Brigadier Rattan Kaul {4/5 GR {FF}}

{The author was Assault Rifle Company Commander during the Battle of Atgram and Forward Rifle Company Commander during Battle of Sylhet, where he was seriously injured}

Trust each other again and again, when the trust level gets high enough, people transcend apparent limits, discovering new and

awesome abilities for which they were previously unaware. David Armstead

Pre War Preparation

Operations In Support Of Mukti Bahini. The Battalion had since concentrated at Panchgram {Badarpur- Cachar District; Assam}; fondly called Char Panch Gram after our Battalion. It was evident that Battalion will have to un-sheath Khukris soon. There was furious activity, exchange of fire and forays deep inside the East Pakistan territory by Mukti Bahini fighters. The influx of refugees had reached all time high and everyday there were news of some activity along the border. Foxtrot Force {Brigadier Wadke} was generally keeping eye in this area and was responsible for various refugee camps. Further South, Echo Force; under late Brigadier later Major General Shahbeg Singh, AVSM, then Deputy GOC 8 Mountain Division, were doing a wonderful job. He used to move around in a check lungi, tied in typical East Bengali style. With his short beard, a gold earring, cropped hair, he looked more of Bahini man. It was during one of the reconnaissance {Recce} missions to border outposts I met him; his Punjabi as well as Gorkhali had given way to working Bengali. He knew battalion from 1964 onwards as he was commanding 3/11 GR, our neighbouring battalion in Balnoi/ Krishna Ghatti Sector {Rajouri J& K}. His warmth was as warm it was in those days. Reports of possible sabotage by Paki Forces along Silichar / Jaintia Hills {Meghalaya} Border were ripe and my

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Sketch : Delta Companys Foray - Sep 71

Company {Delta} was moved to general area Ratachara / Natanpur for patrolling, support of Mukti Bahini, operating in this area and also instil confidence amongst local population. The

2BSF Commander in the area, Deputy Commandant Mr Singha {Or Singhla?}, did quite a few errands with me; chasing on intelligence information; to villages, God forsaken hamlets, jungles and quite a few ambushes; nothing found. Finally, we plonked ourselves alongside BSF Post at Dumchara, just on the banks of Surma River; which later was to be a part of our history during the war. One fine day {Third week of Sept?} Brigadiers Brigadier C A Quinn {Bunty Quinn; Late, Commander 59 Mountain Brigade}, accompanied by Brigadier Tom Pandey, Commander 57 Artillery Brigade, visited the Company. This was the time Paki Guns from Charkhai in Sylhet Sector opened on our positions, to be silenced by a troop of our medium guns, deployed in the area. In the coming weeks, end September, due to frequent firing by Pakistani {Paki} Forces in this area, mostly on Mukhti Bahini fighters, they {Mukti Bahini} had planned to go inside and capture Sarkar Bazar and area around it. They were to move inside East Bengal territory, after crossing Surma River in boats, from a firm base established on the Southern banks of Surma, overlooking Sarkar Bazar. The base was established by around first light and D Company supported Mukti Bahini operations in Sarkar Bazar Area. My senior JCO, Subedar Bal Bahadur Thapa, with a platoon, escorted them, as we had orders not to go beyond the firm base. Marshy area, full of leeches didnt initially deter Mukti Bahini force and by about 3 PM they were in Sarkar Bazar and in jubilation they fired in the air and remained there for the night, withdrew and fell back on our firm base. We remained in the area for two days and there was no retaliation of any sorts from Pakis. Third day, on orders, we returned to our base. This area {Sarkar Bazar} was to become a landmark in our battalion operations in November 1971. In the meantime East Bengal Rifle Units, organised as a brigade {1 EBR Brigade under Colonel Zia {Late General Zia-ulRehman who became Bangladesh Army Chief and later President Of Bangladesh after the assassination of Sheikh Mujib-u- Rehman in a coup on 15 Aug 1975}. One fine day 1 EBR Brigade moved into the area, with one of its battalions. Colonel Zia too arrived and we had a quite evening together over Mach and Bat {Fish Curry and Rice}. He was all in praise of our Colonel Of The Regiment, General Zoru Bakshi, who had been nice to him and his wife {Begum Zia, who too became or rather is Prime Minister of Bangladesh}, when they crossed over from Pak Cantonment of Sialkot. Things had started hotting up; a quiet Dasain {Dussehra} for the Battalion and end October saw the whole battalion again concentrate at Panchgram; fondly called Char-Panch Gram, after our battalion numerical number 4/5 Gorkha Rifles {Frontier Force}, for next session. Count Down Begins. It was quiet Diwali and reconnaissance of Paki Posts opposite Karimganj and Natanpur began in early November. Captain Praveen Johri was at own Border Out Post {BOP} Banga, at the junction of Surma and Barak River{ Barak River here onwards gets name of Khusiara River}. Other two battalions in our brigade were 9 Guards {Lieutenant Colonel Raghubir Singh} and 6 Rajput {Lieutenant Colonel Hardev Singh}. This was the time Maj Gen K V Krishna Rao, General Officer Commanding {GOC} 8 Mountain Division talked to all officers of the division; generally giving the situation around the country with particular reference to then East Pakistan. Though everyone knew what was coming in the weeks ahead, I remember, there was no mention of impending plans or tasks by him. As we moved back to our location recce for the

Photograph Three Days Before Attack on Atgram

L To R : Late Lt Hawa Singh { A Coy }, Vr C ; Maj Viru Rawat {B Coy }; Major Rattan Kaul {D Coy} ;

late Capt P K Johri , SM { A Coy } Late Major Dinesh Rana { A Coy }.

next task was uppermost in our minds. Reconnaissance and Next Objective. We had already done reconnaissance {Recce} along the borders but this time it was area specific, where the brigade was to operate; Zakiganj {Opposite Karimganj} and area opposite Natanpur / Karbala BOPs i.e Paki BOP Amalsid, IB adjacent to Amalsid, Area Amalsid Masjid, Atgram Bus Stand { Also known as Atgram Road Junction} and Raygram. All of these, except Atgram Bus Stand, where in front

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and could be observed and had been actively engaging our BOPs with fire and rockets. Atgram, being in depth, could not be observed and information about the Paki deployment was scanty. The guns supporting Paki defences were reported to be around Charkhai; on road Atgram- Charkhai- Sylhet. By 16 November we were told of our areas of interest; Atgram Complex was the focal point i.e Amalsid Masjid, Amalsid {BOP}, IB and Atgram Bus Stand. Pakistanis Defence Concept And Deployment

Defence Concept. Paki deployment in East Pakistan was designed to defend territory

and deny attempts at establishment of a corridor along borders for a Free Bangladesh. By first week November 1971, our forces; notably in other Corps/Divisional Sectors, had taken certain amount of aggressive postures all along the border. With Knife Thrusts by our forces and active role of Mukhti Bahini {Mukhtis}, Pakis concentrated on the defences of important towns and locations like Sylhet, Comilla, Chittagong etc and turned them into fortress defences. Other towns, along the approaches to these locations, were turned into Strong Points. These Strong Points, closer to border, were to delay our advance, fight until ordered to withdraw and not allow Mukhti Bahini to gain momentum or ground. Finally these Strong Point forces, on withdrawal, were to fight as part of the fortress defences. It was the best what Pakis could do, with hostile population, active Mukhtis and own forces lurking on the borders. This strategy of Pakis left open subsidiary axes, which were later gainfully used, both by us and Mukhtis. Sylhet Sector through Karimganj Salient was one of them.

Deployment in Sylhet Sector. By this time Pakis had deployed two brigades of its 14 Infantry Division, Headquarter at Bhairab Bazar, in Sylhet Division sector; 202 Infantry Brigade {Brigadier Saleemullah} at Sylhet. This brigade was guarding approaches from North and East and defences around and in Sylhet town with 31 Punjab, 91 Mujahid and two Companies of 12 AK Battalion. It had elements, approximately a Company each, of Khyber, Thal and Tochi Scouts. 313 Infantry Brigade {Brigadier Iftikar Rana}, located at Maulvi Bazar, covered approaches from Dharmanagar, Kalaura/ Kailashahr and Juri. 22 Baluch of this brigade was at Gazipur and Kalaura; 30 Frontier Force covering/defending Shamshernagar and Maulvi Bazar. At the operational level Razakars, mostly Bihari Mohajirs, had been organised at District and Tehsil/Taluk levels and incorporated with Strong Points, closer to their villages.

