ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK PCR:PAK 22028

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

ON THE

PROVINCIAL HIGHWAYS PROJECT (Loan 1185-PAK[SF])

IN

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN

December 2002

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (as of 30 November 2002)

Currency Unit – Pakistan Rupees (PRs)

At Appraisal At Project Completion (October 1992) (November 2002)

PRs1.00 = $0.0392 $0.0170 $1.00 = PRs20.05 PRs60.125

ABBREVIATIONS AADT – Annual average daily traffic ADP – Annual Development Program AOTA – Advisory and Operational Technical Assistance CWD Communications and Works Department ECNEC Executive Committee of the National Economic Council EIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return FRDEC Federal Rural Development Engineering Cell GNP Gross national product ICB International competitive bidding IEE Initial Environmental Examination IRI International Roughness Index JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency MELGRD Ministry of Environment, Local Government and Rural

Development MOC Ministry of Communications MVPD Motor vehicles per day NDF Nordic Development Fund NHA National Highway Authority NTRC National Transport Research Centre NWFP North West Frontier Province OECF Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund of Japan PC Planning Commission PC-I Planning Commission Proforma I PDD Planning and Development Department VOC vehicle operating costs

NOTES

(i) The fiscal year (FY) of the Federal Government of Pakistan and the Provincial Governments end on 30 June.

(ii) In this report, "$" refers to US dollars.

CONTENTS

Page

BASIC DATA ii

MAP vii

I. PROJECT DESCRIPTION 1

II. EVALUATION OF DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 3 A. Relevance of Design and Output 3 B. Project Outputs 3 C. Project Costs 4 D. Disbursements 5 E. Project Schedule 6 F. Arrangements for Implementation 6 G. Conditions and Covenants 7 H. Related Technical Assistance 8 I. Consultant Recruitment and Procurement 9 J. Performance of Consultants, Contractors, and Suppliers 10 K. Performance of Borrower and Executing Agencies 11 L. Performance of ADB 12

III. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE 12 A. Relevance 12 B. Efficacy in Achievement of Purpose 12 C. Efficiency in Achievement of Outputs and Purpose 13 D. Preliminary Assessment of Sustainability 13 E. Environmental, Sociocultural, and Other Impacts 13

IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 A. Overall Assessment 13 B. Lessons Learned 14 C. Recommendations 14

APPENDIXES 1. Project Framework 16 2. Status of Compliance 18 3. Disbursements 21 4. Implementation Schedule 22 5. Chronology of Main Events 23 6. Economic Reevaluation 33 7. Project Rating 41

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BASIC DATA A. Loan Identification 1. Country Islamic Republic of Pakistan 2. Loan Number 1185-PAK (SF) 3. Project Title Provincial Highways 4. Borrower Islamic Republic of Pakistan 5. Executing Agency National Highways Authority 6. Amount of Loan SDR 112.3

7. Project Completion Report No. PCR:PAK 721 B. LOAN DATA

1. Appraisal - Date Started 8 July 1992 - Date Completed 23 July 1992

2. Loan Negotiations

- Date Started 5 October 1992 - Date Completed 8 October 1992

3. Date of Board Approval 5 November 1992 4. Date of Loan Agreement 30 June 1993

5. Date of Loan Effectiveness - In Loan Agreement 28 September 1993 - Actual 12 October 1993 - Number of Extensions One

6. Closing Date

- In Loan Agreement 31 December 1997 - Actual * 11 November 2002 - Number of Extensions Four

7. Terms of Loan

- Interest Rate 1 percent per annum - Maturity 35 years - Grace Period 10 years

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8. Disbursements a. Dates

Initial Disbursement

Final Disbursement

Time Interval

27 April 1994 11 November 2002 101 months

Effective Date Original Closing Date Time Interval

12 October 1993 31 December 1997 97.2 months

b. Amount (US$)

Category

Original

Allocation a

Last

Revised Allocation

Amount

Cancelled

Net Amount

Available

Amount

Disbursed

Undisbursed

Balance

Civil Works Provincial Highways 113,096,484 111,682,629 0 0 120,921,048 (9,238,419) Road Safety Measures 4,135,736 3,738,465 3,293,541 444,924 3,293,541 Consulting Services Supervision 14,579,649 13,696,355 0 0 13,965,428 (269,073) Road Management 3,568,693 3,216,557 3,216,557 3,216,557 0 3,216,557 Road Safety 1,461.058 1,316,890 1,316,890 1,316,890 0 1,316,890 Incremental Admin. 1,150,289 1,070,559 137,995 137,995 932,564 137,995 Technical Assistance Third Farm-to-Market 3,179,863 2,985,789 628,482 628,482 2,357,307 628,482 Second Highway 3,580,476 3,451,483 0 0 3,451,483 0 Service Charge 3,300,636 3,076,707 0 0 3,076,707 0 Unallocated 17,347,117 6,172,656 0 6,172,656 Total

165,400,000

150,588,335

144,477,341

6,110,995

a Based on SDR/US$ rate prevailing at appraisal (1.47284)

9. Local Costs (Financed) - Amount $75,025,664 - Local Costs 51% - Total Cost 34%

C. PROJECT DATA

1. Project Cost

Cost Appraisal Estimate Actual

Foreign Exchange Cost 86.0 73.60 Local Currency Cost 121.0 146.73

Total 207.0 220.33

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2. Financing Plan

Cost Appraisal Estimate ($ million)

Actual ($ million)

Implementation Costs Borrower-Financed 41.1 75.85 ADB-Financed 165.9 144.50 Other External Funding

1.Sub-total 203.7 217.25

2. IDC Costs

3.Borrower-Financed

4.ADB-Financed 3.3 3.08

5.Other External Funding

6.Sub-total 3.3 3.08

7. Total 220.33

IDC – Interest During Construction.

3. Cost Breakdown by Project Component

Component Appraisal Estimate Actual

FX b/ LC c/ Total FX b/ LC c/ Total A. Right-of-way 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.86 1.86 B. Civil Works 1. Provincial Highways 55.00 75.00 130.00 61.00 134.08 195.08 2.Road Safety Initiatives 1.25 3.75 5.00 0.44 0.00 0.44 C. Consulting Services for: 1. Supervision 4.27 8.14 12.41 7.02 6.96 13.98 2. Road Management 2.45 0.90 3.35 a/ a/ 0.00 3. Road Safety Initiatives 0.59 0.71 1.30 a/ a/ 0.00 D.Incremental Administration — 0.90 0.90 0.07 0.11 0.18 E. Contingencies 17.35 26.61 43.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 F. Technical Assistance 1.79 4.49 6.28 1.97 3.72 5.69 G. Service Charge 3.30 — 3.30 3.10 — 3.10

1. Total 86.00 121.00 207.00 73.60 146.73 220.33

a/ Funded through credit from the Nordic Development Fund b/ Foreign Exchange. c/ Local Cost.

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4. Project Schedule

Item Appraisal Estimate Actual

Date of Contract with Consultants April 1992 January 1994 Completion of Engineering Designs January 1991 July 1993 Civil Works Contracts CP 1 Commencement August 1993 17 May 1994 Completion August 1996 31 March 1999 CP 2 Commencement August 1993 15 March 1995 Completion August 1996 24 August 1999 CP 3 Commencement August 1993 21 June 1995 Completion August 1996 25 September 1998 CP 4A Commencement August 1993 5 June 1995 Completion August 1996 1 June 1999 CP 4B Commencement August 1993 24 April 1994 Completion August 1996 31 August 1998 CP 5 Commencement August 1993 11 May 1994 Completion August 1996 26 April 2000 CP 6 Commencement August 1993 29 June 1994 Completion August 1996 11 November 1999

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5. Project Performance Report Ratings

Ratings

Implementation Period

Development Objectives

Implementation Progress

From 1 November 1992 to 31 December 1993 S U From 1 January 1994 to 30 June 1994 S U From 1 July 1994 to 31 December 1994 S U From 1 January 1995 to 30 June 1995 S U From 1 July 1995 to 31 December 1995 S U From 1 January 1996 to 30 June 1996 S U From 1 July 1996 to 31 December 1996 S U From 1 January 1997 to 30 June 1997 S U From 1 July 1997 to 31 December 1997 S U From 1 January 1998 to 31 December 1998 S U From 1 January 1999 to 30 June 1999 S U From I July 1999 to 31 December 1999 S U From 1 January 2000 to 30 June 2000 S PS From 1 July 2000 to 31 December 2000 S S From 1 January 2001 to 30 June 2001 S S From 1 July 2001 to 31 December 2001 S S

6. Data on Asian Development Bank Missions

Name of Mission Date Persons (no.)

Person-Days (no.)

Specialization of Members a

Fact Finding 5-27 Feb 1992 2 40 a, d Appraisal 8-23 July 1992 3 48 a, d, g Review 9-18 Feb 1993 1 1 a Review 15-23 July 1993 2 18 a, h Review 15-19 April 1994 2 10 a, d Review 1-18 May 1995 1 18 a Review 1-12 Sept 1996 2 24 a, h Review 3-20 Nov 1997 2 36 a, h Review 13-22 Sep 1998 3 30 a, h, I Review 7-18 Feb 1999 3 36 a, h, I PCR b 13-17 May 2002 3 15 a, h, e

a a-engineer, d-economist, h-project analyst, I-implementation officer , e-consultant b PCR prepared by Hasan Masood, Transport Specialist, South Asia Department (SARD)

I. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

1. The main objectives of the Project were to (i) help the Government of Pakistan develop its provincial highway system to support agriculture and industry; (ii) reduce transport costs and thus, facilitate more efficient movement of goods and passengers; (iii) support rural development by enhancing the mobility of rural communities; (iv) improve the Government’s management of road maintenance, including contract maintenance and quality control; and (v) improve the road safety program.

