atp 3-01.60 counter-rocket,artillery,and mortar operations may 2013

ATP 3-01.60 Publication Date

Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar Operations

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION. Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information for official government use. This determination was made on 01 February 2005. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commandant, United States Army Air Defense Artillery School, ATTN: ATSF-DTA, Fort Sill, OK 73503-5000.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE. Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

Headquarters Department of the Army

*ATP 3-01.60

Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to

protect technical or operational information for official government use. This determination was made on 01 February 2005. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commandant, United States Army Air Defense Artillery School, ATTN: ATSF-DTA, Fort Sill, OK 73503-5000.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE. Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of

the document.

*This publication supersedes FMI 3-01.60, 16 March 2006.

Publication Date ATP 3-01.60 i

For Official Use Only

Army, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

No. 3-01.60

Headquarters

Department of the Army

Washington, DC

Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar Operations

Contents

Page

PREFACE............................................................................................................. vii

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... ix

Chapter 1 INDIRECT FIRE AND THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ......................... 1-1 General ............................................................................................................... 1-1 Enemy IDF: A Tactical Weapon to Achieve Operational Information Effects ... 1-2 Planning to Defeat the Enemy IDF Threat ......................................................... 1-3

Chapter 2 C-RAM OPERATIONS DOCTRINE ................................................................... 2-1 The Joint and Combined Arms Fight to Defeat Enemy IDF ............................... 2-1 Offensive and Defensive Fires Synergy ............................................................. 2-1 Unit Mission ........................................................................................................ 2-2 How to Fight: Enduring Principles ..................................................................... 2-2 The C-RAM Functional Areas............................................................................. 2-4

Chapter 3 C-RAM SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRUCT ..................................................................................................... 3-1 C-RAM Joint Plug-and-Fight Systems ................................................................ 3-1 Core Systems ..................................................................................................... 3-1 Description of Major Components ...................................................................... 3-7 C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery Mission and Organization ............................ 3-12

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ii ATP 3-01.60 Publication Date


C-RAM Joint Intercept Battery Mission and Organization ................................ 3-26

Chapter 4 C-RAM UNIT PLANNING, OPERATIONS, AND SUSTAINMENT .................... 4-1 C-RAM Integration with Supported Joint and Army Units ................................... 4-1 Command and Control Functional Organization ................................................. 4-3 LPWS Employment Considerations .................................................................... 4-8 Base Defense Plan ............................................................................................. 4-8 Network Architecture ........................................................................................... 4-9 WAVES Employment Plan ................................................................................ 4-11 C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery, Platoon, and Squad Operations ................. 4-12 Degraded Operations ........................................................................................ 4-14

Chapter 5 EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES ................................................... B-1 Emergency operating procedures ...................................................................... B-1 Reconnaissance, Selection, Occupation of Position ......................................... B-4 Engagement Operations .................................................................................... B-6 Countering Interference And Jamming .............................................................. B-8 Deployability ....................................................................................................... B-9 Communications and Data Link ......................................................................... B-9 Considerations for Potential Future Split-Based Operations ........................... B-13

Appendix A FIRING CUTOUT ZONE IMPLEMENTATION .................................................. A-1 Locating the Mount............................................................................................. A-1 Boresight Preparation ........................................................................................ A-1 Collecting Boresight Data .................................................................................. A-2 Firing Cutout Zone Design ................................................................................. A-4 Firing Cutout ZONE Switch Sector Design ........................................................ A-4 Firing Cutout Zone Implementation.................................................................... A-6 Switch Locations and Adjustment Procedures .................................................. A-7

Appendix B VME ENC PROCESSOR CCA .......................................................................... B-1 Preliminary Operations ...................................................................................... B-1 Set Up WinPASS ............................................................................................... B-1 Restarting the VME Processor ........................................................................... B-7 Post Loading Procedures ................................................................................... B-7 Checking and Setting the Date and Time on VME Processor ........................... B-8 Set Up the WinPASS IP Address and TFTP Server .......................................... B-9

Appendix C NORTH FINDING DEVICE ................................................................................ C-1 Position the LPWS Mount .................................................................................. C-1 Connecting the North Finding Device to the LPWS and Powering Up .............. C-1 Acquiring Data from the North Finding Device .................................................. C-1

Appendix D SUSTAINMENT ................................................................................................. D-1 Responsibilities .................................................................................................. D-1 Battalion Trains .................................................................................................. D-1 Logistics Packages ............................................................................................ D-1 Unit Interface with the BRC ................................................................................ D-2 Classes of Supply .............................................................................................. D-2

Contents

Publication Date ATP 3-01.60 iii


Maintenance, Recovery, and Repair .................................................................. D-3

Appendix E SLEEP DEPRIVATION ...................................................................................... E-1 Overview ............................................................................................................. E-1 Sleeping in the Operational Environment ........................................................... E-1 Maintaining Performance During Sustained Operations/Continuous Operations .......................................................................................................... E-3 Specific Sleep Loss Effects ................................................................................ E-5 Common Misconceptions About Sleep and Sleep Loss .................................... E-6

Appendix F THE INDIRECT FIRE THREAT ......................................................................... F-1 Threat Analysis ................................................................................................... F-1 Examples of IDF Threats .................................................................................... F-3

Appendix G C-RAM REPORTS ............................................................................................. G-1

Appendix H SITE SURVEY AND RSOP CHECKLISTS ........................................................ H-1 General ............................................................................................................... H-1 RSOP Checklist .................................................................................................. H-1

Appendix I SURVEY .............................................................................................................. I-1 Q48 LCMR Orientation/Survey/Employment ....................................................... I-1

GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... Glossary-1

REFERENCES .................................................................................. References-1

INDEX .......................................................................................................... Index-1

Figures

Figure 2-1. C-RAM functional overview .................................................................................. 2-4

Figure 3-1. Local control console (Unit 1) .............................................................................. 3-2

Figure 3-2. Electronics enclosure (Unit 2) .............................................................................. 3-3

Figure 3-3. Radar weapon assembly (Unit 3) ......................................................................... 3-4

Figure 3-4. Local control station (Unit 13) .............................................................................. 3-5

Figure 3-5. Remote control station (Unit 14) .......................................................................... 3-6

Figure 3-6. SINCGARS radio (generic view) .......................................................................... 3-7

Figure 3-7. Example of wireless hardware configuration ..................................................... 3-10

Figure 3-8. Land-based Phalanx weapon system ................................................................ 3-11

Figure 3-9. Control room internal view ................................................................................. 3-11

Figure 3-10. C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery organization structure ................................. 3-13

Figure 3-11. C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery organization elements................................. 3-13

Figure 3-12. C-RAM Joint Intercept Battery ......................................................................... 3-27

Figure 4-1. LCMR site location ............................................................................................... 4-7

Figure 4-2. Multiple LCMR emplacement ............................................................................... 4-8

Figure 4-3. BDOC early warning network ............................................................................. 4-10

Figure 4-4. C-RAM data flow ................................................................................................ 4-11

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iv ATP 3-01.60 Publication Date


Figure 4-5. Example of local warning configuration ............................................................. 4-12

Figure 4-6. Sense and warn architecture ............................................................................. 4-13

Figure 4-7. AMDWS (addition to architecture) .................................................................... 4-14

Figure 4-8. Engagement sequence from LPWS during degraded operations ..................... 4-15

Figure 4-9. Engagement Sequence from EO Section during degraded operations ............ 4-16

Figure 5-1. LPWS emplaced with mutual support ................................................................. B-5

Figure 5-2. LPWS emplaced with overlapping fields of fire ................................................... B-5

Figure 5-3. LPWS emplaced with mutual support and overlapping fields of fire ................... B-6

Figure 5-4. RAM target versus friendly track ......................................................................... B-7

Figure 5-5. Alert message display during engagement ......................................................... B-8

Figure 5-6. Sending NO FIRE to all platoons ....................................................................... B-9

