ac examinationof documents confirmed a VO military structure in Ainh Dinh krovinceal W-4VDivision (SA.0 V-qG) complete with support units, parts of which wore lsonewly -infiltrated, The battalion oormander of the 93d --n, 2,_ VC Ret., CaptDcakn Doan was captured at 1400 hours., 15 Feb 66 in a cave vie ^767783 byelements of 2/5 av., 2d 3 riGade (I4ol .A2), In addition, a company oommanderrallied. Several larL:e weapons caches were uncovered and detailed information6n VC struoture -:d tactical d)ot ine was obtained from VC0's and a larb. squ-ntity of documents captured.

(3) Oer, tion J D 3OZIE was conducted durin.,' the period13 - 27 %20h 1966 in North 06ntral inh inh Pr6vinoe. .Zlements of oneret ment alon, with elements of the *SAO V.x Division, a te, ional ifeadq~lartersand Support Units were believed t,> be in the area of Operations with an eti-dated strerncth of 3000# No si.nificant contact was made however, PnL strogevidence of an orderly VU withdrawal from the area# prior to thestart of theoperation, wis noted, : previously unexplored area was penetrated, disiaptingVO patterns and denyin, him reor ;anization areas followik, ' I i- Wi

small -number of simificant docuaents were captured.

.(4) Operation Lj9L T_ M0S3Y I wo.s cnductea in Westexn iLeikuand' ontu Provinces durink the period 25 Harch - 17" P-il 1966. "t leastthree NV;ei, ets:(32d, 33d, and 66t .) were believed to be in the area ofoperations. Goniaot was sporadio raNzirn.g from light to moderate, and. diu notinvolve elemeats of the known RV, Retraents. ,, hiEh rate of AV,! Infiltrationfrom Decumber 1965 to Harch 1966 was confirmed as well as the use vf previouslyidentifted infiltration routes, Thre(; new infiltration 6roups were identifiedas possible replacenents for the 32d, 33d and 66th AeEiiaents in the areaa "soconfdrmed was one new :em ,nt (;8 t ant ono enbinuer company (28t,).

12

CONFIDENTIAL

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~AVCCG

SUX T Operational Report on Lessons Learned

Through captured maps and prisoners from the It±gineer Company, infonation wasgained of three newly constructed routes in .0leiku 1rovinoe, which could beexpanded to accomodate trucks# Interrog.;ation of prisoners also revealed thatcover stories were bein, utiUzed. z& major ammunition oiche was uncovered anda major NV.t buildup alonL; the Cambodian border was confirmed.

(5) Operation DIWY I1 bej;an in the kleiku area on 21 April1966 adcontinued i'o

66andonin W th the reportint date. 1Blements of up to two NVAbattalions were bolived to be in the area.,of operations, but no signifibantcontact or findir ;s were reported*

(6) Overall results of operations during; the reporting periods

KLI VOC WNS

Jan 37 88 40

Feb 980 516 327

Mar 134 51 38

Lp7 31 12 iTO..LS 1856 667 472

c. Order of Jattle.

(1) Units confirmed and/or reconfirmed alone With possibleidentifications and movements are as outlined in previously sibmitted reports.

(2) "Te dtiori processed a1l ilncomi intellioenibe -rdports,extratin;3 partinent data (personalities, unit identification and locations,.fgrtifiononscaches) for eard"files.

ao cs The problem of:'nsafficient personnel tq pr~dess infor-mation necessary to supiort combat operations 'as been partially aleviatedby the increased personnel auth9rization.

d'. G2 4i.

(1). ,Missions flown during the reportin,5 period.

,d) 14.22

, V sual 1" -, ...

pA40

:- .'- ;.. .? , . _-11.'~~ ~ IV hl: , .,N#/.#-..,

l CG

UM3JCTa Operational epct on Lessons Learned

(2) "erirl Surveillance and Xargot ioquisition

(a) IR data was used for artillery H&I fires and by the

infantry brigades in their patrol plans, Ground/air follow-up inspectionsproved most of the "hot spots" to -be brush fires and bomb oraters, althougha few recently vacated bunkers were found.

(b) Visual surveillance was the most profitable. Big-nifioant visual action included the locating and destroyint of a possiblemulti-barrel automatic weapon; surprising a VO plato n-size work force in theopen leading.; t- an engagement by armod helicopters, and discoverirn a pre-vi'vely unlocated 3-57 wreokago that had not yet been stripped by the VO.

(c) A l&ao portion of the photo missions performed bythe "rmy were relatively small and completed within a few hours to a few days.This typo mission sup.lemonted the USa large trea ouverage missions.

(d) No intUllience information .,f use to the division wasgained by SLb.R Nearly all missions were flwn in support of Operation NUK4UTDM and for higher headquarters.

0. Maps. here wore no si6nifioant problems in map supply othethan periodic shcrtages of Series L701, Soale 1150,000 maps. 'his series wasnot being received from the depot since it was being phased outb The newreplacement series, L7014 is due in country ou or about 1 July 1966.

f. 54th Infantry Detaohmnt (SuvlI). J nploymoent of the Radarswas primarily in the base conp area with one Ja/T16 33 at the "n Khe ,irfieldand four 4N/?_'S-4!s on, the barrier* Terrain and ,&irnobile operations itigate'their effective use outside ,f the more static base oamp Prea,

g. Dot 24, 30th Weather Sqwi.dron

(1) Support (24 hour forecasts, climate summaries, flightbriefings) was provide& to operating brigades and to the base camp*

(2) The problum rxeas weres

(a) Teletype outagos causing discontinuance of fore-oastine data*! t(b) The lack of a purranent location for tho detachr.oent.

One relocation duo ti'construction ,n the oif Courso and the incompletefacilities at the ,4n .10w Pi rfield precluded stability.

(o) Necessary equipment was periodioclly deadned dueto tool aid spre p ats shortc4ges.

h, 10th RMh. This unit participated in all combat operationsduring the reportihg Poriod. The most si ifioant intelligene oontri-btionoccured during oporatiofn MA8.',wC ITu 'WING. "a . result of adequate lead time,

14

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AVOOG 7 CONI DEN T NLU3JWT Operational Report on Lessons Learned-

target entities located in the are. ot o~erations were completely developedprior to the start f the operation. Special intelligenoe items were alsoproduced durinp thk operation relating directly to enemy activity.

'L. M4 etaoh~ont

(1) The kW OSection interrogated over 600 prisoners in supportof conbat oporations and screenod over 1250 pounds of docinents, of which 45docuMOnts were translated. Items not translated ft this echelon were trans-mitted to I Field Force Vieonmu'for further oxploitatiuo Considera ble

intelligence was gained to include unit designations, loontions, stroithsand activity, The addition of threb Vietnamese sperjdn6 ieiriw~n intorrogat-ore w's .silYificnnt facto, .........

e (2) 01 Teas c'nsisting of two agents .,,.. Lai,; inter .rQtureach Jup'orted bhigade operations by screening refugecs, interrogating VOCand VOS, prooessing documents and conducting liai.on with local Republicof Vietnam (RVN) e4ncioas to obtain Ordler of -ttle anL. counter intellienceinformrtion. Considerable information was Lainod 'f VO infrastructure. ,.sa result of CI conducted operations during the reporting period it was con-cluded that,

(a) There were no known threats to the internal securityo f the Divi sion.

(b) The ?ersonnel Security kcogram was adequate.

(c) Timely reporting of CI Inferma-tion was enhanced bythe establishment of an office operated by CI porsnnel in An Khe as apoint of contact, and closed liais-n with local intelligenpe agencies.

* (3) Special ..rtas Aeciving ,ttontion at the !nd )f heportinu-,Oeriodt

(a) Dncument security to include accountability -zddestruction of claisified iaformtione

(b) )hysical security of thL Basv Camp

(o) '3lowness in processing of VOC from time of capturetill arrivwl at the Divisin Cage.

4. (C) Oper..tions an Training

a. Uranizatibn

(1) Attaochments and Detachments. During the roporting periodtwo units were detached and one unit attached. On 1 Feb 66 the 6/14 IrtilleryBattalion (175mm Gm 81ni') tLinus B3attery C was detached. On the same dateBattery ,, '3/18 ,lxtillery (8" How S,) was also detached. On 7 A'4roh the241st Sisal DetaChment (-,ionics) was attached to Support'Command forfurther attchmont to the 478th 44vi-ition Company (Aieavyl elicoptor).

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T wi' CONFIDENTIAL 74VCOG8UBhC TI Oporational Ilernrt on Lessons Larned

(2) iovisi-:n of Divisicn TW. 67T. review end evalution ofPersonnel md equipment roquirements fo)r tho airmobilo djivision, TUB 67T, wascompleted on 27 -ril anC. mbmitto. throu& ohanels to the Combat Develop-ments Commnnd. The proposed ohinges were based cn a poriod of 7j months of

irm)bile exporienoo against insurgent forces in 8outh Vietnam and were desi~n-ed tn advinco t1%; nobility e4(. P4ility -of the division on the battlefield,[ The rv.jor ohanu,,s reoomiended woru thL- 'ruddition 'of& (1) r, ninth infantrybatto'ien with vdjustiaonts in the battalion jr.canization to increase the number jof urohine uns and nan-mobile mortarws while Ooleting the 90rim recoillessrifles; (2) P third lift battalion (UH-1) and a fourth GH-47 Company toincrease the lift of the divisin; (3) six OV-l. aircraft for increased sur-voillance and target aoquisition end (4) additional personnel for co.iand

W. control and maintenanoe, The proposed ohange represents an increase of2152 personnel spaces (division t tl 17,999), 20 vehicles (totol 1631) and114 a rorrAf (total 548)

b. Trnining -

S(1) ini: .ctlvitics continued under the provision ofDivision Circular 350-44 which included the period 1 January throu 31 March.A revise.' pr t' am was issued to envor the period 1 ,.pril thr.,ugh 20 aeptember.Training- emphasized by thc livision progrnxn includeds

(a)' Ihdividual irMning on kliok-fire ieaotion C.ursos.Laoh replacenent arriving during the period was qualified on the course.

(b) 81rm ra-rtar training. "unner tests to include livefiring exercises were conducted' for all mortar crewnen,

(0) .a1paooment trining was c'nucoted 4t unit level exceptf.r the initial division level orientations c,,nducted during" prooesing in theReplacemont Detachment.- Complete nd detailod orientations were conbacted atunit level. Aviation personnel received *.m special aviAtion operations .ndsafety oriontaiion. In addition to orientation a,. qualification on +ho dcio-fire Reaction Course, replaoement personnel wore required to zero their basicweapon and become fatiliar with other'weapens in the unit,

(d) D, or gunn= r tr ining was conducted fur all .ncomingporscnnel msbi'e11 as d r gunners or crow chie fs. Refresher training wasc. nductod for P11 docr -,unners anl brow chiefs during thu puriod.

(e) Tr'.opor la,:der training. d dUiitiotal equipment wasreceived dur'-..4; period 'n(t permitted trAnizk by ad;rozinatoly 60% ofthe infi'ntr yr po .' .:. l in the air iobilu br . dos.

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1 .,VCCGSU:',J3CTs Operational Report on Lessons Loarnod

(2) Training support from non-divisional sources indludeds

(a) 65 division personnel attended aircraft maintenancetraining on the UH-I nd CH-47 aircraft under the armya ircraft Mobile|" ~~Training. Bssist .%We Atotgam(t P - "

(b) 180 artillery personnel received new equipmentintroductory training on the O5n Howitzer, M102. These personnel con-

, duated unit level trainiyg, for il the IO5mm Howitzer crews in the three,divisional battalions.

S.(o) 2 civil affairs personnel attended a one week ooure

conducted by ILbV/USOM advisory personnel,

(3) Speoial "trainn programs,

(a) A-erial supwessive fire& * viation personnel assignedto weapons companies nd air cavalry troops conducted training in preparationof Lmdin zones aaft suppressive fire using aierial weapons.

(b) Rappel training. .ll infantry units ccntinu~d totrain personnel in rappelling tochniquass

(c) FAX Trtining in adjustment of artillery. " prolramwas initiated t) tr-in all UW F OIs in adjustment of infiroct fires

(d) .-utorotation training with the LII-13 and DH-I

aircraft was conducted with the majority of aviators conducting a minimum ofthree aut'irotations during thd poried.

(4) Training facilities. Anes rn tra.ining facilities were

c npleted to meet the immediate and long range requirements of the division.Al arcas were c, nstructed using troop labor and salvage material. Thefolloving training facilities -re available within the diviaion see areas

Autorotation Areas 3

Ae-rial d'eapons i4inge I"

'Xtillery -d kortar Firing .rua 2

!ick.-fre Reaction Curse 3

Small i&rms: &ges 9

Tactiical TrAining rea 2

1r- 11N -l4I

0iAVCCG8TV1J4i01w 4erational Report on Lessons Learned

tVc Operations.

J (1) During the quw.ter 10 major piins, 15 najor operationsorders and 128 Prag orders were issued. During the quarter the 8 organicinfantry battalions operatud awayr from the division base a total of 629battalion days, nearly 66% of the total infantry. .,ettalion days (960) inthe quarter. During Februpxy and -Lril the percentage of infantry battalionscommitted on operations away from Camp Radcliff was 74 and 75 percent respect-ively. Division artillery battalions were comnitted f'r 428 battalion days Jisupport of oper,.tions away from Camp Radcliff. In all, 182 battery moves wereconducted by the use of aircraft, 167 battery Tund moves were made# and 5battery moves were nade using an aircraft ground vehicle mixture4 Tho cavalrysquadron was committed in operations outside of Casp kt-dcliff 84% Of the troopdries during the quarter and was committed 59% -f the days in operations beyondthe norm.al division tactical areas of responsibility (TiR). Durina Februarythe cavalry. squadron was committed in support of, operations outside the div-ision TAOR for 75% of the troop -lays available*

(2) During the reporting poriod two to three battalions,reinforced by up to 570 personnel from the resident units, continued to defendCamp L adcliff anO. conduct offensve operations within 21 kilometers of CmpRadcliff. These missions, broadly described throughout this report as TAO(operations, included security of the base, 4n Khe imy &irfield the bridges iniin Ihe, and the gpound line of communication (National iLute 195 from the DeoMeni, 2ass to the Xang Yang Pass; patrolling; show f force; support of local CIGforces; pacification and civil action.

(3) Since January a 7.1 kilometer extension was ad1ed to thebarrier system arounrd. Camp itadliff to enclose the un Khe logistical instal-lation, the Division supply area and the Hon Gong Xountain ignal facility.im additional 7.8 kilometer extension was betun to enclose the .#,n Khe armyAirfield, The installation of wire rnd mines on these outer barriers was about65% cc-iioto at the end of the qaartro (Fi;vre 1 shows diakTam of CampRadciCt) I'Sch improvement was made in the barrier system itself. Flame

fougasso Cev.res, trip flares, anti-intrusion 4evices and riot control '-gentswere beirn installed in the barrier by -the end of the reporting period. All ofthe above devices were in addition to the Claymore mines previously installed incement in the barrier. Considerable progress was made in the con'tructi'n offighting positions and oommunications trerohes. The installation of 59fourteeii-fot to;'ers was ilmodt complete at the end of the pJeriod. Thesetowers, when c plete, will provide complete -visual observation of the barripe.iurin" the oauat-t' 621 hectares were defoliated to enhance observation in thebarr-i.c. and a>o'.t areas.

03 ".-cu.-.ion and analysis of .major operationBL

(1) The operations discussed below were the major operationswhich the divipion ccaductol during the period 1 January to 30 April 66. Inaddition to these operation)s, the division participated in many smaller oper-ations. Within thu Tctical Area of Responsibility (TAOR), pl&toon 'to, battalion

4I

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SUBJECTi Operational Report on Lessons Learned

size qirmoile search -qnd clear, 6s well as, search and destroy, operationswere performed daily. l.l of these operations were charaoturized by intensivedaytime patr-,llin, and extensive night time Pnbushes ranging from fir u-team sizeto entire company operations. Some of the other type of operations which thedivision acc,'mplished but which are not discussed below were# support of he-public of Vietnam jirmed Forces with Urial -rtillery, tube artillery, andforces up to complete battalion task force; esort of both US and RVN convoys;escort of engineer nd logistical convoys;. security of downed aircraft; spoil-ing attaoks in the vicinity of the Cambo(dian border i.nd Civilian IrregularDefense Group (cIDG) camps; show-of-force operations; reconnaiss6noe missions by

the Onvalry squadron throughout P'leiku) Kontum, ihu Yen, Darlao and Dinh DinhProvinces; and surveillance and reconnaissance of areas where enemy activityhad been reported.

(2) Operation .NATLDOR I & II On 1 January, the Tht arigado:noved to initiate Opxation MATADOR I, a search anl destroy operation alongthe Csmbodian-border north of Highway 19, and to secure a base area for theincoming 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry DivisiAon north r f PAeik. On 4 January- the2d Br ,ade was committed to c.,nduct spoiling attacks approximately 50 kilometerswest of Kentum along the (Vmbodi!.n Border. derTDOA I) The spoiling attackswere dharaot rized by aggressive, offensive action with units opera-ting fromcompany-size bases. For the first time the division operaiedd in heavily.forested areas where no PZts existed. In several cases -TAO "Iir delivered 750pound bombs to cut holes in the forest. In other 6ases, trooper ladders woreused, to enter areas, followed by clearing an area with saws for I or 2 heli-cnptera, an1 then expanding th LZ with helib,-rne engineer equip~ment. Similarlyperso-nne! wore extracted using trooper ladder; *inoluding, on one oocasion,uxtracting a VOC intn a hovering 0H-47. -.lthcugh c ntaot was limited tooccasional encounters with small groups of local forces, Operation 1 T DChkserved several, very useful putpoees: (1) It c,.nvinced th CIDG and VII forcesth.t there were no massive VC forces along thu border and thus bolstered theirnora." tremendously, and served to encourage offensive opirations by them;-(2) It provided mutual experience to our forces zrond the CIDG in operatinetogertter aind (3)!hoDivision gained detailed knowledge of the trails alonethe :-bodian border," while des tro ynj. the VO way-stations, training areas'and neraLr disrupting his necessary logistical support facilities. Thisoperatioh ende4 on 19 Januarys

1 W T X11 W =- LOSSSFRIE~NDLY LOSSMS.K., 4 (SC) .... 'I6li 4t) W1A. 41VoC 6

• vc I

Jonfiscateti 538,00 potuds of rice

0 .)e I Oration LISH/1IITZ WING, '" 25 January the divisionlaunched upe.cal"'10n MiRUWITZ WING in the northeastern pirtion of ' inh IinhJlrovinoe. Tzis becames the largest offensive undertaken by the 1st CavalryDivision (A.rnbi1 a)since its rrival in -the R1 ublic of Vietnam (RVN). Theprincipal combqt opera.tions occuroed in 'the Hoail Nhon Pistript coastal plain -northeast of '3ong Son ( R849 5) and in the" .Laqaod Kim Son Valleys sou, h astof Dong Son.

I..

SUBJECTs Operational Report on Lessons Leaned

(a) Operation IWIM began with a deception operation s~uthof Bong Son to increase the security of Highway 1 and to lead the enemy tobelieve efforts woult be directed southward. On the 28th of January, in con-junction with the AUVN airborne brigade, air assaults and overland attacks werelaunched north of bong Son with the 4RVN irborne Brigade on the east along thecoast nd the lt Cavalry Divisi'n to the west of Route l. In these attackstwo battalions (the 7th ,nd 9th of th ,iyet Tan 'egiment) were found, fixedend destroyed. The division attempted tr. out off the enemy retreat by landingin blocking positions to the west and north AlonR expected routes of withdrawal..1ithough many small VO elements were killed or captured, intellitence indicatedthat the enemy had exfiltrated from the coastal plain to the adjoining highground to the north and west.

(b) The next phase of the operation involved .an attack onthe high ground between the coastal plain and the An Lao Valley, and into theAn Lao Valley itself. The plan was for the III MY to block enemy escaperoutes to the north of the "n Lao Valley with the XIVN 22d Division blockingthe southern escape routes, while the lst Colv was to att ck with five battalionssimultaneously from both sides 0-f the valley on 4 February. "ad weather delayedthu attack until 6 February at which time the III KJ landed a battalion in thenorth by helicopter; the lot Cav Air ,assaultec. 3 battalions on to the highground west of the valley sweeping from west to east, and situltanoously att,ckedwith 2 battalions in a gr ,und attack from the high ground on the east. 'hisattack was followed by a gr-,nd sweep to the south through the valley. The xtattack into the an Lao Valley met only light resistance. Trough the division's*sy Ops 1rogram the people of the valley were informed tW.t. the Division wc'.ld,not be remaining. The opportunity was offered to leave the valley if they choseto do so. About 4500 of the total population of 8000 did elect to leave the v.l-iey. Over 3300 of those people were flown to freedom in division Ohinouks. The2d. Brigade protected this exo'dus while continuing to clear the enemy from theAn LW Valley an?! the. high ground to the east.