2. The scope of work at appraisal comprised:

(i) Civil Works for Provincial Highway Improvement: Improvement of 14 provincial highway sections, totaling about 600 km, in the provinces of Balochistan, North West Frontier (NWFP), Punjab, and Sindh. Table 1 lists the roads; the map on page ii shows their locations.

(ii) Civil Works for Road Safety Measures : Improvements in road safety, including

solutions in traffic engineering and management to minimize accidents, and the establishment of a systematic reference system for national provincial highways.

(iii) Consultant Services to Help in Institutional Strengthening in:

a. Construction Supervision: Supervision of civil works construction of provincial highway sections.

b. Maintenance Management, Contract Maintenance, and Quality Control:

Establishment of a computerized program to manage road maintenance for all provincial and farm-to-market roads administered by the provincial Communication and Works Departments (CWDs). That included components for functional classification of roads; investigations leading to the establishment of a system for maintenance by private contractors; and services for random quality control of ongoing civil works on the road system.

c. Road Safety: Establishment of a computerized recording and analysis system

to identify “black spots,” where highway accidents are most likely; design to improve safety on such high-priority locations : training of Government staff in road design to prevent accidents; help the CWDs in supervising such construction; training in accident-related law enforcement; youth educational campaigns; and monitoring and evaluating the impact and effectiveness of these measures.

(iv) Project Preparation Technical Assistance for:

a. The Third Farm to Market Roads Project: Providing services to help the Government in the gathering of data on the transport sector, in the conducting of feasibility studies for about 2,500 km of selected project roads in about 20 districts, and in the detailed engineering of high-priority roads;

b. The Second Highways Project: Conducting feasibility studies for improving

about 835 km of selected national highways and about 2,000 km of provincial

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highways in the four provinces, and subsequent detailed engineering of selected high-priority highways.

3. Executing agencies for Project components for each province were the local National Highway Authority (NHA), Ministry of Environment, Local Government and Rural Development (MELGRD), and CWD. MELGRD and NHA were also the executing agencies for their respective Technical Assistance (TA) components. Thus, six executing agencies were responsible for project implementation (para. 21). 4. Financial assistance from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) upon project completion was 65.6% of the total project cost vs 79% at appraisal. This sizable difference is partly attributable to the variation in exchange rates of the special drawing rights (SDR) to the US dollar over the life of the Project. The loan amount was projected at the equivalent of $165.4 million at appraisal, but was only $150.6 million on 9 October 2002. Also, the original financing plan envisaged ADB financing the two. Advisory Technical Assistance (AOTA), which were funded through credit from the Nordic Development Fund (NDF). ADB assistance covered all of the Project’s foreign exchange cost, and part of the local currency costs. NDF provided parallel cofinancing for consulting services for Project components for maintenance management, contract maintenance, quality control, and road safety.

Table 1: Provincial Highways for Improvement

Province Road Name Length (km) Remarks

Balochistan Basima–Surab 89.7 6 km that were already paved were excluded

NWFP Charsadda–Tangi 22.4 Eliminated Mardan–Swabi 47.1 Haripur–Saraikala 22.0 Eliminated Punjab Jhang–Chiniot 80.2 Shorkot–Kabirwala 57.1 7 km were excluded from contract Mianwali–Ghulaman 37.0 Fatehpur–Chowk Azam 24.4 Chowk Azam–Chowk Munda 42.3 Sargodha–Talibwala 42.0 Bhakkar–Darya Khan 17.4 Eliminated Sambrial–Daska 15.5 Sindh Mirpurkhas–Mirwah 22.9 Badin–Sujawal 80.0 Total 600.0 Source: Consultant’s Report.

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II. EVALUATION OF DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

A. Relevance of Design and Output

5. The Project was consistent with ADB’s operational strategy for Pakistan’s road subsector. It addressed the development constraints imposed by the poor road conditions, concentrating on areas that require urgent attention to meet output and export growth objectives: the renovation and upgrading of existing national and provincial highway system, development of farm to market roads, maintenance management, and road safety. 6. The Project design was, and remains, relevant and consistent with the subsector’s strategic objectives. The Project roads were selected from a master plan, prepared earlier, for the development of trunk roads in rural areas. Reasons to upgrade the selected roads included to reduce transport constraints, support rural and industrial development, increase rural mobility, and provide better access to health, education, and social amenities. 7. A need for thicker pavements was realized during Project implementation (para. 14). The additional costs were met by deleting one road section in the Punjab and two sections in NWFP 1 (Table 1). These changes did not affect the Project’s objectives or relevance . B. Project Outputs 8. At appraisal the Project outputs were:

(i) improvement of about 600 km of 14 provincial highways in 4 provinces; (ii) improvement of selected accident-prone locations on national and provincial

highways in the four provinces; (iii) assistance in institutional strengthening through consulting services for (a)

supervision of construction of civil works under (i), (b) maintenance management, contract maintenance, and quality control, and (c) road safety;

(iv) Technical Assistance for preparation of the Third Farm –to Market Project;

and (v) Technical Assistance for preparation of the Second Highways Project.

9. As mentioned before, three sections of provincial road were eliminated from the Project because of added costs due to high bids for the NWFP road, and the need to increase pavement thickness. The remaining 11 sections, totaling 538 km, were completed as envisaged. The identification and improvement of accident-prone spots was only in sections of the national highway, N-5, 2 near Islamabad. 10. A functional classification of provincial roads, including road conditions, covered 91,344 kilometers in the four provinces. This is less than half of the 215,569 km of paved roads

1 The two sections in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) were eliminated because of the high bid for the

Marda–Swabi section, which would have consumed the province’s entire project allocation. 2 The 1,760 km Karachi to Peshawar National Highway N-5 is Pakistan’s main traffic corridor; it carries more than

65% of all passengers and goods.

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reported in the latest Economic Survey of Pakistan3. The road inventory and classification work was expected to be continued, with computers, software, and other equipment, by the provincial road management units (RMUs) in the four provinces. But budget constraints prohibited few RMUs from continuing their work. Only the Punjab and Sindh RMUs are now fully operational; RMUs in the other two provinces are only partially operational. 11. The PPTA 1778-PAK: Third Farm to Market Project was satisfactorily completed, resulting in a new project4. The PPTA 1779-PAK: Second Highways Project was also successfully completed; outputs from its TA were included in new projects5. C. Project Costs 12. The total Project cost at appraisal was estimated at $207 million, of which $86 million, or 41.5%, was in foreign exchange and $121 million equivalent, or 58.5%, was in local currency. The estimated final cost was $220.33 million, with foreign exchange cost of $73.6 million, or 33.4%, and local currency cost of $146.73 million equivalent, or 66.6%. The appraisal estimate included estimates for incremental administration, physical contingencies, price escalation on the foreign exchange and local currency costs, and service charge during construction. Also included were estimated cost of consulting services for road management, and road safety measures, which were subsequently funded through NDF credit. Table 2 compares appraisal and actual costs. 13. The cost estimated at appraisal for civil works on 14 sections of provincial highways, totaling about 600 km, was $130 million while the actual cost for 11 sections, totaling 538 km, was 195.08 million. This increase was mainly caused by increasing the pavement thickness, inflation, and delays. 14. The need for thicker pavement was recognized after some pavement failures soon after opening to traffic of road sections in Punjab (Fatehpur–Chowk Azam and Jhang–Chiniot). Various investigations were carried out to determine why the pavements failed. They confirmed several causes, including increased traffic, overloading by heavy trucks, and marginal design and quality of construction. It is absolutely certain that without the thicker pavements, the roads would have become unusable. 15. Consulting costs for construction supervision were estimated at $12.41 million at appraisal, but implemented for $ 13.98 million, mainly because of delays and extensions of time for supervision. 16. The road safety measures were estimated at $5.00 million at appraisal, but only $0.44 million was actually spent for “black spot” mitigation. The difference is so sizable mainly because the executing agency directed the consultants to concentrated efforts more on training and capacity building, rather than on “black spot” identification and mitigation.

3 A Government of Pakistan publication of economic data. 4 ADB. 2001. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors on a Proposed Loan to

Pakistan for Rural Access Roads. Manila. 5ADB. 2001. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors on a Proposed Loan to Pakistan for the Road Sector Development Program . Manila.

