assessing 10 years of the caribbean court of justice in

CaribbeanJournalofInternationalRelations&DiplomacyVol.3,No.2,June2015:pp.69-91

SYMPOSIUM

Assessing10YearsoftheCaribbeanCourtof

JusticeinitsAppellateJurisdiction:EncouragingSignsofaMature,Relevant

Jurisprudence

Rose-MarieBelleAntoineUniversityoftheWestIndies

Keywords:MyrieCaseandCSME;InternationalNorms;

IndependenceandFairness;CivillawTen years is not an exceedingly long time in the life of a court,especially a complex court such as the CaribbeanCourt of Justice(CCJ) thathas twodistinct jurisdictions: theoriginal jurisdiction–to treat with regional issues falling under the Revised Treaty ofChaguaramas;1 and an appellate jurisdiction – to hear appeals oflaw within the domestic legal sphere, involving a wide range ofsubject matters, whether that be criminal law, civil law,constitutionallaw,humanrightsandthelike.

What is clear is that the CCJ has alreadydeveloped a rich andsignificant jurisprudence which is deserving of an in-depth legalanalysis. This paper undertakes to evaluate this body of law,focusingonbroad,conceptualprinciplesemanatingfromtheCourtand highlighting a few of what can be considered landmark CCJcaseswithrespecttotheappellatejurisdictionoftheCourt.INTERNATIONALJURISDICTIONNOTINCONTENTIONBUTCANGUIDEDOUBTERSInthebroadsocialcontextoftheCommonwealthCaribbeanregion,mentionof theCCJperhapsmostoften conjuresup imagesof the

70Rose-MarieBelleAntoine

MyrieCase.2 This case concerneda Jamaicanwomanwho tried tovisitBarbadosandwasharassedattheairport,strip-searched,andsubsequently deported, despite the existence of a CARICOMFreedom of Movement regime3 which posits an ‘automatic’ sixmonth stay for CARICOMnationals in anyCARICOM country. Thecasewaswidely reported in the Press andwas a source of somecontentionbetweenBarbadosandJamaica.

Infact,theMyriecaseconcernedtheoriginaljurisdictionofthecourtandnot itsappellate jurisdiction.Theoriginal jurisdiction isnot in contention here today since all CARICOM jurisdictions,except the Bahamas, have already accepted this originaljurisdiction. It is the appellate jurisdiction, that is, appeals fromdomestic law, as opposed to the law emanating from theRevisedTreaty of Chaguaramas which produced the CSME regime, thatremains in issue. This forum seeks to examine and frommy ownperspective, persuade those countries which have not alreadysignedon,toadopttheappellatejurisdictionofthecourt.Tosomeextent, therefore, we should not spend toomuch time discussingthe cases from the original jurisdiction, as exciting as they havebeen.

Nevertheless, I do think that assessing, however briefly, thejurisprudenceof theCCJ in relation to itsoriginal jurisdictioncanbe encouraging and indeed reassuring, with respect to how itmeasuresupwithregardtoitsappellatejurisdiction.It isbecauseofthisaddedvaluethattheoriginaljurisdictionwillbementionedbrieflyinmyanalysis.

In attempting to evaluate the court’s performance I havedevised some key denominators to have regard to. The followingarethethreemainprinciplesuponwhichIbasemyassessment:

1. The CCJ’s adherence to established principles of

independence,integrityandfairness;2. TheCCJ’s consistencywith internationally acceptednorms

of judicial decision-making by a superior court, both (a)Procedural; and (b) Substantive.Under thisheading, Iwilllook at reasoning, logic; ingenuity; consistency withaccepted principles of law and keeping in touch withemerging judicial legal trends, such as the currentcoherence with international human rights evident indomestic legalsystems,yetdemonstratingtheabilitytobeinnovativewhennecessary;andtheCCJ’sauthoritativenessso as to enable it to guide lower courts and legal

AssessingtheCCJ’sAppellateJurisdiction71

practitionersanditwouldappearCARICOMHeadsofstatewherenecessary,onissuesoflawandpractice;and

3. The CCJ’s ability and willingness to create an indigenous(Caribbean) jurisprudence,adapting toourparticular localcircumstances without sacrificing appropriate judicialprinciple,alongcherishedgoaloflegalscholarslikemyself.

FromtheoutsetletmestateemphaticallythatIbelievethatwecanseeclearlyinalloftheseareasthattheCCJhasalreadypassedthetest.However,thepaperproceedsnotonapersonaltestimony,buton empirical evidence. Thus, we will examine a few of thedecisions.ESTABLISHEDPRINCIPLESOFINDEPENDENCE,INTEGRITYANDFAIRNESSItisdifficulttobelievethatthecoreprinciplesofindependenceandintegrityof theCCJareseriously indoubtat this juncture. In fact,thearrangementsforprotectingtheindependenceandintegrityoftheCCJareamongthefinestintheworldandUKjuriststhemselveshave remarked on this. 4 There is a separate and independentJudicial Services Commission made up of non-politicians thatselects judges,unlike, forexample, thepoliticalappointmentsthatwe see in the US and the UK. Moreover, the establishment of aspecial fundtosupporttheCourtfinancially isaconsiderabletoolin securing its independence, by insulating it from financialpressures. Indeed, the Court is in a considerably better positionthanothercourtsintheregionwhichmustrelyongovernmentsfortheirfunding,amattercurrentlyincontention.

Moreimportantly,thejurisprudenceofthecourttodatemakesitclearthatitisnoslavetoanygovernment.Thisistheheartoftheissueandwhatonlookerswanttoknow,oraresuspiciousof, thatis, whether the courts are being influenced by politicians. Ifanything,theCCJhasbeensomewhatharshtowardgovernments.Iwas involved in the first case on the original jurisdiction of thecourt,TCLvCARICOM,5whenCARICOMwassued.IwaspartofthelegalteamthatrepresentedCARICOM.Curiously,althoughwewonevery point of substantive law in that case, in the judgement forcosts, the CCJ declared that it did notwish to discourage privatelitigants and therefore shared the costs, which ironically, was noproblem for TCL but a great burden on cash strapped CARICOManditsgovernments.