(o) Wilo the 2d Briga-.o was thus ervaged, the 3d'rigadelaunche,. an air assault into an enemy base aroa in a series of valleys south-west "f one ;on which' branch out from the Son Long Valley - an area-which wasdubbed the "Secles Claw" or "Crow's Foot". The 3d Brigade- E.ir assaulted -toseize the 'foot of the "Ornw' a Foot" while simult ineously landing blocking forcesat the enO. of the "toes" to prevent escape from the falleye.' This strategysucceeded in capturing or killing many enemy nd keeping them well containeduntil the 2d Brigade could land4 on the ri(*es in the high Lround southeast whereintelliience indicated the enemy was hiding in strength and possible had a majorheadquarters.

(d) It wras in the 2d Brigade area, that the enemy was foundentrenched at LZ ME (.T7574) and the "Iron Triangle" (K776).* In destroyingthe enemy hers the 2d Brigade .used. all its organic weponst Ius. ,C 4&iri 352strikes, an, riot control agents (R2A) to successfully destroy the enemy. Thisaction resulted in nrny enemy killed, woundea and captured, plus many largeweapons caches. .The:,mount of ocm=ioation gear and wire captured gve evidencethat the enemy installation included e VO regimentpl headquarters.

20

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8U3J WTI Operational Report on Lessons Learned.

(e) As this operation was procecding, the 3d Brigade wasrelieed by the Ist Brigade which began a series of assaults and sweeps chroughthe high ground around the "0.c;s Foot" and then moved into the high ground alo ,along the eastern and southeak.terr. =ies of the Son Long Valley. Here elementsof the 18th NVA Regiment were encountered, including its headquarters company andits heavy weapons companies. '"he ist Brigade captured ten of the twelve 12,7mmVi machine gans and nearly all of the rocoilless rifles of the qLyet ThangAegiment " nhuch communications gear and a hospital with all its medical supplies.

(f) The let-Brigad,. oined by the 2d Brigade then made aseries of air assaults aind sw ,eps in the easte'U '6id of the don Long Valley.

(g) Mw final phase of these oporations, called WHITE WING(Black Aorse), was aimed at destroying the enecy forces in the Cay Giap houatainssouthesst of Bong Son. This is a forest-covered mountain stronghold whereassrult was m-de by bombing holes through the cover and then rappolling and using

oChinook ladders to assault the dominant high ground and mweep doin the hills.This operation was done simultaneously with the 22d Division who swept ane

blocked along with two battalious of the 2d Brigade in the low ground south ofthe mountains. No larie nunber of VU were killed, but many were captured and themyth of this being a strong enemy base was exploaed.

(h) ti6 March, the operations ended with the lst Uav forcesback in the area siuth cf bong Son where they had started 41 days before. Thedivision had made a 360 deetees traverse around Bong Son in which enemy contactwas maintained for 41 consecutive &ys.

(i) The results of thi-s 41.day operationwesr6s.

I With the aid of the Republic of Vietnam (IVN) forces,the division returned 140,(,)00 Vietnamese to RVN control by clearing the enemyfrom the coastal plain north of JorG Oon.

2 The inhabitants of the n LWo and Son Long Valleys weregiven a chance to be freed of VC domination by moving to areas which were under"gov:,nment control', About half of the total residents responded.

hard blow was struck at enemy anits. which had longthreatened Bong Son and Aoute I from QaL Nhon to Bong Son. 41 three regimentsof thb aao Van# Division (the 44met Chieng the *iyt Thang and the 4,et TamRegiments) were anjacedt rendering five of the nine battalions i, $Q,.adl;itionallyr, a mortar company, a recoilless rifle companyj an anti-aircraft coM-pany, and A signal o.qpany were rendered ineffective. Three field hospitalswere also captured. Specific results of this fighting werei

21 -

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A4VOOG

SUBJ2CT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

~f~iY 0~8U8F±RIZWLY I.O8

KIA 1342 (BC) **KI4 2281746 !st) WIA 834

Wi 1348 st*VOC 633 **Includes 42 personnel killed

VCS 1060 in crash of 0-123 on 25 Jan 66Chieu Hoi 485 VidinifLVof the Doe iiang )?assIndiv Wpns 208

*Crow Served Wpns 52Docurients 1250 pounds

a pturod. & Dvac rice 91 tonsOaptured & jvaa salt 41 tons

*EInemy chptured included a Battalion Corrmder, n-ortar companyco:amider end Regimental heAdquarters executivo officer. Weapons capturedincluded parts of . 105Mu Howitzer; ton 12.7 and thaoe 50 caliber Ii.chino guns, all typos of aimmnition (including 126 rounds 105M) 0oe-rnnioationa oquiViLont and individual equipment in largo a ounts were alsocapturad.

u. ch tactical intolligenao was. obtained which wasuseful to the division eand of significant strategic liportenoe to. higherheAquarters. It was this type of intelligenco which onablod .the divisionto maintain forty-one consecutive days of enemy contact, a length of tmewhich was unhoerd of to this tio in this typo warfare.

. The ability to air assault into even the ostdifficult torrain was demonstrated, yielding an unexpected tactical ad-vantge to the division forces.

6. The, division artillery was omploycd in unlikelyareas thus providing groter tactical advantage while giving continuousand corplote covorago to all. tatical infantry and cavalry units. This

'Was thc first time 155raM Howitzers woro ez.placed by helicopters.

.:i. Two airfields wuxu built by the division engineers,a 2100 foot CV-2 snd 0-123 strip north of Bong $on end a 3200 foot stripwest of Pni Oat capable of paeking 8 0-130's.

8. Continuous psychological olrations wore con-ductod which produced 593 prisoners, 485 Chiou Hoi and kept the inhabitantsof the areas inforLiod as to w ht to do to avoid hari and how to return togovcrmnicnt control.

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b BJXOT& Operational Report on Lossons Leaoned

9. Fighting was successfully conducted in denselypopulatod Poas, strongly defe.nded by the VO, with Uin=iu~a 4Pago or cas-ualtios to non-coLLbatmnt personnel.

10. 0oU pleto opor1intion, knd cooperation was ;.isin-tained in moobat operations on .daily babis wilh the ROK' s, the MN andthe U3 N1rvy, .4ir ForcL and iHarinos in this long ooi.iplex opuration.

11. *it loast 4 infentry battalions (usually 6) werer.mainteincct in sustained oporptions, 65 kilorAuters frou baseo onp for 41consecutive C.eys, tims laying to rest -ny residual doubt about an airuobiledivision's ability to conduct sustained cor.bat operations.

(4) 20 Febrary Atteok on Crrp Radcliff. At 0020 hours, 20Februczny 1966, ol...Lnts of the 407th VO Battalion attackod 0'mip Radcliff witha woll-acorcinatod attnck includin concurrently an 8scalt on Hon Congkiountain (Bi34534'8) as thu uain Pttcdckl> an infiltration of the barrior onthe opposite, side of Caup Radcliff (BR475486) as a diversion; and a Lort=attrck on the division base o The VO cuppany attacking Hon Cong usedone platoon to conduct the acturl attck on the coi..Inictions facilityatop Hon Con, with twu platoons being used in alabish positions to att;a.ckany ground relief forces whichi~ight be coi..itted. The attack on thecomjunications facility did not succoad in destroying any of the vans ortrans.ission facilitios oxcopt for the destruction of fouk 6onurators andthe capturin6 on one 160 Lmchinolun. al. ronforcou~nt of thLe facility we's

perforod by helicoptor thus avoiding the onc.4 aLbush sites. The infil-tration of the baso resulted in 3 personril ont.ring thrugh the barrier,all th me of whou wore KIA. The aortez at tbck delivered 106 82nT. nortarrounds into the western positions of the division base froz, a position to

the north of the bae.so

7EIIi VoC 62 w"

1 OH-l destroyed8 CH-47 danagod (all ropaira-

I ble)4 Generators destroyed

(5) Opration Jl.A BOWIA In Opur=tion Ji BOWIl, which beganon 13 Hixoh, lst vad 3d Brigades executed r, soexch and destroy operation in

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AVOOGbUBJ WT" Operntional Report on Lessons Learned

northern Binh Dinh province against the suspocted Ken Truk VC base areae.The oporation ha.d been delayed for 3 deys by low ceilings each morning.This precluded the execution of the desired coubin-tion of TjC air sorties,araod helicopter attacks, and airLiobilo assaults prior to darkness. Aceiling above 4000 feet absqlute w s. desired bit .ttip operation was finallyoxecutod with a broken ceiling of 12d0 fe. Onlyt light resistance withvery limited contact resultod fro this opcration. Un 21 Iinrch the 1stBrigeo was returned to base to proceed to the Plaiku aeja tend co~nencoOperotion LIMCOLN, 90 kilometers to the west. Thu 3d Brigado continuedOperation JIi BOWIL by conducting a ground and heliborno swoop frou theoperationaj zea, thru the old Special Forces Ca;x.p Knnck area back to thedivision beso at 4n Kho ending the operation on 28 iiarch. iathtmgh thisoperation h,d' relatively light contact, it destroyed a goodly nuilbor of waystations, training areas, and caches of supplies end provided excellentintelligonco of the trails and rutes in this vital area noa the divisionbase. Of interest is the fact that this operations was logistically direc-ted frora the Division base at An Kho, 60 kilometers away.

The rcsults of this operation weres

W -hAIT LO-5412 FRLNDLY W81I~

KIA 25 (Bc) 3KIX. 3 (Lst) *wI4 377WI;. 10 (.st) *Thu uajority wore punji stakes.VC0 7 Only 7 personnel required ovdouationVCS 8 fron the Division*Indiv wpn 13

iathough t'!iu operation did not not lanrge nur.,burs of UnoLV personnel andequiltent the following positive benefits woro derived:

(a) The techniques of assault operations in uountainousand extre:rely donso jungle terrain were inprovod.

(b) z. double-sling syste'a was developed for lifting How-itzers by CH-47. This systea allowed the artillery crew to ride in the air-craft, with the Howitzur being sling lo.Aded underneath and a sling loadof 305m,' cauuition sling loAod under the Howitzer, This provided for aquiok-reacting pc.ckage which could be d6posited in P. siiall aroe. within a

jLZ.

(c) Thu intelligence gained was very tcauoblo in dater-raining ecu- neny strength and go'ogrnphuic inforuaatioh of the re&.

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4,VCCGMUJ.M Operational Roport on Lessons Learnod, I1 cr C ) AAM) S N)

(6) Operation LIhUOLN

(a) On 25 A.arch the divisiun begam Operation LINCOLN intho wstcrn Ploiku Province - -a search and dostroy opt;.ration in the vicin-ity of Duc Co, Plci ii(. end the Chu Pong b1asif. '

(b) Initially thu 1st Brigdeo was coulnittvd. One battalionair assaultod directly from the An Kho base by UH-ID and CH-47 to an LZvicinity of Duc Co. This 130 kiloLmeter air assexalt ostablished v. record forthe co,.b,-t air assault uovejuont of m ,ntiro battalion. The other twobattclions Liuvod to the area of operations by C-130 and t~round convoy, Init-ially the brigade conducted small unit rocun patrols north and east of theChu lnt iiassif, while the 1/9 Cavalry Squadron scroenod along the Coeabo-diem Bordor north and south of Chu Pong. On 30 kirch t- 1/9 Cav sighted3 VO in the open south of Chu Pong (YV863678) and observed 30 ioro hiding.They coritted r, platoon which case under heavy fire nd was reinforcedwith co,:prm , of the 1/12 Cavalry. This compcay too bocaio heavily engagedduring the night and was reinforced in th( Lorning by the roi.ainder of thebattalion. As a result of this operation 3 UH-lD's wore destroyed, withone CH-47 end one UH-ID downed, bu, recovered. ,

LffaiY LOl S FRIL.DLY LO,

KI 75 Kil 10Voc 6 WLA 34Indiv Wpns 14 UH-lD 3

(c) it 1000 hours the following uoring (31 Mirch) thedecision was .iade to Mavamce the tis-c schedule of the operation. This wasdone by assuuing operationti, control of the 3,d Brigade of the 25th InfantryDivision aMd by iioving the 3d Brigade to Plei iio. By niehtfall the 5dBrigade had closed including its supporting ertillery, onLinoors and FOe.One Brttalion was rmovQd by CV-2 directly to P-loi 14ue the 3d Brigade brso,while mzothor battalion rioved by ground coiivoy and C-130 to Ploilu.

(d) The Chu Pong i ssif was thcn attckod witn all threeBrigades, the 3d Brigade, 25th Infentry Division from thu north, 1st Brigadefrou the south and the 3d Brigade, 1st C,valry Divisionl fromi the u ast. Theactual attack was initiated on 4 &,pril by eatablishing blocking positionsalong the Cae-bodian Border to prevent enmm withdrawal across the border.In the course of the attack tho entire Chu Pong .was tr.versed with lightcontact. No bunkers or cave systous were discovered. It thus becaeio ,pex-

ent thnt the nyth of the C.hu Pong base was indeed a ,nyth. 8P,1R ropozi z didindicate a sizable force to the west of Chu Pong across the Cazbodian

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AVCCGUBJDjCTs Oporctionrla Aoport on Lessons Lcarnod

Bord ro Of curious intornst, Lvmdting Zonos X1iY and JLbLY, the site ofthe Novoubor la Drang Cmpaign, showed no sigs of h.ving bon occupiedsince the dop'.turo of the division. The operation was terUinated on 8April,

MiuLTb iM ff LOS M/8 MP'%.LY Lw

KI 447 (BC) KIA 41232 Zst) WI6 102

WIA 163 L'st) UH-lD's 3VC0 12

UffL ~QIY 4T CL4RD

In1ividual weapons 88 Piastoers 2,000,000Crow-sorved weapons 8 Rounds S3 aumzition 4,675Grenades 72 Rounds 12.7rm RL ,.mo 63jib blocks TIT 16 Rounds 82ria Mortar UIjxo 69Packs 2 F1ares 1920Binoculars 1 ai Aadio 1Tons Ricoe 8 PHO-lO Radios 215 bod hospital 1 Boxes of Docui4ents 560r- Ilorter Sights 3 8= iako'ti Bipod 1iirmo Coariors/w/straps 8 Numberous Sl Iteus

(o) This opur.tion was the 1st Caevalry Division's firstopportunity to coubine the rolatively heavy eleomnts of the 25th InfantryDivision, a tank couprany and their araored cavalry squedron, with its AP's,with the ory light taimobile oporations of the 1st 0 avalry Division. 1.toea couposed of uler.,ents of the division's %oir cavalry squadron coupled withL, coupany 3/4 ;xuor (9 tanks and 17 APOts) and a hoevy artillery battalion(8 ane, 175rz- aun) prove4 particularly offoctivo.. The tanks, PC' a andartillery Lovod with rolntivo ease over the lightly wooded Pleika area usingthe helicopters as their eyes., This toau operated frou Ploiku to Dic Co andfrou Ploika to Ploi Me to area W& R (near the eastern odkr of the Chu i-onghassif) aend thQnce to vicinity the Cambodian border along the Ia Dimeg River.Aesupply of the tanks and ,arttllfry was by 011-47. The tanks proved veryuseful in quickly clearing LZa. The tanks, and artillery in turn, wdroable to operate a2ost unrestrictodly boccaso they could be directod andresupplied by helicopter whorever they were.

(f). Frou the support viewpoint, the engineors built amembrsno-cv.wrod 0-130 strip (3500 foot).oapnble of parkng 10 0-130's usingthe now T-17 M-brano at Le Thmnh (Za; 120310), southwest. of Catoka, wheie

26CONFIDENTIAL-

(9 -!I

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CV0,GSUBJIXTI Oportional Roport on Lumsona Learnedthe ist Brigc .o forw rd Ci, brigado base and support elomonts wora located.4n equal fcr.t wr4 the constrotion at LZ CZ, (southeast of Ohu Pong) of a2300 foot 0-123 strip capable of paxking 6 0-123's at a time. This airstrip provideod direct suppoft for a battalion taek force to includeartillery and direct resupply# For this strip# 51 tuns of airiobilo engineerequipment was moved into and out of the site by helicopter alonQ. Tho entirestrip was constructed in 96 hours.

(g) This operation provider.' detailed intelligence as towha.t ntually was located in the so caled Chu kong bases and N ain providedvalu, blo ar intelligence for future operations,

(7) Operation iUiBy Is

(a) Threo days aftr; Operation LINCOLN, on 13 ,,,prilthe division coLmnced Operation 0ibBY I in the western Ploiku-Kontuukrovincos (along the Coxibodian Boreor) to locate infiltration routes, inter-dict onorny novoe:±ent and destroy V0 forces ane installatiuns in the area ofoperations.

(b) Two brigades, the lat and 3d -Brigades, operated in anarea along the Cabbodian Border extending 70 kilo±.otors north of highwy19 while the 1/9 Cav-lry bquadron and an attached coLpany operated in anarea fro,. Dak To to the 0aabo(,ian Border. The Division area of operationsfor I DBY I was 70 x 120 kilxorotors.

(0) This oporation was charactorized by si.all unitrecon and aL,bush patrols fror. bases in the axoa of operations* Lnmiycontect remained litht throughout the operation amd consisted uostly ofsniper fire. On one occasion brief contact was uiAe with an estiuatedonery platoon, ixcellont knowledge of the Uaabodian Border trail networkwas gained and a large nuxber of small LZ's wer,. located, This opurationwas conducted in conjunction with eight Conpanios of OIDG personnel frora theU~a/CIDG caLps at i1ci Mrong, lei Djerong, Duc Co and Dak To. This gaveexcellent training to these forces and will undoubtedly raise their espritand ag6ressivenesso

M. okLT8m LOAI 4NY LOdb!3

KIA 3( BO) ma 23(st) wI 12

VoC 5

27

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IV = I ) IEIV 7-/14-

~AVC G

8b1JCTt Operational Roep.ort on Lessons Loaned

Switchboards 3 Grenades (cases) 7575n iM Rounds 90 50'06 Oalo (cases) 40120u--i ortar iounds 30 82w u Mortar Rounds 50iaaeios (type unknown) 2 12.7ai 4w-1 (cases) 2cl1osivs (cases) 30

(8) Operation iDOBY I1s

(a) On 21 "pril the 2d Brigade coLenced Opvrationi L)oBY II, a seprch and destroy oporation in northeastern 1eiku Province.The -Assion of 1-iO0Y II was to locatc infiltration routes, intercept theenoLW snd d estr.)y onei.y forces and install:ttions in tho area of operation.

(b) No significant hostile contact was t.dve until 22 April,when a holiborne assault into JLZ VW0OD (aR 927572) encountered hLeavy siir.a1rams mid utouratio weapvns fire. No further significant contact was mdo in

the first phase of the oparation. Sweeping actiois netted 27 VGQ, I OhieuHoi rrillier, 3050 r.,unds of suall anms atmo, 8 gronades, 10 bangalor torpedos,I pair fiela i4lssesp 1 bedroll and 1900 lbs of rile.

(c) !htso II of the opcration began with the ,.eploymont toKontubr: ir%.vinco on 25 ,Pril. Rocon in force uoveao~ints northr-.st of KontuaCity :,at with no oneuy contact until 28 4pril, when B Company 2/12 Cavalryreceived 15 rounds of small &ais fire vicinity B 112062. .xtillery firewas diroctedc to the origin of the " fire. On 29 -.pril, Coupany 1/5

rCavalry engaged 5 persons vicinity , 887487 with svrcl1 trn.is and .4.*

Rosulte of EDSBY II as of the reporting late (30 ipr 66) were:

Ki 4 (BC) K14 0WI. 1 WIA 3j 3

V V~S 41 ..

-A .,umo 3059 roundsGronades 114g mines 19Rico 3400 lbs

o. Conbt ,t DevelopLzents. During, the period of this report the

28

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CONFIDENTIALUBJ'LCT: Oper .tional keport on LessOnS Learned

divisi on participated in tests and evaluation of the following equilments

(1) Tests were conducted on the helicopter trap weaponon 26-28 January 1966 in conjunction with JRATA. The results achieved

were unsatisfactory due to the high proentage of duds enontcred.