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Table 2: Appraisal vs Actual Costs

Appraisal Estimate ($ million)

Actual ($ million)

Foreign Local Foreign Local

Exchange Currency Total Exchange Currency Total

i. The Project

A. Right -of-way 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.86 1.86

B. Civil Works

1. Provincial Highways 55.00 75.00 130.00 61.00 134.08 195.08

2. Road Safety Measures 1.25 3.75 5.00 0.44 0.00 0.44

C. Consulting Services

1. Supervision 4.27 8.14 12.41 7.02 6.96 13.98

2. Road Management 2.45 0.90 3.35 a/ a/ 0.00

3. Road Safety Measures 0.59 0.71 1.30 a/ a/ 0.00

D. Incremental Administration – 0.90 0.90 0.07 0.11 0.18

E. Contingencies:

1. Physical 6.36 8.94 15.30 0.00 0.00 0.00

2. Price Escalation 10.62 16.68 27.30 0.00 0.00 0.00

Subtotal (I) 80.54 115.52 196.06 68.53 143.01 211.54

ii. Technical Assistance

A. Consulting Services for:

1. PPTA Third 0.72 2.22 2.94 0.60 1.75 2.35

2. PPTA Second Highways 1.07 2.27 3.34 1.37 1.97 3.34

B. Contingencies:

1. Physical 0.18 0.45 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.00

2. Price Escalation 0.19 0.54 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00

Subtotal (II) 2.16 5.48 7.64 1.97 3.72 5.69

iii. Service Charge 3.30 --- 3.30 3.10 --- 3.10

Total (i + ii + iii) 86.00 121.00 207.00 73.60 146.73 220.33

a/ Funded through credit from the Nordic Development Fund Source: Consultant’s Report. D. Disbursements 17. No schedule for loan disbursement was prepared at appraisal. But based on the implementation schedule, disbursement was expected between the time of loan effectiveness (October 1993) and Project completion (December 1997), and projected on that basis (Appendix 1). Disbursements were delayed because of the late start of some contracts, slow construction, late submission of withdrawal applications, and other delays. The large number of agencies involved in the withdrawal process also delayed payments to contractors and consultants. Complaints were filed, but no affected parties were compensated. Imprest account facilities were used to finance the incremental costs, and were instrumental in financing RMU activities.

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E. Project Schedule 18. Appendix 4 compares the implementation schedule at appraisal with actual progress. Appendix 5 shows the chronology of main implementation events. There were delays at every stage. Advance procurement was allowed for recruitment of the supervision consultants, for prequalification of contractors, and for tendering. At appraisal, supervision consultants were to be in place by July 1993, but this was delayed until December 1993. Prequalification was scheduled for completion by August 1992, but was not completed until January 1993, mainly because response to the initial invitation was so poor. Tendering of the six contract packages was also delayed considerably; at appraisal all contracts were to be awarded by May 1993, and all work completed by August 1996 19. The Project was further delayed when the lowest bidder of two of the three contracts in the first lot, an Italian firm, refused to sign the contracts. One contract was eventually awarded to the second-lowest bidder, and the other was rebid. The third contract was awarded to a firm from the People’s Republic of China, which was unable to start work for some time. But response was better for the second lot of three contracts (later increased to four). Three of the contracts were awarded relatively quickly. The fourth was delayed because the bidder argued for the acceptance of his proprietary pavement stabilization process. 20. After the awarding of contracts, initial progress was slow because working capital was inadequate, and management and support from parent offices were poor. Progress gradually improved after warnings and persuasion. In some cases, significant portions of work were subcontracted to domestic contractors. According to the schedule at appraisal, all work was to be completed by the third quarter of 1996. But substantial portions of all sections were not completed until April 2000. Table 3 shows the commencement and duration by contract package.

Table 3: Contract Duration by Contract Package

Contract Package

Length (km)

Contractor Commencement Completion Duration (mo.)

1 139.0 Hanbo Steel, Korea 17 May 94 31 Mar 99 58 2 104.0 China Water & Elect 15 Mar 95 24 Aug 99 56 3 50.1 Pavito/Pavitol, Italy 21 Jun 95 25 Sep 98 39

4-A 80.8 China Road & Bridge 05 Jun 95 01 Jun 99 48 4-B 22.9 China Lioning 24 Apr 94 31 Aug 98 40

5 47.1 China Yunnan/SKB 11 May 94 26 Apr 00 72 6 83.7 Hanbo Steel, Korea 29 Jun 94 11 Nov 99 62

F. Arrangements for Implementation 21. The project was implemented through six executing agencies: NHA and MLGRD (now MELGRD) at the federal level, and four CWDs in the provinces. NHA was responsible for:

(i) preconstruction activities related to civil works for provincial highway improvement. That included prequalification of international contractors, acceptance of detailed design, pre-bid meetings, and helping CWDs issue tender documents, evaluate bids, and award contracts.

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(ii) hiring the supervision consultant for these works, and monitoring its activities and those of the TA, including costs and supervision of consultants to prepare studies for the proposed Second Highways and Road Safety projects.

(iii) civil works activities for the Road Safety Measures (national highways); and (iv) overall coordination of these components, including submission to ADB of

withdrawal applications for activities related to the supervision consultants and the consultants who prepared components for the Second Highways project, and civil works for the Road Safety component. A senior engineer headed the Project Cell, which was established within NHA through the Second Farm to Market Roads project, to coordinate the Provincial Roads project. It was adequately staffed for its responsibilities.

22. The CWDs were responsible for:

(i) issuing tender documents, evaluating bids, and awarding contracts; (ii) civil works on provincial highways for the Road Safety Measures

(iii) recruitment of consultants for the engineering phase of the TA for the

proposed Third Farm to Market Roads Project; and (iv) submission of related withdrawal applications to ADB. For this, the Project

Engineering Cells, established within CWDs through the Second Farm to Market Roads Project, were strengthened before the beginning of consulting services for the construction of civil works and Road Management. The CWDs for each province also established separate Maintenance Management Units.

23. MELGRD was responsible for implementing Road Management and the TA for the proposed Third Farm to Market Roads Project, including hiring consultants6 and submitting related withdrawal applications to ADB for processing. The existing Project Management Unit for ADB-assisted Farm to Market Roads projects was strengthened for these additional jobs, with guidance from the Project Director of the Federal Rural Development Engineering Cell (FRDEC) in MELGRD. 24. The implementation arrangements for civil works were satisfactory; there were no serious problems. But there was little coordination between NHA and MELGRD, and the CWDs. This caused delays in implementation. Also, the CWDs were not fully in the picture for the components for Road Maintenance Management and Road Safety. G. Conditions and Covenants 25. Government procedural problems caused a minor (2-week) delay.

6 Except for the detailed engineering phase of the TA, for which the CWDs recruited domestic consultants in

conjunction with MELGRD.

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26. The Government and executing agencies generally complied with standard loan covenants for: the hiring of consultants and contractors, availability of land, timely provision of counterpart funds, staffing of executing agencies, and reporting. But audited accounts were not always submitted on time–and the Government’s Project Completion Report was never submitted at all. Appendix 2 gives details on compliance with the covenants H. Related Technical Assistance

27. Two PPTAs were attached to the Loan: the Third Farm to Market Roads Project, and the Second Provincial Highways Project. The Nordic Development Fund financed Advisory Technical Assistance (AOTA) projects: Maintenance Management, Contract Maintenance, and Quality Control; and Road Safety Measures. 1. Third Farm to Market Roads Project 28. This component provided consulting services to help the Government collect data on the transport sector, conduct feasibility studies for the improvement of 2,500 km of farm to market roads in 20 districts, and provide detailed engineering for high-priority roads. The consultants evaluated 254 roads, totaling 3,009 km in length, and selected 1,695 km for detailed engineering. Two of the five local engineering consultants were hired for Punjab, and one each for Sindh, NWFP, and Balochistan. 29. The TA’s estimated cost at appraisal was $2.94 million, of which $0.72 was foreign exchange and $2.22 million was in local currency. The actual TA cost was $2.35 million; $0.60 million in foreign exchange, and $1.75 million in local currency. 30. The TA catalyzed formulation of a project to improve 1,940 km of rural access roads (para. 11). Completion is expected in 2002. 2. Second Highways Project 31. Consulting services helped the Government conduct feasibility studies for the improvement of about 835 km of provincial roads in the four provinces, and for detailed engineering for the high-priority links. The consultants subsequently selected 29 provincial roads totaling 1,054 km, and one 195-km section of the National Highway N-25 (Karachi–Quetta) for feasibility studies and detailed design. 32. At appraisal, the estimated cost of the TA was $3.34 million, of which $1.07 was foreign exchange and $2.27 million was in local currency. The actual cost was $3.34 million, of which $1.37 million was foreign exchange and $1.97 million, in local currency. 33. The TA helped stimulate a project to improve provincial and national roads (para. 11).

3. Maintenance Management, Contract Maintenance, and Quality Control

34. This component was funded through credit from the Nordic Development Fund of $5.4 million equivalent; foreign exchange was estimated at $3.5 million and local currency, $1.9 million. The consultants surveyed, and classified, 91,000 km of roads into three categories: provincial, secondary, and village or farm to market roads. The consultants surveyed highway traffic, axle load, roughness, and deflection; inventoried road conditions and structures; evaluated the economics of operations, prepared a system of maintenance management, and

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trained local staff. The entire process was computerized and given to the CWDs, where Road Maintenance Units (RMUs) were established. 35. Staffing and budgeting for the RMUs have been lacking since the consultants completed their work, and there has been reluctance to increase the road maintenance budget to meet output from the computerized models. But the CWDs are expected to make use of the equipment and inventories through current and planned provincial road sector projects, so the TA will have served as a starting point for improved maintenance. 4. Road Safety Measures 36. This component, also funded by credit from the Nordic Development Fund, did not proceed as originally planned [see para. 2, (iii) c]. Only 10 accident-prone (black spot) locations were identified, all on National Highway N-5 near Islamabad. But the executing agency changed priorities, so the consultants concentrated mostly on training and capacity building 7. I. Consultant Recruitment and Procurement 1. Consultant Recruitment 37. All Project consultants were recruited according to Bank’s Guidelines on the Use of Consultants. Table 4 shows the international and local consultancies, in person-months, projected at Project establishment.

