This article was downloaded by: [McGill University Library]On: 16 October 2014, At: 09:13Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

The Round Table: TheCommonwealth Journal ofInternational AffairsPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctrt20

Australia and South‐East Asia:From cooperation to constructiveengagementK. S. Nathan aa Associate Professor of International Relations in theDepartment of History , University of Malaya , Kuala Lumpur,MalaysiaPublished online: 15 Apr 2008.

To cite this article: K. S. Nathan (1991) Australia and South‐East Asia: From cooperation toconstructive engagement, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of InternationalAffairs, 80:319, 335-348, DOI: 10.1080/00358539108454053

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00358539108454053

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information(the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor& Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warrantieswhatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of theContent. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions andviews of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. Theaccuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independentlyverified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liablefor any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages,and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly inconnection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

09:

13 1

6 O

ctob

er 2

014

The Round Table (1991), 319 (335-348)

AUSTRALIA ANDSOUTH-EAST ASIA

FROM COOPERATION TOCONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT

K. S. NATHAN

AUSTRALIAN-SOUTH-EAST ASIAN relations in the era after WorldWar II have been conditioned as much by geography and socioeconomic

and cultural disparities as by geopolitical and security considerations.Australia's continental landmass covers a huge area of 2.97 million squaremiles, with a very small population of only 17 million, whereas the total landarea of the ten south-east Asian countries (the six ASEAN states of Malaysia,Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines; the three Indo-chinese states of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; and Burma or Myanmar) isonly 1.73 million square miles, but houses a large population of over 423million, of which 315.5 million are from the ASEAN region.

Additionally, Australia's population, which is predominantly white, English-speaking, and growing at the rate of only 0.8 per cent, contrasts sharplywith the multiethnic, multicultural, multireligious, and multilingual South-eastAsian region whose annual population growth rate averages 2-3 per cent.Economically, Australia's gross national product (GNP) grew by 3.3 per centfor 1988-89 as opposed to the fast-growing ASEAN economies which averagedGNP growth rates between 6 and 8 per cent in the same period.1

Perceptions of South-east Asia in the immediate postwar era have un-doubtedly been shaped by two major East Asian actors—Japan and China, andone minor but potentially dangerous actor—Vietnam. The Japaneses thrustinto South-east Asia and the Pacific including Australia during World War II,and the birth of Communist China provided Australian decision makers with thestrong rationale that they were seeking for a cooperative security relationshipwith an external power capable of meeting the twin requirements of guarantee-ing Australian national security and containing the threat of internationalcommunism.

Canberra's political, economic, cultural and security perceptions of Asia ingeneral, and South-east Asia in particular over the past four decades tendedbasically to reflect the national desire to insulate Australia from security threats

Dr Nathan is Associate Professor of International Relations in the Department of History,University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

335

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

09:

13 1

6 O

ctob

er 2

014

AUSTRALIA AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

emanating from the Asian continent, albeit in the form of 'Asian hordes'inundating the sparsely populated Australian continent, or in the form of leftistrevolutionaries attempting to spread the Gospel of Marx to the South Pacific.Ideologically, therefore, Australia's policies toward South-east Asia aimed atdeterring threats to national and regional security by adopting an antagonisticposture against Asian and world communism, and by extension, aligning withglobal and regional forces supporting democracy and anti-communism.

Nevertheless, recent global and regional trends are compelling a reassessmentof Australia's political, cultural, economic and strategic approach to South-eastAsia. Among the critical factors in Canberra's security environment are theeconomic dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region including the ASEAN states,and global military retrenchment in the wake of the declining fortunes of worldcommunism causing in its wake a reduced threat perception in Australia's majorsecurity partner, the USA.

The aim of this article is: (1) to identify the nature of the political, economic,cultural, and security linkages between Australia and South-east Asia in therecent past, and to trace their development to the present; (2) to determine theimpact of regional factors shaping the bilateral Australian-South-east Asianrelationship; and (3) to assess the present and future inputs and outputs of thisrelationship to the emerging post-Cold War era.

Principal trends in the evolution of Australian-South-east Asianrelations in the postwar era

The preoccupation with security concerns in the postwar era stemmed primarilyfrom Australian anxieties about the emerging regional order in the Asia-Pacificregion. Australian security perceptions were shaped significantly by twofactors: (1) the compelling desire to prevent the resurgence of Asian imperialismin the form of a Japanese-oriented Co-prosperity Sphere, or for that matter, aMaoist China engulfing the rest of Asia on orders from world communism'sinternational headquarters in Moscow; and (2) the possibility of regional threatsemanating from the communist giants' regional surrogates such as Vietnam,and possibly, even Indonesia. Canberra became quickly convinced that geo-graphical isolation was no guarantee of national security considering the factthat instability prevailed in Australia's northern neighbour, Indonesia, whoseclaim to West Irian posed a direct threat to Australian national security. Addi-tionally, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (14 February1950), subsequent Chinese involvement in the Korean War (1950-53), and thehumiliating French defeat at Dienbienphu (8 May 1954) were undoubtedlycrucial factors in Australia's decision to join the ANZUS (security pactcomprising Australia, New Zealand and the USA, signed 1 September 1951) andSEATO (South-east Asia Treaty Organization, comprising Australia, NewZealand, Britain, France, Thailand, The Philippines, Pakistan, and the USA,created in Manila, 8 September 1954) alliances.