Figure 5-7. TOCNET notional deployment.......................................................................... B-11

Figure 5-8. Typical TOCNET node diagram ....................................................................... B-12

Figure A-1. LPWS train ring scale .......................................................................................... A-3

Figure A-2. LOS data entry form ............................................................................................ A-4

Figure A-3. Typical switch sector design ............................................................................... A-6

Figure A-4. LPWS FCZ switch logic ....................................................................................... A-7

Figure A-5. Elevation data unit ............................................................................................... A-8

Figure A-6. Train data unit ..................................................................................................... A-9

Figure A-7. Switch stack, top view ....................................................................................... A-10

Figure A-8. FCZ verification form ......................................................................................... A-11

Figure A-9. Firing interrupter switch performance data form ............................................... A-12

Figure B-1. Example of IP address table display ................................................................... B-2

Figure B-2. Boot-up screen display ........................................................................................ B-6

Figure B-3. PSOS information/modification display ............................................................... B-7

Figure B-4. Example of date and time display ....................................................................... B-8

Figure B-5. IP Address assignments for Adapter 1 ............................................................... B-9

Figure B-6. IP address assignments for Adapter 2 ................................................................ B-9

Figure C-1. North finding device installation location ............................................................. C-2

Figure F-1. Rocket launcher .................................................................................................. F-4

Figure F-2. Types of rockets .................................................................................................. F-5

Figure F-2. Types of rockets (continued) ............................................................................... F-6

Figure G-1. Sample of C-RAM Maintenance Tracker Report ................................................ G-1

Figure G-2. Sample of C-RAM IDF Report ............................................................................ G-2

Figure G-3. Sample of Equipment Item/System Report (A) .................................................. G-3

Figure G-4. Sample of Equipment Item/System Report (B) .................................................. G-4

Figure H-1. De-install and install of C-RAM capabilities ....................................................... H-5

Figure H-2. De-install roles and responsibilities for C-RAM capabilities .............................. H-6

Figure I-1. Q48 LCMR orientation (without proper survey orientation) .................................. I-1

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Publication Date ATP 3-01.60 v


Figure I-2. Q48 LCMR orientation (with proper survey orientation) ....................................... I-2

Figure I-3. Survey error .......................................................................................................... I-2

Figure I-4. LPL error from survey error at 2 km ...................................................................... I-3

Figure I-5. LPL error from survey error at 5 km ...................................................................... I-3

Figure I-6. Q48 LCMR preferred orientation methods ............................................................ I-4

Figure I-7. Q48 LCMR orientation summary .......................................................................... I-4

Figure I-8. Q48 LCMR basic employment considerations ...................................................... I-5

Tables

Table 1. STANAGs ................................................................................................................... vii

Table 3-1. FAAD C3I system components ............................................................................. 3-7

Table 3-2. Assess the tactical situation and operations ...................................................... 3-17

Table 3-3. RAM threat factors ............................................................................................. 3-17

Table 3-4. Environmental effects ......................................................................................... 3-17

Table 3-5. Threat analysis ................................................................................................... 3-17

Table 3-6. Enemy COAs ...................................................................................................... 3-18

Table 3-7. Conduct analysis ................................................................................................ 3-18

Table 3-8. Plan ISR ............................................................................................................. 3-18

Table 3-9. COA support ....................................................................................................... 3-19

Table 3-10. Concept of support ........................................................................................... 3-19

Table 3-11. COA comparisons ............................................................................................ 3-19

Table 3-12. Running estimate ............................................................................................. 3-19

Table 3-13. Annex ............................................................................................................... 3-20

Table 3-14. Synchronize ...................................................................................................... 3-20

Table 3-15. EW system operator ......................................................................................... 3-20

Table 3-16. Initialize AMDWS ............................................................................................... 3-21

Table 3-17. Map generation ................................................................................................. 3-22

Table 3-18. Situational display ............................................................................................. 3-22

Table 3-19. TOC network ..................................................................................................... 3-22

Table 3-20. Dual LAN procedures ........................................................................................ 3-23

Table 3-21. Power-up ........................................................................................................... 3-23

Table 3-22. Alerts ................................................................................................................. 3-24

Table 3-23. EW data ............................................................................................................. 3-24

Table 3-24. Battlefield display .............................................................................................. 3-24

Table 3-25. Overlay functions............................................................................................... 3-25

Table 3-26. Data distribution ................................................................................................ 3-25

Table 3-27. CTP Application program .................................................................................. 3-25

Table 3-28. Create a plan or order ....................................................................................... 3-26

Table 4-1. Threat factors ........................................................................................................ 4-5

Contents

vi ATP 3-01.60 Publication Date


Table B-1. Addresses and boot path ..................................................................................... B-2

Table B-2. CPC environment lines on WinPASS ................................................................... B-3

Table B-2. CPC environment lines on WinPASS (continued)................................................ B-5

Table E-1. Basic sleep scheduling factors ............................................................................ E-2

Table E-2. Basic sleep environment and related factors ...................................................... E-3

Table E-3. Using caffeine under various conditions of sleep deprivation ............................. E-4

Table F-1. Adversary Activity Matrix ...................................................................................... F-2

Table F-2. Rocket Threat ....................................................................................................... F-4

Table F-3. Mortar Threat ........................................................................................................ F-7

Publication Date ATP 3-01.60 vii


Preface

The purpose of this field manual (FM) is to describe the joint and combined arms approach to defeating enemy

indirect fire (IDF). It also provides initial guidance on how specialized counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-

RAM) units and capabilities contribute to offensive and defensive counter-IDF fires synergy and to that larger

joint and combined arms effort to defeat enemy rockets and mortars. It describes how C-RAM units contribute

to enabling counter-IDF shaping, denial, and response operations, and describes how C-RAM units and the C-

RAM system of systems (SoS) protect friendly forces by detecting incoming rockets and mortars, providing

timely and focused early warning (EW) of attacks, and, in selected locations, intercepting incoming rockets and

mortars. This FM focuses on operator actions, at the keyboard or system interface, and must be augmented by a

detailed standing operator procedure (SOP) to fully implement the necessary interactions between the

commander, the battle captain, and operator.

This FM provides an overview of C-RAM operations based, in part, on lessons learned during the successful

corps counter-IDF fight during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) in 20072008. The target audience is C-RAM commanders and staff, leaders, and specialists at all levels and C-RAM trainers at schools, centers of

excellence, combat training centers, and mobile training teams. This FM also provides supported maneuver

commanders insight into C-RAM and the larger full spectrum counter-IDF operations that specialized C-RAM

units support.

This publication implements the standardization agreements (STANAGs) listed in Table 1 in compliance with

the multinational force compatibility.

Table 1. STANAGs

Number Title Edition

2034 NATO Standard Procedures for Mutual Logistic Assistance 6

2047 Emergency Alarms of Hazard or Attack (NBC and Air Attack Only) 7

2103 Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Biological and Chemical Attacks, and Predicting and Warning of Associated Hazards and Hazard Areas (Operators Manual)ATP-45(C)

9

2112 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance 5

3700 Joint Air and Space Operations DoctrineAJP-3.3 6

3736 Air Interdiction and Close Air SupportAJP-3.3.2 10

3805 Doctrine for Joint Airspace ControlAJP-3.3.5(A) 8

3880 Counter AirAJP-3.3.1(A) 5

4162 Identification Data Combining Process 2

This manual applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/the Army National Guard of the United

States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. The proponent of this publication is the

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Send comments and recommendations on

DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commandant, U.S. Army

Air Defense Artillery School, ATTN: ATSA-DOT-DTR, Fort Bliss, TX 79916-3802.

Publication Date ATP 3-01.60 ix


Introduction

The enemy IDF threat is enduring and growing. The C-RAM concept is a joint and combined arms

approach to defeating enemy IDF that features offensive and defensive fires synergy and is enabled by, but

not defined by, specialized C-RAM units and equipment.