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Topography And PAK Deployment Sylhet Sector Karimganj Salient- Atgram And Zakiganj {Sylhet Sector}

Karimganj Salient. The ground level operations by Mukhtis, had created a favourable

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position. Pakis could only retaliate by artillery shelling on our BOPs or suspected Mukhti launch pads. In first week of November, it had been decided by Eastern Command that border could be crossed up to about ten miles {16 Kilometres} deep, by own troops, to silence these guns or force them to withdraw. This was also to secure areas across the border, contiguous to own areas for operation, as area for Free Bangladesh. Karimganj Salient {See Sketch above}, one such suitable area, East of Sylhet, consisted of two important locations suitable for Paki defence; Atgram Complex and Zakiganj. The salient offered the shortest route to Sylhet {Approximately 30 Kilometers} and possibly been appreciated by Pakis as main approach our Army may adopt for offensive towards Sylhet.

Atgram and Zakiganj. Atgram and Zakiganj, part of Sylhet District, formed the North-eastern corner of then East Pakistan. In the North, River Surma was the boundary with India; on the East River Barak formed border till Surma River joined it, short of Karimganj {At Banga- See Sketch above} and named thereafter River Khusiara. The salient literally touched the only rail bridge connecting our Tripura State and Silichar {Cachar District}. Pakis were reported to have Strong Point defence{s} in the salient, held by regular troops and flanks/BOPs of these Strong Points held by Paramilitary Forces or Razakars, mixed with regular troops. There were conflicting reports of some of Paki held areas being either occupied by night or daytime only. Reasonable road communication between these two places and to the rear existed. Atgram had a regular bus service from Sylhet and place was also called as Atgram Bus Stand. Local Bihari Mujahirs and Pakis referred it as Umagar. Villages and hamlets dotted the salient, though mostly abandoned, except the hamlets inhabited by Bihari Muhajirs {Expatriates}. Paddy was the main crop and being low lying area next to major river systems, ground was wet, water table almost touching the ground level and large areas marshy. Roads were 5 to 7 feet above the ground level and Pakis had effectively used these for defence purposes. Atgram was not visible from own BOPs and could be seen from Ratachera, a place about 6-7 Kilometres in depth, from a hill, along Karimganj - Shillong Road {NH 44}. Being in the rear, even observation from Ratachera was not clear. In case of Zakiganj, referred to as Dakshinbagh by Pakis, large trees made it difficult to find its extent, depth and deployment, further accentuated by River Khusiara flowing between Karimganj and Zakiganj. The two tips, Atgram and Zakiganj, held key to this salient. Capture of this salient was allocated as task to 59 Mountain Brigade {Late Brigadier CA Quinn, Garhwal Rifles; fondly called Bunty Quinn}. 9 Guards of the brigade was located around Karimganj, 4/5 Gorkha Rifles {Frontier Force}{4/5 GR{FF}} were at Panchgram, while 3rd battalion {6 Rajput} was further South.

COs Discussion with GOC. By first week of November things moved fast and showdown was evident. While we, Company Commanders, were on our recce, CO {Lt Col later Brigadier A B Harolikar, MVC} had already been sounded of the objectives of the operations of the brigade; Atgram Complex by 4/5 GR {FF} and Zakiganj by 9 Guards. During these discussions our objective was referred to as Atgram but to us each area held or reported to be held by Pakis was important and had to be catered as such. It was evident that COs held the view that the area was strongly held and his quote would sum up the deployment dilemma; During Sand Model Discussions at the Divisional Headquarter, General Rao had mentioned that there is only one platoon in that area. While giving out my appreciation and plan of attack, I mentioned that there is a Company with supporting detachments at Atgram {i.e area/objectives we attacked} excluding BOPs and planned for three-company attack. After discussion {at Divisional Sand Model} we settled down to two Company attack. General Rao felt I am overestimating enemy strength. I felt that they were underestimating enemy strength. Finally it was decided to launch two Company attack on Atgram Complex; first step! That much dilemma, as beeline to Ratachera followed for next two days.

Brigade Attack Plan. So far Divisional area had been low key, barring Mukhti Bahini operations and localised actions. Battalions and brigades of the division had been deployed wide apart and thus to that extent an element of uncertainty would have arisen in the minds of Paki 14 Infantry Division, deployed opposite their area. Operations had been active in Southern Sector of the Corps Zone and certain localised actions by other brigades had not been much successful. With this, operations in this area would have had certain element of surprise and it could be more if unconventional method of attack was adopted. BOPs on the other side would become redundant and the aim would be to strike at Paki Strong Points, like foot pincer movements; attack by infiltration. The brigade attack plan, possibly not envisaged as major thrust in the area at this stage, encompassed following: -

A. Capture of Atgram Complex by 4/5 GR {FF} on night 20/21 November 1971, in Phase I of the attack.

B. Capture of Zakiganj {Dakshinbagh} by 9 Guards in Phase 2 of the attack.

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C. On orders secure Karimganj Salient and be prepared to progress operations further. Analysis of Brigade Attack Plan. Basically the operations seemed to be localised in

nature. Atgram-Zakiganj Salient was tempting but had its major disadvantage of two major river crossings and own logistics across these water obstacles. In the plan the objectives had been given but conduct and methodology was evolved between the COs and Commander. While 9 Guards opted for a conventional directional attack across a water obstacle on Zakiganj, it was different chemistry between CO and Commander {Commander}. To achieve surprise CO wanted it to be a silent attack by infiltration i.e attack localities/BOPs from rear avoiding frontal or directional attacks across River Surma, which otherwise would produce tougher objectives in depth by sequential reinforcements of depth areas by Pakis. CO wanted Battalions Khukris to unsheathe and be on blood drawing warpath. To quote CO; Our plan of attack on Atgram was evolved keeping three important aspects in sight. First, this attack was going to be the first one of the Indian Army in this area and the Pakistani troops would not have expected it. Therefore, it was conducive to surprise and silent attack. Secondly we would quietly infiltrate through the gaps between the enemy BOPs, attack and capture Atgram {as against capturing BOPs as a preliminary operation and mounting a deliberate attack in Phase II with the support of Artillery Fire}. Thirdly, we decided to exploit Gorkhas reputation {established during II World War and subsequent Indo-Pak Wars of 1948 and 1965} of using their personal weapon Khukri with deadly effect in close combat. While this formed the basis of the attack, objectives included clearance / capture of BOPs/positions along IB and Atgram Complex. The date /day of attack was significant; night of Id ul-Zuha {Eid}. Laxity on this day was but natural, as they would think that Mukhtis too would be celebrating Eid and nothing significant will happen. I am not sure whether this days effect and likely laxity was considered for selection of D Day, in achievement of surprise, which it did.

Deployment Dilemma. We could somehow get and collate possible deployment pattern, confirmed by ground indicators and periodical firing on our BOPs. Zakiganj and Atgram defended by troops of 31 Punjab and their deployment, in general, in our area of interest was as under {Detailed information including names of commanders was known decades later}:-

A. A Coy 31 Punjab {Major Sarwar} Zakiganj; also called Dakshinbagh. B. B Coy 31 Punjab Atgram Complex {Also called Umagar} {Late Major Azhar Alvi, HJ

{Hilal-e-Jurat} with elements of Mujahids, Thal, Tochi Scouts and Rangers. C. C Coy 31 Punjab {Major Mumtaz Hussain Shah} with EPCAF and Khyber Rifles;

under Brigade Headquarter 202 Brigade guarding Sylhet Airfield and Lathi approach to Sylhet.