In coming to terms with Asian nationalism, Australia was largely influencedby the strategic necessities of the Cold War (1947-69). This invariably impelledthe expression of preferences based on ideology and national interests, ie to stateone's position either in favour of pro-Western Asian nationalism, ie bourgeois-

336

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

09:

13 1

6 O

ctob

er 2

014

AUSTRALIA AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

capitalist nationalism, or pro-communist nationalism, ie revolutionary-socialistnationalism. Indeed, Australia's strategic picture of South-east Asia was nodifferent from that of the USA in the early decades of the Cold War.Nationalism of the communist variety was not viewed as a genuine indigenousdesire to cast off the colonial yoke; instead it was viewed as local manifestationsof the expansionist drive of monolithic communism. While ANZUS addressedimmediate and direct Australian national territorial and security concerns,SEATO was seen as Canberra's long-term contribution to South-east Asianregional stability. Support for bourgeois nationalism meant, in effect, supportfor non-communist South-east Asia, and principally ASEAN. In the 1950s, thecommunist threat to South-east Asia was real: in Malaysia, the Emergency wasdeclared from 1948 to 1960; in Indonesia, the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia)had grown sufficiently strong to the point that it became an integral part ofSukarno's NASAKOM cabinet comprising nationalists, religionists, andcommunists in the early 1960s; and in Vietnam, the southward push ofcommunism had by the late 1950s compelled a US decision to become directlyand militarily involved in the communist insurgency-cum-civil war in thatcountry south of the 17th parallel.

The communist threat to South-east Asia, then, provided the impetus forAustralia's involvement in the region—through the commitment of combattroops under the SEATO framework, and through various forms of economicand technical assistance as part of a comprehensive strategy of strengtheningregional security through development. Australia has extended since the 1950svarious forms of technical, educational, and developmental assistance to South-east Asia under the Colombo Plan, through bilateral arrangements, and othermultilateral arrangements such as ASP AC (Asian and Pacific Council, formedin 1965), and UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). Since theformation of ASEAN, a whole new era in Australian development assistanceand economic cooperation opened in conformity with changing political,economic and security trends in the Asia-Pacific region.

Australian-South-east Asian relations entered a new phase with the enuncia-tion of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969. The reassessment of US national interests inSouth-East Asia in the wake of America's military withdrawal from Indochinacaused, if not compelled, similar reassessments by America's friends and alliesof the emerging strategic scenario after Vietnam. President Nixon's call toAsian allies to be more self-reliant for their defence needs sent a clear signal toprincipal security partners such as Australia, Japan and ASEAN that US globaland regional defence commitments were to be drastically reduced. The messagefor Australia and America's other Asia-Pacific allies lay in the central thesis ofthe Nixon Doctrine:

the United States will participate in the defense of its allies and friends, but. . . America cannot—and will not—conceive all the plans, design all theprograms, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of thefree nations of the world. We will help where it makes a difference and isconsidered in our interest.2

Henceforward, the reordering of national interest priorities became a matter ofcourse, with Australia formulating its national defence policy based strictly on

337

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

09:

13 1

6 O

ctob

er 2

014

AUSTRALIA AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

the doctrine of self-reliance. Never the less, confidence in national and regionaldefence capabilities was buttressed by developments in the global strategicenvironment: the Sino-Soviet conflict which put an end to the myth of mono-lithic communism; regional resilience in the form of ASEAN, manifested bygrowing political stability and economic prosperity; and the onset of detenteand multipolarity in the early 1970s—a factor which provided greater room forregional manoeuvre.

The earliest manifestation of defence cooperation between Australia andASEAN in the post-Nixon Doctrine era was the FPDA (Five Power DefenceArrangements) entered into in 1971 by Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, NewZealand and Britain following the termination of the 15-year Anglo-MalaysianDefence Agreement (AMDA) which enumerated Britain's responsibility for thedefence of Malaysia and Singapore. Australia was keenly aware of Malaysia'sneed for external security assistance—a fact that was exposed by the IndonesianConfrontation of Malaysia between 1963 and 1965. Australia's strong supportfor Malaysia served the twin objectives of demonstrating Canberra's commit-ment to ANZAM, and to ensure continued British interest in South-east Asia.3

