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Asian Perspectiveson the

Challenges of China

Papers from the Asia-Pacific Symposium,

March 7 and 8, 2000,cosponsored by the

National Defense University and U.S. Pacific Command

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY PRESS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

2001

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The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and donot necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government.

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Contents

Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

China’s National Insecurity: Old Challenges at the Dawn of the New Millennium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Dru C. Gladney

China’s Defense Modernization: Aspirations and Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Paul H. B. Godwin

Balancing U.S. Alliance and Chinese Cooperation:Korea’s Emerging Security Challenge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Taeho Kim

Southeast Asian Security: A Regional Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Marvin C. Ott

China’s Precarious Balance: Cohesiveness and Stability in a Fast-Changing Society. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Minxin Pei

The Challenges of China: Australian Perceptions and Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Michael Wesley

Challenges for Sino-U.S. Relations:Issues and Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Jiemian Yang

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The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS)held its annual Pacific symposium on “Asian Perspec-tives on the Challenges of China” at the NationalDefense University in Washington on March 7 and 8,2000. This event brought together representatives ofthe policy community and academe from Australia, thePeople’s Republic of China, India, Japan, the Republicof Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States. Itfocused on how perceptions of China influencedefense and foreign policies in key nations of the Asia-Pacific region, how the likely course of developmentsin China might affect the future policies of countriesin the region, and how such changes might impact ontheir security relations with the United States.

The symposium was keyed to two areas of ongoingINSS research. First, it was integral to a study on U.S.Regional Military Presence in the 21st Century. Thiseffort seeks to identify perceptions of the factors thatwill shape the regional security environment over thenext decade. These perceptions will affect the securitypolicies of both allied and friendly nations and couldcause them to adjust their expectations for security

relations with the United States. The study will assistsecurity planners in developing U.S. regional militarypresence for the future. Second, because Chinese inten-tions and capabilities will continue to be a key deter-minant in shaping the regional security environment,INSS and the Center for the Study of Chinese MilitaryAffairs are conducting research on China as an emerg-ing great power. The symposium formed a crucial ele-ment in that research project as well.

Despite news accounts on China prevalent at thetime, the symposium was not dominated by headlineson tensions across the Taiwan Strait or the latest Chi-nese white paper.

Major Conclusions

Regional views of the “Challenges of China” andhow best to respond depend upon respective views of thenature of the future regional security environment.However, regional analysts are as uncertain as their U.S.counterparts about the future. The first and most dom-inant view is that the United States will remain“engaged and present” and, moreover, that the nextdecade will witness the expansion of U.S. economic,technological, and military dominance. The hub-and-spokes model will prevail, albeit with some adjust-ment in basing, operational tempo, and so on. Propo-nents of a second view hold that the next decade willsee movement toward building multilateral economic

Summary

This summary was prepared by the Asia-Pacific research team ofthe Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the NationalDefense University. Please address any comments or questions onthe summary or the papers in this publication to James J. Przystupof INSS at [email protected].

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mailto:[email protected]

2 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

and security institutions to manage and regulate thebroad spectrum of regional activities. A third anddecidedly minority view postulates the prospect of aU.S. withdrawal from active military engagement. Bei-jing, like its regional neighbors, is constantly assessingthe state of play and will respond according to itsinterests. Generally speaking, Beijing will seek toencourage those forces and trends that limit or attenu-ate U.S. influence and provide opportunities for Chinato increase its own standing.

Regional powers do not wish to see the rise of a hege-mon from within the region. Discussion of multilateral-ism notwithstanding, the majority of regional analyststake a realpolitik view of international relations. Thereis a clear preference for an external presence with a levelof comprehensive national power sufficient to balanceany and all regional powers, including China and, pre-sumably, Japan. It is understood that the external powerwould itself be balanced from within the region.

China is determined to achieve the status of a greatpower. This mandates two imperatives. The first is build-ing a world-class economy and military force. The secondis the completion of national reunification, whichinvolves restoring Taiwan and the disputed territories ofthe South China Sea to Chinese sovereignty. Participantsagreed that Beijing is not likely to be deflected fromeither goal. There was a clear consensus that once Tai-wan was dealt with China would turn its attention tothe South China Sea. Regional powers believe thatboth issues have the potential to evolve toward vio-lence and instability. But they also perceive that Beijingis aware that pursuing reunification could have anadverse impact on its quest for economic development,and that China is engaged in a continuing balancingact. However, there was general acceptance of the judg-ment that, in both cases, Beijing would use militaryforce to achieve reunification, if necessary.

China will become a great power, but the process willnot be an easy one. There was a strong consensus thatthe region should prepare itself to deal with a newgreat power. At the same time, however, there was ajudgment that, although the elite as a whole is reason-ably unified, the leadership remains separated from thepeople. There is also a view that, apart from national-ism, China lacks a coherent ideology to bind thenation together, that Chinese political institutions areextremely weak, and that Chinese society lacks coher-ence. Leadership inability to promote social cohesion isboth a cause and an effect of the rise of competingnationalisms. These involve both ethnically-based

nationalisms evidenced by China’s Muslim popula-tions and competing regionally/economically basednationalisms, such as those between the north and thesouth and the developed coastal regions and the lessdeveloped regions of the interior. On balance, theregional view is that China will make it but that theprocess willnot be smooth. The major differencebetween the views of regional analysts and their U.S.counterparts lies in the apparent readiness of theregion to accept the idea of ultimate Chinese successand to discount the seriousness of the difficulties Bei-jing is likely to encounter along the way.

Most participants feel China does not pose a near-term military threat to the nations of the Asia-Pacificregion. China’s military capabilities are growing alongwith other components of its comprehensive nationalpower. Those improvement are not and will not beseen across the full range of forces or capabilities, butwill be confined to those of greatest relevance to Chi-nese needs, that is, those relevant to Chinese objectiveswith respect to Taiwan. This judgment holds only forthe next 10 to 15 years. There is considerable uncer-tainty about the longer term. Regional observersbelieve that any impulse of the current regime to usemilitary means to achieve its objectives—with theexception of Taiwan and/or the South China Sea—istempered by the need to maintain stability in the inter-est of economic development. While most believe Bei-jing would prefer to avoid the use of force to reclaimTaiwan, there is growing anxiety in the region aboutcross-strait conflict due to miscalculation.

Taiwan is a major, pressing concern. But it is aUnited States problem. The region expects the UnitedStates to handle this problem well. This means twothings: managing events in such a way that conflictdoes not occur and, if it does occur, interveningquickly and effectively to limit the negative conse-quences. The forms, levels, and perceptions of U.S.forward military presence are important factors inmanaging the issue in that they clearly have deterredChinese military action. Regional powers do not wishto be asked to become involved, at least not publicly,and they absolutely do not wish to be asked to lendsupport to any U.S. military operations against Chinain the Taiwan Strait. That said, the region regards U.S.willingness to act in the Taiwan Strait as a test ofAmerican commitment. Failure to intervene to keepthe peace would send an extremely negative messageand do irreparable damage to the American positionin the region. It is worth underscoring that regional


Summary 3

analysts did not hedge their comments with qualifierssuch as “it depends on how the conflict starts.” Dis-cussion on the Taiwan issue left a strong impressionthat Beijing cannot be swayed from “one unifiedChina” and that the only real solution is the reinte-gration of Taiwan.

Regional powers find the cyclical pattern of U.S.relations with China to be disturbing. They are particu-larly concerned about what they perceive to be a presentmajor decline in the tenor and substance of bilateral ties.Participants reaffirmed the long-standing concern thatthe ups and downs of U.S.-China relations complicatetheir ability to maintain stable ties with Beijing. Theydo not wish to be placed in a position of having to takesides between Washington and Beijing. This is of par-ticular concern because, in their words, they and Bei-jing “share the same neighborhood.” Some participantsreluctantly expressed a desire for greater consistencyand predictability in the U.S. approach to Beijing.

China should join the World Trade Organization.Regional participants strongly supported arguments ofa business-oriented U.S. panel to advocate Chineseaccession and passage of permanent normal trade rela-tions (PNTR). The region sees WTO membership as ameans of speeding Chinese integration into the globaleconomy, as a means of encouraging China and Tai-wan to resolve issues of common interest, as a meansof improving U.S.-China relations, and as a help toChina’s economic development. All of these are per-ceived to be in the interests of the regional powers,which view Chinese membership as a means of ensur-ing stability and their own economic well-being.

China should be integrated fully into the politicaland economic life of the region. The region wants to seea China that plays by the rules. There is virtually nosupport for containment, confrontation, or oppositionto a more outward looking China. The most widelyheld view is that the underlying assumptions of Chi-nese foreign and national security policies are evolv-ing. Beijing is increasingly integrated into regionalaffairs, driven primarily by its economic interests. Theregion seems reasonably confident that this processwill reach a successful conclusion and is prepared tolive with an inconsistent China until it does. At thesame time, the regional powers clearly value the U.S.military presence as a counter to Beijing’s growingnational power.

Implications for the Future

In general, we agree with the symposium conclu-sions. A number of the issues raised need to be incor-porated into and/or emphasized in our continuingresearch. Similarly, and from our point of view surpris-ingly, a number of issues did not arise. These omis-sions also suggest subjects for future research.

There is a clear need to focus more directly onChina’s military modernization program and assess theprospects for improving the military capabilities of thePeople’s Liberation Army (PLA). Ultimately, thisrequires analysis of such factors as economics, scienceand technology capability, demographics, productioncapabilities, systems integration, and training. At thesame time, we need a better understanding of the viewsof Chinese leaders on the use of military force, includ-ing its utility as a means of achieving national objec-tives and the conditions under which they might actu-ally resort to force. These issues will be the top researchpriorities of the newly-established Center for the Studyof Chinese Military Affairs.

There is also a need to take our work on regionalperceptions of the forces and trends shaping theregional security environment to the next level and tointegrate it more fully into our study of the future U.S.regional military presence. Specifically, we need to eval-uate the extent to which multilateral institution build-ing is viewed as a useful exercise and how regional pow-ers are thinking about applying the concept in theirsecurity determinations. A related question concernsthe preferences and attitudes of allies and friendsregarding an emerging U.S. tendency to develop multi-lateral forms of military exercises and training.

We were surprised that regional participants failedto mention either theater missile defense, national mis-sile defense, or Japan’s apparently expanding securityrole as factors shaping the future regional securityenvironment. We had thought that discussion of thechallenges of China would eventually lead to a consid-eration of these issues. Our view is that these events arelikely to have significant impact, a view that promptedagreement when shared with regional participants.Accordingly, we see a need to begin work in theseareas. Finally, participants noted the significance of,but did not develop their ideas on, generational changeas a factor supporting pressures for changes in thesecurity orientations of Japan and Korea. This needreinforces our view that research on this subject wouldbe of great value.

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Foreigners and the Chinese themselves typically pic-ture China’s population as a vast monolithic Hanmajority, with a sprinkling of exotic minorities livingalong the country’s borders. This understates China’stremendous cultural, geographic, and linguistic diver-sity—in particular, the important cultural differenceswithin the Han population. It also ignores the factthat China is officially a multinational country, with56 recognized “nationalities.” More important, recentevents suggest that China may well be increasinglyinsecure regarding not only these official nationalities,but also national integration.

China is seeing a resurgence of pride in localnationality and culture, most notably among south-erners such as the Cantonese and Hakka, who are nowclassified as Han. The differences may increase undereconomic pressures, such as inflation, the growinggap between rich and poor areas, and the migration ofmillions of people from poorer provinces to thosewith jobs. Chinese society is also under pressure fromthe officially recognized minorities, such as theUyghurs and Tibetans.

For centuries, China has held together a vast mul-ticultural and multiethnic nation, despite alternatingperiods of political centralization and fragmentation.But cultural and linguistic cleavages could worsen in a

China that is weakened by internal strife, inflation,uneven growth, or a post-Jiang struggle for succes-sion. At the National Day celebrations in October1999, commemorating 50 years of Communist Partyrule, frequent calls for “National Unity”underscoredthe importance China’s many ethnic populations willplay in its national resurgence.

Ethnic Nationalism

At the beginning of the last decade, not a singleobserver of international politics predicted that theformer Soviet Union would now be fragmented into amelange of strident new nations and restive ethnicminorities. When Russian troops first marched intothe Chechen capital of Grozny in 1996 in hopes ofkeeping what remained of the former Soviet empiretogether,1 few analysts drew parallels to China’sattempts to rein in its own restive minorities.

China is thought to be different. Cultural com-monality and a monolithic civilization are supposedto hold the country together. While focus on ethnicnationalism generally has been absent from Westernperspectives and reporting on China, the peoples ofthe People’s Republic of China (PRC) have oftendemonstrated otherwise. Continuing separatist activi-ties and ethnic unrest have punctuated border areassince a major Muslim uprising in February 1996 ledto bombings in Beijing and frequent eruptions on itsperiphery.2 Quick and violent responses to thwart

China’s National Insecurity:Old Challenges at the Dawn of the New Millennium

by Dru C. Gladney

Dru C. Gladney is Research Professor in the Asia-Pacific Centerfor Security Studies at the College of Security Studies inHonolulu, Hawaii.

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localized protests—27 “splittists” reportedly killed inan uprising in December 1999 outside of Khotan insouthern Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region—indicate rising Chinese concern over the influence ofseparatist sentiment spilling over from the newlyindependent Central Asia nations into China’s Mus-lim areas. In these areas, more than 20 million TurkicUyghurs, Kyrgyz, Kazaks, and other Muslims are a vis-ible and vocal reminder that China is linked to Eura-sia. For Uyghur nationalists today, direct linealdescent from the Uyghur Kingdom in 7th centuryMongolia is accepted as fact, despite overwhelminghistorical and archeological evidence to the contrary,and they seek to revive that ancient kingdom as mod-ern Uyghuristan.3

Random arrests and detentions continue amongthe Uyghur, who are increasingly being regarded asChina’s Chechens. A report in The Wall Street Journalof the arrest on August 11, 1999, of Rebiya Kadir, awell-known Uyghur businesswoman, during a visit tothe region by a delegation from the U.S. Congres-sional Research Service, indicates that China’s suspi-cion of the Uyghur people continues.4

China is also concerned about the “Kosovoeffect,”5 fearing that its Muslim and other ethnicminorities might be emboldened to seek outsideinternational (i.e., Western) support for stopping con-tinued human rights abuses. Just before the NationalDay celebrations in October 1999, the State Councilhosted its first 3-day conference on “the nationalitiesproblem” in Beijing, and issued a new policy paper,“National Minorities Policy and its Practice inChina.”6 Though this White Paper did little more thanoutline all the “good” programs China has carried outin minority areas, it did indicate increasing concernand a willingness to recognize unresolved problems,and several strategic think tanks in Beijing and Shang-hai initiated focus groups and research programs toaddress the issues of ethnic identity and separatism.7

But ethnic problems in Jiang Zemin’s China go fardeeper than the official minorities. Sichuanese, Can-tonese, Shanghainese, and Hunanese cafes [“cafes”correct word?] avidly advocate increased culturalnationalism and resistance to Beijing central control.As the European Union experiences its difficulties inbuilding a common European alliance across linguis-tic, cultural, and political boundaries, we should notimagine China to be less concerned about its persist-ent multiculturalism.

If the Roman Empire were around today, it wouldlook much like China. Two millennia ago, the RomanEmpire and the Han dynasty were at their peaks. Bothempires barely lasted another 200 years. At the begin-ning of the last millennium, China was on the verge ofbeing conquered by the Mongols and divided by aweakened Song dynasty in the south and the Liaodynasty in the north, whose combined territory wasequal only to the five northern provinces in today’sPRC. Indeed, it was the Mongols who extended China’sterritory to include much of what is considered part ofChina today: Tibet, Xinjiang, Manchuria, Sichuan, andYunnan. Over the last two millennia, China has beendivided longer than it has been unified. Can it maintainnational unity throughout the next century? Historysuggests not. Indeed, with the reacquisition of Macaoin late 1999, China is the only country in the world thatis expanding its territory instead of reducing it. WillChina be able to continue to resist the inexorable forcesof globalization and nationalism?

Chinese linguists, such as John DeFrancis, speakof the linguistic diversity within China. Attention tocultural diversity should force observers to give fur-ther weight to the plurality of Chinese peoples innational politics. An American President onceclaimed to know the mind of the Chinese. This is asfarfetched as someone claiming to know the Europeanmind. Have any U.S. policymakers spent time talkingto disgruntled entrepreneurs in Canton and Shanghai,impoverished peasants in Anhui and Gansu, or angryCentral Asians in Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Tibet?While ethnic diversity does not necessitate ethnic sep-aratism or violence, growing ethnic awareness andexpression in China should inform policymaking andtake into account the interests of China’s many peo-ples, not just those in power. China policy should rep-resent more than the interests of those in Beijing.

China’s Han Nationality

Officially, China is made up of 56 nationalities—the majority nationality known as the Han, and 55recognized minority groups. The peoples identified asHan comprise 91 percent of the population from Bei-jing in the north to Canton in the south, and theyinclude the Hakka, Fujianese, Cantonese, and othergroups.8 These Han are thought to be united by acommon history, culture, and written language; dif-ferences in language, dress, diet, and customs areregarded as minor and superficial.


China’s National Insecurity 7

The rest of China’s population is divided into 55official minority nationalities that are mostly concen-trated along the borders, such as the Mongolians andUyghurs in the north and the Zhuang, Yi, and Bai insouthern China, near southeast Asia. Other groups,such as the Hui and Manchus, are scattered through-out the nation, and there are minorities in everyprovince, region, and county. An active state-spon-sored program assists these official minority culturesand promotes their economic development (withmixed results). The outcome, according to China’spreeminent sociologist, Fei Xiaotong, is a “unifiedmultinational” state.9

But even this recognition of diversity understatesthe divisions within the Chinese population, espe-cially the wide variety of culturally and ethnicallydiverse groups within the majority Han population.10

These groups have recently begun to rediscover andreassert their different cultures, languages, and his-tory. Yet, even as the Chinese worry and debate overtheir own identity, policymakers in other nations stilltake the monolithic Han identity for granted.

The notion of a Han person (Han ren) dates backcenturies and refers to descendants of the Han dynastywho flourished at about the same time as the RomanEmpire. But the concept of Han nationality (Hanminzu) is an entirely modern phenomenon that arosewith the shift from the Chinese empire to the modernnation-state.11 In the early part of the 20th century,Chinese reformers were concerned that the Chinesepeople lacked a sense of nationhood, unlike Western-ers and even China’s “other” peoples such as Tibetansand Manchus. In the view of these reformers, Chineseunity stopped at the clan or community level ratherthan extending to the nation as a whole.

Sun Yat-sen, leader of the republican movementthat toppled the last imperial dynasty of China (theQing) in 1911, popularized the idea that there were“Five Peoples of China”—the majority Han, theManchus, the Mongols, the Tibetans, and the Hui (aterm that included all Muslims in China, now dividedinto Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Hui, etc.). Sun was a Can-tonese, educated in Hawaii, who feared arousing tra-ditional northern suspicions of southern radicalmovements. He wanted both to unite the Han and tomobilize them and all other non-Manchu groups inChina (including Mongols, Tibetans, and Hui) into amodern multiethnic nationalist movement against theManchu Qing state and foreign imperialists. The Han

were seen as a unified group distinct from the “inter-nal” foreigners—within their borders the Manchus,Tibetans, Mongols, and Hui—and from the “external”foreigners, namely the Western and Japanese imperi-alists. Professor Frank Dikötter, Director of the Con-temporary China Institute at the University of Lon-don, has argued a racial basis for this notion of aunified Han minzu,12 but I suspect the rationality wasmore strategic and nationalistic—the need to buildnational security around the concept of one nationalpeople, with a small percentage of minorities sup-porting that idea.

The Communist Party expanded the number ofpeoples from 5 to 56 but kept the idea of a unifiedHan group. The Communists were, in fact, disposedto accommodate these internal minority groups forseveral reasons. The 1934–1935 Long March, a6,000-mile trek across China from southwest tonorthwest to escape the threat of annihilation byChiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (KMT) forces, tookthe Communists through some of the most heavilypopulated minority areas. Harried on one side by theKMT and on the other by fierce “barbarian” tribes-men, the Communists were faced with a choicebetween extermination and promising special treat-ment to minorities—especially the Miao, Yi (Lolo),Tibetans, Mongols, and Hui—should the party everwin national power.

The Communists even offered the possibility oftrue independence for minorities. Chairman Mao fre-quently referred to Article 14 of the 1931 ChineseCommunist Party (CCP) constitution, which “recog-nizes the right of self-determination” of the nationalminorities in China, their right to complete separa-tion from China, and their right to the formation ofan independent state for each minority. This commit-ment was not kept after the founding of the People’sRepublic.13 Instead, the party stressed maintaining theunity of the new nation at all costs.

The recognition of minorities, however, helpedthe Communists’ long-term goal of forging a unitedChinese nation by solidifying the recognition of theHan as a unified “majority.” Emphasizing the differ-ence between Han and the minorities helped todeemphasize the differences within the Han commu-nity. The Communists incorporated the idea of Hanunity into a Marxist ideology of progress, with theHan in the forefront of development and civilization,the vanguard of the people’s revolution.14 The more“backward” or “primitive” the minorities were, the



more “advanced” and “civilized” the so-called Hanseemed and the greater the need for a unifiednational identity. Cultural diversity within the Hanhas not been admitted because of a deep (and well-founded) fear the country would break up into feud-ing warlord-run kingdoms, as happened in the 1910sand 1920s.

China historically has been divided alongnorth/south lines—into Five Kingdoms, WarringStates, or local satrapies—as often as it has beenunited. Indeed, China as it currently exists, includinglarge pieces of territory occupied by Mongols, Turkicpeoples, Tibetans, and so forth, is three times largerthan China was under the last Chinese dynasty, theMing, which fell in 1644. Ironically, geographic“China” as defined by the People’s Republic was actu-ally established by foreign conquest dynasties, first bythe Mongols and finally by the Manchus. A strong,centralizing Chinese government (whether of foreignor internal origin) has often tried to impose ritualis-tic, linguistic, and political uniformity within its bor-ders. The modern state has tried to unite the variouspeoples with transportation and communication net-works and an extensive civil service. In recent years,these efforts have continued through the controlledinfusion of capitalist investment and market manipu-lation. Yet even in the modern era, these integrativemechanisms have not produced cultural uniformity.

Invented National Unity

Although presented as a unified culture—an ideaalso accepted by many Western researchers—Hanpeoples differ in many ways, most obviously in theirlanguages. The supposedly homogenous Han speakeight mutually unintelligible languages (Mandarin,Wu, Yue, Xiang, Hakka, Gan, Southern Min, andNorthern Min). Even these subgroups show markedlinguistic and cultural diversity; in the Yue languagefamily, for example, Cantonese speakers are barelyintelligible to Taishan speakers, and speakers of theSouthern Min dialects of Quanzhou, Changzhou, andXiamen have equal difficulty communicating.15 Chi-nese linguist Y. R. Chao has shown that the mutualunintelligibility of, say, Cantonese and Mandarin is asgreat as that of Dutch and English or French and Ital-ian.16 Mandarin was imposed as the national languageearly in the 20th century and has become the lingua

franca, but like Swahili in Africa it must often belearned in school and is rarely used in everyday life inmany areas.

Cultural perceptions among the Han often involvebroad stereotypical contrasts between north andsouth.17 Northerners tend to be thought of as larger,broader-faced, and lighter-skinned, while southernersare depicted as smaller and darker. Cultural practicesinvolving birth, marriage, and burial differ widely.Fujianese, for example, are known for vibrant folk reli-gious practices and ritualized reburial of interredcorpses, while Cantonese have a strong lineage tradi-tion, both of which are almost nonexistent in thenorth. One finds radically different eating habits fromnorth to south, with northerners consuming noodlesmade from wheat and other grains, open to consum-ing lamb and beef, and preferring spicy foods, whilethe southern diet is based upon rice, eschews lamb andbeef in favor of seafood, and along the coast includesmilder dishes. It is interesting, in this regard, that FeiXiaotong once argued that what made the Han peopledifferent from minorities was their agricultural tradi-tions (i.e., minorities were traditionally not engaged infarming,18 though this failed to take into accountgroups like the Koreans and Uyghur who have farmedfor 1,400 years). Yet Fei never considered the vast cul-tural differences separating rice-eaters in the Southfrom wheat-eaters in the North.

This process of national unification based on aninvented majority at the expense of a few isolatedminorities is widely documented in Asia and is notunique to China.19

Identity Politics and NationalMinorities

China’s policy toward minorities involves officialrecognition, limited autonomy, and unofficial effortsat control. The official minorities hold a significancefor China’s long-term development that is dispropor-tionate to their size. Although totaling only 8.04 per-cent of the population, they are concentrated inresource-rich areas, cover nearly 60 percent of thecountry’s land mass, and exceed 90 percent of thepopulation in counties and villages along many bor-der areas of Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Yun-nan. While the 1990 census recorded 91 million mem-bers of the official minorities, the 2000 census isestimated to report an increase in the minority popu-lation to 104 million.20



Shortly after taking power, Communist leaderssent teams of researchers, social scientists, and partycadres to the border regions to identify groups as offi-cial nationalities. Only 41 of the more than 400groups that applied were recognized, and that numberreached 56 by 1982. Most of the nearly 350 othergroups were identified as Han or lumped togetherwith other minorities with whom they shared somefeatures for generally political reasons. Some are stillapplying for recognition, and the 1990 census listedalmost 750,000 people as “unidentified” and awaitingrecognition—which means they were regarded as eth-nically different but did not fit into any of the recog-nized categories.

In recognition of the minorities’ official status aswell as their strategic importance, various levels ofnominally autonomous administration were created—five regions, 31 prefectures, 96 counties (or, in InnerMongolia and Manchuria, “banners”), and countlessvillages. Such “autonomous” areas do not have truepolitical control, although they may have increasedlocal control over the administration of resources,taxes, birth planning, education, legal jurisdiction, andreligious expression. These designated areas haveminority government leaders, but the real source ofpower is still the Han-dominated Communist Party—as a result, they may actually come under closerscrutiny than provinces with large minority popula-tions, such as Gansu, Qinghai, and Sichuan.

While “autonomy” seems not to be all the wordmight imply, it is still apparently a desirable attain-ment for the minorities in China. Between the 1982and 1990 censuses, 18 new autonomous counties wereestablished, three of them in Liaoning Province forthe Manchus, who previously had no autonomousadministrative districts. Although the government isclearly trying to limit the recognition of new national-ities, there seems to be an avalanche of newautonomous administrative districts. In addition tothe 18 new counties and many villages whose totalnumbers have never been published, at least 8 morenew autonomous counties are to be set up. Five willgo to the Tujia, a group widely dispersed throughoutthe southwest that doubled in population from 2.8million to 5.8 million from 1982 to 1990.

The increase in the number of groups seekingminority status reflects what may be described as anexplosion of ethnicity in contemporary China. Indeed,it has now become popular, especially in Beijing, forpeople to declare themselves to be Manchus or mem-

bers of other ethnic groups, admitting they were notHan all along. While the Han population grew a totalof 10 percent between 1982 and 1990, the minoritypopulation grew 35 percent overall—from 67 millionto 91 million. The Manchus, a group long thought tohave been assimilated into the Han majority, addedthree autonomous districts and increased its popula-tion by 128 percent, from 4.3 million to 9.8 million,while the population of the Gelao people in Guizhoushot up an incredible 714 percent in just 8 years.

Clearly, these rates reflect more than a high birthrate; they also indicate “category shifting” as peopleredefine their own nationality from Han to a minorityor from one minority to another. In interethnic mar-riages, parents can decide the nationality of their chil-dren, and the children themselves can choose theirnationality at age 18. One scholar predicts that if theminority population growth rate continues, there willbe a total of 100 million minorities in the year 2000and 864 million in 2080.21 China has recently begunto limit births among minorities, especially in urbanareas, but it is doubtful that authorities will be able tolimit the growing number of applications for redefini-tion and the hundreds of groups applying for recogni-tion as minorities.

Why is it popular to be officially ethnic in 1990sChina? This is an interesting question, given the nega-tive reporting in the Western press about minoritydiscrimination in China. If it is so bad to be a minor-ity in China, why are the numbers of minoritiesincreasing? One explanation may be that in 1982there were still lingering doubts about the govern-ment’s true intent in registering the nationalities dur-ing the census. The Cultural Revolution, a 10-yearperiod during which any kind of difference—ethnic,religious, cultural, or political—was ruthlessly sup-pressed, had ended only a few years before.22 By themid-1980s, it had become clear that those groupsidentified as official minorities were beginning toreceive real benefits from the implementation of sev-eral affirmative action programs. The most significantprivileges included permission to have more children(except in urban areas, minorities are generally notbound by the one-child policy), pay fewer taxes,obtain better (albeit Chinese) education for their chil-dren, have greater access to public office, speak andlearn their native languages, worship and practicetheir religion (often including practices, such asshamanism, that are still banned among the Han),



and express their cultural differences through the artsand popular culture.

Indeed, one might even say it has become popularto be ethnic in today’s China. Mongolian hot pot,Muslim noodle, and Korean barbecue restaurantsproliferate in every city, while minority clothing,artistic motifs, and other expressions of cultural stylesadorn Chinese bodies and private homes. In Beijing,one of the most popular new restaurants of the youngHan nouveau riche is the Thai Family Village (Dai JiaCun), which offers a cultural experience of the Thaiminority (known in China as the Dai), complete withbeautiful waitresses in revealing Dai-style sarongs andshort tops, sensually singing and dancing, and exoticfoods such as snake’s blood. It is not unusual to learnof Han Chinese prostitutes representing themselves asThai and other minorities to appear more exotic totheir customers.23 Surprisingly, the second-most pop-ular novel in China in 1994 was The History of theSoul (Xin ling shi), which concerned personal and reli-gious conflicts in a remote Muslim region in north-west China. It was written by Zhang Chengzhi, a HuiMuslim from Ningxia. This rise of ethnic chic is indramatic contrast to the anti-ethnic homogenizingpolicies of the late 1950s’ anti-Rightist period, theCultural Revolution, and even the late 1980s’ “spiri-tual pollution” campaigns.

Foreign policy considerations have also encour-aged changes in China’s treatment of minority groups.China has one of the world’s largest Muslim popula-tions—nearly 20 million, more than the United ArabEmirates, Libya, or Malaysia—and has increasing con-tacts with trade partners in the Middle East and newMuslim nations created on its borders. China providesthe Middle East and Central Asia with cheap labor,consumer goods, weaponry—and increasing numbersof Muslim pilgrims to Mecca.24 These relations will bejeopardized if Muslim, especially, Uyghur, discontentcontinues over such issues as limitations on mosquebuilding, restrictions on childbearing, uncontrolledmineral and energy development, and continuednuclear testing in the Xinjiang region.

Foreign policy considerations also argue for bettertreatment of Korean minorities, since South Koreaninvestment, tourism, and natural resources have givenChina’s Koreans in Liaoning and Manchuria a boom-ing economy and the best educational level of allnationalities (including the Han). Another factor hasbeen the increase in international tourism to minorityareas, including the “Silk Road” tours to Xinjiang and

package tours to the “colorful” minority regions ofYunnan and Guizhou that are marketed to Japanese,Taiwanese, and Southeast Asian Chinese tour groups.

The most striking change in Chinese policytoward a single minority as a result of internationalrelations has been the initiation—just after theimprovement in Sino-Israeli relations in 1992—ofdiscussions about granting official nationality statusto Chinese Jews (Youtai ren), once thought to havedisappeared entirely. As Sino-Israeli relationsimprove, and China seeks increased tourism dollarsfrom Tel Aviv and New York, one would assume theChinese Jews will once again reappear as an officialnationality in China.

The creation of several new nations on China’sCentral Asian frontier with ethnic populations onboth sides of the border has also made ethnic sepa-ratism a major concern. The newly independent sta-tus of the Central Asian states has allowed separatistgroups in Xinjiang to locate some sources of support,leading to over 30 reported bombing incidents in theXinjiang region in 1999 claimed by groups militatingfor an “Independent Turkestan.” At the same time,freer travel across the Central Asian borders has madeChina’s Muslims well aware of ethnic and politicalconflicts in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, and alsodemonstrated that they are often better off economi-cally than their fellow Muslims across the border. Sev-eral meetings of the “Shanghai Five” (PRC, Kaza-khstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia) since April1997 concluded treaties to strengthen border securityand establish the refusal to harbor separatist groups.In April 1999, for example, Kazakhstan returned toChina three Uyghurs who were accused of separatism.

Beijing’s challenge is to convince Chinese Mus-lims that they will benefit more from cooperationwith their national government than from resistance.In the south, a dramatic increase in cross-border rela-tions between Chinese minority groups and Myanmar(Burma), Cambodia, and Thailand has contributed toa rising problem of drug smuggling. Beijing alsowants to help settle disputes in Cambodia, Vietnam,and Myanmar, because it fears ethnic wars will spillover the border into China. In Tibet, frequent reportsof ongoing resistance and many arrests continue tofilter into the media, despite Beijing’s best efforts atspin control.



Internal Divisions Among the HanMajority

Not only have the official minorities in Chinabegun to assert their identities more strongly, pressingthe government for more recognition, autonomy, andspecial privileges, but different groups within the so-called Han majority have begun to rediscover, rein-vent, and reassert their ethnic differences.

The dramatic economic explosion in South Chinahas encouraged southerners and others to emphasizetheir cultural and political differences. Cantonese rockmusic, videos, movies, and television programs, allheavily influenced by Hong Kong, are now popularthroughout China. Whereas comedians used to makefun of southern ways and accents, southerners nowscorn northerners for their lack of sophistication andbusiness acumen. And, as any Mandarin- speakingBeijing resident will tell you, bargaining for vegetablesor cellular telephones in Guangzhou or Shanghaimarkets is becoming more difficult due to growingpride in local languages; nonnative speakers alwayspay a higher price. Rising self-awareness among theCantonese parallels the reassertion of identity amongthe Hakka, the southern Fujianese Min, the Swatow,and a host of other generally ignored peoples nowempowered by economic success and embittered byage-old restraints from the north.