Table 4: Consulting Services

Component Firm Person Months

Int’l Local Construction Supervision Italconsult S.p.a./W. S. Atkins in association with

Engineering Consultants Int’l, Republic Engineering Corporation, and Loya Associates

274 1360

Road Maintenance Management

FINNROAD OY in association with Progressive Consultants

100 144

Road Safety Measures FINNROAD OY in association with ADCON

Engineering and National Transport Research Centre

30 120

TA Second Highway Project Italconsult S.p.a./Pacific Consultants in association

with Engineering Consultants International and Progressive Consultants

32 170

TA Third Farm-to-Market Roads Project

Roughton International in association with Indus Consultants

49 259

Source: Consultant’s Report.

7 This was Pakistan’s first motorway. NHA had to establish a road safety system and motorway police force rapidly.

10

38. Delays in civil works increased consultant person-months to supervise construction to 425 for international, and 6,873 for local consultants. 2. Procurement 39. As intended at appraisal, pre-qualified contractors did civil works through international competitive bidding (ICB) procedures in accordance with ADB’s Guidelines for Procurement. The advance action for prequalification of international contractors, and issuance of tender documents, were used to assess international contractors’ interest as soon as possible. That helped the Government to issue tender documents in time to start civil works by mid-1993. Prequalification applications were invited in April 1992, closing on 31 May 1992. But response was poor, so the date was extended to mid-July 1992, then again to 25 January 1993. Of 10 applicants, ADB conditionally approved 7 firms for prequalification, subject to more information about their financial resources. 40. Civil works for provincial highways were divided into six contract packages, which were later increased to seven. Response from international contractors was poor, so contracts were staggered into two lots. The first lot of three packages was awarded in 1994 and the second lot of 4 packages, in 1995. But an Italian contractor in the first lot—the lowest bidder for two of the three contracts—later refused to sign the contract. Thus, one contract was awarded to the second-lowest bidder; and the other was re-bid. 41. Civil works for low-cost road safety measures were through competitive bidding among pre-qualified domestic contractors. J. Performance of Consultants, Contractors, and Suppliers 1. Consultants 42. Performance for all Project consultants was considered satisfactory. But contracts for supervision of consultants were extended several times, because some civil works contractors performed poorly. 2. Contractors 43. Some civil works contractors performed unsatisfactorily. The Government had considerable difficulty in attracting international contractors during the prequalification phase, which resulted in only seven prequalified firms. Difficulties continued with the tendering; one contractor refused to sign the contract after being low bidder on two packages; one contract was eventually awarded to the second-lowest bidder, and the other, re-bid. All contractors were slow to mobilize and start work. In one case, there was no activity for 12 months. In two cases, significant portions of the work were subcontracted to domestic contractors. The details, by contract package, follow.

(i) Hanbo Steel and General Construction (Republic of Korea) was awarded two contract packages, CP 1 in Punjab with three road sections totaling 139 km in length, and CP 6 in Balochistan with one road, 8km in length. The progress of work on CP 1 was very poor at first. The parent company in Korea went bankrupt, but the local staff used funds generated within the contract to keep the work going. This worsened the slow progress. A 14-month delay by CWD in

11

approving design changes for the Daska–Sambrial road also contributed to the delay. CP 6 is in a remote, arid region of Balochistan that has extreme climatic variations and serious security problems. The contractor was unable or unwilling to provide a detailed program for completing the work. CP 6 was eventually completed satisfactorily, although late.

(ii) China Water and Electric (People’s Republic of China) was awarded CP 2 in

Punjab. The contractor started slowly, but later improved. This contract was extended because of pavement failure, and the need to make the asphalt concrete thicker.

(iii) Pavito/Pavital (Italy) was awarded CP 3 in Punjab. No progress was made during

the first year, while Pavito/Pavital tried to persuade the Punjab CWD to accept an alternate pavement design using proprietary techniques of stabilization. After the Punjab CWD refused, the contractor expedited the work and completed the contract satisfactorily.

(iv) China Road and Bridge (People’s Republic of China) was awarded CP 4A in

Sindh. This contractor also started slowly, but improved significantly. A disagreement over payment for quantities exceeding the original contract was resolved with ADB’s assistance.

(v) China Lioning (People’s Republic of China) was awarded CP 4B in Sindh. Again,

this contractor started slowly then accelerated the work. Thicker asphalt concrete was also required on this road, which delayed the job.

(vi) China Yunnan Corporation (People’s Republic of China) was awarded CP 5 in

NWFP. Due to non-performance of this contractor (less than 10% progress during 20 months of the contract period) the contract was reassigned to a domestic contractor who completed it satisfactorily. This was the longest of all contracts (72 mo.).

K. Performance of Borrower and Executing Agencies 44. The Borrower is Pakistan. As mentioned in para. 21, the Project had six executing agencies: four Provincial CWDs, NHA, and MELGRD. 45. The Provincial CWDs have a long history of construction and maintenance of provincial roads and bridges, project planning and implementation, and contract management. They have a large cadre of engineers who are experienced in dealing professionally with local consultants and contractors. They undertake construction and contract management with interest and vigor. The four provincial CWDs implemented the Project satisfactorily, despite their lack of experience in working with international consultants and contractors. Their performance was highly satisfactorily for civil works, the project preparation TA for the Second Provincial Highways Project, and Road Maintenance Management. But interest and vigor were not so evident for the Road Safety Measures, because it did not reach the provincial level. Consequently, from the provinces’ standpoint, implementation of this component was not fully satisfactory. 46. NHA, as Pakistan’s primary road development agency, has much experience in managing international consulting services and construction contracts . Thus, NHA was

12

expected to play a critical role in coordinating Project activities and in guiding the CWDs in management of international contracts. NHA’s performance may be considered satisfactory, but it did not play a significant role in Project coordination and implementation. Although the Project financed a full-time Project Management Unit (PMU), its staff also had other responsibilities, which limited its effectiveness. 47. MELGRD, as a federal agency, dealt only with policy matters; implementation was the responsibility of the provincial- and district-level line agencies. Therefore, MELGRD was not organized or staffed for project implementation. MELGRD was selected as the executing agency because a central coordinating agency was needed, and MELGRD has a history of involvement in development of farm to market and rural access roads through FRDEC. FRDEC’s role and effectiveness was gradually diminished, however, as the Project financed the establishment of an independent PMU in MELGRD. Thus, officials at higher levels of MELGRD had little interest in the Project. Hence the PMU could not establish effective partnership with the CWDs. Furthermore, the Farm to Market and Rural Access Roads is a localized matter. Its centralization in MLGRD divorced the development process from local requirements. Subject to this overall deficiency, the PMU’s performance in MLGRD was satisfactory. But after Project completion, the PMU staff had no place in the Ministry, because they do not fit into the ministerial service cadre. L. Performance of ADB 48. ADB’s performance was satisfactory. The Project was formulated rapidly, less than 4 months from appraisal to Board approval. ADB sent eight review missions, which advised on some technical issues, the preparation and evaluation of bid documents, and other matters of loan administration. Additional missions might possibly have speeded up the Project’s implementation and progress. Training and institutional strengthening through the supervision consultants and the consultants for the two AOTAs were positive and timely.

III. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE A. Relevance 49. The Project is considered relevant and in line with the Government’s strategy for development of the provincial highway system that supports agriculture and industry. This is by reducing transport costs and thus facilitating more efficient movement of goods and passengers; supporting rural development by enhancing the mobility of rural communities; improving the Government’s capacity for road maintenance management, including contract maintenance and quality control; and helping improve road safety. B. Efficacy in Achievement of Purpose 50. Objectives of the Project’s main component, improvement of provincial highways, were substantially achieved. The target at appraisal was 600 km; 532 km were improved (although at somewhat higher cost than projected at appraisal). Achievements of other Project objectives are not directly measurable. For Maintenance Management, the provinces now have a computerized database of road conditions and a model for budgeting and allocation of funds. The provincial RMUs now have a starting place from which to grow. But the centralized implementation of Road Safety Measures was coordinated poorly, which resulted in no “black

13

spot” mitigation in the provinces. Only a few locations were improved, all on the national highways near Islamabad. The Project is rated efficacious.

C. Efficiency in Achievement of Outputs and Purpose 51. The economic viability of the Project is quite high. The economic internal rate of return (EIRR) for various sections ranged from 16.0% to 52.8% vs 11.5% to 68.0% at appraisal. The differences are because traffic has increased at a far lower rate than expected on paved roads, and at a much higher rate on gravel roads; and inflation has driven up the prices of vehicles and cost inputs. Appendix 6 gives details of the methodology used in calculating the EIRR. The Project is rated as efficient. D. Preliminary Assessment of Sustainability 52. Funds allocated for maintenance were diverted to emergency repairs in some cases, particularly in NWFP. The project component dealing with maintenance includes a comprehensive framework for improvement. The provincial governments must commit themselves to improving the funding and staffing for maintenance, for best use of the tools available. The Project’s sustainability is rated as likely. E. Environmental, Sociocultural, and Other Impacts 53. The Project’s main component, improvement of provincial highways, involved no new construction or realignment. Therefore, problems were minimal with land acquisition for right of way, resettlement, and changes in land use patterns. The initial environmental impact study rated all environmental parameters as having no significant effects, except for small effects on soil erosion during construction of all project roads, and on hydrographic modification by one road in Balochistan. These minor problems were resolved during construction. The cutting of trees to widen roads, however, had a moderate negative effect on the environment. 54. On the other hand, the strengthening and widening of roads, and raising of embankments with proper culverts and bridges, have helped improve the area’s environment. The better and smoother surfaces of new roads require less traction power, which means lower fuel consumption and reduced air pollution. The smooth flow of traffic produces less noise, although both air and noise pollution are relatively less important in rural areas. 55. The Road Safety Measures have also improved potential black spots; the reduced chances of accidents mean lower social costs. Better road maintenance through Road Maintenance Management will have a positive impact. 56. All of the Project roads are old, carrying high volumes of traffic. Their improvement has little socioeconomic or sociocultural impact. The trading patterns among regions will continue as they are, except for small diversions of traffic from alternate routes. On the whole, the project has little significant environmental effect.

IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Overall Assessment 57. The project was implemented as conceived, although with some change in scope and additional costs for road improvement. Because of the multiple executing agencies, supervision

14

of the various components was diffused, with too little coordination. That made the overall project complicated. The system of performance monitoring tracked the Project adequately, but more ADB supervision missions would have been beneficial. 58. Coordination between the executing agencies and the provinces would have made the Road Maintenance Management and Road Safety components far more meaningful. Confusion and a lack of communication among the implementing agencies—MELGRD, NHA, and NTRC—for the Maintenance Management component continued throughout implementation. 59. The Project’s logical framework was satisfactory and its performance targets reasonable. The Government executing agencies had established contracting procedures. There were no problems with ADB approval of procurement documents, including shortlists, prequalification documents, contract documents, awards, and contracts. Nor were there problems with ADB disbursements , although there were some delays by the executing agencies. Monitoring and evaluation were adequate. Overall, the project is rated successful. B. Lessons Learned 60. Careful consideration should be given to the selection of executing agencies. Having multiple executing agencies with no direct linkage with the Government’s hierarchy made coordination and cooperation among the entities almost impossible. The Road Maintenance Management and Road Safety components would have been more successful with CWD implementation. 61. The drawbacks of using a central coordinating agency, NHA, and MELGRD in the Project were: (i) assumption of a far greater role than originally envisaged, thus resisting delegation of responsibility to the provincial CWDs; (ii) diffusion of the institutional and sectoral aspects as reflected in the loan covenants; and (iii) a general lack of ownership by the provinces. 62. Delays and extra expenses caused by pavement failures and the need to add thicker asphalt concrete on several road sections might have been avoided if supervision of the PPTA consultants, and scrutiny of the final civil works designs, had been closer. Funding constraints should not pressure design consultants to cut back on design standards; it would have been better to shorten the lengths of roads to be improved, rather than marginalizing the design. 63. The Project had difficulty in attracting the interest of international contractors for the prequalification process. Breaking such projects into smaller packages, suitable for local competitive bidding, would probably have been better. C. Recommendations

1. Project-Related Recommendations

a. Covenants

64. The Government had comprehensive requirements for maintenance of completed road improvements. But it has not complied in budget allocation, strategic maintenance planning, or developing an action plan for a new classification system.

15

b. Future Monitoring

65. Monitoring should continue on performance of road sections that failed soon after opening. Such monitoring should be by objective surveys of traffic, and of axle loads. 66. ADB should closely monitor the development of the RMUs in the CWDs to assess how well maintenance management is being carried out, in accordance with Schedule 6 C., Road Maintenance, of the Loan Agreement. Furthermore, ADB should closely monitor and follow up with the Government on provincial budget allocations for maintenance. Conditions for future subsector funding should include strategies for both adequate maintenance, and adequate budgets.

c. Timing of PPAR Preparation

67. All works have been completed and most improved roads have been open to traffic for more than 2 years, so the project performance audit report (PPAR) may proceed immediately.

2. General 68. Greater care should be taken in the prequalification process to ensure the short-listing of only well-qualified contractors. All required data should be submitted and vetted before a company is included on the short list. 69. Consideration should be given to the packaging of civil works contracts so that local competitive bidding can be used when it is difficult to attract international contractors. 70. Implementation arrangements for the project were generally satisfactory. But the Road Maintenance Management and Road Safety components would have been far more successful had the CWDs played a greater role in their implementation.

16

Appendix 1

PROJECT FRAMEWORK

Design Summary Targets Issues (Recommendations) GOALS

Support rural development by enhancing the mobility of rural communities

Achieved

Improve government’s capacity for road maintenance management

Resources for road maintenance remain below optimum, but expected to improve

Monitoring and follow-up by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) should be on a regular basis

Assist government in its road safety program

Achieved

Improve road maintenance Establish a systematic and computerized system of road maintenance management

System established, but not fully operational because of resource constraints

ADB monitoring and follow-up should be on a regular basis

Improve road safety Establish a computerized recording and analysis system to locate accident-prone spots on national and provincial roads, and train staff on the system and other safety-related aspects

System established but not fully operational. Training completed

ADB monitoring and follow-up should be on a regular basis

Appendix 1

17

OUTPUT Civil works: upgrading of provincial roads

Appraisal Completion: Aug. 1996 Cost: $130 million (excluding contingencies)

Actual Completion: Dec. 2001 Cost: $195.08 million

Main causes of delay to civil works

• Slow prequalification process

• Late Recruitment of Road maintenance management system

Mar. 1993 – Jan. 1996 $3.35 million

Aug. 1996 – Nov 1999 Funded under a credit from the Nordic Development Fund

supervision consultants • Slow starts by contractors • Poor performance by

contractors

Accident-prone spot recording and analysis system and training.

Mar. 1993–Dec. 1996 $1.35 million

Oct. 1996–Dec. 2000 Funded under a credit from the Nordic Development Fund

INPUT

Supervisory services

Appraisal

Aug. 1993–Nov. 1996 $12.41 million (excluding contingencies)

Actual

Jan. 1994–Dec. 2001 $13.98 million

Establishment of ndf funded maintenance management system

Originally included for ADB funding

Not administered by the Bank

Establishment and training for NDF-funded road safety system

Originally included for ADB funding

Not administered by the Bank

Technical assistance for project preparation

$6.38 million

$5.81 million

18 Appendix 2

STATUS OF COMPLIANCE WITH LOAN COVENANTS

Covenant Reference

in Loan Agreement

Status of Compliance

The Borrower shall cause Project executing agencies to carry out the Project with due diligence and efficiency, and in conformity with sound practices of administrative, financial, engineering, environmental, and highway construction.

Section 4.01 (a) Complied with

The Borrower shall make available, or cause to be made available, as promptly as needed, the funds, facilities, services, land, and other resources that are required, in addition to the proceeds of the loan, to carry out the Project, and to operate and maintain the Project facilities.

Section 4.02 Complied with

In carrying out the Project, the Borrower shall cause competent and qualified consultants and contractors, acceptable to the Borrower and ADB, to be employed to an extent and upon terms and conditions satisfactory to the Borrower and ADB.

Section 4.03(a) Complied with

The Borrower shall cause the Project to be carried out in accordance with plans, design standards, specifications, work schedules, and construction methods acceptable to the Borrower and ADB. The Borrower shall furnish, or cause to be furnished, to ADB, promptly after their preparation, such plans, design standards, specifications and work schedules, and any material modifications subsequently made therein, in such detail as ADB shall reasonably request.

Section 4.03(b) Complied with

The Borrower shall ensure that the activities of its departments and agencies involved in respect to the carrying out of the Project, and operation of the Project facilities are conducted and coordinated in accordance with sound administrative policies and procedures.

Section 4.04 Complied with

Appendix 2 19

Covenant Reference

in Loan Agreement

Status of Compliance

The Borrower shall maintain, or cause to be maintained, records and accounts adequate to identify the goods and services financed out of the proceeds of the loan, to disclose the use thereof in the Project, to record the progress of the Project (including the cost thereof) and to reflect, in accordance with consistently maintained sound accounting principles, the Project-related operations and financial condition of the agencies of the Borrower responsible for the carrying out of the Project and operations of the Project facilities, or any part thereof.

Secton 4.06(a) Complied with

The Borrower shall (i) maintain, or cause to be maintained, separate accounts for the Project; (ii) have such accounts and related financial statements audited annually, in accordance with sound auditing standards, by auditors acceptable to ADB; (iii) furnish to ADB, as soon as available but in any event not later than twelve (12) months after the end of each related fiscal year, certified copies of such audited accounts and financial statements and the report of the auditors relating thereto, all in the English language’; and (iv) furnish to ADB such other information concerning such accounts.

Section 4.06(b) Complied with

In addition to annual audited financial statements, the Borrower shall furnish to ADB, within nine (9) months after the end of each fiscal year, unaudited annual accounts.

Section 4.06(c) Complied with

The Borrower shall furnish to ADB monthly reports on the carrying out of the Project.

Section 4.07(b) Complied with

The Borrower shall submit a Project completion report not later than 3 months after physical completion of the Project.

Section 4.07(c) Partially complied. A draft was submitted, but was never finalized

20 Appendix 2

Covenant Reference

in Loan Agreement

Status of Compliance

Preparation by Borrower and submission to ADB, road maintenance plans, annual budgetary allocations, and preparation of an action plan for a new road classification system.