The FPDA being a loosely structured security arrangement could not thereforebe relied on totally to protect Malaysia and Singapore from external(communist) attack. Conceptions of national and regional security in a post-Vietnam context must necessarily incorporate to a greater extent the political,social and economic dimensions. To be sure, regional states like Malaysiatended to find greater security through socioeconomic development rather thanthrough heavy investment in defence resources and state-of-the-art militarytechnology. Australian-ASEAN approaches to security in the 1970s andbeyond required restructuring of relationships with major external powers onthe basis of burden-sharing and partnership. This also necessarily meant thatthe tempo of regional security concerns and requirements was going to beincreasingly determined by the regional states themselves with minimal inputsfrom external powers. The increasing emphasis on the political and socio-economic dimensions of security led to new, indigenous formulations such asASEAN itself, and its Malaysian-inspired product, ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace,Freedom, and Neutrality)—a proposal arising from the Kuala Lumpur Declara-tion of ASEAN Foreign Ministers in 1971.

From the Australian perspective, if ZOPFAN represents ASEAN's broadsecurity response to post-Vietnam South-east Asia, it did not seriously conflictwith Canberra's strategic perspective. It is useful and relevant to quote the viewof an Australian scholar on the notion of security:

Security is indivisible: it is rarely exclusively regional: it is seldom whollya matter of military defence. In the contemporary world it is not only thatsecurity is global but also that it is concerned with questions of politicalstability, economic satisfaction, ideological poses, and value attitudes.4

The demise of superpower (US) hegemony in South-east Asia in the 1970sand beyond tended to strengthen regional optimism in favour of equi-distant diplomacy in accord with reduced threat perceptions regarding externalintervention in regional conflicts. The creation of a post-Vietnam regionalorder could now realistically focus on principles of peaceful coexistence,

338

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

09:

13 1

6 O

ctob

er 2

014

AUSTRALIA AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

accommodation, and even functional cooperation. The strengthening ofASEAN was a cardinal pillar of this new approach as the regional association'sprimary focus was socioeconomic, not military. In supporting ASEANregionalism Australia continued to share the USA's strategic perspective ofSouth-east Asia in terms of commitment to the non-communist forces—aperception that was reinforced by the Vietnamese invasion and occupation ofCambodia only three years after the collapse of Indochina's pro-Americanregimes.

The third Indochina war witnessed the fusion of Australian, ASEAN,American, Japanese and even Chinese strategic perspectives of South-east Asia.The Soviet threat, then as now, provided the stimulus for Canberra's anti-Soviet-Vietnamese coalition. The late 1970s and 1980s marked the strengthen-ing of Australia's cooperation with ASEAN at all levels—military, political,economic, social and cultural. Australia became a key component of ASEAN'sspecial relationship with six Dialogue partners, namely the USA, Japan,Australia, New Zealand, the European Community and Canada. This relation-ship augmented to a significant extent ASEAN's political and economicviability as a regional grouping in the face of communist expansion symbolizedrespectively by Soviet and Vietnamese adventurism in South (Afghanistan) andSouth-east Asia (Cambodia).

In sum, the evolution of Australia's attitude and involvement in South-eastAsia during the period of the first Cold War (1947-69), the first detente(1969-79), and the second Cold War (1979-89) was strongly governed bypostwar ideological considerations shaped to a large extent by the power andpresence of the USA in the Asia-Pacific region. As multipolarity began toincreasingly characterize international relations in the 1970s and 1980sstemming in part from a reduced US global presence, Australian as well asregional strategic doctrines began to emphasize the concept of self-reliance.This post-Nixon doctrine approach was less ideological and more comprehen-sive emphasizing political and socioeconomic development—a trend that hascontinued into the present, and may well characterize the substance of national,regional and global interaction in the post-Cold War era. Thus, it would bepertinent to examine more closely the substantive aspects of Australian-South-east Asian relations with a view to understanding how past and present trends—strategic, economic, political, social, cultural, ideological and scientific—have influenced the current relationship, and how this relationship itselfwill be modified in the future by ongoing dramatic developments in globalrelations.

Substantive aspects of Australian-South-east Asian relations

Australian strategic perceptions of, and commitment to South-east Asiandevelopment and regional security can be measured by the objectives, nature,level and consequences of this commitment as expressed in real terms. For thepurposes of this study, Australia's strategic involvement is examined in terms ofthree criteria: (1) security assistance and defence cooperation; (2) developmentassistance and economic cooperation; and (3) Australia's capacity to shape theregional order in the emerging post-Cold War era.