(2) Five power units (1.5 KW, 28 Volt DC) were testedto determine if the equipment could be used as an interim solution to

the requirement for an auxiliary power source for the UH-IB command aircraft

while on the groimd in the forward areas. The equipment provedsatisfactory in performances but was determined to be too heavy andr:equired eicessive space in the aircraft.

(3) Two LA aocoustio telescopes were tested duringtactical operations* The equipment was very fragile and could not becarried due to the configuration. Numerous mechanical problems wereencountered with the wiring circuits due to the uquipwent being too fragilefor, normal handling.

(4) The two commercial telescopes tested during thelast reporting period were returned and an evaluation report submitted.Both soopes were satisfactory and compatible with the respective weapons(M-14 and ii-16 rifles)

(5) Evaluations were conducted with tne shotgun adapterfor the i'-79 Grenade Launcher. The equipment proved to be =xcellent inmeeting the requirement for a close-in area type weapon. It was determinedthat the weapon was effective up to 30 mut.ra .nd would penetrate fairlyheavy vugetation. This division favors using the 80mm multiple pxojectilethen stocks become available. This will eliminate the grenadier from havingto remove the adapter to fire HW or other ammuniLtion and will achieve a

g .eattr killing zone,

(6) The test program witih thi X1546, 10mm beehiveround continues. There was no requirement for combat firing of the roundduring the reporting period* The Xia590 - 90mm beehive, M4591 - 90mm M,and ZA581 - 106mm beehive rounds were received for tust and pvaluation.The initial evaluation reports will bc submitted based on combat operationalresults.

- w (7) The initial battalion size packet of individual and

crew-scrved weapons night vision sights was ruc. ived during mid-January.An additional packet was received during Harch. The first packet

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"I °

C N I oX - W-MA-

JMMGT& Operational Aeport on Los&;ns Loarnod

was evaluated within one iafantry battalion and lator distributed equallyto all divisional o,.btt umits. The sights have proven satisfactory for, ground ni(,ht observe.tin except in areas of heavy voeGtation. The weightof both si,;hts nakos it difficult for thm. to easily be tranzsported duringtactical opurations. The individual sight has proven satisfaotory fur usefrona helicopters at altitudes above 1000 feet on nights when there is noquartcr or noro moon. The crow-served sight could not be focused duringtests from the helicopter.

(8) One Stanford L eseerch Institute non-directionPlbullet detector was evaluated Pnd proved to bc very satisfactory in detoc-ting grcund fire. An evaluation ruport was subriitted thrugu coxandchannols which included a recoaiondation that the dovice be prucured as anintorL solution until doveloiient ff thL directional detectors.

(9) Twenty-two 130-lb clusters, cannister, riot iontrcl,C6 ero recoivcd during the quarter for test and evaluation. Thirteen ofthe clusters were used, nine of the. on corbnt support missions. Theclusters havo all functioned well except one which had p1rcbably beensubjected to too r.x.ch rain prior to use. "ii of the clusters w,re uod-ifioe by iounting the tiA;ers rot a 60 degree antie fr,,n the strong baokassembly so as to permit reloso of the cluster fromi 1500 foot altitudeinstead of the designed 500 foot altitude. The clusters were drol,,'ed frotthe pod nounting, racks of tue ,1a6 saient subsystem. Coverse of theuuaitiuns ranocd fro0r about 100 x 150 Lotors to 150 x 300 Loters doendingon the altitude of functioning. The only dasigm deficiency found was thcatthe tLiors were not accurate. ,n evaluation report wab boinl; subitt6d at theend of the Poriod recomonding that the cluster be procured as a C deliverysystoe.

f During the period covered by this report the isyoholcgioaJ.Warf4re effort of the Division developed frV, a part too duty under thestaff supervision of the G-5 into a priL,a.ry duty under the staff, supervisionof the G-3 on 7 Fobruy. The Division uade extensive use of isy War insupport of a i'jor operations; Opuratiorn i..0 I and I, BLU LIGiHT,!i"f-\1HITw Avdt., JDL OW;li L1M;OLN, NQ BY I and II. tee ocl forsmplos of loafletsused).

(1) Opurations kafx,d I and Il covered the period 1 -17

January. During this tiu 6,000 leaflets wore distributod in two Lissions.

(2) Operation ,i8ii4-W±JT WBiG covered the period 25, Jazmw"y through 6 haxch. During this operation 85 missicns distributedz 37,600,000 loflots. Besides the leaflets 104 loudsperker missions wore

30

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AVCOGS=UBJiT 0perrtionel Report on Lessons Looned

conducted; 7,'. hours and 45 rAnutos broadcasting tiiao was u od; 61 groundloudspeaker interpreter team dys were conaucted, and. 483 ralliers worerecorded.

(3) Operation Jli BOwIU; ccvered the period 13 - 27Harohe 6o,0 26 missions distributed l,160000 leaflets. Twenty loud-speaker nissions were conducted; 27 hourx and 30 minutes speaker broad-cest tizm was presented; 4 interpreter teem ground loudspeaker missionswore ,ccomplished and one rallier was recorded.

(4) Operation LINCOLN covered the period 25 March - 9ipril during which time 55 missions distributed 1,126,000 leaflets. Fifty-six loudspoakor missions were conducted; speaker broadcast tiae of 70 hoursand 55 minutes was used; 3.2 ground loudspeaker 1 interpreter toau days wereused an'! 3 relliors were mrd ~ed.

(5) Operation kObBY I covered the perio. 13, - 17 d&ril.During this period 23 missions distributed 2,385,000 leaflets. 8o;o 23loudspepker missions were ccnclucted; 28 speaker broadcast hours wore usedand 1 rallier recorded a isy War tape.

(6) During 6,vr~tion I4O BY II from 21 .pril to thereporting date (00 ."pril), 24 missions distributed 2,480,000 leorlets.8o0a 21 loudspcqkor missions wore conducted; speaker broadcast tme of 21hours was used rnd 10 ground loudspeaker and 1 intorpreter teom dfys wereusod.

(7) The 1sy Ops enjoyed e.rtoculr success whenever theDivision L,intained cntact with unerq furces, dCiq and night. Aosults weremost alliaront in the Bong 5on Cam.paign when 483 VG/NV,, rallied, I-Lorathan 100 additional VO/NV4 rellied to lucal forces followin& the dopnxtureof the Division elorunts.proving the effectiveness of Psy Ops. DuringOleration LIOOlit oven though the Qrbodian border was close enough forretreat, 3 NM. allowed thoselves to be taken prisoners. -.'xperionco hasproven that casualtios, sickness, lack of food, artillery fire, air strikesand continued dley and night broadcasts of OHIIJ B)I appeals weaken the willof the eneny. During this reporting period 1 sy Ops facilities were expandedto day and night operations with the result of an increase in nubors ofralliers which was impressive. Dring the initial phase of the Bong BonOperrotion, hostile fire fr,. i populated areas was necessary. 4a. problemexisted in raletion to noncobibatant casualties. The resulting procedurewas estroblisheds Yirst, a warning to the population and VC not to fire atour aircraft. If fir.,ng continued, the non-cobeatants were instructed tomove away from the pcpuletod area, and aftur the strike, the VO wore blmedfor the destruction. The non-cobatants were allowed one hour to comply

31

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I

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k!TJBJJICTt (Qkoretionti. R~eport onl Lessens Leared

with thu instracti,,ns. -1th,-uth thoeo 1-nocedures wore t:L.o ctnauuings tileDivision ico0toeL thoii as necessary ProCudUres bocanso Of thu potuntcir.l non-coL0ibtant casu,.lty probloul.

in othvolno 8)The VC/NV4% paopk,anda effort si6,ificantly inoru,2sodin othvolnu ndvariety with 000asinel high quality printin(G on a geod

grade of p.'r The thos w, re no.t now. They reprosented the stcndardG01"'unist pjarty line of Liriclisij and war ioneuring luaders. ThiL soldierswere exhorted. tc, go ho.e not fight and disobey coibat orders. However, ovenwith the increase of the VC/xWi rojal effort thore wcre little danger tothe integrity of Divisiun troops.

(9) Ahiin ; the reporting periodL, the 1,sy Ops resourceswere reorgAnized at I FMUMOT level. This oliuinated the atteohed Divisionisy Ois support an, creatod E. delay Of 7 - 10 days in obtaininU requestedleafle-ts. Ziditionzil auprort has beon requested to enable tile Division toco~ntrol both t, 1rinting -.nd, -,cund loudspeaker interpreter to.nz1 capability.

go "ircraft Operationso Daring thu repcortiin,j)Upriudp divisioneiroretft flow 236,117 scrties, rmoved 54P417 tons of car6Ae and 321,339 truops.In porforyin6 these :-Assi-onst 343 aircraft were hit by ground Lire, with 23boint6 downod. Of' the downae aircraft, 15 vore recovered and repairablooDuring the entire period, there were 10 orew riezibors killed and 78 woundedP~ a rbsult of onony action (beo Inc 7).

h. 01rcrationr-1 iroblemst

(1) The Lajor oierational pr.;ble. durin( tho reporting poriod.oontinued to be the liited avail,%bility of sufficient nuubors of Llissionready aircraft. The aiircraft availability throuL-hout uiost of the reportingperioC. wa,,s such that it frequently required .,oifica.tionl of tactical c'iara-tions, rc.thur than punittint' a full renge of tactical- schoL.ius of L.AziuvoroTho airimobile concept, as testud in CIMIfa, pr..vidorl for a helioptur liftbattal,.ion which could lift the oo~b,.bat ulceltents of on infantry battrlion.L'von if ouparv-.ble aircraft availability existed in Viutnxu to tnlat fur whichthe TO&L~ was e,.si~,nod9 r. sovere ro..uction in air mobili.ty would result inViutri, -'uc No~vl to trio iuuch hi ;her air 0,osity prevalent in thisDivision's opcv;-tiunal area (over 4000 feet -Ienaity altitude), coupled withthe add6c. weight of an.Lorl necessary eiuorgoncy su4ipliesi and arawnt hasro1.ucod the lift capancity of a lift batt,.lion by rou(Shly uo-third. 8upor-iupo sod on this problena, was a reduced availability of uission ro~.'A air-craft c.ue to lc~k of all typos of aircraft parts.

32

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

W U]3J±LTt O0.orxtional ±uoport cn Lessons Lccrrnee,

It is anticipatod tha-t this pro'blou will be ovnsiderebly inproved intthefutrefor two roascna. j.iroraft OPP=e parts arrived iii riuch great'er

initintod on 27 -4rilt as 1part , o; the proposed TW revision, to request

extre. aircraft and mdantenaw)o P6soeiiiol foi O'prations in Vietnam*

be quito hi~h rnd oneuLect much valuable staff tize at all levels, .

study was condlucted cuncerning zol.%;rtap their ooverego and their distributionsThis study indicate.d that all sig;nificant actions were bei.ng reprted at leasttwice in vryinL detail to hit.4wr hoexaterep and that in Liost cases the twoLor throc reports required for each o..eration went to the saw-e office of thehigher hoadqunrtors.- The study also idiatod that the :aost courohonsivereports had tho shortest repertin6 tius while simpler reports had longerreportintS ULr.ese Loction waa initiated to Headquarters I Field Force Vietnai.±recu. endling aimpliication, ra.uced repetition tund adjustment of :t:portingtimeos*

5.'(0) Logistics

a. Goneral

(1) 'buring thq& p 'eoit covoted bj -this repoort, logisticalsuxtwsprovided for6 ajvr oprtoo -;4AI IId , BULG

WING, JnI BQWVID, LINCOLN, I.0sBY I end' 11. j& detailed study ofairmobilo log4utioal su.Liport wrs co.plpt9do The results of this studly areshown "y uo.jor oporation. in Inclosuro 5.

(2) 9jporn'tion ' a ljD( I clnl qn1 overod ~thr puriod I.Jnaythxouj..h 17 J-nufa-Y and woro one brigade ope ratlons supported by tholot Forward 8utport -MoL tent (i.; 5 )*. The lst FaU was located in the vicinityof Ga'toolca (Z 202342) anO, 'recived backu~p suppurt. frua Log Cond activitiesat Ca-'p"Iollaway, Ulk.

(3)Qpc~i B 3U;- 4IGHT 'was a one -brigade oporationconducted during the period 4 -12 Januay, inclusive. This P~Oration wassulpporte d by tho 2d J'UJ, co-located at Gai4~ Holaway with the supporting LogOomad supw1y aLctivit~y.

('i) (~o~ti 4.6i11I* WniG were o~nrluotod iduringthe period of 24 .Janu(ay tkiroiwh 6 iiroh in tho nor'theaitomn BinhI Din~h,I rcvincoo Those woro two -,brigado :operantions with all tihraJbrigados par-,ticipating' during the ipuriod# The thr. WPl~'s located withi brigade bapqOat dii Cat and Bong bon 'suirported their Lespeotive brigades. Resupply frouLoG, Cor-Ap whs effected by. grourid line of coLL.iuniation (GWOC) over jHoute 1#

33CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALA.VCOQSUBJWOt Operational Report on Lessons Learned)

which was sooure(, and ieintained by 1,014 and AQKl foreos. Log LUoi supijlyPoints wero co-located with Division b'upport 0or-afld A~leLoftc in the PhuCat and Bong Son areas and'resulted in outstanding coordiUnation andliaison,.

(5) Oporation JHi± fUWI1L, 13 h~arch thirough 27 W~archtIwas a two brijgade oper-tiun sujJ-)orteG& by the ).st an,, 3d FS.Wls operatingfroua the Division Lases Thc Fj~s o unfigured their units in the base are&.ito respond to baigade doeincs on a ti~uely basis. Tho Y]jWs, wore supj,,rtoddrecty by Support COLTrAand with backup pjport oo.ii1b froi the A~n KheI .GS Battalion. Reports froL the or.iitted brigades indicated thiat logis-tic-2 support -prvided during the J311 BOWI1 O,,eration was the uost co,:petetad iiost rosponsive since0 the Division hMe been in Vietral2. Units worevesuplied by helicopter a LiaxL=u distance of 65 kilc.ietarse * An ai:,ergoncyresupply joint with JP-4 ane. AVGiW web established 'vicinity the OIDO Cmipin Vinh Thanh Valle ye This sujply point was serviced by GLOC frora the WuiNhon Support hxen.

(6) Opeo'ation- LINCOLN begdn on 25 March with the corn-riti.ont of tne lst Brigade in the Pleiku area. The Ist Fb1E was establishedat Lo~ Thanhe Log Corad co-located their Forward bapply Activity rat Le Thnnh.Pn 31 Narch the, 30. FWO doployqd to Pici M"e to supjvort 3d Brig,.adeo o)erations'in that are'a. The 'plan of lugi~tica3.'su,,1ort fuor thc 1st and 3d Brigadeswas a GLOC froma qui Nhon bupp.rt aren to the forward elui.nets of tho 34thbS/G8 Btlion' ='' Peiku, then A GLOC to Division F'S Ia at Le Thnnh rjundK1ei hoo 4 Lo; Coue, liaison officer w0 present with Division eloi.xonis atI'lei he. Ol.eration, TOL1Pten~nated) 8 jiril.

Lliate on18oPexaiuna u.3yZI which bogan on 3-1 .iiril end ter-nime' on184jril was a two' 'brgade rAd 1/9 Cairy Squadron TF operation

and w,;as supportoci by tha1t, 2d fm,. 3cL, FSilk located at Le Tkhvnh, i]ei14ront7, and flak To* Forward?0 b.ipport Activities of the qxi WThon Support LAreaware co-located with the Divisi(.n F~j's ,t Le Thanh and flak To. L06 COLclliaist:.n officers were ludated with Divisio(n lrg-,;tical co.ornts at Plii14ron~e Rosupl.1 was charecterizod by GLOC frui :V1eiku an. W.i Nhon to LeThanh, A1ei Mr .ng, and flak Tog with throu, hput fr,-ti qui ion to Le Thenhan'I ±lei !byrong. partial AWLC was utilizo. in effecting resupp±ly friL.111oifcu to,.Dak Too Airing tis ojreti ,np the Divisi~n FbL1 s wore locatc1

ovr&15 ko 2 etrsrd uptig troop opurations, ona17kioeerfront.- '

016a#i W h~d 4'4g n 21, !pril with doriaitaentof a 2d B i VaCte t h6 1AlJ.gW "ca FS,2 X-was oatabli~hed at ] Jeiku

d, ;% ' C

CONFIDENTIA

* CONFIDENTIAL

LaU3XX~T: ~.uctin1Rei% rt on Laessonf, ljoaxnc-,

ane wr-8 su1jP-rt00 frlo" Lto CL1.ld stt~oki, thpat nad boon built up at C~alpHullwoar l'1oiku- Un 25 4~pri~l tho 2d AiL diblilaced to K( -3tt'a aa thu;

bx~~v(.o ili~m. hr-,so II of thuc.poxticn. JLo upprt waa ruccQvud0frvii

sc O lass V ito~i wcL rt.liho. tvaou i pr-in S-YI ae .ntiaiuinL; att th. -nl' of thu rc.jxrtin6 1,Qriude

(9) qui M'Jon to !lei iw is -rxi..xt~.y 225 kil.otorsand Wi M'fon tc Dnk To io apixoxiowvtely 250 Iiloturo, Thoce lonie rP(distvziooc oaus~ c..e uniquuj problr., boxto of thujso road~s rejuired wcxtun-sivo chimo;iur cffcrt tc rcpcair Okw-,g inflictor. by ho;stilo activne 1. 30kilc~zdtor s(..ti-,n of soc'..ndary ritdv !r, lo o tu thL juncti.,n uf 1{ifhwWy14 hrt.. t(. bc roixclNry. u~in4 Divisiun, roacurces, In ejpitc of Cff, rts ilcdot%, 0Xvoditimauly handlu vehicicos involvoed in the thxcughput froL 1 Ui INhCLnit wcts not forasiblo tc offoot I n o u~~.un.Ti ouo havail.ublc truck trrinsjrt. This L-ng; GLOiC disclfuas'1 a sari. usp thcugh notyet critical3. -hr.o:f ~tr trans rt axistiY4. in the Ist L:,g Core.010-01nt -I~orinting c-ut (-f 4jai Nhcn.

(10) During thc: Lii UULV/N0..@Y Uporcttic,ns ti-1 ,ecurity coflogiotical c nv, ya ir .i Acliku ti- Lo Thenh, I'1ti lit; lui Iir-n,,, -'Kcntu-,anc, D~k To andi raturn wr-s a priiary c,-nai-korcti.,n, ~a/ USCrts, air' an~dgLoul~ en. conm..nicati -n otrp,,iliticos worc .mvicio fcr thcac lioitcalC~rftcys. IT( l0-50ca C:Uc t(. h( stile acti(n wore. iziurd.

(11) Tho now irfiJAdL C- nlStIuctcd wore; ra DUG mearBucng i sn (jj 8702),paoio oal.able uf C-123 use; Hmki..nel Fielod, nozz 1,hCat (BR 8854), laterito, cv~jzLblc cf 0-130 uce; Le Thwzih, all woathor, T-17UOL~brano 00vorod ( the. first 0 ..ritruotod in Viotnau) 9 capribl- of C-130 uso;an;' aELOF 0.2 (YV 9389), lattcritcp oapabko of C-12.) uuo,.* In Fad(.itijn t(:thiff no-w -ntructi n, thO Eairfiold at Vlo± XL1n Was i&-_rCV~d to takc0-13018 t'.'T thQ Par'king ane t -- iwpvL, at KontuL andI j.'atcku Gi wore ii.jrovvdt" incrW1'ke tno-ir Cantbility fer linQlinij C0301s. This airfioldl c..nstxuc-tion nr'. ini, vo."nt 14~~Latoripa11y iflcrotacd tile r,-nu-c- of Divisionupur .ti: m, y rzvicting tho &A~:itina1 facilities noede. for lodistica1fsu )v-.rt Of o'.-orati. e m stn fr-jA .rLnt~irf ic;ds,

(12) jifirst w6; abcomjklishc(d during 0porativn I-UWJ.LA-?(MT IM whten a CH-54 lifted0 nm, kositioned ct 155 hocwitzer inl a aclabrt2Moa Thia wr~s -aa potsaiblL. after fiolId fabricati,,n end to'stini. of j,e1 ,cirl1 blini, by Division oupp t.rt Comcmod,

(13) 0-1U-i6o~rr of units wathin the. DiviLion b-cm.iu awaroof te dotiot ~v!nt~cs f a riol rsuj)ly in c,.rtrt.in QiturotLnaFo

35

CONFIDENTIAL

eON IY PN-r/R.4VCCG

b1J~~LCT 0~rc~i(n,02 ±~ojxcrt cm LoL~at no Ltaamcd

OutaL4lca Darin&, Ujlerirtiun LL±4CU±N9 thirty-fiv F a'rinl doliv,_ry a~-rtiea, Wercflown* deolivorinf; oi~hty (80) ti n.4 ,f urg,.ntly nuocud aujlioe. Two uf tnco

u~.~tic , livering critically needed OCas I and V, wore flown sat ritiihtto a unit in c,,ntrct with thu. canuryg whon nQ tricr zioans of ef fecting ro-supply wc~s availi-blo. ial. of thueuo aissiona w .ro (r.jj3.i~hLed uDs.nL thori!6 iN, ceIjability organic t,, this DiViaiuh am'. aircraft attacnedc t' tiluDivizicn.