The first chapters of this manual focus on the enduring and growing IDF threat and enduring principles

associated with defeating enemy IDF. Chapters 4 and 5, and associated annexes and appendices, address

the current rapidly spiraled C-RAM units and equipment, and how we fight them. C-RAM organization and

equipment will change over time but the enduring principles will not.

The C-RAM SoS provides the following top-level functional capabilities:

SHAPEReal and non-real-time operations to deny insurgents the opportunity to conduct rockets, artillery, and mortar (RAM) attacks.

SENSETimely, reliable, accurate acquisition of in-flight RAM to support deny, warn, intercept, and respond operations.

WARNTimely, reliable, accurate, localized troop warning for impending RAM attacks.

INTERCEPTRAM munitions in-flight destruction.

PROTECTHardened shelters for high-density troop locations.

RESPONDReal and non-real-time, accurate response operations to defeat RAM insurgent personnel/teams.

COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2)Effective battle command structure to support timely and

accurate C-RAM operations

SUMMARY OF CHANGES The following items summarize the doctrinal changes made by this field manual:

Addresses the joint and combined arms approach to defeating enemy IDF with more equal emphasis on all C-RAM functional areas compared with earlier doctrine that was focused almost exclusively on the intercept function.

Replaces staff estimate with running estimate to reflect FMI 5-0.1.

Replaces the term fires effects cell (FEC) and fires effects coordinator (ECOORD) with fires cell (FC) to reflect FMI 5-0.1.

Replaces the term fires and effects with fires to reflect FMI 5-0.1.

Adds graphics showing the difference between RAM and friendlies.

Adds text indicating new alert messages with different options for sending fire permit to platoons and/or options for sending data to Wireless Audio-Visual Emergency System (WAVES) (with or without correlation).

Adds graphics of new forward area air defense (FAAD) screen shots.

Changes combat service support (CSS) to sustainment operations to reflect FMI 5-0.1.

Adds Sense and Warn Platoon, to split the Operations chapter.

Adds new capability to accept data from FAAD box at external forward operations base (FOB).

Publication Date ATP 3-01.60 1-1


Chapter 1

Indirect Fire and the Operational Environment

This chapter discusses how multinational forces are defeating and planning against

the enemy IDF threat in an operational environment. It describes the primary and

strategic uses of IDF. Also discussed is how, in general terms, the enemy employs

IDF as part of a larger approach in the current operational environment. It addresses

the need for commanders to learn who the enemy factions in their area are and learn

their weapons capabilities.

GENERAL

1-1. The battlefield in Iraq is complex and violent. The enemys strengths derive from the ability to hide within the populace. This allows the option to select the time and place to engage you with his improvised

explosive device (IED) and SAF ambushes. In this way, the enemy avoids your superior firepower and

controls your operational environment. Operational environments are a composite of the conditions,

circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the

commander (JP 3-0). You must address the enemys strengths with your tactics. Use a coordinated effort of overt and covert activities to manipulate your operational environment to get the enemy to show up at a

time and place of your choosing so that you can apprehend or kill him.

1-2. Identify the various sites in your operational area (OA) where the enemy frequently chooses to fight you with IEDs. From this list, select the site that offers your unit the best combination of concealment and

firing position for multinational forces (MF).

1-3. Army missions require leaders, Soldiers, and units to be trained as they must fight in that environment. Observations from the field have emphasized the criticality of unit leadership confident in

their ability to train realistically and units that can fight effectively over the duration of an operation or

deployment.

1-4. The threat from IDFparticularly from rockets and mortarsis enduring and growing. During the Hezbollah-Israeli conflict, the enemy executed approximately 150 rocket attacks per day. Many in the

Middle East perceived Hezbollah had won at least a moral victory by being able to wage a sustained and

very public rocket operation battle against Israel, despite Israeli dominance in other aspects of the fighting.

It was no surprise when Hezbollah tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) migrated to the Iraqi theater

of operations. During OIF, enemy rocket and mortar attack levels reached over 1,000 attacks per month

during a concerted enemy effort to inflict casualties and erode U.S. and multinational political and popular

support. Successful multinational surge operations and focused counter-IDF actions, supported by

specialized C-RAM units, helped mitigate the effects of this IDF operational battle and, ultimately, reduced

the enemy IDF threat to much lower levels. However, IDF attacks, along with IEDs, suicide bombers,

snipers, and other means, remain part of the larger asymmetric arsenal available to our enemies to inflict

casualties and battle damage, get media attention, and erode multinational political and popular will. IDFand the larger Hezbollah model of warfarewill likely remain a staple of combat for the near future.

1-5. IDF provides the enemy a low-cost means of attacking U.S. and multinational forces. The IDF threat in Iraq has mostly consisted of rockets and mortars. Therefore, it is important to note that many potential

adversaries possess the ability to employ RAM in concert with all or some of the other elements that have

replaced manned air forces as the principle aerial threat: tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs), cruise missiles

(CMs), and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs). While this FM focuses on the IDF threat and C-RAM

operations, many of the principles in this FM for attack operations, active defense operations, passive

Chapter 1

1-2 ATP 3-01.60 Publication Date


defense operations, and C2 information system associated with C-RAM and defeating enemy IDF can be

applied to this larger combination of asymmetric aerial threats that U.S. and MF will likely face in the

future.

1-6. Rockets and mortars vary in size and destructive capability. Each type presents its own challenges to applying offensive and defensive C-RAM fires to defeat them. For example, the enemy shooting 60-mm

mortars into an FOB off a rooftop or out of the back of a vehicle generally provides minimal destructive

power but can be more difficult to detect, target, and respond against. An enemy 240-mm rocket attack can

create a spectacular fireball and can cause significant damage but is easier to detect and respond to.

1-7. C-RAM units were created based on urgent operational needs statements from commanders in theater. These commanders, despite significant offensive capabilities, remained vulnerable to the enemy

IDF threat. The remainder of this chapter introduces how, in general terms, the enemy employs IDF as part

of a larger approach in the current operational environment. Appendix F provides more specific

information on enemy rockets, mortars, and their employment, and describes some of the pattern analysis

and other tools that C-RAM leaders, fires planners, and maneuver intelligence officers should be familiar

with when assessing and planning against the enemy IDF threat.

ENEMY IDF: A TACTICAL WEAPON TO ACHIEVE OPERATIONAL

INFORMATION EFFECTS

1-8. C-RAM is deployed in operating areas where the enemy uses primarily asymmetric means to attack their objectives. Enemy commanders have stated that more than half the battle is a media war; a struggle to

create perceptions in key global audiences rather than a contest to gain terrain or political control through

kinetic force.

1-9. The enemy conducts lethal attacks but does so in ways, and against target sets, that will have the maximum possible effect in the information arena. These methods include direct fire attacks, suicide

bombs, IEDs, and IDF. While the IDF weapons used in current theaters are only occasionally effective in a

tactical sense, those used in future conflicts where adversaries have significant support from hostile states

may present a lethal IDF threat with far greater accuracy and intensity. Regardless of accuracy, the enemy

is adept at getting media attention using rocket and mortar attacks against key U.S. and multinational bases

and units.

1-10. In the current active OA, the weapons available to insurgent forces are generally as mediocre as they are plentiful. While IDF remains one of the enemys primary means of inducing casualties and achieving battle damage against targets such as helicopters on the ground, effectiveness in the current OA has been

lower than enemy leaders expected it to be or believe it really is. The training level of insurgent or militia

personnel varies greatly but generally consists of semi-trained personnel who have had some instruction

from a military veteran familiar with that particular system. Sometimes these veterans will conduct attacks,

which are generally more accurate on average, but typically, they will restrict their activities to recruitment

and training of entry-level insurgents or militiamen. In a long-term struggle, enemy commanders do not

want to risk their valuable training cadre just to increase success in a given attack, unless a key target is

available. Identifying and targeting training cadre is an important element of the counter-IDF fight. In some

cases, U.S. forces will face IDF crews that received more focused training in third world countries

supporting the extremists. Since these crews are relatively easy to identify based on the accuracy they

achieve and the TTP they use, they should be a priority for elimination.