Interestingly, most of these southern groups tra-ditionally regarded themselves not as Han but as Tangpeople, descendants of the great Tang dynasty(618–907 A.D.) and its southern bases.25 Most China-towns in North America, Europe, and Southeast Asiaare inhabited by descendants of Chinese immigrantswho came from the mainly Tang areas of southernChina. They are built around Tang Person Streets(tang ren jie).

The next decade may see the resurgence of Tangnationalism in southern China in opposition to north-ern Han nationalism, especially as economic wealth inthe south eclipses that of the north. There is also anewfound interest in the ancient southern Chu king-dom as key to modern southern success. Some south-ern scholars have departed from the traditional Chi-nese view of history and now argue that by the 6thcentury B.C., the bronze age culture of the Chu hadspread north and influenced the development of Chi-nese civilization, rather than the culture originating in

the north and spreading southward. Many southernersnow see Chu as essential to Chinese culture, to be dis-tinguished from the less important northern dynas-ties—with implications for the nation’s economic andgeopolitical future. Museums celebrating the glory ofChu have been established throughout southernChina. There is also a growing belief that northernersand southerners had separate racial origins based ondifferent histories and contrasting physiogenetic types,a belief influenced by highly speculative 19th centurynotions of race and Social Darwinism.26

There has also been an outpouring of interest inHakka origins, language, and culture on Taiwan,which may be spreading to the mainland. The Hakka,or “guest people,” are thought to have moved south-ward in successive migrations from northern China asearly as the Eastern Jin (317–420 A.D.) up until thelate Song dynasty (960–1279 A.D.), according to manyHakka (who claim to be Song people as well as Tangpeople). The Hakka have the same language andmany of the same cultural practices as the She minor-ity, but they have never sought minority status them-selves—perhaps because of a desire to overcome theirlong-term stigmatization by the Cantonese and othersoutherners as “uncivilized barbarians.”27 This lowstatus may stem from the unique Hakka language(which is unintelligible to other southerners), the iso-lated and walled Hakka living compounds, or therefusal of Hakka women during the imperial periodto bind their feet.

Nevertheless, the popular press in China is begin-ning to note more frequently the widely perceived butdifficult-to-establish rumors of the Hakka origins ofimportant political figures (even Deng Xiaoping, MaoZedong, Sun Yat-sen, former party General SecretaryHu Yaobang, and former President Ye Jianning). Peo-ple often praise Zhou Enlai by stressing his Jiangnanlinkages and Lee Kuan-yew as a prominent Hakkastatesman; and even Chiang Kai-shek is lauded as asoutherner who knew how to get money out of theUnited States.

National Disintegration

China’s economic vitality has the potential to fuelethnic and linguistic division, rather than integratingthe country further, as most would suppose. As south-ern and coastal areas get richer, much of the central,northern, and northwestern regions are unlikely tokeep up, increasing competition and contributing to



age-old resentments across ethnic, linguistic, and cul-tural lines.28 Southern ethnic economic ties linkwealthy Cantonese, Shanghainese, and Fujianese (alsothe majority people in Taiwan) more closely to theirrelatives abroad than to their political overlords inBeijing. Already, provincial governments in Cantonand elsewhere not only resist paying taxes to Beijing,but they also restrict the transshipment of goodscoming from outside the province across provincial—often the same as cultural—lines. Travelers in Chinahave seen an extraordinary expansion of toll roads,indicating greater interest in local control.

Dislocations from rapid economic growth mayalso fuel ethnic divisions. Huge migrations of “float-ing populations,” estimated to total over 150 millionnationally, now move across China seeking employ-ment in wealthier areas, often engendering stigma-tized identities and stereotypical fears of the “out-siders” (wai di ren) within China. Crime, housingshortages, and lowered wages are now attributed mostoften to these people from Anhui, Hunan, or Gansuwho are taking jobs from locals—complaints similarto those heard in West Germany about the influx ofEasterners after reunification. Reports that 70 percentof those convicted of crimes in Beijing were outsidershave fueled criticisms of China’s increasingly openmigration policy.29

The result of all these changes is that China isbecoming increasingly decentered. This is a fearsomeprospect for those holding the reins in Beijing. Per-haps it was a factor in the decision to crack down onthe June 1989 demonstrations in Tiananmen Square.At that time, central authorities had begun to losecontrol of a country, which they feared could quicklyunravel. That such fears have not eased is shown bythe increased calls during the National Day celebra-tions for National Unity and efforts to reduce corrup-tion. Worker and peasant unrest reported throughoutChina cuts across, and may at times exacerbate, cul-tural and ethnolinguistic differences between thehaves and the have-nots, who in today’s Chinaincreasingly interact along lines marked by multieth-nic diversity.

National Disunity?

Although ethnic separatism will never be a seri-ous threat to a strong China, a China weakened byinternal strife, inflation, uneven economic growth, orthe struggle for succession after Deng Xiaoping’s

death could become further divided along culturaland linguistic lines. It was a southerner, born andeducated abroad, who led the revolution that endedChina’s last dynasty; and when that empire fell, com-peting warlords—often supported by foreign pow-ers—fought for local turf occupied by culturally dis-tinct peoples. And, the Taiping Rebellion of the 1850sand 1860s that nearly brought down the Qing dynastyalso had its origins in the southern border region ofGuangxi among the so-called marginal Yao andHakka peoples.

These events are being remembered as the gener-ally well-hidden and overlooked “others” within Chi-nese society begin to reassert their own identities inaddition to the official nationalities. At the same time,China’s leaders are moving away from the homoge-nizing policies that alienated minority and non-northern groups. Recent moves to allow and evenencourage the expression of cultural diversity, whilepreserving political unity, indicate a growing aware-ness of the need to accommodate that diversity. Thisdevelopment will be important to watch over the next2 years, as China prepares to incorporate Hong Kong,a city that operates on cultural and social assumptionsvery different from those of Beijing.

The construction of Chinese national identity hasalways been tentative. In June 1989, while China’sfuture hung in the balance, there was significant con-cern over which armies would support Deng’s crack-down—those based in Sichuan, Hunan, Canton, orBeijing; all had their own local concerns. The militaryhas since been reshuffled and somewhat downsized,attempting to uproot any local attachments and pro-fessionalize the command structure. However, thisonly underscores the growing importance of regionaland local ties. China, as of now, is a unified countrymilitarily, and perhaps, politically. As a result ofJiang’s continuance of the Deng Xiaoping reforms,China is increasingly less unified economically. Yethow can China continue to withstand the forces ofglobalization and nationalism without a governmentlegitimized through popular elections, transparencyin the political process, adherence to the rule of law,and good governance?

Last November, an ambassador from one of theMuslim nations friendliest to China remarked pri-vately to this writer that, by the end of the nextdecade, China would be divided into nine republics.



Historians debate whether a foreign threat has beenthe only thing that has held China together. Now thatthe encirclement doctrine, upon which PresidentRichard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissingerbuilt the Sino-American alliance, is no longer valid,and containment has been replaced by improvingU.S.-China relations based on a policy of engagement,China faces only enemies from within.

The Chinese press reported more than 5,000organized social protests in 1998 alone, with manymore in 1999, culminating in the widespread FalunGong uprising and crackdown. Most of these protestshave been organized by labor unions and peasantassociations, but, increasingly, ethnic and religiousgroups such as the Falun Gong have begun to speakout. The fact that China is becoming dangerouslydecentered perhaps may be the main reason for therecent rush on Beijing’s part to finalize internationalborder agreements with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzs-tan, Tajikistan, and most recently, Vietnam.

U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan predictedthat there will be 50 new countries in 50 years. Thetrend began with the breakup of the Soviet Union in1991 and has continued throughout much of Africaand Asia, particularly Indonesia. Why should Chinabe immune from such global diversification? Whileethnic separatism alone will never be threateningenough to pull a strong China apart, a China weak-ened by internal strife, inflation, uneven economicgrowth, or the struggle for (un)democratic successioncould certainly fragment along cultural and linguisticlines. Ethnic strife did not dismantle the formerSoviet Union; but it did come apart along boundariesdefined in large part by ethnic and national differ-ences. The generally well-hidden and overlooked“others” within Chinese society—the Cantonese,Shanghainese, Sichuanese, and Fujianese—are begin-ning to reassert their own identities in addition to the“official” nationalities on China’s borders. IncreasingTaiwanese nationalism has caused great consternationin Beijing, an “internal” ethnic nationalism that fewChinese nationalists can understand.

The rising politics of difference are of concern notonly in Lhasa and Urumqi, but in Canton and Shang-hai as well. The “Kosovo effect” may very well turninto the “Chechnya effect,” whereby ethnic groups,especially Muslims, are stereotyped as separatists, andcleansing is launched as an internal affair. The prob-lem for China, however, is that many of its internalthreats may not come from official nationalities who

are more easily singled out by race or language.China’s Chechnya, like Indonesia’s Aceh problem, mayvery well come from within its own peoples who areseeking economic and political advantage. The nextdecade promises to be as momentous for China as thelast was for Europe and Russia.

Notes1 Russian troops marched on Chechnya, a secessionist, self-

proclaimed “independent” republic in the Northern Caucasus, in1996. Russia again began bombing the territory of Chechnya inSeptember 1999.

2 See the critical report, People’s Republic of China: Gross Vio-lations of Human Rights in the Xinjiang Uighur AutonomousRegion (London: Amnesty International, April 21, 1999).

3 The best “Uighur nationalist” retelling of this unbrokendescent from Karakhorum is in the document “Brief History ofthe Uyghers,” originating from the Eastern Turkestani Union inEurope, and available electronically at www.geocites.com/Capitol-Hill/1730/buh.html. For a recent review and critique, includinghistorical evidence for the multiethnic background of the contem-porary Uyghur, see Dru C. Gladney, “Ethnogenesis and EthnicIdentity in China: Considering the Uygurs and Kazakhs,” in VictorMair, ed., The Bronze Age and Early Iron Age People of Eastern Cen-tral Asia: Volume II (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study ofMan, 1998), 812–34. For a discussion of the recent archeologicalevidence derived from DNA testing of the desiccated corpses ofXinjiang, see Mair, “Introduction,” The Bronze Age and Early IronAge People of Eastern Central Asia, 1–40.

4 Ian Johnson, “China Arrests Noted Businesswoman inCrackdown in Muslim Region,” The Wall Street Journal, August18, 1999.

5 Referring to the international effort to prevent the “ethniccleansing” of the largely Muslim Albanian Kosovars in the Serbianprovince of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999.

6 China State Council, “National Minorities Policy and itsPractice in China,” Beijing, October 1999.

7 The China Institute for Contemporary International Rela-tions (CICIR), under the State Council, has initiated a “National-ity Studies Project” in order to examine security implications ofChina’s minority problems (Chu Shulong interview, November14, 1999).

8 Colin Mackerras, China’s Minorities: Integration and Mod-ernization in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1994), 25.

9 Fei Xiaotong, “Ethnic Identification in China,” in Fei Xiao-tong, ed., Toward a People’s Anthropology (Beijing: New WorldPress, 1981), 20.

10 Emily Honig, Creating Chinese Ethnicity (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 1992).

11 Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 47.

12 Frank Dikötter, The Discourse of Race in Modern China(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).


www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/1730/buh.html

www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/1730/buh.html


13 Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in thePeople’s Republic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996),60–75.

14 Dru C. Gladney, “Representing Nationality in China: Refig-uring Majority/Minority Identities,” The Journal of Asian Studies53 (1994a), 97.

15 Jerry Norman, Chinese (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1988), 27.

16 Yuen Ren Chao, Aspects of Chinese Sociolinguistics (Stan-ford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 83.

17 Fred C. Blake, Ethnic Groups and Social Change in a ChineseMarket Town (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1981).

18 Fei Xiaotong, “Zhonghua minzu de duoyuan jiti juge”(“Plurality and Unity in the Configuration of the Chinese Nation-ality”), Beijing Daxue Xuebao 4 (1989), 12.

19 See Dru C. Gladney, ed., Making Majorities: Constitutingthe Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, and theUnited States (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

20 Zhang Tianlu, “Xiandai Zhongguo Shaoshu minzu renkouzhuangkuang” (“Analysis of the Contemporary China MinorityNationality Population Situation”), paper presented at the Con-ference on Contemporary Migration and Ethnicity in China,Institute of Nationality Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sci-ences, Beijing, October 7–8, 1999.

21 Ibid.22 The Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution ran from 1966

until the death of Mao Zedong in 1976.23 Gladney, “Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring

Majority/Minority Identities,” 92–123.24 Dru C. Gladney, “Sino-Middle Eastern Perspectives and

Relations Since the Gulf War: Views from Below,” The Interna-tional Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, November 2000.

25 Leo J. Moser, The Chinese Mosaic: The Peoples and Provincesof China (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985).

26 Mair, The Bronze Age and Early Iron Age People of EasternCentral Asia.

27 Blake, Ethnic Groups and Social Change in a Chinese MarketTown.

28 See Wang Shaoguang, et al., China’s Inequality (NewHaven: Yale University Press, 1999).

29 Fei Guo, “Beijing’s Policies Towards Ethnic Minority/RuralMigrant Villages,” paper presented at the Conference on Contem-porary Migration and Ethnicity in China, Institute of NationalityStudies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, October7–8, 1999.


15

Assessing Beijing’s defense modernization programsin the midst of increasing apprehension over thegrowth of China’s military power is a daunting task.During the Cold War, despite some concern over thelong-term implications for the United States, assess-ments were viewed through the prism of China’s rolein containing the Soviet Union. Improvements (how-ever marginal) in Beijing’s military power were seenas serving U.S. interests by requiring Moscow to divertresources from the possible confrontation with theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance.By the mid-1990s, this perspective had shifted. Manyobservers perceived Beijing’s confrontation with Tai-wan and its aggressive, nationalistic approaches to ter-ritorial claims in the South China Sea as indicators ofthe belligerent policies China will pursue as economicenrichment and improvements in indigenous scienceand technology capabilities enhance its militarypower. Swelling defense budgets and military technol-ogy links with Russia, Israel, and Europe are viewed asgiving China the potential to destabilize East Asia andchallenge U.S. military preeminence.

A divide among analysts of Beijing’s progress indefense modernization is accompanying this changingperception. Although observers have followed the pat-tern and progress of Chinese defense modernizationprograms in detail since reforms were initiated in the

late 1970s, their assessments of that progress havediverged in the past few years. On one side standthose who interpret much of the writing coming outof China as indicating the aspirations of the People’sLiberation Army (PLA).1 Although recognizing theimportance of the weapons and technologies beingacquired, these analysts tend to be skeptical of theextent to which China is achieving the capabilities tomeet these aspirations. On the other side of the divideare those whose research demonstrates to them thatmajor improvements in China’s military capabilitiesare closer at hand than the skeptics recognize.2

This divide in assessments is created by two fac-tors: the changed perspective from which China’sdefense modernization is now viewed, and the differ-ing estimates of the speed with which China candevelop and produce weapons and technologies asso-ciated with the revolution in military affairs (RMA).Whatever the source of the rift, the issues dividing theskeptics and the optimists,3 as I shall refer to them, areclear. The purpose of this essay, however, is not toresolve these differences or bridge this divide. Rather,the differences will be identified to underscore the dif-ficulties in assessing the progress China has made intwo decades of defense modernization.

The Debilitating Legacy of the Past

Despite differing assessments, both camps agreethat the defense reforms and modernization programs

China’s Defense Modernization:Aspirations and Capabilities

by Paul H. B. Godwin

Paul H. B. Godwin is a former professor in the National WarCollege at the National Defense University.



Beijing has undertaken since 1978 encompass far morethan its armed forces. After Soviet assistance ended in1959–1960, the Chinese defense industrial base andresearch and development (R&D) infrastructureeroded into obsolescence. By the mid-1970s, with thepossible exception of the nuclear weapons programs,Chinese defense industries were only capable of pro-ducing weapons and equipment based on Soviet tech-nologies from the 1950s. Defense R&D also was weak-ened and was incapable of developing arms to meetthe demands of late 20th century warfare.

Extensive involvement in Mao Zedong’s radicaldomestic campaigns, especially the Great ProletarianCultural Revolution of 1966–1976, had done equalharm to the armed forces. As Chairman Mao’s succes-sor Deng Xiaoping critically observed in the summerof 1975, the PLA had degenerated into an aging, over-staffed, obsolescent, arrogant giant incapable of con-ducting modern warfare.4 The poor performance ofthe PLA against Vietnamese forces in 1979 verifiedDeng’s critique.5 The PLA may have been capable ofconducting a 1930s-style protracted war of attritionagainst a massive Soviet assault designed to defeat andoccupy China, but that was an improbable scenario.

Even if Deng Xiaoping had placed the highest pri-ority on reforming and modernizing the defenseestablishment, overcoming the extensive constraintsdeveloped over the previous two decades would havebeen difficult. Deng, however, made modernization ofnational defense his lowest priority. Deng’s approachto defense modernization was long term and part of abroader strategy to bring China into the ranks of theworld’s strongest powers. Rebuilding the defenseestablishment would occur not at the expense ofDeng’s broader strategic objectives for China’s futurebut in balance with the reform and modernization ofcivil industry and science and technology. A self-reliant (to the extent possible) defense industrialcapability was to be derived from the modernizationof China’s civil industries and science and technologyinfrastructure.

The armed forces themselves had to be recon-structed and reformed before the PLA could move for-ward. A new, younger officer corps capable of plan-ning and conducting contemporary and futurewarfare had to be created. The armed forces’ organiza-tion and training had to be revised before modernweaponry and equipment could be integrated into

strategy and concepts of operations. Logistics, sustain-ment, and maintenance procedures had to be preparedfor the complexity of more modern arms. In short,defense modernization was to be incremental andbased on a long-term development process. Leadersclearly recognized that no quick fix could overcomethe two decades of neglect and deterioration that haderoded the PLA ability to conduct modern warfare.

Defense Modernization and ThreatPerception

Changing threat perceptions in the first decade ofreform added to the preexisting constraints on build-ing the PLA into a more capable defense force. In1978, the national military strategy was one of conti-nental defense against the Soviet Union. The militaryobjective for this strategy was to defeat a major Sovietassault as close to China’s borders as possible. Beforethis objective was fully integrated into planning, con-cepts of operations, force deployments, and training,Beijing’s threat perception changed. In 1985, DengXiaoping concluded that a major, possibly nuclear, warwith the Soviet Union was no longer probable. Futurewars—including a potential military confrontationwith the Soviet Union—were more likely to be limited,local wars on the periphery of China. PLA plannerstherefore shifted their focus to contingency planningfor short, high-intensity wars in which the adversary’spolitical objective would be limited and the combatconfined to localized theaters of operations.6

The Persian Gulf War of 1991 came as the PLAwas getting more comfortable with the new nationalmilitary strategy. In many ways, this war was a modelof the type of military conflict PLA researchers hadbeen assessing since 1985. It was a high-intensity warfought for limited political objectives within a con-fined geographic area. Nonetheless, Operation DesertStorm stunned the PLA. Military analysts observed theeffectiveness of high-technology weaponry and equip-ment implemented with joint service operations andsaw this war as demonstrating that an RMA was underway. Senior Chinese military leaders concluded thattheir armed forces were incapable of conducting mili-tary operations at this level of sophistication andintensity. Chinese forces lacked more than just theweaponry and critical support systems so central tothe coalition’s overwhelming military success in theGulf; the basic PLA military doctrine and concepts ofoperations had not kept pace with late 20th century


China’s Defense Modernization 17

warfare. This conclusion led to the modification of theguiding principle for PLA modernization from local,limited war to limited war under high-tech conditions.

Even as China pressed forward with two decadesof reform and modernization of its defense establish-ment, Beijing found that military technologies, doc-trines, and concepts of operations for contemporaryand future warfare were outpacing the progress thePLA was clearly making. Confounding this problem,these two decades also saw the quasi-alliance thatonce linked China and the United States transformedinto mutual suspicion and, in Beijing’s eyes, hostility.7

This perception became evident in years following theAmerican response to the Tiananmen slaughter of1989. The exultation that swept over the United Stateswith the end of the Cold War, the brilliant militaryvictory over Iraq, and the disintegration of the SovietUnion led Beijing to conclude that as the remainingsuperpower, the United States would seek to dominatethe post-Cold War world.

This perception of the United States was paral-leled by the emergence of democracy in Taiwan andits quest for greater international recognition. As theimage of China became ever more blemished in theUnited States, Taiwan’s grew ever more attractive. TheU.S. sale of advanced military technologies to Taiwan,especially the sale of 150 F–16s in 1992, increasedChinese suspicion that the United States was covertlycommitted to an independent Taiwan. President LeeTeng-hui’s “private” visit to his alma mater, CornellUniversity, in 1995 served to enhance Beijing’s percep-tion of a hostile, duplicitous United States. From theChinese perspective, this hostility was confirmed in1996 when the United States dispatched two aircraftcarrier battlegroups (CVBGs) to the Taiwan area inresponse to the Chinese use of tactical ballistic mis-siles in so-called exercises off Taiwan. Beijing’s blatantuse of coercive diplomacy focused both China and theUnited States on the distinct possibility that theycould confront each other in a military conflict overthe future of Taiwan.

The United States as Probable Adversary

Identifying the United States as its most danger-ous potential opponent and focusing on the TaiwanStrait as the most likely arena for confrontation wereto have a critical influence on Chinese defense mod-ernization programs. Whereas the programs followedafter 1985 promised to transform the PLA into a morecapable and flexible defense force, a possible military

confrontation with the United States raised morecomplex and difficult issues for the PLA to contem-plate. Before the early 1990s, preparing for a local,limited war was actually considered contingency plan-ning. A number of potential threats existed, but withthe Soviet Union’s implosion in 1991, none wouldlikely require large-scale use of force. Identifying theUnited States as a potential adversary, however,demanded careful assessment of what was required toprevail against the world’s most advanced militarypower in a high-intensity limited war.8

Chinese military analysts’ focus on Taiwan and ona potential conflict with the United States did notescape the attention of American observers.9 ColdWar terms began to enter the lexicon of Americananalysts, who began asking when China wouldbecome a peer competitor and develop sufficientforce projection capabilities to threaten U.S. interestsin East Asia.10 Thus, by the late 1990s, both the UnitedStates and China viewed each other with increasingapprehension. The exchange of summit meetings in1997 and 1998 improved the climate of bilateral rela-tions, but the potential for a military confrontationover Taiwan was recognized as a continuing hazard toSino-American relations. That such a confrontationwould be between two nuclear powers only added tothe underlying tensions.

The Nuclear Dimension11

Allegations that China had acquired detailedspecifications of U.S. nuclear weaponry, includingwarhead design and missile technology, through espi-onage activities heightened the apprehension sharedby Beijing and Washington. These allegations ledsome to believe such information could dramaticallyincrease the accuracy, reliability, and lethality ofChina’s nuclear forces, thereby enhancing the threatthey posed to the United States.12

Despite the conclusions of the congressionallyappointed Cox Committee,13 specialists in Chinesedefense modernization programs have not split intoskeptical and optimistic camps in their assessments ofChinese nuclear forces and strategy. There is consen-sus that, until recently, Beijing has sought the capabil-ity known in Western analyses as minimum deter-rence: relying on a small number of warheads capableof threatening what is hoped will be unacceptabledamage in a second strike after receiving a nuclearfirst strike from an adversary. Analysts generallyaccept that beyond seeking the status of being a



nuclear power, China is trying to prevent nuclearblackmail. From Beijing’s point of view, if an adver-sary believes it will receive a punitive retaliatorystrike, it will not seek to deter or threaten China withnuclear forces.

China’s inventory of weapons reflects this mini-mum deterrence logic. It contains some 20 DF–5intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable ofstriking targets across the United States. Augmentingthese are 20 DF–4 limited-range ICBMs capable ofstriking targets in the U.S. northwest and the north-ern Pacific. Neither weapon can be maintained at highlevels of readiness because they are liquid-fueled, pro-hibiting the rocket launchers from staying onextended alert. The warheads are stored separatelyfrom the launchers, and loading the liquid fuels andwarheads can take 2 to 4 hours. This extended prepa-ration time, together with the inherent inaccuracy ofthe weapons, limits their role to a retaliatory “city-busting” strike. Beijing’s declared policy of no first useprobably reflects the deficiencies of its weapons asmuch as it does the intent behind their employment.

The second component of China’s nuclear forcesconsists of around 100 intermediate-range ballisticmissiles (IRBMs) capable of striking targets in the cen-tral and western Pacific. With the exception of the 48DF–21As, these missiles are liquid-fueled and sufferthe same constraints as the DF–4/5. Some suggest thatthe latest Chinese short-range ballistic missile(SRBM), the DF–11/15, may be nuclear-capable. Thefinal missile component is formed by Beijing’s singlenuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN)carrying 12 missiles of 1,000-mile range. Following along and difficult development life, this ship enteredservice in the early 1980s. Because it rarely if ever goeson patrol, China’s SSBN is not considered operational.

Joining the missile forces are approximately 100B–6 (Tu–16) and A–5 (modified MiG–19) nuclear-capable bombers. Although updated with a variety ofmore advanced imported and Chinese-developedimprovements, these aircraft were originally designedand built with 1950s-era Soviet technologies. Conse-quently, their ability to penetrate contemporary airdefenses is minimal, limiting their utility as a regionaland tactical nuclear bomber force.

The U.S. Arsenal

Although China definitely has a menacing capa-bility, it confronts approximately 8,000 U.S. strategicweapons deployed on 575 ICBMs, 102 strategic

bombers, and 17 SSBNs. A single Trident-armed U.S.SSBN carries 24 multiple-warhead missiles capable ofdelivering 144 extremely accurate weapons. Just oneAmerican SSBN can carry more than seven times thetotal number of warheads carried on all of China’sD–5 ICBMs—and at a much higher degree of readi-ness. These conditions seem to assure deterrence.Future Chinese nuclear strategy and force structuremay well change. The aging, slow-reacting, inaccurateliquid-fueled weapons constituting most of China’sdeterrent are to be replaced by far more capable sys-tems. The solid-fueled, tactically mobile, and presum-ably more accurate DF–31 and DF–41 will replace theDF–4 and DF–5. Solid fuel provides quicker and morereliable reaction time than liquid fuel, and tacticalmobility makes the DF–31 and DF–41 less susceptibleto the counterforce capability found in the extremeaccuracy of U.S. and Russian weapons.

A Minimal Deterrence Strategy

A possible review of the strategy guiding China’snuclear deterrent may be as important as its systemupgrades. For the past decade, some Chinese militarystrategists have been questioning the future viabilityof a minimum deterrence strategy.14 The incentive torevise its core nuclear strategy stems from a variety ofconditions that Beijing considers threatening to thecredibility of its deterrent posture.

First, with ballistic missile defenses on the hori-zon, the size of China’s strategic forces becomes anissue. Should the United States deploy even a thinnational missile defense (NMD), the current numberof ICBMs would not satisfy Beijing’s requirement foran assured second strike. China is therefore underconsiderable pressure to increase the number ofdeployed weapons. India’s nuclear and ballistic missiletests add to the pressure for increased deployments. Asizeable increase could well occur.

Second, ensuring survivability may result inChina’s current SSBN program coming to fruition. Amissile has already been derived to fill the launchtubes of the DF–31. Although tactically mobileground-launched missiles could ease Beijing’s appre-hension over the survivability of its deterrent force,building several SSBNs may add to its confidence thatChina’s deterrent force is viewed as credible.

The final issue influencing the future of China’snuclear forces is whether minimum deterrence willbe replaced by what Beijing’s strategists refer to as



limited deterrence (you xian hewei she). Some Chi-nese strategists consider relying on a single counter-value punitive strike to deter a nuclear adversary tobe passive and incapable of fulfilling what they see asa future requirement for a more flexible nuclearresponse. As conceived by analysts in Beijing, a strat-egy of limited deterrence would significantly increasethe number of weapons available in order to enableBeijing to respond to any level of attack, from tacticalto strategic. Increasing the number of weaponswould permit some degree of escalation control,because China could retain sufficient forces forextended exchanges.

These same analysts, however, also recognize thatChina lacks much of the supporting infrastructurerequired for such a strategy. For example, China doesnot have the space-based reconnaissance and earlywarning systems required to determine in near-real-time the size and origin of the attack. Strategists inBeijing are well aware of this and numerous otherdeficiencies constraining the implementation of alimited deterrence strategy. Thus, although programsto correct these constraints are very expensive andcomplex to build, it would be wise to assume that theyare under way. Prudence probably will lead the UnitedStates to assume that over the next two decades thesize and capabilities of China’s missile forces willincrease, despite some disagreement over the extent ofthe enlargement.15 The number of ICBMs capable oftargeting the United States could substantiallyincrease, together with the number of IRBMs capableof targeting U.S. territories and bases in the Pacific.Some of these weapons will likely be armed with mul-tiple independently targetable reentry vehicles(MIRVs) to ensure that their warheads penetrate bal-listic missile defenses.16 The number of conventionaland nuclear-armed SRBMs also will increase as Bei-jing anticipates the introduction of theater missiledefense (TMD).

Without a major change in the mutual suspicionsand the dynamic driving the military strategies andobjectives of both Beijing and Washington, in thenext two decades, China probably will increase thenumber of deployed weapons and possibly alter thestrategy directing their use. At the very least, thenumber of weapons will be increased to offset antici-pated TMDs and NMDs.

China’s Aspirations

As the PLA focuses more and more directly onthe United States, China’s defense modernization pro-grams— including the growing arms and militarytechnology linkage with Russia and Israel—have beenobserved and analyzed in detail.17 Indeed, since themid-1970s, U.S. analysts have continuously scruti-nized Beijing’s efforts to bring its defense establish-ment into the late 20th century, including the acquisi-tion of foreign arms and military technology frommultiple sources.18 The Chinese defense industrialbase has received particular attention.19 With very fewexceptions, these two decades of assessments providethe skeptics with their evidence to question whetherthe aspirations so clearly expounded in Chinese mili-tary journals can be achieved in the next decade oreven further in the future.

The skeptic’s conclusion is based upon a numberof variables encompassing factors beyond the acquisi-tion of arms and military technology. Skeptics do notquestion that, at least within the PLA’s preeminentresearch center, the Academy of Military Science,there is now clear recognition of the demands of 21st

century warfare. Nor do they disagree with the propo-sition that since the Gulf War, PLA researchers haveanalyzed at great length a combat environment inwhich information technologies allow space, air, sea,and land to be integrated into a single operationalenvironment.

The RMA has made this battlespace increasinglytransparent, allowing extremely accurate targeting forover-the-horizon land-, air-, and sea-launched preci-sion-strike munitions. Information technologies notonly guide the ordnance but also are equally valuablefor near-real-time command, control, and intelligence,allowing dispersed forces and weapons to exploit bat-tlefield opportunities. Because information technolo-gies are critical for the prosecution of contemporaryand future military operations, these analysts concludethat the forces achieving electromagnetic dominancewould hold the initiative. Forces losing this aspect ofmodern warfare will be rendered operationally deafand blind. Consequently, the hard damage inflicted bymunitions is intensified by the soft damage made pos-sible by information warfare (IW).

Doctrine and Operations

Chinese assessments of future warfare have cre-ated a basic pattern in the doctrinal and operationalaspirations filling the pages of its military journals.



First, gaining battlespace initiative is viewed as essen-tial in defeating an adversary distinctly superior in thearms and technologies of warfare. That adversary isclearly the United States—“our new rivals.”20 Suchoperations will require offensive and possibly preemp-tive operations. This approach to military operationsfits the PLA’s traditions and experience. Mao Zedongplaced the highest emphasis on gaining battlefield ini-tiative, directing his field commanders to set this as aprimary military objective. In particular, his com-manders were to win the first battle of an operation,for this gave them great flexibility. Mao saw flexibilityin employing his forces as the clearest indicator of acommander’s dominance of the battlefield.21

These operational analyses have folded IW intotheir focus on offensive and preemptive operations.Assessing U.S. military doctrine and operations, cur-rent PLA analyses identify the growing dependence ofadvanced technology forces on information technolo-gies as a potential critical weakness. In this assess-ment, dependence on information technologies hasled to nodes linking together systems for acquiring,processing, and disseminating information. Offensiveor preemptive operations attacking command, con-trol, communications, computers, and intelligencenodes are seen as eroding if not disrupting U.S. hardattack and joint operational capabilities. Attackingthese critical information nodes is perceived as a forcemultiplier—reducing an opponent’s ability to con-duct operations will effectively increase the PLA’soffensive strength.22

Weapons of choice for the hard attack componentof offensive or preemptive operations are standoff,precision-guided munitions (PGMs). Such munitionsare air-, land-, and sea-launched and are directed totheir targets by various means, including terminalguidance, satellite guidance, and other information-based technologies. Of critical importance, thesemunitions can be launched outside the adversary’sdefenses. The range and accuracy of cruise missiles hasconvinced many Chinese analysts that offensive opera-tions can now be initiated at any time and in anyweather, granting distinct advantage and quite possiblybattlespace initiative to the forces that attack first.

As PLA analysts now view a possible confronta-tion with the United States, the operational preferenceseen in their analyses is clear:

First, the PLA’s core operational doctrine from the1930s remains central to its assessments: Defeating asuperior adversary requires gaining the initiative inthe opening phase of a campaign.