339

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

09:

13 1

6 O

ctob

er 2

014

AUSTRALIA AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

Security assistance and defence cooperation

Australia's security commitments to, and defence cooperation with South-eastAsia was strongly moulded by (1) the fact of Asian imperialism via Japan duringWorld War II, (2) the postwar threat of communist imperialism via China andVietnam, and (3) the promise of anti-communist nationalism via principallywhat later developed as the Association of South-east Asian Nations since 1967(Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, The Philippines, and Brunei). Theimmediate Australian response to the outbreak of the Cold War was thecreation of ANZAM—a strategy designed to lock-in British defence support toits colonies in Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories. ANZAM servedthe dual purpose of Australian security policy: it 'ensured, even though tempo-rarily, Australia's northern territories against threats from the north',5 whileindicating at the same time Australian commitment to South-east Asianregional security. In this regard, Australia even attempted to extend its commit-ments to the region by directly linking ANZAM to the Manila Pact. Accordingto Prime Minister Robert Menzies, the Australian commitment of a battalion ofinfantry to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in Malaya, announced on 1April 1955 'represented the most advanced stage of planning against thebackground of the Manila Treaty'.6

The commitment of Australian combat troops in the Vietnam war indicatedthe extent of the anti-communist thrust in Australian foreign policy until the late1960s. Australia's contribution of an infantry battalion to support theAmerican war effort was also aimed at containing 'the possibility of an Asianthreat to White Australia, which had been feared for much longer'.7 At its peakbetween 1962 and 1972 when Australian combat troops were committed toVietnam, Canberra's military presence, justified within a SEATO framework,totalled 10000 personnel. However, Canberra's military commitment to theVietnam war considerably declined when the Labour government came topower in 1972—an event accompanied by other dramatic changes in big powerinvolvement in South-east Asia. Henceforth, Australia's security approach hadto reflect the possibilities and constraints prevailing in a climate of internationaldetente. With commitments under a SEATO framework no longer possible ornecessary, Canberra's focus shifted towards a looser but more appropriatesecurity arrangement and defence cooperation with Malaysia, Singapore andANZAM partners, Britain and New Zealand. The new security arrangement(FPDA) came into being in 1971 in the wake of the British withdrawal 'East ofSuez'.

Australian security assistance and defence cooperation with South-east Asiaevidence both continuity and change—continuity in the sense of focusing assis-tance to traditional recipients (Malaysia and Singapore) under the FPDA, andchange in the sense of commitment to the Nixonian principles of burden-sharing, partnership, and recognition of regional resilience, capabilities andsensitivities. Australia's FPDA contributions to date contain the followingmain elements:

• a rotational rather than a permanent presence in the light of growingregional defence capabilities coupled with declining threats to national andregional stability;

340

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

09:

13 1

6 O

ctob

er 2

014

AUSTRALIA AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

• centralization of support facilities with home-port basing of fighter aircraftwith a view to facilitate easy deployment over long distances;8

• regular bilateral as well as multilateral air and naval exercises under theFPDA with a view to augmenting the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS)which became operative simultaneously with the FPDA since 1971; and

• a growing emphasis on service-to-service training and exchange of personnelto reflect changing security needs and requirements, as well as mutualinterests and aspirations.9

From a critical standpoint, these looser arrangements are more a product ofnecessity than choice. For instance, Malaysia's emphasis on the doctrine of self-reliance in defence policy was strongly influenced by five factors: (1) a growingreluctance on the part of Australia, Britain and New Zealand to intervene inregional disputes after the 1968 announcement of British withdrawal from Asia;(2) Australia's preference for neutrality in regional disputes such as thePhilippine claim to Sabah; and (3) hesitant support from Australia and Britainfor Malaysia's request for arms and equipment following the 13 May Incidentinvolving race riots in Kuala Lumpur;10 (4) large-scale US military retrench-ment in Asia and the prospect of communist victories in Indochina; and (5) theemphasis on achieving security through socioeconomic development domes-tically, and through ASEAN-oriented cooperation at the regional level.

ZOPFAN therefore exemplified the need for regional resilience and thereduced need for external intervention and security assistance in a climate ofregional and global detente. Never the less, it must be noted that ASEANregional confidence has always been predicated on the availability, even if notthe reliability, of Western defence resources, presence and cooperation in con-tingencies. Thus, Australia's rotational deployments of its sophisticated F/A 18Hornets and F-l 11 fighter aircraft to Butterworth, strengthened by the develop-ment of a major base at Tindal in the Northern Territory (operational sinceMarch 1988), together with a detachment of RAAF Orion maritime recon-naissance aircraft based at Butterworth, plus the presence of a rifle company(the Australian military presence in Malaysia ranges from 500-650 personnel atany given time)—demonstrate the level of support and cooperation that is bothmutually desirable and possible under current circumstances. Any heightenedmilitary presence, be it Australian or foreign, would run counter to regional,and especially Malaysian professions of neutrality and non-alignment. ForAustralia's part, such an arrangement also accords well with the desire forequidistant diplomacy with the major global as well as regional actors includingChina and Vietnam.