(1.4) ..eri, rity rcquirciacnts. have been -.ot tb~rcuL;hout thero,?,rtin , pcriO. by closce 1iaison visits with 1Jni1i e duj.~pcrit =a~ anrl 4iiNluhcn uor .za

b. a.upjply ana 6oxcvicos

(1) Clasz It Thu DiviLi .n csubistod'prLc-riiy in B and' , uUi-fiot. 1, ratinuf with C rations buing u:ooe. au r;quirLCL ,-n ficld rtileThulivciy of freh produo was increased fr~2000 poundls ( tily to 9000 )oundasdaily durinC the Lonth of ;.ril. ;iffuctiva 26 .,Iril tho ,ir Force at-u.o(I theLiaion .)f transporting .1)rLcuco f ri. Da Lat t,,., 6 n Khu fr the Division. Thefundling fl r those prOduce c ntracts will ox, ire at the tnd of the currentfi ,ca year; h,.wevar, nlu probleis are aticipatod' in fun'inEg thc. c ,ntrnfcts furFY 67s The Divisicn was scheuule 1 . tc go a a poraane.nt L.d'Itd rati,-n asof 1 "pril. Hover, LV.)dif i~d .,rati,.nm wore ',nly rocoivcl on -an as avail-able basis Tho objectivc t. jpr~vidc the Div-.Liin with a p.ur~~r-nent 1 Ociifiod

1ra~tion issue wfs Ltyclo,0 by a lack -,f -.r1aqu-.to refricperated storvga inwui N4hon ancl the jn Kbe area. The rublUL Waii furtiler cco..,licatod by trmns-

pertti~n sh.rta-gcs be-tween 4ui Nhon ant., .,n Khe. .,t thL n-' of the rujx.rting1.,urio, 1600 cubic f,,.et p.rfab rfirtrswere boinL; installed in the 34th( art~rL.Estr Dattcalion and nine 800 cubic f,,e.t units in the ))ivisic.n UlassiI pointo These nofrigoratvrs w uld arlve the ,t.xu~rblou; howevar gon-oratorE, wore not availrable to 1;-wor any of this rofrigorati(no

(2) Class II & MV ,, Liclf )urvicc Liupply Centur and V. ContralIssuc Facility becaie availablo to thce Divicsion during il Liaison be-tween this lioaQ' qurt ro anO. q~ai Uhun Lu,.j(rt, Co,."Ln1 was inatrmiont3. in es-trblishinj_ thcoe facilities&. The.y are o],uratoc' by thLu 34th ouerti.'astorBatt,'JIion* ieretoft.ro, flu -ucki facilitius worce evail~ ille t, the, DiviLn

1n all requesGts f cr clothing tan ex~nl bl. uirU,,i w.ro channulleL thr, ughtho Division 'jupjjly Officor o.n roquisiti(.nk. Theotbi&aon of those f a-cilitie S redIuced the e;xcuosive Wk rk load cn UtLock rcu..rC, .;rs~nncl ,.e. cxio-ditce. ixr.cosising, t.f supily requests for i.j r ituj.o6 e, non-c cpenk.,.blc sup-plies. Cuntr.ls were ilpsdby thiu headquetrte u.n the. i-rchE,.o of those-itoL~s which wor. c:,ntinually in Lohurt aujlly t(, abouro cquitablo distributio.nto using units. Concurrent with the ostablish.ont of' tthese facilitics, itwas ge) by thiis hedquartera am. ii Nh.on that all ruquUsts fr,,- the 1st

36

CONFIDENTIAL

'V.'%

,, ., 0 o• C A/F' 0/1-M 7"/ t ,

SUBJECTs Operational Report on Lessons Learned

Cavalry Division for major items of equipment and non-expendable supplieswould be sent to Wi Nhon. Formerly, requests were sent through the 34th4iartermaster Battalion, An Khe. This new policy reduced supply reactiontime by eliminating one processing agency from the supply system. M)ringthis report period, the civilianlauny coat;N s broadened to provideincreased service to the diviiion. The new contract provided for laundryof cooks whites, sheets and pillow oases. On 24 April the Wuartexmasterlaundry integrated a dyeing process in the laundry cycle to dye all whiteunderwear, towels, and handkerchiefs an OD color. This dyeing station willbe a permanent addition to the laundry. Replacements for mission essentialequipment lost during tactical engPa;emunts wore received on a tiel.y basis.The overall res.-4neiveness of the supply agencies showed a marked improvementduring the" period. Although some items of supply remained in snort supplythe logisticl depots and associated agencies were initiating positive actionto correct problems.

(t) Clers llls Class III operations- functioned smoothly duringthe reporting period. Three Fuul System bupply :Voints (FUi), woro deliveredto the Division from qui lIhon to expand the pro duct handling cJL.pabiity ofthe Division. These FPaas will be deployed with the throe FU's in supportof unit operations. The rocoipt of these systems greatly increased theforward storrge capacity for fuel. The rmount of fuel which could be placedat the FS' sites increased the latitude for operation of transportationolomunts transporting the fuel forward. It provided a storage facilitywhich is cwapblo of opetation without overextending availeble petroleumtransporting equipment. Class III operations were stebilized -nd weill tailoredto moot the Division requirements.

.(4) Class Vs The major area of signikicemce during thisporting period was 81m= mortar amunition, 0225, with i'1-52 series, fuze.

this a unition was restricted to emergency oorabs.t use only and colprised all/ 81m assets on hand. A renovation point for reworking the suspot. anlunition

was projocted for Ai Nhon soiutime during the next reporting period. As ,aninterim measure all assuts on hand in the Division wore boing inspected bythe 661st Ordance Ajmunition Inspotion Tera to insure zaximuu sorvico,.bility.Use of this aLrnition for ±&I fire for perimeter defense was authorized byUSaRV.

(5) The following asounts in short tons wore used by theDivision in Jexuary, Fabrurxy, ivrc' ' e-' nd Aprils

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CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIALAVOGSUBJEOTt operational Repott on Lessois Learned

A Rations I Rations ltos-

844.2 5-1.3 732.3

ClassfTtJallonsAVGAS 939,000

JP-4 5P8481632

MOGAS 184055

DIESEL 681,529

class V

7,346.9

c. Transportation

(1) USAF airlift in support of 14OSBY I was unuatisfactoryoTwenty-six sorties were promrared to lift the aI, Jrigade from Oasis to AnKhe on 17 April. Load time oonfirmed by IFFV was 0735. The first airliftarrived at 0855, By 1730 only 21 sorties had been flown and 12 CV-2B sortieswere required to close the 1st Brigade by 1915 hours.

(2) USAF sairlift was requested to move the 2d Brigade TF toPedlku on 21 April. Two aircraft positioned at An Khe on the evening of19 April were damaged by the attack on An Rhe Airfield in the early hoursof 20 April. The airlift on 21 April was delayed by late arrival of the0-130 aircraft but a total of ten aircraft were devoted to the effortduring the afternoon and the programmed 16 sorties were o(mpleted at 1730houtws

(3) Aircraft repair parts continued to be flown to An hefrom Saigon by the Southeast Asia (SA) Airlift System. Additional airliftwas obtained from USARV G4 on 20 April-'nd GV-2B airorafV were employed tosupplement USA airlift for projeot .ode 031 through 034 ircraft repairparts shipmente

(4) On 8 April a 0aribou maounted refueling system was testedy the 00, Support Ommnd Rnd found to be unsatisfactory because of the'

weight of the system. A formal evaluation-was forwarued to-Headquarters,

38

CONFIDENTIAL-

% !''

- * CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECTs Operational Reparts on esson:Learned bgnt okt elc

~: defective pierced steel planking (FSP) on the Az1 Khe uirfield. Work wasaccomplished at night to avoid cessation of airlift operations.

()Scheduled bus service fC'om Base Camp through uin Ktae tothe "n Khe "irfield began on, 25 Marcoh 66, ising 4irmy comuercial type busses.The 00, ikn I~ie DS/GS Bn, was" given the responsibilitty for operation of thebus service. Seven drivers were provided from Division resources to DS/GSBn on a temporary basis to operate the buses.

do Maintenance

(1) Ground Maintenance

(a) ., new Redball Epress Format was received from1st Log Comd requiring units'to use a block form to facilitate transmittinginfoniiat ion onto punch cards.

(b) Thts XK-102 Light Weight Howitzer Calibration Teamarrived in the Division and immediately started calibrating the )(M-102 Is thatwere on hand in Division A.rtillery, a.s of 30 April 66, 56 each V0l2'sbad arrived in the 1st Air Cavalry Division*

(a) Three critically needed 4U 304 gransrators -L"r the-I/MP.P-4 Ra~dar Sets arrived 26 March and were issued to Division Arxtillery..& list of deadlined parts for the radar sets was transmitted to the lst'Log%; 'ond through the Division iaison Office. 1st Log 0 ond prepared to sendthese parts from fl6at rad-x sets to the Division to facilitate removal ofall MPQP4 sets from deadline during the next reparvting periods

(2) Aircraft Maintenance

(a) Afne (9) OH-l3st 10 U1H-lB, 23 IJH-lD, 3 UHi-47- and.I CI{-54-~ aircraft were dropped from property accountability dva to combatand crash damage.

(b) Two (2) OH-138, 9 -U~lB, 10 UH.lB/540, 10 Hrind 1 CH-54 wele issued to the Divisaion from theater assets.

(c .As a result jf the Mabry 'Committee Is reezonmendation,198 aircraft r.-echuanics were requested. as additions to aviation unit's TO&E's.

(d) Ten (10) W2? 348 for -IN/iLRC 54 r~ldio and 19 pach CU942Gouplers were received as float stock from theater stocks.

(3) Status of Yaintenance at End of Periods

(a) .11rcraft %SL 51,40 fill

* 1 Jaionics 34.5VA fill

39CONFIDENTIAL

AVCCG

SUBJBCTs Opcrational Report on Lessons Learned

? &r4maent 36. 5 fill

Aircraft 61.8% fill

(b) Ground ASz, 48.1% fill

(0) Vehicle deadlined 5.1%

(d) Aircraft EDP 1o.%

(e) Aircraft availability 68%

e. Onnstruotion and Facilities

(1) Construction materials for the self help building oflatrines arrived in the form of a ship load of lumber, plywood and oement,,Pacific Architects and Rnineers, a contracting firm, will prefab the latrines.

* (2) -" new Divisih Regulation 420-15, Ripair and Utilities, waspublished 20 April routing all Job Order Lt quests through this JeMdquartera. Areview of all outstanding JOR's resulted in the cancellation of several invol-ving use of laborers inside the barrier*

f. Medical

(1) Disease and Injury btatistical Datas

(a) Injured as a Reslt of Hostile "otion (ML) 1135

(b) Non Battle Injuries (NBI) 668

(o) Diseases 2842

(a) '"alaria 587

(b) Scrub Typhus 33

(0) Hook l7o. 30

(d) psychiatric Ceses 322

(e) Others 1900

(d) Killed in Aotion (L.) 206

(e) lieturned to duty 2251

40

CONFIDENTIAL

I I I' -

' COW FPIF.Nr-/IAVCCG0SUBJECTs Oper.tional Report on Lessons Learned

(f) Remained in Hospital * 2168

S $ome of this number were returned to duty, butrec(rds on them were not available as of the end of the period.

(2) Discussion of Disees.es'

(a) The number of malaria cases dropped in January,February z.n March when compared to late 1965, but a marked increase tookplace in tpril reflecting Operation JIM BOWIL in the Vinh Thanh Valley andOperr.tion MOSBY I & II along the Cambodian border.

(b) Hcakworm was recognized in 30 1st Cavalry Divisionpersonnel. It had previously been reported in troops operating in the Deltaregion but never before in American personnel within the II Corps area.These infections probably occured during the long Son activities,

(o) ;, consultant, Major Phillip Russell, the Virologistfrom the SlTO Laboratory in Bangkok reviewed all cases of Fevers of UnknownOrigin (UO) oocurinG in division personnel. It was his opinion that most ofthem were caused by Znteric Cytopathogenic Human Orphan (EBOIO) Viruses. A

study nf the ocnditi',n was beyond the current oapabilities of the researchfacilities in South East ,sia.

(3) Discussion of IXIA, WL, and NBI

(a) KL,/Thkb, ratio. 206/1131 or 1/5.5 which was ci-siderably different from the rati. of 1/4 observed in Korea.

(b) Types of IRli.'s

a -Ouring tki'reporting period 446 punji stakewounds occumed. This was almost 5 times as great as the 83 which hadoccured previously.

cc) NBI. No unusual non-battle injuries occurred,

(4) Medical Directives Publisheds hevisions, updating and/orchanges were made on six Medical Jirculard during the repcrting period Thesechanges pertained t6 Housing and Control of Respir:-tory Diseases; iUedicol Civil&ctinn Program (NILDC"P); Field 6anitation Team Training; aearing 2rozran;Uontrol of othe-r Communicable Diseases and roblens of 1!xtreme Climaie, andVontrol of mphetamines s'.d Barbiturates.

(5) Medical News Letters$ .dvawe Civilifz Sducation 0,por-tunities and.Difficulty in Receiving "Iedical Supplies were the topics of twonevsletters released 3 Jan 66. Following these were Class III Physicals ofDoor Gunn ,; :"Azi±ration of -IV .?l k qs; 'Udiograms; .AA Mobile Army Surgical

41

oWF/ ie Atr/M/

'LL

CONFIDENTIALAVCCG Rprto 50l .re

SUBJECTs Operational Repast on Lessons Learned

Hospital; Optical Laboratory and use of Tranquilizers; Black Water Fever; Healthand D~ntal Records; Penioillin, Yacilities Immunization PIdical Clearance;Gamma Globulin; Spectacle Requisitioninjg; 6ourse Announcement; ProfessionalTraining; Residency Training; Rabies; ood Harlers Certificates; Dentia Facil-ities; Course Announcoment; Wound Study Date. Collection Progam; Reporting ofVenereql Disease.

(6) Oivil Affairs Activities

(a) MEMDCA, All revalations and directives on MDOAP IIactivities are published and MDOAd II supplies are available to all teams withan approved pro ject.

(b) Oomprehensive bilingual directives for Ice Plant and

i'estaurant operations were written.

(7) Inspections

(a) Inspections wore made of health and narcotic records 8andcomprehensive reports were rendered.

(b) Mess and sanitary inspections were cinducted.

(8) .reventive medicine t 41i units were notified that plague,cholera and gamma globulin immunizations were required.

(9) A-oblems Unsolved&

(a) A good malaria prophylaxis tablet was still not availableat roporting date.

(b) The standard prophylaxis tablet, Chloroquine-Irimaquine,FSN 6505-753-5043 (C-P Tablet) has been proven to be unsatisfactory for tworeasons:

1 It is not effective against many strains of i'lasmodiumFalcip-trum malaria, the predominate strain found in Vietnam. The division hashad 1882 cases of Plasmodium malaria since its arrival in Vietnam. Ali theseindividuals are believed to have taken their prophylaxis tablet for theftilo'wihg reasons% First, the malaris relapsed with chloroquine treatment; andSecond, these were pure infections, i.e., they did not have Plasmodium Viralmalaria associated. Twenty four cases of Vivax w.laria have ocoured, but allwere in individuals who probably did not take the Ohloroquine tablet. Sincethe 1882 patients did not have mixed infeotlons, and since Plasmofium Vivaxmalaria was prevalent in the area, it was ooncluded that all 1882 eases tooktheir Ohloroquine-!rimaquine table't'o

2 The tablet oaused diarrhea and gastrointestinal upsetsin many individuals.

42

CONFIDENTIAL

i , ,i

d.l

C 6 Al 12 -wrAVOCGbIJBJECTs Operational Report on Lessons Learned

6. (C) Civil Affairs

a. General. Civil affairs efforts during the period were direct@pboth to support combat operations and civil action. in the vicinity of CampRadcliffe

b. Support of Combat Operations.

(1) Operation ihATAO±R. Approximately 15 tons of capturedrice was evacuated from coordinates YA 645487 to Le Thanh District Head-quarters for distribution to the refugees and local population. The oper-ation took two days to complete. An additional 4 tone of rice was destroyedbecause of evacuation difficulties. On 5 JanuarY 1966, 160 refugees weretransported from Son Tuo to Le Thenh District Headquarters. Some 40,000expedient leaflets were distributed in the vicinity of the Chu Pong area.The theme of these leaflets was two fold. First to inform Vietnamesecitizens to remain in the vicinity of their homes; not to move in roadsand to observe the district ciyrfew so that they would not be mistaken forVC and be fired on. Second, to provide safe conduct passes for prospectiveVC ralliers.

(2) Operation itInER-WIaITI WIiG. This operation had thelargest civil affairs requirement in support of combat actions of any oper-ation performed in Vietnam to date because it was conducted in the heavilypopulated Zastern coastal plain - the Hoai Nhon and oai An Districts.

(a) Refugeess

1. Refugees in Bong bon prior to the operationtotaled 7,806. ts operations began approximately 13,000 wer victims movedto ighway 1. District officials initially permitted 3,400 true refugeesto enter Bong Son and kept evacuees north of area DOG. During An. Lao Valleyoperations, 4,500 refugees moved to Bong Son. Of those, the division trans-ported 3,022 refugees from An Lao Valley by helicopter. At the end ofoperations, Bong Son contained 15,836 refugees and Highway 1 north of area

*MG contained 11,806 evacuees, Hoai Nhon" District contained a total of27,652 refugees and evacuees after the operation.

2. In Hosi Nhon and im Lao Districts the Divisioncaptured L=d evacuated 47 tons of rico and 14 tons -of salG to the districthaedquPrtors in Bong Son. Dvacuation was made by GH-47 ircraft., InIdition a two ton cach of rice was captured at 'BB 843097 and distributed

to needy, local eivilies.

43

I -ECONFIDENTIAL i

CONFIDENTIALAVCCGSUBJ..,CTs Operational Report on Lossons Learnod

to dfugees in Hoai jn District prior to 11 Fob-ruexy 1966 toted 7,514. Subsequent operations freed over 10,000 wevictims, most of whom occupied vacant buildings or moved into homes offriends between area BIRD and district headquarters. The Division ovacuated320 refugees by helicopter. -A totrl of 2i876 refuguos from the bon LongValley moved into secure broas by foot with their food supplies and personalbelongings. The rofugues population in Hoai An District at the end of April

was 17,622.

4 Hoi =n District officials Lnd lHaV advisorsdistributed the following USkID supplies to refugeos: Bulgar wheat -68,640 pounds; cooking oil - 1,520 gallonst and cotned milk - 480 cans.The following items wore furnished to the district headquarters by-theDivision for civil action support of war viotims: blnkots - 30; soap -75 bars; VIS mwgazinos - 2001 blue medical trousers o 240 and 120 bluemodicel shirts. GVN oivili n supply support of refugoos was roduced becausethe district chief permitted refugees to return to their homas to retrievefood and clothing.

(b) Captured supplies.

1. In Hoai Nhon end "n Lao Districts the Divisioncaptured rnd ovacut.tod 47 tons of rice and 14 tons of sat to the districtheadquarters in Bong Uon. }vacuation was made by CH-47 aircraft. Inaddition a two ton cache of rice was captured at B8 843097 and distributedto needy, local civilians.

2. In lioai An District the Division caltured 4tons of rice. Twonty and one-half tons of this rice and ten pigs woredelivered by helicopter to the district huadquartors. The remaining 22 tonsof rice wvos evccurtod from BA. 825828 and BR 825821 by 900 civilians actingunder orders from the district chief. Smll quantitius of VC medicalsupplies, text books tnd clothing wero captured end presented to VN modicalpersonnel.