Schedule 6 C, paras 7–10

Partly complied. Consultants collected data, and prepared estimates, plans, and an action plan—but it was not submitted by to ADB by the Government

Project Benefit Monitoring and Evaluation: Borrower shall compile and analyze baseline and final survey data

Schedule 6 D, para 15

Partly complied. Consultants prepared the final survey and report, but they were not incorporated into the PCR

Appendix 3 21

Year Projected Actual

1994 8.621995 14.201996 22.021997 26.191998 35.461999 19.702000 10.102001 8.132002 0.07

DISBURSEMENTS($ million)

Disbursement Details

0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

40.00

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Projected Actual

36 A

ppendix 6

22 A

ppendix 4

Appendix 5 23

CHRONOLOGY OF MAIN EVENTS

Date

Event

8 January 1992 The Asian Development Bank (ADB) sent a long list of

consultants to the National Highway Authority (NHA) 23 January Initial Environmental Evaluation (IEE) Report circulated for

interdepartmental comments 28 February ADB received draft SPELL OUT (PQ) documents 2 March 1992 Request for advance procurement action for inviting applications

for prequalification 5–27 February Fact-finding mission (sr. project. economist and project. engineer) 10 March Management Review Meeting (MRM) 8 April A draft general procurement notice was received from NHA 15 April ADB sent a long list of consultants for Third Farm to Market

Roads 15 May Approval of concept clearance by SPELL OUT (EAD) 8–23 July Appraisal Mission (sr. project. economist, prof. engineer,

programs officer) 28 August Staff Review Committee Meeting 1 October Draft Credit Agreement received from the Nordic Development

Fund (NDF) 5–8 October Loan negotiations 20 October Consultants sent draft PQ evaluation report 14 October Approval for Board circulation 16 October Board circulation 5 November Loan approval 11 November Consultants sent PQ evaluation report 15 December Issuance of bid invitations 6 January 1993 Fax from NHA informing ADB of extension of closing date for

submission of PQ applications

24 Appendix 5

Date

Event

12 January Executive Committee of the National Economic Council approval

03 February Fax from NHA requesting a reduction in construction period for

the six civil works contracts to 36 months 5 February ADB’s fax to NHA disapproving request for reduction of

construction period 9–18 February Review mission (project. engineer) 8 March ADB approved the prequalification of 7 of the 10 international

firms that applied 26 March ADB letter to EAD advising that ADB was unable to sign the loan

agreement because of limitations on the consultancy as approved by ECNEC

13 April ADB’s fax to NHA disagreeing with NHA’s proposal that

consultants are not required for preparation of agenda, management of the pre-bid meeting, etc

2 May EAD’s fax confirming ECNEC’s conditions of the cost of

consultancy, and inclusion of development of the maintenance system

4 June ADB’s letter advising EAD of alternative arrangement to reduce

the consultancy 30 June Signing of loan agreement 12 October Loan was declared effective 19 January 1994 ADB’s comments on the draft PQ evaluation report 1–18 May 1995 Review Mission (project. engineer) 19 August Reallocation of $150,000 to NHA Incremental Expenditure from

the unallocated category 6–12 September Review Mission (.asst. project. analyst and sr. project. engineer) 1–12 September 1996 Review Mission (asst. project. analyst and sr. project. engineer) 14 March 1997 VP-West approved change in implementation arrangements for

North West Frontier Province (NWFP) component 26 March ADB approved extension of loan closing date for 18 months from

31 December 1997 to 30 June 1999

Appendix 5 25

Date

Event

02 April ADB’s fax to NHA advising of the extension of the loan closing

date 3–20 November Review Mission (project. engineer, project. implementation

officer, asst. project. analyst, sr. project. engineer) 22 May 1998 ADB’s fax advising NHA of the project financing, ADB will not

approve the additional bypass on CP 4A and additional variation to supervision consultants’ contract

13–22 September Review Mission (asst. project. analyst, implementation officer

SPELL OUT (PRM), asst. project. analyst) 7–18 February 1999 Review Mission (asst. project. analyst, implementation officer

[PRM], sr. project. engineer) 19 June ADB approved 12-mo. extension of loan closing date, from 30

June 1999 to 30 June 2000 25 November Approval for additional pavement works on the Jhang–Chiniot

Road 21 March 2000 EAD requested 12-mo. extension of loan closing date 9 May ADB approved extension of 12-mo. loan closing date, from 30

June 2000 to 31 June 2001 9 June Loan upgraded from unsatisfactory to partly satisfactory 12–20 July Review Mission (proj. engineer, implementation officer) 9 February EAD’s request for 6-mo. extension of loan closing 22 February ADB approved the extension from 31 December 2001 to 30

June 2002 13-17 May SPELL OUT (PCR) Mission (transport specialist, asst. project.

analyst, staff consultant) PUNJAB (PACKAGE 1) 7 July 1993 Bid opening date for Package 1 7 July Representation letter from Hanbo Steel and General

Construction, upon Rizzani de Echer’s non-submission of bid bond

26 Appendix 5

Date

Event

2 September

ADB’s letter to Hanbo advising of the interpretation of the Guidelines on Procurement

22 December ADB approved award of Contract Package 1 to Rizzani de

Echer 2 February 1994

Rizzani de Echer failed to sign the contract within the stipulated time, so the Government decided to award Contract 1 to the Hanbo, the second-lowest bidder

4 April NHA asked for ADB’s concurrence on the award of Contract 1

to Hanbo Steel 12 April ADB’s fax to NHA approving the award of Contract 1 to Hanbo 16 April Letter of acceptance was issued to Hanbo 17 May Contract 1 was signed 30 June Contract documents for Package 1 received by the ADB 20 December Hanbo’s letter seeking comments on the merger with an

associate firm and change of name and identities 21 February 1995 ADB advised that CWD should enter into a new contract, with

the same terms and obligations, with Hanbo 5 August Contractor granted 150 days extension of time for delays

caused in tree felling, as determined by the engineer and approved by the employer

29 February 1996 Consultant’s letter to Hanbo advising of the insufficient rate of

progress at site 6 April Hanbo was instructed to make available the necessary

programming expertise on site 26 March 1997 Consultant’s letter to CWD on the delay of issuance of variation

for the design of drainage in Jhang–Chiniot road 8 November CWD’s letter advising the consultants of the adoption of the

revised pavement design of Sargodha–Talibwala road prepared by the Road Research & Material Testing Institute

19 November Consultant’s letter advising CWD that the revised payment

design appeared to contradict the latest recommendations given by AASHTO

Appendix 5 27

Date

Event

25 November ADB’s fax suggesting that the pavement specialist should

review the design 26 March 1998 Substantial completion certificate was issued 30 September Letter from consultants with suggestions to CWD on the

finalization of contractual and commercial issues raised by contractors

30 December 1998 End of maintenance period for Jhang–Chiniot Road 12 August 1999 ADB’s fax to CWD on the possibility of financing the overlay on

the Jhang–Chiniot Road 16 September CWD’s letter to ADB requesting concurrence for the financing

of additional overlay on Jhang–Chiniot Road 15 September ADB’s fax to CWD advising them that ADB agreed in principle

on the financing, pending submission of outstanding claims 4 October Italconsult’s letter to NHA proposing the purchase of weigh

stations 25 November ADB approved use of surplus loan funds for the overlay on the

Jhang–Chiniot Road 4 October ADB received test results and proposed pavement design for

Jhang-Chiniot 24 February 2000 NHA’s letter requesting ADB approval for variation for

construction supervision on the overlay 1 March ADB’s fax confirming the causes of the failure 1 March ADB’s approval to the variation to Contract Package 1 for

additional overlay PUNJAB (PACKAGE 2) 2 June 1993 ADB sent copy of ADBBO advertisement for prequalification to

NHA 15 December ADB received evaluation report for prequalification 26 December CWD Punjab proposing to repackage the works for domestic

contractors

28 Appendix 5

Date

Event

10 January 1994 ADB’s fax requesting for NHA’s comments on the repackaging

of works 31 January ADB advised NHA that ICB approach is to remain the same 9 February Italconsult’s clarification letter to NHA on the prequalification

evaluation 19 February NHA’s concurrence on the prequalification evaluation report 23 February ADB approved prequalification evaluation report 25 April Letter of invitation issued 28 April ADB approved prequalification of two additional firms 12 June NHA advised that it will defer opening of bids because of the

Finance Department’s concerns on the bidding document 15 June ADB advised NHA that deferring the opening is against the

ADB’s Guidelines 17 August Bid opening for Packages 2 and 3 8 November ADB received bid evaluation report for Package 2 15 November China International Water & Electric submitted revised program

schedule in accordance with his bid 26 December CWD Punjab recommended award of Package 2 to CIWE 14 February 1995 Procurement Committee meeting 14 February ADB approved award of Contract 2 to China International

Water and Electric Corp for PR1,184,242,009 11 April 1997 Italconsult’s letter to NHA advising that extensive drainage was

required in Chowk Munda 14 July Italconsult’s letter to CWD Punjab on the problems with asphalt

base course 15 October NHA’s report for Chowk Azam–Chowk Munda section based on

FWD deflection testing 20 February 1998 NHA proposed the services of a pavement specialist to

investigate premature failure of the pavement on Package 2

Appendix 5 29

Date

Event

24 February ADB concurred on the proposal of Dr. Baladi to carry out the

study 7 March Italconsult letter advising CWD that results of the study were

contrary to the report of the consultant and NHA issued on 15 October 1997. Thus, Italconsult recommended that an independent international pavement specialist should conduct the study

3 December

CWD’s letter to Italconsult instructing them to start work on the Bhakkar–Darya Khan Road

16 December ADB’s fax advising CWD of insufficient financing for Bakkar–

Darya Khan 25 January 1999 ADB’s fax asking CWD to provide the ADB with a formal

request for an extension of loan closing if they wanted to proceed with the construction of Bakkar–Darya Khan

PUNJAB (PACKAGE 3) 14 December 1993 ADB received the PQ Evaluation Report 26 December CWD proposed to repackage the contract into smaller

packages 31 January ADB advised CWD that International Competitive Bidding

approach is to remain 10 February 1994 NHA approved prequalification report 17 August Bid opening 15 November ADB received bid evaluation 20 January 1995 ADB approved the awarding of Contract Package 3 to