Development assistance and economic cooperation

Australia's desire for greater economic interaction with South-east Asia in thepost-Nixon doctrine era stemmed from a cardinal principle of national securitypolicy: the shift after 1969 from the strategy of forward defence to the conceptof self-reliance. It is noteworthy that current socioeconomic trends inAustralian foreign policy towards South-east Asia have their origins in theLabour government of Gough Whitlam since 1972. During his 1974 visit to

341

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

09:

13 1

6 O

ctob

er 2

014

AUSTRALIA AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

South-east Asia, Prime Minister Whitlam emphasized the need to shift quicklyAustralian policies from the hitherto strict ideological-military orientation to'one based on more enduring ties such as trade, aid programmes, regional co-operation, economic cooperation, and the development of a network of culturalcontacts and agreements'.11

The extension of development aid to South-east Asian countries originated inthe postwar era with the Colombo Plan—a multilateral aid programmepioneered by Australia in 1950 and launched officially on 1 July 1951 to provideeconomic, technical and developmental assistance to underdeveloped Asiancountries. Fear and sympathy appeared to be the driving forces of thisdevelopment aid programme: fear stemming from the communist threat toSouth-east Asia and eventually to Australia, and sympathy for the undevelopedand poverty-stricken masses of Asia. In the first 15 years (1951-65), Australianexpenditure under the Colombo Plan reached A£58 641744. Of this total,A£41 295 157 was devoted to economic development, while A£17 346 587 wasspent on technical assistance.12 The Colombo Plan can be viewed as furnishingthe ideological, philosophical and humanitarian basis of Australia's subsequentaid policies for South-east Asia. For, with the formation of ASEAN,Canberra's concerns for regional stability centred on providing developmentassistance to the regional grouping. In 1976-77 ASEAN alone accounted for 10per cent of Australian foreign aid, with most of it going for agriculture, ruraldevelopment and transportation.13

With the process of modernization, development and industrialization pro-ceeding apace in South-east Asia, and especially in ASEAN, Australian-ASEAN interaction is being progressively upgraded from one based onapprehension and dependence to one based on mutual confidence and partner-ship. The most cogent evidence of this trend is ASEAN's dialogue-partnerrelationship with Australia inaugurated in 1974 at about the same time as theregional entity was upgrading its international profile through similar relation-ships with the European Community (1972), New Zealand (1975), and withCanada, Japan and the USA in 1977. Dialogue-partner support for ASEANregional cooperation has facilitated the building of multiple cooperativelinkages on an intra-regional, as well as extra-regional basis in numerous fields,viz (1) finance and banking, (2) food, agriculture, and forestry, (3) industry,minerals and energy, (4) transportation and communication, (5) science andtechnology, (6) social development, (7) culture and information, and (8) drugcontrol. External inputs into these functional areas contribute directly as well asindirectly towards augmenting national developmental and growth strategieswhile at the same time strengthening regional integrative forces. For instance, inthe field of secondary and tertiary education, Australia's role as a majorprovider of this vital resource cannot be overlooked. To date, over 100000Malaysians have completed their studies in Australia, with a majority beingbeneficiaries of partial or full funding from the Australian government. Also,of the 20 000 foreign students currently enrolled in long-term courses inAustralian universities, colleges and secondary schools, over 11000 areMalaysians.14

Australia's development assistance to Malaysia and other ASEAN countriesis currently provided through three major channels: (1) the Australian Inter-

342

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

09:

13 1

6 O

ctob

er 2

014

AUSTRALIA AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

national Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB), (2) the Australian Centrefor International Agricultural Research (ACIAR), and (3) the InternationalDevelopment Program of Australian Universities and Colleges (IDP). Ofgreater importance is assistance provided by AIDAB under the ASEAN-Australia Economic Cooperation Program (AAECP) in which Canberra'scurrent annual contributions total A$7 million for specific projects including(a) food handling, (b) food technology research and development, (c) non-conventional energy research, (d) trade and investment promotion, (e) micro-electronics, (f) living coastal resources, and (g) regional ocean dynamics.15

The significance of South-east Asia in Australia's aid programme is readilyseen when compared to other aid recipients (except for Papua New Guinea forobvious historical and geopolitical reasons) for 1987-88, as shown in Table 1.However, although total Australian aid allocations for South-east Asia in1989-90 amounted to A$298 million or 25 per cent of the total Australian aidvote, Australia's role as aid donor in South-east Asia and the South Pacific isdeclining in importance as other countries especially Japan become more active.For instance, Japanese aid to the Pacific marked an increase from US$17.6million in 1983 to US$66.49 million in 1987, while aid to South-east Asiaincreased from US$845.32 million to US$1.87 billion over the same period.16

Trade is another maj or area of development in Australian-ASE AN relations.Bilateral trade flows are increasingly being conditioned by two crucial factors:the steady progress of ASEAN industrialization, and the rejuvenation ofAustralia's manufacturing and service sectors. The dramatic growth in two-waytrade over the past decade is clearly indicative of the mutual desire for expandedtrade cooperation as both entities face diverse and more complex economicchallenges to their mutual survival and progress. The potential for greatercooperation is borne out by the fact that over the past ten years (from 1977-78to 1987-88) Australian exports to ASEAN increased by 24 per cent from A$2.4billion to nearly A$3 billion. ASEAN exports to Australia in the same periodrecorded an even higher increase of 35 per cent from A$1.9 billion to almostAS2.6 billion. Australia's principal exports to ASEAN comprise wheat, crude

Table 1. Australian Official Development Assistance to developingcountries, 1987-88.