Second, because technology has greatly enhancedthe speed, accuracy, and lethality of military opera-tions, gaining the initiative in current and future bat-tlespaces requires offensive and possibly preemptiveoperations. Hence, PLA planners must consider “gain-ing the initiative by striking first” (xianfa zhiren).23

Fulfilling the Vision

The skeptics and optimists begin to diverge intheir assessments of when and if the PLA will achievethe capabilities required to fulfill its vision. Mostobservers agree on the doctrinal and operationalfocus found in China’s military journals. They do notall agree on whether or when China’s defense indus-trial and R&D capabilities can fulfill the vision, evenwhen they consider imported technologies and tech-nical assistance in their assessments.24 The skeptics areequally doubtful that the PLA can develop the jointoperational skills required to implement the visionany time in the foreseeable future. The optimistsargue that the skeptics focus too closely on the moreconventional means of warfare. They agree with theskeptics that “conventional PLA ground, air and navalforces are woefully inadequate, and it is difficult tobelieve that they will be able to overcome these short-comings in the short to mid-term.”25

The optimists insist, however, that the skeptics’myopic focus on conventional forces leads them tooverlook what may well prove to be the most signifi-cant aspect of China’s defense modernization pro-grams—the quest to achieve information dominance(zhixinxiquan), which they argue26 forms the core ofthe PLA’s emerging doctrine.27 The optimists there-fore focus their attention on new and emergingaspects of China’s military R&D priorities, which pri-marily involve developing a spectrum of capabilitiesto enable the PLA to locate and destroy critical targetsranging from satellites to military bases and CVBGs.Beijing’s defense R&D and industries concentrate ondeveloping ground-, air-, and space-based sensors togive the PLA information dominance around China’speriphery. Information collection is paralleled byR&D that focuses on information attack by targetingcommand and control nodes, computers, and air andspace assets. Hard attack programs are focused ondeveloping a long-range precision attack capability.



Both cruise and ballistic missiles are being developedwith the ability to penetrate TMDs and NMDs, allow-ing no critical target to avoid attack.

These programs are joined by development proj-ects that seek to defend China’s information infra-structure. Major Mark Stokes has detailed the exten-sive research and development under way to defendChina’s critical assets against low-visibility (stealth)aircraft and cruise missiles. During the opening phaseof the Gulf War, China observed that the U.S. militaryobjective was to destroy or degrade Iraq’s air defensesand command and control centers. Accordingly,countering air and missile attacks with an integratedair defense system has extremely high priority inChina’s R&D programs. Ideally, however, the People’sLiberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) would seek todestroy the adversary’s weapons before they arelaunched from the ground, ships, or aircraft carrierdecks. Counterspace and ballistic missile defensesform yet another priority.

The great value in Stokes’ work is the detailed list-ing of China’s defense R&D projects and the particu-lar institutions having priority and joint responsibilityfor these programs. Further, he reveals that each pro-gram is designed to counter a specific capabilityemployed primarily by the United States. Nonetheless,Stokes notes that with such a diverse and demandingset of R&D programs, success is far from certain. Hecautions, however, that even modest success in a fewareas over the next decade or two “could significantlyhamper U.S. operations in the region.”28

Wendy Frieman,29 Director of the Asia Technol-ogy Program at Science Applications InternationalCorporation, joins Stokes in suggesting that specifichigh-priority sectors of China’s science and technol-ogy program are more advanced and capable thanskeptics have assessed. She emphasizes that over thepast 15 years, China has undergone a technologicalrevolution. Frieman recognizes there is little evidencethat this revolution has thus far had a major effect onChina’s defense industries, but she suggests the capa-bility is present, especially in those areas closely asso-ciated with the RMA. “Spectacular progress,” sheexplains, has been made in such areas as “computersciences and artificial intelligence, electrical engineer-ing, telecommunications, physics, and certainbranches of mathematics.”30

Citing Western analysts, Frieman maintains thatthe essential discriminators of future battlefields“involve the ‘soft’ side of military capability: thetelecommunications, sensors, and the entire informa-tion technology infrastructure available to the mili-tary forces in question.”31 Under these conditions, sizeand capability of ships and aircraft will be far less sig-nificant than they are today. The ability to destroy orinflict serious damage to an adversary’s informationinfrastructure could well be more important thanholding an overwhelming advantage in firepower.Further, Frieman suggests that the important techno-logical innovations associated with the RMA are notderived from deliberately focused defense R&D, aswere Cold War innovations, but from commercialR&D.32 Thus, Frieman argues, overlooking China’spotential for placing these achievements at the serviceof the defense R&D and industries would be unwise.

The skeptics’ differences with the optimists arepartly found in interpretations of the force structurethe Chinese military leadership seeks. Although notdisagreeing with the RMA focus found in China’s mil-itary journals, the skeptics perceive that Beijing will,over the next 20 to 40 years, seek a multidimensionalforce structure capable of conducting joint militaryoperations across a battlespace spectrum embracingthe electromagnetic, space, atmospheric, land, and seaenvironments. This therefore requires them to assessChina’s defense R&D and industrial capabilitieswithin a broader framework. They assess the widerange of Beijing’s weapons and technology imports asdemonstrating that China’s defense industrial baseand R&D infrastructure are unable to provide such aforce structure. Beijing has had to import not onlymajor combatants such as ships, submarines, and air-craft, but also the weapons, target acquisition suites,and powerplants that make these platforms effectivecombat systems. China’s indigenous programs formajor conventional weapons programs also dependon technology imports, with the domestic contentderived largely from reverse engineering.33 Someskeptics are particularly doubtful that China canachieve its objectives in such critical technology areasas space systems, sensors, lasers, guidance, navigationand vehicle control, and information system tech-nologies.34 Thus, the skeptics insist that with the sin-gle exception of China’s ballistic missile and nuclearweapons programs, the PLA’s most advanced militarycapabilities either have been acquired through pur-chases or have originated in imported technologies.



Given the divergence between the optimists andskeptics, how should one approach the question ofassessing China’s military capabilities in the nextdecade? The skeptics and optimists agree that Beijingdoes not anticipate transforming the entire PLA into a21st century defense force any time in the foreseeablefuture. Nor is Beijing seeking to replicate the U.S.armed forces, especially the force projection capabili-ties that drive so much of the American force struc-ture. Skeptics and optimists agree that Chinese con-cerns are focused on their periphery and maritimeclaims. Of greater concern to both skeptics and opti-mists is the distinct possibility that selected advancedtechnology programs and air, naval, ground, and mis-sile force units have been given priority based uponpotential near-term needs.

Focused Acquisitions andDevelopment Programs

The most problematic contingency the PLA antic-ipates is a potential confrontation with the UnitedStates over Taiwan. In this scenario, the entire range oftechnological disadvantages the PLA faces becomespart of the scenario. In addition to opposing theworld’s most advanced conventional and strategicforces, Chinese military planners have to integrate theconsequences of future U.S. TMD and NMD into theirplanning. Furthermore, whereas Yugoslavia’s ability towithstand NATO’s precision-guided munitions duringthe Kosovo intervention may give some comfort toplanners assessing China’s defensive capabilities, it alsoindicates that Taiwan’s ability to resist air and missileattack is greater than Beijing would hope.35

If the single most dangerous potential militaryconfrontation for China is with the United States overTaiwan, secondary priority is given to possible con-flicts over Chinese maritime and territorial claims inthe South China Sea. Nevertheless, China’s naval andair power deficiencies would only come into playshould the PLA confront either the combined forcesof states in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) or the United States. Although there is noresolution in sight, the participation of ASEAN inseeking to minimize the likelihood of a major clashsuggests this probability is extremely low. A third pri-ority would be China’s inner Asian borders. BecauseBeijing continues diplomatic work to minimize thepotential for large-scale conflict on these borders, theprospect for major confrontations is very small.

Should a conflict break out, these borders can bedefended with the current force structure. Assumingthe PLA did not contemplate force projection beyond50 miles and applied appropriate strategy and opera-tional concepts to the evaluation, the kinds of reformsand limited modernization of weapons and equip-ment implemented and under way since the mid-1980s are sufficient for a defensive land war. Underthese conditions, quantity can compensate for anyqualitative advantages the PLA may face.

Taiwan: The Troubling Scenario

Conflict across the Taiwan Strait is the most dis-turbing potential scenario. Although agreeing thatTaiwan has top priority in PLA contingency planning,skeptics and optimists diverge in their assessments ofPLA capability to conduct the strategy and militaryoperations implied in China’s military journals andsupported by its operational traditions. The greatestobstacle to Beijing being able to subdue Taiwan bymilitary force is the almost certain participation ofthe United States in the island’s defense.36 Certainly,PLA contingency planning has to assume a decisionby the United States to intervene militarily.

Planning for a probable U.S. involvement appearsto drive the PLA quest for a quick, decisive neutraliza-tion of Taiwan’s ability to defend itself before theUnited States can intervene. Blockades, low-levelharassment of Taiwan’s shipping lanes, and frequentcrossing of the Taiwan Strait’s imaginary center linewith air and naval combatants would alert the UnitedStates to possible escalation and provide time for abuildup of deployed forces and concentrated intelli-gence collection. Such low-intensity military activitieswould provide strategic warning to both Taiwan andthe United States.

A military strategy designed to present theUnited States with a fait accompli has a specific polit-ical objective. Assuming the strategy was successful,the United States would be required to roll back themilitary success China had already achieved ratherthan assisting in Taiwan’s defense. This scenariowould almost certainly require the United States toattack PLA command and control centers, missilesites, air defenses, air bases, and naval facilities. Suchactions present the possibility of a wider war thanwould a military confrontation confined to thedefense of Taiwan. If the United States did not take



military action, Beijing could well anticipate Taipei’scapitulation. Seeking rapid suppression of Taiwan’sdefenses would therefore in part be designed to deterthe United States by raising the political and militarycost of intervention.

A Potential Taiwan Scenario for 2010

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) hasalready assessed the dimensions of a potential PLAcampaign in a report to Congress.37 The DODappraisal of security in the Taiwan Strait states is thatover the next decade, China’s SRBM force is expectedto “grow substantially” and that land attack cruisemissiles (LACMs) will enter the PLA inventory.Although expressing doubt that the PLA could coor-dinate missile attacks with concurrent military opera-tions, the DOD report states that these weaponswould be most effective when used in “high-volume,precision strikes against priority military and politicaltargets, including air defense facilities, airfields, Tai-wan’s C2 [command and control] infrastructure andnaval facilities.” Furthermore, it assesses that missiledefenses “will not sufficiently offset the overwhelmingadvantage in offensive missiles which Beijing is pro-jected to possess in 2005.”38

DOD’s assessment, however, raises a more com-plex problem for the PLA to counter. AlthoughChina’s SRBM and future LACM forces will play acentral role in quickly subduing Taiwanese defenses,their function is to open the way for follow-on opera-tions. Accomplishing Beijing’s military objectivedepends upon the success of these operations inexploiting the suppression of Taiwanese defensivecapabilities. Consequently, the campaign’s successultimately depends on the cumulative result ofsequential military operations.

With so much depending on missile forces to sup-press Taiwan’s defenses in the critical opening phase ofa campaign, three issues become central: (1) targetacquisition, (2) missile accuracy, and (3) the PLA abil-ity to coordinate missile attack with other concurrentmilitary operations. A fourth issue to be addressed isthe potential role to be played by IW.

Target Acquisitions

Obtaining detection and tracking sensors is highamong PLA priorities.39 Space-based and airborne sen-sors are being developed, with Beijing working onreconnaissance satellites and long-range drones. Air-borne early warning (AEW) capabilities are entering

the PLAAF with the acquisition of the Israeli PhalconAEW system mounted on Russian Il–76 aircraft. TheNavy is acquiring the British Skymaster radar systemfor surface surveillance. These emerging capabilitiesmust be joined with China’s access to commercial satel-lite imagery, with resolution down to 2.5 meters. Takencollectively, the PLA will soon be able to detect andtrack targets and to develop digital maps for missionplanning, target identification, and missile guidance.

Missile Accuracy

China has sought to improve the accuracy of itsstrategic, theater, tactical, and cruise missiles for manyyears. Presumably, the PLA is hoping to achieve thecapability to pinpoint a target40 within 50 meters forits tactical and cruise missiles. The degree of its accu-racy significantly affects the missile’s mission.Extremely accurate missiles can be used to cut run-ways and damage specific port facilities, air defenseradar sites, surface-to-air missile sites, and other tar-gets. The less accurate the warhead, the more missileswill have to be assigned to the target, thereby signifi-cantly increasing the numbers of weapons requiredfor the operation. Less accuracy also increases poten-tial collateral damage, which Beijing may wish toavoid for political reasons.

Joint Military Operations, Logistics, and

Sustainability

Reports in Chinese military journals reflect thedifficulties the PLA is facing as it attempts to preparefor joint operations. Updating and reorganizing logis-tics to sustain joint warfare has proven equally diffi-cult.41 Nonetheless, the fact that the PLA considersjoint operations and logistics to be a requirement forcurrent and future warfare is significant. Unitsassigned to the Taiwan contingency plausibly couldreceive priority in terms of weapons, equipment,training, logistics, and sustainability in preparationfor a possible military confrontation. Further, theDOD report notes that the PLA is considering imple-menting a joint command structure at the theaterlevel that would exercise operational command overall forces assigned to the theater.42 This concept hasbeen discussed since the late 1980s; thus, the theaterresponsible for Taiwan (Nanjing Military Region)probably would be the most likely location for settingup and exercising a joint command.



Information Operations

Over the past decade, China’s military researchershave spent considerable effort investigating the vari-ous facets of IW. Speculating on IW has developedinto a veritable cottage industry in PLA research cen-ters, especially the Academy of Military Science.43 Inthe process, Chinese authors have incorporated theprinciples found in U.S. concepts for the role of infor-mation operations (IO) in future warfare in theirpublications. Consequently, much of the language andterminology that Chinese analysts use reflects theinfluence of American concepts. However, graspingthe fundamental principles that could be used toimplement IO does not equal having the capability todo so. Nonetheless, China is investigating both defen-sive and offensive information operations.

The DOD report states that China’s primaryeffort is focused on defensive measures, includingelectronic countermeasures. Chinese technologicalcapabilities augmented by the procurement of West-ern technology make offensive operations plausible inthe future. These operations could include computerwarfare, electronic warfare, and antisatellite (ASAT)programs. Ground-based stations can be used to jamand interfere with satellite communications, andChina now has the ability to track satellites with accu-racy sufficient for targeting. A nuclear-armed ballisticmissile can damage a satellite, but China also isresearching lasers as an ASAT weapon. The reportsuggests that China may even now have the capabilityto damage a satellite’s optical sensor.44 These develop-ments strongly indicate that by 2010, the PLA’s abilityto conduct IW as a component of a cross-Strait sce-nario may be quite robust.

A 2005–2010 Taiwan Scenario

When focused on future PLA capabilities, the ele-ments of a possible Chinese strategy become omi-nously evident. Although missiles form the centralcore of the strategy, the follow-on military operationsprovide potency to the strategy. The most dangerousscenario can be outlined as follows: 45

■ Initial Attack. Cruise and ballistic missile attacks would becoordinated with IO to quickly degrade Taiwan’s commandand control capabilities, air defenses, and early warningradar systems. These attacks would be paralleled by missilestrikes on air bases and naval facilities. If successful, thisopening phase would temporarily paralyze Taiwan’s airforce, significantly degrade ground-based air defenses, anddamage naval vessels in port.

■ Second Round of Attacks. The second phase would exploitthe paralyzed air defenses, with aircraft striking the sameand additional targets using conventional munitions andPGMs. Special operations forces could strike at specific tar-gets, especially command and control centers, radar sites,and other facilities essential for a coordinated defense ofthe island but that missile attacks could not neutralize. Thissecond set of attacks would make it very difficult for Tai-wan’s air and naval forces to sustain the operationsrequired to achieve and maintain air superiority and seacontrol of the Taiwan Strait. Without air superiority, Tai-wanese naval forces would be dangerously exposed tostandoff antiship cruise missiles, while air-dropped mineswould threaten their entrance and exit from port facilities.When these dangers are heightened by aggressive opera-tions by the sizable Chinese submarine force, the ability ofTaiwan’s navy to control the seas adjacent to the islandwould be significantly eroded.

■ Final Assault. Assuming China gains air superiority and seacontrol, Taiwan would be open to escalating attack, includ-ing the insertion of airborne forces. If the shock effect ofthe previous two phases were effective enough, the air-borne assault forces would not face a coordinated defense.Further, if the PLAAF had gained air superiority, then theinserted forces would have the distinct advantage providedby close air support and battlefield interdiction strikes. Thelack of effective command and control, together with theinability to defend against air attack, would counteract Tai-wan’s ground forces manpower advantage.

Assessing the Scenario

Evaluating the probability of success in such acomplex scenario is problematic. Even though Stokesrecognizes the difficulties involved in such an intricatecampaign, he believes that China’s military R&D pro-grams and the PLA concepts of operations are suffi-ciently mature that they could “decisively tip thecross-Strait military balance in Beijing’s favor.”46

Three years ago, Jencks speculated on a similar sce-nario (among others) and suggested that—although itwas very unlikely to succeed—it is “so crazy it justmight work.”47

The simple reality is restricted to unclassifiedinformation; it is impossible to judge whether in 10years the PLA will have the capability to conduct acampaign so dependent on both initial success andthe follow-on sequential operations. Beyond theissues of the arms and military technologies requiredfor success, there are questions of training, commandand control, logistics, and all the other non-hardwarefacets of military operations required to transform



concepts of operations into a successful campaign.Equally important is the extent to which Taiwaneseforces will have adjusted to the capabilities repre-sented by improvements in the PLA, including thedeployment of an effective missile defense system. Tenyears is a long time to forecast, and it would be amajor error to conjecture a decade ahead based uponprinciples that apply today.

Similar questions surround American participa-tion in the defense of Taiwan—a definite focus of Bei-jing’s concerns. R&D programs under way in Chinaare almost certainly conceived as preparation for apossible confrontation involving the United States.U.S. dependence on overseas basing and CVBGs forforce projection offers specific targets for PLA plan-ners. Space-based sensors capable of tracking U.S.naval forces joined with long-range precision strikemunitions are a definite PLA priority and present anemerging threat to U.S. operations in the westernPacific. Looking ahead a decade, if these programs arecoupled with improvements in the PLA air and navalforces, as they almost certainly will be, then operatingseveral hundred miles off China’s coast could becomefar more hazardous than it is today. U.S. base facilitieswould be equally threatened.

This same decade, however, will see significantimprovements in U.S. defensive and offensive capabil-ities. TMD and NMD should be likened to the tip of atechnology-driven iceberg. Given the American tech-nological and industrial advantage, defensive andoffensive IO could be many times more robust thanthey are today. China’s search for information domi-nance may well run into an impenetrable Americanelectronic wall, even as the PLA information defensesbecome easier to penetrate and degrade. U.S. strategicand tactical reconnaissance and strike capabilities willbe far more advanced than demonstrated in the GulfWar and after. Chinese naval and air forces could bedangerously exposed from distances far greater than isthe norm today.

Nevertheless, a decade hence is just too far foraccurate prediction. Rather, when focused on specificscenarios, such prognostications should be viewed aspotentially valuable speculations. Here, the optimistshave performed a significant service by requiring theskeptics to think more carefully about China’s futurecapabilities, especially the implications of researchand development in those areas of technology andwarfare associated with the RMA.

Prospects and Implications

The optimists made a valuable contribution byfocusing research on Chinese high-technology pro-grams, especially those that could be used to exploitwhat strategists in Beijing interpret as U.S. weakness.Nonetheless, what must be kept in mind when assess-ing Chinese military capabilities is the distinctionbetween long-term trends and current or near-termcapabilities. A vast gap exists between the vision of afuture the PLA describes in many journal essays andthe capability of China’s defense industries and armedforces to achieve the vision.

The record of Chinese defense industries indevelopment and innovation supports the skeptics’assessment that bridging the aspirations-capabilitiesgap will be difficult. Nevertheless, when looking adecade or two into the future, advances in the civilsector of the economy, together with extensive for-eign military technology assistance, have the poten-tial to reverse this dismal history. Such potential mustbe taken into account in assessing the future ofChina’s defense programs.

Although Chinese planners are not even attempt-ing to transform most of the PLA into a late 20th cen-tury defense force, they definitely are striving to bringselected units to a higher level of competence andreadiness. Acquisitions, indigenous production, anddevelopment programs demonstrate that the objectiveis to build a multidimensional force that is capable ofconducting joint operations by integrating air, sea,and land forces. The current focus is on a Taiwan con-tingency, but the emerging force structure could beemployed in the South China Sea and elsewhere onChina’s maritime periphery.

Chinese acquisitions and development programsprovide ample evidence of Beijing’s intent. Althoughcurrently few in number, procurement and construc-tion of fourth-generation fighter aircraft, aerial refu-eling, airborne warning and control system aircraft,and advanced surface and subsurface naval combat-ants demonstrate PLA priorities. China’s emphasis oncruise and tactical ballistic missiles, including a long-range reconnaissance strike capability, is part of thisoverall package. These programs are linked with proj-ects to strengthen capabilities in IW, electronic war-fare, imagery reconnaissance, early warning, com-mand and control, surveillance, and sensors fordetection and targeting. Concentrating on softwaredeficiencies accompanies enhancing the means to



conduct war. Exercises designed to advance jointoperational capabilities together with revisions to itslogistics and sustainment management demonstratethat the PLA is seeking to correct these critical defects.

Focused efforts to improve the effectiveness ofPLA conventional general-purpose forces are comple-mented by China’s longstanding commitment tobuilding a more robust strategic deterrent. Tacticallymobile strategic weapons in greater numbers, somearmed with multiple warheads, will constitute a moreviable deterrent than China currently possesses.

A decade hence will not see the PLA transformedinto a military superpower capable of global powerprojection. This is not the purpose of the defensemodernization programs Beijing has pursued sincethe late 1970s. China’s objective is to be capable ofoperating much more effectively on its periphery, andthis requires a multidimensional force structure.Assuming current trends continue and the diverseadvanced technology programs under way have rea-sonable success, Beijing’s armed forces will beapproaching such a capability—and under the shieldof a more credible strategic deterrent.

Given the current state of Sino-American rela-tions, the improving Chinese military capabilities aretroubling. Beijing continues its efforts to intimidateTaipei with the threat of military force. PLA publica-tions continue to assess ways to exploit the weak-nesses they see when U.S. forces are engaged in mili-tary operations far from home and are dependent onforeign basing rights. For the time being, this stancereflects more a deterrent strategy than a war plan. Adecade ahead, will such a conclusion be viable?

Even if the Taiwan dilemma is somehow resolved,Beijing will sustain its defense modernization pro-grams. The Chinese quest for international status andthe requirement to defend the country’s interestsaround its extensive maritime periphery require pow-erful, flexible forces. When China’s inner Asian bor-ders are added to this pattern, strong ground forcesare also required. Whether these developments will befor good or ill is beyond the scope of this paper. How-ever, if the current hostility and suspicion markingSino-American relations continues, the future will becovered by an ominous shadow.

Notes1 I am grateful to Bates Gill for introducing the “aspirations

versus capabilities” concept in his “Chinese Military-TechnicalDevelopment: The Record of Western Assessments, 1979–1999,”delivered at the 1999 CAPS/RAND Conference, State of the PLAon the Eve of the Millennium: A Retrospective of the Last TwentyYears, Radisson-Barcelo Hotel, Washington, DC, July 8–11, 1999.

2 See, for example, Michael Pillsbury, “PLA Capabilities inthe 21st Century: How Does China Assess Its Future SecurityNeeds,” in Larry M. Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the21st Century (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. ArmyWar College, December 1999), 93.

3 This term is used by John Culver, “Session 5: Defense Pol-icy and Posture II,” in Hans Binnendijk and Ronald Montaperto,eds., Strategic Trends in China (Washington, DC: Institute forNational Security Studies, National Defense University, 1998), 69.

4 Deng Xiaoping, “Speech at an Enlarged Meeting of the Mil-itary Commission of the Party Central Committee” (July 14,1975), in Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaop-ing] (Beijing, July 1, 1983), in Joint Publications Research Service,China Report (hereafter JPRS-China), October 31, 1983, 19.

5 See Harlan W. Jencks, “China’s ‘Punitive’ War on Vietnam:A Military Assessment,” Asian Survey 19, no. 8 (August 1979):801–815.

6 See Paul H. B. Godwin, “China’s Military Strategy Revised:Local and Limited War,” The Annals of the American Academy ofPolitical and Social Science 519 (January 1992): 191–201, for ananalysis of the logic behind this shift and the consequences forPLA doctrine and concepts of operations.

7 For a current assessment of PLA views of the United States,see David Shambaugh, “China’s Military Views the World:Ambivalent Security,” International Security 24, no. 3 (Winter1999–2000): 62–67.

8 For a recent discussion of the United States as a militaryadversary, see Yao Youzhi and Zhao Dexi (both from the PLAAcademy of Military Science), “How Will China Handle War inthe 21st Century,” Liaowang, No. 2 (January 10, 2000), in FBIS-China, February 14, 2000.

9 See James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, eds., Crisis in theTaiwan Strait (Washington, DC: National Defense UniversityPress, 1997), for assessments of the 1995–1996 confrontation.

10 Culver, “Session 5: Defense Policy and Posture II,” 71.11 For a recent appraisal, see Paul H. B. Godwin, “China’s

Nuclear Forces: An Assessment,” Current History 98, no. 629(Summer 1999): 260–265.

12 United States House of Representatives, Select Committeeon United States National Security and Military/CommercialConcerns with the People’s Republic of China, The Cox Report onChinese Espionage, prepared by Representative Christopher Cox(R–CA) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May1999) [hereafter cited as the Cox Committee Report].

13 Ibid.14 For an illuminating analysis of the ways in which Chinese

strategists are approaching the issue of a revised strategy for theircountry’s nuclear forces, see Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” Interna-tional Security 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995–1996): 5–42. Much of thediscussion below is drawn from this essay.



15 See, for example, Tom Woodrow, “Session 6: Nuclear Issues,”in Binnendijk and Montaperto, Strategic Trends in China, 87.

16 Although China has had the capability to develop multiplereentry vehicles for some years, it has not yet done so. Westernanalysts believe Chinese deployment of MIRVs for mobile missilesto be many years in the future. Jeremiah Commission, The Intelli-gence Community Damage Assessment on the Implications of ChinaAcquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Information on the Develop-ment of Future Chinese Weapons, Key Findings, April 21, 1999.

17 For recent analyses, see, John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai,Chinas Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization inthe Nuclear Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994);Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack,China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA:RAND, 1995); Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China’s Arms Acquisi-tions From Abroad: A Quest for ‘Superb and Secret Weapons’(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Lilley and Downs, eds.,Crisis in the Taiwan Strait; David S. Shambaugh and Richard Yang,eds., China’s Military in Transition (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1997); Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall andthe Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security (New York: W. W.Norton & Co., 1997); James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds.,China’s Military Faces the Future (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe,1999); James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., The People’sLiberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND1999); Srikanth Kondapalli, China’s Military: The PLA in Transi-tion (New Delhi: Knowledge World in association with the Insti-tute for Defense Studies and Analysis, 1999); and Wortzel, ed., TheChinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century.

18 See, for example, Paul H. B. Godwin, Doctrine, Strategy, andEthic: The Modernization of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: The Air University Press, 1977); Har-lan W. Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalismin the Chinese Army, 1945–1981 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,1982); David G. Muller, China as a Maritime Power (Boulder, CO:Westview Press, 1983), Paul H. B. Godwin, ed., The Chinese DefenseEstablishment: Continuity and Change in the 1980s (Boulder, CO:Westview Press, 1983); and Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army After Mao(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).

19 In addition to individual chapters in the works cited above,see Paul Humes Folta, From Swords to Plowshares? Defense Indus-try Reform in the PRC (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), andJorn Brommelhorster and John Frankenstein, eds., Mixed Motives,Uncertain Outcomes: Defense Conversion in China (Boulder, CO:Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997).

20 See, for example, Senior Colonel Huang Xiang, “Holdingthe Initiative in Our Hands in Conducting Operations, GivingFull Play to Our Advantages to Defeat Our Enemy: A Study of theCore Idea of the Operational Doctrine of Our Army,” ZhongguoJunshi Kexue, No. 4 (November 20, 1996), FBIS-China, November20, 1996.

21 Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), “On Protracted War” (May1938), in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: For-eign Languages Press, 1972) [hereafter cited as Selected MilitaryWritings], especially 228–254.

22 See, for example, an untitled article presented by ProfessorLiu Kejun at the September 15, 1997, Defense ModernizationSymposium organized by the Chinese Electronics Society, BeijingYuguangtong S&T Development Center, and Zhongguo Dianzi

Bao held at the PLA General Staff Department Research Institute61, reported in Zhongguo Dianzi Bao (October 24, 1997), in FBIS-China, January 14, 1998. For an assessment of PLA informationwarfare developments, see James Mulvenon, “The PLA and Infor-mation Warfare,” in Mulvenon and Yang, The People’s LiberationArmy in the Information Age, 175–186.

23 See Lu Linzhi, “Preemptive Strikes Crucial in Limited HighTech Wars,” Jiefangjun Bao, February 14, 1996, in FBIS-China,February 14, 1996.

24 For a detailed analysis of this question, see Bates Gill, “Chi-nese Military-Technical Development: The Record for WesternAssessments.”

25 Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implica-tions for the United States (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,U.S. Army War College, September 1999), 5.

26 Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future Warfare(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997).

27 Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, 9.28 Ibid., 140.29 Wendy Frieman, “The Understated Revolution in Chinese

Science and Technology: Implications for the PLA in the Twenty-First Century,” in Lilley and Shambaugh, China’s Military Faces theFuture, 247–267. Frieman has consistently been an optimist inassessing the development of China’s defense industries. See, forexample, “Foreign Technology and Chinese Modernization,” inCharles D. Lovejoy, Jr., and Bruce W. Watson, eds., Chinese Mili-tary Reforms: International and Domestic Implications (Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1986).

30 Ibid.31 Ibid., 248.32 Ibid.33 For a recent analysis of these issues, see John Frankenstein,

“China’s Defense Industries: A New Course?” and Rear AdmiralEric A. McVadon, USN (Ret.), “Systems Integration in China’s Peo-ple’s Liberation Army,” both in Mulvenon and Yang, eds., The Peo-ple’s Liberation Army in the Information Age; and Richard A.Bitzinger, “Going Places or Running in Place: China’s Efforts toLeverage Advanced Technologies for Military Use,” presented at theConference on the People’s Liberation Army, September 10–12,1999, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

34 Bernard D. Cole and Paul H. B. Godwin, “Advanced Mili-tary Technologies and the PLA: Priorities and Capabilities for the21st Century,” in Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st

Century, especially 176–184.35 For an interesting assessment that includes but goes

beyond the military issues involved, see Arthur Waldron, “TheKosovo War: Implications for Taiwan,” presented at the Confer-ence on the People’s Liberation Army, September 10–12, 1999,U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

36 The primary foundation for this expectation is the TaiwanRelations Act (TRA) of 1979 (Public Law 96–8). The TRA stipu-lates that the United States will “consider any attempt to deter-mine Taiwan’s future by other than peaceful means … a threat tothe peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of graveconcern to the United States.” Further, Congress and the adminis-tration will “make available to Taiwan such defense articles anddefense services as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintaina sufficient self-defense capability.”



37 U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress Pursuant tothe FY99 Appropriations Bill: The Security Situation in the TaiwanStrait (DefenseLINK, February 26, 1999). [Hereafter Report. Pagenumbers refer to the version downloaded fromhttp://www.defenselink.mil/.

38 Ibid., 18.39 Ibid.40 Circular error probable (CEP) is the radius of a circle

within which 50 percent of the warheads fired will achieve impact.41 See, for example, Tai Ming Cheung, “Reforming the

Dragon’s Tail: Chinese Military Logistics in the Era of High-Tech-nology Warfare and Market Economics,” in Lilley and Sham-baugh, China’s Military Faces The Future, 228–246.

42 DOD Report, 15.43 For a thorough analysis of PLA work on information war-

fare, see James Mulvenon, “The PLA and Information Warfare,” inMulvenon and Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation Army in theInformation Age, 175–186.

44 DOD Report, 11.45 This scenario draws from DOD Report, 18; Harlan W.

Jencks, “Wild Speculations on the Military Balance in the TaiwanStrait,” in Lilley and Downs, Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, 131–165,and Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, 136–140.

46 Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, 140.47 Jencks, “Wild Speculations,” 160. Jencks discusses several

scenarios in his interesting speculation.


http://www.defenselink.mil/

29

Despite the beginning of the new millennium, somefundamental policy dilemmas in U.S. relations withChina and Japan remain unsettled and have implica-tions for Korean security. One of the principal foreignpolicy challenges for the United States during the1990s has been how to give China implicit recognitionfor its rising status and influence and assuage its deep-seated suspicions that America’s post-Cold Waralliance with Japan was targeted at it, while at thesame time offering Japan security commitments andcredibility and strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance.1

China’s policy conundrum since the TiananmenSquare incident in 1989 has been that the UnitedStates remains the country that is most important toits economic development and foreign policy but, atthe same time, is posing the greatest threat to contin-ued communist rule in China and to prospects forreunification with Taiwan.2 Finally, although U.S.alliance ties with Japan and the Republic of Korea(ROK) are strong and are likely to remain so in theforeseeable future, will they continue to be robustenough to withstand future regional challenges andcrises in which the “China factor” looms largest?

These security uncertainties and policy dilemmashave combined to produce sophisticated and multi-faceted hedging strategies by the states in that region,

as the recent increase in high-level diplomatic andmilitary-to-military contacts shows. In particular,concerns about how best to cope with the challenge ofan ascendant China to regional prosperity and secu-rity have occupied these states’ strategic plans. Koreais no exception to this trend.

To assess the security implications of China’smodernization of its Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA)for U.S. allies in East Asia, it is first necessary to takestock of the linkage between Sino-U.S. relations andthe relations of both countries with Korea and Japan.In light of the sustained discord between the UnitedStates and China in the 1990s, their policies and inter-ests concerning the Korean Peninsula are far morelikely to diverge than to converge in the future, espe-cially when it comes to concrete policy issues andlonger-term agenda. This reality could complicateKorean security planning, because that requires coop-eration—or at least acquiescence—on the part ofboth the United States and China to resolve an arrayof relevant issues. Korea’s optimal approach would beto continue to differentiate how it relates to theUnited States and China, even if it continuously andsystematically pursues a specific set of confidence-building measures (CBMs) with the latter.

Balancing U.S. Alliance and ChineseCooperation: Korea’s EmergingSecurity Challenge

by Taeho Kim

Taeho Kim is a Senior China Analyst and Director of ResearchCooperation for the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA)in Seoul, and Nonresidential Research Associate at the MershonCenter of Ohio State University.