Pavito/Pavital 21 June Contract signing SINDH (PACKAGE 4A) 10 July 1993 Bid opening. Only two bids were received

18 August Consultants submitted bid evaluation report

9 September 1993 ADB received bid evaluation report

30 Appendix 5

Date

Event

15 December ADB approved award of Contract 4 to Rizzani de Echer for

PR841,384,516 20 December CWD sent letter of acceptance to Rizzani de Echer But the

contractor refused to accept two qualifications import in the letters

22 December Rizzani’s telex expressing reservations concerning the

conditions inserted in the letter of acceptance 30 April CWD’s request for rebidding of contract and splitting the

contract into two 16 June 1994 ADB approved splitting the package into two smaller packages,

and to the prequalification of suitable domestic firms 20 October 1994 Bid opening for Contracts 4A and 4B 29 December Bid evaluation report received 4 February 1995 CWD concurred on the award of Package 4A 6 May ADB approved award of Package 4A to China Road & Bridge

Corporation for PR645,479,369 25 May Issuance of letter of acceptance 14 June Contract signed SINDH (PACKAGE 4B) 29 December 1994 Receipt of bid evaluation report for Package 4B 8 March 1995 CWD’s fax requesting ADB’s concurrence to the award of the

contract to China Lioning International 27 March ADB approved award of contract to China Lioining International

Corporation for PR180,153,49625 13 April Issuance of letter of acceptance 24 May Contract signed 2 April 1999 Substantial Completion Certificate issued

Appendix 5 31

Date

Event

NWFP (PACKAGE 5)

2 December 1993 Bid opening 3 February 1994 Chief Minister of NWFP decided to reduce the scope of works

to only the Mardan–Swabi section because of financial limitations

11 April NWFP recommended award of contract to China Yunan

Corporation 18 April ADB approved award of contract to China Yunan Corporation

(CYC) 2 October Period of commencement 1 November

Request for ADB approval for Zee Khan Associates to work as subcontractor to the main contractor, because progress had been disappointing

6 February 1995 NWFP had requested the inclusion of the Jehangira–Swabi

road in the scope of work 8 February ADB declined the request for the inclusion of Jehangira–Swabi

road 13 February CYC was warned about its poor performance on the contract 7 March CWD issued a notice under Clause 63 for default of contractor 14 March CYC replied to the two notices 21 June The contractor had largely failed to improve progress, despite

the warning notices 1 March 1996 ADB fax concurring to subcontract 70% or more of the works 9 April ADB approved proposed subcontract between CYC and SKB 18 June ADB approves inclusion of Sheikh Maltoon Bypass in the scope

of the NWFP works 1 October Notice to expel was sent by CWD to CYC 16 May 1997 ADB approved assignment of Package 5 from CYC to

Saadullah Khan & Brothers (SKB)

32 Appendix 5

Date

Event

BALOCHISTAN PACKAGE 6)

12 December 1993 Bid opening 17 May 1994 Bid evaluation report received 30 May ADB approves award of contract to Hanbo for Cons

PR38,872,756 2 August Order to commence work issued

Appendix 6 33

ECONOMIC REEVALUATION

A. Introduction 1. The methodology used in the economic reevaluation was similar to that used at appraisal. The standard consumer surplus technique normally used for ADB project appraisal was used to evaluate investments in road improvement. The tangible benefits to road users were measured by incremental life cycle operating costs of vehicle trips “without” and “with” road improvement. Discounted cash flow techniques were used to compare costs and benefits over 20 years of the Project’s economic life, with a discount rate of 12%. B. Traffic

1. Existing Traffic.

2. Design consultants surveyed traffic in 1991, and supervision consultants, in 1999. But Project implementation was delayed until 1994 and 1995. Traffic estimates are, therefore, required for 1995, the year that Project implementation began. The Punjab Highway Department regularly surveys the traffic on all the roads that it maintains. Thus, traffic data for Punjab roads (contract packages 1, 2, and 3) are available from 1991 to 2000. Figures for 1995 were used in the analysis. For roads in Sindh and NWFP, 1995 estimates were interpolated from traffic surveys by a design consultant in 1991, and a supervision consultant in 1999. In Balochistan, a week-long consultant survey indicated an 11-fold increase, from 73 vehicles in 1991 to 806 in 1999.8 The reason is that without roads, the local people use numerous tracks, in all directions. But traffic shifts to a new road, once constructed. In such situations, a traffic count on one track is insufficient to estimate traffic. That explains the under-estimation of 1991 traffic. For our analysis, 1995 traffic estimates for Balochistan were derived by reducing 1999 traffic by 5% per annum to the year 1995.

2. Forecasts of Traffic Growth Rate 3. Analysis at appraisal was based on a growth rate of 4–9% for passenger vehicles and 3–8% for goods vehicles. The Project Benefit Monitoring Report9 showed that the actual growth rate was lower than predicted for 7 of the 11 Project roads, and slightly higher than predicted for 4 roads; average growth was 24% lower than predicted.10 4. Comparison of the two indicates growth rate variations of from –5.3% to 10.9% for the existing paved roads, and 33% for gravel roads. Variations for types of vehicle are still greater. The average overall growth rate is 4.7% per year. The increase in traffic has been lower than normal during the past few years because of decreased economic activity and severe drought in some areas. A yearly growth rate of 5% was used for the first 10 years, and 4% for the past 10 years uniformly, for all sections, partly for that reason, but also considering general trends that affect transport demand such as population growth, gross domestic product, and agricultural and industrial production, as well as to simplify analysis.

8 The absolute increase is small—only 733 vehicles . The relatively high percentage is due to a low base. 9 Italconsult, October 2001. 10 Ibid, Table 4.

34 Appendix 6

C. Benefits 5. The quantifiable benefits of Project road improvement consist of savings in operating costs for passenger and goods vehicles. Vehicle operation costs (VOC) depend on vehicle characteristics and prices (weight, size, engine power, fuel used), and on road conditions (type of surface, roughness, curvature, etc.). The HDM model has built-in equations for estimation of vehicle operation costs, depending on vehicle characteristics and road conditions (Tables 2 and 3). These are based on comprehensive VOC studies carried out under the auspices of the World Bank from 1975 to 1982 in Kenya, Brazil, and India. The vehicle prices assumed in the reevaluation are based on those in 1998, the first year of Project operation. Data on road conditions were taken from PC1 form of 1992 and design parameters 6. For economic reevaluation, vehicles were classified into six categories: (i) cars, jeeps, small vans, and pickups; (ii) wagons and pickups (medium size vehicles); (iii) buses; (iv) trucks, 2-axle; (v) trucks, 3-axle; and (vi) trucks, > 3-axle. Animal-drawn vehicles and tractors were ignored because the model has no provision for them, and they are unlikely to be of major significance. Motorcycles were classified as cars, at the rate of 3 motorcycles:1 car. Similarly, an agricultural tractor trolley was considered the equivalent of a two-axle truck. 7. The level of roughness of existing road pavements predicted by the model, and vehicle operation costs for various levels of roughnes is also shown in the table. D. Construction and Maintenance Costs

3. Construction costs

8. Construction costs include actual costs of civil works, cost of construction supervision, the executing agencies’ incremental administrative expenses, and relevant Project Preparation Technical Assistance (PPTA). The cost of civil works can be determined for individual road sections, but the costs of supervision and incremental administration are common for all or several roads. Those costs have been distributed over individual sections on a per-kilometer basis. Construction supervision accounted for 8.3% of the costs of civil works; incremental administration accounted for 0.6%, and PPTA, 0.1%. Because those items total 10%, the civil works cost was increased by 10%. The actual costs include taxes and duties that must be excluded for economic evaluation. Thus, actual costs were multiplied by a factor of 0.85 to arrive at economic costs , or costs excluding taxes, duties, and transfer payments. Economic costs are based on detailed analysis of road projects in Pakistan, and used extensively for economic evaluation.

2. Maintenance costs 9. Maintenance costs for the allocation of maintenance funds have been assumed as PRs50,000/km per year by the provincial governments. These were reduced by a factor of 0.85 to arrive at economic maintenance costs.

The costs of construction and maintenance used for individual roads are shown in the table.

Appendix 6 35

E. Evaluation 10. The economic reevaluation was developed by comparing the incremental costs of use over the life cycle of a road, “with” and “without” the Project, using discounted cash flow techniques and the economic internal rate of return (EIRR) as decision criteria. A table shows the resulting EIRRs for individual roads; they range from 15.7% to 50.6%; the overall EIRR for the Project was 28.3%. 11. At appraisal, roads were evaluated at an average cost of PRs5.6 million per km, with an EIRR of 53.3%. Because of inflation and changes in design, the cost at completion averaged PRs12.5 million per km. With other items considered equal, the EIRRs have decreased proportionately to cost increases. 12. Sensitivity analysis was calculated by (i) increasing costs by 15%, (ii) decreasing benefits by 15%, and (iii) a combination of the two. In all cases, every road section remains viable, with EIRRs higher than 12%. Sensitivity indicators (ratio of change in EIRR: change in variable tested) were also computed. They indicate elasticity of change in EIRR with respect to change in costs or benefits. In all cases, 1% change in costs of benefits would result in less than 1% change in EIRR. 13. The benefits accrue through savings in vehicle operating costs: fuel, oil, tires, parts, maintenance labor, depreciation, interest, and crew costs (plus value of passenger time, for passenger vehicles). Parts and maintenance labor are affected significantly by changes in road conditions. Parts and maintenance account for 90% of savings in operating costs for cars, wagons, and trucks; and 78% for buses. For buses, value of passenger time is also important; it accounts for 7% of costs. These ratios were developed by using HDM4, which gives more details about vehicle operating costs. Thus, benefits are ultimately sensitive to road conditions and proposed improvements. Poorer road conditions mean higher costs for repair and maintenance, and mean higher payoffs for improvement.