D. D Coy 31 Punjab; generally guarding axis from Dauki {Shillong- Meghalaya}. E. Battalion Headquarter at Charkhai {CO; Late Lieutenant Colonel Riaz Hussain

Javed}. F. Headquarter Company elements, which had MMG, RCL, Chinese Rocket Launchers

and 81 mm mortars, distributed to these sub units. G. Troops at Zakiganj / Atgram were supported by guns, deployed in the areas of

Sarkar Bazar/Charkhai. Reconnaissance {Recce}. We had already observed area Amalsid Masjid, Paki BOP

Amalsid and Inspection Bungalow {IB}. Atgram Bus Stand {Also known as Atgram Road Junction} and Raygram, where in the depth and not observed from own BOPs. Another location, Sarkar Bazar, few miles West of Atgram, on road to Sylhet, was also location of interest. By 16 November we were told of our areas of interest i.e Amalsid Masjid, Amalsid BOP, IB, Atgram Bus Stand and Sarkar Bazar. Generally, CO gave the following deployment of Pakis in the area, as available to him from higher headquarters and available information obtained from BSF BOPs/ Mukhti Bahini operating in the area :-

A. Approximately a Company plus of Pakis including some Scouts {Identity and full strength in the area was not then known} in Atgram Complex.

B. Amalsid BOP - a Platoon, some Scouts and Razakars. C. Company Headquarters with some regular troops at IB {Inspection Bungalow}. D. Area near Amalsid Masjid; Razakars with Section each of Regulars and Scouts. E. Section Mortars in Area Atgram Bus Stand and possibly and at best {or worst} by a

Platoon including High Ground North of it. F. Raygram and Bala; east of Atgram Complex; approximately platoon, with Razakars. G. Amalsid BOP had Recoilless Gun, as many times they had fired rockets on our BOPs.

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H. The information that Company Headquarter of Pakis was based on observation of lighter vehicle movements in the area and officer having been frequently seen in the general area of IB {Inspection Bungalow} by BSF troops of own Karbala BOP.

I. Guns supporting from general area Sarkar Bazar. J. Battalion Headquarter at Charkhai, with immediate counter-attack force capability

of Company or Company plus, effective within 45 minutes to one hour along road Charkhai Sarkar Bazar - Atgram.

K. Villages appreciated to be acting as eyes and ears of Pakis with the help of pro-Paki locals and Razakars, mostly Bihari Mohajirs, brought in from depth areas.

L. Due to frequent crossings and raids by Mukhtis across Surma and Khusiara River; vulnerable crossing places would be effectively patrolled.

Recce and Apprehension. While own BOPs at Karbala and Natanpur precluded close observation of Raygram, Bala and Atgram, Ratachara was suitable view point to observe these areas. Few days prior to finalisation of attack plan, CO took us all to Ratachara which gave unlimited view of the area but restricted in terms of clarity, due to distances involved, being nearly 6-7 Kilometres from the objectives and Atgram looked like a tiny peck. We could make out the roads, few huts and even saw a bus at the stop, but nothing more. We could

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Appreciated Pakki Deployment - Atgram Complex appreciate objective to be 300 to 350 yards in length along the road with certain amount of depth. The observation of Atgram was obscured by a high ground to its North, towards the border, which also denied observation of most of the Atgram objective. Here, generally, CO instructed us to focus on sub objectives as under {See Sketch above}:-

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Alfa on Amalsid BOP and IB {Inspection Bungalow}. Delta on Atgram Road Junction Locality. Bravo on general area Sarkar Bazar. Charlie Gap between IB {Inspection Bungalow} and Raygram and area of Jungle

South of Atgram along Road Atgram Zakiganj. Major later Colonel Yashwant {Jassi} Rawat, area just South of Atgram.

Atgram - Key To Paki Defences. Armed with this information, we felt that Atgram Bus Stand was the key and should be held by more than a mortar section and some regular troops. Jassi and Maney also shared same views and felt that we were underestimating enemy strength {We at that time didnt know COss discussion at Divisional Headquarters and that he too was of this view}. From the general allocation of areas of interest it was clear to us that it would be two-company attack {Alfa and Delta}, while Charlie and Bravo would be either as reserves or employed differently. It was a major task and any slip would have proved costly for the entire battalion. Each one of us was curious and apprehensive too; should there be more than the estimated strength then what! We had discussions with CO and he convinced us that Pakis would and should be low in morale and it would be our valour and Khukri, which would take care of the rest or any additions in estimated strength of Pakis.

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Diagram Showing Diagrammatic Attack Plan Atgram Complex

Attack Plan of Atgram. The countdown began on 17 November 1971. CO gave out attack plan in the Officers Mess at Panchgram, on an enlargement {See Sketch above}:-

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Concentration into Forward Assembly Area {FAA} Night 19/20 November. FAA two kilometres behind Natanpur BOP, in a jungle area. Move partly by day ex Panchgram and move beyond NH 44 after hours of darkness.

Attack by infiltration, after establishing secure corridor across Surma River. Movement to Surma riverfront to start after last light 20 November.

Crossing of Surma River with pneumatic boats under arrangements 108 Engineer Regiment, BSF to secure home bank but to be told of the task at last minute. C Company {Major later Colonel Maney Malik} secure far bank and establish corridor by 2130 hours 20 November. Kelagram/ Raghur Chak to be masked but no physical assault.

Beyond far bank, B Company {Viru Rawat} to move ahead; bypass Raygram, Kamalpur villages, establish Road Block in area Sarkar Bazar as early as possible but not later than 0300 hours 21 November 71, act as reserve from the direction of West and CO 2 {Second-in-Command}{late Major Shyam Kelkar} to move with the company and control road block operations.

C Company less a platoon to move behind B Company, establish road block on Atgram Zakiganj Road in area jungle, South of Atgram Road Junction and act as reserve. Platoon {Under Ravindra Singh?} for corridor protection to reel up and move at the tail of the battalion column and join the company as early as possible.

Major later Colonel Yashwant {Jassi} Rawat with Pioneer Section, Section each of MMGs and Rcl, making adhoc platoon; to move behind C Company and establish in general area just North of C Company for task to be given later.

A Company {Late Major Dinesh Rana} to move behind C Company and capture Amalsid BOP and IB {Inspection Bungalow}.

D Company {Major later Brigadier Rattan Kaul} to move behind A Company and capture Atgram Bus Stand to include Atgram High Ground.

Attack timings to be synchronised depending upon movement, but appreciated between 0100 and 0300 hours 21 November 71 {More details later}.

Battalion R Group to move with C Company up to the corridor and thereafter move with one of the company, as the situation and progress of movement warranted.

Strict silence and fire control; avoid known positions or as they come up. No return fire, while moving to the objectives.

Artillery support only during the assault to be coordinated on Radio by CO, Company Commanders, BC and Artillery OPs. {This is gist of Attack Orders given out by CO and put in chronological order, as best I can recollect. There may be minor differences here and there, but

overall the essence/base remains same}. Choice of H Hour. Unlike conventional attack, CO gave a broad band of Hotel hour and

rightly too, for the attack was by infiltration; timings depended upon progress of movement through the area. It also depended, to certain extent, time it took to cross Surma River. CO when asked about his Hotel hour at the Divisional Headquarter had given down to earth reasoning and in his own words; Planned to close in {i.e. pounce on the enemy inside their bunker} between 1 AM and 3 AM on the night of 20/21 November 71, their senses dulled, and reactions and responses slow. I had seen {in peacetime manoeuvres} tired soldiers sleeping while standing or walking like zombies. There could not be a better time than that to assault them..... There was no denial of this fact and reasoning in his mind.

Analysis of Attack Plan. Within the task allocation and available resources, this was the best option. Surprise attack by infiltration and use of Khukri were the hallmark of the plan. In keeping with the progress of the operation, the artillery fire support was to be On Call, that too when surprise was lost. Reserves were suitably located on two different axes, effective within short time and by their location enabled interdiction of any Paki reinforcements into the area. There was, however, element of two assaults by Company each {Alfa and Delta} and coordination of these assaults would have been difficult. CO had kept his location wide open but as luck would have it, things changed fast and rapidly; to find CO at the right place at right time with right troops. The artillery had allocated OP Officer with each company with an Anchor OP at Ratachara {2/Lt Chaturvedi SM; who achieved direct hit on enemy guns at Sarkar Bazar on 21/22 November}.