Diverging U.S and Chinese Interestsin Korea

One useful way to assess the future of East Asianstability—in light of the perceptions of the states inthis region about security uncertainties—is to inquireabout the health of the Sino-U.S. relationship. Chinaand the United States are the two most powerfulactors in that region as well as on the Korean Penin-sula. Ideally, an amicable relationship between theUnited States and China, especially renewed securitycooperation, would contribute to regional and penin-sular stability and the attainment of their respectiveobjectives in East Asia.

In reality and contrary to popular belief, theprospects for improved Sino-U.S. relations remaincloudy, if not bleak, for the foreseeable future.3 Few oftheir outstanding issues—including the status of Tai-wan, human rights, trade, nuclear espionage, and pro-liferation—show signs of early or conclusive resolu-tion. On the contrary, there seem to exist somefundamental differences between the two countries—primarily in terms of their political systems, socialvalues, and strategic objectives. Given the ongoingand internal political dynamics in Beijing and Wash-ington, compromise on these differences will be diffi-cult to achieve in the near term.

Since the Tiananmen incident in 1989, there hasbeen widespread discussion—accentuated by eventsin 1999—among Chinese strategists and scholars overhow to assess a series of “adverse currents” in China’sexternal security environment and what kinds of pol-icy options Beijing should choose to cope with thesecurrents, separately or collectively. One of the fewemerging consensus opinions in China—at least dis-cernible to the outside analyst—is that U.S. global“hegemonic” behavior is the source of the threat to“world peace” (i.e., China’s interests).

Such U.S. global behavior, some Chinese leadersand strategists conclude, clashes directly with China’snational interests (such as economic priority, reunifi-cation with Taiwan, and continued rule of the Com-munist Party) and strategic visions (such as multipo-larity, anti-hegemony, anti-power politics, and theFive Principles of Peaceful Coexistence). In particular,U.S. regional “hegemonic” behavior in East Asia—thelocus of Chinese diplomatic and economic activity—includes the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan allianceand their joint development of theater missile defense

(TMD), and, most seriously, its continued weaponsales to Taiwan.4

The depth of Beijing’s fear of an American domi-nated world is manifest in such newly minted codephrases as “new hegemonism,” “the Asian edition ofNATO,” “a global intervention mechanism,” “AsianKosovo,” and “the next Serbia.”5 Particularly worri-some to China’s leadership is a possible connectionbetween the strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance and theTaiwan question, from the scope of regional contin-gencies in “areas surrounding Japan” to TMD andTaipei’s overall relations with Washington and Tokyo.In short, China finds the prospects of a re-armedJapan unnerving and a Taiwan armed with TMDunacceptable. The United States is the key link toeither of these scenarios.6

The Korean Peninsula also occupies a central placein the crowded bilateral and regional agendas of theUnited States and China. Despite the long list of theirdisputes at both levels, China and the United Stateshave time and again argued—at the official anddeclaratory level, at least—that they share a set ofcommon interests over Korea—namely stability on thepeninsula, dialogue between the North (the Democra-tic People’s Republic of Korea) and the South, andpeaceful reunification. Yet, in light of their vast differ-ences in strategic visions, political systems, social val-ues, and objectives, let alone diverging interests overbilateral and regional issues, it is far more logical andmore empirically valid to say that the United Statesand China are likely to remain divergent over penin-sula issues as well. Beneath the façade of the “strategicconstructive relationship,” their interests could signifi-cantly conflict with one another over some concreteissues and longer-term agendas. Prominent examplesinclude, but are not limited to, a North Korean contin-gency, future status of the U.S. force in Korea, theNorth’s possible possession of weapons of massdestruction (WMD), and the military capability andstrategic orientation of a unified Korea.

The U.S. commitment to Korean defense and uni-fication remains strong and is highly likely to remainso in the future. But their divergent perceptions of(and policies toward) a series of recent North Koreancrises illustrate that the South Korean and U.S. Gov-ernments need to coordinate their policies towardNorth Korea more tightly and coherently in thefuture. For example, the emphasis on a “soft land-ing”—which is not a policy—may mitigate the conse-quences of an economically crippled North Korea, but


Korea’s Emerging Security Challenge 31

it by no means constitutes a viable long-term strategyfor either alliance maintenance or regional security.On the contrary, as long as this concept persists, boththe ROK and the United States will not only be sub-ject to various domestic criticisms, primarily for being“soft” on North Korea’s brinkmanship, but also theirpolicy toward North Korea will remain adrift as aconsequence.

This does not bode well for the long-term devel-opment of the U.S.-ROK alliance, especially if theparties have to prepare for the day when they “run outof enemies.”7 Korea needs to take into considerationthese kinds of specific policy issues and longer-termquestions when formulating its strategic plan for thefuture security environment.

The “China Factor”

Fundamental to understanding the importanceof the China factor in the South Korean security cal-culus are:

■ China’s geographical proximity to the Korean Peninsula,■ China’s continuing influence on North Korea,■ Growing bilateral ties between China and South Korea, and ■ Strained relations between Beijing and Washington.

China is certain to remain a major player inKorean affairs, including the unification process. Tounderstand why, a brief overview of Sino-SouthKorean relations leading to normalization in 1992 andof China’s place in the South’s diplomatic and securitycalculus in the post-Cold War period is necessary.

For most of the Cold War, relations betweenChina and South Korea were locked in mutual hostil-ity and suspicion. The Chinese intervention in theKorean War, the bipolar configuration of the world’spower structure, and China’s continuing rivalry withthe Soviet Union for influence over the Korean Penin-sula made relations between the ROK and Beijing anegligible factor for three decades after the cessationof hostilities on the peninsula. Because China recog-nized North Korea as the only Korean state on thepeninsula, there were no contacts between SouthKorea and China until the late 1970s.

Toward the end of the 1970s, however, two princi-pal developments presaged major changes in China’straditional stance toward North and South Korea. Onewas China’s adoption of reform and the “open door”policy in 1978, which allowed unofficial and indirecttrade between China and South Korea to begin, albeitslowly. During the early to mid-1980s, China gradually

but unmistakably pursued a de facto “two-Korea” pol-icy, which included cultural, academic, and sports con-tacts with South Korea. Another principal develop-ment was the improvement in Sino-Soviet relations inthe mid- and late 1980s, which undercut the rationalebehind their rivalry over North Korea.

By 1988, the growth of still unofficial but substan-tial ties between China and South Korea made theirimproving relations unmistakable. Indirect tradebetween the two countries exceeded $3 billion; Chinaparticipated in the Seoul 1986 Asian Games and 1988Olympics; and the ROK government announced amajor diplomatic initiative known as “NorthernDiplomacy,” or nordpolitik. Northern Diplomacy, inparticular, was aimed at creating a condition favorableto peaceful unification of the Koreas throughimproved ties with then-socialist countries. Beginningwith Hungary in January 1989, South Korea estab-lished diplomatic relations with all East Europeanstates, the Soviet Union (September 1990), and China(August 1992).

For Beijing, the primary factor motivating thedecision to normalize relations with South Korea wasthe domestic economic imperative. The passing of theCold War not only enhanced the value of economicties with South Korea, but also saw the end of theSino-Soviet/Russian rivalry over North Korea.Another important motive for Beijing was to expandChina’s diplomatic influence across the region—which had suffered from post-Tiananmen isolation—by consolidating ties with neighbors such as SouthKorea, a major regional U.S. ally.

To the government in Seoul, normalizing rela-tions with China was a diplomatic tour de force. Firstand foremost, normalization helped culminate itsNorthern Diplomacy initiative and symbolized its vic-tory in the decade-long diplomatic competition withNorth Korea. Furthermore, the ROK hoped normal-ization would help to bring China’s influence to bearon North Korea to facilitate dialogue with the South,open up its society, and restrain its provocativeactions against the South. Less immediate but stillimportant considerations were the economic andpolitical benefits that flowed from Seoul’s strength-ened relations with China.

Sino-South Korean relations have expanded rap-idly on most fronts. Bilateral trade reached $6.4 billion



in 1992, the year that diplomatic relations were estab-lished. Bilateral trade for the past three years reached$23.7 billion, $18.4 billion, and $20.2 billion,8 respec-tively, making China and South Korea each other’sthird largest trading partner. Over half a million peo-ple visit the other country annually, and passenger air-lines now make about 100 round-trip flights over theYellow Sea each week. By the end of 1998, over 1,500Korean companies were operating in China, and num-bers of registered, long-term Korean residents inChina exceeded 35,000, including 12,000 students.

Growing economic and social ties between Chinaand South Korea are further buttressed by an increasein investment, tourism, and sea/air routes. To help con-solidate these growing ties, the three most senior Chi-nese officials (President Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng,and CCP Standing Committee member Hu Jintao)have visited Seoul. These remarkable developmentsbetween the two nations over the past few years haveled to a shift in the South Korean public’s perception ofChina as now a benign, pragmatic economic partner.

Regarding how this new perception of Chinaaffects the U.S.-ROK alliance, a recent series of surveysof the Korean public, media, and policy elite indicatesthat the public remains “somewhat critical” of theUnited States and “fairly friendly” toward China. How-ever, members of the ROK policy elite air the oppositeview—that is, they are “somewhat critical” of Chinaand “fairly friendly” toward the United States.9 Themedia are divided between “progressive” (pro-China)and “conservative” (pro-American) newspapers, evenif the majority of all major Korean newspapers arecritical of U.S. trade policy toward Korea. Interestinglyenough, younger Koreans, who are most vocal aboutU.S. policy toward Korea, have consistently supportedthe continued presence of the U.S. military force inKorea for security and other practical reasons. A vastmajority of the Korean public and elite, on the otherhand, have responded that China’s influence overpeninsular affairs would grow in the future and thatKorea’s military-to-military exchanges and coopera-tion with China should be expanded.

In the so-called “military exchanges and coopera-tion” area, there have been more frequent, regular, andhigher-level visits between the two countries in recentyears.10 In August 1999, in particular, ROK Minister ofNational Defense, Cho Seong-Tae, made a visit toChina to attend the first-ever ROK–PRC DefenseMinisterial Talks with his counterpart, General ChiHaotian. General Chi reciprocated with an official

visit to Seoul in January 2000, which made him thehighest-ranking Chinese officer to visit that capital inthe history of Sino-South Korean military relations.

In the early years after normalization of relationsin August 1992, it became increasingly clear toobservers of Sino-South Korean relations that Korea’stwo specific sets of goals for China policy—i.e., facili-tating inter-Korean relations and improving bilateralties with China per se—remained largely independentof one another. Moreover, most Korean observersconcluded that no appreciable outcomes had resultedfrom its political or security relations with NorthKorea or with China. In light of the remarkable andmore balanced developments in economic, diplo-matic, and military ties between South Korea andChina in recent years, however, the earlier assessmentsshould be revised to focus on the longer-term conse-quences of a close Sino-South Korean relationship forthe United States, China, and Korea.

The changing strategic environment reflectsincreased uncertainties about the future U.S. and Chi-nese roles on the peninsula and in the region, as wellas South Korea’s continued concern about the securitychallenges North Korea poses. It is against this back-drop of regional uncertainty that China’s militarymodernization should be assessed.

Implications of PLA Modernization

China’s actual and perceived ability to projectpower along and beyond its borders has a direct bear-ing on whether it will achieve its foreign policy goalsand act to destabilize regional security. An adequateassessment of China’s power projection capabilityshould go beyond the examination of conventional“bean counting”; it also should involve a comprehen-sive analysis that is as detailed as possible regardingcapabilities, such as in long-distance operations, C3I,11

air- and sea-lift, missile defense, logistics, and jointand combined operations. As this analysis is donecapably elsewhere,12 the following discussion surveysthe PLA’s ongoing efforts in this area.

Power projection capability can be defined as arelative military capability to launch and to sustaincombined combat operations at a reasonably long dis-tance and over a long period. By this rigorous defini-tion, China currently and for the next decade or morelacks critical capabilities in projecting force over a



long distance. Even in conventional categories such asweaponry, the PLA inventory is roughly 10 to 20 yearsbehind that of advanced Western militaries.

On the other hand, the PLA has gradually butconsiderably improved its fighting capability oversome fifteen years, through an across-the-boarddefense modernization program in command andcontrol, organization, weapons systems, education,and training. Since 1990, in particular, it has beenprocuring new weapons domestically and advancedsystems from abroad, most notably from Russia.

On balance, however, the PLA remains an anti-quated force compared with many of its neighbors’militaries, let alone those of its advanced Westerncounterparts. Occasional improvements in the PLA’snaval and air capability make their way into newspa-per headlines in China and elsewhere, but they are notintegrated into an overall fighting capability, and theyprimarily reflect stated goals rather than actual quali-tative changes.

The PLA Navy (PLAN) has placed a priority ondefense modernization since the early 1980s, asChina’s reform and open-door policies significantlyelevated the importance of protecting China’s mar-itime interests in overall national development andsecurity planning. The PLAN’s capability to conductand to sustain long-distance operations is quite lim-ited, however. Among the 18 destroyers and 35frigates it currently operates, approximately 10 arejudged to be relatively modernized. They aredeprived, however, of effective defense systems andelectronic countermeasures. For example, the Luhuand the Jiangwei are indigenously designed, second-generation vessels, which are better equipped thantheir predecessors in terms of engines, command andcontrol, and armament. But they reportedly lack sev-eral sophisticated pieces of equipment, such as elec-tronic support measures (ESM), electronic counter-measures (ECM), and air defense systems, whichmight expose them to enemy attack in sustained,high-sea missions. Similarly, the PLAN’s submarineforce remains seriously outmoded, despite its fullinventory of over 100 submarines. It is not knownhow many of them are actually operational at anytime, but they seem increasingly likely to spend longermaintenance hours at the docks. To the Chinese agingsubmarine fleet, the Russian Kilos would be a signifi-cant addition. Two export-version Type-877EKMsand two of the more advanced Type-636 Kilos weredelivered to China by the end of 1998.

Overall, the PLAN’s vessels are mostly outdatedand lack anti-air, anti-ship, and anti-submarinedefense systems as well as modern radar and elec-tronic equipment. Furthermore, the PLAN has notyet conducted long-distance naval exercises, and itsreplenishment at sea (RAS) capability is believed tobe rudimentary. Given the lack of effective air cover,the PLAN’s vessels remain dangerously exposed toenemy air and surface attack if they were to operatefar from shore.13

The long list of advanced systems and technolo-gies that the PLAN has purchased recently or shownconsiderable interest in obtaining—including theSovremenny-class guided-missile destroyer (theHangzhou), the A–50 airborne early warning and con-trol aircraft, airborne radar systems, and anti-shipcruise missile technologies—indicates that PLA lead-ers understand fully the glaring deficiencies in theapplication of its naval power.14 The PLAN is doubt-less committed to developing and acquiring high-technaval systems and technologies, but a considerableamount of time and resources will be needed to bringthis objective to fruition.

The quantitative superiority of China’s submarineforce remains a concern to other nations, but thenoise of the submarines makes them vulnerable todetection by a variety of anti-submarine capabilities.The current limitations in PLAN naval weapon sys-tems and electronic equipment, naval air power, andRAS capability—let alone the fact that it has no car-rier force—will deprive it of an effective long-distanceoperational capability for many years to come.

The least modernized service branch is the PLAAir Force (PLAAF), despite its huge inventory of over5,000 different types of aircraft. Compared with itscounterparts in neighboring countries, this is espe-cially the case. Together with the 3,000 J–6s, China’sversion of the Soviet MiG–19, virtually all of itsdomestically manufactured combat aircraft are basedon 1950s- and 1960s-vintage technologies.

PLA leaders are well aware that air power plays acrucial role in modern warfare and that the air force isthe most technologically oriented service in the armedforces. But China’s relatively backward aviation indus-try has long failed to meet PLAAF requirements. Inter-mittent contacts with selected Western aircraft manu-facturers in the 1970s and the 1980s produced nobreakthroughs in either upgrading its existing inven-tory or developing a new generation of fighter aircraft.



On the other hand, the current PLA strategy offighting “local wars under high-technology condi-tions” will require rapid mobility and effective fire-power for contingencies along and beyond its borders.The PLAAF obviously has been ill equipped to meetthe new challenges. Thus, it is the gap between thedoctrinal requirements and the existing aircraftinventory that sharpens the sense of urgency amongthe top leaders of the PLA. Air force modernizationhas received a top priority in Chinese defense plansand foreign weapons acquisitions, especially pur-chases from Russia.

Although China has been in the process ofacquiring several different types of modern combataircraft over a long period of time, of particularimportance is the J–10 (XJ–10) and the Su–27. Recentreports indicate that the prototype of the J–10 hasbeen developed by the Chengdu Aircraft Corporationwith Israeli assistance and that the first flight testwould be made soon.15 But the details of the J–10 pro-gram and the Israeli involvement are largely shroudedin secrecy, partly because of Israel’s transfer of aircraftsubsystems and technologies.16 In addition to the 26Su–27s acquired in 1992, China secured an additional22 Su–27s in 1996 with an agreement to license-pro-duce the Su–27s in China.

To build a modern air force, it is also necessaryfor the PLAAF to acquire a wide array of advancedcapabilities that could multiply the effectiveness of airoperations. Included in this category are various C3I,airborne early warning, surveillance, and mid-airrefueling capabilities. These assets remain China’s toppriority in preparing for high-tech warfare, yet itwould take many years for Beijing to acquire and tofield such force multipliers.

Until then, in a future air campaign against themodern air forces of China’s neighbors, the PLAAF’soutmoded aircraft will be rigorously tested. Evenworse, the combat readiness of the PLAAF forces isknown to suffer from insufficient flying hours, lackof combined operations, and limited repair andground logistics support.17 The prospect that thePLAAF could significantly improve its air power bythe year 2010—even with Russian technologicalassistance—is not bright. Before then, if it were toattempt to overwhelm a rival air force with a largenumber of aircraft compared with regional mili-taries, losses could well be severe.

The PLA Ground Force is the world’s largest at1.8 million, after the 1985–1987 reductions of 1 mil-lion troops in overall PLA manpower; it is being fur-ther reduced as a result of a half-million drawdownplan. The PLA weapon inventory, while diverse andhuge, is still outmoded and obsolete. For this reasonalone, modernization of the PLA Ground Force hasbeen very selective and has received the lowest fund-ing priority among the three PLA service branches.Chinese leaders have apparently concluded that thecurrent size and armament of the Ground Force areadequate to meet any land attack and that prospectsfor land attack in the foreseeable future are slim.

In particular, China’s amicable relations with Rus-sia, coupled with rapprochement with Vietnam andIndia, have allowed its leaders to reduce substantiallythe number of ground troops and to divert the budgetsavings from these troop reductions to other areas,including better living standards for PLA soldiers,operation and maintenance of the select rapid reactionunits (RRUs), and the development or purchase ofmodern weapon systems. In this regard, there seems tobe an unmistakable linkage between troop reductionand the acquisition of modern weapon systems.18

In sum, a combination of financial, operational,and organizational constraints will force the PLAGround Force to remain a huge defensive army in thenear future. But the PLA military strategy of “limitedlocal warfare,” embodied in the strategic shift at the1985 Central Military Commission (CMC) meeting,emphasizes the offensive operations in limitedregional conflicts as well.

Most Western PLA specialists concur that China’snuclear force, with approximately 300 deployednuclear warheads, is primarily dedicated to its strat-egy of minimum deterrence, which means that nopotential enemy would launch a nuclear strikeagainst China without suffering retaliation. Since theend of the Cold War, China has reconfigured some ofits nuclear-tipped intermediate-range ballistic mis-siles (IRBMs) to make conventional missions. Appar-ently, it has done so to boost that capability inregional contingencies.

There is little indication that the role of nuclearweapons in overall Chinese security has declined inthe post-Cold War era. China instead has vigorouslypursued a nuclear modernization program toimprove the survivability, reliability, and safety of itsnuclear arsenal, in conjunction with its conventionalmilitary modernization efforts. China’s ongoing



major nuclear and missile modernization programs,19

which predate the post-Cold War period, is evident inall three branches.

Future improvements in China’s nuclear capabil-ity would reinforce its nuclear weapons’ minimumdeterrent value and even facilitate a nuclear doctrinalshift to “limited deterrence.”20 As long as China aimsat improving the level of technological sophisticationof its nuclear arsenal to that of advanced Westernnations, it may be reluctant to join the internationalarms control and disarmament process. It could alsotry to retain as much as possible the military value ofits nuclear and missile programs, which compensatefor the lack of air power.

In the foreseeable future, the chance of a nuclearthreat to China is extremely low. But its nuclear andmissile capability provides China with the interna-tional status and prestige to which it should be enti-tled. Thus, China’s nuclear and missile modernizationprograms will continue to be a source of concern forinternational nonproliferation, arms control, andregional security. In particular, the psychologicalimpact of China’s nuclear and missile capability ismore likely to fall on its neighbors than on extrare-gional powers. China remains strongly opposed toneighboring countries’ deployment of missile orstrategic defense systems, which could dilute the mili-tary value of its nuclear and missile capability.

On balance, the PLA’s power projection capabilitywill take at least a decade or more to materialize.Although the current military strategy emphasizes thecontinued development of this capability, to equateChina’s growing military capability with an intentionto resolve by force outstanding issues with its neigh-bors would be incorrect.

China vs. U.S.-Japan-Korea: A FutureStrategic Configuration in East Asia?

Despite its own global pretensions, China remainsa regional power in Asia. Chinese foreign policy andsecurity concerns also revolve around Asia, where itscurrent and future capability to project power is lim-ited, rarely reaching remote areas of the globe. Thus,Beijing feels most threatened by events close to thehomeland, such as those involving Taiwan, Japan, andKorea. In light of China’s new anti-American tone andthe extent of its involvement in potential East Asianareas of tension, the United States, Japan, and Korea

should consider Chinese sensitivities in their three-way cooperation for security or in their bilateral inter-actions with China.

The U.S.-Japan Alliance

Probably the most fundamental dilemma Chinahas faced in the post-Cold War era regarding thefuture direction of the U.S.-Japan alliance is that itwants that alliance neither too tight and strong nor tooloose and weak. If too loose, it could eventually lead toJapan’s more independent posture in East Asia—aDamocles’ sword in Chinese eyes. Too tight an alliance,on the other hand, means China’s disadvantageousposition vis-à-vis the United States and Japan.Throughout the 1990s, however, Chinese strategistshave had good reason to worry about the latter.

In terms of future regional stability, questions inthe late 1990s concerned the type of relationship thatwould develop between the two major regional powers.It would be either strong and cooperative or weak andconfrontational. In addition, the diverse yet uncertainimpact of this evolving relationship on the future ofEast Asian security is unclear, particularly in light ofthe absence of a unifying Soviet threat and a continuedU.S. policy dilemma vis-à-vis Japan and China.

Despite their huge and growing stakes in main-taining an amicable relationship, China and Japan willcontinue to have difficult and often tense relations.The persistence of their traditional rivalry and longdistrust suggests that their relations may have more todo with deeply ingrained cultural, historical, and per-ceptual factors than with the dictates of economiccooperation or shared interests in regional stability,which are mutually beneficial.21 Also underlying theircomplex but competitive ties are fundamental differ-ences in terms of their political systems, social values,and strategic objectives in Asia and beyond.

As befits their traditional rivalry for regional influ-ence and their present-day status as the two most pow-erful East Asian states, Japan and China have a broadrange of bilateral concerns. Many scholars note thatthe enduring dual images of superiority and inferior-ity permeate their perceptions in ways that often makeofficial and public perceptions of the countries andeach other different, divergent, and distorted. Theyalso note that currently there seems to be no strongconstituency in either China or Japan to promote theirlasting friendship and cooperation. In a recent studyon Japan’s cultural diplomacy toward China, DianaBetzler and Greg Austin convincingly argued that “the



main impulses for official interaction between the twocountries [China and Japan] remain outside whatmight be called the popular imagination.”22

Regular high-level visits between the countries,such as President Jiang Zemin’s visit in November1998 and Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo’s in July 1999,emphasized that the countries need to put aside theirhistorical enmities toward each other. Moreover,growing bilateral trade and investment activity islargely restraining open criticism of each other. Mili-tary diplomacy reached a new level in the 1997–1999period, including frequent military-to-military con-tacts, an accord on maritime accident prevention, andplans for future joint drills and port visits. But the tra-ditional rivalry and historical distrust still linger.23

The Taiwan issue also factors into the ongoingdebate about Japan’s regional security role. At issue isa definitional shift in Japan’s defense contributionfrom “defense of the Far East” (Article Six of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty) to the defense of “areassurrounding Japan,” as stipulated in the November1995 National Defense Programme Outline (NDPO)and reconfirmed in the April 1996 U.S.-Japan JointDeclaration on Security and the September 1997Review of the Guideline for U.S.-Japan DefenseCooperation (the “new Guideline”).

China has always been wary of Japan’s expandedregional role, of course, but this time it would like toknow whether the phrase about “situations in areassurrounding Japan” includes Taiwan—a controversythat recurred during and after the final revision of thenew Guideline in September 1997. Given Chinese andother neighboring nations’ sensitivity on Japan’sregional security role, Japan’s official policy on thisissue seems to be “not [to] offer a specific definition,”echoing the U.S. position that the scope of the newGuideline is “situational, not geographical.”

China sees the U.S.-Japan security ties as crucialin restraining Japanese military power and in main-taining regional stability. Beijing adamantly opposesthe revised Guideline on the grounds of a possibleU.S.-Japan collaboration in a Taiwan crisis and Japan-ese militarism.24 However, despite China’s pessimisticview of the revised Guideline and the U.S. role inpost-Cold War East Asia, China is well aware thatU.S.-Japanese security relations remain the primarylinchpin of the current stability in East Asia. In addi-tion, Chinese analysts believe that the disappearanceof the common foe and new dynamics in Americanand Japanese domestic politics could lead to a further

redefinition of U.S.-Japanese security relations in theyears ahead. The so-called “double containment” roleof U.S. forces over Japan’s possible unilateral militaryrole is largely seen in a positive light among manyChinese security analysts, even if not without debate.

In a litchi nutshell, notwithstanding the remain-ing regional controversies over the interpretation of“areas surrounding Japan,” the NDPO and the newGuideline are steering Japan’s security role and policytoward a new direction, which may enhance commonregional security if it is guided by prudence.

The U.S-Korea Alliance

There is no doubt that a combined South Korea-U.S. deterrence against a possible North Koreanattack—a wider assault rather than a conventionalfull-scale war—remains the U.S.-ROK alliance’s pri-mary security mission in the foreseeable future. Aslong as the North Korean military threat persists, anyROK and U.S. efforts to engage China should comple-ment the goal of deterrence. Additionally, the ROKand the United States should seek to bring Chineseinfluence on North Korea to bear in achieving com-mon interests on the peninsula, namely continuedpeninsular stability, improved North-South Koreanrelations, and North Korean economic reform.Mutual understanding would not only offer a poten-tial solution to the current stalemate in North-SouthKorean relations but also create a favorable conditionfor peaceful unification of Korea.

However, China’s more confrontational posturetoward the United States and Japan is likely to con-tinue for years to come. A sustained confrontationbetween the regional superpower and the globalsuperpower could sharply exacerbate their differencesover a host of peninsula-related and regional issues.In particular, China’s growing influence over andinterdependence with South Korea despite the rivalrybetween the United States and China could well makeuntenable the proposition that the countries cancooperate to resolve a myriad of concrete policy issuesand longer-term questions on the peninsula. SouthKorea’s balancing act between its alliance with theUnited States and its cooperation with China, inshort, could well turn out to be the most prominentsecurity challenge of the 21st century.

To avoid possibly stark strategic decisions, SouthKorea should be able to “walk on two legs”—to para-phrase the Maoist slogan—by maintaining a strongsecurity relationship with the United States while



charting out a long-term, comprehensive strategytoward China. This envisions post-unification rela-tions between Korea on the one hand and the UnitedStates and China on the other.

South Korea’s economic cooperation with China,augmented by increased diplomatic and cultural con-tacts, is essential for the expansion of bilateral ties.Military-to-military relationships need to be set up aswell. Given the current and expected influence of thePLA in Chinese domestic and external policies, itseems only prudent for the ROK to foster personalties and eventual institutional relations with the Chi-nese military gradually. In addition, South Koreaneeds to formulate a panoply of security and confi-dence-building measures (SCBMs) that are specifi-cally designed to address China’s potential concerns,such as a unified Korea’s intention to promotefriendly relations with China, the creation of a bufferzone in and joint development of Sino-Korean borderareas, and the establishment of a three-way securitydialogue among China, the United States, and theunified Korea.

U.S. Policies Toward China

For its part, the United States should continue topursue the strategy of comprehensive engagementwith China, especially in areas of mutual benefit (suchas Chinese economic reforms and trade). Addition-ally, America’s China policy must be firmly linked toits overall Asia policy, carefully weighing the costs andbenefits of the former to the latter. Conflict betweenthe two policies would require strong political willand leadership in Washington to resolve.

Finally, the United States must differentiatenational interests from universal values, strategic flex-ibility from policy reversals, and long-term goals fromshort-term gains. If and when the above efforts yieldno reciprocity from the Chinese, the United Statesmust consider alternatives to its strategy of compre-hensive engagement, although the consequences maybe difficult to predict.

All in all, to advance the longer-term goal of a sta-ble and prosperous East Asia, not only should theUnited States and East Asian nations recognize China’sdiffering yet often legitimate security requirements, butthey also should make genuine efforts to build confi-dence with China, which is time-consuming but theleast threatening way to make China more transparent.The paths China and the United States choose will

influence East Asia’s regional economic and securitydevelopments as well as the individual states’ strategicsoul-searching.

Notes1 For a detailed analysis of U.S. policy dilemmas vis-à-vis

China and Japan, see Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, “Chi-nese Apprehensions about Revitalizing of the U.S.-JapanAlliance,” Asian Survey, April 1997, 383–402.

2 See Xiaoxiong Yi, “China’s U.S. Policy Conundrum in the1990s: Balancing Autonomy and Interdependency,” Asian Survey,August 1994, 675–91.

3 For a comprehensive but focused discussion on the currentstate of relations between, and different internal political dynam-ics in, Washington and Beijing, see David Shambaugh, “TheUnited States and China: A New Cold War?” Current History, Vol.94, No. 593 (September 1995), 241–47; Denny Roy, “Current Sino-U.S. Relations in Strategic Perspective,” Contemporary SoutheastAsia, Vol. 20, No. 3 (December 1998), 225–40; Arthur Waldron,“Bowing to Beijing,” Commentary, Vol. 106, No. 3 (September1998), 15–20; Melvin Gurtov, “Fragile Relationship: The UnitedStates and China,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1999), 111–41;Harry Harding, “The Uncertain Future of US-China Relations,”Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1999), 7–24. For Chinese per-spectives, see Zhu Chenghu, ed., Zhongmei guanxi de fazhan bian-hua ji qi qushi [Development and Change of Sino-U.S. Relationsand Their Trends] (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1998).For a Chinese “democratic peace reversed” perspective, see LiuJixian and Xu Xikang, eds., Haiyang zhanlue huanjing yu duiceyanjiu [Research on Maritime Strategic Environment and Counter-Measures] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1996) (internal publica-tion).

4 Xie Wenqing, “Observing US Strategy of Global Hegemonyfrom Nato’s Use of Force against FRY,” International StrategicStudies, No. 53 (July 1999), 1–9; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Beijing Waryof ‘East Asian Nato’ Threat,” South China Morning Post, May 31,1999, 8; “Paper Comments on US Hegemonism,” Beijing Review,June 14, 1999, 7.

5 See footnote 3 above.6 Tom Plate, “East Asia Racing into Arms Escalation,” South

China Morning Post, July 10, 1999, 10.7 For an excellent analysis on the future security alternatives

of the ROK-U.S. alliance, see Jonathan D. Pollack and Young KooCha et al., A New Alliance for the Next Century: The Future of U.S.-Korean Security Cooperation (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation,1995).

8 Data for 1999 include January through November.9 See, for example, Jae Ho Chung, “The Korean-American

Alliance and the ‘Rise of China’: A Preliminary Assessment of Per-ceptual Changes and Strategic Choices,” Discussion Papers,Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, February 1999.

10 For a comprehensive treatment PLA military diplomacy inthe 1990s and China’s military relations with both Koreas, seeKenneth Allen and Eric A. McVadon, China’s Foreign MilitaryRelations (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, Octo-ber 1999), especially 66–68.

11 C3I refers to command, control, communications, andintelligence capabilities.



12 See the special issue on China’s military in transition,China Quarterly, No. 146 (June 1996); Paul H. B. Godwin, “ForceProjection and China’s National Military Strategy,” in C. Denni-son Lane, Mark Weisenbloom, and Dimon Liu, eds., Chinese Mili-tary Modernization (London and Washington, DC: Kegan PaulInternational and the AEI Press, 1996), 69–99; Mark A. Stokes,China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States(Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute,September 1999); Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of FutureWarfare, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. National Defense Univer-sity, 1998); Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China’s Arms Acquisitionsfrom Abroad: A Quest for ‘Superb and Secret Weapons’ (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1995).

13 Shen Zhongchang, Zhou Xinsheng, and Zhang Haiying, “ARudimentary Exploration of 21st Century Naval Warfare,” Zhong-guo Junshi Kexue [Chinese Military Science], No. 1 (February 20,1995), 28–32, in FBIS–CHI, June 13, 1995, 26–32. See also BoJiansheng and Yang Sancheng, “Prospects for Naval Weapons in[the] 21st Century,” Jiefangjun Bao, March 17, 1996, 2, inFBIS–CHI, 51–52.

14 “China Expands Reach with Russian Destroyers,” Jane’sDefence Weekly, January 15, 1997, 5; “Russian Imports Step in toFill the Arms Gap,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 10, 1997,27–28; U.S. Department of Defense, Selected Military Capabilitiesof the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern-ment Printing Office, April 1997); Bill Gertz, “Pentagon Says Rus-sians Sell Destroyers to China,” The Washington Times, January 10,1997, A1; Richard D. Fisher, “Dangerous Moves: Russia’s Sale ofMissile Destroyers to China,” Heritage Foundation BackgrounderNo. 146, February 20, 1997, 1–14; “Russian Kamovs Set to BoostChinese ASW,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 4, 1998, 14; MikhailUrusov, “Cooperation: ‘Arsenal for China’,” Moskovskiye Novosti,No. 4 (February 1–8, 1998), 15, in FBIS–CHI (98–051), February20, 1998 (Internet version).