1-11. Despite limitations in the tactical realm, the use of IDF plays some key supporting roles at the operational and even strategic levels in the larger enemy information war, therefore it is likely to endure

and grow in the operational environment. For the C-RAM unit or supported commander, the three uses of

IDF for operational and strategic purposes most relevant to the conduct of the mission are erosion of

popular will, key event exploitation, and symbolic retaliation. At the tactical level, commander assessment

of troop and critical asset criticality, vulnerability, recuperability, and threat (CVRT) (likelihood the enemy

will target those troops and assets with IDF) remains important to prioritizing active and passive defensive

capabilities for protecting Soldiers and equipment from enemy RAM.

Indirect Fire and the Operational Environment



ATTEMPTS TO ERODE WILL

1-12. Steady attacks on U.S., multinational, and host government bases or units create statistics that are weapons in themselves. This accumulation of events assessed as "attacks" feeds reports that create an

impression of no progress, despite the fact that the majority of these attacks may have been totally

ineffective or even led to friendly force raids and counter-strikes inflicting enemy losses. Based on attack

reports, opinion-makers and casual observers in the U.S. and key nations wrongly perceive that the U.S.

and its allies are stalled, or that the long-term fight is hopeless. The reverse side of this coin is that merely

conducting attacks reinforces enemy morale. Many insurgent forces inductively reason that their attacks are

much more effective than they actually are. As a minimum, the enemy assumes that their persistence will

wear down the morale of targeted U.S. and multinational commanders and troops, if not inflict actual

casualties or operational disruption.

KEY EVENT EXPLOITATION

1-13. The second primary operational or strategic use of IDF relevant to C-RAM is the use of IDF attacks to create strong images during key windows of opportunity. Such an attack might be an attack timed during

the visit of a key U.S. or allied official or head of state. While the enemy commander may know there is

little chance to hit this individual, the real target is the increased number of media outlets that will be keyed

to that location. The attack will almost certainly be broadcast in near-real-time to the world and is

calculated to cause the maximum impact for the resources expended. The enemy may also attempt to

exploit large crowds where cameras are likely to be used. During OIF, the successful C-RAM intercept of

an incoming rocket that was projected to hit a crowd at a morale, welfare, and recreation concert is an

example of a C-RAM tactical action that prevented the enemy from achieving a significant operational

effect with IDF. The incident also serves as a reminder to commanders about the necessity for operations

security (OPSEC) when scheduling events with large crowds, given the known enemy tendency to try to

exploit key events with IDF.

SYMBOLIC RETALIATION

1-14. The third primary operational and strategic use of IDF is to retaliate against U.S. forces after particularly damaging U.S., allied, or host nation security force operations. The insurgent or militia

commander cannot hit the forces that inflicted the damage, but still must strike back quickly. This is

necessary to sustain morale and to possibly deter friendly forces in the area from future operations. A

variant of this type of attack is the indirect response to an event. This could be another faction's attack on

insurgents or allied groups, which insurgents try to associate with U.S. forces. This can even be a general

propaganda attempt to link the U.S. to a negative event that just happened elsewhere in the OA. It is

important to be familiar with historical dates that are significant to the enemy and the region, as symbolic

retaliation attacks frequently occur on the anniversary of a significant date.

PLANNING TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY IDF THREAT

1-15. C-RAM unit leaders and supported commanders need to learn who the enemy factions in their area are and learn their weapons capabilities and attack tendencies. It is just as important to learn the motivations of the different factions and how they see the battlefield. Look at your defended areas from the

enemy's perspective. C-RAM leaders also need to understand the local population, especially in areas

where enemy rocket crews are more likely to get active or passive support. They also need to understand

local geography, that, if hit by enemy IDF (intentionally or unintentionally) can be exploited in the larger

effort to undermine enemy IDF crews as extremists who are denying the people stability and progress.

Once C-RAM leaders understand how their OA fits in the enemy's target set, they must begin the detailed

intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). This will create the baseline assessment, with projections

of enemy activity in terms of time, weapon system, point of origin (POO), and associated trigger events as

well as the larger network of enemy supply and training activities and locations. Even though C-RAM

sections may have no assigned intelligence personnel, they can still use the simple tools provided in Army

intelligence and doctrinal publications to create and sustain a relevant assessment. This will enable them to

Chapter 1



maximize the potential of the weapon systems under their command as well as advise supported

commanders on other C-RAM functional areas in the larger holistic counter-IDF fight. C-RAM leaders

need to understand their supported unit OA. They must maintain situational understanding of supported

unit actions. This will enable them to anticipate the impact of friendly force operations and how that might

alter templated predictions of enemy activity. C-RAM leaders also need to be aware of dates of historical

significance in the region that could alter anticipated enemy activity. Appendix F provides more detail on

pattern analysis and other tools that C-RAM and supported leaders can apply when assessing and planning

offensive and defensive operations to defeat the enemy IDF threat. This will deny them both the tactical

and operational advantages they seek, and enable them to target all elements of the enemy IDF network,

both physically and in the information arena.



Chapter 2

C-RAM Operations Doctrine

This chapter describes some of the enduring principles associated with defeating the

enemy rockets and mortar threat. It also discusses the C-RAM functional areas. The

rapidly spiraled C-RAM organizations and equipment currently used in response to

the urgent operational need statement for dedicated C-RAM capability will change

over time; however, the principles associated with defeating enemy IDF will likely

endure.

THE JOINT AND COMBINED ARMS FIGHT TO DEFEAT ENEMY

IDF

2-1. C-RAM is a joint and combined arms and full spectrum approach to defeating enemy IDF that features offensive and defensive fires synergy. It is enabled by, but not defined by, specialized C-RAM

units and capabilities.

2-2. The enemy uses IDF to try to inflict casualties and battle damage, reduce multinational political and popular will, and to raise their stature in the community. C-RAM operations reverse this equation by

minimizing the casualties caused by enemy IDF. This denies them the mass casualty scenes they seek to

exploit in the information arena. It also decreases their stature in the eyes of the average citizen either by

their physical destruction or by nonlethal fires that expose their cowardly actions, and the adverse effects

such actions have on peace and stability for the people.

OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FIRES SYNERGY

2-3. Defeating enemy IDF requires offensive and defensive synergy. Offensive or defensive capability alone fails.

2-4. Offense alone will not defeat the enemy IDF threat. During recent conflicts, multinational bases that both possessed and employed the most offensive firepower in theater suffered casualties, major losses of

attack as well as lift helicopters, and other valuable equipment. This caused severe mission disruption

because commanders lacked the capabilities to provide early warning to troops, had inadequate protective

barriers, or lacked the capability to destroy incoming rockets and mortars with C-RAM surface-to-air fires.

The enemy was often able to exploit these successes, with operational effect, in the information arena.

2-5. Similarly, in bases that apply a strictly defensive approach, the enemy will fire without any retaliation. The enemy IDF crews and the population that passively or actively support them fear no

response and are consequently emboldened. Recruitment of IDF crews becomes easy since the job is less

dangerous. It is much easier for the local population to rationalize allowing their neighborhood to be used

as an extremist rocket launch site when they know multinational forces will not fire back into their

neighborhood. As a result, both the number of attacks and the number of rounds fired in each attack goes

up. While defensive C-RAM measures will prevent casualties in many attacks, they cannot prevent them in

all attacks. The increase in enemy attacks encouraged by a strictly defensive approach will ultimately

overwhelm defenses and achieve at least some tactical effect. More significantly, friendly morale suffers

and enemy morale goes up when enemy IDF attacks go unanswered and when there is no serious joint and

combined arms effort to deter, deny, or defeat them.