Allocation of Objectives by Companys. Based on orders, both assaulting Company Commanders allocated objectives and tasking as under, after coordination within themselves:-

A. Alfa. Simultaneous attack on Amalsid and IB {Inspection Bungalow} from rear with two platoons {Praveen Johri {No 1 Platoon} and Hawa Singh {No 2

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Platoon}} with Subedar Ran Bahadurs platoon {No 3 Platoon} as reserve. Attack timings were to be coordinated with Delta and progress of the movement. B. Delta. Simultaneous attack from rear along Zakiganj- Atgram Road with two platoons {Yang Bharat {No 10 Platoon} and Subedar Tirtha Bahadur {No 11 Platoon} with Subedar Bal Bahadur Thapas platoon {No 12 Platoon} as reserve. No 10 Platoon was specifically tasked to capture area of Atgram Road Junction, {No 11 Platoon} Subedar Tirtha Bahadur capture high ground overlooking road junction. {While the plan of Delta Company was formulated by me, it is my recollection as to what was formulated by Late Major Dinesh Rana for Alfa Company, as discussed by him with me during our mutual coordination}.

OC Delta [ Kaul] Crossing Barak River On A Barge for Move to Atgram On 19 November 1971

Concentration and Paki Reception. Invocation of blessings of Durga Mata, presiding deity of the Paltan {Battalion} in the Battalion Mandir at Panchgram, 19 November 1971 was the day for move to Forward Assembly Area {FAA}. Since the crossing of Barak River was possible only with help of barges and that too before last light, movement across was to be by day. Battalion O{Order} Group moved in two parts; Battalion R {Reconnaisance} Group, CO 2 {Kelkar} and Bravo Company O Group in first lot, followed by Alfa, Charlie, Delta Company O Groups and Major later Colonel Yashwant {Jassi} Rawat in the second lot. The battalion F {Fighting} Group was to move slightly later, cross Barak River and stay in a place 10 Kilometres from Panchgram and move to general area Natanpur only after last light. Last few kilometres of the move were to be on foot and even kept secret from BSF. CO, briefed Battalion O Group in turns at Natanpur BOP View Point and as part of surprise, even BSF Commander in the area Mr Singha was not told about it. During the briefing at the View Point, we could see IB {Inspection Bungalow}, Amalsid Masjid / BOP and portion of Kelagram, hidden amidst thick grove of trees. While we were on it, two Rockets fired from IB hit the post quite close to us which had Chinese markings

{This Chinese Wheeled Rocket Launcher was in our hands after the attack}. CO gave out more details and outline orders in the FAA; a jungle of mixed forest. No cooking, self-contained for 48 hours. Battalion F Group fetched up by about 2100 hours 19 November, dispersing into Company areas.

Atgram Terminators on Way to Atgram

on 19 November 1971 L to R: Dinesh Rana [Alfa], Kaul [Delta] &

Yashwant Rawat Front: Maney Malik [Charlie]

Last Thoughts and Sound Sleep Before the Storm. Morning of 20 November was different, it was Eid Day and a test day for the Paltan. This was the first time in the history of the Paltan, after re-raising, a set piece deliberate attack by infiltration was being launched. Johnnys {Acronym for our troops} had no expression and went about their sleep. Few of us huddled together for last minute coordination and final touches to COs orders. We were wondering that CO had not given his position in the order of march and I asked him this question. The reply, which at that time I thought was curt, but as matter of factly he said I will be there when you want me. On God we left and there was a gun salute as the FAA was shelled by Paki Artillery. Shyam Kelkar {CO 2} strolled across and we sat together for a while, he was sure that the attack would go very well, what he was worried was

the crossing of Surma, which he thought was time consuming and dependant on 108 Engineer Regiment troops arriving, with boats, in time and at the right place. Company Commanders briefed their O Groups on the make shift Sand- Model. I briefed the whole company, platoon at

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a time about the task. 10 Platoon { Yang Bharat} to capture Atgram Bus Stand, 11 Platoon {Subedar Tirtha Bahadur} to capture High Ground overlooking Atgram Bus Stand and 12 Platoon {Subedar Bal Bahadur} to be reserve. My party, with Rcl Detachment, at the tail of 10 Platoon, followed by 11 and 12 Platoons. With orders over, leaving rest to Durga Mata, went to sleep for few hours amidst the din, soft and pleasing sunshine of November, till it was time to get up for the move.

On the way to Atgram - Khukris Wait To Unsheathe {Conduct}.

Crossing of Surma. At last light COs Party and elements of C Company { Maney Malik} left for the riverfront to marry up with 108 Engineer Regiment Platoon, who were reaching directly with boats. Their arrival was delayed and when they arrived the boats were deflated and had to be inflated. Lack of adequate number of foot pumps for inflating boats further delayed the crossing. After inflation of few boats, at about 2030 hours, Maney with a platoon crossed over. The Southern bank was secured and the remaining elements of Charlie Company built upon this base. Due to restricted and narrow strip of crossing area, each trip could carry about a platoon. CO was himself on the bank supervising the crossings. By 2100 hours remainder of Charlie Company had built up followed by Shyam Kelkar with a platoon Bravo Company, remainder of Bravo Company under Viru Rawat. As the crossing was going one could hear sporadic firing from general areas Kelagram and Bala. The initial bridgehead having been established, crossing of Surma picked up. Jassi Rawat and his troops, Alfa under Dinesh Rana and finally Delta {Kaul} crossed, in that sequence.

Raygram Hold Up. As the column moved, it was the dampness of the ground which retarded our movement. Suddenly the ground became soft and marshy, reducing our movements further. Around 2300 hours we were, that is what we thought, closer to Raygram when all hell broke out. Amidst shout of Allah-o-Akbar firing from Paki Posts started from both flanks in the general direction of the column. The whole column took to ground, orders not to return fire superbly adhered to. Jassi Rawat and myself were together and thinking that we were getting late for the assault. In the process of whispering, in otherwise quiet night, we heard, what appeared to be a Paki Out Post; Allah-o-Akbar. Allah sab momin ko taufiq farmai {Allah is great. May Allah {God} be benevolent on all who believe in Him {Allah}}. This was in chaste Urdu language and accent was that of Punjabis, so different from Bengalis or even Bihari Muhajirs. I surmised that it must be Paki troop post, at best their Para Military Forces. Nearly 30-45 minutes or so in doggo position, around midnight or so, firing died down. One didnt know as to whether the Pakis had withdrawn or gone to sleep or was it a standing timed patrol. Well irrespective of it, the silence was welcome and suddenly CO was looking for us. I had last seen CO when we were on the home bank, he had moved ahead and he too must have been held up. Like us, time running against us was his prime concern. Quickly the column started to move. First Step to Luck. CO had kept his position in the column wide open and so far he had been moving either with Bravo or Charlie. During this halt all except Bravo were together. Shyam had moved ahead and remainder of Bravo Company {Viru Rawat} were ahead as per the plan. CO, Maney, Jassi Rawat, Dinesh and I were now together. Time was around 0200 hours and movement was slow due to marshy area. Frankly we had moved, halted and all our direction bearings were mixed up. There was no indication of any landmark being picked up against the skyline, as it was second or third day of new moon {The Eid, Muslims Holly festival is generally on the second/third day of the new moon and this time Eid was on 20 November}. Looking towards North, we could see hill range of Meghalaya against skyline and it was of no consolation or help. The columns movement had been circuitous, avoiding Paki firing and possibly due to inadequate information on terrain available to us; like existence of Marsh in the area. However, there was someone generally keeping a listening watch; Bunty Quinn, our Brigade Commander. At Karbala {Natanpur?} BOP he was keeping a tag of the column. Time was running out and standing in a marsh CO called us for a conference, gist as under:-

1. We knew we were beyond Raygram, but feeling was we had gone too deep and away; possibly more towards Zakiganj possibly away from the objective and we had to move fast.

2. Take help of artillery round fired on one of the objectives for direction finding and navigation; possibly Atgram, being in the rear we could pick up this round.

3. Alfa and Delta to move together and CO would move with them. The aim was to reach closer to objective and once fixed and confirmed, Companys to go in for assault. CO himself was to coordinate this aspect.

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4. Viru {Bravo} and his troops to move faster and join Shyam Kelkar, who had moved aheadwith a platoon but was still far from Sarkar Bazar; as he thought.

5. Maney Malik {C} and Jassi Rawats force to move faster to their location. {The timings of events are approximate but four timings are certain. First, the time of crossing of Surma River around 2230 hours 20 November. Second, around 0130 hours 21 November we moved again after being held up. Thirdly it was just first light when Atgram, baring one odd bunker, was captured; i.e around 0450-0500 hours. Fourthly, both companies were in file formation at the time of charge and next to the objective, just turned right and assaulted Atgram ; main position as it turned out to be. Though it is difficult to say how much time the assault took, I think it was swift and in barely less than an hour we had annihilated whole company of the 31 Punjab of Pakistan Army}.