15 The J–10 and Su–27 programs are discussed in Hsiao(Xiao) Yusheng, “China’s New-Generation Main Military Air-craft,” Kuang Chiao Ching, No. 278 (November 16, 1995), 70–72,in FBIS–CHI, January 31, 1996, 28–30. See also David A. Ful-ghum, “China Pursuing Two-Fighter Plan,” Aviation Week & SpaceTechnology, March 27, 1995, 44–45; “China Plans Progress WhileOthers Look On,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 22–26, 1998,22–26; “First Flight for F–10 Paves Way for Production,” Jane’sDefence Weekly, May 27, 1998, 17; John Wilson Lewis and XueLitai, China’s Search for a Modern Air Force,” International Secu-rity, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), 64–94.

16 For the Israeli assistance in China’s early warning capabil-ity, see Steve Rodan, “Israel Pushes China Aircraft Deal DespiteU.S., Russian Objections,” Defense News, January 6–12, 1997, 22.See also Yitzhak Shichor, “Israel’s Military Transfers to China andTaiwan,” Survival, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Spring 1998), 68–91.

17 For an excellent study on the PLAAF’s history, organiza-tion, training, and operational capability, see Kenneth W. Allen,Glenn Krumel, Jonathan D. Pollack, China’s Air Force Enter the 21st

Century (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1995). See also Ken-neth W. Allen, “PLA Air Force Logistics and Maintenance: WhatHas Changed?” in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds.,The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Mon-ica: The RAND Corporation, 1999), 79–98.

18 Robert Sae-Liu, “PLA Reorganises Group Armies,” Jane’sDefence Weekly, September 15, 1999, 3.

19 For an overview of the history and current capability ofChinese nuclear and missile force, see Yen Chun, “Unmasking theSecrets of Communist China’s ‘Nuclear Counterattack’ Force,”Kuang Chiao Ching, No. 282 (March 16, 1996), in FBIS–CHI,April 10, 1996, 65. For the Chinese development of surface-to-airand anti-ship missiles, see Paul Beaver, “China Prepares to FieldNew Missile,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 24, 1999, 3; ZongShu and Xiao Zhu, “Several Chinese Air Defense and AntishipMissiles,” Hangkong Zhishi, No. 5 (May 6, 1995), 8–10, inFBIS–CHI, January 23, 1996, 30–33; An Hua, “China-Made LY–60Surface-to-Air Missile Weapons System,” Bingqi Zhishi [OrdnanceKnowledge], No. 6 (November 15, 1995), 4–5, in FBIS–CHI, Feb-ruary 16, 1996, 21–22. For the development of M–series missiles,see Ta Wen, “Second Artillery Corps and M–Class Guided Mis-siles,” Ta Kung Pao, March 9, 1996, A1, in FBIS–CHI, March 14,1996, 24–26.

20 For a fuller discussion of China’s limited nuclear deter-rence, see Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’:The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security, Vol.20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96), 5–42.

21 For an exposition on the role of perceptual and culturalfactors in Sino-Japanese relations, see Min Kyu Park and TaehoKim, “Anchoring a New Pattern of Interdependence and StrategicRivalry: China-Japan Relations Toward the 21st Century,” KoreanJournal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Summer 1998),121–40; Akira Iriye, China and Japan in the Global Setting (Cam-bridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); idem, “Chinese-JapaneseRelations, 1945–1990,” in Christopher How, ed., China and Japan:History, Trends, and Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1996), 46–59.

22 Diana Betzler and Greg Austin, “Gulfs in Sino-JapaneseRelations: An Evaluation of Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy TowardChina,” Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Summer-Fall1997), 611–12.

23 There exists a substantial body of Chinese literature onBeijing’s concerns over Japan. More recent examples include XiLaiwang, ed., Ershiyi shiji Zhongguo zhanlue da cehua: waijiaomolue [China’s Strategic Grand Plan in the 21st Century: DiplomaticStratagem] (Beijing: Hongqi chubanshe, 1996), 133–44; LuGuangyue, “The Impact of Reinforcement of Japan-U.S. MilitaryAlliance on the Asia-Pacific Security and World Peace,” Interna-tional Strategic Studies, Serial No. 53 (1999), 21–24; Zhao Dawei,“Riben junshi anquan zhanlue ji qi qianjing” [Japan’s Military andSecurity Strategy and Its Prospects], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [Interna-tional Studies], No. 2 (1999), 49–54.

24 For a Chinese critique of U.S.-Japan security ties,especiallythe new Guideline, see “Cadres Voice Concern over U.S.-JapanTies,” South China Morning Post, September 6, 1997, 9; LiangMing and Ding Zengyi, “How Can One Win the Trust of Othersby Shifting His Troubles Onto Others,” Jiefangjun Bao, May 18,1998, 5, in FBIS–CHI, June 2, 1998; Robert Karniol, “Japan Pro-motes Regional Security with US Accord,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,October 1, 1997, 15; “Hashimoto Warned on Scope of SecurityPlans,” South China Morning Post, September 5, 1997, 10; StevenLee Myers, “Risking China’s Wrath, U.S. and Japan Bolster Mili-tary Ties,” The New York Times, September 24, 1997, A7.


39

For Southeast Asia, as for the West, the end of theCold War was a seminal event. The region had been amajor Cold War battleground. Communism was aclear and present danger to the survival of regimesand, in the case of Cambodia, to the very existence ofa people and culture. Marxism left its mark in thethree wars and failed economies of Indochina; in themid-1960s upheaval in Indonesia; as a contribution tosocietal disruption in Burma, Malaya, and the Philip-pines; and, even to a degree, in the militarization ofsome Southeast Asian polities.

In the years immediately following the Cold War,this picture changed dramatically. The collapse ofSoviet power meant the withdrawal of the RussianPacific Fleet back to port and the end of subventionsto the Vietnamese economy. In September 1989, theVietnamese army ended its occupation of Cambodia.In the Philippines, the communist New People’sArmy, which in the mid-1980s posed a genuine andgrowing threat to the Philippine government, hadbegun to ebb. The Khmer Rouge, who also posed aserious threat to take power, had by the beginning ofthe 1990s misplayed their hand and become politi-cally isolated and increasingly ineffective.

Thus, for the first time, the Southeast Asian coun-tries faced no major security threats from within orwithout the region. With relatively marginal excep-

tions, governments were secure, societies stable, thestatus quo accepted, economies were growing, andexternal powers posed no immediate danger. To adegree that far exceeded that which existed anywhereelse in the Afro-Asian world, the Southeast Asianstates had developed regional institutions and pat-terns of interaction that gave the region increasingcoherence as a single political, economic, and evensecurity entity. The centerpiece of that achievementwas the establishment in 1967 of the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which subse-quently spawned the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement(AFTA), soon to be followed by the ASEAN RegionalForum (ARF), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Coop-eration (APEC) forum.

Meanwhile China was preoccupied with the taskof consolidating the far-reaching domestic reformsinitiated by Deng Xiaoping. By any historical meas-ure, this was (and is) an extraordinary moment thatcould prove short-lived, or it could be an opportunityto consolidate regional security for the long term. AsJusuf Wanandi of Indonesia’s Centre for Strategic andInternational Studies has warned, “If this opportunityis missed and these countries go their separate ways, itwould be much more difficult five or ten years downthe road to construct a security arrangement.”

The urgency Wanandi expressed reflected a perva-sive uneasiness among the foreign policy elite of theregion that seemed to disprove their recent record ofsuccess and a palpable growth in national and regional

Southeast Asian Security:A Regional Perspective

by Marvin C. Ott

Marvin C. Ott is professor of national security policy in theNational War College at the National Defense University.



self-confidence. This uneasiness derived from a num-ber of perceived vulnerabilities, latent threats, andrelated concerns. Economics did not loom large inmost calculations, but it was a crushing economicdownturn that brought Southeast Asia’s post-ColdWar reverie to a sudden end.

As senior foreign affairs and defense officials inSoutheast Asia assess the regional security environ-ment, the vulnerabilities that they see begin but donot end with economic reconstruction.

Economic Recovery

The financial/economic crisis that began in Thai-land in late summer 1997 and rolled across the regionwas (and still is) deeply unsettling. It revealed that theextraordinary economic growth and modernizationof the last three decades—a phenomenon character-ized by the World Bank as the “Asian Miracle”—wasnot as solid as nearly everyone had believed. Theimage of a kind of regional money machine gave wayto a quite different picture of ineffective regulatoryinstitutions, illusory bank balance sheets, wildly irra-tional investments, excessive corruption, and conspic-uous consumption. As the value of the baht, rupiah,and ringgit collapsed, Southeast Asians werereminded that not just living standards, but also socialorder, political stability, and even national securityrested ultimately on economic performance. Thehubris so evident in statements associated with the“Asian values” debate of the 1980s and early 1990sgave way to a more chastened, far more worried tone.

Political Fragility

The political dangers embedded in economic fail-ure were graphically revealed in Indonesia. For 32years, the New Order regime of President Suharto hadbeen a fixture of the Southeast Asian scene. Indonesiahad been politically stable (if not static), economicallysuccessful, and socially dormant. But under theimpact of the financial crisis, the framework of theNew Order cracked, triggering mass political demon-strations, widespread street violence, and a change inregime. Next door in Malaysia where Dr. Mahathirhad been entrenched as Prime Minister for 17 years, asomewhat analogous but less virulent chain of eventsensued. A confrontation between the Prime Ministerand his deputy over how to respond to the economiccrisis took an ugly turn with the arrest and imprison-ment of the latter on sexual misconduct and othercharges. Mass demonstrations of a kind not seen in

Malaysia for 30 years shook the government to itsfoundations. In Thailand, the Chavalit government,paralyzed and ineffective in the face of the economiccollapse, was replaced by parliamentary vote amidstatements by senior military officers pledging thatthere would not be a coup. In sum, the political stabil-ity that had seemed almost as assured as continuedeconomic growth was now clearly questionable.

Ethnicity

Although ethnic disputes have not proven to beas lethal in post-Cold War Southeast Asia as in someother regions of the world, ethnic/minority issuesare a significant source of domestic tension. InBurma [Myanmar], a simmering civil war betweenthe lowland Burmese and highland minorities (suchas the Karen, Karenni, Shan, Wa, and Kachin) hascontinued at varying levels of violence for nearlyfifty years. A series of agreements beginning in thelate 1980s between the Rangoon government andseveral of the minority groups has dampened thefighting, at least for the moment. In Malaysia, thelatent tension between the Malay majority and theover one-quarter Chinese population pervadesnational life. The spectacular economic growth ofthe Federation in the years since the communal riotsof 1969 has been seen by many as almost imperativeto preserve domestic stability.

Recurring communal tension and occasional vio-lence gave way to something much more serious inIndonesia in 1997–1998. Under the strain of eco-nomic deprivation, widespread anti-Chinese violencedestroyed not only property, but also the confidenceof the Chinese business community in regard to theirfuture as citizens of Indonesia. Violence against theChinese seemed to trigger a chain reaction of ethnicand religious strife involving other communal groupsthat make up the complex patchwork of Indonesia.The secession of East Timor produced the bloodiesttableau of all—inflicted by “militias” associated withthe Indonesian army. The potential for a still moreviolent confrontation looms in the province of Aceh.

Territory and Boundaries

Although the territorial status quo is broadlyaccepted by the Southeast Asian states, there are anumber of specific disputes that have been minorirritants for some time and that could assume more


Southeast Asian Security 41

serious dimensions if the security climate in theregion were to change. These include:

■ The claim of the Philippines to the Malaysian state ofSabah;

■ Claims to the Spratly Islands by China, Vietnam, Taiwan,Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines;

■ Disputed ownership by Malaysia and Singapore over PedraBlanca Island;

■ Disputed ownership by Malaysia and Indonesia of theislands of Sipadan, Sebatik, and Ligitan;

■ Clashes along the Thai-Myanmar border;■ A dispute between Thailand and Malaysia over the land

border and offshore demarcation line;■ Boundary disputes between Malaysia and Vietnam and

between Indonesia and Vietnam over their offshore demar-cation lines;

■ A boundary dispute between Cambodia and Vietnam; and■ A dispute between Malaysia and Brunei over Limbang and

offshore boundaries.

Among these issues, the South China Sea is themost serious for several reasons. It is the only disputeto involve more than two Southeast Asian states andthe only one to which outside powers (China and Tai-wan) are a party. Large, potential offshore gas (andpossible oil) reserves elevate the economic stakes to ahigher level than elsewhere. Also, any conflict in theseessential, heavily traveled sealanes would immediatelyjeopardize the interests of the United States, Japan,and other major powers.

External Powers and a ChangingSecurity Environment

Two extra-regional powers, China and Japan, area continuing source of uneasiness to security plannersfor the medium and long term, even as they assumeroles in the present that are largely welcomed.

China

China is simply too large and too near not to be amajor factor in Southeast Asian equations and not tobe viewed with some trepidation. With certain iso-lated exceptions, China does not have a history ofseeking imperial control over Southeast Asia. More-over, for roughly three centuries comprising the Euro-pean colonial epoch, China ceased to be a seriousgeopolitical factor in Southeast Asia. But this was anabnormal circumstance that has now passed into his-tory. China’s postwar support for communist revolu-tionary movements in the region marked the reap-pearance of Chinese power in Southeast Asia. This,coupled with the presence of economically influential

Chinese populations in nearly every Southeast Asiancity, has bred distrust. Beijing’s explicit claim thatnearly all of the South China Sea constitutes Chineseterritorial waters (and its refusal to disavow the use offorce to back up those claims) has caused alarm in anumber of quarters. Growing Chinese influence inBurma and Cambodia has been a further source ofconcern. Finally, the burgeoning of China’s economyin the recent years has been welcomed by some(mostly ethnic Chinese) Southeast Asian businessmenas a major new investment opportunity while fearedby others because of the potent competition fromemergent, ultra-low wage Chinese industries.

The prevailing uneasiness and ambivalence con-cerning China is evident not only in official state-ments and actions but also in some suggestive publicopinion data. For example, in U.S. InformationAgency (USIA) polls, about 45 percent of respondentsin Thailand and the Philippines view China as an“expansionist power,” but only a small percentage inboth countries regard China as a direct securitythreat. In a survey of regional executives (many ofwhom presumably were ethnic Chinese), the Far East-ern Economic Review found large majorities “con-cerned about the security situation in the SouthChina Sea.” A similar survey found majorities rangingfrom 53 percent (in Thailand) to 80 percent (inIndonesia) who favor a “greater [Chinese] leadershiprole in world affairs.” This desired leadership roleemphasizes the prevailing strategy among SoutheastAsian governments to draw China into a role as a ris-ing but status quo power by binding China to the restof the region with ties of mutual economic advantage.

From Southeast Asia’s perspective, the best Chinais one that is domestically preoccupied, much like theChina of the last decade. The fear is that as China getsits domestic house in order, gains economic and mili-tary strength, and is largely freed of its historic secu-rity concerns to the west (Russia) and the east(Japan), it will feel increasingly free to turn its ener-gies southward.

Japan

Japan labors under the shadow of the recentmemories of its often harsh wartime rule over theregion. However, these memories vary significantly bydemography, ethnicity, and location. Political powerhas passed to a postwar generation that has no direct



personal recollection of the New Asia Co-ProsperitySphere. Also, some populations like the overseas Chi-nese and the Filipinos experienced an often brutaloccupation. But others like the Burmese and Indone-sians recall the Japanese invasion as the critical eventthat broke the hold of European colonialism in theregion and, in some instances, gave local nationaliststheir first taste of political power. Thailand effectivelyacquiesced to Japanese occupation and therebyescaped its most adverse effects. Since the war, Japan’sinteraction with Southeast Asia has been largely con-fined to economics—as trader, investor, and aidprovider. In recent USIA polls, 92 percent of Indone-sian respondents gave Japan an overall “favorable” rat-ing compared with 77 percent for the United States.In Thailand, a plurality of opinion regards Japan asthe Kingdom’s “closest economic partner.”

Today Japan is valued as an economic engine thatpowers much of Southeast Asia’s economic growth.Japan plays no direct security role in the region, andthe Southeast Asian states want to keep it that way. Aslong as the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty remains viable,the Southeast Asian governments are confident thatJapan will be content to leave to the United States thetask of protecting the vital Southeast Asian sealanesthrough which the bulk of Japan’s oil supplies aretransported. The great fear is that if Japan were to feelthe need to use its own navy for that purpose, it willprovoke China into military countermeasures. Thelast thing that the Southeast Asians want is a competi-tion for military preeminence in the region betweenChina and Japan.

The United States

Finally, Southeast Asians are uneasy about theUnited States—about America’s commitments and itsstaying power. The reasons for doubt on this score arenot hard to discern. Despite repeated assertions byAmerican officials to the contrary, many SoutheastAsians do not regard the United States as an inher-ently Asian power. In time, so the thinking goes, it willwithdraw to its natural geographic sphere of influencein the eastern Pacific. Perhaps ironically, such doubtswere reinforced by America’s Cold War victory. Theend of that contest provided the obvious rationale, ifone were needed, for a substantial reduction of theU.S. security presence in Asia. Without a worldwideadversary, America acted logically by pulling back itsoverseas military deployments to gain a peace divi-dend. For the harshest skeptics, America’s post-Cold

War record of military engagements overseas pro-vided additional evidence. Prime Minister Mahathirof Malaysia put the matter in characteristically bluntterms: “The presence of a Western power will notmake a difference especially after Haiti, Somalia,Bosnia, and Rwanda. It takes only one soldier to bekilled before the whole force will be withdrawn.”

All Southeast Asian governments were keenlyaware of the downward pressures on the U.S. defensebudget in the immediate post-Cold War period. Mostwatched with dismay as the U.S.-Philippine negotia-tions to extend the U.S. military lease of its base atSubic Bay failed. Nor were they reassured by thedefeat of President George Bush by a little knownsmall state governor in a campaign that stressed U.S.domestic concerns to the almost total exclusion offoreign policy. Finally, the Gulf War, when U.S. troopswere deployed through the Mediterranean rather thanSoutheast Asia, seemed to suggest yet one more rea-son why the United States might deemphasize itssecurity role west of Guam. This is ironic because theprimary route for logistical supply to that battlefield(mostly by sea) was across the Pacific and through theIndian Ocean.

Against this backdrop, the U.S. naval deploymentsin response to the Taiwan crisis of 1996 and the U.S.-led NATO operations in Kosovo provided a welcomedegree of reassurance regarding American capacityand determination to retain its global security role.When U.S. warplanes bombed the Chinese embassy inBelgrade, at least some senior military officers inSoutheast Asia reacted, first by assuming the bombingwas deliberate and second by welcoming it as a signalreminding China who is boss.

At the same time there is tangible uneasinessamong the policy elite concerning another implica-tion of Kosovo—a growing predilection on the partof the United States to engage in “humanitarianintervention.” The specter of the United States andits allies deciding what values are to be enforcedinternationally evokes not too distant memories ofWestern colonialism.

The Regional Response

The ASEAN response to this changing securityenvironment has occurred along three dimensions:unilateral, multilateral, and bilateral (with theUnited States).



Unilaterally, the ASEAN governments have donetwo things. First, they have continued to act on thesame central principle that they followed for nearlythree decades: the foundation of national security is asuccessful and growing economy. “Resilience,” a for-mulation connoting social stability, economic success,and a general ruggedness, was coined in Singaporeand soon spread as a kind of regional mantra to theother states. All of the successful ASEAN states havekept their focus on the priority objective of economicgrowth and modernization.

At the same time, these states began to investmore heavily in their respective military establish-ments. This growth has been sufficiently noteworthyto lead many observers to refer to a regional armsrace. In the early 1990s, Southeast Asia was the onegrowth area in an otherwise contracting global armsmarket. Indonesia purchased much of the former EastGerman navy—29 ships in all. Malaysia purchasedFA–18s and Russian MIG–29s. Singapore, Indonesia,and Thailand purchased F–16s. Thailand purchasedChinese tanks and armored personnel carriers, Ger-man helicopters, and American P–3s. The completelist of such acquisitions was long, but it was mislead-ing to refer to a regional arms race.

What was going on was a reorientation of armedforces away from domestic counterinsurgency mis-sions toward external defense coupled with a modern-ization and upgrading of forces by countries that nowcould afford it. The growth in military spending waswithin planned national budgets and generally trackedor only slightly exceeded aggregate economic growth.Other factors at work included (1) an effort toimprove national capabilities to defend offshore terri-torial claims, particularly in light of China’s assertive-ness in the South China Sea, (2) a response to the con-siderable political influence enjoyed by the armedforces in several countries, and (3) some undeniablecompetition and one-upmanship among the states ofthe region, notably between Singapore and Malaysia.

One of the consequences of the Asian economiccrisis that began in 1997 was a scaling back of militaryprocurement budgets throughout the region—mostnotably in Thailand’s decision to rescind its purchase ofFA–18s from the United States. If a feeling emerges inthe region that the economic crisis is effectively over,military budgets can be expected to benefit accordingly.

The most interesting developments in terms ofregional security have a multilateral character. ASEANhas become the centerpiece in this process. When the

association was created in 1967, its declared purposewas to foster economic and cultural (and by implica-tion, political) cooperation among its members. Thefounders of the organization were emphatic andexplicit that ASEAN was not, nor would it become, asecurity organization (that is, a military alliance). Infact, ASEAN was, from the outset, an organizationthat had an overriding security purpose. Its achieve-ments in terms of fostering cultural contact andunderstanding have been constructive, but hardlyearthshaking. Its various initiatives in the direction ofregional economic cooperation have come to little forthe basic reason that the economies of the memberstates are competitive rather than complementary.

But security is another matter. ASEAN wasfounded in the aftermath of Indonesian “confronta-tion” against Malaysia, exacerbated by the Philippinesterritorial claim to Sabah. The clear intent in creatingASEAN was to prevent the outbreak of another con-flict among the five founding members. This has beenone of ASEAN’s great successes. Patterns of consulta-tion and collaboration have been fostered; mutualtrust has been nurtured; and political and foreign pol-icy elites have become closely acquainted with oneanother. In short, ASEAN has become a “securitycommunity” defined as a collective in which militaryconflict among its members has become almostunthinkable. For example, despite recurring acrimonyover a number of issues, a military clash between Sin-gapore and Malaysia is about as unlikely as onebetween Spain and Great Britain over Gibraltar. Dis-putes exist, but they are either resolved through nego-tiations or adjudication or set aside until they becomenegotiable at some future time.

The second major achievement of ASEAN came inresponse to Vietnam’s 1978–1979 invasion and occu-pation of Cambodia. ASEAN took the lead in coordi-nating a remarkably effective diplomatic campaignthat denied Cambodia’s UN seat to the Vietnamese-installed government in Phnom Penh. Three govern-ments (Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand) alsoworked with the United States (and China) in provid-ing covert assistance to the various Khmer guerrillaorganizations conducting military resistance againstthe Vietnamese. These efforts, along with the U.S.-ledeconomic embargo, were instrumental in persuadingVietnam to withdraw finally from Cambodia.



Although ASEAN is not a military pact, several ofits members have been engaged in bilateral coopera-tion for many years on security-related issues ofshared concern. Examples include Thailand andMalaysia on their common border (long a haunt ofthe Malayan Communist Party and Thai Muslimsecessionists), the Philippines and Indonesia regard-ing smuggling, and Singapore and Indonesia concern-ing piracy. Since the U.S. decision to evacuate theClark and Subic Bay bases, each of the ASEAN coun-tries has offered to make appropriate facilities accessi-ble to U.S. naval and air forces. Beginning in 1992, amultilateral dimension was introduced when securityissues were explicitly included on the agenda ofASEAN ministerial meetings and uniformed officerswere included in senior officials’ meetings. In thesame timeframe, the annual meeting of the ASEANforeign ministers with ASEAN’s “Dialogue Partners”began to encompass security issues. In 1993, this secu-rity dialogue was expanded to include China, Russia,and India. Meanwhile, Vietnam, Laos, Burma (Myan-mar) and Cambodia have become full members ofASEAN. All of this official dialogue has been supple-mented by semi-official meetings and conferencesconducted by academics and policy institutes in theASEAN countries with invited outside experts anddevoted to security issues.

Eventually, the participants will have to decidewhether to extend multilateral security cooperationbeyond discussions to embrace operational activities,including possible multilateral joint exercises andtraining, and coordination of some equipment pur-chases (such as maritime patrol aircraft) to allow forpossible joint use and interoperability. However, thereis little or no likelihood that ASEAN will ultimately betransmuted into a full-fledged military alliance. Thereis no serious sentiment within the organization forsuch a step. The region remains too diverse with toolittle consensus regarding the identity and extent ofsecurity threats. Thailand and Vietnam, for example,have distinctly different views of China in this regard.Even if an alliance were established, the collective mil-itary strength of the region would be insufficient tocope with aggression or intimidation by a large power.Finally, nonalignment still exerts a significant tug onofficial sentiments within the region.

The latest development is an ASEAN decision toestablish a formal arrangement to manage the officialsecurity dialogue—the ASEAN Regional Forum. TheARF hosted its first annual meeting in Bangkok in

July 1994. Comprising 19 Pacific Rim countries,including China, Japan, Russia, India, and the UnitedStates, the ARF had the potential of becoming a sig-nificant arena for addressing such common securityconcerns as piracy and such regional disputes as theSpratly Islands. In reaction to the discovery of Chi-nese military construction on Mischief Reef in 1995,the ARF became the vehicle for a serious initialattempt to resolve conflicting interests and claims inthe South China Sea. Yet when additional Chineseconstruction was detected during the most acutephase of the Asian economic downturn, the ASEANcountries could not muster an effective responsewithin the ARF. At this stage, the jury is still out as towhether the ARF will become a viable diplomaticvehicle for addressing security issues in the region. Acurrent test is provided by efforts within ASEAN touse the ARF to negotiate a “code of conduct” for man-aging disputes in the Spratlys.

The U.S. Role

As a consequence—and somewhat paradoxi-cally—the ASEAN states still look to external powersas the ultimate guarantors of their security. The FivePower Defense Pact links the United Kingdom, Aus-tralia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Malaysia. But it isthe United States that is overwhelmingly the region’spreferred security partner. This shows up clearly, asnoted above, in USIA polling of regional opinion (forexample, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, and thePhilippines), in official public statements (for exam-ple, Singapore) and in government actions and privatecomments by officials (for example, Malaysia). Even innominal outliers like Vietnam and Burma, it does nottake long for some senior military officers to revealtheir preferences for a continued robust Americandefense presence in the region.

Since the demise of the Southeast Asia TreatyOrganization (SEATO) in 1977, the United States hasbeen party to only one multilateral Asian alliance withAustralia and New Zealand (ANZUS). But Americadoes have bilateral defense agreements with Thailandand the Philippines. More important, the U.S. 7th

Fleet, headquartered in Hawaii and forward based inGuam and Japan (composed of permanently assignedunits and those deployed for 6-month periods fromcentral and eastern Pacific bases), operates on a con-



tinuing basis in the region. U.S. air assets deploy tothe region out of Japan and Alaska, and forces fromall services, including ground forces, regularly go tothe region from the continental United States for avariety of exercises. Altogether, and on a continuingbasis, approximately 100,000 American military per-sonnel are forward deployed.

At the most basic level, U.S. objectives in South-east Asia have remained consistent over the last fivedecades:

■ Prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon,■ Keep open the sea and air routes that transit the area, and ■ Maintain commercial access to the economies of the region

and the peace and stability that commerce requires.

Pursuit of these interests has carried U.S. securitypolicy through five historical phases over the past halfcentury: (1) The war against Japan in the 1940s,(2) The counterinsurgency/nation-building period ofthe 1950s and 1960s, culminating in the Vietnam War,(3) The Nixon Doctrine and the focus on strengthen-ing the 7th Fleet as a counter to the Soviet militarypresence based at Cam Ranh Bay in the late 1970s, and(4) Pressure (working with and through some of theASEAN governments) against the Vietnamese militaryoccupation of Cambodia, culminating in the 1989Vietnamese withdrawal and the signing of the 1991Paris Agreements establishing a framework for a possi-ble political resolution of the Cambodian conflict.

Coincidentally, the demise of the Soviet Unionand the end of the Cold War removed Russian mili-tary power from the region. Since 1991, the UnitedStates has entered a fifth phase with the terminationof the U.S. military presence in the Philippines. Theloss of facilities at the Clark and Subic Bay bases com-pelled a rethinking of U.S. strategy that involved a dis-persal of U.S. presence in the region through accessarrangements in a number of countries, but no largeU.S. bases. With the advent of the Clinton administra-tion, there also was a change of emphasis that wasmore accommodating to multilateral approaches tosecurity. The new approach embraced the advent ofARF and explicit intra-ASEAN discussions of securityissues as fully compatible with existing U.S. bilateralsecurity ties and activities in the region.

The United States now faces a substantiallychanged security landscape in Southeast Asia, onethat reflects the essential success of its postwar poli-cies. America currently is without challenge as thepreeminent military power in the region and, from aSoutheast Asian perspective, that presence is largely

benign because it comes without territorial or overthegemonic ambition.

Security regimes generally develop in response toor in anticipation of threats. What makes the U.S.security role in Southeast Asia so distinctive and chal-lenging in intellectual and policy terms is the absenceof a clear threat. Instead, there is the regional sense ofuneasiness noted earlier. The Southeast Asians wantthe U.S. presence as an insurance policy—a benevo-lent cop on the beat to protect them against potentialexternal threats, against the unknown, and, to someextent, against each other. As long as the U.S.-JapanSecurity Treaty is operative and the U.S. 7th Fleetpatrols the Southeast Asian sealanes, Tokyo will notneed to contemplate its own military presence in theregion. Disputes or potential disputes within theregion are less likely to flare up or to provoke a localarms race if a neutral third party is by far thestrongest military presence in the area. The day maycome when the combination of growing economies,militaries, and multilateral institutions and processeswill give the region sufficient strength and coherenceto make a U.S. security presence largely superfluous—but not yet.

Other considerations that underlie SoutheastAsian support for a continued U.S. presence includethe preference among the armed forces of the regionfor American weapons and equipment and for theUnited States as a source of common military doc-trine and shared intelligence. U.S. forces treat South-east Asia as a single security area. Moreover, jointexercises, exchanges, and interactions with localarmed forces give the region what coherence it nowhas in military terms. Finally, the U.S. military pres-ence is valued as a means to maintain U.S. interest inthe region and to encourage an increase in Americaneconomic involvement. The United States remainsSoutheast Asia’s largest single market. Since exportsand foreign investment have largely driven the eco-nomic growth of the region, the American connectionremains hugely important to its future. SoutheastAsian governments also want to encourage increasedAmerican investment as a counterweight to the mas-sive presence of Japan in that sector. If SoutheastAsian industry is going to compete successfully withlower wage Chinese competitors, an infusion of for-eign technology will be required in many cases.

Note that significant constraints exist on Americaninfluence in the region. First, until recently, the mostobvious were limitations on U.S. defense budgets. It is a



great irony that if the Philippines Senate had approvedthe tentative agreement for renewal of the lease at SubicBay, the United States would have faced significant dif-ficulties in fulfilling the financial terms of that agree-ment. In a new era of federal budget surpluses, it is nolonger so evident whether budget limitations pose aninsuperable hurdle to maintaining a major, capital, andpersonnel-intensive presence in Southeast Asia, like atthe Clark and Subic Bay bases. That will become clearonly if an opportunity for such a facility presents itself.

Second, nationalism constrains the willingness ofSoutheast Asian states to accept a close, visible tie withthe United States. ASEAN has a long-standing formalcommitment to the objective of establishing a South-east Asian Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality(ZOPFAN), which would amount to the exclusion ofthe external great powers from the region. ZOPFANhas taken on no role beyond the declaratory, but itaccurately reflects a widely held determination not tobe the cat’s paw of others outside the area. Thisimpulse received a recent impetus from Indonesia’sselection in 1993 to serve a 5-year term as leader ofthe Nonaligned Movement. One consequence of allthis is a desire to minimize the size and visibility ofthe American military presence in each of these coun-tries. None of the states want to have the raucousequivalent of Angeles City or Ilongapo that servicedAmerican airmen and sailors outside the gates ofClark and Subic in the Philippines. Visiting Forcesagreements establishing legal jurisdiction over U.S.military personnel have become a lightning rod forsuch concerns.

Third, there have been a number of recurring irri-tants in U.S. relations with the region, most related totrade disputes and human rights. Examples include along-running and acrimonious quarrel with Thailandover protection of intellectual property rights; a pub-lic argument between the United States (includingPresident Clinton) and Singapore (including formerPrime Minister Lee Kwan Yew) over the proper pun-ishment for an American teenager found guilty ofvandalism in Singapore; and the congressionally man-dated cancellation of some International MilitaryEducation and Training (IMET) aid programs due tocriticisms related to human rights—notably,Malaysia’s policy toward Vietnamese refugees andIndonesia’s handling of East Timor. During the 1990s,the mood in several of the ASEAN governments

became palpably more resentful of, and resistant to,U.S. pressure on behalf of a human rights/democrati-zation agenda. Singapore and Malaysia were particu-larly outspoken concerning U.S. “arrogance” and “cul-tural imperialism.” The Asian financial crisis tendedto override and to mute these issues, while diplomaticnegotiations resolved some of them. If Indonesia’snewly empowered democracy takes hold, the politicalclimate on these issues in the region will presumablybecome more receptive to U.S. views.

At the same time, the Asian financial crisisinjected a new discordant element into the picture—asense of acute vulnerability to the forces of the newglobalized economy. Malaysia’s combative Prime Min-ister Mahathir angrily blamed international currencyspeculators for triggering Asia’s meltdown and theInternational Monetary Fund for running roughshodover local sovereignties in responding to the crisis.Mahathir’s view that the West (and the United Statesin particular) had acquired too much economicpower over Southeast Asia is widely shared by otherless outspoken leaders in the region.