Similarly,theCCJdidnotbowtoBarbadosintheinflammatoryMyrie case, mentioned previously, despite much comment in thenation’snewspapers.More recently, in a case involving the rightsof indigenouspeoplesagainsttheGovernmentofBelize,theCourtfound in favour of the indigenous community, despite theimportanteconomicandpoliticalinterestsatstake.6EventheCCJ’sfirst case, Boyce,7 on the contentious death penalty, consideredfurther below, demonstrated that the Court is able to take firmdecisions which run counter to and even directly challengingprevailingpoliticalandpublicopinion.CONSISTENCYWITHINTERNATIONALNORMSOFGOODJUDICIALDECISIONMAKINGThe inevitable question that arises when one discusses courts intheregionisaboutthecalibreofthejudges.Overtheyearsweasapeople have tended to devalue and even to fail to recognize ourown contribution to thePrivyCouncil’s jurisprudence and recordof good judges with this enduring question. In response, I quotefrom the Feature Address at the Inauguration of the CCJ in 2005entitled‘LeaptoEnlightenment’,8madebytheLeadPrimeMinisterof theCCJ initiative,Dr.KennyAnthony,whoencapsulated this inone word, ‘confidence’. He reminded Caribbean peoples that theregion’s legal profession and judicial system had a ‘glorious past,amongthestrongestintheCommonwealth,forthreequartersofacentury’.9 He recalled the distinguished contribution that theregion’s legal practitioners had made elsewhere in theCommonwealth and internationally. This includes sitting as ChiefJusticesinmanypartsofAfrica,judgesattheInternationalCourtofJustice in theHagueandother internationalTribunals. Indeed,heremarked, in ‘per capita terms I doubt if anyother community inthe world has served the world-wide cause of justice morecomprehensivelyandmoreconsistentlythanhastheCaribbean.10

Consequently, he reasoned: ‘The Caribbean is not a fledglingstate approaching tentatively the threshold of the rule of law’.11Thus,establishingaCCJwasnot‘aleapintothedark,tobefeared,buta‘leaptoenlightenment’tobeembraced’.12

Further,apointwhichisoftenoverlookedisonethatispositiveforCaribbeanjurisprudence.ThisisthatCommonwealthCaribbeanlegal practitioners and judges are often those who fashion thedefiningprecedentsinourjurisprudencethroughargumentsinthelower courts, endorsed by the Privy Council who often merely


adoptthereasoningtherein.Yet, it is thePrivyCouncil judgmentsthatweciteapprovinglyandthejusticesofthatcourtwhichgetthecredit for these outstanding jurisprudential creations. This isparticularlythecaseinconstitutionaljurisprudence.Ioftentellmystudents that we taught British judges how to interpret writtenconstitutions, given that they did not have one of their own. Wehavemadethoseargumentsandfosteredthoserichargumentsthathave formed the bedrock of international human rights law in anumber of issues that concern us. This is not always, or evenusually,atopdownapproach.

We can say therefore, that Commonwealth Caribbeanpractitioners and judges have themselves contributed to thecollectivewisdomofthePrivyCouncilandindirectlytothecorpusof the common law. Indeed, the Privy Council itself hasacknowledgedthelearningandreasoningoflocaljudgesinsomeofour landmark decisions. A fine example is the affirmation ofGeorgesJinThornhillvAG.13

Former President of the CCJ, Michael de la Bastide has alsostatedthatinlookingattheactualcasesthatwentbeforethePrivyCouncil, more often than not, the Privy Council agreed with thelocal courts’ decisions. This practice endorses the strength of ourlocal judiciary and indeed, those who present arguments beforethem.14Between1983and1993,forexample,63percentoftheirdecisionswereupheldbythePrivyCouncil.15Clearly,theevidenceisthatourjudgesaresound.

Statisticsliketheseareofcoursetobewelcomed.However,theparadox isworthnoting that justas final courtsareneverwrong,so too final courts are not infallible. This is as true of the BritishPrivyCouncilasitisfortheCCJ.ThefactthatthePrivyCouncilmayoverturnajudgmentbyaCourtofAppealdoesnotmeanthatithasa monopoly over truth. Justice is an imperfect mistress, but it istrue and loyal one. This is perhapsmost evident in the instanceswhere the Privy Council has had to overrule its owndecisions inorder to ‘correct’ a legalprinciplepositedpreviously, asoccurredmost dramatically in the death penalty cases.16 These formerjudicial precedents were no less legitimate as those which stoodthetestoftime.

This fine tradition of sound judicial reasoning fromCommonwealth Caribbean courts, from my purview, has beencontinuedandenhancedintheCCJ.Theyhaveapproachedthistaskdirectly, dealing with a fair number of hard cases, including testcases,withindependence,integrityandintellectualrigour.


ACTIONSCONSISTENTWITHAMATUREFINALCOURTIssuesofProcedureIntermsofproceduralissues,theCCJhasactedwithmaturityandauthority in the now numerous cases laying down guidelines forbothjudgesandpractitionerstoaidintheadministrationofjustice.Forexample,itruledinordertoassistjudgesindeterminingwhento strike out for breachof orders inBarbadosRedifusion17and toput forward appropriate legal principles on the enforcement offoreignjudgmentsinReidvReid.18Similarly,ithasissuedadviceasto howMercy Committees should actwith respect to pardons, asseenintheBoyceCase.19

Indeed,thereareseveralcasesinthisvein,butunderstandably,this paper is primarily concernedwith the rulings on substantivemattersissuedbytheCourt.Issuesofsubstance:DecisionsofaSophisticatedFinalCourtNotsurprisingly,manyofthelandmarkcasesthatdemonstratetheskillanddepthoftheCourtinitsappellatejurisdictionhavehadtodo with public law, in particular, constitutional law and humanrights, including international human rights matters. In thesematters, it is clear that the Court is infused with a deepunderstanding and appreciation of cutting edge principles offairness,proportionalityandthescopeoftheseparationofpowersprinciples (and accordingly the appropriate balance of powerbetween the Executive and the courts). These are all acceptedparameters of a final court that are consistent with and wellentrenchedinuniversallyacceptedjudicialtraditions.