Not To Scale

Diagrm Showing Execution Of Attack Plan As Executed on Night 20/21 Nov 71

Quinns Pearls of Wisdom. Literally getting late and feeling of moving away from the objectives, CO spoke to Commander. The conversation went nearly on these lines {May be around 0300-0315 hours}:-

CO {Harry}- We are delayed due to firing around Raygram. I think we seem to be much beyond Raygram.

Quinn- Appears to me you are nearer to your objective and that too without Pakis knowledge. You must keep surprise element.

Harry - Could you ask gunners to fire a round on Atgram, so that we generally know the direction of out objective{s}? We have to hurry too as it is getting late.

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Quinn- Harry, you have been moving so well so far, a round may give away surprise. I feel Pakis have taken your move as routine Mukhti raid and all is quiet. I am sure you will get onto your objective soon, move ahead and we can see later. Dou you see North Star? Take help from it in your navigation.

Conversation over, CO decided to move with the instructions to us {Dinesh and Kaul} that he would give orders for assault, control move hereafter as he would be with assault companys. Commanders words of wisdom were pearls and this brought two-fold advantage to us: -

Surprise maintained so far was not given out. Later events proved that the complete troops of 31 Punjab and others in the Atgram Complex were surprised.

Both assault companies were now together and CO himself was with them for on the spot coordination and decision. This, as the events followed, allowed capturing the most important objective Atgram with a combined two-company assault.

Pak Patrols Order To Raise Hands. As the move started picking up momentum, Shyam Kelkar {CO 2} reported he was nearing Sarkar Bazar with a platoon of Bravo Company, while Viru Rawat {B} confirmed he was on his way. A short distance away Maney Malik {C} too thought that he was nearing his objective and moved South-westwards. Soon our column crossed a track/road. It was 5 to 7 feet above ground level and we thought we had either crossed Atgram-Raygram/ Bala or Atgram-Zakiganj Road and the objectives were still far off. At this juncture the assaulting column guides {Alfa Company} started steering towards North. There was need to go closer towards the objective, as it was felt that we were going away. Alfa column, COs Group had crossed over the road, Deltas 10 Platoon too had crossed. My Group had just crossed and part of 11 Platoon too had crossed, but bulk of this platoon was on the road. By some coincidence Subedar Bal Bahadur bringing up the tail fetched up parallel to this platoon and in whispers was asking me as to how far we were from Atgram. The road remained solidly silhouetted against starry night. Suddenly few men appeared against the skyline, on the road, with a bunker close by. Someone amongst them shouted Kaun Hai. Hath Khara Karo {Who is there? Raise your hand}. I felt that this was the position of Atgram; indicators being road, bunker and Paki troops who must have thought that Mukhtis had come. In retaliation few of us, close by, shouted Charge Ayo Gorkhali. Frankly to this day I dont know what made us shout the war cry, at this stage, when indicators were not enough of being next to the objective. I could hear CO shouting Parkha, Objective ma pughe Chhaina {Wait, we are still away from the objective}. To quote CO; My instant thought was that we had called the charge prematurely and the main Atgram position was still further ahead. But the arrow had gone out and there was no way to turn it back. But, as luck would have it, this was the main position. The slaughter had begun and blood {enemy} started flowing. There was no stopping of the Gorkha fury. It was either we or they, and it had to be We . And indeed it was WE. Unsheathing Of Khukris The Assault

Pakistani Defences And Assault At Atgram. Alfa Company had already crossed Atgram Zakiganj Road and so had part of Delta Company. The head of the column was veering due North and the force was somewhat diagonal to Atgram. Of course no one knew at that time that it was Atgram, but we knew it was definitely an enemy position. The shout of Ayo Gorkhali remained for a little while and soon it was rattle of Paki MMGs and firing which tried to encounter it. Most of the Paki defence structures at Atgram were based on reinforced shellproof bunkers and constructed horizontally in inverted L form. The longer arm of the defences/bunkers was along the Atgram-Sarkar Bazar road and shorter arm along Atgram-Zakiganj Road. The Western edge was more towards the wooden bridge, 100-150 yards away along road to Sarkar Bazar, while its Eastern edge extended up to 50 yards from the road junction towards Raygram. North of the road junction there was a small piece of high ground, with thick bamboo trees and few bunkers. Basically the defences were front {North} oriented but defence structures at the edges were duplicated to cover rear approaches also. Living barracks were in the centre and fair number of defence structures were constructed North of the road also. Defences south of the road were closer to barracks; possibly for the purpose of quick occupation in an emergency. From the layout of defences it was apparent that Atgram apart from being logistic base, was the main depth position and covering approaches from Surma River-Sarkar Bazar; Chargram- Amalsid; Inspection Bungalow; Raygram- Bala and Banga - Zakiganj. Both edges of the defences had MMG bunkers with a clear field of fire.

Alfa Company Assault. All the three platoons in a file, their charge drew MMG fire from the Western flank MMG /defences, as they veered North for the charge {See Sketch

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above and Painting/Sketch below}. The assault can best be narrated in COs words, who at that time was with Alfa Company. I found myself drawn by an unknown and inexorable force, running forward along with my Comrades-in-arms. This [charge] was like a wave with its own momentum and I could hear and faintly discern our brave jawans with their drawn Khukris- now blooded- moving from bunker to bunker, slaughtering one and all. It was as if all of us were possessed by super human powers... The enemy had been alerted by the war cry Ayo Gorkhali and was resisting with all its might, if for nothing else but to save their lives! As I was rushing into a bunker I suddenly found Subedar Ran Bahadur [a platoon commander] abruptly stopping me and informing that two of the enemy soldier were still inside and firing. He [Subedar Ran Bahadur] was in the process of unpinning a grenade, which he lobbed inside through the bunkers firing slits. There was one big explosion and both enemy soldiers were dead and beyond recognition. There were battle sounds of bursting grenades, rifle and MMG fire from all around. No 1 Platoon under Captain Johri went in for the Western defences then veering inwards, towards defences in front of the barracks. No 2 Platoon under Lieutenant Hawa Singh penetrated through the barracks, destroying bunkers on the Southern side and thereafter defences ahead of barracks and along the road. Subedar Ran Bahadur with No 3 Platoon took on the defences right of No 2 Platoon and then veering West towards the barracks and the defences close by. Again to quote CO; As I moved further I found Rifleman Dil Bahadur Chettri with his bloodied Khukri in his hand, emitting sounds which were a mixture of laughter and the cry of an insane man dancing the dance of death. And it was a death dance, with a number of dead bodies {.. } lying around him {He was later awarded MVC for gallantry, the fist one of the battalion}. A little further, in

Painting Depicting Assault on Atgram on Night 20/21 November 1971 front of another bunker, I found Captain Johri lying face down with a bloodied Khukri in his hand and another enemy soldier lying nearby. Hawa Singhs platoon having penetrated in the centre of the defences cleared bunkers at the rear of the main barrack and many more in front along the road. Dinesh Rana {Company Commander} was moving along No 1 Platoon and as soon as he sighted defences towards Chargram Bridge, ordered No 2 Platoon to clear the area. Hawa Singh had been seriously injured and in his absence the platoon havildar took charge of the platoon, veered left and cleared the area. With Johri dead, Hawa Singh seriously injured, Dinesh divided overall responsibility of platoons between himself and Subedar Ran Bahadur. While he looked after the Western edge of the defences including approach from Chargram - Sarkar Bazar, Subedar Ran Bahadur looked after the Central Barrack area. As this was happening, first light had broken out and one could see movements, dead, causalities clearly. It was the leaders who had led the assault; two officers of the company {Hawa Singh breathed his last an hour later}, Subedar Bobi Lal Pun, MFC with the