2-6. The combination of offensive and defensive fires synergy, both lethal and nonlethal, has proven extremely effective against enemy IDF. The combined arms effort to keep the enemy from employing

Chapter 2



rockets, mortars, and the fires synergy that targets the enemy at the IDF point of origin while

simultaneously cueing early warning and defensive fires to protect Soldiers in the vicinity of the projected

IDF point of impact (POI) (or precise employment of nonlethal fires/information operations if the enemy

IDF POI is a civilian target) is what C-RAM operations are all about.

UNIT MISSION

2-7. The generic mission of specialized C-RAM units, to be modified as appropriate based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC),

is as follows:

C-RAM units, working as part of a joint and combined arms effort, detect incoming

rockets and mortars; provide focused early warning; destroy inbound rockets and mortars

at prioritized locations; and enable counter-IDF shaping, denial, and response actions in

order to protect friendly forces and high-value assets, ensure mission continuity, and help

to kill or capture enemy IDF teams and seize their caches.

HOW TO FIGHT: ENDURING PRINCIPLES

2-8. C-RAM detections help fuel the larger joint and combined arms fight versus enemy IDF. Detections provide the cueing for the immediate offensive and defensive fires used to defeat an enemy IDF attack.

They also contribute to the database of historic IDF POO used for pattern analysis and both proactive

operations and a more detailed study of past events leading to deliberate operations against the enemy IDF

network. C-RAM fusion of organic detections and both supported and networked unit detections enables a

more robust situational awareness of enemy IDF patterns than was previously possible.

2-9. Shape operations attempt to prevent enemy IDF attacks from being generated in the first place. C-RAM and supported maneuver operations attempt to shape actions and attitudes associated with IDF

employment in areas that can be used as launch points against MF. This is conducted with information

operations and other full spectrum operations designed to help people, win their support, and make them

less inclined to support enemy IDF activity. In addition, ground patrols attempt to find and seize caches. A

high positive ratio of enemy IDF rounds seized in caches compared to enemy rounds fired is an important

measure of success in the combined arms C-RAM fight. Aircrews that operate in the FOB OAs should be

well briefed on historic enemy IDF POOs and pattern analysis, and should be trained to look for signs of

enemy IDF activity during routine flights. Many of the kills achieved against enemy IDF teams during OIF

came from alert aircrews looking for and finding enemy IDF activity. Properly cleared denial fires and the

conduct of helicopter gunnery and other test fires in historic POOs also help deter and deny enemy IDF

activities.

2-10. C-RAM sense and warn operations provide the detection that is key to the joint and combined arms C-RAM fight. Sense and warn operations then provide warning to friendly troops of incoming rockets and

mortars so that they can seek cover to avoid being killed or wounded.

2-11. C-RAM intercept operations destroy or deflect incoming rockets and mortars at prioritized locations.

2-12. Protect operations provide Soldiers passive protection against the effects of rockets and mortar blasts. T-walls, Hesko barriers, rocket roofs, and other means help reduce exposure to the risks of enemy

RAM.

2-13. C-RAM respond operations (which is a base defense operations center [BDOC] function), directly or indirectly, attack insurgent forces with lethal and nonlethal fires. During OIF, U.S. and MF killed enemy

IDF crews and destroyed rockets and rails at the POOs with weapons fired from UASs, attack helicopters,

joint air, artillery, ground forces, and other means. When positive identification could not be made at the

POOs, U.S. forces tracked vehicles and personnel at the POOs back to their weapons caches. Multinational forces then planned and conducted appropriate operations to kill or capture the enemy IDF teams and

associated supporters. When the enemy fired at U.S. and multinational forces but missed and hit civilians




instead, nonlethal fires such as information operations were used to undermine the enemy for their actions

and to reduce their support base.

2-14. Many of the kills achieved versus enemy IDF teams during OIF came from alert aircrews looking for and finding enemy IDF activity. Properly cleared denial fires and conduct of helicopter gunnery and other

test fires in historic POO also help deter and deny enemy IDF activities. C-RAM sense and warn operations

provide the detections that are key to the joint and combined arms C-RAM fight and provide troops

warning of incoming rockets and mortars so they can seek cover to avoid being killed or wounded. Protect

operations aim to provide Soldiers passive protection against the effects of rockets and mortar blasts. C-

RAM intercept operations destroy incoming rockets and mortars at prioritized locations. C-RAM respond

operations shoot back at the enemy with lethal and nonlethal fires.

2-15. C-RAM command and control operations ensure that all C-RAM functions are being leveraged in the fight and seek to maximize synergy between the offensive capabilities of the supported unit and the

specialized C-RAM unit supporting the fight.

2-16. These C-RAM functional areas are enduring principles critical to a successful joint and combined arms C-RAM fight. It is important to note that they are interrelated. For example, the response functional

area has a significant shaping effect on both the enemy and the population that the enemy depends upon for

active or passive support in order to recruit, fund, hide caches, or operate among the people. These

functional areas are listed and described in more detail, following the historical vignette below.

Historical Vignette III Corps successfully applied a full spectrum and a joint and combined arms approach to defeating the enemy and enemy IDF. The enemy used IDF to try to inflict casualties, reduce multinational political and popular will, and to raise their stature in the community. Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) defeated this approach with a full spectrum, combined arms approach, withstanding the highest enemy IDF attack levels of the war through the spring and summer and ultimately reducing the enemy to the lowest attack levels in over 4 years by the end of 2007. During the 2 months of November and December 2007 alone, multinational forces seized over 10,000 rounds of enemy IDF. During 2007, multinational forces killed scores of enemy IDF teams with Predator-mounted Hellfire, AH-64, and joint fires. Artillery helped shape and deny support for enemy IDF activity and reduced the number of rounds fired per enemy attack. In selected locations, specialized C-RAM units and equipment contributed to the combined arms approach and to synergy between offensive and defensive counter-IDF fires. C-RAM units successfully warned on well over 800 enemy IDF attacks and intercepted over 72 rockets and mortars in specified locations during the III Corps tour, saving lives and reducing the impact of a concerted enemy IDF-intensive offensive. Information operations helped undermine extremists for the frequent collateral damage their IDF attacks exacted on the Iraqi people. Full spectrum operations helped shape attitudes in favor of multinational force security efforts and against extremists that emplace IEDs and attack multinational forces and Iraqi civilians with IDF. The Joint Fires Cell and MNC-I C-RAM Section played a key role in focusing on the enemy IDF threat and leading and integrating efforts to defeat it. IDF, along with UASs, CMs, and TBMs, will remain the Poor Mans Air Force and something we will continue to see brought into the fight to challenge us. The successful III Corps counter-IDF fight provides many valuable insights into how to defeat this aspect of the threat that we will no doubt see again in the future during the continuing struggle against radical extremists. XVIII ABN Corps and subsequent MNC-I and other formations facing IDF threats will continue the process of learning, improving relevant tactics, techniques, and procedures, and cycling lessons learned from operational deployments to the generating force.

COL Timothy Keppler MNC-I C-RAM LNO

Chapter 2



THE C-RAM FUNCTIONAL AREAS

2-17. The C-RAM functional areas are depicted in Figure 2-1 and are described in the paragraphs that follow.

Figure 2-1. C-RAM functional overview

SHAPE

2-18. The C-RAM shape functional area denies or minimizes the enemys ability to launch successful IDF attacks that undermine the friendly force mission. C-RAM shape operations include predictive and pattern

analysis to assist the counter-IDF aspects of the enemys IPB. Good IPB helps orient dedicated and general purpose collection and attack assets in time and space, and provides enhanced situational awareness to non-

dedicated aviation and other forces operating in the area based on known enemy IDF trends and tendencies

and identified intelligence gaps. It also helps establish appropriate anticipatory battlefield coordination

measures. These procedures all combine to facilitate successful supported unit lethal and nonlethal counter-

IDF area denial operations. They shape the civilian population and deny the enemy the launch points they

seek. It also fuels preemptive attacks to seize enemy rocket and mortar caches and/or attack other aspects of

the enemy IDF systemology with the net effect of denying or minimizing enemy IDF success. We face a

thinking adaptive enemy; therefore, IPB and the shape process are continuous. Proper command emphasis

and focus on the C-RAM shape functional area helps stay one step ahead of, and stay out in front of,

thinking adaptive enemies in the counter IDF fight.