TheCourthasalsodisplayedaremarkableabilitytomanoeuvrebetween competing schools of thought, often weaving through amultitude of precedents from several jurisdictions (usually fromtheCommonwealth,theUK,theinternationalhumanrightssystem,as well as Caribbean jurisprudence). This, combined with a fineappreciation of the local circumstances at play have enabled thecourt to master the art of distinguishing precedent to findappropriate judicial balances inproblem solving. This is certainlynotacourtthatsimplyadoptsthelatestPrivyCouncildecision.Ofcourse,particularlyinhumanrightsmatters,thePrivyCouncilhasbeen contradicting itself more often than not in recent times,especially when considering the death penalty cases, which


promptedsomeoftheirownjudgestocomplain.20Thisishardlyarecipeforpersuasion.Careful dissection of the Separation of Powers Principle and theCorrectApproachtoSeveranceIn a recent case from Belize, AG of Belie v Zuniga and BCBHoldings,21theCCJgivesusacarefuldissectionoftheseparationofpowersprinciple,examiningindetailitsscopeandsubstance,inawayrarelyseen,evenatthePrivyCouncil.Thefactsinthecasearequite complex, involving a controversial attempt at a privatecompany to use arbitration to frustrate attempts by the state torectify allegedly bad investments made in Belize by a previousgovernment administration. A new law was passed to foil suchattempts, including the introduction of criminal contempt, amandatoryminimumpenaltyandareversaloftheburdenofproofwhere injunctionsweredisobeyed. The company sought relief onconstitutional grounds alleging a breach of the separation ofpowers principles on the basis that the lawwas for an improperpurpose, was not according to the tenets of lawmade for peace,orderandgoodgovernment,butwasreallytotargetthem,inotherwords,anabuseofpowerbythestate.

TheCCJ found that theseparationofpowersprinciplewasnotso lightlybreachedbutdidfindviolationsof theconstitutionwithrespect to the mandatory minimum sentences, which it saw asundermining the inherent supervisory jurisdiction of the court inits power to exercise its discretionwith regard to penalties. Thiswas a sophisticated analysis of the issue clothed in modernprinciplesof fairnessandrights, in that theCourtconsidered thatthe mandatory minimum sentence was grossly disproportionateandinhumane.Wemustconsiderthatcombinedwiththereversalof proof, any person associated with the offence could attract aharshpenalty.

TheCCJalsoidentifiedviolationswithregardtothereversalofthefundamentalpresumptionofinnocence,thoughconcedingthata reversal could be appropriate in other circumstances. Animportant aspect of this case is the guidance that theCourt giveswithrespecttoseverance(strikingoutthepartsofanActdeclaredunconstitutional), balancing the need to preserve the legislativeintent and objective with the realization that changes to thelegislativetextcouldinfactfrustratethatveryobjectiveandindeedusurp the functions of Parliament (itself a separation of powers


issue). These are not trite exercises in judicial logic and the CCJhandlestheseissuesadmirably.GenerousApproachtoCommonwealthCasesIn my view, the Court has been generous in its approach to lawfrom the Commonwealth as a whole, understandably wishing todemonstrate its liberation from UK law. I think that when oneconsiderstheUK’sowncheckeredhistorywithrespecttoissuesofhuman rights, challenged often by the European Court of HumanRightssinceitsadoptionoftheEuropeanCharteronHumanRights,this is a justifiable approach. The CCJ has found more solace inCanadian, Australian and other Commonwealth precedents,perhapsunderstandingthatwesharenotonlyacommondestiny,but a wedding to supreme Constitutions. This practice has beensupported by the similarities of Commonwealth Caribbeanconstitutions to European and international human rightsinstrumentsandtherichandoften liberal jurisprudenceavailablethereonwhichtodine.

The approach is seen clearly in theBoyce22 decision, a deathpenalty case, discussed further below. This was the first case tocome before the CCJ. Tellingly, the CCJ was able to sidestep alimitingandcontroversialUKprecedentandrelymoreheavilyontheAustraliancaseofTeoh23inconstructingitsdeadlycocktailofalegitimate expectation to an international human right inproceduralterms.24IMPACTOFINTERNATIONALHUMANRIGHTSLAWIt is intheareaofinternationalhumanrightslawthattheCCJhasperhapsbeenmakingthemostimpact.Ithasmadesomeveryclearstatementsabouttheinfluenceandimportofinternationalhumanrights law. I suspect that it has done this evenmore so than thePrivy Council, the latter being a court entrenched in the UK’sinherent suspicion of foreign law, particularly if Europeanflavoured.

As discussed earlier, it has been Caribbean Courts and otherCommonwealthCourtsandtheirattorneys,whohavereallyledthejurisprudenceonconstitutionsandhumanrights,at least initially,before the Privy Council. Thus, it is unsurprising that the newlyvestedCCJwouldbemore liberal in its approach to internationalhuman rights law, especially in the now uncontested


acknowledgementof the commonalitybetween theBillsofRightsexisting in Commonwealth Caribbean Constitutions and theEuropeanandotherinternationalinstrumentsofhumanrights.TheBoyceCase:TheCCJandInternationalNormsThe first case to comebefore the CCJ in its appellate jurisdiction,Boyce,wasinfactagoodtestoftheCCJ’sphilosophyandviewpointoninternationalhumanrights.Inissuewereanumberofgrounds:-independence of the court in the face of public opinion; orconversely, indirect government pressure, indeed independencefromthePrivyCouncilwithoutdisturbingjudicialprosperity;theimpact of international lawon our legal systems; the elasticity ofourconstitutions;thestatusofjudicialprecedentandthequestionof creating an indigenous jurisprudence. These were all largequestionsatstakebeforetheCourt.

More intriguingly, an important underlying issue was how totreatwithaPrivyCouncildecisionwhichhadpreventedthedeathpenalty frombeing appliedusingwhat tomanywas flawed logic,whilemaintainingthesameresult.25

To explain further, the Privy Council judgment had alreadypronouncedon thematterof thestatusofunincorporated treatiesindomestic law,whichhadbeenraisedasadirect issuebefore it.The question was whether the Barbados Mercy Committee (alsocalled the Barbados Privy Council (BPC), the bodywhich had theauthority toconsiderpetitions formercy,wascompelled toawaittheoutcomeofapetitionbyapersononDeathRowto the Inter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRights(IACHR),beforecomingtoitsdecision,giventhatthejurisdictionoftheIACHRemanatedfromthe American Convention on Human Rights which Barbados hadratified and which provided for an individual right to petition.While Barbados had ratified the treaty instrument, it had notincorporated it into domestic law.26 Accordingly, under theaccepted premise of international law, in the dualist tradition, anunincorporatedtreaty(notwrittenintolocallaw)wasnotdirectlybinding,butwasofpersuasiveeffectonly.

InBoyce, theCourtofAppealofBarbadosreliedon theearlierPrivyCouncildecisionofLewis,27andheldthattheBPCwasinfactobliged to await the outcome of a petition to the IACHR beforeproceeding to ruleon the issueofpardon.Thequestionhadbeenraised in thecontroversialLewis casewithrespect toproceedingsoftheJamaicanPrivyCouncil,(JPC)thebodyequivalenttotheBPC.