Papua New GuineaASEAN (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,

and Thailand)South PacificChinaSouth AsiaIndochinaBurma

Total ODA Budget for Asia-PacificTotal Development Assistance for world

including Middle East and Africa

A$103

306.7

202.386.634.130.120.711.8

692.3

1019.5Source; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Annual Report1987-88 (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra,1988), pp 178-181.

343

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

09:

13 1

6 O

ctob

er 2

014

AUSTRALIA AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

petroleum, non-monetary gold, aluminium and alloys, refined petroleumproducts, and milk and cream. Canberra's principal imports from ASEAN arecrude petroleum, refined petroleum products, fish, crustaceans and molluscs,wood/rail sleepers, veneers/plywood, machinery and natural rubber.17

Never the less, two-way trade between Australia and ASEAN still accountsfor only 6.8 per cent of total Australian trade, with the trade balance still inAustralia's favour (in 1987-88 Australia exported nearly A$3 billion worth ofgoods to ASEAN, and imported goods valued at about A$2.5 billion).18

The explanation for the low volume of two-way trade may well lie in the factthat both Australia and ASEAN share to some extent similar characteristics ofunderdevelopment causing a tendency to orientate their export markets to themajor industrialized powers, viz North America, East Asia (Japan and SouthKorea), and the European Community. Intra-ASEAN trade is less than 20 percent of total trade because ASEAN, like Australia, is essentially an exporter ofprimary commodities.

As ASEAN industrializes further through competitive market-orientedstrategies and policies emphasizing private sector participation as the primaryengine of growth, the regional entity's share of the Australian import market isbound to increase in the next decade. This prospect appears brighter asAustralia's Labour Government of Bob Hawke is taking strident steps towardmaking Australian industries more efficient and competitive especially in themanufacturing and service sectors. ASEAN's share of manufactures in totalexports to Australia has steadily increased in recent years, from 42 per cent in1987-88 to 50 per cent in 1988-89. Another noteworthy factor reflectingASEAN's capacity for trade and investment expansion is the level of investmentflows to Australia. As of June 1987, the total stock of ASEAN investment inAustralia stood at A$10.4 billion (mostly Singapore portfolio investment), ascompared to total Australian investments in ASEAN valued at only A$1.4billion. This figure is indeed very small when compared to investments byASEAN's other major dialogue-partners such as the USA which in 1988 hadinvestments valued at over US$10 billion.19 This apparently unfavourable trendin Australia's investment policies needs to be corrected as both sides upgradetheir productive industrial capacites, and work towards reducing protectionism,increasing their terms of trade, and striving for a more just and open tradingsystem via the current Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.

Capacity to shape the regional order in the post-Cold War era

The capacity of any nation to influence regional and global developments isessentially determined by goals that it sets for itself, and the strategies it adoptsto realize those goals. The crucial issues here are: What are Australia's foreignpolicy objectives? Second, to what extent is Australia capable of achieving theseobjectives in the context of the realities of international objectives?

The objectives of Australian foreign policy may be enumerated as follows:

(1) Strategic: to maintain and promote Australia's territorial sovereignty,national security and political independence through the creation of astrategic environment involving the maintenance of political, intelligence,

344

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

09:

13 1

6 O

ctob

er 2

014

AUSTRALIA AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

and defence cooperation with countries in the Asia-Pacific region.(2) Economic: to ensure and promote Australia's economic and social welfare

through fostering trade and economic growth, creating an efficient andcompetitive economy, and promoting an open, cooperative, just and pro-gressive international economic order.

(3) Social: to promote the cause of humanity by raising international standardsof political, social and economic justice, and to work towards a globalconsensus for the improvement of the human condition.20

In conformity with these objectives, Australia's postwar foreign policies reflectthe adoption of trade, aid, development and defence strategies to preserve andpromote Australian values and interests in the comity of nations. The strategicapproach to national security required the pursuit of defence cooperation withmajor powers as well as geographically proximate regional states. Canberra'scapacity to contribute to national as well as regional defence was manifestedvariously through ANZAM, ANZUS, SEATO, ASP AC and FPDA. Commit-ment did not necessarily denote capacity, and capacity need not necessarilydictate commitment—as evidenced by Australia's wavering participation inSEATO and reluctance to get too involved with the defence of South-east Asiafollowing decisions by its senior security partners, Britain and the USA, towithdraw militarily from South-east Asia. However, both these instancesrelating to regional security are indicative of pressures on policy makers toassess security threats based purely on national interest considerations—whichalso involves the evaluation of alternative approaches to security.