SENSE AND WARN

2-19. The C-RAM sense and warn functional areas are focused on detecting, discriminating, and tracking RAM events in flight and providing timely, focused early warning to Soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and

civilians.

Sense

2-20. Detections generated in the sense and warn functional areas are critical to joint and combined arms C-RAM success. The sense detections enable multiple functions to occur. In addition to enabling focused




early warning of friendly personnel, the sense function alerts C-RAM intercept systems to enable surface-

to-air engagements that destroy incoming rockets and mortars. Detection information assists in determining

POI information, with sufficient accuracy to enable the use of lethal and/or nonlethal response.

Accumulated detections also allow proactive shaping and denial efforts. Accumulated POI analysis and

identification of accuracy trends are useful in understanding enemy IDF intent, focusing of C-RAM-related

OPSEC, and efforts to identify and eliminate enemy human intelligence and forward observers. This also

provides indicators of external training and equipping influence in the area.

2-21. The C-RAM sense effort features an integrated sensor system, able to recognize threats, support the alerting of friendly forces to RAM attack (warn), support intercept cueing, and assist commanders and

supported units with both lethal and nonlethal response actions and proactive shaping and denial

operations.

Warn

2-22. The warn function is focused on providing timely and accurate localized early warning to friendly personnel. This early warning allows time to get in the prone position, seek protective cover, or remain

within a hardened structure until the RAM event is complete. This function must maintain a high degree of

reliability, to minimize complacency.

2-23. The sensor/warning interface should be automated and make effective use of the following:

Local sensors for short-range attacks.

A network of broad area sensors for long-range attacks and to mitigate the impacts of terrain

masking.

A high degree of sensor discrimination to minimize false warnings.

Timely dissemination of warnings using multiple methods (audio, visual, both indoor and

outdoor).

The ability to quickly move or augment existing warning coverage based on changes in

protected unit stance or other METT-TC factors.

2-24. The rapid warning of a predicted impact area, using input from existing C-RAM and supported and adjacent unit sensors, facilitates the early warning of personnel. Warning is accomplished by transmitting

an immediate audio and/or visual warning to a targeted area, limited to the actual zone of danger and not

the entire base or area of operations, unless area coverage is directed by the supported commander and

troops are educated on this local TTP. This enables threatened personnel to seek any immediately available

cover and get in the prone position. The end product of the warn effort is saving Soldiers lives and denying the enemy the casualties through IDF. Countless Soldiers have walked away from close encounters with

rockets by proper, disciplined reaction to C-RAM warnings.

INTERCEPT

2-25. The C-RAM intercept functional area is focused on the destruction or neutralization of RAM munitions in flight. C-RAM intercepts required acquisition and tracking of incoming rounds that have

predicted POI within the designated protected area. C-RAM intercept capability enables supported units in

defended areas to continue the mission with greater confidence and less fear of enemy rockets and mortar

attacks. Successful C-RAM intercepts prevent lethal effects within protected areas and help to prevent or

minimize battle damage. While the C-RAM warn capability is more readily available and significantly

improves Soldiers survivability, it does not stop the rocket or mortar impact and ensuing destruction and shrapnel damage at and around the POI. Any exposed high-value assets such as attack and heavy lift

helicopters on the ground cannot react to warning. The C-RAM intercept capability destroys rockets and

mortars in the air or deflects them away from targeted areas, saving lives and preventing or minimizing

shrapnel effects. Successful C-RAM intercepts boost friendly morale and, at a minimum, deny the enemy

the degree of casualties, damage, and the resulting information operations advantages the enemy seeks

through an IDF attack. When C-RAM intercepts are visible or otherwise made known to the enemy or local

population, there is a psychological advantage for friendly forces that can dampen both the enemys

Chapter 2



enthusiasm for IDF attacks and the willingness of civilians to provide active or passive support for enemy

RAM attacks. CVRT is key to prioritizing the allocation of limited C-RAM intercept capability and

doctrinal active air defense principles, and employment guidelines are applicable to positioning. The

recuperability time and cost of replacing defended high-value assets and troop concentrations should be

considered when assessing the costs and benefits of C-RAM intercept capabilities and requirements. C-

RAM intercepts have saved a large number of lives and prevented significant battle damage. In several

instances, C-RAM intercepts prevented the enemy from achieving what likely would have been a damaging

media story.

PROTECT

2-26. The C-RAM protect functional area is applicable to all units, regardless of whether or not they are resourced with specialized C-RAM units and capabilities. Many doctrinal passive air defense principles

apply. Use of T-wall barriers, Hesko barriers, earthworks, sandbags, SCUD/RAM bunkers, hardened mess

hall dividers, and other materials help shield and harden troop billeting and work areas, and protect

equipment from shrapnel damage. C-RAM CVRT analysis guides prioritization of barrier emplacement and

allocation of limited protection resources for projects such as rocket roofs over high troop concentration

areas and dining facilities. The protect function is particularly important for units and places without

specialized C-RAM sense and warn or intercept capability. Simple barriers have saved countless lives by

containing shrapnel blast and by shielding Soldiers.

RESPOND

2-27. Respond is the execution of lethal and/or nonlethal fires in response to detected enemy IDF attacks. The C-RAM respond function primarily focuses on killing or capturing enemy IDF crews that fired on, are

firing on, or are about to fire on friendly forces. The C-RAM respond function can also include nonlethal

effects (focused information operations) targeting local populations that are impacted (intentionally or

unintentionally) by enemy effect. Since respond and shape efforts often overlap, the respond function

impacts friendly, enemy, and local population attitudes. Units that respond aggressively, decisively, and

intelligently to enemy IDF enjoy a boost of friendly morale and generally realize a decrease in both number

and size of enemy attacks. This is due to a reduced willingness in the local population to support attacks

from their area and increased enemy respect for the capabilities of U.S. and multinational firepower and the

demonstrated will to use it.

2-28. U.S. and MF kill or capture enemy IDF crews and destroy rockets and rails at the POO by employing weapons fired from UASs, attack helicopters, joint air, artillery, ground forces, and other means. When

positive identification can be made at the POO, U.S. forces use target mensuration and other techniques to

determine what vehicles and personnel are near the POO at the time of launch and then plan and conduct

appropriate operations to kill or capture the enemy IDF teams and associated supporters. Proactive response

is conducted based on intelligence that initiates lethal or nonlethal fires prior to IDF action. Reactive

response attempts to destroy IDF teams prior to their vacating the POO. When the enemy fires at U.S. and

multinational forces but misses and hits civilians instead, or when the enemy intentionally fires at civilian

targets, nonlethal fires such as information operations are employed to undermine the enemys actions and to reduce the enemys support base. When possible, POO sites are examined for intelligence gathering and sensitive site exploitation and captured IDF teams are interrogated for intelligence that can help prevent

further attacks. The response functional area, whether employed aggressively and effectively or not, has a

significant shaping effect on both the enemy and the population that the enemy depends upon for active or

passive support in order to recruit, fund, hide caches, or operate among the people.