TheUKPrivyCouncilinLewisbaseditsdecisiononthenotionthatdue process, which it found to be a constitutionally protectedconcept,prohibiting the JPC fromproceedingwithout consideringthereportfromtheinternationalbody.Thepremiseofdueprocessasarationalefortheobligationhadbeenverycontroversial,givenits assumption of a kind of osmosis of international law whichcouldbeimpliedintotheConstitution.

Notwithstanding the much-criticised reasoning, the net resultwas that the Jamaican proceeding had been ultra vires theConstitutionandthesentencesofLewisetalhadtobecommuted.Lewis was therefore a contentious and troubling Privy Councildecision and can also be faulted for not laying down clearprinciples for taking thepositions that itdid. It createdconfusionabout the impactof international law, suchas thesuggestion thatinternational law norms from unincorporated treaties could bedirectly enforceable in domestic law, as occurs in the monisttradition, evident in civil law jurisdictions such as those in LatinAmericaandEurope.WhilethedecisionthatpersonsonDeathRowshould be permitted to proceed to petition the IACHR could bedefended, the judicial logic leading to that result was difficult todefend.

The CCJ had a ripe opportunity to pronounce clearly on thisissue,notonlytoclarify themeaningofLewis,butalsoto identifyappropriatelegalprinciplesontheissue.ItproceededtorejecttheLewisapproachandrightlyso.ImplicationsofBoycefortheLegitimacyoftheCCJInBoyce, theCCJ answered thequestionof the impactof theOAStreaty provision differently by referencing to the doctrine oflegitimate expectation, a doctrine born out of judicial review inadministrative law and not without some difficulty itself. Thecourts in theDeathRowcaseswere,of course, facedwithseveralseriousdilemmas.Perhapsthemostdifficultwaspresentedbythenowwell-knownPrattandMorgan28principleonunduedelayandinhuman punishment in Death Row cases. Governments, inattemptingtoavoidtheinternationaltreatyprocess,weretryingtoavoid the problem of undue delay in administering justiceidentified in Pratt. They could do this only by preventing thelengthy process of petitions to international bodies, a processwhich they could not expedite as they had no control over it. Insomecases,thiswasdonebyissuingwritteninstructionsastothe


relevant time period before capital punishment would issue, asoccurred in theLewis case. The CCJ found that a petitioner had aright to adequate time for his petition to be heard and laterconsideredbytheMercyCommittee.However,itdidsobywayofadifferentlegalprinciplefromthatespousedbythePrivyCouncil.

The Pratt ghost also had ramifications for the very existenceandlegitimacyoftheCCJasafinalcourtofappealintheregion.Ontheonehand,manyjurists,includingthedistinguishedPresidentofthe CCJ, while still Chief Justice of the Trinidad and TobagoSupremeCourt,hadmadeitquiteclearthatthePrattandMorganlineofdecisionswasinappropriateandthatthePrivyCouncilwasoutoftouchwithCaribbeanrealities.29Ontheotherhand,theCCJcameintobeingsurroundedbyaccusationsthatitspurposewastobe a ‘hanging court’. Had it given its first important decision andpermitted a hanging, thiswouldhavemade the accusation a self-evidenttruth.30Thiswasthereforeadifficultpositiontobeinanditistestimonytotheingenuityandcreativityofthecourtthatitwasabletocomeupwithaworkablesolutionwithoutsacrificingsoundjurisprudentialprinciple.DUEPROCESSANDLEGITIMATEEXPECTATION:NEWRIGHTSORNEWROUTES?Intruth,whatthedeathpenaltycasespurporttodo,istolaydownguidelinesforproceduralrightsinaccordancewithnotionsofdueprocess,natural justiceor legitimateexpectationwherea countryhas ratified the relevant human rights Convention and anapplicationisdulymadetotherelevantinternationalhumanrightsbody.

The majority view in Lewis saw these procedural rights asstemmingnotfromthetreaty,butfromconstitutionaldueprocessorprotectionofthelaw.31Thiswasviewedasunsupportableevenby the dissenting judgment. There are, therefore, several reasonsfor viewing the Privy Council’s majority judgment in Lewis as aweak one, a conclusion which the CCJ itself came to.32 The CCJ’sanswertothequestionofunincorporatedtreatiesandtheirimpacton the death penalty is to be preferred to the Privy Council’sresponseinLewis.33

InBoyce,34theCCJ,incontrasttothePrivyCouncil35foundthatwhile unincorporated treaties were not directly enforceable,citizenshadalegitimateexpectationtotheproceduresestablishedbysuchtreaties.Thisthen,wasthegenesisoftheproceduralright,


not a controversial notion of due process. Indeed, it is a credibleapproach.Itisclearhowever,thattheTeohdecisioncannotbereadtomeanareversalorabolitionofthedualisttradition.Allthatthedoctrineof legitimateexpectationdoeswithrespect to treaties, isto give rise to procedural expectations, that a particular (fair)procedurewillbe followed, inthis instance,ahearingof the issuebeforetherelevantinternationalbody.36Itwasemphasisedthatitwas only the entitlement to the actual hearing before theinternational body that was being protected and a subsequentconsideration of any report which that body made by the localmercy committee. In such cases, therefore, the fairness of thehearing is simply a duty to consider the rights enshrined in thetreatybeforemakingadetermination.

Thelegitimateexpectationroutetoproceduralrightstherefore,avoids a decisionwhich challenges the dualist tradition towhichcommon law states subscribe. The CCJ did warn that the Boyce‘decision should not be seen as opening up avenues for thewholesaledomesticenforcementofunincorporatedtreaties’.37Thiswas, unlike Lewis, no loose precedent that could suggest thechangingofadualistmodeltoamonistmodelthroughjudiciallawmakingwhich is unacceptable. The CCJ went to lengths to dispelthis,asaresponsiblecourtoughttodo.

Certainly, thedoctrineof legitimateexpectation in this contextcan also find critics.38 However, in these circumstances it is anapproach infinitely more grounded in good law than the PrivyCouncilprecedent inLewis.This iswhatweaskofa finalcourt,asuperiorcourt–weaskfor legitimacy,andwehaveit.Legitimacyandintegritydonotmeanthatwewillagreewitheverydecision.TheMyrieCase:HumanRightsIndicatorsOur jurisprudential evaluation in this paper revolves around theappellate jurisdiction of the CCJ. However, theMyrie judgment39identifies international and community law principles which arealso useful for assessing the appellate jurisdiction of the Court.Myriedeterminesthat treatyobligationsundertheCSMEfreedomof movement regime encompass human rights requirements andare indeed directly enforceable. In so doing it elevates theinternational human rights dimensions of our law in a moderncontext.Whenoneconsiderstheplaceofhumanrightstoday, it isnotatallsurprising.