In the post-Cold War context, the pursuit of national interests requires moreimaginative formulations. The notion of comprehensive security facilitatesconsensus-building across cultures, ideologies and nations. Australia's as wellas ASEAN's capacity to influence the regional order depends on the skill inmanaging the interplay of a multitude of factors including: (1) national andregional sensitivities in South-east Asia; (2) the purpose and value of securitycooperation in a rapidly de-ideologizing region; (3) the need for Australia andASEAN to adopt policies and strategies that facilitate integration with thedynamic economies of Pacific-Asia; (4) ensuring domestic economic andpolitical resilience to boost national capacity to influence the regional order ina mutually desirable direction; and (5) focusing on diplomacy and developmentas the most appropriate strategies to avert tension, conflict and war.-

Australia's greatest asset in dealing with South-east Asia is its non-threatening profile. Unlike Britain, the USA, Japan and even China, there is nopast record of imperialism or aggression. Australia's steady record of providingdevelopment assistance enables developing countries like ASEAN to view theAntipodean nation as a source of national development and progress.Australia's inputs into ASEAN regional projects, though relatively small incomparison to other dialogue-partners, are generally considered by participants'to be quite successful and instrumental in promoting ASEAN regionalcooperation'.21 In the area of educational advancement, ASEAN-Australianinteraction can attain even higher levels with spinoffs in terms of upgradingmanagerial and technical skills needed in an increasingly high-tech world.Canberra's abandonment of discriminatory immigration policies against

345

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

09:

13 1

6 O

ctob

er 2

014

AUSTRALIA AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

Asians, and its humanitarian support for refugees from conflict-ridden areas,especially Indochina, are bound to increase regional confidence in even-handedapproaches to problem-solving. It is relevant to note here that Australia hasaccepted over 120000 Indochinese refugees since 1975—a figure representingthe highest proportion of all resettlement countries, and more than twice thequota accepted by the USA.22

In political and diplomatic terms, Australia's capacity to contribute toregional security must relate to current and likely future trends in the directionof disarmament and neutralization. This is not to suggest that existing securitybonds be weakened; in fact they should not as long as ties such as the FPDAare mutually desired as Australian and ASEAN security policies are based onthe doctrine of self-reliance. However, existing security relationships need to bealigned with the emerging regional order bereft of the Cold War. In this regard,Australian and ASEAN efforts and initiatives in finding a Cambodian settle-ment based on the national interests of all Cambodians, the legitimate securityinterests of its neighbours, and the broader humanitarian and global interests inresolving regional conflicts—are complementary, integrative and relevant toregional stability and cooperation. Australian/ASEAN energies need equally toaddress the long-term integration of a reformed China, Vietnam and Burmainto the emerging regional order.

Conclusion: facing the challenge of change into the 21st century

The greatest challenge in the final decade of the 20th century and beyond forboth Australia and ASEAN (as it is for other nations as well) is economicchange. This factor becomes more crucial in the wake of the ideological changesthat are dramatically, though painfully, transforming command economies intocompetitive and open political systems. The waning of ideological conflicts canwell lead to economic wars if the transformation is mismanaged as a result ofinadequate preparation. In as much as Australia, ASEAN and their major allieswere able to demonstrate significant political willpower in confronting anddefeating the ideological (communist) challenge of the 1950s, immediate pastperformance indicates that they have the political, and, even more, theeconomic capacity to turn 'swords into ploughshares'.

The APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) proposal put forward byPrime Minister Bob Hawke in November 1989, with the aim of regularizingconsultations on trade liberalization and economic cooperation, appears to bea positive initiative for the 1990s and beyond23—in the same way that theColombo Plan was a response to meet some of the huge requirements of socio-economic development of the newly independent countries in South and South-east Asia soon after World War II.

Canberra's APEC initiative is based on the fundamental assumption that 'theeconomic dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region is leading to a decisive shift inthe centre of gravity of world economic activity from the Atlantic to thePacific'.24 Far from creating a formal negotiating body or a trading bloc,Australia views APEC as an informal collective arrangement which could (1)help liberalize trade in the region, (2) facilitate tourism, direct foreign invest-ment, and exchange of services, (3) protect the regional interest in wider

346

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

09:

13 1

6 O

ctob

er 2

014

AUSTRALIA AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

economic forums, and (4) foster a more efficient use of regional resources suchas energy markets and fisheries.25

For Australia as much as for ASEAN, the adoption of concrete measures toput their domestic economic house in order would be a direct and constructiveresponse to the challenge of change. This entails, as Australia's federalopposition leader, Dr John Hewson put it, 'reducing our record foreign debt,bringing down our rate of inflation, realizing our export potential, andachieving real reforms in our economic infrastructure'.26 As partners in acommon struggle, Australia, ASEAN, Japan and the USA, in as much as theyhave earlier demonstrated a capacity to structure their regional order for thebenefit of mankind, now have the opportunity to restructure this regional orderin association with other global and regional powers (especially China and"India) to face collectively the political, economic, technological, ecological andstrategic challenges of the emerging 21st century.27 In specific terms, theprevious levels of cooperation attained within the ASEAN-Australian frame-work could now provide the foundation for further confidence-buildingmeasures and constructive engagement in the prospective order in South-eastAsia.