(C) edical Tr atmontw

1. During sick call activities in Hoai Nhon Pnd "nLao Districts, the Division treated 2,362 Vietnamese patients ind ovacuated62 soriously injured personnel to the Bong Son di-ponsary, liodical troet-ment was preridod along Highway I and in aroas adjacent to trctioal opor-ations to assist the GV,. Tre.tment was given on 33 occasions at 19different loor.tions,

44

CONFIDENTIAL

XTiJECTs Operational Report on Lessons Loarned

2. In Hoai Ln District a total of 107 pationtswere treatod. Throe seriously injured patients were evaouatod to thedistrict disponscary. Trot.thient was given on fourteen different occasionsin the vicinity of tctical eas.

(d) Uhiou Hoi

1 During operations in Hoai Nhon cand iin LaoDistricts - totrl of 408 Chiou Hoi surrendered to GVN officials. Of those270 used l(aflets to surrender; 302 were VO guerrillasp and 106 woreinfrastructure cadre.

2. 1 total of 75 Chiou Hoi surrendered to GVNofficials durang operations in Heal jin District. Of tnose five utilizcdsafc conduct passes; 50 were VC guerrillas, and 25 wore ifrastructurecadre.

(e) Short-term, high-impact projucts

1. Coordination was oftected with an 15OD teamfrom the 184th Ordnance Battalion to remove 500, 250 nd 300 pound bombsfrom near Victncmosoht.nlcts (Bo 890062, B6 901129 nd B$ 895126).

2. Candy was distributed to children.

Ba .gi...r units repaired Bong Bon strets and

the roa-.ds loading to the three refugee camps.

A. A water pump was installed at Hoi Nhon Districtdispensary.

. , VO monumunt was destroyed at B8 882062.

6. The Division -.ssisted in obtvaining Bong lonCatholic iricst to porforut services for V4 civili.ns in Hoi ..n District.

1L Actions were initiated to construct a welland lctrinu in tne now Bong 3on reflugee camp.

8. A unit solatium contribution; letter of con-dolence, C;.RB fabric kit, and cooking oil wore presentod throueh SKdistrict officials to grandparents of six year old Bong bon traffic victim.

9. In conjunction with ,WVN offici'J,.s, C.L fabrickits and assistance in cloims form proparation were given to a VN man andgirl who r.ceived minor injuries in a misfire inBorg bon.

45

CONFIDENTIAL

I CONFIDENTIAL j

J

AVCCG

UBJICTI Opertional .ioport on ,..3sons Learned

1O A Vi.tnr-zacso widow, child .nd rohtives were

oscourtod to a cemetery in the Division CP areva to p=rAt mourning ethusbezd's grave.

11, Hoai Nhon district chief presented 20,000 sheets

of lec-Zlots papor fe-aturing GVW -lag for use in local VI Psy Opns program*Assist;xico was given VIb in fonmulation of special news bull-tin published

and distributed in the Bong Son ares.,

12. Gifts of cooking oil, fabvic kits rad clothce

woro distributed through the district chief to 11 Vi citizens who forfeited

property for forward Division CP eoa end acss roads. ussisttanco was

given in prepexation of claims forms -nd GVI officials were encouraged to

oxlx ito procos.Ang,

(3) Oporution.J1L B,.M4; had minial civil aff;.irs activitiessince it wa-.s conducted in an unpopulatod ree.

(4) Opo .ations LINCULN, aBY I and 1,BY II

(a) General

u. Doring operations no problovms concerning refugees

or non-corabattt casuities developod dua to the dosenco of civilian commun-t ities within the areeas of operation.

2. Small caches of rice were iscov(-.;d during

opoNationa in inaocoasr7 le loc.tions and evaoveation gen,';ally wts not

possible*

(b) Operation- in Th.'nrh . District

'I. An activu civil action progr&i was conducted in.

Thhi&n District. Diret rsistance was given to the Tharh 4f District

Chief vnd t-iCV absoctor Advisor in the improve,,ont of the district head-

quarters defensive poriLioter and in the construction of a markot place.

, uinp was also p.Lovidod..sq that'. -6he hoadque wa:rs well would bu oporational.Extnsiva sick call activiti(.s wore conducted during which 3P111 potients

wore tre.atud on 27 occasions at 11 different locations, The followin6supplies were distributed to n-ady, ros.ottled refuguos:

Blankts 23 uaoh Clothing 665 pounds Rico 645 poundsFabric kits 49 each Cooking oil 74 gallons Salt 175 pounds

Powdered nill 50 pounds soap 1,760 b-.rs

46,

CONFIDENTIAL

. .5

ii.. ', ,

.4..' CONFIDENTIAL'iVCCG

SUBJECTs Operational Report on Lessons Learned

2 In order to develop good relations with Montagnardand Vietnamese civilians and to win acceptance for US military personnel,distribution was made of 31 boxes of candy, 48 Yo-yom, and one case of calen-S dars,

(c) Operations in Kontum, Dak To and PleikU City area.

1 During operations 135 pounds of VO equipment,medicine and clothing wore captured by the 3d Brigade in Kontum Province.This material was presented to Kontum District Headquarters after intelligenceprocessing for distribution to a soldiers and needy refuLoee.

2 Headquarters and deadquarters Company of the Divisionmade a 3/4 ton truck and driver available to the Kontum District Headquartersfor use in transporting lumber to the site of a new hamlet beirC establishedsouth of Kontum City.

The village of Plei Kep, west of II Corps Hjadquarters,was visited and distribution of 57 yo-yos, candy, and chewing gun was made toMontagnard residents.

The 1/9 Cay assisted Dak To District officials andMACV advisors by transporting an estimated 3,K0) pounds of VC rice from thearea of opera;ion to the district headquarters&

(d) Operations in Le Truong District.

1 The Be Klanh Village Chief was provided with an O-13helicopter to assist him in conducting a survey of outlying village crop lands.Sick call activities were conducted cduring which 314 patients were treated on5 occasions at 4 different locations. In order to improve sanitation standards,a class on the use of soap was given to residents of Be Klahh Village. " smallcache of rice (600 pounds) was disoevztezd at coordinates AR928575. The rice wasevacuated to Le Truong District Headquarters. The following supplies were,distributed to needy residents of Le Truong Districts

assorted food stuffs Vitamin -ills - 2 bottles

Dry Milk - 4 packages Cboking Oil -. 3 gallons

Soap - 50 bars Salt - 35 pounds

Blankets - 2 each Rice - 600 pounds

47

CONFIDENTIAL

II

C O0 / - ',.VCCGSUBJECTs Operational Report on Lessons Learned

c. Civil ;Actions in the Vicinity of Camp Radcliff

(I) Refugee Centers

(a) Three centers were being sapported by 2d Brigade andSupport Command as followst Distributicn 'of food, clothing, building materials,candy and tools. Barrels furnished for incineration of refuse, and ash removalscheduled. A~edical treatment provided regularly. Vector o ntrol spraying toeliminate flies and mosquetoes. Concrete platforms constructed around wellsto improve sanitation. Partitioning of individual family living quarters.Establishing laundry businesses.

5b) An Tuc District Dispensary - 15th Med Bn. Thisproject is about 7Mo complete. During the reporting peritd the roof wasrepaired P.A., walls nad floors repaired; a screened-in porch was construdto;VN dctors quarters were completed, VU medical personnel were trained andconstruction of separate kitchen and new latrine were completed. Furtherwork however is needed to complete interior remodeling, plambing a&, apatient room ward. Groundwork on the wardt a 40' x 120t structue began on27 Mlarch.

(a) iodel Home, 4 model home desi.ined to overcome materialshortages and provido a bettor overall product for duplication by indi6tnouspersonnel was completed An a new u Ke housirk,- area. Materials were furnishedby USAID and Mi&CV subsector advisor and 15th Ned Bn" supplied funds - the 70th4ngineeras provided design and technical assistance. Two families, widows andchildren of PF soldier *und GVN official moved into the home after the 18 Febdedication ceremonies.

(d) Schools. 5 room school to Mccomodate 5U studentsper room has been designed for construction in the resettlement area by 8th ,lngineers. The school is scheduled for completion by mid June. ilans and

*estimated building costs were developed by Support Gonmed for addition of5 rooms to "n Khe 4lemehtary School, These roums also 4re designed toaccomodat4 5) students and construction of necessary tables an benches isproposed. One room was renovated in the Vietnamse Information Servicebuilding fr use as a library. This Division CA Team project is 50 percentcomplete.

(0" Division Short-Ranget igh-Impaot 'ivil 44ction Projects.Some 19 separate periodic or necessitated endeavors were tallied in this areaduring the reporting period. This iclided sick calls; fooid distribution;immunization against plague, typhoid, cholera; claims settlements; Psy Ormovies; road gradin;; culvert installations and bridge building; repair ofschools; corunications facilities; Christmas porties with toys for children;Med evwc; assistance in collection of IM bills; ban. concerts; dud removal;hiring of civilian laborers; cofistructi-n of . bick factory; posting ofrewrxds for lost equipment; (,uidance in unauthorized use of M"Cls; Granting ofleave to civilian laborers during "Tot" holidays, and price control andrationing guidance. -.

48

CONFIDENTIAL

I

CONFIDENTIALAVCCGSUBJWTs '0*rational keport on Lessons Learned

() Miscellaneous Data. Doing the reporting period 288,210Vietnamese labor man days were enployed in 1Division base; 39,210 Vietnamesepatients were rendered medical treatment; 3,115 immunization shots weregiven Vietnathse civilians; 61 students were furnished school supplies, 'Licecaptured during operations tallied 236j60o lbs and salt captured came to28,000 pounds. Not including projects of units or unit personnel of personnelaid, Division personnel contributed $2,565.96 for use In unit civic actionsprograms. U.S. Citizens provided the division with over 431 boxes and 4,560pounds of clothing and sa.:plies for civic action use.

49

CONFIDENTIAL

II

I i'Basg-jef ense Diagram for Camp Radoiff')

1445 46 47 48 49- so

AL_

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9e

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c CONFIDENTIAL !U. ~~(.,,V.uw' , . .

SECTION II - Commanderis Analysis nd Recov:nendations

1. Lessons Learned

Location of Trails

ITFIM Loc,-.ion of trnils in densbl : fe twods;*

DI2CUSSION: In dense forestareas vertical~ &erial photography will notreveal the complete trail network, Low level visual aerial reconnaissancealso is ineffective due to the thickness of the overhead cover. Only byplacing ground reconnaissance patrols in the area can a complete trailnetwork be deterAined.

OBS VATION: Ground reconnaissance patrols are required if complete trailnetworks are to be developed,

VnllIk2; Landin Z~n~

IT._ During operation YASHER/WHITE 1INO advantavges w-ere gained by usingunlikely LZ's located on ridgelines and pinacles.

DISCUS3IOY: Experience proved that using this technique significantly lessground fire and hits on aircraft resulted.

Tro6er Ladder

ITM.T: Use of trooper ladder during combat operations.

DISCUSSION: During all oper .tions in heavily ;ooded and mountainous terrainthe ttooper ladder was used in operations ranging from fire'tepmm size toentire cofi.pnies. The trooper ladder is 36" wide series of aluuinui rodsarranged as a ladder on three 4000 pound tensil strength cables. Eachladder is 100 feet :ong and c-an be reeled from % hovering CH-47 or U1-iD topermit personnel to descend or oscend through very sraall holes in thejungle czopy. Then desired two trooper ladders can be joined together%ith xappelling srnp linko through the loops t eaoch end of the troopcrladders. The ladder has been used successfully both at night and duringthe d,,ytine,- Trooper ladders nre issued to the aviation units Pnd areoper-ated by the aircranft crew members.

OBS3WilTION: Units conducting .irmobile operations should plan for theuse of trooper lAders.

Use of _:. to Clew LZS

IT7: Use of Napaln to cie,-x Lnndin, Z s.

* CONFIDENTIAL

Q~v~j

CONFIDENTIALDISCUSSION: T1e use of napalm to clear LZ's for landing was of limitedbenifit during operations, If it is itterpted enxly, surprise is lost.If it is done just prior to an as.ult it results in reduced visibility,increase in densitr altitude and cre!%tes ^. fire hazard to amircraft usingthe LZ,

OBSERVATION: This method of cleoaing s. LZ proved to be of limited tacticalvalue and should be utiltzed only wrhen 'nethods such ns the trooper ladder,r-ppolling or air force 750 or 1000 pound bombs are not available.

Landing Zone bcpansion

ITM: Landing zones can be ex ,cnded during e rly stages of occupation bythe use of a lightweight bulldozer*.

DISCUSSION: The use of lightweight bulldozers in clearing LZ's wilI

eliminaote n large anount ef hand clearing, This reduces the time required

to make the %rea conpletely operational.

OBSRVATION" Units conductiig irmobile ,ssrults should include a light-weight bulldozer in their plrs .and airlift it into the LZ os soon as

feasible,

ITM? Tanks :nd self-propelled ,rtillery can be very effectively used to

create helicopter landing zones in lightly wooded area.s.

DISCUSSION: During Operation LINCOLN, M-48 tanks and self-propelled

artillery vere used as part of a .ech-ized-airmobile tean. When a

lan-ding zone Was needed for n.a,:unition or POL resupply the tricked vehicles

nerely ran dovm a few t.rees, ma.de several quick turns and thus developed a

hasty LZ. Tis technique pernitted vriost unliuited arior operations since

airmobile reinforcements -nd aeriol renupply could always be effected.

OB3_RVUION: When tracked vehicles ar rvcilble, consideration should be

given to their use in creating hasty LZ's for refuejing, resupply and re-~inforcing.

Pathfinder

ITTT'!: Pr.thfinder Support9

DISCU933Ois During operations involving snall LZ's it is nmndatory that

nhigh degree of control be exercised over aircr.ft entering and departing

the area,, This is p"Lrticularly true -hen artillery and nortars rire firing

fron the LZ.

OBSYVATION: A minimum of two pithfinderta with equipment shoul, be provided

CONFIDENTIAL

/Vw . A I.O F IE T/J

each inf,,try battalion during airmobile operations.

Viet Con g der Holes

IT_I: VC use of extremely snall spider holes (covered foxholes) forgreater protection.

DISCUSSION: During Operation LINCOLN south of CHU PONG, the 1/9 CavalrySqundron found A nunber of extremely snall spider holes which provided aconsiderable degree of protection from TAC air and artillery fire. The

holes were so smnll tha-t the VC left their packs outside the spider hole.The packs actually provided friendly forces .- means of detecting 4he

nornlly well-car'ouflaged positions.

OBSERVATION: This VC technique should be made knoxm to all forces.

Repeated Use of &ibush Sites

ITII: The use of the sine ambush site for three or four dcys.

DISCUSSION: During The early phase of Operation LI15COLN north of UC 00,1/12 C.valry Battaolion caught 12 enemy personnel ;-,lkiny across a stremYrth no security. In the succeo4ing throe days sever-l nore ?ersonnel werecaught in the sazme .%bush. Prom this experience, it appears that the enemydoes not have an effective menss of con-uicating to his troops, iho areenr6ute 'regarding the lo&b.tion of our azbush sites. Once a good %-bush siteis .used it may sometimes not be necessary to move it if suitoble supportingfires are avilable to secure it.

OBS TNATION: it is not always necessary to move a good r.1mbush site aftereach successful, mibush, particularly ''hen operating ,long infiltrationtrails. ..

Piush'Trctics

ITEUi: Flush techniques Vere used effectively during operation IISHR/WHITEWING by the- 3d. ,.nd I st Brigades.

DISCUSSION: About two-thirds of the forces take up well concealed ambushpositions covering ntural routes into and out of the %rea. This ambushfor% is poaitioned by cnefully chosen flight routes and deceptive landings.The .-abush force ±s'pIepnxed for 48 hours operation without resupply. Theremainder of the force is positioned to act as "beaters" novin towards .theembush forces, 3:ased on observed movements awry from the benter forceartillery ind air interdiction is used on the routes between the beater and

52,

. CONFIDENTIAL

4.""

( CONFIDENTIALambush forces day and night. Flares and searchlight illuminate the area atnight, thus permitting the Air 0 aV and other forces to continue surveillanoeand bring aocurate fire on moving enemy forces. This keeps the Jressure onthe enemy and makes him very susceptible to Psy War.

Displaceent of Medium Artillery by CH-54 Helicopter

-IT--!' 155mm Howitzers can be moved by 0H-54 Aircraft.

DIoCU 6INI A four gun unit, A Battery, 1/30 Artillery, was repositionedon several occasions by four 0H-54 sorties. The prsonnel and remainingequipment were moved by nine 0H-47 sorties. 155mm Howitzers cap b,. placedin strategic positions that best support the tactics of a particularoperation, By using the CH-54 the howitzers can be positioned in areas thatare completely inaccessible by ay means other than aerial lift.

0BSwVATIONs This capability permits 155's to Occupr firing positionsto 6upport tactical operations which otherwisu would be inaccessible.

Dis lacement of Lijkar. Artillery by CH-47 Hlico r._r

ITjit The displacement of 105mm Howitzers, basic load of ammunition andartillery crew in one lift.

DISCUSSIONs Utilization of a double sling system allows one CH-47 to movene 105mm howitzer slung below the CH-47, with a scond sling 00low thehowitzer carrying th, basic load of ammunition (75 rounds). The howitzercrew rides in the holicoptoro Upon arrivel at the batt~ry position tneammunition is positioned, the howitzer is umplacod a few feet from thcammunition, and the crew departs from the helicopter as it lands a few met-ndfrom the howitzer.

0 BZ1VAT.ONI Th use of the double sling system provides a fast means forthe displacement of complete artillery sections and does not require rehand-ling or moving uither the howitzer or the ammxnition. (See Figure 2)

powwod Akrcra~t

ITi,: Security force for downed aircraft.

DISC UBSIONa It is desirable to form a small reserve unit to providesecurity for downed aircraft. This prevents tasking a tactical unit in thevicinity which already has a tactical plan and mission to accomplish. Asuitable solution developed was to keep a portion of a base or FbE securityforce on ground alert to provide security for downed aircraft.

53

CONFIDENTIAL

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i % ,

O)RATIONs Security for dovmd aircraft is essential ad sould beconsidered in all airmobile planning*

Reconnaissance When Mioving tileor and Trac Vhiclas

ITAM Thorough reconnaissance must be made when moving heavy artilleryand track Vehiclest

D U SI During Opration LINCOLN it was found that APO's, 1-48 tanksand self propelled artillery could move very fast and surmount mostobstacles@ bince these tracked -ehicles frequontly retunied from an attackposition via the same route much greater attention was required on theinitial reconnaissance to determine likely ambush sites. Axtilleryconcntrations were then registored on these sites, to the sides, frontand rear as the column entered the area.

OBS AWATIONs Likely ambush areas must be chocked as a now area ia entcred.It is dexirablo to rogistur concentrations to the sides, front side and rearof columns to counter possible embushos.

Armored - Airmobilu TaSk Force

I.a An Armord Task Force combined with Airmobile elemunts can beextremely successful.

DXLCUSbIONs During Operation LINCOLN the 3d Brigade, lot Air CavalryDiiritibn and elemunts cf the 25th Infantry Division waneuvred a taskfo,:co of artillery, APC's, tanks and airmobila forces throughout Ploiku,Chu Pong, Plui lIe and Duc Co areas, conducting link-up mnd reconnais~aneoop-retioas using the armored elements for gTound fire 2"p.riority andusing helicopters as the eyes of the tank force.. No traffic abilityproblems wer.o .ncountured even though there are no roads in the area.The soil in these areas seems to absorb rain and dry quickly. Th use ofarmor and airmobile forces added a tremendous incremont to overall abilityto o-ploit since the availability of resupply for ammo, IQL and reinforce-mi.nts permitted almost unlimited range for the ariaored olements, whiletbe airmobilo elements enjoyed the advantage of the great groundfire-power of thu armored elements.

OB&.RVTION: X hen both armored and aixmobile forces are availableconsid ration should be given to their use in combined task forces.

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0 N ,r ,="e r|!

Use of T-17 Membrane for Airstrips

ITMEs The use of T-17 lenbrane to cover a runway.

DISCUSSION: During Operation LINCOLN, T-17 nenbrane Tas used for the firsttime to cover a runway which could accoriodate C-130 traffic. Eighteenhours were required to lay a 3500 foot strip 80 feet wide. This nembrneis -thicker ,aid cones in narrower strips than the previous T-15 uenbrane.The nobrane has fo non-skid surfV=ce and provides excellent, quickly built,tactioal air strips.