Certainly inMyrie, we have gone one step further thanBoyce,butthisisinthecontextoftheoriginaljurisdictionandthespecialregimetherein.Thecase,initsclearreasoningoftheraisond’etreoftheCSMEregime,givesustherationaleforadifferenttreatmenttoBoyce. It provides important lessons as to how a stellar courtmustapproachcomplexquestionsofinternationallaw.

WhatMyriedoesistoestablishfirmlythemeaningandvalueofa Caribbean Community, at a time, Imight add,when the typicalman on the street was beginning to doubt its very existence. Inaffirming the enforceability of CARICOM Heads of Governmentdecisions,Myriedemonstratestous,albeitindirectly,thattherearenowthreeseparatespheresofjurisdictionforustocontemplate:

(a) The domestic sphere (which will reference the appellate

jurisdictionoftheCCJwhenaccepted);(b) An international sphere –often concerning international

human rightswithwhichBoycewas concernedandwherethedualist traditionofrequiring furtherdomestic laws forincorporation in a substantive sense still survives, thoughlimping along, in contrast to the clear proceduralobligations that have now been identified (legitimateexpectationetc.);and

(c) AclearlydemarcatedCaribbeanCommunity spherewithinthe context of the Treaty of Chaguaramas and the CSMEregime.ThisCARICOMsphereinvokesauniquejurisdictionoftheCCJandonewhichitguardsjealously.SinceMyriewenow know that this special regime is indeed enforceablebecauseCARICOMdecisionsaretreatedasbinding.

AstheCCJsaidinitsimpeccablereasoninganditsfullappreciationof the CARICOMCSME regime in theMyrie case, on the questionwhetherArticle24oftheTreatyasdecidedbyCARICOMHeadsofGovernment gave rise to an enforceable right of CARICOMnationalstoenterfreelyasisterCARICOMstaywitharightofstayforaminimumof6months:

…ifbindingregionaldecisionscanbeinvalidatedattheCommunitylevelby the failureon thepartofaparticularState to incorporatethosedecisionslocallytheefficacyoftheentireCARICOMregimeisjeopardized and effectively the Stateswould not have progressedbeyond the pre 2001 voluntary system that was in force. Theoriginal jurisdiction of the Court has been established to ensureobservance by the Member States of obligations voluntarily


undertakenbythemattheCommunitylevel. . . Itistheobligationof each State, having consented to the creation of the Communityobligation,toensurethatitsdomesticlaw,atleastinitsapplication,reflectsandsupportsCommunitylaw.40

TheCourtcontinued:

Tostate[that}…internationalrightsandobligationsresultingfroma Conference Decision are created and binding at the Communitylevel onlywhen they are incorporated into domestic law leads toabsurdity...intheabsenceofanyindicationtothecontraryavaliddecision of a Community Organ or Body taken in fulfilment orfurtherance of the RTC or to achieve the objectives of theCommunityisimmediatelybindingattheCommunityLevel.41

Incidentally, the CCJ had already ruled on this point in an earliercase: Hummingbird Rice Mills Ltd v Suriname and the CaribbeanCommunity.42Theobligationonstatesafterratifyingtreatiestoacttobringdomestic law into linewith the treatyprovisions isnotanew idea in international law, but it is one that CaribbeanCommonwealthCourtshaveoftenignored.NewCaseonMayanRightsThe CCJ recently examined a new case on the enforceability ofinternationalhumanrightslaw,thistimewithrespecttotheMayanindigenous peoples, from Belize.43 The case concerns therecognitionofMayancustomarylandtenureinBelizegivingrisetocollective and individual property rights and non-discriminationunder the Constitution. These rights, as established underinternational law pertaining to indigenous rights are identifiableevenwherenolandtitleisheld.Thequestionofrightstolandforindigenous peoples is especially important given the issue ofmineralsexistingonsuchlandandthethrustofgovernmentssuchas Belize, to engage in extractive industries so as to exploit suchland.

This case is a landmark one for the entire region, and inparticularthosecountrieswithsignificant,recognisableindigenouspopulations, such as Guyana, Belize, Suriname, Dominica and tosomeextentTrinidadandTobago,giventhat the issueof the landrightsofindigenouspeoplesisakeyconcerninthesecountriesandthe wider region. As Rapporteur for Indigenous Peoples in theInter-American Commission, I emphasise that it is the mostimportant issue for such peoples and one of the most troubling


questions concerning international human rights bodies. To date,the international human rights community has been framing thisquestion with reference to the ILO’s Convention on IndigenousPeoples,Convention169,which,althoughan instrumentdesignedfor theworkplace, has become the basis for defining those rightssincethereisnootherConvention.EmbraceofaCommonLawTortofMisfeasanceinPublicOfficeThere have been some surprises in terms of content in the CCJ’sdecisions.Forexample,aboldstepwhichmightsendshiversdownthebacksofpoliticiansisthefindinginanotherlandmarkcase,thatofMarin andCoye vAGBelize,44which identified and embraced acommon law tort ofmisfeasance inpublic office. It remains tobeseenhowthiswillbedevelopedinaregionwherepersonsinhighoffice are often and easily criticised and where Commissions ofInquiryhavetraditionallycarriedouttheroleofprosecutor.CREATINGANINDIGENOUSJURISPRUDENCEAnimportantcategoryforassessmentconcernstheanalysisoftheCCJ as a Court committed to advancing the goal of creating anindigenous Caribbean jurisprudence, whilst maintaining theintegrity of an essentially common law legal tradition.We shouldfirst consider the theoretical justification for such an approach,hearkeningtothenotionofthedivergent,asopposedtotheunitarymodelofthecommonlaw.45PerhapsthemostdamningindictmentagainstthePrivyCouncilisitsfailuretoadapttoitsroleasafinalappellate court reflecting the needs and mores of its adoptedcountries.Thisissoparticularlyinrelationtoitsuseofprecedent.I have previously airedmany ofmy concernswith respect to thefailure to create an indigenous jurisprudence for the region andtheseconcernsarerelevantherealso.46TheobservationsbyJusticeSaundersandPresidentdelaBastideoftheCCJinAGetalvJosephandBoyce, 47,thattheCCJismindfulofitsroleinthisregardistobewelcomed.Hopefully,thiswillnotbemererhetoric.Thereitwassaid:

The main purpose in establishing this court is to promote thedevelopmentofaCaribbeanjurisprudence,agoalwhichCaribbeancourts are best equipped to pursue. In the promotion of such ajurisprudence, we shall naturally consider very carefully andrespectfully the opinions of final courts of other Commonwealth


Caribbean countries and particularly, the judgments of the JCPCwhichdeterminethelawforthoseCaribbeanstatesthataccepttheJudicialCommitteeastheirfinalappellatecourt.