In sum, U.S. security planners face a complexenvironment in Southeast Asia that requires an intelli-gent, sensitive (even subtle) diplomatic touch; thatintegrates political, economic, and military considera-tions; and that looks beyond the immediate to at leastthe mid-term future. The names of the game areanticipation, prevention, deterrence, and reassurance.

Looking Ahead

Southeast Asian attitudes and approaches towardU.S. policy and presence will be shaped, in the firstinstance, by developments within the region. Thesewill include performance of the major SoutheastAsian economies, the viability and unity of Indone-sia, and the cohesion and effectiveness of ASEAN.Beyond these obvious factors, there are some wild-cards in the deck, including a potential politicalupheaval in Burma.

Economic success breeds confidence and stabil-ity—or, in the parlance of the region, “resilience.” Eco-nomic growth also provides the budgetary resources toupgrade national military capabilities. Economicgrowth undergirds the development and strengtheningof regional institutions, including ASEAN and its vari-ous elaborations and spin-offs. A prosperous andmodernizing Southeast Asia will deal more confidentlywith the major external powers, such as Japan, China,



the United States, and, in the future, India. Such aSoutheast Asia will be more inclined to draw lines inthe sand (or sea) regarding China and to insist on con-ditions and quid pro quos regarding the U.S. securitypresence. Conversely, a Southeast Asia unable to regainits pre-1998 economic footing will be less assertive vis-à-vis outside players and more prone to intraregionaldisputes. Such a region will be more vulnerable togrowing Chinese influence and, at the same time,more inclined to look to the United States both formarkets and for security support.

Indonesia is a huge factor in this regard. If itholds together and begins to restore economic growthunder a moderate democratic government, Indonesiacan regain its role as the linchpin of a modernizing,increasingly interactive Southeast Asia. In the worstcase, a disintegrating Indonesia will fundamentallyalter the balance of power in East Asia. Opportunitiesfor Chinese ambition will grow, and the tendency ofregional states to strengthen bilateral securityarrangements with the United States will probablygrow as well.

All of this is intimately connected to ASEAN. Theassociation as we have known it cannot survive abreakup of Indonesia; it will survive only as a shell ifIndonesia becomes the chronic sick man of SoutheastAsia. ASEAN is already confronting major difficultiesas a result of the Asian financial crisis and the ill-advised and rapid decision to expand its membershipto include Cambodia, Laos, and Burma. ASEAN todayis a distinctly less cohesive and effective organizationthan it was in 1996.

The second broad set of factors that will affect U.S.attitudes concerns the policies and actions of majorpowers in East Asia—notably China and the UnitedStates. The foreign policies of Southeast Asian govern-ments generally are predicated on the hope and theexpectation that China will give the highest nationalpriority to economic development and modernization,which will in turn require good relations with itsneighbors. A China focused on economic growthwould logically desire increased trade with and invest-ment from Southeast Asia. Such a China would eschewprovocative, destabilizing policies in the South ChinaSea or elsewhere that would jeopardize such relations.Southeast Asian policies toward China have beendesigned to reinforce such logic and tendencies.

But few Southeast Asian officials are confidentbeyond doubt that Beijing will prove to be such abenign presence in the region. Unlike the United

States, China is geographically next door and doeshave territorial ambitions. There is an undercurrent ofapprehension present in every Southeast Asian gov-ernment to varying degrees. The possibility thatChina may pursue a strategy designed to assert its pri-macy in the region cannot be ruled out. Chinese state-ments and actions in the South China Sea validate thedanger in the minds of many regional defense andintelligence officials.

A China with hegemonic tendencies posesanother danger: Japan strengthening its military capa-bilities and assuming a more “normal” security role inthe region. In short, a logical consequence of growingChinese power could be a great power rivalry withJapan along Asia’s rim. None of this would be wel-come in Southeast Asia.

The U.S. economic presence in Southeast Asia hasnever been seriously controversial. Not only was it asource of needed imports, technology, managerialexpertise, and investment, but it was also, mostimportantly, a natural concomitant of America’s mostimportant contribution—its market. As far as one cansee into the future, that market will remain absolutelyvital to economic well-being in Southeast Asia.

The U.S. security presence has been welcome inSoutheast Asia since the early days of the Cold Warfor the measure of protection that it provided. Insome instances that protection was direct and tangi-ble, as with U.S. assistance to the Philippines againstthe Hukbalahap insurgency. In one case—Vietnam—it was direct, massive, and unsuccessful. But generallythe U.S. presence has been valued for the general cli-mate of stability and security that it has provided. Aslong as the strongest military power in the region wasan outside player without territorial ambition, South-east Asians could be confident that nothing reallybad—for example, a hostile hegemon or a majorinterregional conflict—would be allowed to happen.That confidence in turn was key to foreign investmentand other economic development initiatives thatmade the Asian Miracle possible.

In sum, the regional context in which SoutheastAsians view the U.S. security role is remarkablydynamic and indeterminate. China’s strategic direc-tion—aspiring regional hegemon or increasingly sat-isfied status quo great power—remains entirelyuncertain. In all probability, the China of the next 10to 15 years will emerge as a complex amalgam of thetwo. Just as China’s strategic direction is a question, so



too are its economic and political prospects. The Chi-nese economy of today faces huge problems, includ-ing hopelessly inefficient state enterprises, a techni-cally insolvent banking system, and an alarming andunsolved environmental crisis. A substantial slowingof economic momentum has profound implicationsfor a regime that has lost Marxism/Maoism as aneffective source of political legitimacy and reliesinstead on an improving economy. Future historiansmay see the ongoing crackdown on the Falun Gonggroup as the first clear signal of a systemic Chinesepolitical crisis.

Uncertainties concerning China extend to otherelements in the strategic environment. As the Taiwandispute becomes more acute, the confident expecta-tions of a few years ago that the situation could bemanaged and contained are no longer prevalent.ASEAN is still reeling under the impact of the finan-cial crisis in Asia and suffering acute indigestion fromtrying to incorporate too many new members toofast. The association’s future is very much in doubt.

The economic crisis has raised a number of otheruncertainties, the most basic being whether the regionwill make a full recovery. There are some hopefulindicators in that regard, but whether they represent areal or false dawn is still a question. Even larger ques-tions surround Indonesia, including whether thearchipelago will remain politically unified.

All of these uncertainties tend to impel theregion, however reluctantly, toward increased relianceon the U.S. security presence as an anchor in stormyseas. This will be true only as long as the United Statesis really seen as an anchor. Southeast Asian states willbecome increasingly sensitive to any signs of decliningU.S. interest in or disengagement from the region.Assessments of U.S. resolve will become even more ofa cottage industry for Southeast Asian governmentsthan they have in the past. For this reason, the contin-uing (and even growing) ambiguity concerning U.S.policy toward the South China Sea does not bodewell. What exactly is America prepared to defend andunder what circumstances? Few in Southeast Asia areconfident of the answer. Those that are uncertain willtend to hedge that uncertainty. The logical alternativeto reliance on the U.S. security presence will be somesort of regional accommodation to Chinese primacy.


49

Concerns about China’s political and social stabilityfigure prominently—and rightly—in Western govern-ments’ formulation of policy toward Beijing. Unlike astrong, stable, but less-than-friendly China, an unsta-ble (and presumably weak) China presents a differentset of strategic and political challenges to Westernpolicymakers. Instability—whether economic, social,or political—makes it difficult to protect some of theimportant interests that have been pursued by theWest during the last two decades (such as improve-ments in human rights, governance, and access to theChinese market). Internally, political instability usu-ally triggers large-scale violence and loss of govern-ment authority. In the case of China, which has alarge arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, a likelyfallout from such instability would be ineffective con-trol regimes over the exports of such weapons andrelated technologies.

Despite these profound concerns about the conse-quences of instability in China, however, reliable pre-dictions about Chinese politics have been quite rare.Few analysts, for instance, foresaw the downfall of twoof Deng Xiaoping’s chief liberal lieutenants (HuYaobang and Zhao Ziyang) or the bloody Tiananmenevents in June 1989. Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin,was derided as a lightweight and thought incapable ofmanaging a smooth transition of power from the

Deng era. On the eve of China’s resumption of sover-eignty over Hong Kong, the conventional wisdom inthe West was that China would “kill the goose thatlays the golden eggs.” Shortly after President Clinton’svisit to China in June–July 1998, there was much opti-mism about the prospects of political liberalization.And immediately before China and the United Statessigned a historic trade agreement paving the way forChina’s entry into the World Trade Organization(WTO), such a deal was considered unlikely becausethe top leadership in Beijing was judged to be hope-lessly divided and paralyzed.

These and other similar instances of wrong pre-dictions about Chinese politics in general, and politi-cal instability in particular, may be attributed to ananalytical approach that focuses exclusively on elitepolitics. Given the thick secrecy with which Chineseleaders conceal their decisionmaking process, this eliteapproach can yield guesswork at best.

To examine the issue of political stability morecomprehensively, the emphasis here is not on thecharacteristics of individual leaders, but on a set ofenvironmental factors that influence decisionmakingand politics. The central premise of this analysis isthat stability (or its opposite, instability) is the prod-uct of a dynamic process of change: The economic,social, and political transformation that has beengoing on in China in the last two decades has gener-ated forces of both instability and stability, disintegra-tion and cohesion. As the transformative process

China’s Precarious Balance:Cohesiveness and Stability in a Fast-Changing Society

by Minxin Pei

Minxin Pei is Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace in Washington, DC



unfolds, the forces of disintegration and instabilitymay assume different forms and manifest their effectsin different ways, as do those of cohesion and stability.What matters most is the overall dynamic balancebetween such forces.

Generally speaking, four primary types of cohe-siveness—elite, ideological, institutional, and socialcohesiveness—influence China’s political stability.Looking at changes in these four variables will pro-vide an overall assessment of the balance of forces ofdisintegration and cohesion in China today.

Elite Cohesiveness

Elite cohesiveness is generally considered one ofthe most important factors in determining the stabilityof a regime. Obviously, deep division within the elite,especially the ruling elite, is often a source of politicalconflict and paralysis in decisionmaking. Elite cohe-siveness itself is also an aggregate consisting of a set ofmeasurable and intangible primary characteristics ofthe members of the elite. Such characteristics mayinclude ideological outlook (which will be discussed inthe next segment), political experience, sociologicalbackground (education and class background), andgenerational identity. In addition to these primaryvariables, elite cohesiveness is also affected secondarilyby the norms and procedures governing elite politics.Although the primary variables are crucial in deter-mining the degree of cohesiveness among the elite, therole of norms and institutional procedures in enhanc-ing or reducing such cohesiveness is considerable,though often overlooked.

Historically, political instability in the People’sRepublic of China (PRC) was, almost without excep-tion, triggered initially by a power struggle within theruling elite. Such struggle, in turn, was caused by alack of elite cohesiveness. For analysts, elite cohesive-ness is a relative concept, especially when it is used inthe context of contemporary China.

It is thus unavoidable to compare the degree ofelite cohesiveness of Maoist China with that of post-Mao China. One can make a strong case that, otherthings being equal, the lack of elite cohesiveness dur-ing the Mao Zedong regime (1949–1976) was a majorsource of political turmoil. The low level of cohesive-ness in the Mao regime was the result of many factors.First and foremost, the fact that the Chinese revolu-tion was won by a coalition of nationalist, Leninist,and liberal forces determined that the new ruling elite

would comprise individuals from diverse sociological,political, and ideological backgrounds. Conflicts soonemerged inside the young PRC, both within the Chi-nese Communist Party (CCP) and between the CCPand its former allies (mostly liberal intellectuals).Some conflicts led to internal purges and claimed, astheir victims, some of the senior revolutionary leadersin the CCP hierarchy (such as Gao Gang and PengDehuai) and sowed the seeds for future power strug-gles. Other conflicts resulted in the split between theCCP and the intelligentsia, as in the tragic Anti-Right-ist Movement of 1957 that destroyed the lives andcareers of half a million people, most of whom weremembers of the intelligentsia.

Table 1. Elite Cohesiveness in China’s Regimes, 1949–1999

Mao Deng Jiang

Ideological Outlook Diverse Less diverse SimilarPolitical Experience Diverse Similar SimilarSociological Background Diverse Diverse SimilarGenerational Identity Strong Weak StrongElite Norms Weak Improving Strong

Ultimately, the ideological conflicts within theelite over the fundamental CCP policy—“class strug-gle vs. economic construction”—escalated to irrecon-cilable levels and culminated in the Cultural Revolu-tion (1966–1976). With the help of the radicals andthe control of the military, Mao Zedong was able topurge those who advocated a more moderate policyand took China on a disastrous path to self-isolationand bloody civil turmoil.

It must be pointed out that diversity in the back-grounds and ideological outlooks of the elite shouldnot be a necessary condition for conflict. In MaoistChina, what made intra-elite conflict inevitable anduncontrollable was not merely the above-mentioneddiversity, but the lack of institutional procedureswithin the CCP for managing such conflict and con-taining its political devastation. As in other totalitar-ian regimes, the supreme leader, in this case Mao,enjoyed unrestrained power and discretion, especiallyin the appointment and removal of members of thetop leadership. Job security for the elite throughoutthe regime was minimal, as there was no due process


Stability in a Fast-Changing Society 51

or set of principles providing a basic level of protec-tion for the elite. Worse still, there was no guaranteeof the physical security of the elite. Fall from powerwas immediately followed by public humiliation,physical abuse, torture, show-trial, incarceration, andworse. In most instances, even the family members ofthe disgraced officials were not spared. This created a“winner-take-all and loser-lose-all” environment inwhich power struggles became extremely vicious anduncompromising.

Two additional factors intensified power strugglesamong the elite during the Mao era. First, the CCPhad no internal procedures to marginalize or reducethe power of extremists. In fact, the radicalized Com-munist ideology under Mao legitimized leftistextremism, and the rapid promotion of radicals dur-ing the Cultural Revolution provided further incen-tives for displaying extremist outlook and behavior.Second, the Mao regime had no reliable system ofpromotion and retirement. As a result, elite circula-tion was slow and frustrated the ambitions of theyounger generation, many of whom were thus easilyrecruited into rival factions with the prospects of bet-ter political careers.

The Deng era saw many reform measures aimedat correcting the flaws of the Maoist regime. As aresult, the ruling elite became more homogenous andwere protected by more reliable rules and norms. Thehomogenization initially occurred due to a combina-tion of political purges and institution-building. AfterDeng consolidated power in 1979, he began a system-atic purge of the radicals inside the regime and asimultaneous campaign of rehabilitating and recruit-ing moderates. Consequently, although Deng retaineda considerable number of ideological conservativesleery of rapid economic reform and gave them somepolitical space, his efforts to promote younger andmore educated individuals gradually built a solid coreof moderates within the elite.

Deng also pushed through one of the most impor-tant political reform measures in post-Mao China—amandatory retirement system for government officials.Under the new system established in 1982, strict retire-ment rules were set for officials at different levelsinside the government (but not the CCP). This greatlyaccelerated elite circulation and helped inject much-needed fresh blood into the regime. It also removed asource of political instability—the frustration of capa-ble and ambitious individuals whose politicalprospects would otherwise be utterly hopeless under

the old system. To better manage intra-elite conflicts,Deng introduced a set of rules that spelled out theprocedures for resolving policy and political disputes.He also made sure that losers in internal power strug-gles enjoyed a minimal level of physical security andmaterial comfort (he violated this policy only once,when he personally ordered the persecution of BaoTong, chief aide to Zhao Ziyang, after the Tiananmencrackdown in 1989). To prevent the rise of radicals oneither end of the ideological spectrum, Deng man-dated limited competition for certain CCP posts. Overthe years, such competition was responsible for pre-venting some of the more controversial political fig-ures (mostly hardliners and princelings) from rising toimportant positions inside the regime.

By and large, Deng’s efforts were very successful inincreasing the degree of cohesiveness within the rulingelite. However, the Deng regime had a more mixedrecord in dealing with China’s nonruling elite. Mem-bers of the nonruling elite, or societal elite, are busi-ness leaders, professionals, and intellectuals. Ifcoopted, these elites can be an important source of sta-bility. If alienated, they can become potent opponents.The regime astutely adopted a divide-and-rule strategyin dealing with societal elites. It gave considerablegains in freedom, status, and material rewards forbusiness and professional elites because their primaryinterests—economic and professional opportunities—were compatible with the regime modernization pro-gram and could be satisfied without threatening itshold on power. It was the liberal intelligentsia, a peren-nial opposition in all authoritarian regimes, whoposed a constant challenge to the regime.

Although Deng initially relied on this group todislodge the radicals and formulate an ideologicallypalatable theory (“Socialism with Chinese Character-istics”) to justify his economic reforms, their demandsfor political reform and democratization soon col-lided with his precepts on the supremacy of CCP rule.The subsequent conflict between the regime and theintelligentsia formed the most visible schism in Chi-nese politics in the last two decades. Its most violentand tragic expression was the 1989 Tiananmen Squarepro-democracy movement. Interestingly, it was thebloody setback of the Tiananmen movement, whichled to the imprisonment and exile of the leaders ofthe intelligentsia, that transformed the relationshipbetween the regime and the intelligentsia.



The crackdown itself produced a surprisingresult: With the removal of the radical liberals (mostlythrough exile) and their intraregime patrons, themoderates inside the intelligentsia gained dominance.Their ascendance also coincided with two epochalevents and one interactive trend: (1) the collapse ofcommunism in the former Soviet bloc, (2) Deng’stour of southern China in 1992, and (3) rising Chi-nese nationalism and China-bashing in the West.These three factors produced an unanticipated politi-cal realignment that led to the re-incorporation of themoderate intelligentsia into the regime and the fur-ther marginalization of the liberals. The social andpolitical turmoil following the Soviet collapse graphi-cally demonstrated to the moderates the costs of radi-calism and the undesirability of hasty reforms. Deng’stour, which reenergized China’s lagging reform, gavethe moderate intelligentsia new hopes as well asopportunities to rejoin the regime or seek businessprospects in the private sector. The more controversialand not-so-well-understood factor—the interactionbetween rising Chinese nationalism and China-bash-ing in the West—did much to undermine the intelli-gentsia’s admiration and support, which was verydeep in the 1980s, for Western values.

As a result, the threat posed by the intelligentsia,which used to obsess the regime in the 1980s, greatlydiminished toward the late 1990s. But the incorpora-tion of the intelligentsia into the regime may havebeen only a temporary trend, because the fundamen-tal goal of the moderate intelligentsia—reformingChina’s economic and political systems—conflictswith the declared CCP goal of maintaining itssupremacy. At the moment, China’s deterioratingexternal environment (unstable relations with theUnited States and the increasing prospects of a mili-tary conflict with Taiwan) makes it hard for thisgroup to push their political reform agenda. Shouldthe external environment improve and, more impor-tant, should this group eventually come to realize thebasic incompatibility of their interests with those of aCCP intent on perpetual monopoly of power, they arelikely to turn against the CCP. The probability of anintraregime power struggle will increase becausemany members of the moderate intelligentsia are nowinside the regime.

Ideological Cohesiveness

The concept of ideological cohesiveness refers,first, to the degree to which professed ideological val-ues are consistent with actual policy and, second, tothe degree to which the elite and the public identifywith such values. Ideological cohesiveness on bothdimensions is politically important. A relatively highdegree of consistency between a regime’s professedideological values and its policy tends to inspire confi-dence and loyalty, among both the ruling elite and thepublic. On the other hand, a high degree of disso-nance between ideology and policy usually generatescynicism. A regime’s professed ideology must alsohave an intrinsic appeal to its elite members and thepublic at large. Without such an appeal, the degree ofoverall ideological cohesiveness may be low.

It has been obvious to students of Chinese politicsthat, if measured by these two standards, China’s offi-cial Communist ideology has declined considerably inthe last two decades. On the whole, this decline haspositively contributed to political stability andprogress of reform. At the elite level, declining Com-munist ideology has marginalized the leftist forces thatpreviously had dominated Chinese politics. Pragma-tism has replaced ideology as the guiding force for pol-icy. The decline of the official ideology has neverthe-less created subtle difficulties for the regime. Because ithas not yet officially jettisoned the Communist ideol-ogy, the dissonance between the regime’s professedvalues and policy has increased greatly and become asource of cynicism. This dissonance also makes theregime vulnerable to occasional attacks launched bythe dwindling leftist forces. Sometimes, it becomes animportant obstacle to economic reform (such as mas-sive privatization). Bereft of ideological appeals, theregime has no effective means to mobilize the emo-tional support of its people. As institutionalist econo-mists have noted, ideologically inspired voluntarycompliance and cooperation can significantly cutmonitoring and enforcement costs (and increase effi-ciency). Loss of the regime’s ideological attractivenessmay have become an important, though not quantifi-able, source of internal decay (such as corruption anderosion of CCP authority) as well as popular resistanceexpressed in a variety of forms (such as tax evasion,open defiance of authority, and noncompliance withgovernment rules). The ideological void created by thedeclining Communist orthodoxy has led to the prolif-eration of new values that pose direct and indirect



challenges to the regime. Among those values areWestern liberalism (especially strong among the intel-ligentsia), various religions and cults (such as theCatholic Church, Islam, and quasi-religious groupslike the Falun Gong).

The relationship between the regime and societyhas been affected by the ideological shift. The value-based bond (however false, in retrospect) that con-nected the regime with the Chinese people has evapo-rated. Faced with a people deeply disillusioned withits official ideology and distrustful of its policies, theregime has grown increasingly reliant on a new set ofinstruments, the most prominent of which are prag-matist policies aimed at maintaining high economicgrowth and improving people’s livelihoods, appeals toChinese nationalism, and selective repression.

It remains too soon to judge whether this ad hocapproach can adequately offset the loss of ideologicalappeal suffered by the regime. Pragmatist policiesunder Deng and Jiang Zemin have contributed greatlyto China’s economic growth and rising standards ofliving. However, pragmatism is no ideology—it mayprovide ad hoc political justification of policy, but itdoes not supply an alternative vision. Its appealremains strong at the moment because most Chinesepeople seem to assign a high value to economic devel-opment. Such appeal may decline as, ironically, thestandards of living rise to a certain level and peoplebegin to demand changes in the political system.

Appeals to nationalism can produce, at best,short-lived support. Such appeals tend to be moreeffective when the country faces acute externalthreats. Without such threats, it is hard to translatenationalism-generated emotions into political sup-port for the regime’s domestic policy. On many issues,nationalism is simply irrelevant to China’s most press-ing problems (rampant official corruption, risinginequality, environmental degradation, and restruc-turing of unprofitable state-owned enterprises). Over-playing nationalism could also backfire because itrisks jeopardizing the regime’s other goals. Obviously,fueling anti-Western nationalism could undermineChina’s relations with the West and investors’ confi-dence. The nationalism card could also be played bythe dissident groups to embarrass the regime.

On balance, declining ideological cohesivenessdoes not pose an immediate threat to political stabil-ity. Its impact on Chinese politics is subtle, indirect,and impossible to measure. In all likelihood, theregime will face greater challenges—mainly from the

rise of competing ideologies and beliefs—in thefuture, especially if it fails to offer a more coherentideology that is fundamentally compatible with theChinese political reality.

Institutional Cohesiveness

Institutional cohesiveness—the degree to whichthe principal institutions of a political system per-form according to a set of rules and norms—affectspolitical stability in several ways. In a polity in whichthe main political institutions have a well-definedscope of authority and norms are enforceable, thepolitical process tends to be more stable and the gov-ernment functions more effectively. This does notmean the total absence of conflict in such systems—conflict of interests exists in any political system.However, well-defined and enforceable rules andnorms can help manage such conflicts and containtheir effects. In contrast, polities in which the princi-pal institutions perform according to poorly definedor unenforceable rules and norms often experienceparalysis as institutional rivalry develops into anuncontrolled fight for power.

In the Chinese context, an analysis of institutionalcohesiveness must examine two sets of institutionalrelationships—those between the ruling CommunistParty and the state and those among the various insti-tutions of the state.

The central characteristic of the Chinese politicalsystem is its party-state. A peculiar product of the 20th

century, the party-state differs from the nation-statebecause of the supremacy of the ruling party over thestate and the existence of a parallel system of rulewhich embodies and ensures such supremacy and per-forms the basic functions of government. The emer-gence of the party-state in China was largely a productof history. The Chinese Revolution forged a well-organized political party that later established the Chi-nese state after winning the revolution. For a develop-ing country ravaged by revolution and civil war, theCommunist Party became a central organizing force.Its hierarchical structure, organizational networks, andpolitical ideology could easily be tapped to meet theurgent needs of state-building. Despite the claims thatthe Communist Party built the modern Chinese state,the truth is that the state was established on the backof the Communist Party. The short-term advantages



of a party-state were evident: State authority wasswiftly established; the young communist state, againstmonumental odds, was able to perform its most criti-cal functions (law and order, national security, andprovision of basic public goods).

However, the party-state has numerous long-termdegenerative flaws. The effective administration of thestate by the ruling party perpetuates the weakness ofthe state. Political risks in a party-state are highly con-centrated, because the health of the state depends onthe vigor of the ruling party. Ideological and organi-zational decline of the ruling party inevitably impairsthe effectiveness of the state. Internal division andpower struggle of the ruling party often affect theintegrity of key state institutions. Most important, thesupremacy of the ruling party politicizes the basicstate institutions, such as the military and courts,which are supposed to be autonomous in modernpolitical systems.

The tensions between the ruling party and thestate are thus unavoidable, for the basic needs of theparty (maintaining its monopoly of power) and thoseof a modern state (keeping itself autonomous frompolitical forces) inevitably conflict. To be sure, suchconflicts of party interests vs. state interests in theChinese case have been often disguised as intraregimedisputes (such as over the party’s policy priorities). Inthe Deng era, the ruling elites became increasinglyaware of the need to define the party-state relation-ship and proposed, in 1987, to separate the party fromthe state. The reform initiative, which was associatedwith soon-to-be-disgraced CCP General SecretaryZhao Ziyang, failed miserably in the conservativebacklash of 1989. After the Tiananmen crackdown,the regime reemphasized the supremacy of the CCPand never seriously entertained any thought of with-drawing itself from the state. Consequently, the long-accumulated tensions between the party and the stateremain and, if anything, are expected to increase inthe future as the contradictions between the centralcharacteristics of a monopolistic party regime and therequirements of a modern state intensify and becomemore visible.

The cohesiveness of a state is not only influencedby the relationship between the ruling political forcesand the state apparatus, but also by the relationshipbetween the various components of the state appara-tus itself. In the Chinese case, these two sets of rela-tionships are interdependent. This interdependenceposes highly complicated challenges to reform efforts

aimed at creating a more decentralized and flexiblestate. It is generally recognized that, despite dramaticeconomic decentralization of the last twenty years,political authority in China remains highly central-ized. Such centralization has been usually attributedto China’s perceived need for it and to the country’sproverbial fear of disintegration. Much less well-understood, however, is the fact that, although cen-tralization of power has long been a historical featureof the Chinese political system, the monopoly ofpower by the Communist Party has made the central-ization of state not only necessary but sustainable.Without the party-state, such centralization may bepossible, but its perpetuation is unlikely. On the otherhand, a highly centralized state serves the needs of theCommunist Party effectively.

Centralization, however, has come at great costs.Intrastate institutional relations, especially thosebetween the central government and provincial gov-ernments, remain unstable. As a result, policy changesare frequent and sudden, creating ample incentivesfor both the center and provinces to cheat. This stateof affairs has created a unique paradox: centralizationand ineffectiveness. It is marked by the oft-observedlow capacity of the central government to implementits policies and enforce its rules in provinces, despitethe apparently high degree of centralization of deci-sionmaking power. Without restructuring China’sconstitutional framework to create a federalist state,this paradox will only worsen in the future.

The greatest failure of the Deng era was that of theregime to establish institutions capable of effectivelymanaging state-society relations. Although significantprogress in legal reform has created increasing, butlimited, institutional channels through which the Chi-nese people can seek protection of their personal andproperty rights, the overall institutional framework ofmanaging state-society relations remained almostnonexistent. For example, there are few legitimateinstitutions and procedures that can represent inde-pendently organized social interests. Those that areaccessible to the public—such as the press, the People’sCongress, and the courts—have not demonstrated suf-ficient effectiveness to gain credibility. In any case, theyprovide only individual relief, but no collective assis-tance. State-society relations are thus treated more orless as crisis management: The ruling elites are galva-nized into action only after long-accumulated state-society tensions develop into crises. Without a com-plex and sophisticated institutional framework to



address such tensions, the regime typically resorts torepression, rather than manipulation or diversion, todeal with such crises (the most recent example beingthe crackdown on the Falun Gong movement). Thismodus operandi tends to create short-term instabilitywithout any long-term benefits. The fundamentalsolution to this systemic flaw is a gradual, but signifi-cant, expansion of democratic participation and socialautonomy in China—a highly unlikely prospect giventhe current political climate in Beijing.

Social Cohesiveness

Two factors determine the degree of social cohe-siveness of a society: class cleavages and cultural iden-tity. Generally, societies with less divisive class cleav-ages and strong cultural identity (Japan and Germanybeing such societies) enjoy a higher degree of socialcohesiveness. Although social cohesiveness per se maynot have a direct impact on political stability, it is animportant environmental factor that increases (orlowers) the overall risks of political turmoil. In coun-tries where deep class divisions (manifested chiefly inhigh inequality) and conflicts of cultural identity(mainly ethnic cleavages) exist, the likelihood of polit-ical instability is significantly higher than in countrieswhere similar cleavages are less pronounced.

There is mounting evidence showing risinginequality in China in the last twenty years. Many fac-tors contributed to this trend. The abandonment ofegalitarian policies that imposed an artificial level ofequality (mainly by preventing the accumulation ofwealth by the talented and entrepreneurial segmentsof society) during the Maoist era obviously played arole. Economic liberalization that freed up marketactivities and created new business opportunitiesallowed the entrepreneurial elements to take greaterrisks and seek higher returns. Freer labor mobility,while benefiting some, has left immobile labor ele-ments behind economically. As in the West, rapidtechnological progress has favored the younger andmore educated in the labor force. The restructuring ofloss-making state-owned enterprises removed therents previously collected by their workers. To be sure,these market forces were not solely responsible for ris-ing inequality in China. Government policy or inac-tion exacerbated this trend. For instance, lack of pub-lic investment in rural infrastructure, research anddevelopment, and primary education was a major

cause of stagnant rural income. Continual discrimi-nation against private firms (especially in terms oftheir access to bank credits and financial markets)inhibits the growth of the private sector, which couldhave helped alleviate the rising unemployment prob-lem (a major cause of inequality in urban areas). TheCCP prohibition against independent labor unionshas further denied Chinese workers their collectivebargaining power and left them poorly protected in arapidly changing labor market with few rules.

Measured by inequality, China’s social cohesive-ness has evidently declined. But it is difficult to deter-mine, on the basis of available evidence, the politicaleffects of this decline. Inequality in China has twosalient characteristics: interregional (or interprovin-cial) and urban-rural inequality. In the past, the polit-ical effects of inequality could be contained geograph-ically because of these two characteristics. Inpost-reform China, labor mobility has effectively bro-ken down the geographical barriers. The consequenceof this breakdown is rather mixed: it both reducesinequality and increases it at the same time. On anindividual level, mobile laborers who migrate to moreaffluent areas have increased their income, while thoseimmobile ones remain mired in poverty. On aregional level, provinces with a large outflow of labor-ers seem to have benefited greatly from the remit-tances those laborers have sent back.

The novel—and potentially destabilizing—phe-nomenon is the emergence of the urban poor (mainlyvictims of reforms in state-owned enterprises). Unlikethe vast masses of the rural poor (hidden and dis-persed in inaccessible interiors), China’s urban poorare concentrated, visible, and easily organized. More-over, as a relatively privileged group (state employ-ees), they are more aware of their relative deprivation,more assertive of their rights, and more skillful inconfronting the government.

The other aspect of social cohesiveness—culturalidentity—changes much more slowly than class cleav-ages. In China’s case, there are two contradictorytrends—one enhancing such identity and the otherreducing it. The trend of rising Chinese national iden-tity has evidently coincided with the resurgence ofChinese nationalism. This trend has received enor-mous impetus from the decline of the official Com-munist ideology (which used to subordinate Chinesenationalism to a universal doctrine), from govern-ment-inspired and spontaneous efforts to restore Chi-nese cultural and historical symbols, from China’s



recent economic success, from the country’s growingconfidence in its international standing (such confi-dence, it should be noted, owes a great deal to theremarkable success of Chinese athletes in interna-tional sporting events), and from the ironic effects ofglobalization (in curious ways, increasing contactwith the rest of the world may only increase the Chi-nese people’s self-cultural awareness).

But the rising Chinese cultural identity is accom-panied by a contradictory and centrifugal trend—therise of ethnic cultural identity in outlying regions withhigh concentrations of minority groups (such as inTibet and Xinjiang). This resurgence of separatism,which emphasizes cultural distinctiveness, rather thanidentity, coincided with the breakup of the SovietUnion, a historic development which inspired China’sminority groups to re-kindle their own nationalistdreams. It is worth noting that, ironically, the growthof ethnic separatism occurred despite (perhapsbecause of ) the relatively liberal ethnic policiesadopted by the post-Mao leadership. The best examplewas Tibet, where liberal reforms introduced by HuYaobang in the early 1980s failed fully to addressTibetans’ nationalist needs. Consequently, the failureof liberal policies has caused Beijing policymakers tore-adopt harsh, repressive measures in these areas. Ifthe record of the last decade is any indication, repres-sive measures have not worked. Ethnic separatism willremain a major source of instability for the foreseeablefuture, despite the low probability of success (definedin achieving the political goals of independence).