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company, killed as he had been hit by a bullet short of the objective; two Other Ranks killed. As the firing melted down, shots could be heard from Amalsid, Raygram etc. Delta Company Assault. When the Paki Patrol was encountered, Yang Bharats Platoon had crossed the Atgram Zakiganj Road, Company Headquarter was literally hugging the road. With the shout of charge, 10 Platoon under its commander turned diagonally right and charged with their centre of attack just to the left of the road T Junction {See Sketches/Painting above and Sketch below}. The firing of MMG was not that effective, as they pressed home the attack and destroying fortifications in the area. While this was happening I asked 11 Platoon to clear the enemy patrol area, which turned out to be a sentry post on the Southern edge of Atgram defences on Atgram- Zakiganj Road. The road was about 5-7 feet above the ground level and as such movement of the platoon took place along the sides of the road. This proved to be useful as the fortifications were covering the road and with this side movement, were tackled from the rear. It was at this stage MMG from T Junction fired onto the platoon and one of its section moving along the road was pinned down. 57 mm Rcl detachment at this time was moving along with me and was pressed into destruction of the

Not To Scale

Diagrammatic Depiction of Assault Lines at Atgram At Platoon Level bunker, which they did with two direct hits. The section, pinned down along the road, thereafter charged and cleared fortification in front of them. Rifleman Than Bahadur of the section was in the lead and while spraying bullets inside the bunker was hit by Paki bullet in the head. Probably this firing was from Atgram High Ground, as I could hear the firing from there and see the tracer flights also. 12 Platoon in the meantime had been briefed and I felt that Atgram High Ground would have to be cleared at the earliest. The fighting onto our left was still ragging and what we were worried was the daylight breaking as one could see at this stage. CO suddenly came from left searching for me and asked me to hurry, as the dawn was to breakout at any time. This was the time 57mm Rcl blew up enemy fortification. Few more minutes and 10 and 11 Platoon were on the objective and clearing /securing bunkers north of the road. Firing from Atgram High Ground was also neutralised by 12 Platoon, who assaulted it from the direction of Raygram and captured it. Dead bodies in different coloured uniforms and few in civvies were lying all over. The surprise had been total, evident from even loose shoes etc. The tenacity of the opponents, though surprised, was evident as they fought till the end; there were no prisoners; either they fought till dead or had bolted. As the firing died down,

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both companies were in the process of reorganisation and regaining of command and control. It now dawned on us that we had captured Atgram, which happened to be main position in the area.

Reorganisation Phase Alpha Company. After the capture of main position Alfa Company less a platoon troops moved due west towards Chargram Wooden Bridge. Moving for coordination with Dinesh, I found CO rushing towards a bunker. I was stunned to see Johri lying dead at the entrance of the bunker with three dead enemy soldiers inside. He had apparently charged the bunker and had been shot in the hand-to-hand fight. During the last few months he had volunteered to be at Banga Post and almost every night would cross over Barak River into own toe hold enclave and then even go across the border in civvies. BSF personnel of the Banga Post had special respect for his dare devilry. For his bravery during the assault he was awarded Sena Medal posthumously. This was not the time to grieve, I moved towards the barrack where our injured men had been shifted. CO was also moving around and entered a side room, which appeared to be Company Commanders bunker/shelter and a telephone hanging with a long ring breaking the eerie silence. CO picked up the receiver; apparently it must have been someone from one of the posts or probably from alerted headquarter! It was difficult to know the conversation from other side but I was stunned as CO told the person, in a somewhat nasty language, on other side that all of their men had been killed and tell everyone Gurkhas had done it. It was not COs rage which stunned me but the tone of the conversation he used, but that was it; anger and a chemistry unknown to me as he himself called it. In the partly open barrack just outside the side room, a line of Paki dead had been lined up. A moan for water from a high bamboo cot drew our attention. The voice was familiar; that of Hawa Singh. He had been hit by a bullet in the spleen and was in great pain. Someone gave him the water and his voice quivered and was silent thereafter. Though we didnt realise it, he had apparently breathed his last. He and his platoon had cleared the centre portion of the enemy defences and in hand to hand fight had been shot. He was awarded Vr C posthumously, for his bravery of the highest order. Few metres away body of another brave, Rifleman Phas Bahadur Pun reminded of further tell tales of the fierce hand-to-hand fight. He had single-handed destroyed an enemy bunker together with its occupants for which he too was awarded Vr C posthumously. At this stage there were reports of some movement from Charkhai towards Atgram and CO directed Dinesh {A Company} to move further ahead along the road to take positions astride it for countering any Counter Attack from that direction. Subedar Ran Bahadurs platoon and Delta Company remained in the area and also occupied Atgram High Ground.

Reorganisation Phase Delta Company. Platoon under Yang Bharat had cleared bunkers both South and North of the road and had organised defence in coordination with A Company Platoon {Ran Bahadur}. For 11 Platoon {Subedar Tirtha Bahadur} the battle had started as soon we were crossing the road and encountered Paki patrol just south of Atgram {it was the enemy post as part of Atgram defences covering Zakiganj}. Tirtha Bahadur had moved his platoon along either side of the road, getting some sort of protection from Paki small arms of fire. There was no time for me or to him or other platoon commanders to divide or allocate objectives. His sections moved clearing the bunkers on the way till they reached the T-junction. It was here that a strong bunker had opened up; rather late. His balance of the troops charged and cleared the bunker. For his exemplary bravery he was awarded Sena Medal. Atgram High Ground for this narration has been called High Ground {See Sketches above} but literally was 50 by 50 feet mound, about 4 to 6 feet high, covered with thick bamboo. This High or raised ground had two bunkers, possibly giving depth to forward defences of Amalsid and Inspection Bungalow. No 12 Platoon under Subedar Bal Bahadur Thapa on the spot was tasked to clear it {BB, as we called him became Subedar Major of the Paltan}. Typical of BB; shouting Mero Pache Move {Follow Me} amidst the din of firing, he moved out with his platoon along the right side of the road and cleared the High Ground and deployed his platoon. Sporadic firing from Amalsid and IB continued. Atgram had been captured finally and what remained were Amalsid and IB; both now relegated to lower importance as majority of Paki troops had been cleared/ killed. Movement of Pakis from Charkhai towards this area was reported by Anchor OP. CO, therefore, decided to ensure the defence of Atgram and approaches to it.

Progress of Bravo, Charlie, Jassis Force and Zakiganj Front. Shyam Kelkar with one platoon had reached Sarkar Bazar Road block site just as the assault went in, as the remainder of the company had been held up due to firing. At first light the remainder of the company had joined and effectively blocked road Atgram-Charkhai-Sylhet. Charlie was in the process of establishing roadblock when the assault was launched and Maney realising this

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quickly deployed his company and also effectively blocked road Zakiganj-Atgram. Mortars under Sally {Salgotra} had been deployed closer to C Company, location under the eyes of Jassi Rawat. Jassi Rawat had established his force along the road closer to Atgram and ensuring that our route of infiltration was kept under fire and observation for any interruption by desperate Pakis through this route. Artillery had opened up on predetermined and fixed targets; we had hardly asked for few rounds at Atgram, as surprise was complete and troops were already on the objective. It is at this stage scattered minefields covering Northern approach to Atgram, just adjacent to Atgram High Ground, were detected and so did Jassi Rawat next to his position. Luckily for us, home sides had been demarcated with wire and since we had taken the rear approach it helped us. Karan Puri {Adjutant} with administrative echelons was close to Natanpur. RMO, Captain DK Sengupta was despatched with his light man-pack MI Room on foot along the infiltration route with his Nursing Assistant and personnel from medical platoon. His journey was not smooth as his Nursing Assistant was hit by a bullet but DK, as we called him, continued with one Johnny and just an hour or so after the capture of objective was seen by us literally running in. As soon as he arrived, he was busy with the injured men {Captain Sengupta was awarded Sena Medal for his exemplary devotion to duty and performing job under extreme difficult conditions without any concern for his personal safety}. The information from Zakiganj was not forthcoming and was confusing. It appeared that only part of the objective had been cleared, as the assaulting troops had been day-lighted. This situation was of concern as Pakis would have tried to induct troops into this area and most possible route for reinforcement was Atgram/Kamalpur-Zakiganj. This situation demanded effective blocks for reinforcements from Charkhai and/or Sylhet. In either case Sarkar Bazar became focal point. At this time CO decided that part of Alfa {Company less Platoon} under Dinesh should move to Sarkar Bazar to further reinforce the road block site. Subedar Ran Bahadur was to remain at Atgram with his platoon. Dinesh on his move out was also to secure Chargram area, astride the road. Major Azhar Alvi, Company Commander B Company 31 Punjab Pak Army- Fights Back. During the process of reorganisation, I was moving along with CO and we had already seen Company Commanders bunker. As we came out into a bigger room, where our injured and dead were lying, we saw a row of 8 to 10 Paki dead bodies; but none except one with a weapon. The person was fully and neatly dressed, lying amongst the dead. I am not sure as to whether he was injured or feigning; in no case seriously injured. Sudden movement by this person startled us. CO was quite close to him with myself, Battery Commander and Subedar Ran Bahadur {A Company} with him. Actually we were taking toll of enemy dead and our own causalities, little realising, which can best narrated by Lieutenant Colonel Later Brigadier A B Harolikar, MVC. As I entered the first big room I noticedabout 8-10 enemy soldiers lying dead. This was obviously the Company Headquarters bunker. As I entered, I noticed an enemy person lying apparently dead. He was sturdy and well built and hardly had I sensed that I had seen this person somewhere earlier, when Major Rattan Kaul who had arrived there earlier and now standing at the other end shouted Sir Sir Look Out. That warning saved my life. What happened next cannot be explained in sequence or in words. I recollect, that with those warning words, I noticed that the sturdy young person posing as dead, was moving his hand on the rifle at his side {Actually it was deadly Chinese Carbine, as I recollect- Author}. {I came to know later that he was Major Alvi, B Coy Commander, 31 Punjab Pak Army }. Having moved in the pre -dawn