This is, therefore,a firm indication that theCCJdoesnotconsideritself bound to precedents from the Privy Council or any othercourt.

The liberation of Caribbean jurisprudence from restrictiveattitudestoprecedentisfurtheredwiththeabolitionofappealstothe Privy Council. Caribbean Courts of Appeal will be less self-consciousandtimidintheirapproachtodecisionmaking,mindfulofthefactthatnolongerdotheyhaveaBritishPrivyCouncilasanoverseer, eager to impose centuriesoldBritishdoctrineand legalphilosophy contained in English precedent, no matter thecircumstances.

Inthiscollectionofessays,JusticeLoganoftheAustraliancourtshasdemonstratedclearlyhowtheabolitionofappealstothePrivyCouncil in Australia led to the formation of a dynamic, rigorous,Australian version of the common law. This has also been theexperience in Canada, so much so that the UK courts now oftenturntoAustralianandCanadianprecedentsforguidance.

An interestingobservation in the JosephandBoyce case is thatthe CCJ, in particular, the joint judgment of Justices de la Bastide(President) and Saunders, was grounded in arguments not evenintroducedbycounseloneitherside,i.e.thedoctrineoflegitimateexpectation.Thisisreassuringsinceitpointstothecapabilityandindependenceof theCourt, demonstrating its confidence indoingitsownresearch.

I confess that I was among those cynics who waited to seewhether the CCJ would simply follow UK precedent, withoutmeaningful responsiveness, or even sensitivity to our Caribbeancontext,inotherwords,‘businessasusual’.Ieven,ratherunkindly,inoneofmybooks,cautionedthemnottobe‘mimicmen’!48

Thistome,isthemostdifficultaspectofthisdiscussion,despitethe fact that it is theone thatwepaymost lip service to. Is theretrulyadesiretocreateanindigenousjurisprudence?Lawyersandeven judges are all too eager to point out that a judgment goesagainst some precedent from the UK and elsewhere, suggestingthatthat,inofitself,issufficienttorenderitunsound.

The CCJ was perhaps boldest in this regard in its firstjudgement,theBoycecase,whenitdeviatedfromthePrivyCouncildecisionofLewis.49Yet,evenhere,perhapsitfoundthecouragetodosobecausethatdecisionwasalreadycriticizedheavily.Notably,


itsresultwasthesame–astayofthedeathpenalty,but,aswehaveseen, its reasoning was very different from that of the UK court,although influenced by other Commonwealth courts. Oneappreciatesthatthereismeriteveninthatstep,sincemovingawayfrom the ‘navel string’ of a colonialist jurisprudence is anachievementinitself.

Thus far, therefore, the CCJ has not been extremely radical inthisregard,butthereareencouragingsigns.Atminimum,thereisabetter appreciation of what obtains here in the region and aconsciousand thoughtful reflectionas tohowbest toaddressourown situations, while still giving credence to established legalmores.

At the very least, one can say that although the CCJ’sjurisprudencemaynotbeasindigenousasitcouldbeasyet,ithasbroken new ground in several cases. A good label might beproactive. InGibson vAG ofBarbados,50 for example, theCCJ heldthat in certain circumstances as fairness determined within therubricofafairtrial,apersonontrialformurdercouldbeentitledto funding from the state to provide a forensic expert(orthodontologist) to aid in his defence.Here, the CCJ consideredthesignificanceofteethmarksaspersuasiveevidencewhichcoulddetermineguiltorinnocence.Thecourtwasmindfulofthefactthatthiswasanindigentperson,asituationoftenmetintheCaribbean.

IntheGibsoncase,thewayinwhichtheCCJartfullyavoidedthefloodgates argument, while at the same time ensuring a justsolution forMr.Gibson, is impressive. This isa fineexampleofafinal court being able to make determinations based on skillfullogic and reasoning. Clearly, in relatively poor countries such asthoseintheCaribbean,aprinciplethatassertsthattheStatehasaduty to provide funding for an expert witness to benefit adefendantineachcase,becauseoftheprovisionintheConstitutionthatspeaksofproviding‘facilities’foradefencesotoensureafairtrial, would have been too wide. The CCJ was able to limit theprinciple, first upon a narrow construction of theword ‘facilities’andthentoconstructarelevantframeworkforsuchapersoninaCaribbeanlandscape,thatis,onewhoispoorandincircumstanceswheretheonlyevidenceistheforensicevidence.Itidentifiedsucha person within this narrow construct as the person to whom itmightbeunfairtowithholdfundingfortheexpert.

In another case dealingwith forensic evidence,R v Grazette,51the Court clearly defined the appropriate standard for theadmissibility of forensic evidence. This is to be on a balance of


probabilities test and not the standard of ‘beyond a reasonabledoubt’.CCJUNAFRAIDTOCRITICISEUNHELPFULPRIVYCOUNCILPRECEDENTSCertainly, the CCJ has not been afraid of criticizing unhelpfulprecedent emanating from the Privy Council. This was clearlydemonstratedinBoyce,butalsoinGibson,52whereitalludedtothe‘mathematical formula’ attached to the death penalty issue in thecaseofPrattandMorgan,53 anartificial construction if ever therewasone.Asiswellknown,PrattandMorganhadheldthatapersononDeathRowcouldnotbehungafterfiveyearsonDeathRow,orelse this would constitute cruel and inhuman punishment. In aneminentlysensibleandawarestatementinGibson(consideringthehavocthePrattlineofcaseshascaused),theCCJnoted:

Afindingthattherehasindeedbeenunreasonabledelayinbringingtheaccusedtotrialmustbemadeonacasebycasebasis.Itcannotbereachedbyapplyingamathematicalformulaalthoughthemerelapseofaninordinatetimewillraiseapresumption,rebuttablebytheState,therehasbeenunduedelay.54

There is a certain pragmatism here, a grounding in the localcircumstancesofthejurisdictionthatiswelcome,whileatthesametimeavoidingthesacrificeoftheprincipleoffundamentalfairness.