2-29. Rules of engagement (ROE) are extremely important to effective C-RAM response. A key element of effective response is the ability to establish positive identification rapidly that meets criteria established

in the commanders ROE. In more restrictive cases, units may require positive visual identification in addition to radar data. Since C-RAM units get the grid for the enemy POO sooner than other sources,

collocation of specialized C-RAM units with UAS controllers and fires leaders in the maneuver

commander tactical operations centers (TOCs) is a TTP that helps units synchronize intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to the POO for positive identification and clearance of fires more




quickly. It is important that units clearly understand how the ROE right of self-defense applies to enemy

indirect fire. Along with the desire to minimize collateral damage and other considerations, commanders

must consider the likelihood that ROE which severely constrain response against enemy rocket and mortar

crews typically can cause an increase in both the number and the size of attacks. It may also increase the

likelihood of the local population actively or passively supporting enemy IDF activity in their

neighborhoods. All C-RAM proactive and reactive response must be executed within the commanders intent and in accordance with established ROE.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

2-30. The C-RAM command and control functional area ensures all C-RAM functional areas are being leveraged in the fight and seeks to maximize synergy between the offensive capabilities of the supported

unit and the specialized C-RAM unit supporting the fight.

2-31. At corps level, a theater C-RAM lead and small staff element, typically working as part of the joint fires cell, integrates the overall C-RAM fight within the corps commanders intent. It is important that the corps C-RAM section have a mixture of surface-to-air and surface-to-surface fires expertise, as well as

division and corps level experience. Depending on the number of C-RAM units and locations in the fight, a

C-RAM tactical command post (CP) may need to be established to synchronize multiple specialized C-

RAM units with multiple supported division operations. The C-RAM Intercept Battery commander

integrates the C-RAM fight with the supported commander at selected high-priority locations allocated as

C-RAM intercept capability. The C-RAM sense and warn squad leader integrates with a supported brigade

or regimental combat team or the senior tactical commander at the designated FOB, patrol base, or joint

security station. The C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery commander and platoon leaders work with multiple

C-RAM sense and warn squads and the division(s) commanding supported units. While some units

collocate C-RAM units with BDOCs or protection cells, operational experience suggests the best command

and control practice is to collocate the C-RAM sense and warn squads in the portion of the TOC where ISR

and fires decisions are made. This facilitates positive identification with UASs and results in rapid

clearance of fires. The warning function can be triggered as easily from the TOC as from a BDOC or

protection cell; however, synchronization with ISR and fires is typically more difficult from a protection

cell or BDOC than from the TOC. Commanders organize their command posts as they see fit, and C-RAM

unit leaders must be ready to aggressively integrate all C-RAM pillars with supported unit operations from

wherever positioned. The key is to promote proactive and aggressive offensive and defensive synergy

against the enemy IDF threat. Chapters Four and Five describe current C-RAM Intercept Battery and C-

RAM Sense and Warn Battery organizations and operations.



Chapter 3

C-RAM System of Systems Description and Organizational Construct

This chapter outlines the current states and operational functional solution to the

threat facing Soldiers on the battlefield today with the complex threat of indirect fire.

Commanders, through their analysis, determine the best employment of available

systems and personnel in response to the current threat. This chapter discusses the

core systems. It also discusses the C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery mission and

organization.

C-RAM JOINT PLUG-AND-FIGHT SYSTEMS

THEORY AND OVERVIEW

3-1. C-RAM and its systems in their current state of spiral development are an operationally functional solution to a complex IDF threat facing combat forces on today's battlefield. Designed as a joint plug-and-

fight system, there are both core and non-core systems. Commanders and planners must be familiar with

both the capabilities and limitations associated with the integration and networking of additional sensors

and responders to the core C-RAM system. Currently, the FAAD, air and missile defense workstation

(AMDWS), WAVES, lightweight counter-mortar radar (LCMR), land-based Phalanx weapon system

(LPWS), and Redline are organic to C-RAM units. Others, like LCMRs, may be either C-RAM equipment

or theater-provided equipment, and which C-RAM personnel will maintain and operate. Systems like the

Q36, Q46, Q37, Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) system, and Integrated Base Defense Security

System (IBDSS) will not be under operational control of C-RAM units. However, commanders may

designate them to support the C-RAM mission through system integration and inter-FOB networking. The

concept of the C-RAM SoS is based on the premise that systems under development will integrate

successfully with current fielded systems, enhancing their capabilities and moving towards the objective

SoS. There is no basic issue or standard equipment that comprises C-RAM. In the current state, manning

and equipment are based on a variety of factors. Commanders, through their analysis, determine the best

employment of available systems and personnel in response to the current threat.

CORE SYSTEMS

LAND-BASED PHALANX WEAPON SYSTEM

3-2. The LPWS consists of a trailer-mounted MK 15 close-in weapon system (CIWS). The CIWS is a 310-degree, 20-millimeter gun system with separate search-and-track radars, and a forward-looking

infrared (FLIR) radar. The gun system is capable of firing 4,500 rounds per minute, with a magazine

storage capacity of 1,580 rounds. Two 60-kilowatt generators mounted on the trailer supply power to the

entire system. The remote control station (RCS) requires its own power source. A Schreiber Engineering

chiller (mounted on the trailer) provides cool water to the electronics (ELX) enclosure. Emplacement time

for the complete system is approximately 45 minutes with a six-man crew. The LPWS can be towed by a

10-ton vehicle.

Chapter 3



Description of LPWS Components

3-3. The MK 15 LPWS consists of the following unit components:

Unit 1, the local control console (LCC).

Unit 2, the ELX.enclosure.

Unit 3, the radar weapon assembly.

Note: Units 2 and 3 together comprise the weapon group.

Unit 13, the local control station (LCS).

Unit 14, the RCS.

3-4. The LCC (Figure 3-1) is located in the control room. Threat criteria and engagement data can be entered into the weapons control computer (WCC). If the RCS is inoperable or if the FAAD/LPWS fiber-

optic link is broken (degraded operations), the LCC can be used as the primary control panel for the LPWS.

The LCC also functions as a maintenance control panel. The operator can perform operability tests, fault

isolation, and maintenance operations at the LCC. The LCC contains the local control panel (LCP), mass

storage device drawer, and power supply.

3-5. The LCC cabinet houses its chassis assembly, mass storage device drawer, power supply, and air-cooling fans (capable of moving 300 cubic feet per minute to dissipate 2,000 BTUs per hour). The LCC is

designed for sit-down operation. A pullout shelf is located at the base of LCC chassis assembly and

provides a work surface for the operator. Each of the assemblies is mounted on drawer slides, which may

be opened and locked into position for maintenance operations. The control panel/chassis assembly in the

LCC is mounted at a 15-degree angle on slides. The chassis assembly houses replaceable circuit card

assemblies (CCAs). The CCAs are designed to simplify fault isolation, with one CCA controlling each

section of the control panel. For example, one CCA controls the ENGAGEMENT STATUS section, while

another CCA controls the MODE CONTROL section.

Figure 3-1. Local control console (Unit 1)




3-6. The ELX (Figure 3-2) provides environmental protection and packaging for most of the weapon group electronics items. A connector shield, a power junction box assembly, and a transient surge

suppressor assembly are mounted on the right side of the enclosure. The enclosure is mounted on six

helical shock isolators. The bottom of the enclosure is fitted with two drain fittings that are opened

periodically to drain any water that may have accumulated in the bottom of the enclosure. Two hinged

doors on the front of the enclosure allow access to the electronic items. Door stay assemblies are located on

each top corner of the enclosure. They enable locking the doors in either the 90-degree or 180-degree open

position for maintenance operations. The interior of the enclosure contains slide-out drawer assemblies 2A1

through 2A5 and 2A7 through 2A11, which all contain replaceable CCAs. These CCAs are also referred to

as replaceable modules. The lower portion of the enclosure houses a power supply and control group 2A6

and 2A12. Small double doors on the lower portion allow access to the power supply and control group

(PSCG). Portions of the PSCG are located on the backside of these two doors, with the remainder located

in the lower portion of the enclosure. A tie rod on the backside of the enclosure door can be connected to a

pivot on the PSCG door. This secures the PSCG door during maintenance operations.