OBSMR7ATION: The T-17 rienbrme providos a very suitable all weathertactical air strip cover.

Construction of Airstrip at CA'

I2_E1: Construction of a 2300 foot airstrip in a wooded aeo to acconrodate0-123 traffic using organic engineer equip-ent.

DISCUS8IONt During Operation LINCOLN Company A, 8th Engineer Battalionconstrhaoted a 2300 foot C-123 airstrip at ,, location where no roadsexisted into the site. All of the 51 tons of orgwiic engineer equipnent.and n:terials required was moved by helicopter to the othei-,wise inac~essablearea. -ovenent of all the heavy 3ngineer equipuent by helicopter waspossible bec-use of its specially designed sectionalized engineer equipment.The ability to build such strips provides conplete freedo in tacticalneuver planning since heavy logistic support can be delivered directlyb;, the A1ir Force to precisely where it is needed.

OBSMVATIONs Airstrips oan be built in areas which are only accessibleby helicopter, if sectiondlized engineer equipi-ent is available. Otherengineer units operating in remaote -areas should consider the possibilityof obtaining airobile engineer equipment.

Destruction of Food Storn Areas

ITEaM Destruction of VC food storage arens.

DI3CUSSION: Secondary explosions occured while burning rice and otherfood storge areas which indicated that nrmaunition and other items ofequipnent were concealed under food stuffs.

OBS"..ATION: All rice or food caches shoull be probed prior to burning.Once the. storage area haos been ignited all troops should move to a safedistance fror. the area.

C$5

Cc 'W ,1

AI

Use of Riot Control "fentiR with Artillery

f ITU: Riot Control Agent(RCA), Up can increase the effectiveness ofnxtillery fires.

DI9CUS3ION: During the brittle of the IRON TRIANGLE, entrenched enemypositions hrl resisted a,',oinst artillery fire for over a dVy. Agent CS,delivered by helicopter ,L,.d follow:ed by nxtillery and rocket fires, wa~sused to drive the VC fron their entrenchments in a mat-ter of about 2hours with three repetitions of the CS-artillery procedure. Of interest,on one occasion during Operation LINCOLN, IC did not leave their entrenich-dents. In this ca se rocket fire ws delivered both ineintediately before,during nd follolving the CS a-ttack. It is presuEled thaot in this one ca se

the rocket fire wa s so ihtense that the VC suffered thru the CS ratherthan leave their entrenchnents. The 7C did ceaose firing at helicoptersthough. From the single case, it wuould appear that a sufficient pause nustbe allowed in artillery fires for the enemyr to feel he has a ch-nce toescape the CS cloud.

OBSERVATION: This te(lhuique should be considered in the attck of anyfortifie- xarea agoinst uni-sked personnel.

Techniques for Cleamn Qpeorations

ITW: Riot Control ge:its(RCA) can be ve ?y effectively usel in clearingoperations.

DISCU3SION: During the TTAS1-R/VHITE -'ING Operation, which occurred in ahighly populatted area CS h.nd grenades were used on lar3er suspoct areas.This provided an opportunity to d1;ternine whether the occupants weremerely civilians hir!ing or were a.rnued VC's. This, technique aoided-inreducing the nrumber of non-combatant deaths. On another occasion 4) V0were pursued into a cave. All 43 dep,rted Nhen CS hand grenades were thro,.*ninto the cve. Only one was killed who refused to surrender,

OBSERVATION: CS can be very effective fcr clearing operations in populated

56

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i 2

CON F EI TIAL

2. Personnel 11anageaents

a. *A Aviator Infusion krograw was initiated during the rekortingperiod in order to reduce the August aviator lo.,is froik 72 percent to less than47 peroont of the total nuiaber of aviators assigned (908). 6even hundred andeight were originally due to rotate in August. At the end of the period thedivision was at the midpoint of a 2.0-week aviator infusion program involvingother units in Vietnam. The reassignment of 250 aviators and replacing themwith personnel with a Date of Lxpected Rotation from Overseas Assignment(DBL04) other than August was designed to provide a training period of suf-fi.jicnt length to provide minimum continuity in the aviation eleents. Com-plotion of tnle aviatirn infusion program was expectod not later tian 10 June1966.

b. The August ratational hump was in the planning state at the end." of the reporting period. The proposed plan was designed zo lend itself to

N' phasing out some 8800 troops during the month of August without seriouslyhampering the combat operations and effectivwness of the division. The DuRO6peak for the division is 17 Auiust 1966. The Inown losses for June and Julywill be roplaced routinely without regard to any redistribution of Augustlosses. The input of replacements for August losses will be distributed overa sixty day period. Total numbur of personnel rotating during the month ofAugust roprescnts 59 percent of the division authorized strength. However,77 percent of authorized officers and warrant officers and 75 procunt of non-commissioned officers and specialist and above have an August DLsA-0. It isnot anticipated that our officer, warrant officer and nioncommissioned officerstatus will iiprove enough to materially change these percuntages. At thisti.-ue there axe no discernable probltms that cannot be ovrome by meticulousplanning and energotic follow through. Over a 60 day period it is expectedthat the August rotatioaal hump will have minimums impact.

3. (0) Intelligamce. Darine Gnc roportine period a. trouendous awountof intellionce was gained - nuich of it tnrough successi,4l operations to in-elude occasions ,hon enouq regiental naadquizters w,r actually caturod orannihilet.d, For instance, documents catured during Operations ,a'R and

I i400LZ fro.- eneLW higher huadqutters provided valueblc information for tnccurrent Division operations as well as providing strategic info nation ofgroat value for future operations. aziewy captives also provided much valuableintelligence. The IN section interrogatod over bOO prisoners in support ofcox-bat opertions.

Rorgenization of the Division intel- igunce sction made possibL faster,more efficient application of intelligenqe data to operations. This roorgan-ization and the addition of personuol providod smoothly functioning round-the-clock operation of the DTOC plans element an report and ant-lysis section.

Visual and photo surveillance proved most profitable. Very little in-tolligence was gained by SLAR in support of Division operations although SLAR

C N FI. NT/Al-

0 OCON F IL-- N TI AL

provided consiCerabla intolligpnce on the strategic level during trio porioL"Additional visual/photo surveillance aircraft, six OV-1A's) have boonrccoLu.aonc&d in this Division's 27 iPril subiaission of recoLiended changes toTO&I 67T to enhance tnis valuuble intelligence source.

4. Operations and Training

a. During the reporting period the Division oxtendtd its raneu o:oPorations beyond the already large area in which it had operatud during thepast quarter. Along tne China boa in the vicinity of Bong bon, the Divisionsuccessfully engaged the iLajor olem.ents of +'. bao Vang Division, in a 41 daycaijea1gn wiich i:.aintained continuous contact with the oneuy while traversinga cc,plote circle over an area aluost 80 kilouutors by 50 kilouctars whichwas densely populated and a traditional VC stronghold. ailong the CaLbodiarborder the Division conducted tiorough search and destroy operations over a170 kilon±etor portion of the Cambodian border frr s6Vth of the Uhu LongMassif to north of Dak To, gaining much valuable inform.ation on the trailnetworks, destroying wa'y-stations and logistical facilitics and instillingconfidence in the RVN forco6 of the area, plus forcing the VC and NIVA unitsto rctreat into Cabodia.

nubor of firsts wero accomplished during the rcporting peri6d. TheCH-54 was used for Laoving 155ai Howitzers to previously ipossiblo locations,thus greatly increasing the evailable fire power of tae Division. Tecmiqueswerc gmjetly iaproved for operations in densely foli otod arrous whore no LZ'sex.stci. In those cases trooper ladders wro used, holus w-rc blown in thejungle canopy with ',ir Fo:ce bomabs, or suall air t ozansi ole bulldoze.zswur holiliftcd to the area. Landing strips capable of handling U-123 Flir-craft wore constricted in rueote areas with heliborne engineer oquipucnt.This technique provided and will continue to provide iLproved response tiausfor supplying and supporting all forces directly by ,ir 2orce lift. Aiotcontrol eonts were used as a liuitod combat supdort technique for drivingonemy ,roa entrenc.ed positions and caves, for su,pression of su.ill ex,.ksfiring and in ereas where civilians wore possibly interCilod. Coubatpsychological operations were extensively and very successfully used, couplEdwith close and detailed guidance to coibat soldiers in the use of liuitodr: sponse firepower. 1l1 of these raeasures w,re instruental in achievingsuccossful operations in heavily populated areas without undue casuzltius tothe noncoubEotant poplation. The Division also initiated an intensive PsyOps jrogra i during the reporting period. This progra, proved extremely ef(c-tive. In Operation 1IViiR alone, 483 enoay rallied. These rr-lliers providedmuch useful intelligence and greatly aided in expediting coubat operations.A request has been i.ude that aaditional support be provided to the Divisionto provide printing and ground loudspeaker/interpreter tom. operations ca-pabilitios.

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CoOPID NTIAL

The only oj)oratioul'a problem area was the generally low availabilityOf aircraft throughout ihe period. at the end of the reporting period,aircraft availability was increasing duo to the gonerally increasing supplyof airra, parts and increased cao=1waic emphasis on all possible areas whichcould lead to increasod aircraft availability - such as iaintonanco, pooling

tof th aduinistrative flight requirounts slid the use of ground tranaporta-tion whenever possible.

b. No major problem areas arose in the training area. iuchtraining was accomiplished by sualler units while on co~bat operations.Training facilities within the Division base were comploted and will prob-ably be heavily used during the expected heavy turnover of personnel duringJuly and august 1966. Replacements during the puriod were arriving withouttraining on the M-16 rifle or airuobile technique,.

5. (0) Logistics

Axring; the reporting poriod logistical support for the Division wasgreatly iuproved. Forward Support loaents were de.loyed fron 65 kiloLootorsto over a 115 kiloretor spr.ad supporting troop operations on a 170 kilometerfront. &eriP2 delivery sorties, using tho rigging capability organic to thisdivision and aircraft attached to the division, wor used to resupply critic-ally needod supplioe. I& Self 6c.rvice Supply Centor and a Contral Issue Facil-ity becao avail.blo during april. This oliuinated roequisitions for expend-able supplios enct reduced the workload of the stock control personnel. I.rked increoe in j.eL fill was experienced during .,he reporting period. The

84A Airlift systoi, aag.entod by additional CV-2B i4iroraft, noved large quan-tities of aircraft repair parts from aaigon to n khoe. A 14 iercent deadlineof generators existed throughout the division at the end of the reortingperiod which is .ttributed to the lack of spare p-yrts and the continual useof tactical generators in an administrative roles Uoparate action has beeninatiated to obtain the necessary extra generators end spare parts.

6. Civil Affairs

Civil affairs efforts during 6he period were directed both tocombat support operations ant civil action in the An Khe area. In supportof conbat operations, 3802 refugees wore airlifted to GVN controlled areas.Captured supplies, including 236,600 pounds of rice and 28,000 pounds Qfsalt, wore distributed to refugees and noedy civilians. bick calls hold incombat opcrations areas treated 3,058 civilians. In the Division T.,OR,three refugee centers were supported by Division cleents with distributionsof food and c'ther supplies, regular uedical treatuent and vector controlsprering. Construction projocts included a dispensary for the A Tue District,a five roou school for the Resottlemont I4.rea and a five room addition to theAn Ihe Uoleaontcxy School. Short ranig, high impact civil actions included

CON F-1) N I 1L.

Awl

COIN FJIPENTIALLI siok calls, Psy Opa uovios, repair of schools, 1vied vvaag hiring of OiVilan

laborers# dud rooval and band concertS.

6 Inols EARY W. 0.

1 - Tzbo of Contonts ItaJor General, USA

2 - Photo Commanding

4. - Phao tt~t3 - Task Org.nization by Operation4 - Aviation Statistics

5 - Logid/tical suumary by Oporation6 - Psychological Operations

I!

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CoN F IDlENTIAL

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Flo-

GV0P-M4 (27 May 66) '3dInd (C)SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Lea-,ned for the Period 3. January -

30 April 1966, Reports Control Symbol CSGPO-28 (l)

HQ, UeS. AEW, PACIFIC, AO San Francisco 96558 17 AUS196 6

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force DevelopwI t, Department of the ArmyWashington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) The Operational Report on Lessons Learned of the 1st InfantryDivision for the period 1 January - 30 April 1966 is forwarded herewith. Thisis an outstanding report that deserves careful study. The value of the reportis greatly enhanced by the attachment of significant supporting documents.

2. (U) For ease of reference, this headquarters' coents are separatedinto subject areas.

3. (C) CER. With reference to Section II, paragraph ld(l), of the basicOPLL, and paragraph 8, USARV 2d Indorsement, concerning the requirement fora rice contaminant, COMJSMACV requirements and concepts of use have been ob-tained and provided to ACSFOR DA. Additional tests on the toxicity of the

contaminant, which produces a bitter taste and has a laxative effect, havebeen scheduled. The urgency of the requirement for this item remains high.

4. MIOE's and Personnel Shortages.

a. (U) Reference paragraph 5, USARV 2d Indorsement. The basicMTOE mentioned in Section II, paragraph la(5) of the ORLZ was forwarded to DA

d} for approval on 28 June 1966.

b. (U) Reference paragraph 3, USARV 2d Indorsement, and Section I,paragraph la(3), basic ORLL. MiOE 5-148E has not been received by this head-quarters. Separate action has been initiated by this headquarters to verifythe AVLB requirement, which will clarify the status of this MICE.

c. (C) Reference paragraph 2, USARV 2d Indorsement and Section I,paragraph 9a(1)(a) of basic ORLL. The reported shortage of interrogators,NDSC 96020, is valid, for USARV, as of 30 April, had only 72 percent of itsauthorization. The situation has improved somewhat since that time, butthere remains a world-wide shortage of NPS 96C in grades E-4 and E-5. Re-sources are not available within this theater to relieve the shortage, whichremains a critical matter.

d. (C) In regard to the same references, the reported shortgpoof

cooks was not valid for the reporting period. As of 30 April 1966 USARV had4,186 cooks assigned against an authorization of 3,823. If the shortage was

as critical as the 1st Infantry Division stated, the problem could have beensolved by reassignments within USARV.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS ,DECLASSIFIED AlTER 12 YEARS

DOD DIR 5200.10

.,71W

GFOP-MH (27 May 66) 3d Ind (C) 17 AUO 96

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for the Period 1 January -30 April 1966, Reports Control Symbol CSGPO-28 (Ri) (U)

5. (U) S

a. Concur with paragraphs 4 and 9, USARV 2d Indorsement.

b. Reference paragraph la(4), Section II, basic ORLL. In view ofthe problems encountered with AN/NB-b9's, it is recommended that considera-tion be given to utilization of the Light Mobile Tactical Relay Equipment.

6. (C) Aviation.

a. Reference Section II, paragraph la(2), basic ORLL. The recom-mended increase in OV-I aircraft is not in consonance with the DA ARCSAstudy., which recomends deletion of OV-l aircraft from all types of divisionsexcept airmobile divisions. USACDC is currently developing TOE's in accord-ance with the ARCSA study., and the TOE revision is to be completed by1 October 1967. Actually, under the provisions of ARCSA, presently OV-Iaircraft bould be withdrawn from the 1st Infantry Division.

b. Accordingly, this headquarters must disapprove the recomenda-tion that the 1st Infantry Division be provided with additional OV- aircraft.

PUR TH COIOKANER IN CHIEF

1 Inl )SONnc Capt, AGO

Last AGCory Furu:CG USARV, Attn: AVC-DH

I,

DOD DIR 5200.10

'k7.

CONFIDENTIA~

AVF-OG (5 May 66) lot IndSUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96240 3 JUN 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,Washington, D. C. 20310

-Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO US Forces 96307

Concur with the comments in basic report.

FOR THE COANDER:

iJOHN R. DFANE, JR.Brigadier General, UM'AChief of Staff

hen separct~d from

csasified inosure- _ -FIDENTIAL

•~~~~~ . ' Ioj,;-

AVC-DH (5 May 66) 2d IndSUBJUCTs Operational Report on Lessons Learned JUN 196

LEDQUARTRS, UITE STATES ARM, VIRM9, APO San Francisco 96307

THUs Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTNs OPOP-MXf,APO 96558

TOt kzisrant Chief of Staf for Force Devlopit, Departmnt of theArmy, Waahington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquartors oonours with the let Cavalry Division'sOperational Report on Lessons Learned and with the let Indorsement.

2, (U) Most commands experlanced days when no mail was received duringthe reporting periode This was particul'rly true during January and Februarybecause there was a lack of refinement of handling procedreso Since thattime the days with no mail deliveries have been reduced to those days whenTAC alerts occur. These alerts can be expected on two or three days eachmonth.

FOR THE CO1.4ANDEs

6 Incl fRUY DINNEYCWO USA

Asuistant.Adjutant Gene..

4-

OThis document mey be

whon sepaialed iOn clazs'dld ir UX

C CONFIDENTIAL

e2:.rpj ~Table of Contents

a, ener~'.itwirion

bt 0r",aiization and TY"e.t Pers onnel A - 2

2. Personnel6

as "3tren-th6

b. 'Zeplacerients6

c. :orc,.le of' Personn~el6

do.' :raorotions 7

e, "teenliq L-.ents 7

f, Postal 7

--?5~ecia~l .5ecrices G

h, 'H'nance3

i. Chnaplain 6

jo. Mintenance of Discipline. Lamr and Order 10

k. I,.aspector ' eneral 10

,. hbl'ic Infornrv- -on Office 11

3. Intelli-ence 12

a, Or;nization

b. Operations 13

bi Or der of Battle 13

d4 G2 Air 1

- C O P&Et P/Y uri9A.

CONFIDENTIAL

e. Maps 14

f. 54th Infantry Detachment (aurvi) 14

g, Det 249 3'th Weather Squadron 14

h. 10th RRU 14

i. MI Detachment 15

4. Oporations and Tr ining 15

a. Organization 15

b. Training 16

O. Operations 18

d. iscussion and Anpaysis of Major Operations 18

0. ombst Developments 28

Psyc 1ogic .W farv0

g. Aircraft Op 32

he Operational Problems 32

5. Logistics 33

a. General 33

b. Supply and Serioes 36

c. Transportation 38

d. Maintenance 39

e 0onstruction and Failities 40

f. Medical 40

6. Civil Affairs 43

s, Goneral 43

b. Suport of Uombat Operations 43

o. Civic Actions in the vicinity of An Khe 48

C 0 V-F N r AN i.,-C Ftill

r"I

, .. 2

CON FI DENTIAL6. Civil Afairs 43

as General 43

b. Support of Vombat Operations- 43

o. Civic Actions in the vioirity of an Khe 48

8EC.ION II Comanders imalysis and Recommendations

I Less6ns Learno. 50

2. Personnel Wmagement 57

a. Aviator Infusion Program 57

b. August Rotational Hump 57

3. Intelligence 57

4. Operetiono and Training 58

a. Qperationa 58.

b. Training 59

5. Logistics 59

6. Civil Affairs 59INGLO8URES

1. Table of ' ontents 1-i

2. Photo of Captured Battalion Comander 2-1

3. Task Organization for Major Operations 3-14e Aviation Date. 4-1.

5. Logistics During Major Division Operations 5-i

6. Psy Ups Leaflets 6-1

CONFIDET IALI.

AO-

TAT- ORAMS'"ATION FOR IT.JOR OJRATIONS

HAPPY VALLrXY I (60ot 19 Nov 65)

Units S

3d Brigade

1it Bn. 7th qav,

2d Bn, 12th Car

2d Bn,- 5th Cay

lot Bn, 21st Arty

HAPPY VALLEY II (9 Oct - 19 Nov 65)

Units$

2d Brigade

lst Bn, 5th Cay

2d Bn, 5th Cay

Ist Bn, 77th Arty

sHINY BAYOMT (10 - 14 Oct 65)

Units:

3d Brigade*lIt Bnj 7Mh Cay

2d Bnt 7th Cay

1st Bn, 12th Cav' (Abn)

lot Bn, 21st Arty

ktT

01. -

- :; 4,.,.':

OPERATION: C CONFIDENTIAL IN T iI /_PLEIKU CAIPAIGN -

ALL THE WAY (23 0ot - 9 Nov 65)

Units:

Ist Brigade(Abn)

2d Bn, 8th Cav(Abn)

2d Bn, 12th Cav

Cp S,1 t h: Cav(Ab%

2d Bn, 19th Aktr(Abn)

Btry B, 2d Bn, 17th Arty

Btry A, 2d Bn, 20th Arty

227th AHB -)

229th AHB (-)

228th A3B (-)

17th Avn Co

6th Bn, 14th Arty (+)

3d Bn, 18th Arty (-)

"Eagle Flight" ,CIDG

SILVER BAYONET (10 - 20 Nov 65)

* Uniits !