Similarly,inGibson,theCCJalludedtothe‘profoundinterestincriminaltrialsbeingheardwithinareasonabletime.Delaycreatesand increases the backlog of cases clogging and tarnishing theimage of the criminal justice system’.55 On the other hand, itrecognisedthatreleasingallegedoffendersonbailforlongperiodscould create a danger for society. This is a court bent on realsolutions.

Certainly,onemaynotagreewitheveryaspectofthedecision,or indeed any decision. One could, for example, scrutinize theconclusionrelatingtotherighttosilenceandtheprivilegeagainstself-incriminationwhichIbelieveshouldbemorestronglyupheld,butthisdoesnottarnishthejudgement.56


DEVELOPINGANINDIGENOUSJURISPRUDENCEWITHRESPECTTOOURHYBRIDLEGALTRADITIONSOne aspect of the value of the CCJ that is often overlooked is itsgreat potential to develop the hybrid legal tradition that is stillprevalent in the region and to facilitate the civil law tradition. Irefer here to the fact that in two countries of the region, Guyanaand Saint Lucia, there is a mixture of the common law legaltraditionorlawandcivillawlegaltraditionsexistingsidebyside.57Suriname,acivillawcountry,isalsoamemberofCARICOM.

This is already proving to be of tremendous value to Guyana,oneofthefirstcountriestoaccepttheCCJ’sappellate jurisdiction.The fact that a civil law lawyer58 sits on the court is vital to thisdevelopment. Current President Byron, through his distinguishedtenure as Chief Justice of the OECS Supreme Court, where heconfrontedmixed legal tradition issues from Saint Lucia, such asthe law surrounding the Queen’s Chain,59 is also experienced inadjudicating on the civil law/ hybrid legal tradition. These legalluminariesarewellplacedtoadvancethisimportantjurisprudenceoftheregion.

AsCARICOMexpandsanddeepenslinkswithHaitiandperhapsPuertoRico,addingtotheexistingrelationshipwithSuriname,thisrole for the Court becomes even more important. Indeed, thejurisprudence of this hybrid legal tradition is itself indigenous,because we have recognised that when civil law is mixed withcommon law, often what bears fruit is something entirely new,hencethetermhybrid.TheresultisnotthesameasFrenchlaw,orDutch law entirely, as the case may be. Already, there exists afascinatinglineofcasesdecidedbytheCCJexploringthishybridormixedlegaltraditionoftheregion.Theseinclude,forexample,thecaseofRamdassvJairam,60onthequestionofequitableinterestsinlandwithinthecontextofRomanDutchCivilLawinGuyana.Whileequitydoesnotformpartofthecivillaw,inthisuniquecontextofamixed legal tradition in Guyana, the CCJ found that specificperformance,anequitableconcept,couldbeordered.

Similarly in Ramkishun v Fung Kee Fung,61 involving anotherland issue, the CCJ looked at three different systems of law toresolve the dispute: English common law, European Roman civillaw and modern South African Roman Dutch law decisions. It isanticipated thatwewill seeevenmore significantand interestingcaseswhenSaintLuciajoinsthecourt’sappellatejurisdiction.62


CONCLUSIONOnexaminingthevariousaspectsoftheCCJ’sappellatejurisdiction,itisevidentthatthisisaCourtthathasmaturedandacceptedwithdignity its rightful place as a premier legal institution and anindependent, informed judicial body in step with internationaljuridical mores, firmly grounded in its environment and shapingappropriatelythedestinyofCaribbeanpeoples.NOTESONCONTRIBUTORRose-MarieBelleAntoineistheDeanoftheFacultyofLawandProfessorofLabourLawandFinancialLaw,UniversityoftheWestIndies.SheisanattorneyandawardwinningscholarwhoservedasPresidentoftheInter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRights,OAS,Washington,theRapporteurfor Persons of African Descent and Rapporteur for Indigenous Peoples.Currently, she is the Chair of the CARICOM Regional Commission onMarijuanaandCARICOMChaironHIVandMigration.DeanAntoineholdsadoctorate in law from Oxford University, an LLM from Cambridge andcertificatesininternationalhumanrightsfromtheIIHRinStrasbourg.Shehas been a Consultant to all of the governments in the Caribbean, UK,Venezuela, USA and Canada states, the judiciary and internationalorganizations, including the EU, OAS, IADB,World Bank, CDB, CARICOM,OECS, UNICEF, ILO, UNIFEM, CAREC, PANCAP, UNAIDS and UNDCP,drafting legislationandauthoringPolicyReportsonseveralvaried issuesincludingpubliclaw/humanrights,health,publicservice,juvenilejustice,financialandlabourlaw.Shehaswritten12booksandnumerousarticles,including the well-known Commonwealth Caribbean Law and LegalSystemswhichdevotesseveralchapterstotheCCJ–PrivyCouncildebateandthecreationofanindigenousjurisprudenceintheCaribbean.NOTES 1 The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community,including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME), 2001 signed byMemberStatesoftheCaribbeanCommunity(CARICOM).

2MyrievBarbados[2013]CCJ3(OJ).3 The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is the regional economic and politicalgroupingintheCommonwealthCaribbean.Itestablishedaneconomic,freetraderegime for its Member Countries, one component of which is the ability ofCARICOM nationals to move between the states without restrictions, for aminimumofsixmonths,includingtheabilitytoworkwithoutaworkpermitforqualifiednationals,undertheRevisedTreatyofChaguaramas,referredtoinnote2.

4 BBCCaribbean, ‘Forum:CCJ vsPrivyCouncil’, 22 September2009.Available at:http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2009/09/090925_forumccjprivy.shtml.


5TrinidadCementLimitedvTheCaribbeanCommunity[2009]CCJ4(OJ).6 ‘Maya IndigenousPeople of BelizeWinMajor LandRightsVictory in CaribbeanHigh Court’ http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-1235405; ‘IPLP Wins LandmarkHuman Rights Case in Belize,’ https://law.arizona.edu/iplp-wins-landmark-human-rights-case-belize.ThejudgmentoftheCourtwasdeliveredinApril2015,butpublicationreservedpendingassessmentofcompensation,TheMayaLeadersAlliance&TheToledoAlcaldesAssociationonbehalfoftheMayavillagesofToledoDistrict&23Othersontheirownbehalf&onbehalfof23otherMayavillagesvTheAttorneyGeneralofBelize,BZCV2014/002.

7AGofBarbadosvJosephs&Boyce[2006]CCJ3(AJ).8 Kenny D. Anthony, ‘Leap to Enlightenment’, Address by Dr. The Hon Kenny DAnthonyPrimeMinisterofSt.LuciaandLeadPrimeMinisterontheEstablishmentof the CCJ at the Inauguration of the Caribbean Court of Justice, Port of Spain,TrinidadandTobago,April16,2005,p7.