Figure 3-2. Electronics enclosure (Unit 2)

3-7. The radar weapon assembly (Figure 3-3) includes the 3A1 radar-servo fire control assembly, 3A2 gun subsystem, 3A3 elevation drive group assembly (mount), 3A4 barbette assembly, 3A5 train platform

assembly, 3A32 electro-optical stabilization system (EOSS) pedestal assembly, and 3A33 thermal imager.

The barbette assembly supports the entire radar weapon assembly. The train platform assembly is mounted

on top of the barbette assembly and is supported by four shock isolators. The train platform assembly

supports the bearing mounted elevation drive assembly. The elevation drive group assembly supports the

gun subsystem and the radar-servo fire control assembly.

Chapter 3



Figure 3-3. Radar weapon assembly (Unit 3)

3-8. The LCS (Figure 3-4) is located in the control room. The LCS provides the capability of command and control (from the mode control menu). It also provides friendly protect functions during degraded

operations from the FLIR display, and provides operator computer displays and the same mode displays as

those of the RCS. The LCS console contains the parameter analysis and storage system (PASS) computer

and printer; an engagement controller with video monitor, function keys, electro-optical stabilization

steering control, guarded fire button, power supplies, and electronics chassis. The electronics chassis

contains the LPWS support processor, which acts as the electro-optical system controller and data interface

with the WCC, and the acquisition video tracker that processes infrared image signals in electro-optical

search and track (disabled in LPWS).

3-9. The LCS cabinet houses the PASS computer and printer chassis assemblies, engagement controller, Versa Module Europa (VME) bus chassis assembly, and air-cooling fans (capable of moving 240 cubic feet

per minute to dissipate 3,276 BTUs per hour). The engagement controller contains a video monitor and

keypad. The VME chassis assembly contains the thermal imager video interface devices. Each of the

assemblies is mounted on slides that may be opened and locked into position for maintenance operations.




Figure 3-4. Local control station (Unit 13)

3-10. The RCS (Figure 3-5) is located at the engagement operations (EO) section (when the tactical situation permits) and allows an operator to break engagements while in antiair warfare (AAW) mode. The

RCS integrates the remote control panel MK 340 into a single console, which duplicates most LPWS

operational C2 functions of the LCP, and exercises control of these functions through the mode control

menu. The RCS contains circuitry to accept target designations automatically from other sensor/radar

systems. The RCS console also contains an engagement controller with video monitor, function keys,

electro-optical stabilization steering control, guarded fire button, and a power supply chassis.

3-11. The RCS cabinet houses the remote control chassis assembly, engagement controller, power chassis assembly, and air-cooling fans (capable of moving 240 cubic feet per minute to dissipate 2,730 BTUs per

hour). Through use of the mode control menu, the RCS can mode sequence selected mounts. The

engagement controller contains a video monitor and keypad. The power chassis assembly contains power

supplies for unit operation. Each of the assemblies is mounted on drawer slides, which may be opened and

locked into position for maintenance operations.

Chapter 3



Figure 3-5. Remote control station (Unit 14)

ENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS SECTION

3-12. The FAAD command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) system provides automated EO and protection operations capabilities at the C-RAM EO section. EO section capabilities include real-

time EW and target cueing information to C-RAM weapon systems, friendly aircraft identification, and air

battle management. Force operations (FO) capabilities include automated mission planning, automated staff

planning, and interoperability with other command systems.

3-13. The components of the FAAD C3I system include the following:

The EO section that monitors and controls the C-RAM tactical operations for the FOB/BDOC.

The Army airspace command and control (A2C

2) system that controls the engagement process

and provides FOB/BDOC liaison.

The sensor/C2 system that processes and disseminates track data to firing batteries.

The primary intelligence component, the Sentinel radar that provides airspace deconfliction

capability for the Intercept Battery in order to prevent fratricide.




Table 3-1 lists FAAD C3I system components.

Table 3-1. FAAD C3I system components

Common Name Official Nomenclature

Air and Missile Defense Work Station (AMDWS)

Computer, Tactical, AN/GYQ-88

Sensor C2 Subsystem

Communications Control Set AN/TSQ-183, AN/TSQ-183A

800 W Uninterruptible Power Supply 5-kw Generator/Trailer

Power Supply PP-8282/U 5-kw, 60-Hz Generator Set, Diesel Engine-Driven, Trailer-Mounted PU-751/M

10-kw Generator/Trailer 10-kw, 60-Hz Generator Set, Diesel Engine-Driven, Trailer-Mounted PU-798/M

Antenna OE-254/GRC Antenna Group OE-254/GRC

Adaptive Programmable Interface Unit (APIU) Adaptive Programmable Interface Unit MD-1217B/U

Fill Device Electronic Transfer Device, KYK-13/TSEC

Sentinel Radar Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) Ground-Based Sensor, AN/MPQ-64

High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)

Truck, Utility, S250 Shelter Carrier, 4X4, M1113 or Truck, Utility, 5/4-ton, Cargo/Troop Carrier w/4x4 M998 (HMMWV)

Precision Lightweight Global Positioning System Receiver (PLGR)

Satellite Signals Navigation Set, AN/PSN-11

Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System/90 (SINCGARS/90)

Radio Set, AN/VRC-90

SINCGARS/91 Radio Set, AN/VRC-91

SINCGARS/92 Radio Set, AN/VRC-92

DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR COMPONENTS

3-14. SINCGARS (Figure 3-6) are very high frequency (VHF) frequency modulation (FM) radios with the capability to transmit and receive voice or data communications. The SINCGARS voice radios are used in

all FAAD C3I subsystems.

Figure 3-6. SINCGARS radio (generic view)

Chapter 3



AIR DEFENSE MANAGEMENT EQUIPMENT

3-15. Air defense management equipment consists of the FAAD C2 and the AMDWS. This equipment is described in the following paragraphs.

Forward Area Air Defense

3-16. The FAAD links the various RAM sensors and the Sentinel radar. It provides situational awareness (SA) to the AMDWS and engagement commands to the LPWS. The FAAD C

2 also cues the WAVES EW

system (located in the BDOC) automatically when two or more sensors pick up the inbound RAM,

providing EW for the area at risk.

Air and Missile Defense Workstation

3-17. As one of the five original Army Battlefield Command Systems (ABCS), the AMDWS allows the C-RAM unit to provide air and missile defense (AMD) force planning and operational support. The C-RAM

unit holds one AMDWS linked to the FAAD and the BDOC (when the unit is located at FOB), or the air

defense system integrator (ADSI) (when not located at an FOB), where it can obtain external air tracks. The

AMDWS sends EW and other vital track data to the other C2 systems in the network.

ADVANCED FIELD ARTILLERY TACTICAL DATA SYSTEM

3-18. The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) is the digitized link providing automated technical and tactical fire direction solutions, fire asset management tools, and decision support

functionality. The system provides Army, Navy, and Marine Corps automated fire support C2, pairs targets

to weapons to provide optimum use of fire support assets, and automates the planning, coordinating, and

controlling of all fire support assets (field artillery, mortars, air support, naval surface fire support, and

attack helicopters). The AFATDS has the following capabilities:

Tactical air support.

Technical fire control.

Expanded target coordination and trigger events.

The ability to process 250 fire missions per hour.

Enhanced continuity of operations automation.

Improved attack analysis and target list.

SENSORS

3-19. The sensors assigned to the C-RAM Intercept Battery are the LCMR and the Sentinel radar. Improvement to existing sensor and the addition of new sensors make C-RAM even more accurate and

efficient. The following sections describe various sensors currently used by C-RAM.

Q-48 LCMR

3-20. The LCMR is operated as either a counter-fire sensor (Special Operations

atp 3-01.60 counter-rocket,artillery,and mortar operations may 2013

Documents

cram operations doctrine

official government

cram joint plug

army washington

official use

government agencies

cram functional areas

fight systems