3d Brigade

lst Bn, 12th Cav(Abn) (10-12 Nov)

2d Bn, 12th Cay (10-11 ov)

1st Bn, 7th Cav

2d Bn, 7th Cay (12 - 20 NOv)

1st Bn, 5th Cae m(15-20 Nov)

.2d Bn, ,5th Cay (11-20 lov)

CONFIDENTIAL

.4

* CONFIDENTIAL ~AL

1st tn. 21 At

Btry C, 2d Bn, 20th Arty(AR&)

6th in' 14th Arty(D~iov)

2d. Bn, 19th z.fty(Abn) (10-12 Nov)

1st Sqdn, 9th C6V H-

229th AB

228th ASHB'

SILVER BkloNM 'I1 (20 -28 N~ov 66)

Units:*

2d Brigade

1st Bn, 5th Cay

26d Bn, 5th Cay

2d. Bn,-; 12th, Calr'

lt tn ; 8th Cd-y

* st Bn, 77th Arty

2d-Bn, 17-th4rty.,

Btry B, 2d. Ba, 20th Arty(ARA)

229th AB

Z28ti _ASHB

3d Bnj9 18th Arty, -

CLEAN HOMR-0 (Vt'.31 .Meo 65)CLEAI HOUSE I 107' 1'9 Dee)

U3ni tst

3d Brigade

let ~VA BL 7t

Cellj~lA

CONFIDENTIAL 1 A ,.2d Bn, 7th Cay

1st Bn, 8th Cav(Abn)

lst Bn, 21st Arty(DS)

Btry B, 2d Bn, 20th Arty(GS Reinf)

229th AH..(DS)

Co,. 228th ASHB(D$)

CLAN HOUSE II (20 - 23 Dee)

Unitas

3d Brigade

Ist Bn, 7th Gay

2d Bn, 7th Cav

lt Bn, 21st Arty(D3')

Btry., 2d Dn," 20th ArAty(S Reinf)

229th AMB(Ps).

Co, 22"th ASTMl (P~S)

Trp p, lot Sa.n, .9th Cay -)

CL''A.N HiOUSE 111 (27 - 31 Dec)

Units:

3d Brigade

lst Bn, 7th Cav

2d Bn, 7th Cay

2d Bn, 12th Cav

OPIRATION:

M".t.,R (1 Jan 17 'Jan 66)UTfQ0310 I (I Jan ,7,13 JanY

Units

lot B3rigade(Abn)

3-4o I A L

t,4°

2d Bn, 5th Car

1st Bn, 8th Cav(Abn)

2d Bn, 8th Cav(Abn)

let 3n, 12th Cav(Abn)

'2d Bn, 19th .rty(Abn)

B _ 1'7 '2 17th 4rty, . V .L. ',:"

A Btry, 2d Bn, 20th Arty(ARA)

B Btry(-), 6th Bn, 14th Arty

B Btry(-), 19th Arty(SLT)

lot Sqdn 9th Cav(-)

227ta AIB

Co. 229h AHB

226th ASIIB(-)

"Hurricane Team, CIDG"

*Co, 8th iEngr Bn

*Plt, 545th MP Co:.. *TI/CI Tin, .191st Ila Det

*Tm, 10th RU

*Tn, 41st CA Co

*Sig Spt Tin, 13th Sig Bn

*Tm, 54th Inf Det(Surv Radar),

*Tm, USAF 7.eather Det

*Fwd Spt Elm, Spt' Comd(Spt)

4 'his grouping is Yormal for each coruitted brigade and will not beincluded in subsequent brigade task organization listings.

S j o CONFIDENTIALIL

3-5

L ' " "

2d Brigade

lit Bn, 5th Cay

2d Bn, 12th Cay

1st Bn, 77th Arty(Reinf' as required)

nmAOR Ir (l13 - 17 Jan)

Units:

1it Br.4g&de(AbrV)

lit Bn, 8th Cav(Abn)

2d Bn, 8th Cav(Abn)

1it Bn. 12th Cav(Abn)

2d Bn, 19th Arty(Abn)

B B try, 2d 13n, 17th Arty

A B3tryt 2d Bn, 20th Arty(ARA)

B Btry(-), 6th Dn, 14th Arty

B Btry(-), 19th Arty(SLT)

let S3qdn, 9th Cav(-)

227-th AHB

Co, 229th 1.11

22Sth ABB(-)

"Hlurricane Tecun, 01411

2d Brigade

1it n, 5th Cav

2d Bnt 5th Cay

1it Bn, 77th Arty

Btry , 2d Bn, 20th I rty(AIA) (Reinf)

C Trk, M1st Sqdn, 9th Cay

C o _1 GIDG-

CON (, ot J.TIAL.01 . ATION '1 £ T !,WR/,HI. T :ING (24 Jan - 6 Iba 66)

"M SME (24 Jan - 4 Feb 66)

Units:

3d Brigade

ist Bn,' 7th .Car ,3 .

2tlBn, NtiO09y.,

1st Bn, 12th C.v(Abn)

2d Bn," 12th Car

lst Bn,' 21st Aty(D))

1st, Sqt, 9th Cav(-) OPCON

11th Avn Gp(-)

1st- Bn, 5th CeAv(30 Jan-4 Feb)

TdIMM WIbNG (4 Feb - 10 Feb 66)

Units:

2d Brigade

1st Bn, 5th Cav

2d Bn, 5th Car

2d Bn, 12th Cav

1"st ,Bn, 77th Ar~ty

Tm 245th Psyops Co

TACP

Naval Gunfire 3pt Tm

Trp Bo lost Sqdn, 9th Car

~3d Brigade

' I f ' "'"

1st Bn, 7th Cav

2d Bn, 7th Cav

5,.-7.

C~N~IDENrIAL.1st Bn, 12th Cav(AIbn)

1ot En, 21st Az'ty(DS)

Trp C, lot Sqdn, 9th Cav'(OpCon)

229th AB(DS)

EAGLE'S CLAW (11 - 28 Feb 66)

Units:

lot Brigade(Abn)

lot Bn, 8th Cav(Abn,)

2d En, 8th Cav(Abn)

1st'Bn, 12th Cav(Abn) (18 -28 Feb)

2d En, 19th Arty(Abn) (DS)

A Btry, lot En, 30th Arty(155mma)

TM(IiE), 244th Psy Ops

~ItrPoint, 8th Engr En

2d Brigade

1st Bn, 5th Cay

2d En, 5th Cav(16-28 Feb)

2d En, 12th Cay

lot Bn, 77th Arty

TACP

Trp B, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cay (opcon)

3d 1>-isade

lot Bn, 7th Cav

2d En, 7th Cay

l1ot En, 12thCav(1i-17 Feb)

:2d En, 5th Cav(14-16 Feb)

coN'F t. 0 N I iAu:1 3-8

a lot Bn, 21st Arty(DS)

1ot Sqdn, 9th Cav(-) (Opcon)

229th AIM(DS)

228th ASHB(-) (S)

BLAUK HORSE (l - 6 Mar 66)

2d Brigade

1lat Bn, 5th Cay

2d Bn, 5th Cav

lot Bn, 8th Cav(Abn)I 2d Bn, 8th Cav(Abn)

lot Sqdn, 9th Cav(.-)

2d.Bn,12th Cay

jlot Bn, 77th ArtyBtry, 2d Bn, 17th Arty

Naval.Gumf ire Tm

2d Bn, 20th Arty

I JIM BO07I (13 -2'7 Mr 66)j'Units:s

1ot Brigade(Abn)

lstSBn, 8%h Cav(Abn)

2d Bn, 8th Cav(Abn)I

1st Bn, l2th Cav(Abn)

2d1 Bn, 19th Arty(Abn)

A Bt2?y, 1ot Bn, 30th firty(15mm)

U1ater Point, 8th Enar Bn

C.~ CONFIDENTIAL /!A'L

CON iDfEN TsAL3d Brigade

1st BAY 7th Cav

2d Bn, 7th Cav

2d Ba, 5th Cav(13-15 Miar)

C Trp(-)g Ist'Sqdn, 9th Cay (Opcon)

1st Bn, 21st Arty(Ds)

'ater Point, 8th Engr Ba

OPERATION

LIHCOLNUnitst

1st Brigad~e(Abn),

lst Bn, 8th Gav(Abn)

2d Bno 8th Cav(Abn)

lat Ba, 12th Cav(Abn)

Co BY lot Bn, 69th Armor

4..Lp C, 3 Sqdn, 4th Armor'ed Cav

2d BnY 19th Artyr(Abn)

Btry B, 2d Mn, 17th Arty

Water Point, 8th Engr Ba

3d Brigade

lot Bn, 7th Cay

2d Bn, 7th .Cav

1st BM, 21st Arty(DS)

Tma 3, l6 thl- bxDot

;)IMBY I (Ii 1 '8 4~r 66)

uni ts 5

1 &i B~ i aQ6Abn)

('~ CONFIDENTIAL A L

0 N fQNTIALlot Bnf 8th Cav(Abn) -

2d Bn, 8th Cav(Atn)

lot Bn, 12th Cav(Abn)

2d Bnq 19th Arty(.Abn)

Watew Point, 8th Eagr Bn

Co(+), CIDO, Duo Co USSF Camp

I 3d Briga-doI t 1ot Bn, 7th Cav

2d Bn, 7th Cay

lot Bn, 21st Arty(DS)

Scout Tm, C Trp, 1st Sqdn, 9th Ca~v

2 Cole, CIDG9 PJloi M.Trong

2ls. CD, 21st jyDj flinnf

2los CIDG 21st Djey(Dn)

cTr) C, otSqnth avL.

Ti1

6.N r-iO2IVTIALAVIATION DATA

PAT Aircraft Flight flour's (Mllonthly)

pART Il Major Operations

PART III Support Rendered to X=48FPTO r :adCilan

PART iv Support Rendered to Non-Divisional Units

PAR? V Signific ,At Operations (orFganic Arcraft)

PART VI Aviation Statistics (Monthly)

PART VII Aikroraft Hit Data - Aviation Casualties

PART VIII Monthly lission Ready Airicraf t Ava~ilabil ity

I 4-1

Co - LE061 TIALJANUARY 1966 0-1 OV-1 CV-2 0R-13 UH-IB,D CH147 CH-54

11th Avn '-roup 452.0 416.0 531.0 9433.0 2072101/9 Cavalry Sqdn 1655.0 2843.0Div Artillery 121.0 369.0 1977.0Support Command 1377.0 71.0 698.0 60.0 77.0Ist Bde 451.0 328.02d Bde 282.0 348;03d Bde 257.0 252.0

DIVI3ION TOTALS 573.0 416.0 1377.0 3643.0 15,879.0 2132.0 77.0

TOTAL FLYING HOUIS = 24,097,0

FmRUARY 1966 0-1 OV-1 CV-2 0H-13 UH-1B,D 0H-47 CH-54

11th Avn Group 497.0 404.0 581.0 9632.0 1854.01/9 Cavalry Sqdn 1421.0 2943.01 Div Artillery 28.0 456.0 1879.0Support Con:iand 1524.0 65.0 747.0 77.0 70.01st Bae 409.0 371.02d Bde 344.0 335.03d Bde 202.0 297.0

DIfISION TOTALS 525.0 404.0 1524.0 3468,0 16,204.0 1931,0 70.0

TOTAL FLYING HOURS = 24,126

,AzCH 1966 0-1 ov-1 C71-2 0H-13 UH-1BD CH-47 CH-54

11th krn group 419.0 352.0 415.0 9165.0 1816.01/9 Cavalry Sqdn 1502.0 2832.0Div Artillery 28.0 535.0 1855.09up-?ort Command 1103.0 55.0 689,0 58.0 89.01st Bde 418.0 359.02d Bde 283.0 313.03d Bd; 369.0 286.0

DI-IJIOP ..'.:OAT.1,3 447.0 352,0 110.0 3502.0 15,499.0 1874.0 89.0

T0Tr T . '.' T jOgS = 22,946

t.U; !c,:( 0-1 OV-1 CV-2 0H-13 UH-1B,D 0H-47 0H-54

" " 436.0 413.0 '465.0 8P802.0 1,820.0K I-, 'h-•s:-,: . 1,752.0 3;127.0

. .,.:i ,r 13;0 402.0 1,839.01,583.0 126,0 831.0 31.0 143.0

I F.e 436.0 291.0

2.C1 : 434.0 319.0S,506.0 267-0

, ( 41".') 1,580.0 4,121.0 15,476.0 1,851.0 143.0f r Vm '/ .)'. FO-ts ' TZIur L TRU 30 April 1966

_ , o CONFIDENTIAL4-~2

. 4"' ....

* AVaTION DATA

(MAJOR OPATION8 - 196()

0o rARATION DAT RO. S FLOMT. SORTIES MIW TONS -[A U MM

MATAWR 1-20 Jan 10l0O8 24,937 4,224 41,239

YASHE 24 Jan6 6,801 25,214 3,269 25,9803 Fob

WHITE WING 3 Feb- 6 t / 1 1497186 ,,. 1,429 28,56111 Feb .

EAGLEi CLAW 11 Feb - 15,094 3?,627 6,517 66,04428 Feb

TOTAL(T.ST" 24 Jan- 28,024 77,627 11,515 120,585

WHITE "IF:G & 28 FebEAGLE CLI.fW

JIM. B07nn 13-27 Ma 11,215 30,013 4,733 41,807

LINCOLN 25 idar - 11,370 32,196 4,492 36,367 Apr

ISBY I 8 Apr - 7,289 17,736 , 2,512 26,73817 Apr

-14SBY II 21-30 Apr 0,321 22,854 3,383 27,858

C 6 N FI DEHTIAL

I - , ii 0 -. . .I 4.;: :,, ".'z.:

SUPPOT RENDM3D

" .l

Aviation support to non U.S. Fdrces includes the movement of ARVN,CIG, Popular Forcesp refugees and oivic action missions:

9ICIF SORTIES ilOw

January 1966 UH-1 126 96.8CH-47 16 11.

February UH-1 112 51.5

Maroh 1966 CH-47 20 12,1

April 1966 U- 396 163;0CH-47 18

TOTALS UHi121 1

CH-47 242 96,3

4-4• ., '-C;O lrFt.-,,N TI At .L -

. , ~'CcrOhi .rI E"NTIAL

'Aviation supp,)ort to non-divisional U.S. Foroes includes support of

the 1/101st Abn Bde, 3d Bde, 25th Infantry Division (eXptvwhen attaohedto the 1st Ai4, Cavalry Division) and recovery of doomed USM[C, USAU andArmy aircraft. Detailed accountirg of such support has not been a standing

requirement. Therefore, the totals presented axe estimates gleaned fromsituation and highlights reports. Support provided bj 1T{-1 and CH-47is expressed in days only.

MONTH UNIT SUPPORTED CH-47 DAYS UH-1 DAYS CV-2 MIS OH-54 .RS

Jan 66 FPV support of 15 2 0 0USSF1/101 Abn Bde 0 0 121.7 0USA? 0-123 recov 0 0 0 1.0

Feb 66 1/101 Abn Bde acft 28 0 0 0recov-52d Avn Bn

mar 66 3/25th Inf 51 0 0 01/101st Abn Bde.(ec6v'Opns-FFV .-l3 0-43 OV.2 0 0 3 9.0

Apr 66 3/25 Inf y7 12 0 0 0Recov 0',ns-FFVRecov of 2 eachC-47 and 2 eachOV-1 acft for FPV 0 0 0 9.3

T0TULS ~i 1 719.3

C 0N , ,t.NT Ai.

1J

U' DENTiAL INIFICAPT AVIATION OPM&TIONSefformed. bO Oganic Airorat

28 Nov 65 - 3 Jam 66 Operations CLTAN SWMP and CLEAN HOUSE I, Iand III

32 Infantry battalions airlifted23 Artillery batteries airlifted

4 - 19 Jan 66 Operation IATADOR

9 Infantry battaliois 'airlifted20 Artillery batteries kirlifted

24 Jan - 3 Feb 66 Operation MAMHR

17 Infantry battalions airlifted10 Artillery batteries airlifted

3 - 11 Feb 66 Operation YT,{IEfING

10 Infantry battalions airlifted12 Artillery batteries airlifted

11 Feb - 28 Feb 66 Operation EAGLI'S CLAW

50 Infantry battalions airlifted21 Artillery batteries airlifted

13 27 mar 66 Operation JI1.1 BOWIE

19 Infantry battalions airlifted22 Artillery batteries airlifted

'5 x 1-7 Apr 66 Operations LINCOLN AD J'DSBY I

34 Infantry battalions airlifted39 Artillery.batteries airlifted

" -~v O :.e, ation MOSBY II

10 Infantry battalions airlifted11 Artillery batberies airlifted

C oi F: O.. NTAL

I

AVIATION ahITO (VEONT tLY)

R SR~,s TONS-

Janua#- 1966 241097 56,563 2,757441-1

7Februaxy 1966 24,126 65,586 16,185 . 104,280

Wtrch 1,966 22,946 554612 5,030 70,764

April 1966 24,041 58,356 8,327 73,882

C1JI.TLtLTIVE 95,210 236,11,7 54417 323,339

k .

A'7 *"A .'-

104 EN4 ItL

e ~~ ~ -2' W M

t~t

t 4,j

't~ttN

O ~NtIDENTIAL, 'Lb

UNIT ITTL SRi WR SN1 DAG DEG

11th Avn 1roup 155 4 2 0 15 2 .A

1/9 Cavalry Sqdn 140 8 0 6 7 0

Division Arty 21 0 0 0 0 0

Support Comimand 15 1 0 0 10

lst Brigade 3 0 0 0 0 0

2d Brigade 5 0 0 0 1 0

3d Brigade 4 2 0 0 0 0

TOTALS 34 52 642

AVIATION CA3UALTIES

UITIT KIA IVIA Ia

11tbhAvn Group 3 33 0

1/19 C'avlry Sqdri 7 41 0

Th4tnArty 0' 1 0

~)~ i': A~ld0 1 0

~t .>.~:0 0 0

0 2 0

78 0

S hot down - Recovered-Repairable";ho)t down - Recovered-Not Repairable$*!,t dorm - Not recoverable-Total losstsm-agoil on g'round-Enemy s&ction

_ ~ on rground-.Eneay action

-7-

~~0"

~ A.' ~ 'h%

Co N r.- NT AL

I. NTHLY '.&DY AIMCMY AVAILOILITY

!0P-m- January

TYPE AIROAFT: 0H-13 Ul-B UH-iD 0H-47 CH-54 CV-2B OV-1 0-1

AVAILABLE 58 68 63 46 (66 55 70 6s

MIT3TH: February

T.TZ A1CIAFTs 0H-13 UH-B UH-ID CH-47 CH-54 CV-2B OV-1 0-1

AVAILABLE 61 72 65 43 75 57 78 55

MONTH: Maoh

TYPT, AIRC".WAT: 0H-13 Uill-B U1-ID CH-47 0H-54 CV-2B OV-1 0-i

% AVAILABLE 62 70 60 40 67 62 54 55

j4ONTH: April

TM.. AIRCRM-T: OH-i 3 MH-B UH-iD CH-47 011-54 CV-2B OV-1 0-i

% t.VAIIlBJ2: 65 71 64 45 62 63 76 77

i'

,'1P

5UBX~ Lgisic Drin hjo DiisonOpration: s s~

supply wore computed at the ending of ech Liajor divisionoporatiork. The purpose of thcuse omputatiows was to providedate. orr which future requiei~ionts could be pro jected* Con-

Nku OF O2B4PION 110LN 5

SIMHY BI.YON)LT 2

IUPIY V.jLLEY 3ALL.TIr' .Y 4.91hVER1 BAYOMiT 5'WILTi~i BI.YOINLT 11 6OLZIN 15fLIJP 7

±Lt.mRWHITL WIN~G 9Jfl4 BOWIL 10LjBiiOLN, 1 11

I LiCOLN 11 12'4±OjBY 1 13

Co Ft I PF- T IA

I C IN F I O v'Y IAL

1. R- iD BY0I0,,T 5 - 10 October 1965

2. )iajor Task Organization .Total Personnel

3d Bde TF 3371

3. Location of Support Mleaunts B.R 644445 (BINH KMi)

4. Type of LOCs GLUC out of qui Nhon

JU.0C out of jj Khe

5. Significant Logistical Problouss

a. Non-availability of aircraft to FbL for logistical support.