9Ibid,p3.10Ibid,p5.11Ibid,p5.12Ibid,p7.13[1981]AC61.14 In addition, many decisions of the Privy Council which have overturned thedecisions of the lower courts, have been severely criticised by the Englishcounterpartsofthatcourt.Morerecently,atabooklaunchinginPortofSpainonSeptember17,2015, JusticeAdrianSaundersnotedthathehadexaminedPrivyCouncildecisionsforthepastyearandonlytwodecisionsoutofsevenhadbeendisapproved.

15DelaBastide,above.16See,e.g.RoodalvTheStateofTrinidadandTobago(2003)64WIR270;WatsonvTheQueen[2005]1AC475.

17BarbadosRedifusionServiceLtdvMirchandani[2005]CCJ1(AJ),(2005)69WIR35.

18ReidvReid[2008]CCJ8(AJ),(2008)73WIR56.19AGofBarbadosvJosephs&Boyce[2006]CCJ3(AJ).20SeeLordHoffman’sdissentinLewis,above,p.89.21[2014]CCJ2(AJ),(2014)84WIR101.22AGofBarbadosvJosephs&Boyce[2006]CCJ3(AJ).23[1995]3LRC1.24 For a fuller discussion of this, see Rose-Marie Belle Antoine, CommonwealthCaribbean Law and Legal Systems, Routledge-Cavendish, UK, 2rd edn, 2008,chapter12,‘InternationalLawasaSourceofLaw’.

25ThiswasthecaseofLewisvAGofJamaica,(2000)57WIR275(PC).26 A collateral issue was the reviewability of the exercise of the prerogative ofmercy, anotherconstitutional law trend.TheLewis lineof casesandnowBoyce(CCJ) holds that this prerogative power can be reviewed to ensure thatproceduralfairnessobtains.

27LewisvAGofJamaica,(2000)57WIR275(PC).28FromthecaseofPrattandMorganvAGofJamaica(1993)43WIR340.29SeedeLaBastideCJ,inBoyce,above,n8,para126.30Indeed,thedeLaBastide/SaundersjudgmentdemonstratesquiteclearlythattheCCJwasawareofthesereservationswhentheyadmittedthattherewasa lotof‘speculation’surroundingtheapproachtheCJJwouldtaketodeathpenaltycases,ibid.


31LewishoweverconcededthattherecommendationsoftheCommissionwerenotbindingontheGovernorGeneralintheexerciseoftheprerogativeofmercy,butgiven the terms of the treaty which the government ratified, the MercyCommittee should await a ruling from the international body. The court tookpains toremindus thatunincorporatedtreaties, thoughtheycreate ‘obligationsfor the state under international law, does not . . . create rights for individualsenforceableindomesticcourts’.Above,atp32.

32TheCCJnoted:‘Itseemstousthattheeffectwhichthemajoritygavetothetreatyi.e. expansion of the domestic criminal justice system so as to include theproceedingsbeforetheCommission,wasinconsistentwiththeirprotestationsofsupportforthestrictdualistdoctrineoftheunincorporatedtreaty.Intheresult[thereasoningwas]...unsupportedbylegalprinciple’.Boyce,above,n8,page36,para76.

33 Hoffman’sdissentinLewisisinstructive.Ithingesonthefundamentalprincipleof the separation of powers doctrine which clothes the dualist doctrine. Lawmakingpower isgiven to theLegislature,not to theExecutive.Accordingly, thesigning of a treaty by the Executive cannot promulgate law. Lord Hoffmanlaments,somewhatpoetically:

The majority have found in the ancient concept of due process of law aphilosophers stone, undetected by generations of judges, which can covert thebase metal of executive action into the gold of legislative power. It does not,however,explainhowthetrickisdone,Lewis,above,n28.

34Above,n8.35[1995]3LRC1.36 The CCJ perhaps confused the question of whether such an expectation wassubstantive or procedural, yet this does not take away from the essence of theargument.

37Boyce,above,n8.38 I criticized some aspects of it in an earlierwork, for example. See Rose-MarieAntoine,CommonwealthCaribbeanLawandLegalSystems,Routledge-Cavendish,2008,2nded,UK.

39Above,n3.40Ibid,atpara52.41Ibid,atpara53.42HummingbirdRiceMillsLtdvSurinameandtheCaribbeanCommunity[2011]CCJ1(OJ).

43MayaLeadersAlliancevAGofBelize(CCJAppealNoBZCV2014/002).AtthetimeoftheSymposium,thejudgementinthiscasewaspending.Subsequently,itwasreceived, inAprilof2015.TheCourt issuedaconsentorder in favourofMayanland rights, but had reserved judgement on compensation. The Consent OrderdictatesthetermsofanAgreementsupervisedbytheCCJoverthefullrecognitionandimplementationofthoserights.

44FlorencioMarinandJoseCoyevAGofBelize[2011]CCJ9(AJ)45See,e.g. thediscussion intheUrencase fromAustralia,wherethecourt laidoutthe justification for deviating from established English precedents using thisapproach: Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren [1969] 1 AC 590 (PrivyCouncil.

46Seeabove,Antoine,supra,n25,Chapter8,‘TheCommonLawandtheDoctrineofPrecedent’.

47NoCV2of2005,decided8November2006.48SeeRose-MarieAntoine,CommonwealthCaribbeanLawandLegalSystems,supra,n25,chapter17,atp344.


49Above,n29.50GibsonvA-GBarbados[2010]CCJ3(AJ)51[2009]CCJ2(AJ)52Above,n51.53Above,n29.54Ibid,atpara58.55Ibid,atpara48.56 TheCCJ alsoheld that if the statepaid for the expert evidence, it could compeldisclosureofitsfindings.

57SeeKennyD.Anthony,‘TheViabilityoftheCivilistLegalTraditioninSaintLucia’in Landry,HAandCaparros, EEssays on theCivil Codes inQuebecand St Lucia,OttawaUP,Ottawa,1984.

58InthepersonofJusticeWit,whoisDutch.59 See, e.g. the case ofCaplan vDuBoulayNo29of 1999, dec’d21May2001 (HC,SaintLucia).

60RamdassvJairam[2008]CCJ6(AJ).61RamkishunvFungKeeFung[2010]CCJ2(AJ).62SaintLuciain2015signaleditsintentiontoaccepttheCCJ’sappellatejurisdiction.

assessing 10 years of the caribbean court of justice in

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