Conclusion: Focusing on the BigPicture

This discussion of political and social cohesive-ness in present-day China does not, unfortunately,yield an unambiguous assessment of the country’sstability. The rapidity of change and fluidity of condi-tions make it almost impossible to offer such an

assessment. However, this analysis demonstrates that,on balance, there has been an overall decline of socialand political cohesiveness (see table 2). Strictly speak-ing, one need not be alarmed about declining politicaland social cohesiveness in transition societies—rapidchanges inevitably produce forces tearing at the polit-ical and social fabrics of these societies. Generally,what has kept most transition societies from fallingapart under such pressures is a set of countervailingtrends that generate new forces of social and politicalcohesion. In China’s case, such trends are emergingand visible. The main cause of concern is, however,that these stabilizing trends are weak and tentative. Atthe moment, they do not appear to be capable ofcountering the centrifugal forces working within theChinese society and polity.

Table 2. Overall Assessment of Political and SocialCohesiveness

Type of Cohesiveness Increase (�) or Decline (�)

Elite �

Ideological �

Institutional �

Social �

Obviously, not all forces of disunity and instabilityhave the same political effects. For example, decliningsocial and ideological cohesiveness has mostly an indi-rect, background effect on political stability. Analystsmust focus their attention on elite and institutionalcohesiveness, because these two factors more directlyand powerfully determine political stability. Moreover,given the slow pace of institutional change and adapt-ability, elite cohesiveness will remain for a long timethe principal cause of China’s political stability.


57

A rapid worsening of Sino-Australian relations in1996 provided the new Coalition government in Can-berra—elected that March—with a clear practicaldemonstration of the importance of China. China’sirritation with Australia, already roused by the award-ing of the 2000 Olympic Games to Sydney rather thanto Beijing, had increased in March when an Australiangovernment statement expressed support for the U.S.intervention in the Taiwan Strait crisis.1 In June 1996,Chinese Minister for Trade Wu Yi expressed “strongconcern” over Australia’s sudden decision to discon-tinue its Development Import Finance Facility (DIFF)aid program. China was one of several Asian nationswith joint projects that were jeopardized by the DIFFcancellation.2

China’s annoyance with Australia increased inJuly 1996 after Australia voiced concerns over the fateof democracy and human rights in a post-handoverHong Kong3 and over China’s July nuclear test on theeve of a testing moratorium.4 Annoyance becameanger in August, when an editorial in the People’sDaily denounced the “strengthening” of the Australia-U.S. alliance as part of a coordinated campaign tocontain China that included the earlier renegotiationof the U.S.-Japan alliance: “From this we can see thatthe United States is really thinking about using thesetwo ‘anchors’ as the claws of a crab.”5 Simultaneously,

a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement accused Aus-tralia of breaching the “one China policy” in approv-ing an unofficial visit by Primary Industries MinisterJohn Anderson to Taiwan.6

Later in August, Australian Defense Minister IanMcLachlan suggested that China’s actions during theTaiwan Strait crisis, its claims in the South China Sea,and its “newly assertive international posture” weredestabilizing to the region.7 In September, AustralianPrime Minister John Howard met with the visitingDalai Lama, despite Chinese threats that such a meet-ing would jeopardize bilateral relations.8

Although none of these incidents in isolationwould ordinarily have upset bilateral relations, theiroccurrences in the space of several months plungedSino-Australian relations to the lowest point since theTiananmen incident in 1989.9 China canceled officialvisits to Australia, and verbal attacks on Australiabecame common in the official Chinese media, bring-ing Australian leaders face-to-face with the conse-quences of soured relations. The business communityraised concerns over the future of the flourishingbilateral trade. The Chinese-Australian communityand Asianist scholars questioned the government’scommitment to the Asian region. Foreign policy mak-ers pondered the added difficulties that an openlyhostile China would add to the country’s already deli-cate regional diplomacy. The strategic communityconsidered the additional defense measures thatwould be required if China became an enemy.Michael Wesley is Professor of Political Science at the University

of New South Wales, in Sydney, Australia.

The Challenges of China: AustralianPerceptions and Reactions

by Michael Wesley



Concerns were expressed outside Australia aswell. Countries in Southeast Asia questioned whetherthe worsening of Australia’s relations with China rep-resented a shift in its regional policy, which could altertheir relations as well. United States President BillClinton, embroiled in his own bilateral friction withChina, urged the Australian government to mendrelations with China during his November 1996 visitto Australia.

The lessons of 1996 for Australian foreign policymakers were profound. The Foreign and Trade PolicyWhite Paper, released in September 1997, listed Chinaas one of Australia’s “foremost” bilateral relationships,alongside the United States, Japan, and Indonesia. Itnoted that the Sino-Australian relationship would bebased on hardheaded pragmatism:

China will remain one of Australia’s key relationships.The Government’s approach to China will be based onshared interests and mutual respect. These principlesprovide the basis for a realistic framework for the con-duct of the relationship, and offer the best prospects tomaximize shared economic interests, advance Australia’spolitical and strategic interests, and manage differencesin a sensible and practical way.10

The Australian Strategic Policy White Paper ofDecember 1997 continued this theme:

Clearly, the development of policies which serve ournational interests while acknowledging China’s political,economic, and military growth will continue to be amajor priority for Australia. Our policies and actionswill seek to show China that the strategic outcomes weseek are consistent with China developing a key role onregional political, economic, and security issues com-mensurate with its legitimate claims as an emergingmajor power. The best way we can do that is to encour-age more high-level dialogue and contact betweenChina’s policy makers and our own to build bettermutual understanding of each other’s positions.11

These observations, providing a policy frameworkfor the bilateral relationship, are ubiquitous in theforeign policy establishment’s statements on Sino-Australian relations, from Department of ForeignAffairs and Trade (DFAT) briefings to speeches by thePrime Minister and the Foreign Minister.12 Accordingto both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister,the bilateral policy framework has delivered to Aus-tralia “a more productive, realistic, and sustainablerelationship with China than at any time since theresumption of diplomatic relations in the seventies.”13

This policy framework gives the impression thatthere is a unified view among Australian policymakerson the future of China, how this will affect the Asia-Pacific region, and how Australia should respond.Closer analysis reveals, however, that no such unifiedview exists. The following discussion outlines the threedifferent visions of China’s future role in the regionthat are held by Australian policymakers and academ-ics: (1) as a player in an “accelerating status quo” in theAsia-Pacific; (2) as a crucial participant in an increas-ingly integrated Asia-Pacific community; and (3) as agreat power in an imminent balance of power.

While these visions all tend to agree on China’sobjectives—the need to become a unified, internallystable, great power—they differ on China’s ability toachieve these objectives and how its development willaffect the region, and they differ on their prescriptionsfor how Australia should manage bilateral relationswith China and the United States. The different visionsare not always mutually exclusive, nor do individualpolicymakers and academics always subscribe to thesame one. Each vision tends to rise to prominencewhen called forth by different events in the region.

Three Visions of China’s Future in the Region

Vision 1: An “Accelerating Status Quo”

This vision of the future for China in the region, aview held by many Australian policymakers and aca-demics, is like the others in that it expects China andother states of the Western Pacific to seek greaterwealth, power, and internal stability. However, it dis-agrees with the other views on China’s ability toachieve equal status with other great powers.

This skepticism is expressed in two ways. One clus-ter of opinion suspects that China’s rise to great powerstatus will be interrupted by serious internal problems:corruption, unemployment, political instability.14 Theother cluster argues that even if China does becomewealthy, internally stable, and powerful, the nature ofpower has changed in such a way that China will not beable to assail the lead in power that the United Statespossesses. The United States will continue to lengthenits lead over China due to revolutions in informationand technology, which place American power in a dif-ferent strategic league and complement the “revolutionin military affairs” (RMA).15


Australian Perceptions and Reactions 59

The common conclusion reached by both of theseschools of thought is that the continuing predomi-nance of American power, and its estimated 25-yearlead in military technology over its closest WesternPacific competitors, will see the present security struc-ture in the Asia-Pacific region persist for the majorityof the 21st century. That all of the states of theregion—China, the United States, Japan, and theASEAN states—will continue to advance in wealthand power will mean the situation will “accelerate,”but not in any way alter the status quo in the currenthierarchy of power. Neither will these advanceschange the basic hub-and-spokes structure of bilateralsecurity relationships between Asia-Pacific states andthe United States.

Vision 2: The Emerging Asia-Pacific Community

Agreeing with the first view that China and otherWestern Pacific states want wealth, power, and inter-nal stability, this vision argues that pursuit of thesegoals will alter the nature of their societies and orderin the region. Analysts point to the growing interde-pendence and continued economic dynamism of theAsia-Pacific, despite the recent Asian financial crisis,as the most direct route to attaining wealth andpower. The incentives are for these states to fosterthese interdependent links—through regimes pro-moting trade liberalization, regional stability, andgreater understanding.16

Asia-Pacific institutions—the Asian-Pacific Eco-nomic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the ASEANRegional Forum, and the ASEAN Post MinisterialConference—will all make gains in their strength,resources, and effectiveness. These interdependenciesand the regimes that foster them are judged to be ulti-mately more important than the occasional tensionsand conflicts that flare up in the region. In fact,broader and more regular contacts will breed a senseof common regional feelings and mutual identifica-tion that will make such disputes less and less com-mon.17 Furthermore, greater openness and contactwill eventually alter the Asia-Pacific states’ domesticstructures, bringing greater liberalism and democracy.Newly democratic “Asian tiger economies,” such asSouth Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and perhapsIndonesia, provide evidence that economic liberalismbrings political liberalism.

From this point of view, then, China will integratefurther into a strengthening set of Asia-Pacificregimes as it pursues wealth, power, and stability, and

in the process become more open, liberal, and lessinclined to pursue interests that oppose other coun-tries in the region.

Vision 3: A Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific

According to Defense Minister John Moore,China will be “probably the second-biggest power” inthe world.18 China, Japan, Russia, and India are par-ticularly bent on gaining on the United States inpower. Such is the imperative in balancing the pre-dominant American power in the region that they arelikely to single-mindedly devote themselves to thisgoal and achieve it. The regional power race is alsolikely to be provided by the rivalry between China,India, and a Japan that is increasingly unsure aboutthe U.S. security commitment.

The Asia-Pacific region is likely to see a full eco-nomic recovery from the effects of the Asian financialcrisis, but plagued by both old and new tensions,rivalries, and instability. A five-power balance may notemerge initially. Analysts see moves such as theDecember 1999 signing of the Sino-Russian commu-niqué urging all nations to join a “balanced, multipo-lar world order” as evidence of an increasing willing-ness of former rivals to join together in balancing U.S.power.19 New regional institutions will form aroundthis new imperative to balance power.20 There will belittle prospect of reconciling the competing powers;permanent friendships will be superseded by perma-nent interests. The imperative of all states in the Asia-Pacific will be to ensure that open conflict does notbreak out between them, four of which have nucleararsenals. In this vision, China will be one of the greatpowers in an Asia-Pacific “Balance of Power.”21

How China Will Affect the Asia-Pacific Region

Each vision of China’s future entails a specificprediction about how China will affect the Asia-Pacific region in the future. The “Accelerating StatusQuo” vision is essentially one of a frustrated, and per-haps increasingly desperate, China using regionaldiplomacy to try to leverage its power in relation tothat of the United States. The region will continue tobe plagued by the Sino-U.S. rivalry, as well as otherrivalries, comprising an unresolved “uni-multipolar”structure of both attraction to and competition withthe United States.22



Under an “Accelerating Status Quo,” the issue ofTaiwan reunification is unlikely to be resolved, despiteChina’s persistent efforts to seek unification. Taiwan,on the other hand, is likely to act with increasing con-fidence if it sees the relative U.S. lead undiminishedand if the U.S. commitment to Taiwan security con-tinues.23 The more pessimistic opinion of China’spotential foresees domestic problems in China creat-ing further instability in the region, possibly throughmassive refugee flows.24 Regional instability will beincreased if recovery from the Asian financial crisis isnot complete. Continuing economic fluctuations willcreate domestic turmoil, particularly in ethnicallymixed Asian states with governments that have weaklegitimacy. There is a potential for an “arc of instabil-ity” to form to the north and east of Australia, stretch-ing from Burma and Cambodia through Indonesiaand Papua New Guinea, with New Zealand becomingever less significant as a strategic force in the region.25

The “Asia-Pacific Community” vision has a muchmore benign prediction for how China will affect theregion. China’s decision during the Asian crisis not todevalue its currency demonstrated its commitment tothe return of economic stability and growth to theregion.26 Figures already show that the region is wellon its way to a full recovery, and before long will beleading the world in economic growth.27 In this con-text, regional institutions will be strengthened andmade more effective; institutional innovations arealready being mooted with this purpose in mind.28

China’s growing interest in and commitment toregional institutions will continue.29

Interdependence and regime membership willincreasingly define China’s relationship with the Asia-Pacific region. These forces will also begin to trans-form China and the Asia-Pacific. Economic opennesswill be followed by political liberalization and the“demand for new institutions, social welfare struc-tures, and a more predictable legal framework.”30

Generational change in leaderships will bring newpolitical values into the governments of China andothers.31 As interdependence breeds a sense ofregional community, structures of sovereignty andrivalry will begin to be mitigated. This may eventuallycontribute to the resolution of the region’s most seri-ous ongoing tensions—between China and Taiwan,on the Korean Peninsula, and in the South China Sea.

The “Balance of Power” vision sees China’s rise topower exerting a profound influence on the region.Security calculations of the region’s states, until now

determined by U.S. strategic predominance, will needto be reviewed in relation to a new center of poweremerging.32 Thailand and Malaysia have already dab-bled in developing closer relations with China as theybecome uncertain about their ties to the UnitedStates.33 For its part, China will seek allies to balancethe coalition of U.S. allies in the region: This has beenthe motive of its refusal to devalue its currency duringthe crisis, and its campaign to improve relations withSoutheast Asian states.34

For the most part, China’s regional strategy will bedriven by its overriding rivalry with the United States,leading it to seek accommodation with former greatpower rivals Russia, India, and possibly Japan. Asia-Pacific states will have more options if their relationswith the United States become strained. On the otherhand, the new imperative for the smaller states of theregion will be to avoid being trampled in the course ofgreat power competition. They will need to managetheir relations with the great powers in such a way asto avoid being “chain-ganged” by a larger ally into aconflict not of their making. They will also have aninterest in maintaining stability and peace between thegreat powers in order to escape the devastating effectof what may possibly be a nuclear conflict. Regionaltension spots such as Taiwan and the Korean Penin-sula, will become possible conflict detonators and arelikely to attract great attention within the region.

Australia’s Regional Policy

The different visions of China in the region alsocall forth different imperatives for how Australia willrelate to the Asia-Pacific region. If an AcceleratingStatus Quo develops, Australia’s overriding objectivewill be to maintain its security alliance and close rela-tions with the United States. To these ends, the For-eign and Trade Policy White Paper states that:

A key objective of the Government will be to strengthenfurther the relationship between Australia and theUnited States by expanding the already close links thatexist at the bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels.The Government will be looking, in particular, tobroaden its dialogue with the United States on Asia-Pacific issues, and to encourage it to accord sustainedhigh-level policy attention to the region.35

The East Timor crisis—for which Australiaappealed to the United States to lead the international



peacekeeping force into the devastated province butwas politely rebuffed—introduced another elementinto these calculations. Echoes of the Nixon doctrinewere audible in the U.S. commitment to providelogistical support but not troops, urging Australia totake the lead. This led to the now-infamous interviewgiven by the Australian Prime Minister and its charac-terization as the “Howard doctrine”—Prime MinisterJohn Howard suggested that Australia could take thelead in stabilizing regional turmoil while U.S. forcesplayed the role of a “lender of last resort” in securityterms. In an “Accelerating Status Quo” vision, Aus-tralia could be an agent of U.S. security policy in low-level security situations:

[The East Timor operation, led by Australia] has done alot to cement Australia’s place in the region. We havebeen seen by countries, not only in the region but aroundthe world, as being able to do something that probablyno other country could do; because of the special charac-teristics we have; because we occupy that special place—we are a European, Western civilization with strong linksto North America, but here we are in Asia.36

The Prime Minister has since retracted supportfor this so-called Howard doctrine in the face of polit-ical ridicule and media criticism.37 Elements of theintent behind the Howard doctrine can, however, stillbe heard in statements of the military and foreignpolicy establishments.38

A vision of an “Asia-Pacific Community” requiresAustralian policy to focus on participating in and thestrengthening of regional multilateral institutions:

Active participation in APEC and other regional insti-tutions demonstrates Australia’s recognition that itsfuture is inextricably linked to the future of the Asia-Pacific region. It reflects the Government’s commitmentto being closely involved—from the inside—in shapingthe region’s future.39

Regional states that are not yet members of theseinstitutions and important global institutions shouldbe included as soon as possible. Furthermore, it isimportant that the great powers abide by the rulesand norms of these institutions, thereby protectingthe interests of smaller regional players like Australia.

The current government is wary of placing all ofAustralia’s interests in “grand constructs,” and muchmore skeptical of multilateralism than its predecessorhad been:

Australia must be realistic about what the multilateralsystem can achieve. The twentieth century has been

both the incubator and the graveyard of a long list ofinitiatives for international cooperation. In most casestheir failure reflected an inability to recognize thatinternational organizations can only accomplish whattheir members states are prepared to enable them toaccomplish. All too often international initiatives havefailed to match aspirations with capability.40

At the same time as the government has elevated“practical bilateralism” to the core of Australia’s for-eign policy, the current Australian government hasremained committed to and interested in multilateralstructures, from the United Nations and the Compre-hensive Test Ban Treaty, to forging a link between itsown free trade agreement with New Zealand and theASEAN Free Trade Area.

A “Balance of Power” vision requires Australiandiplomacy to be flexible, able to respond quickly toshifts in power balances. It also needs to be pragmaticand dedicated to developing working relationshipswith all states in the region, which it can subsequentlycall on in the context of the evolving balance. “Specialrelationships” are to be shunned, as is “emotionalism”in foreign policy. This has been emphasized by theAustralian government, particularly in relation toChina: “[A]ffirming that we have a special relation-ship with China does not improve our policy choices,it constrains them. It sets up unreal expectations bothhere and in China which cannot always be met. In theend, it only sets us up for a fall.”41

Many see Australia’s unthreatening nature and itscreativity in foreign policy as conferring the advantagesof playing the role of a middle power,42 helping to miti-gate tensions between great powers: “For Australia, it isadherence to fundamental values wrapped around acreative and nimble diplomacy that helps to show thebigger powers the imperative of reaching solutions.”43

At the same time, the new instability in the region hasled many to question Australia’s military preparedness,comparing defense spending of less than 2 percent ofGDP in 1998 unfavorably with Australia’s more than 5percent of GDP defense budget in 1951.44

Another view within the balance of power schoolis that Australia should prepare for the coming bipolaror multipolar regional system by prioritizing relationsnot with the United States or China, but with thesmaller states of the region, which are similarly tornbetween the two and endangered by the prospect ofthe Sino-American rivalry spilling into open conflict:



Our best guarantee against being forced to choose[between the United States and China] is to give muchgreater emphasis to our relations with other countries inEast Asia and to make common cause with them—inour separate bilateral relations and in larger, multilat-eral formations. This gives us options and flexibility andsome possibility of working together with other EastAsians to help ameliorate the tensions between Wash-ington and Beijing.45

Australia’s China Policy

Examining Australian policies toward China inthe context of these three different visions helpsexplain some of the complexities in Australia’s largerforeign policy. Each vision prompts a distinctive set ofAustralian policies towards China.

The vision of an “Accelerating Status Quo” in theAsia-Pacific, and Australia’s imperative to maintain aclose relationship with the culturally similar Ameri-can superpower, is comforting to those who are con-vinced that “there will continue to be major differ-ences between our societies and political structures,”46

and that these differences have a major influence onthe ability of states to associate. China policy thereforedepends heavily on the state of Sino-American rela-tions at any given point in time. Australia’s allianceimperative to support the United States in the Asia-Pacific, both rhetorically and materially, will some-times entail tension in the Sino-Australian relation-ship. However, Australia will continue to haveimportant interests that require a workable relation-ship with China; the imperative therefore will be totry to mitigate conflicts between Australia’s interestswith China and its commitment to the U.S. alliance.47

The structures underlying the “Accelerating StatusQuo” vision are likely to be the RMA and the proposalfor theater missile defense (TMD) in North Asia. Aus-tralia will probably need to subscribe to or supportthese programs in the future,48 while its forces willneed to remain interoperable with those of the UnitedStates and its Asia-Pacific allies.

Those with visions of an “Asia-Pacific Commu-nity” believe Australian policy toward China shouldfocus on a number of different imperatives:

First, China’s participation in, and commitmentand adherence to, regional and multilateral institu-tions should be encouraged: “China must have a placein international institutions and a say in setting the

rules it is expected to abide by. But China’s participa-tion must be on a basis that will strengthen thoseinstitutions.”49

Australia has strongly backed China’s bid tobecome a member of the World Trade Organization(WTO), and was an early advocate of including the“three Chinas”—China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan—in APEC.50 Institutions and norms are the best wayto accommodate China’s unsettling regional aspira-tions: Australia actively promoted the adoption of acode of conduct to regulate the actions of China andits rival claimants to the South China Sea,51 andreacted with disappointment when China rejectedthe proposed code.52

Second, Australia should build a stronger andmore varied bilateral relationship with China. Thishas prompted innovations such as the “One and aHalf Track” security talks and the establishment ofexchanges with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) asan extra line of access into the Chinese government.53

Such regular contact and socialization is important infostering empathy between the two countries:“[T]here is absolutely no substitute for face-to-facecontact in gaining a better understanding of howanother country sees the world.”54

Third, Australia’s policy should be dedicated toworking with China on issues where their interestsconverge:

Australia has worked to build a relationship whichmaximizes our mutual economic interests, promotescooperation on the many issues of common concern;protects our strategic interests, and is direct about thedifferences in values while managing them as produc-tively as possible.55

Fourth, positive domestic change within China ina non-confrontational way should be promoted. Cur-rent Australian policy includes an annual bilateralhuman rights dialogue and a human rights technicalassistance program designed to promote civil societyand the rule of law.

An Asia-Pacific “Balance of Power” vision entailsa number of benefits as well as imperatives for Aus-tralia’s China policy. In fact, a number of benefits infinding common cause with China have emerged inrecent years. China intervened on Australia’s behalf inits attempts to free jailed aid workers Peter Wallaceand Steve Pratt from a Belgrade jail.56 In September1999, imprisoned Chinese-Australian businessmanJames Peng was released from a Shanghai prison. As a



permanent member of the Security Council, China isimportant to various initiatives Australia may want topursue in the United Nations.57

Australia has also proved useful to China. A furi-ous China relied partly on Australia to pressure PapuaNew Guinea to reverse its decision in July 1999 toestablish full diplomatic relations with Taiwan inexchange for an estimated $3.8 billion in aid.58 Aus-tralia has already been able to use its strengthened tieswith China to apply pressure to the United States overthe troubled issue of Australia-U.S. trade. Visiting Bei-jing in July 1999, Foreign Minister Alexander Downerunfavorably contrasted the U.S. announcement of itsimposition of quotas on lamb imports—a major Aus-tralian export market—with a recent Sino-Australianunderstanding on trade: “So, on the one hand [theUnited States is] closing off an important export mar-ket to Australia and on the other hand, on the otherside of the Pacific, through our World Trade Organi-zation negotiations with China, we are getting betteraccess to a whole range of markets.”59

The relationship with China must at all times bepragmatic, and interest-based, however: “[I]n thepast, Australia’s relations with China have assumed anoverly emotional character, with a tendency to suc-cumb to the excesses of opprobrium or enthusiasm.”60

A realistic view of Australia’s relative importanceto China can have real advantages in a Balance ofPower. As Foreign Minister Downer noted:

Australia will rarely dominate China’s foreign policyconsiderations. . . . But this does have advantages for us.We do not come to the Chinese with the same compli-cated political baggage that others have. We do not chal-lenge Beijing in the same way. We are also not directlyembroiled in regional issues like the South China Sea,where Beijing believes it has core national interests atstake. We can talk to China about such matters withouthaving our own vested interest called into challenge and,as a result, are now seen as valuable interlocutors on awhole series of regional issues.61

This advantage also means that Australia shouldnot adopt a confrontational stand on human rights.Here, Australian policymakers are less constrainedthan their American counterparts because of the lackof a large and organized lobby concerned with China’shuman rights record. Australian public concern tendsto peak around issues such as the Tiananmen incidentor the forced abortion—under the one-child policy—of a pregnant woman deported from Australia to

China.62 Australian leaders have adopted the stancethat, “Shouting at the Chinese about human rights inpublic forums is counter-productive,”63 which allayssome of the media and public criticism of their stanceof not confronting China on human rights abuses.64

They have also argued that not only does confronta-tion with China risk Australia’s trade ties and diplo-matic influence, it is pointless, given Australia’s lack ofdiplomatic weight with China. Moreover, it is lesseffective than private representations and dialogue.

Australian Policies toward the UnitedStates

Each vision also prescribes different ways to han-dle Australian relations with the United States. The“Accelerating Status Quo” view places Australia-U.S.relations at the center of Australian foreign policy;thus, all policy decisions should follow from the pre-rogatives of the alliance with the United States. TheU.S. presence in the region is vital for Asia-Pacificsecurity : “Australia—along with others in theregion—regards [American] strategic engagement asvital for the stability of Asia. We are committed toproviding the political and practical support to makethat possible.”65

There are two main policy prescriptions involvedin this task. The first is to ensure that the UnitedStates remains interested in and engaged in the Asia-Pacific region. Great nervousness is caused by isola-tionist elements in the U.S. Congress, which would seethe U.S. reduce its security forces in the WesternPacific and perhaps close its markets to Asianexports.66 The maintenance of the bilateral alliance, of“highest strategic priority” for Australia, is crucial formaintaining U.S. engagement: “[T]he US-Australiaalliance has come to be seen by both sides as animportant element in the post-Cold War strategicarchitecture in the Asia-Pacific region, helping to sus-tain US strategic engagement in the Western Pacific.”67

The second policy requirement is to make surethat the United States never loses interest in itsalliance with Australia. Australia, long dependent onalliances with “great and powerful friends,” also has avisceral fear that its allies will not come to its assis-tance when it is attacked.68 For this reason, Australiamust continually demonstrate its usefulness to theUnited States, in intelligence sharing, in regional



diplomacy, and in maintaining a significant enoughstrategic presence to be useful as a coalition partnerwith U.S. forces in regional operations.69 Australiamust also restrain itself from pushing issues of con-flict with the United States, such as agricultural trade,which could damage the core security relationship.

The “Asia-Pacific Community” vision dictatesthat the United States must be kept committed to andengaged in regional institutions. For the most part,this is consistent with policies seeking continued U.S.engagement in the region. It leads Australian policy-makers to stress the achievements of regional organi-zations such as APEC, in order to maintain U.S.interest in the organization.70 On the other hand, itentails harsh criticisms of American policy when thisis seen to be damaging to, or ignoring its obligationsunder regional institutions.71 It also has brought crit-icism when U.S. policy toward China and Asia moregenerally is characterized as “confused,” to the detri-ment of the institutions and norms emerging in theAsia-Pacific.72

A sub-stream of opinion within this vision sug-gests that it may be easier to construct more viableregional institutions if the United States is left out ofthem. Citing ongoing bilateral tensions between theUnited States and both China and Japan, such opin-ion proposes a regional organization in the WesternPacific, including Australia and New Zealand with theASEAN states, China, South Korea, and Japan, but notthe United States or Canada.73 This arrangementwould not be in order to balance against U.S. powerand influence; rather, the United States would still betied into the Asia-Pacific region through other bilat-eral and institutional structures, as it is with the Euro-pean Union.

The “Balance of Power” vision creates greaterfreedom to maneuver Australian policy toward theUnited States. The evolution of different centers ofpower means that Australian policy would no longerbe tied to the maintenance of one key bilateral rela-tionship, but could balance it differently as its inter-ests were affected by different issues. This wouldresolve a central tension in Australian foreign policy:its current overwhelming reliance on the bilateralsecurity alliance with the U.S., but a growing fre-quency of disagreements with the United States on avariety of regional issues, from trade to human rightsand environmental standards.74 If the balanceremained loose, the prospect for Australia may be togravitate toward states with more complementary

interests and views on particular issues. On the otherhand, threatening to gravitate elsewhere could presentAustralia with some additional leverage over theUnited States:

We in fact have more powerful weapons in our handsthan we know. Since the end of the Cold War the strate-gic alliance with the US has become less important andless central to our affairs. . . . Would we be brave enoughto say to the US: we want your friendship, we want thestrategic alliance to remain but, if you want it toremain, you also have to treat us as an economic allyrather than as an economic enemy?75

The danger of the balance of power, however,would be the added risk of being drawn into a majorgreat power conflict. Such concerns were raised asrecently as July 1999, as China reacted angrily whenTaiwanese President Lee Teng-hui described theirs as“state to state” relations: “If China attacked Taiwan,the United States would probably support Taiwan.Australia and Japan could be drawn in under theterms of their defense agreements with the US.”76

Conclusion

The purpose of this analysis has not been to sug-gest that the Australian foreign policy establishment,academics, and the media are divided into three cohe-sive groups of opinion on China and the region’sfuture, and its implications for Australian policy. Theanalysis itself uses statements made by the same peo-ple on different issues and at different times to illus-trate different visions. The central point of this analy-sis has been to argue that a close examination ofAustralian foreign policy and the statements of lead-ers and academics show that in Australia there is noconsensus on the future of China in the region. Thethree visions outlined above are simplifications ofcurrent opinion in Australia; they do allow similarviews in the same rubric. They allow one to explorethe implications of each vision for Australian policytoward China and the United States.

Each vision is based on a different prediction forChina and the region in the future. As events emergeto support or call into question these predictions, dif-ferent visions and their policy consequences will riseto prominence. The Asian crisis, in calling into ques-tion the inevitability and sustainability of the “Asianmiracle,” has seen the Accelerating Status Quo vision



gain currency since 1997. At the same time, the weakresponses of regional institutions to the Asian crisiscalled into question the Asia-Pacific Communityvision and its predictions of a more institutionalized,norm-governed, stable region. Yet this vision hasgained strength from China’s decision against devalu-ing its currency, and the democratization of a numberof western Pacific states. The Balance of Power visionhas been given new prominence by the December1999 Sino-Russian communiqué and the South Asiannuclear tests.

None of these “standards of evidence” are decisiveenough to allow one vision to predominate. For thisreason, Australian pronouncements and policy fre-quently contain elements and consequences of allthree. Whether the weight of evidence accumulates infavor of one vision or all three is likely to determinethe policy responses of Australia. However, at thisuncertain time, it is unquestionably better to haveseveral possible visions of the future than for Australiato have invested all of its confidence, resources, andinterests in one, possibly mistaken, vision.

Notes1 China’s military forces conducted live-fire air and naval

exercises in the Taiwan Strait between March 8 and March 25,1996. Missiles were launched from China into the sea near Tai-wan’s two major ports. The exercises were seen as intimidation ofTaiwan shortly after it held the presidential election in which LeeTeng-hui became the first directly elected head of state in China’shistory. The United States responded by sending two carrier bat-tlegroups to the area.

2 See Michael Dwyer, “Downer Forced into Backdown,” Aus-tralian Financial Review, June 25, 1996.

3 On July 1, 1997, Britain officially ceded sovereignty overthe territory of Hong Kong to the PRC.

4 Don Greenlees, “Downer Warns China on HK,” Australian,July 26, 1996; Gabrielle Chan, “Downer Condemns ChineseN–Test on Moratorium Eve,” The Australian, July 30, 1996.

5 Michael Dwyer, “Australia and Japan are the Claws US WillUse to Entrap Us, Says China,” Australian Financial Review,August 8, 1996.

6 Mark Baker, “China Launches Double Attack,” SydneyMorning Herald, August 8, 1996.

7 Don Greenlees, “McLachlan Criticises China,” Australian,August 24, 1996.

8 D. D. MacNicholl and Don Greenlees, “PM Defies China’sEconomic Threats to Greet Dalai Lama,” The Australian, Septem-ber 27, 1996.

9 On June 4, 1989, the Chinese government used tanks andmilitary forces to suppress thousands of student demonstrators inTiananmen Square.

10 Commonwealth of Australia, In the National Interest: Aus-tralia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper (Canberra: NationalCapital Printing, 1997), 63.

11 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Strategic Policy(Canberra: DPUBS, 1997), 24.

12 See, for example, the Department of Foreign Affairs andTrade Website at http//www.dfat.gov.au/ geo/na/prc.

13 John Howard MP, Prime Minister of Australia, Address at aLunch Hosted by Georgetown University, Washington, DC, July13, 1999.

14 See, for example, David Lague, “Dancing With the Dicta-tors,” Sydney Morning Herald, September 8, 1999.

15 See, for example, Paul Dibb, “The Revolution in MilitaryAffairs and Asian Security,” IISS Annual Conference on SecurityChallenges in the Rising Asia-Pacific, Singapore, September11–14, 1997.

16 See, for example, Ross Garnaut, Open Regionalism andTrade Liberalisation: An Asia-Pacific Contribution to the WorldTrade System (Singapore: ISEAS, 1997).

17 See Gareth Evans, “Australia in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific: Beyond the Looking Glass,” speech to the Asia-AustraliaInstitute, Sydney, March 20, 1995.

18 Quoted in David Lague, “Dancing with the Dictators,” Syd-ney Morning Herald, September 8, 1999.

19 David Lague, “Russia, China in Pact Against West,” SydneyMorning Herald, December 11, 1999.

20 For example, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung sug-gested in October 1999 that Southeast Asian nations and the threeNortheast Asian nations—South Korea, the People’s Republic ofChina (PRC), and Japan—establish a new regional mechanism oneconomic and security cooperation; see Chon Shi-yong, “KimCalls for Merger of East Asia, ASEAN,” The Korea Herald, October23, 1999.

21 Paul Dibb, David D. Hale, and Peter Prince, in “The Strate-gic Implications of Asia’s Economic Crisis,” Survival, Vol. 40, No. 2(Summer 1998), suggest that both China and the United Stateshave emerged relatively strengthened by the Asian crisis, a factorlikely to lead to added competition and balancing urges.

22 This term was coined by Samuel P. Huntington, “TheLonely Superpower” Foreign Affairs 78 (March/April 1999).

23 See Greg Austin, ed., “Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan’sFuture: Innovations in Politics and Military Power,” CanberraPapers on Strategy and Defence No. 122 (Canberra: AustralianNational University, 1997).