Company Headquarter Barrack of B Coy

31 Punjab At Atgram, where Maj Alvi

tried to kill CO and Others. darkness from his bunker to company headquarter bunker he was probably awaiting an

opportunity to kill a company or battalion commander. Major Kaul- always alert- had noticed the movement of Major Alvis fingers moving on the rifle and had instantly shouted the

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warning for me. I found myself and Major Alvi struggling with each other on the ground. I do not have any recollection whether he pulled me down or I jumped at him. But I do remember very strong fingers near my eyes as if a strong force was trying to gouge the out. Next I remember is, again Major Kaul in a bid to save me had instantly come very near me and was trying to shoot Major Alvi. But that was difficult as Major Alvi and I were grappling with each other. My recollection is that Major Kaul twice tried to shoot Major Alvi but his sten gun misfired {that is, when the trigger of a cocked sten gun is pressed, it does not fire. Sten Guns in those days were known to be unreliable because of this well-known phenomenon}. In the meanwhile, I noticed somebody standing towards the head of Major Alvi, took out his sten gun and holding its barrel in his two hands, hit hard on Major Alvis head. I remember a fountain of blood and then all was quiet!. Major Alvi lay dead. Subedar Ran Bahadur, who was next to us and seeing my sten not firing, hit him and pumped a burst into Alvi and killing him instantly. Major Azhar Alvi of B Company 31 Punjab died a death of a brave soldier. Even when the chips were down, he tried his best to kill command elements of the Battalion. Exemplary bravery, a dignified death in the best tradition of the troops he commanded and for the country he served. Major Azhar Alvi was awarded Hilal-e- Jurat, Pakistans second highest award for bravery {Equivalent to our MVC} posthumously. He deserved it, for he set an example by doing something spectacular in these circumstances. Securing Of Chargram Jungle, Amalsid BOP and Inspection Bungalow. By 0500 hours Atgram had been captured, blocks on incoming roads effective and ready for any Counter-attack. Odd shot firing was still heard, possibly from isolated posts that may not have known of the fall of Atgram. Chargram, barely a kilometre from Atgram Junction, a raised ground, effectively dominated the road and the wooden bridge close to it. For any local defence of Atgram, securing of this area was important. The task was given to Alfa Company less a platoon and by 0700 hours Dinesh {A} and his troops had secured the area. Atgram was now defended physically by four platoons; Platoon of Alfa and complete Delta Company. Alfa less a platoon was deployed covering Western edge- Chargram. We had yet to secure/capture Amalsid/IB and it was assessed that either they would have been vacated or the strength could not be more than a section each. Physical securing of Amalsid /IB would have cleared route to own BSF posts and made area across Surma contiguous. At About 0700 hours CO tasked Delta less a platoon to secure/ capture these places. By about 0730 hours we were close to Amalsid Masjid with no signs of Pakis and quickly moved through it. Pak BOP IB too seemed to be vacated; there was no sign or movement as seen from Amalsid Masjid. The initial plan, after securing these two places, was to leave some troops for their defences. At about 0745 hours after completion of the task CO instructed the company to return to Atgram, as reports of movement of Paki troops, possibly for Counter-Attack had been received. By 0800 hours Company was back at Atgram. At this stage Alfa Company was instructed to move to Sarkar Bazar and build up on Bravo Company road block site, which it did and by 0900 hours both Companys {A and B} had established effective block astride the road. Delta was also warned to be ready to move ahead. Charlie was now earmarked as reserve for Zakiganj, as it was apparent that 9 Guards would have to launch further attack. Lot of PAK currency notes were lying around at Atgram and it had no value to any of us and Johnnys were tearing these notes. Older JCOs had told boys that taking any such war booty would bring ill luck. By about 0900 hours D Company was also warned to move to Sarkar Bazar, to be deployed to cover Jamalpur approach either to Atgram or Zakiganj. At Atgram, CO had found a walking stick and when after situation had stabilised Commander, came to Atgram, he tried to present the walking stick to him, which was declined. But he, Bunty Quinn, noticed a Parakeet {Possibly pet bird of late Major Alvi} shrieking, forlorn, almost insane and caged in the room. He whistled to the bird for a while and was successful in quietening him. The bird was handed over to Commander and he gracefully took it. The Parakeet would have sensed death of his master and in his hour of grief someone, Bunty Quinn, had come to share it and that is how he quietened as Bunty Quinn whistled to him. Battalion Less Charlie Company Concentrates at Sarkar Bazar. Soon it was learnt that 9 Guards had captured the remaining portion of Zakiganj defences and both battalions established contact with each other; CO 9 Guards came to Atgram and met CO. The threat was now from Sylhet side and Delta ordered to move to Sarkar Bazar. As I led the company column along the road, we saw a 6 feet tall burly Pathan, in Muzri dress, duly tied with rope, being escorted by two Johnnys; Naik Damar Bahadur Gurung, a boxer of the battalion who was hardly 5 feet tall and Naik Suk Bahadur; both of Bravo Company; with remainder few men walking loosely behind them. It was apparent that the patrol had captured the Paki and

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were now escorting him to Company Headquarter. A smile appeared on my lips, while men around me giggled. We were approximately 100 yards away from them when I hailed them Damre. Damare, as we called Naik Damar Bahadur Gurung, looked towards me and before I could say Jack Robin, there was a grenade blast. The Pathan seeing his predicament had taken out a grenade from his pouch, took off the pin, kept it next to his body, told Damare and his colleagues to Bago {Run Away} and blew himself up. He was from Tochi Scouts, as his shoulder titles indicated. Tochis are Pakistans Northern Area tribal; fiercely proud and brave. This unknown Tochi had stood by the reputation of his tribe.

Area Ahead Of Sarkar Bazar Where Paltan Finally

Firmed in

Consolidation, Visits and Body Count. As the afternoon of 21 November rolled, CO visited us. On his way he had moved over mines laid along the road, which were later cleared by sappers. In the afternoon Commander came and as ever in soft words was in praise for the well-accomplished task. Vigilant night, it was more at Atgram than at Sarkar Bazar, for many Paki Posts had yet to come to know about the fate of Atgram Troops. It was around midnight 21/22 November Jassi Rawat was on guard at Atgram, when a patrol of Pakis rolled in. A smacking short and sweet conversation in Punjabi with a gentleman like Jassi followed for a few seconds and then his LMG let go. No patrol or lost Pakis dared to come anywhere near Atgram till 4/5 Gorkha Rifles {Frontier Force} were there. Captain V K Sharma and Transport

After deploying D company I reported to Major Shyam Kelkar, our Second-in-Command and now in charge of the defences in the area. He stood up hugged no words were exchanged for a while and it was welcome cup of tea and Puri offered by his sahayak which broke the ice. The battle of Atgram had gone our way against all odds; anticipated strength of Pakis, delay uncertainties of direction of the objective. He assigned my Company {D} to cover Jamalpur approach and by about 1230 hours three Companies {Alfa, Bravo and Delta} had taken defences at Sarkar Bazar to counter any Pakki reaction from Sylhet Charkhai side.