Acknowledgment

The writer wishes to express his gratitude to Mr Christopher Sparke, FirstSecretary of the Australian High Commission in Kuala Lumpur, for his kindassistance with relevant data and reference materials, and to Ms Susan Teo,Librarian of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS),Malaysia, for her kind cooperation.

Notes and references

1 Figures compiled from Information Please Almanac: Atlas and Yearbok 1989(42nd edition) (Houghton Mifflin, New York, 1989); and Asia 1990 Yearbook (FarEastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, 1990).

2 US Foreign Policy For The 1970s: A Strategy For Peace (A Report To TheCongress, by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, 18 February 1970),p 6.

3 ANZAM stands for an informal consultative arrangement created in 1949 by thegovernments of Australia, New Zealand and Britain to coordinate defenceplanning for the ANZAM region covering Australia, New Zealand, and the Britishterritories of Malaya and Borneo. For details, see Alan Watt, Australian ForeignPolicy 1938-1965 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967), pp 163-166.

4 Gordon Greenwood, Approaches to Asia: Australian Postwar Policies andAttitudes (McGraw-Hill, Sydney, 1974), p 480.

5 This is the finding of an Indian scholar, Mitra Nandan Jha, based on his doctoralthesis entitled 'The origins of SEATO', cited in Ravindra Varma, Australia andSEA TO: The Crystallisation of a Relationship (Abhinav Publications, New Delhi,1974), p 107.

6 Cited in Leszek Buszynski, SEATO: The Failure Of An Alliance Strategy(Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1983), p 63.

347

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

09:

13 1

6 O

ctob

er 2

014

AUSTRALIA AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

7 R. Catley, 'Prelude to Vietnam', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies (SpecialNumber: 'Australia, New Zealand and Southeast Asia', edited by NicholasTarling), Vol II, No 1, March 1971, p 48.

8 Chris Freeman (ed), Australia and Malaysia 1990 (a publication of the AustralianHigh Commission in Kuala Lumpur, D23/86 1990), p 9.

9 F. A. Mediansky, 'Security cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islandsin a multipolar regional order', The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol 2,No 1, Summer 1990, p 86.

10 Muthiah Alagappa, 'Malaysia: from the Commonwealth umbrella to selfreliance', in Chin Kin Wah (ed), Defence Spending in Southeast Asia (Institute ofSoutheast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1987), p 180.

11 Cited in Khien Theeravit, Australian-Thai Relations: A Thai Perspective(Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, Occasional Paper No 58, 1979),p 6.

12 Commonwealth of Australia Yearbook (1965), p 1226, cited in Watt, op cit, Ref 3,p 198.

13 Theeravit, op cit, Ref 11, p 11.14 Freeman, op cit, Ref 8, p 13.15 Ibid, pp 16-17.16 Ministerial Statement (December 1989) by Senator Gareth Evans, Australian

Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, entitled 'Australia's regional security'(Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 1989), p 32.

17 Based on discussions with Australian Foreign Ministry officials in Kuala Lumpur,November 1990.

18 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Annual Report 1987-88 (AustralianGovernment Publishing Service, Canberra, 1988), pp 172-175.

19 K. S. Nathan, 'The political, institutional, and security dimensions of US-ASEAN dialogues', in Pamela Sodhy (ed), US-A SEAN Trade: Current Issues andFuture Strategies (Malaysian Association for American Studies, Kuala Lumpur,1988), p 321.

20 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Annual Report 1987-88, op cit, Ref 18,p 33.

21 C. P. F. Luhulima, 'ASEAN-Australian relations: status of the art', TheIndonesian Quarterly, Vol XIII, No 1, 1985, p 91.

22 Evans, op cit, Ref 16, p 38.23 The APEC process was formally launched in Canberra on 6-7 November 1989,

with 26 senior ministers from 12 countries attending the inaugural meeting. Thesecond APEC ministerial-level meeting was held in Singapore in July 1990, and thethird meeting is scheduled to be held in Seoul in 1991.

24 Richard Woolcott (Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and TradeAustralia), 'APEC: the wave of the 1990s', Australian Foreign Affairs and Trade,Vol 61, No 2, February 1990, p 64.

25 Asia 1990 Yearbook (Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, 1990), p 78.26 Speech entitled 'Australian foreign policy: the necessity of choice', delivered at The

Australian Institute of International Affairs, Canberra, 13 September 1990, p 9.27 See, for instance, the view expressed by Evans, op cit, Ref 16, p 46.

348

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

09:

13 1

6 O

ctob

er 2

014