24 Australian concern over the effects of refugee flows hasbeen heightened in recent months by the rising tide of illegalimmigrants and people-smuggling operations that have beendetected by the Australian customs and immigration service; seeBernard Lagan, “The People Smugglers,” Sydney Morning Herald,May 22, 1999.

25 Dibb et al., “The Strategic Implications of Asia’s EconomicCrisis.”

26 Ben Dolven and Lorien Holland, “Softly, Softly,” Far East-ern Economic Review 62, No. 23 (June 10, 1999).

27 “ASEAN Looks to the New Year,” The Economist, December19, 1998.

28 Michael Wesley, “The Asian Crisis and the Adequacy ofRegional Institutions,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 21, No. 1(April 1999).

29 Patrick Walters, “China to Play Key Role in ASEANForum,” The Australian, July 23, 1996.


http//www.dfat.gov.au/ geo/na/prc


30 Howard, Address at a Lunch Hosted by Georgetown Uni-versity, July 13, 1999.

31 Recently, Foreign Minister Downer cited the introductionof elections at the village level in China as evidence of the progressof liberalization, but warned that much still remained to be done;see Alexander Downer, “The 1999 China Oration,” Australia-China Business Council, Sydney, November 25, 1999.

32 Greg Austin, “Apocalypse Next? Will Asia Become the NextArena For Great Power Conflict?” Asia-Australia Papers, Septem-ber 2, 1999.

33 Michael Vatikiotis, Murray Hiebert, and S. Jayasankaran,“Imperial Intrigue,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 160 (Sep-tember 11, 1997).

34 “East Asia’s New Faultlines,” The Economist, March 14,1998.

35 Commonwealth of Australia, In the National Interest: Aus-tralia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, 58.

36 Fred Brenchley, “The Howard Defence Doctrine,” The Bul-letin, September 28, 1999, 24.

37 Paul Kelly, “Delusions of Grandeur,” The Australian,December 11, 1999.

38 Howard, in a speech to the Millennium Forum in Sydneyat the end of November 1999, said, “I don’t think this country hasstood taller and stronger in the chanceries of the world than itdoes at the present time”—a clear signal that the triumphalismderived from the East Timor operation is still alive and well in thethinking of the Prime Minister and foreign policymakers.

39 Commonwealth of Australia, In the National Interest: Aus-tralia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, 45.

40 Ibid., 47.41 Downer, “The 1999 China Oration.”42 Michael Wesley and Tony Warren, “Wild Colonial Ploys?

Currents of Thought in Australian Foreign Policy,” AustralianJournal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 1 (March 2000), 19.

43 Bruce Wolpe, “Learning to Stand on Our Own Feet,” Syd-ney Morning Herald, August 30, 1999.

44 “Time to Take on Defence,” Sydney Morning Herald, Sep-tember 17, 1999.

45 Stephen FitzGerald, “How (Not) to Deal With China,”Quadrant, Vol. 41, No. 7–8 (July-August 1997), 19–20.

46 Howard, Address at a Lunch Hosted by Georgetown Uni-versity.

47 Stuart Harris, Will China Divide Australia and the US?(Sydney: Australian Centre for American Studies, 1998).

48 Stephen Lunn, “$10 bn for Defence to Catch Up,” The Aus-tralian, November 1–2, 1997, quotes remarks by Deputy Secretaryof Defence Hugh White predicting that this amount of investmentwill have to be made over the next 10 years if it is to remain com-patible with U.S. systems. He also stated that Australia’s failure todo this would create a “strategic risk” in the region.

49 Howard, Address at a Lunch Hosted by Georgetown Uni-versity.

50 Michelle Grattan, “PM Backs China’s Trade Bid,” SydneyMorning Herald, September 9, 1999.

51 Craig Skehan, “Downer Push for Regional Code,” SydneyMorning Herald, July 27, 1999.

52 Joseph Brady, “China Snubs Island Peace Code,” SydneyMorning Herald, November 27, 1999.

53 David Lague, “Canberra Forges New Links with PLA,” Syd-ney Morning Herald, February 26, 1999.

54 Downer, “1999 China Oration.”55 Howard, Address at a Lunch Hosted by Georgetown Uni-

versity.56 David Lague, “China to Plead for Aid Pair,” Sydney Morn-

ing Herald, July 13, 1999.57 A recent reminder of this was China’s refusal to endorse

the renewal of the U.N. mandate for the peacekeeping force inMacedonia because of Macedonia’s recognition of Taiwan; see“China Pressed on Macedonia,” Sydney Morning Herald, February27, 1999.

58 Australia’s representations to Papua New Guinea to cut tieswith Taiwan included its warnings that its neighbor’s move added“unwelcome tension” to the region, and would have “negative eco-nomic implications” for Papua New Guinea; see David Lague,“Ties with Taipei Infuriate Beijing,” Sydney Morning Herald, July7, 1999.

59 Michelle Grattan, “Give Us Action, Not Talk: PM,” SydneyMorning Herald, July 14, 1999.

60 Downer, “1999 China Oration.”61 Ibid.62 Damien Murphy, “China Forces Asylum Seeker to Abort

Baby,” Sydney Morning Herald, May 5, 1999.63 Downer, “1999 China Oration.”64 See David Lague, “Downer’s China Syndrome: What

Human Rights Abuses?” Sydney Morning Herald, July 17, 1999.65 Howard, Address at a Lunch Hosted by Georgetown Uni-

versity.66 Geoff Hiscock, “US View of Asia Dangerous, Says Hawke,”

Australian, August 7, 1996.67 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Strategic Policy, 19.68 Wesley and Warren, “Wild Colonial Ploys?”, 15.69 Max Walsh, “The Dollars and Sense of Defence,” The Bul-

letin, September 28, 1999, 25.70 Michael Wesley, “The Politics of Early Voluntary Sectoral

Liberalisation in Australia,” Research Paper for the Institute forDeveloping Economies, Japan External Trade Organisation, Feb-ruary 2000.

71 For example, Prime Minister Paul Keating referred to theU.S. push to include the Russian Federation in APEC as “an act ofinternational vandalism.”

72 Michelle Grattan, “Stop the Violence, PM Tells Jakarta,”Sydney Morning Herald, July 15, 1999.

73 See, for example, former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser,“Great Power Relations and the Issue of Taiwan in the AsiaPacific,” Asia-Australia Papers, No. 2, September 1999; a variantmay also be the original Australian concept for APEC, whichenvisaged an organization without members from the easternPacific.

74 Andrew MacIntyre, “Pacific Adrift: Southeast Asia and theUS-Australia Relationship,” Pacific Review, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1996).

75 Former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, “Memo US: We’rean Ally, Not an Enemy,” The Australian, February 27, 1997.

76 David Lague, “Taiwan’s Swagger Provokes Outburst,” Syd-ney Morning Herald, July 14 , 1999.


67

As the world enters a new century and the new mil-lennium, so too does the configuration of world pow-ers. The multipolarization of the world and the glob-alization of the economy are introducing newinternational factors. In the post-Cold War era, majorpowers are readjusting and realigning their relation-ships. The developed countries, especially the UnitedStates, are enjoying a relatively stable period of eco-nomic growth and making progress in science andtechnology. The information revolution has made theworld a more integrated one. Along with these devel-opments are changes in people’s mindsets—mentali-ties as well as ideas. Another prominent developmentis the increase of the numbers of nonstate or super-state players, regional organizations, nongovernmen-tal organizations (NGOs), and multinational corpora-tions. Finally, the disintegration of the former SovietUnion is forcing the United States to redefine itsstrategic defense and China policy.

Nonetheless, states are still the most importantactors in international affairs. In terms of state-to-state relations, the Sino-U.S. relationship is one of themost important bilateral relationships. In 1999, Sino-U.S. relations experienced dramatic and drasticevents, ranging from the bombing of the ChineseEmbassy in Belgrade1 to the conclusion of a trade

agreement in Washington as a step toward China’saccession into the World Trade Organization (WTO).The U.S. presidential election in 2000 makes thefuture of the Sino-U.S. relationship even more com-plicated and difficult to predict.

Sino-U.S. relations have a strong internationalcontext because of other regional and global factors.The direction that the relationship takes will directlyaffect peace and economic development around theworld and in the Asia-Pacific region in particular.China and the United States, as two major powers,bear special responsibility. Given the commonality ofsome goals and differences between the two nations,there exist both positive and negative possibilities fortheir relationship in the years ahead.

The World, the Region, and China

World Environments

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has wit-nessed some fundamental changes. The bipolar envi-ronment has disappeared, but it is not yet clear whatkind of system is developing. Some observers suggesta Pax Americana; others talk about a multipolar sys-tem. Still others advocate something in between. Thequestion of how to define the new world system hascaused some uncertainties and anxieties.

The transition from the Cold War internationalorder to the post-Cold War environment does notresemble what has occurred in previous periods. The

Yang Jiemian is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Departmentof American Studies at the Shanghai Institute for InternationalStudies, People’s Republic of China.

Challenges for Sino-U.S. Relations:Issues and Problems

by Yang Jiemian



transition did not follow a major war and newtreaties; instead, it has been undergoing a long processof evolution. The United Nations (UN), the Interna-tional Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bankcontinue to be important parts of the current interna-tional order. But the WTO is definitely somethingnew. All countries, especially some big and middlepowers, want to obtain an advantageous position inthe NIPEO—the new international political and eco-nomic order.

Both the content and extension of internationalaffairs have expanded greatly. State-to-state relationsexceed traditional spheres, now extending into eco-nomic affairs, education, culture, environmental pro-tection, and others. Nonstate actors are coming toplay more important and active roles than everbefore. International and regional intergovernmentalorganizations act as part of a supranational govern-ment. Some multinational and transnational organi-zations have not only much more economic powerbut also more political power than do some mediumand small countries. A state’s physical boundarieshave become less important for the flow of people,capital, and technology.

A dichotomy of trends is appearing to gathermomentum. On the one hand, nations and peoplesare inclined to determine their priorities by practicalinterests. Economic growth and the elevation of qual-ity of life issues are more important than abstractconcepts. On the other hand, the United States andsome other Western powers are increasingly stressingsuch notions as democracy, freedom, and humanrights. They emphasize the limitations of sovereignty,advocate humanitarian intervention, and call for pre-ventive diplomacy.

The information revolution has rapidly and pro-foundly changed the world, not only in the ways peo-ple communicate but also in the ways they live, work,and think. The ease and swiftness of communicationsenable nations and people to think in a much broadersense. This is especially true in international affairs.The developed countries are attempting to takeadvantage of this to expand their political and eco-nomic interests in the world. The developing coun-tries are obviously at a disadvantage.

The United States continues to gain advantages. Itis enjoying the longest period of economic growthand rapid developments in science and technology.Through NATO expansion and the U.S.-Japan Secu-rity Guideline, the United States has succeeded in

readjusting its relations with its major allies. With thisboost to its comprehensive national strength and self-confidence, the United States is anxious to translate itswill into actions in certain international affairs. At thesame time, the United States has had to readjust itsrelations with other major powers. It faces difficultiesin dealing with Russia, China, India and, to a certainextent, France. The United States also has troublesdealing with the developing countries.

Regional Environments

The perceptions and realities of the Asia-Pacificregion have greatly changed over the past decade. Tenyears ago, people were greatly optimistic about theregion’s politics, economy, and security. The Asia-Pacific region did not suffer the European kind ofpolitical and economic turmoil at the end of the ColdWar. People were thus encouraged to talk about thepossibility of a peaceful and prosperous transition.The previous two decades of economic growth ledthem to entertain such ideas as an “Asia-Pacific cen-tury.” Some people even doubted if there would everbe a business cycle in the region. However, recentdevelopments proved these predictions wrong.

First, the major power relationships in the regionhave seen frequent difficulties. Relations among theUnited States, Japan, and China have become difficult.Indeed, Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japan relations havesoured. The strengthened U.S.-Japan military allianceis being watched carefully by China, while closer mili-tary-to-military ties between China and Russia arecausing grave concerns in the United States and Japan.

Second, the Asian financial crisis that began sev-eral years ago ended a long period of high economicgrowth in the region. Many economies have actuallyregressed for many years. Asian countries realize nowthat their economies are vulnerable to outsideimpacts. As a result, the process of achieving regionaleconomic cooperation and integration has beennoticeably affected.

Third, in some countries political turbulence hasgone hand in hand with economic difficulties.Indonesia finally discarded the Suharto regime. Ten-sions on the Korean Peninsula caused repeated con-cern. The U.S.-Japan Security Guideline and the pro-posed Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system arehighly controversial. The nuclear arms race betweenIndia and Pakistan has been a severe setback to non-proliferation efforts.


Sino-U.S. Relations 69

Despite these adverse developments, the Asia-Pacific region is still moving ahead. On the whole, theAsian financial crisis is over. South Korea, Thailand,Malaysia, and others have regained their momentum ofeconomic growth. Moreover, the Asia-Pacific countrieshave learned a good lesson that will benefit their devel-opment in the future. Indonesia has displayed a greatcapability to avert political disaster and adapt to thenew situation. The ASEAN countries are closing theirranks and preparing for a new role in regional affairs.

Implications for China

After twenty years of reforming and opening up,China has substantially improved its nationalstrength. Beijing hopes to transform backward Chinainto a moderately developed country by the middle ofthe 21st century. To achieve its goals, China needs apeaceful environment externally and stability inter-nally. Thus, China pursues an independent and peace-ful foreign policy.

China set out a very clear global and regionalstrategy. At the global level, this strategy seeks toensure a more just and reasonable international order.China, as an emerging power, does not demand anoverhaul of the existing international order. Actually,China is already part of the existing one. For politicaland security matters, China is one of the five perma-nent members of the UN Security Council. For eco-nomic matters, it is a member of both the IMF andthe World Bank. China is sparing no effort to join theWTO. As a matter of fact, China’s policy of reformand openness is a manifestation of how painstakinglyChina is working to integrate itself into the interna-tional community.

In the meantime, China also works hard atimproving the existing order. China does not endorsea monopolar world, nor is it satisfied with Westerndominance of world affairs. China calls for anincreased role for developing nations. China hopesthat, through negotiations and dialogue, the worldcommunity will finally be able to establish a more justand fair NIPEO.

At a regional level, China’s first priority is toimprove relations with its neighbors, and thanks topast efforts, China enjoys good and stable relationswith most of them. China has settled almost all of itsborder issues with Russia, the former Soviet republics,Vietnam, and some others. China’s proposal for com-mon development while shelving disputes in theSouth China Sea has been widely appreciated by the

parties concerned. During the Asian financial crisis,China kept its promise and did not devalue its cur-rency, thus halting the “domino effect” and a newround of Asian devaluation. China’s high sense ofresponsibility has won great admiration from itsAsian neighbors.

In fact, many Asian countries have come to realizethat China is not a threat, but a helper. China alsoplays an important role in maintaining peace and sta-bility in the Korean Peninsula and works hard on theissue of nonproliferation. China is a positive andactive member of major regional organizations andmechanisms, such as the Asia-Pacific EconomicCooperation (APEC) forum, the ASEAN RegionalForum (ARF), the 10+3 (10 ASEAN nations plusChina, South Korea, and Japan), the 10+1 (10 ASEANnations plus China), and the Asia-Europe dialogue.

Trends in Sino-U.S. Relations

New Challenges

There have been new challenges to the Sino-U.S.relationship:

First, mutual frustration has reached a dangerouspoint. In China’s view, the United States has createdone trouble after another. These include allegations ofChinese political contributions to a U.S. presidentialcampaign, plans for theater missile defenses, therelease of the congressionally commissioned CoxReport on suspected espionage,2 a last-minute rejec-tion of the package deal with visiting Chinese PremierZhu Rongji on China’s accession to the WTO, theembassy bombing, and the proposed Taiwan SecurityEnhancement Act (TSEA). The United States, on theother hand, has criticized China for its human rightsrecord, its ties with such rogue nations as Iraq andIran, its rejection of renouncing the use of force tosolve the Taiwan issue, and its vehement reaction afterthe embassy bombing. The United States also com-plained that, among other things, China does notreturn America’s well-intentioned gestures.

Second, the strong mutual frustration has turnedinto deep mutual suspicion. The worst scenario hasprevailed in some cases. Foreign policy depends sub-stantially on perceptions. If people just think theworst of each other, sensible and reasonable policieswill not be made and implemented. Some of the U.S.media have often depicted China in a very negativeway. Some Americans both inside and outside the



government have suspected that China will becomean adversary. Some believe that a conflict between thetwo sometime in the coming century is inevitable.

Third, domestic factors play an increasingly largerole. Many complicated and difficult factors areaffecting China policy in the United States. Politicaland partisan fights often derail the President’s agenda.The U.S. preference for unilateralism and the strangealliance of the left and right exert great pressure onany attempt to improve Sino-U.S. relations. The sin-gle-issue pressure groups, such as human rights andenvironmental protection groups, trade unions, andreligious organizations, have all challenged the Clin-ton administration’s China policy. The 2000 presiden-tial campaign has made the situation even more diffi-cult to handle.

In China, increasing integration with the worldand with the United States has blurred the distinctionbetween foreign and domestic issues. The issues ofPermanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) statuswith the United States and WTO accession are twocases in point. The Chinese people’s resentment anddissatisfaction over U.S. pressure have been on thequick rise. Patriotism and enhanced self-confidencehave become important factors to be reckoned with inChina’s foreign policy decisionmaking process. Ofcourse, not all the domestic factors are negative. Yearsof interchanges in politics, economics, cultural affairs,professions, and academics have created a large groupof people who want a normal and healthy relation-ship. The two business communities play an activeand effective role in this bilateral relationship.

Fourth, the Sino-U.S. relationship is closely tied tocross-Strait relations. Since the Taiwan Strait crisis in1995–19963 and the summit visits in 1997 and 1998,the United States has exercised some restraint andcaution on the Taiwan issue. The U.S. executive andlegislative branches and others in the mainstreamhave reached a sort of consensus behind the view thatTaiwan should not take provocative moves. However,two opposing forces are pulling the United States: thedesires to improve the Sino-U.S. relationship and tostrengthen U.S. ties with Taiwan. The United Stateshas increased arms sales to Taiwan, the U.S.-Japandefense Guideline virtually includes Taiwan, and theproposed TMD will give military, political, and psy-chological support to Taiwan’s separatist tendencies.

Some Positive Trends

The Sino-U.S. relationship is so important thatneither side can afford total confrontation. Even dur-ing the troubling and eventful year of 1999, the twogovernments were able to control the damage andcontinue their relationship. There is some encourag-ing news.

1. Both governments are working to put theirrelationship back on a normal track.

Because the Sino-U.S. relationship is too impor-tant to let it get out of control, both countries areworking to repair the damage. They reached an agree-ment on compensation for the embassy bombing. It isencouraging to see that the two presidents used their“hotlines” after both that bombing and Taiwan’s LeeTeng-hui’s “two-state” remarks.4 The Jiang-Clintonsummit at the APEC meeting in September 1999greatly facilitated the completion of the WTO deal.Finally, China and the United States have resumedpolitical and military consultations, which had beensuspended after the bombing incident.

2. The WTO trade package will exert a positiveinfluence on the Sino-U.S. relationship.

Although President Clinton turned down the bestpossible offer from Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji dur-ing his April trip to the United States, the U.S. execu-tive and legislative branches finally realize its impor-tance. Only four months after the bombing incident,the two presidents met at the APEC meeting in Auck-land, New Zealand, and agreed to reopen the WTOtrade negotiations. Two months later, the two govern-ments concluded the package agreement. As animportant step in fulfilling the U.S. obligations, theU.S. Congress will vote on whether to offer PNTR toChina some time in the middle of this year.5 Inessence, this is a vote on whether the United Stateswould like to continue its normal trading relationswith China and realize the hard-won benefits from itstrade negotiations with China. The conclusion of theWTO deal will help narrow differences and expandcommonality in the relationship. Closer economicand trade relations will also have positive rippleeffects in other fields.

3. China and the United States have reached a cer-tain degree of understanding in order to stabilize thesituation in the Taiwan Strait.

China and the United States realize that healthyand normal relations facilitate stable cross-Strait rela-tions, which are in the interests of all the parties con-cerned. Shortly after Mr. Lee Teng-hui put forward



his “two-state” theory last July, the U.S. executivebranch clarified its position on adhering to a “OneChina” policy and criticized Mr. Lee for his intentionto “rock the boat” and “change the status quo.” Evensome pro-Taiwan elements within the U.S. Congressshowed their dissatisfaction. Some credit should begiven to the Clinton administration for helping todefuse the tension.

4. The two sides have resumed political and secu-rity dialogues.

While the proposed constructive strategic partner-ship is controversial, both governments continue con-sultations on strategic and security matters. Startingfrom December 1999, China and the United Statesresumed political and military dialogues. It has beenreported that more high-level visits will take place. TheChinese side has again agreed to allow U.S. ships tocall at Hong Kong ports. The two sides will also holdjoint maritime humanitarian exercises. Such mutualvisits and military-to-military exchanges are obviouslybeneficial for increasing mutual understanding.

5. Realistic expectations reduce the chances ofdisillusion in future relations.

The two sides have become pragmatic and realisticin setting their goals this year, an election year in theUnited States. On the American side, the Clintonadministration understands that the best course ofaction is to avoid controversy during the presidentialcampaign. It is focusing on winning support for PNTR.On the Chinese side, Beijing also realizes that under thecurrent circumstances it is not likely to reach any sig-nificant breakthroughs in Sino-U.S. relations. There-fore, promoting the trade and economic relationshiphas become the major theme, and possibly the only fea-sible target. Perhaps this is what both sides have learnedin the past few years: it is better to resist temptingcatchwords and to adopt realistic attitudes.

How Sino-U.S. Relations Impact theRegion

China and the United States are two importantmembers of the world and the Asia-Pacific region.Their bilateral relationship has great significance forthe foreign and domestic policies of the Asian-Pacificcountries. For the past three decades, though with upsand downs, the general trend of the Sino-U.S. rela-tionship has been positive and forward-looking. Animproved relationship has greatly contributed topeace and development in the region.

In order to maintain this trend, we must under-stand some of the conceptual and actual differencesbetween the two countries. In evaluating the globaland regional situation, China does not see eye to eyewith the United States. China believes that the worldis heading for a multipolar arrangement. Since theend of the Cold War, the configuration of world pow-ers is changing. The original bipolar confrontationhas been replaced by the coexistence of one super-power and several major powers. Although this pat-tern basically remains stable, U.S. superiority is on therise. Moreover, the United States is trying hard totranslate its superiority into the advancement of itsown interests in politics, diplomacy, security, andeconomy. China calls for the establishment of a morejust and fairer NIPEO. It appeals for respect for theterritorial integrity and sovereignty of all countries; itopposes interference in others’ internal affairs; and itrejects the use or threat of use of force.

The United States maintains that it should con-tinue its leadership role in world affairs well into the21st century. On the basis of its enhanced interna-tional standing and increased national strength, theUnited States tries hard to project its powers, promoteits values, expand its economic interests, and spreadits culture. U.S. superiority has been further strength-ened vis-à-vis a weakened Russia, an economicallyinjured Japan, and a Europe that is not yet a peer. Inhandling world affairs, the United States is often hege-monic, hotheaded, inclined to interfere with others’internal affairs, and solve some regional conflicts byforce. The United States has even gone so far as tobypass the UN to use military force. Just since August1998, the United States has used force, either individ-ually or multilaterally, against Afghanistan, Sudan,Iraq, and Yugoslavia.

The United States has not moved beyond theCold War thinking in security matters. At the end ofthe Cold War, some Americans seriously thought ofrestricting NATO’s role, withdrawing some overseastroops, and calling for peace dividends. In the Asia-Pacific region, the Clinton administration once putforward the concept of a “New Pacific Community.”American academic circles explored possible collec-tive models, ranging from the Northeast Asian Secu-rity Cooperation Conference to the ARF. However, inrecent years, Cold War thinking is picking up in theUnited States. According to the U.S. Governmentstrategy stated in 1997, the United States takes as



guiding principles molding a conducive internationalenvironment, maintaining the capacity to win twotheater wars at the same time, and preparing forunforeseeable crises. It is stepping up a security sys-tem in the Asia-Pacific region by strengthening bilat-eral military alliances under its leadership.

The United States has clear-cut targets in thesetwo strategic regions. First and foremost, the UnitedStates tries to maintain its global and regional leader-ship role. It wants to continue to weaken Russia sothat there will be no way for Russian to challenge theUnited States once again in the future. In the Asia-Pacific region, the United States has a hedging policyto prevent China from becoming its peer sometime inthe next century.

In order to realize its security strategy, the UnitedStates needs to cooperate and coordinate with itsallies. The United States has worked out a securitynetwork in Europe by strengthening and enlargingNATO. In the Asia-Pacific region, the United Stateshas made the U.S.-Japan alliance a cornerstone of itssystem of bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea,Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia.

China has always advocated the casting away ofCold War thinking. It has called for common andcooperative security, and it opposes obtaining onenation’s security at the expense of others. Chinaopposes the so-called NATO expansion, the U.S.-ledNATO action in Kosovo, and U.S. military actionsagainst some countries. China firmly opposes U.S.arms sales to Taiwan, the inclusion of Taiwan underthe U.S.-Japan Security Guideline, the TMD coversfor Taiwan, and the proposed TSEA. All these not onlyseriously violate three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués,but in China’s eyes, they gravely encroach uponChina’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Small wonder that China and the United Statesdiffer on a number of international issues, such asChina’s relationship with Iran and Iraq, post-nucleartest relations with India and Pakistan, the interna-tional trial of former Khmer Rouge leaders, and par-ticularly the Kosovo crisis. Therefore, some Ameri-cans even claim that there is no basis of cooperationfor the proposed strategic partnership between thetwo countries.

A Better Future

Working Toward a Better Sino-U.S. Relationship

As a ranking U.S. Pentagon official said, amongthe Sino-U.S. problems, the most important andimminent danger lies not with concerns over humanrights, trade deficits, or the Falun Gong, but with theTaiwan issue. Indeed, the Taiwan issue has alwaysbeen the most important and sensitive issue at thecore of the relationship. Therefore, the United Statesshould play a positive role in handling the Taiwanissue. Fundamentally speaking, the Taiwan issue is aninternal affair between the Chinese across the TaiwanStrait, and the United States should not interfere withChina’s internal affairs. However, the Chinese side candiscuss the Taiwan issue with the Americans becausethe United States created the Taiwan issue half a cen-tury ago6 and still possesses great influence over Tai-wan. The Taiwan issue remains the most importantand sensitive issue at the core of the Sino relations.The U.S. executive branch and the U.S. Congressshould not play a negative role in the process of Chinareunification. The United States should abide by thethree joint communiqués and keep to its commitmentto the “One China” principle; the U.S. Congressshould encourage cross-strait dialogue instead of Tai-wanese independence.

In the near term, both countries should strive tostabilize their relationship. Like it or not, the U.S. elec-tion culture has created a four-year cycle of firstattacking and then dealing with China. Campaignrhetoric fuels fiery debates in both countries. Politicaland opinion leaders have a great responsibility to sta-bilize the bilateral relationship. The gradual resump-tion of political, strategic, and military exchanges isimportant for mutual communication. The so-calledsecond tracks are indispensable in promoting mutualunderstanding. The economic interaction is a stabi-lizer in the relationship. Allowing each other to speakcandidly and refraining from overreaction to wordsbenefits efforts to maintain a stable relationship.Doing something of common interest and deferringsomething controversial facilitates a constructive rela-tionship. The reverse will result not only in a competi-tive but also a confrontational relationship.

In the medium term, both countries shouldimprove their mechanisms and work towards moreconfidence-building measures (CBMs). They shouldalso create a favorable regional environment. Giventhe importance of the two countries, their bilateral



relationship has far exceeded their physical bound-aries. It is in their common interest to create a politi-cally friendly, strategically cooperative environment inthe region. China and the United States should adopta down-to-earth attitude to discuss importantregional issues, such as the China-U.S.-Russia rela-tionship, the China-U.S.-Japan relationship, theKorean Peninsula, economic and financial coopera-tion, and so forth.

In the long term, both countries should take astrategic and long-term view when they deal with eachother. They should take concrete steps to enhanceunderstanding, dispel misunderstandings, remove sus-picions, reduce troubles, and increase cooperation.First and foremost, they should work out a strategy formaking friendlier relations and not making enemies ofeach other. They must have more official and unoffi-cial contacts, greater economic and trade interactions,better coordination on global and regional issues,closer consultation in international organizations, andjoint efforts in building up a NIPEO.

Working Toward a Better Asia-Pacific Region

As the Sino-U.S. relationship directly affectsregional stability and prosperity, the two countrieshave special responsibilities and hold the keys to build-ing regional security and an economic framework.China and the United States should display more sin-cerity and trust in conducting dialogues on regionalsecurity matters. Together with other countries in theregion, they should work out a formula to enhancemutual trust, reduce mutual suspicions, alleviate thedanger of an arms race, and avoid unintentional acci-dents. Through these CBMs, they could contribute toa stable and secure regional environment.

On some existing and potential hot spots in theregion, both China and the United States shouldexpand cooperation where such cooperation exists,such as concerning the issues of the Korean Peninsula,Cambodia, and the matter of non-proliferation on theSouth Asia sub-continent. They should work hard tofacilitate cooperation where such possibilities can besought, such as in Southeast Asia. They should also doa better job of damage control where they have funda-mental differences. Neither side should take unilateralactions that will aggravate the situation.

Security far exceeds traditional boundaries. Eco-nomic security has become an important componentof national security considerations. China and theUnited States worked together at the APEC forum and

cooperated to a certain extent on financial and mone-tary matters during the Asian financial crisis. How-ever, further cooperation needs more frequent com-munication, understanding, and trust. China, theUnited States, and other concerned countries shouldwork together toward this end. Here, region-widecooperation must be a precondition for building upthe regional mechanism to promote trade liberaliza-tion, cooperation in science and technology, and sta-bility in finance and monetary matters.

Working Toward a Better World

China and the United States are major worldpowers. They are both permanent members of theUN Security Council, and both possess nuclearweapons. China is the largest developing country,whereas the United States is the strongest developedone. Moreover, China is emerging and the UnitedStates is not declining. To a large extent the two coun-tries will be critical to the establishment of the NIPEOon a more just and fairer basis.

Both countries should work together with majorcountries and/or country groups to reach a consensuson the principles for establishing the new internationalorder. They should determine the codes of conduct aswell. While it is useful to explore such concepts ashuman rights and humanitarian concerns, no countryhas the right to monopolize their interpretation, letalone to enforce their views onto other nations. In themeantime, the two should fully implement China’sFive Principles of Peaceful Coexistence7 as a prerequi-site to establishing the NIPEO. Of course, they shouldalso take into consideration other proper principles.

To realize these goals, China and the United Statesshould work with other countries to reach agree-ments. China does call for an immediate realization ofthe NIPEO, but through negotiation and in a gradualway. It advocates strengthening rather than weakeningthe role of the UN It firmly opposes unilateral alter-ation of existing arrangements, such as the Anti-Bal-listic Missile Treaty (ABM). It positively participatesin new negotiations, such as the Comprehensive TestBan Treaty (CTBT). And China makes relentlessefforts to join new organizations such as WTO.

Both countries should work hard, with a view tothe era of the “earth village.” China and the UnitedSates are major nations that both have vast territories,big populations, and considerable powers. Therefore,



it is relatively easier for them to adopt the earth villageconcept, but still difficult to translate it into policies.They should stress the welfare of the entire humanrace rather than their own. They have the responsibil-ities and obligations to eliminate poverty both athome and abroad. Broad-mindedness is the basis forharmony, instead of conflict, between nations.

Both the United States and China should thinkfar in advance for ways to promote the peace andprosperity of the world. At this time of invention, cre-ativity, and advancement, new progress in science andtechnology takes place every day. China, the UnitedStates, and other countries are confronted with theissue of how to make these developments work forworld peace and prosperity. All countries should con-centrate their wisdom and resources on lifting uppeople’s living standards. All countries should usethese new achievements to promote healthy state-to-state relations, instead of interfering with other coun-tries internal affairs. No country should be allowed tostart a new round of arms race by taking advantage ofits strength.

The above-mentioned principles may seem to betoo idealistic and moral-driven. However, for a betterand more secure world in the new century and mil-lennium, we need inspiration, principles, value, andtruth. China is one of the birthplaces of greatthoughts. The United States is typical in generatingnew thinking. Asia is proud of its unique value. TheAsia-Pacific region has immensely contributed todevelopment strategy and philosophy. There is no rea-son why China and the United States should hesitateto talk about ideas and ideals.

In the United States, especially in the military cir-cle, it is generally believed that strong and sufficientmilitary preparation can stop war. In Chinese charac-ters, two parts make up the word “military”: meaningsay NO to weapons. We have something in commondespite of all our differences. Therefore, let us makejoint efforts at the two ends of the world to say NO towars and YES to peace and prosperity.

Notes1 On May 8, 1999, NATO bombs hit the Chinese embassy,

killing four. NATO said its planes were attacking a Yugoslav armsprocurement office in Belgrade and fired on the wrong building.

2 The Cox Committee, formally titled the Select Committeeon U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial concerns withthe People’s Republic of China, issued its report in June 1999.

3 China conducted military exercises that included missiletests in the Taiwan Strait, to which the United States dispatchedtwo carrier battlegroups and other ships.

4 Lee made these remarks to a German radio station reporteron July 9, 1999.

5 The United States House of Representatives voted toapprove PNTR on May 24, 2000; the Senate approved the measureon September 19, 2000.

6 In 1949, when Mao Zedong declared Beijing the capital ofthe new People’s Republic of China, millions of Kuomintang(KMT) supporters fled to Taiwan. The United States did not offi-cially recognize the People’s Republic of China until December 15,1978.

7 These principles for fostering friendly relations with othercountries were formally presented by Premier Zhou Enlai in April1955 at the first Asian-African conference (the Bandung Confer-ence). In 1982, these principles were written into China’s Consti-tution.


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