Roco. .endationss The iiajor unit boing supported allocate suffi-cient aircraft to the A7L to transport the sup-plies from Brigade Base to Forwrcd Locations.

b. Inufficient nuabor of watcr containors.

Rccoiiondtions Units take additional containers on o;)crationfrom base cwp.

i. Ti,4'ficant Logistical Firstt

.Locisr~cil auport atatistics: /

C4.4Cfr, XLO-IW

tI , l os 60.67 /Ta .F-4 ~216.o EITft 1C$ 32.5 S/T 25.4 S/T[ ftU,*s 6.0 t;/T

V 68.75 S/T 41.45 S/Tfl & rIL,45 b/TT i 'aL L 87,37 S/T 66.85 S/T

j C.O;M P iD E 1 T A L.

I

16 -lilY BIY0iT 11 14 Octobor "9,

2. lajor Tal Organization ;d Total Personnel

3d Bde TF 7415

2& Bde TF' (-)

3. Loootion of Support 1lements BR 644445 (BINH MD)

4, Type of LOO GLOC out of Wi NhonALOC out of An KhQ

5. Significant Logistical Problerass

a. Non-availability of aircraft to F& f6i logistical support.

Recomaendations The ,aajor unit being supported allocate suffi-cient aircraft to the FS, to transport the sup-plies frou Brigade Base to Forward Locations.

b. Insu..ficient number of wrater ontainers.

Recoamoendationt Units take additional containers on operationfrom base caup.

6. Wignificant Logistical First.

None

7. Logisticl bupport btatisticss

Clis 'GLOO

I 29,660 meals 29.66 S/T 14.,830 meals 14.83 S/Tit J4 495.3 /T,

AVG.,.* 22.5S /T.1.1 *"/T .08 b/T

v 33.12/T 56.8 s/TII&Iv .7. S/T

SUaS582.38 S/T 71.71 S/T

- 5-3... C6N PiD T0

r'. ."

• - ""-'J" T, I.

-'/,o i- '7,

1Ilo Oporations Hi"Y VALIV 13 - 31 October 1965

2, Major Task Organizations Total Personnel

1/5 GayTP 600

3. Location of Support Eloents

DB;o. Caw~p hn Kho

4. Type of LOC GLOC

5, Significant Logistioal Prob1 si

1(ono

Sigifioant Logistical Firsts

Nom.

7. Logistioal Support $tatistioss

GLOG.

32,200 meals 32.2 8/T

III JP4 ,74#55/TffGa.O 8,6 SiTHAW 16.2 S/T

v 27. //T

1~62.o S/T

CONFI PEN)AL4.~54

1. Oprations LI 'fU WAY 24 Oatobor - 8 ov= er 1965

2, Iajor Task Organizations Total Personnel

1.t Bde TF 5240

3. Looation of Support ] oonts aR 800469 (21S )

4. Type of LO0t GL0O *24'06otober - 8 1Novumber24 Oetobur - 8 Novmbor

5. Significant Logistical Phvblomso

6. Significant Logis8ticoal Pirat,

Nono.

7, Logistioal Wklpport Statistims

1 91,43-9 raeals 91,42 b/T 133,069 mals 135.38 b/TIII JP4 3.361,00 b/T 860,90 8 T

,v4 5.6 S/ 35.1 ZIT.,,G., 4.6 8/T 27.8 4/T

V 86.67 SIT 365,39 b1T14 & X 5,68 S/T 19-34 VT

TOTAL l •

SP.L 329,97 OT.: . 344103 5/T

I F

I"1 . . . s5

CON Pt D 'N'TIA L

1. Operations bILV1h BA3YONET 9 - 20 Novoiber 1965

2. Major Task Organizations Total Personnel

3d Bde TF 5123

3. Location of Support 4lemen ts .R 800469 (PL310)

4, Type of LOCI GLOC '9 - 20 Noerber 19651100 9- 20 November 1965

5. Sigmifioant Logistical Problerass

Insufficient Supply handlers with F6.E

Recooaundations Cargo handlers novo out with M at beginning ofexercise. Log Comd establish Forward Supply Points.

6. Signific:nt Logistical Firsts

None

7. Logistical Bupport btatisticss

CL SGLOC £I.OC

V I 45,821 meals 45.82 6/T 127,594 i,,als 127.59 b/TIII JP4 374.0 ',./T 511.0 /T

VG4 14.9 9 T 2i.0 /T,I)GLiS.5 /T 17.0 6/T

v 135.6 6/T 793.84 /TII & IV 345 /T P 36 S/T

TOAUL 21° I2 • 58627.,8/T 147§.79.S/T

if°(

- I .. 1, -

ra 1, Jk,,

C OPti oTIAL

1 Opor=Aiont SiLVUR BIYMINT II 20 - 29 Novembor 1965

2. 1ajor Task Organization Total Personnel

2d Bd'3 TF 5477

3. Location of Support "omliofntS". im )00469"PLf )

4. Type of LOGs GLOC ' 20 - 29 November 1965zLOC 25 Novomber 1965

5. Significant Logistical Problomss

None

6. Significant Logistical First$

None

7. Logistical bwpport Statistical

I 26,800 meals 26.8 S/T

III JP4 447.0 S/T20.6 6/T

*.. :j.:/T 1.0 B1Wv . )"o.0 SITIr & IV" 1.1 /T

TOT.,aL 1 L'L. k 530-7 IT' 1.0 S/T

o , -5-7C FVPCMN4T IAL

ki W9 i Xjjii!

IO I ENI Al. Oporation JL-1X VP4W 17 - 31 Deoombor 1965

2. Major Task Organizations Total ?ersonnol

3d Bdo TP 3668

3. Location of Support Blouokitf- '"-644445. (BWi1 IM)

4. Typo of LO0 GLOO 17 - 31 Docoriber 1965

5, Sipifioant Logistical Problanst

Nono

6. Signifioant Logistioal Firsts

Nono

7. Logistioal Support Statistioos

1 59175 59.17 S/TIII J134 640.00 /T

iVG.Ib 35.00 S/TIIGhA 26.00 b~/

v 901.52 i/TII & Iv 344 6/T

TOTAL Z1665413 P/T

--8

'I Co~hp~TI"AI

.I. . .- ' a -' ..,

1. O~&tons ~/W T~ WIIGa i iacy *6 &=oh 1.966,

2~baoTLcl OrmitoX ",1Ql Total PorO1O1

Zd Bdo TI' 745

t~~~3 Tyo oLOTV GQ

5. 11011o0upot a~us

I ~ c M, R8 59403y

49~ ~ ~ Tyoo LT W

5, Siaiicn 5.97 i~e-Icb/T

101102.6 8/

6. SgaifamtliogsialF~t

LoitclIPv nt0-00tdwt -4 ho zvdvx

II~- l & 420-WT t

TOU aL 5____I af__ I

CON__ P -9 W -A,

1 *Oporations 1'LT.DMk 2 - 20 janu&axy 1966

2. Ma~.jor TasBk Or~inizationa Total Pernorl

1st Bdo TF 36682d Bdo(-

3. Location of ba~pport Umioont:

1st FnJ 7d. 202342 (CaLTCIL)2d FZ LR 801475 (.PLlin)

4. Tyvo of LOC& GLOC

5. infcn Logistical ierob~loris

Nono

6. digifioant Logistical Firots

Noneo

I670548 racalD 6764 /

in: 3293CO 8/T& 190'8/

TOTI aL zz.S~kIJI.~8736.94 V/T

- CONEC1 TI AL

I .q

CON PP#14TAL

1. Operations LINCOLN I 25 - 31 March 1966

a. IM4aor Task Organizations Total Personnel

lst Bde TF 3670

3. Location of SuPPort Blexonts

Zh. 119288 (LBi THNH)

4. Typc of LOCt GLOC

5& Significant Logistical Ptoblemst

None

6. Significant Logistical Firsts

First night aerial delivery of Class V & Class I to a unit in contect.

7. Logistical Support Statistics:

R"AS GLOG

I 51,500 meals 51.0 Z/T'111 04 372.0 s/T

"Ma240OSI1- p 4.-0 d/T

21-4.8 S/Tii& IV 15.0 i

TOTAL ALL

'~A ;1-3 B/

CO - CN w

CON I JAIJT AL

. Operationh LINCOIX II 1 - 8 jpril 1966

2. Macjor T sk 0rganizctions Total Personnel

let Bde F 134b3d Bde TF

3. Location of Support Llomnta

ist FS] Z. 119288 (L;; TIU i)3d FW;, Y., 165059 (PLE"I I)

4. Typo of LOOt GIO

5. Significant Logistical Problemss

None

6, Sienificant Logisticcr. Firsts

None

7. Logistioal b -bport 8tatistics

I 238,400 238,4 S/TII JP4 1640.0 8/T

.wjt 106.0 4/T18.0 WIT336;6 8/T

11 & Iv 15;6 4/T

2356.6 S/T

- 5C12C ON Fi { AI TIAL

1, Oporation: JI BOWIN 13 28 ,aroh 1966

2. Major Task Organizations Total Porsonnel

lst Bde TF ,," .13d Bde TF

3. Location of Support Element:

Base Camp Ln Khe

4. Type of LO0s GLOG

5. 4ignificant Logistical Problemss

None

6. Significant Logistical First&

Supported from Base OGap by two FSE' s

7. Log istical bupport Statisticsl

I 48,700 meals 48i? B/TIII JP4. 163.o s/r

281.6 S/T_,o_ .13.5 s/T

~& v 3~ T/V11 IV .... /6f,' t l

TOT,. ..8UPL~a 32.0 6/T

T, P

. . CON r-1 DENTIAt,

T1. '° . . '"' ' " .

• --. °5

CON Fl lSIIVTIAL

1. Oporationt Il)BY 1 11 3.16 .,pril. 1966

2. 1vajor Ta-sic Orgrmizations Total 'ersornno1

1st Bdo TB' 74603d Bdo TB'

3. Loation of bupport aJozants

1-st FbL L,~ 115 288 (LB T11JH~)2d F~i Z 016218 (DIX To0)3d FZU- Zih.3116672 (Z.fl lLBONG)

4. Typo of LOOt GIJOC

5. Signifionnt Logietiorl Problem-ss

N;one

Nome

12219200 221a. ;gT

III JP4 046'O 5/T

686.0 S/T

11 & IV 9.1 #/T

TO~uL ,,LJUPPLI~i 11:,55.9 S/T

5--14

CON Fl L TrA L

M4ONSOON L1~AFLLT

NVA Soldiers I The broken bodies of thousands of .'our comrades lie inlonely graves along the Central Ilateaup axound PIY.I 14]N, DUC C0, and thecoastal plain along 30N0 SON. 'The Communist Foroes could not resist theIinvincible land and air foroes anad the artillery of the GVIl and its allies,

N~ow your 'Jommunnist Masters make an attempt to save face, They saythat the GYNI Allied Forces will be s2owed by the Monsooh Season. Hearthe truth while ther, is still time to save yourselves, The 1st UnitedSatates Air Cavalry Division is specially trained for combat in any kindof weather. The deadly Viat Birds, will relentlessly continue to pursueind destroy the Communist Forces. N'either wind, rain, nor darkness candelay them.

You must choose -- either to rally to the GVN and begin a new life,or you can continue to follow the path of darlness and certain dea.th*

/~ ~ 737! -

/i

f V I I Iiit

14ONSOON LIkFLET

NVA Soldiere) The broken bodies of thousands of -vour comrades lie inlonely graves along the Central Plateau# around PLiK'I-INh, D1JC 00, and thecoastal plain along BONG~ SON. linie Communist Foroes could~ net resist theinvincible land and air forces and the artillery of the GVfl4 and its allies*

Now your 'Communist Masters make an attempt to save face, They saythat the GNN Allied Forces will be slowed by the Monsooh Season. Hearthe truth while ther. is still time to save yourselves. The 1st U~nitedStates Air Cavalry Division is specially trained for combat in any kindof weather. The deadly War Birds, will relentlessly continue to purse~ind destroy the Conmmunist Forces. Neither wind, rain, nor darkness candelay them.

You must choose -- either to rally to the GVN and begin a new lifetoyou can continue to follow the path of darkness and certain deiathe

- t

L I i4AI ANl TWING RiETURS TU FRXDUI AUNi IE i JUST 0082s~

Mai Huu Twing was a soldier in the VC Trantiport ',ompany Ton Bang*IHe watched hi3 comrades betrayed by their communist Foreigh Masters,.M4ai luu 1Lrexg's Company lacked food, medicine a.d annruition. Learnjneof the CiRIbV 11.0 Programn, he contacted a unit of the 1st h~ir vavalryDivision in B11111 DI~I{. He was warmly welcomedp paid for his weaponand helped in every way to begin a new, prodiuctive and honor? .ble life.

Those still:in VC ranks should follow Miai ,Iluu Tra'g's examnple, andRaly. You will be well treated and you will receive food, clothing andmedicine. You will receive financial assistance ana eiven work as youreturn to the just cause*

Come forward now to begin a new and happy life*

NW.Hi1 '1 RANlG TR(I VyE IL?-I)u VA CHANH-NGHIA

Cgtu~c~a-0i chyen van Tho~nBng ogHai 16,ahiit-ih -hd Chianh-Ph~ Viat-Namn C4 g-HAa Anh

"I~ng 196 Carihsa ngoet-dinb667 tha y nh~hng bar) ci~a anh b' bo r~i ta sao b!quan hyCg-nnoabn.

Va tDoion Ma -14u-Tra'nW.' lqeU .hdk- an. thuoc men vla (tan dMe. Biet d~ct

Ky- inhKhtng-Vit as.Mnh )jn An doc ipiong hic n.aqud.d thu&gA A

acba ocn ho i'igi.i ('3c1on hn e nig ien 4cg~

M, fb V' . 'a/ bn s- ifC st Odet~n t n aoqun IU2

MenLairiv, u'ythe t~ngUp.(-k: ),.n o dfdoth~g ign dfocgiI v

I zo %I P 4

The 1st Air Cavalry Division of the United States Army ts here atthe r quest o± the Republic of Vietnam to help restore peace and security.You can help make this poasiblel

If you' have any information conoernaing the Viet Cong, please notifythe Distrfot Police or any U.S. Army unit. You ill be given a rewardd ifthe information proves to be faotual; the aiount of the reward will bedetoevined by the value-of the information.

Your cooperation in bringing in weapons and information of the enemyto the. District Police will. bring you a reward.- It also way help savethe lives of your friends,, relatives, and even you own family. Informantsare aasured that their identity will not be disolosed.

All persons will be eligible for the rewards, including VO personnelwho rally to GVN or assist in the oapture of their compatriots*

You may notify any US Aray unit of your informationt show them thispaper*

PI.AN .',WNGD9-NHKT S1bD6AN Y-IN'-h .HSjNG-V.N (OA-KY c6 mA tai diy

li do su yu-cju cuea VIT NAM C9ONG H,. de* --ip Qu6 c.gia nay tii-lip An-niah vi B6a.biab. Ban t-6 thei ,ty b g'o cich:

Neu b~n co ti-trc g . hejqua' .e t-Chi, xin rui lbn bio choCinh-st Qu~ir loic m6t don-vi (,' n-4iA, Hoa-K Ao d6. Ban s duac

US Forces, take the beuer to y'our Unit Commander or IntelligeaceOlficec .

HARRY W. 0, KINNARD46- .-245N Maj General

• Iat Air Car Div

Si.Qk dem la 3nth ga, uo,-n

Moju 1d- koch( -~--,vtcn ~. nluc

A~f kf

US Frce,'tte te bere to ourUnitComnandr o Intllierc

BACK

&APIES OF MRWARDS

Information leading tot

a. Capture of personnel

VC political, intelligence, or military personnel $50 - 15,000 VN

b. Capture of equipment, material, or weapons

VC mines or booby traps 50 - 600Communications equipment 100 - 5,000Pistols and rifles 800 - 5,000Machine guns 4,000- 7,000Recoiless rifles, mortars, howitzers 2,000 - 40,000

c. Capture of documents

VC intelligence documents 100 - 2,000VC communication codes 100'- 10,000

Payment will be made for any information of value to the lst Air CavalryDivision.

PIIAN THUdNG MAU

Tin-tirc dua de'n:

a. Bt duac nahivi~n

Chinh-trj vi&i VC, Tinh-bao vien VC, Ijnb VCthtr&ug tI 50$ dgn 15,000

-. b. Lly duqc quin-dVrg, vlt-liu, hoic vu--khiWin VC hoic b. y min thkcoug tt 50t dga 60' 6Dzng-cv truyn-tin thtrong t 100t d~n 3,000$Sing hlc, sang trtrbg thong t0 800$ den 3,000SDai-iea thlrong tdr 4/D001 den .7,0001Dai bic kh6ng giit,singcoi dai bc " thormg t~r 2,000S de'n 40,0001

c. Lay duc tii-liuTii Ii.u finh bic, VC throng tdr 100$ dgn 2,000Mit-m! truy~n-tin VC thtang tOr I015 dn 10,003

Bat ctr ,i-tic c6 gai-tri nao d'n D -NH SU-DO)N KHONG-VANHOA.-KY si duoc IRnh thrmg.

'-3

The Viet Cong a4d.the Ooumnist N6rth heinamese Forces suffered acuashing defeat in the, operaticn" in North- East Binh Diah Provinces Themajor portions of 3 communist regiments were destroyedo More than 3,000cor wuist were killed. More than 700 VC and Cormmnist North Vietnamesesollers were captured. Nearlyr:500 Viet Cong reaounced their foreignmasters and rallied to the GVN* They were warmly welcomed and receivedthe necessary assistanoe to begin a new and happy life*

Those who followed the Viet Cong found themselves abandoned by theVC as allied forces approached.

The VC and the N6rth Vietnamese soldiers re:used to stand and fightwhen GVN-allied forces approached.

The Allied Forces of the Republic of Vietnam, The Republio of Korea,and the United States are continuing pursuit of the loeing Oommunist*,

The forces the Government of Vietnam and its allies are invincibleThey move as !Yiftly as birds to any point in Vietnam. If the VG return#additional GVN-Al2ied Forces will return and destroy them,

Do not aid the VC outlaws. Helping the VO can only bring sufferingand death to families and hamletso

Luc- ng Cong-^ u ia Bac-Vict vi Vi&-Cong d tham- bai tLe-tham t r ong 'chi-dch d6ng-bac Blabh-dih. Phan 1o 3 rrung-doin Cng-sin di bi ti&u-di.t. Hon 3,000 c6ng.quin d- bip)hoi they tren nam uj . Hon 700 Vi~t.cong'vi binh-linh mi nBac d! bi l'c-Icvng ta bit girt. Gn 500 Vi~t-c.n 3 di tt bhing-ng do ngoai.bang ch i-xtiong de try ve quy- thuin v.ri Ch ah-phA Vi4t-nam. H? d! dirvc ti p d6n nong-hiu vA d4' dutc gir-d moi thi can .thitA d' b"t dlu mat d~i sngdrng rn .

.Nhng ai d! tt~ng theo Viet-c6ng" d1 nhi t5y-7 nh bj b6 xii bon Vi t-Cang thl di duwc gla ban luc.Iong DWng. inh.

¥ .4-~a vi binhlinh Bdc-Viet da tr ef6i li6ng chig-daul-" "ruc khi tr& v9 vi lvrc-ltroag the-gi&i t v-do.

hrc-li rag D~ng-Minh'ci*a'Vi - nam Cng- hoi, rc- 1trgnig Caug-ho OD.-Han v. M -Quoc ti~p.t~c ti~u-tr C6ng-quin trong v~ngniy.

12.Il mg c a Chinh.phu Vi&t-nam v cic "nuc DMhg-Minh banrait h~na-hu. _ Ho di-ct'uy~n nanh boan chim d'n hit-cr nai niaotrong lnah.tho Oa&- Fia. Ngu mat ki Viet-cbag tr& lai, hoMAla 1rc-lu ug flWng-Minh si tr& 1ai vi ti6-diet chdng.

Dbrg ho-trc cho bin Vit-c6cg'ngai vbng phip-lu~t. Sq'• gitip.d Vi&t.cgc6 th' chi iiang db dan thaig vi sty tang.t6c cho gia-dlish con cng than p.

3,.66-4