GOC; Maj Gen KV Krishna Rao inspecting Arms and Ammunition At Atgram. To his left Lt Col AB Harolikar {CO}, further Left Late Brigadier C A

Quinn, Commander. Also in picture; V K Sharma, Maney Malik [Extreme left] and Dinesh Rana and

Subedar Amar Singh Mortar Platoon {Right}.

with GOC, Major General KV Krishna Rao, Late Brigadier CA Quinn our Commander accompanied by late Colonel Zia ul- Rehman {Then Commander 1 East Bengal Rifles Brigade, later Chief of Bangladesh Army and finally President of Bangladesh} visited us. Krishna Rao

Officer {Captain TD Gopalkrishna} brought the battalion B Echelon late in the night on man pack and light vehicle basis and evening we had the first fresh meal of the day but what eluded smokers was the cigarettes. Locals gave few and then it was selling of Bengali Cigarettes and even Paki currency would do. Alas we hardly carried own currency and had torn Pak Currency. Night in wet, soggy trenches was never comfortable but it was slumber for all of us, of course in turn. Morning of 22nd was special for we saw few known faces with cartons loaded on their head.The caravan was that of Mahadev Prasad Poddar- our unit contractor; a package of sweets and cigarettes for each of us, including men. Touchy indeed and cannot forget this gesture and so will many more amongst us. The day was again busy

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was all good words for us but did ask Dinesh {Alfa} and me, about number of Pakis killed at Atgram. Day earlier we had counted 31 bodies and we told him so. He wanted Battalion to move ahead and preparations started immediately. Commander was more euphoric, warm as he congratulated Officers, JCOs and men present. GOC on his way back did see the pile of arms and ammunition captured during the attack. We moved ahead of Sarkar Bazar towards Charkhai and firmed in. We were now under the impression that either we will stay in the area for the time being or continue our operations along the same axis; both proved to be wrong. CO for that night stayed with us and shared a small hut with Shyam Kelkar. We were all together for a while, sombre mood for we had lost our colleagues but were happy to have done a great job. Early morning {23rd} CO held a conference of all officers and JCOs and were told that we may have to move out and handover the area to 1 East Bengal Rifle Brigade and /or Mukhti Bahini. All of us had reservations that they {Mukhtis} will not be able to hold the area, thus our efforts and blood shed would go waste. In fact there was somewhat belligerent attitude, of most of us, towards such a measure. CO must have understood our views and we felt he too must be of the same view, but like a true soldier he would express it to his seniors and not to us. This apparently he must have done, as on 24th we were on way out from Atgram Salient but it was BSF that came to relieve us. As we moved through Atgram, back to Panchgram, we had left trail to glory, sacrifices, memories of two of our daring officers, a JCO and men killed or injured and everlasting impressions of Khukri yielding soldiers on the minds of Pakis. Analysis of Atgram - Luck, Valour and Khukri. After 1965 War, this was the first major operation of the battalion. The officer lot was new and young, but CO, many senior officers and JCOs were battle hardened. At lower level we had dynamic NCOs {Non Commissioned Officers} and many Lance Naiks who had participated in 65 War and all beans. Many other ranks too were 65 War hardened and about 25 percent of our troops who had less than 3-4 years service. While Nagaland stint had given some training in Jungle operations, the excellent field craft picked up had stood us in good stead. Last few months training around Panchgram and cooperation with Mukhtis had given added weight age. In spite of all this, there were many factors, which made the operation a 200 percent success:-

COs leadership; a mix of firmness, flexibility and exponent of unconventional warfare. He knew whom to tap and at what time.

The plan was evolved by CO based on the premise that infiltration attack, where the combat ratio was nearly equal, would pay dividends.

The task put added weight and responsibility on the shoulders of commanders at all levels. Any commander would dread a fiasco.

To each one of us, positive result mattered; to CO it was first test of his command and to all of us maintaining Battalions Izzat {honour}, its reputation and our own reputation being at stake.

To Late Major Shyam Kelkar, our beloved Second-in-Command, it had different significance; considered a lucky mascot in Nagaland, he dared to be in the front; at Atgram he chose to be in the front with Bravo Company and kept it up till his death.

From the beginning CO had grilled that it had to be Khukri assault. In the days to come this was the greatest terror creator in the minds of Pakis and stood well with our war cry Ayo Gorkhali; Gurkhas did come with flashing Khukris.

Leadership at higher, middle and junior level was superb; CO and Company Commanders in the lead of the assault wave; middle level and junior commanders all beans; leading sections. No wonder three junior leaders sacrificed their lives.

Valour of the highest order at all levels, where personal safety, in the best tradition, was given absolute go and what mattered was to see opponent killed.

Bulk of our troops were young and raw. It was move by stealth, which was the beginning of a surprise turning move. For nearly one hour none stirred as Pakis opened fire at Raygram; a step which made Pakis believe to be that of Mukhtis.

Element of luck too favoured, which steered us to events, which finally paved the way for quick, complete, timely and exemplary assault come true. Some of those events are:- a. Both assault companies and CO join together and then on both companies are

together as a force. b. Commander refusing to give direction-finding artillery round; had this been

accepted and given, possibly Paki troops at Atgram would have been alerted. c. Atgram Complex had a full company of 31 Punjab plus Para Military Forces, as

against own appreciation of scattered deployment at Atgram, Amalsid and IB

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and required three to four companies for an ideal infantry assault. Joining of both companies and joint assault was just and barely adequate.

d. I am not sure as to selection of the date of assault, which coincided with Eid. Was it reckoned or mere coincidence? In both cases it was unique, as Pakis definitely were caught by surprise, though they reacted quickly and fiercely.

e. The area was kept inactive for nearly a fortnight, after elements operating in the vicinity had been withdrawn and activated only on required day and time.

f. It was sixth sense, which spurred shout of charge, when there was no ground indication that we were closer to Atgram. Paki patrol and war cry, which followed thereafter did the trick. Both instruments of luck! To quote Brigadier Harolikar, MVC again: For a mili second a thought had passed in my mind that we have charged too early, in that, the objective {Atgram} was still a kilometre ahead. But I remember telling myself Arrow has gone out and you cannot call it back.

Trail To Glory. In-spite of inadequate intelligence and topographical information, we waded through

deep marshy area, which was not known, but nobody cared at that time. It can be best summed up by COs words, when reminded of the marsh;Surprisingly I have no recollection of marshy area. . I think this is because mind is so deeply and intensely occupied with variety of likely consequences and toying with contingencies thereof that body is immune to external stimuli. That is the state of mind on such occasions. Atgram was classic assault by infiltration, against strong and almost equal opposition, delivered with the skill of a craftsman, who achieves a perfect result, even beyond his expectations. B Company 31 Punjab Pak Army and affiliated troops at Atgram ceased to exist for the rest of the war. And finally the encounter with late Major Azhar Alvi; CO, myself and many others being his close and immediate target. The encounter for Alvi was either you or me. It would have been catastrophic had Alvi succeeded, though Second in Command {CO 2- Shyam Kelkar} was in place, though away from the place. This is what Major Mumtaz Hussain Shah of 31 Punajb Pak Army had to say about the fate of B Company of his battalion at Atgram in the early hours of 21 November 1971; The second prong {sic: 4/5 GR {FF} assault; first prong refers to 9 Guards attack at Zakiganj} on Major Azhar Alvis B Coy was more lethal.... B Coy was mauled completely. Major Alvi and his men laid their lives. Only few stragglers could reach the Battalion Headquarters at Charkhai to tell the tale. Not that troops of B Company 31 Punjab Pak Army were cowards but they had been annihilated by Gorkhas from none other than Fourth Battalion The Fifth Gorkhas {Frontier Force}.

Battle of Atgram was the beginning of a saga of valour and fame for next over three weeks as well.

Man should discover his own reality and not thwart himself. For he has his self as his only friend, or as his only

enemy. A person has the self as friend when he has conquered himself, but if he rejects his own reality, the self

will war against him.Bhagwad Gita

{From compilation AS WE GREW UP WITH FOUR FIVE. Brigadier A B Harolikar, MVC quotes from his compilation Bravest Of The Brave}

Karimganj Salient- Atgram And Zakiganj {Sylhet Sector}