36 A

ppendix 6

ROAD CONDITION, TRAFFIC AND COST DATA

SEC. Description CP1-1 CP1-2 CP1-3 CP2-1 CP2-2 CP2-3 CP3 CP4-A CP4-B CP5 CP6

A. Existing Condition

1Width of pavement (m) 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 5.8 5.5 7.0 6.1

2Width of Shoulder (m) 2.0 3.0 1.5 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.0

3Type of Surface TST TST TST TST TST TST TST TST TST TST Gravel

4Structural No. 2.00 1.36 1.78 2.73 2.28 1.66 1.43 1.55 3.19 2.20 0.00

5Roughness IRI 3.70 3.90 3.70 3.70 3.80 4.30 3.70 3.10 4.20 4.20 12.00

B. Proposed Improvement

1Width of Pavement (m) 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 6.1

2Width of Shoulders (m) 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0

3Surface Type AC AC AC AC AC AC AC AC AC AC TST

4Structural No. 4.57 5.00 3.31 3.48 4.49 4.57 4.43 3.70 3.64 3.42 1.09

5Roughness IRI 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 4.00

C. Traffic ADT

1Cars 628 818 1334 766 994 804 891 628 832 1281 143

2Wagons 318 488 249 616 410 475 172 425 352 928 184

3Buses 154 463 212 360 440 474 368 133 275 277 30

4Trucks 2 axle 1275 838 284 952 1089 1127 818 379 575 262 105

5Trucks 3 axle 102 741 12 225 652 622 286 395 35 1 29

6Trucks > 3 axles 26 63 42 78 135 109 76 33 5 0 1

7 total 2503 3411 2133 2997 3720 3611 2611 1993 2074 2749 492

D Cost of Improvement (Mill Rs./Km)

1Completion Cost Mill Rs 1194.29 405.86 157.30 459.89 432.80 667.58 584.44 742.71 243.07 427.65 760.04

2Length km 80.38 43.10 15.54 37.14 24.53 42.38 50.08 80.80 22.90 47.10 83.73

3Cost per km Mill Rs. 14.86 9.42 10.12 12.38 17.65 15.75 11.67 9.19 10.61 9.08 9.08

4Const. Supervision etc. 10% 1.49 0.94 1.01 1.24 1.76 1.58 1.17 0.92 1.06 0.91 0.91

5Total Fin. Cost. 16.34 10.36 11.14 13.62 19.41 17.33 12.84 10.11 11.68 9.99 9.99

6Eco. Cost 85% of fin. 13.89 8.80 9.47 11.58 16.50 14.73 10.91 8.59 9.92 8.49 8.49

Appendix 6

37

Sec. Year cp1-2 cp1-3 cp2-1 cp2-2 cp2-3 cp3 4a 4b cp5 cp61 1995 5.2 4.0 4.0 4.3 5.2 4.6 3.8 4.4 4.4 21.42 1996 6.4 4.1 4.1 4.7 6.0 5.3 4.4 4.5 4.5 21.43 1997 7.6 4.3 4.3 5.1 6.9 6.0 5.1 4.6 4.6 21.44 1998 9.1 4.6 4.6 5.6 7.9 6.9 5.8 4.7 4.7 21.45 1999 10.8 4.9 5.0 6.3 9.1 8.0 6.7 5.0 4.9 21.46 2000 11.5 5.5 5.5 7.3 10.9 9.5 8.1 5.3 5.2 21.47 2001 11.5 6.1 6.0 8.5 11.5 11.2 10.0 5.6 5.7 21.18 2002 11.5 6.9 6.7 10.0 11.5 11.5 11.5 5.9 6.3 21.19 2003 11.5 7.7 7.4 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 6.2 7.0 21.110 2004 11.5 8.8 8.3 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 6.6 7.9 21.111 2005 11.5 10.1 9.3 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 6.9 9.0 21.112 2006 11.5 11.5 10.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 7.4 10.5 21.113 2007 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 7.8 11.5 21.114 2008 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 8.3 11.5 21.115 2009 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 8.9 11.5 21.116 2010 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 9.6 11.5 21.117 2011 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 10.3 11.5 21.118 2012 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.2 11.5 21.119 2013 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 21.120 2014 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 21.1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 108.20 8.40 8.50 8.80 9.00 9.40 9.80 10.20 10.807.60 7.80 8.10 8.60 9.00 9.60 10.10 10.60 11.30

15.30 15.60 15.80 16.20 16.40 17.00 17.40 18.00 18.709.40 9.50 10.10 10.70 11.20 12.00 12.60 13.25 13.90

13.10 13.30 13.96 14.50 15.10 15.90 16.50 17.10 17.80

WagonBusTruck 2 axleTruck mxl

Vehicle Operating Cost by Roughness Level (Rs./km)

Vehicle Roughness Level IRI

Car

11.511.511.5

11.511.511.511.5

11.511.511.511.5

7.48.7

10.311.5

4.65.15.66.3

Roughness Level of Existing Roads Predicted by HDM (Base Cost, Without Project, Minimum Maintenance)

cp1-14.2

38 A

ppendix 6

Vehicle Operating Costs by Level of Roughness

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Roughness (IRI)

Rs.

/Km

Car

Wagon

Bus

Truck 2axle

Truckmxl

Appendix 6 39

EIRR and Sensitivity Analysis

IRR % Sensitivity Index

Contract Name of road Base case

15% cost increase

15% bnfts decrease

both together Cost Benefits

cp1-1 Jhang Chiniot 24.2 22.1 22.0 20.0 0.58 0.61

cp1-2 Sargodha Talibwala 50.6 46.5 46.4 42.6 0.54 0.55

cp1-3 Daska Sialkto 20.0 18.3 18.4 16.7 0.57 0.53

cp2-1 Mianwali Ghulaman 25.1 23.7 23.7 21.8 0.37 0.37

cp2-2 Fatehpur Chowk Azam 30.5 28.1 28.0 25.7 0.52 0.55

cp2-3 Chowk Azam Chowk Munda 35.5 32.4 32.5 29.6 0.58 0.56

cp3 Shorkot Kabairwala 31.0 28.3 28.4 25.9 0.58 0.56

cp4-a Badin Sujarwal 28.1 25.7 25.7 23.4 0.57 0.57

cp4-b Mirpurkhas Mirwah 15.7 14.0 14.2 12.6 0.72 0.64

cp5 Mardan Swabi 21.0 19.3 19.4 17.4 0.54 0.51

cp6 Surab Basima 29.6 26.5 26.9 23.9 0.70 0.61

Average 28.30 25.90 25.96 23.60 0.57 0.55

Weighted Average 28.85 26.38 26.43 24.01 0.57 0.56

40 Appendix 6

Traffic Volume, 1991 Sno Name mcy cars wgn bus trk2xl trk3xl trk>3xl total

1 jhang chiniot 234 359 364 144 1,304 138 57 2,600 2 kabirwala shorkot 294 611 171 504 1,441 384 144 3,549 3 mainwala-ghulaman 87 231 229 273 557 78 50 1,505 4 sambrial daska 491 541 516 231 187 7 1 1,974 5 fatehpur chowk azam 226 335 407 132 1,222 132 54 2,508 6 chowk azam chowk munda 90 277 232 323 1,151 579 88 2,740 7 sargodha talibwala 500 734 440 269 999 85 9 3,036 8 mirpurkhas mirwah 385 577 255 304 578 20 6 2,125 9 badin sujawal 300 417 504 182 668 164 821 3,056

10 mardan swabi 55 957 794 315 196 9 1 2,327 11 Basima surab 17 15 25 9 13 0 0 79

total 2679 5054 3937 2686 8316 1596 1231 25499

Traffic Volume 1999 1 jhang chiniot 497 1,042 784 325 1,620 1,097 563 5,928 2 kabirwala shorkot 537 887 784 418 1,117 275 117 4,135 3 mainwala-ghulaman 122 666 324 190 469 198 154 2,123 4 sambrial daska 506 742 704 368 767 326 173 3,586 5 fatehpur chowk azam 138 597 250 286 867 311 159 2,608 6 chowk azam chowk munda 547 1,237 289 434 1,846 1,043 391 5,787 7 sargodha talibwala 1,013 957 1,014 208 510 36 53 3,791 8 mirpurkhas mirwah 543 826 449 504 660 63 10 3,055 9 badin sujawal 528 438 372 99 408 65 67 1,977

10 mardan swabi 543 826 449 504 648 63 10 3,043 11 Basima surab 197 117 251 38 135 37 2 777

total 5,171 8,335 5,670 3,374 9,046 3,514 1,699 36,809

Growth rate % p.a. 1 jhang chiniot 9.9 14.2 10.1 10.7 2.8 29.6 33.1 10.9 2 kabirwala shorkot 7.8 4.8 21.0 -2.3 -3.1 -4.1 -2.6 1.9 3 mainwala-ghulaman 4.3 14.2 4.4 -4.4 -2.1 12.3 15.1 4.4 4 sambrial daska 0.4 4.0 4.0 6.0 19.3 61.6 90.4 7.7 5 fatehpur chowk azam -6.0 7.5 -5.9 10.1 -4.2 11.3 14.5 0.5 6 chowk azam chowk munda 25.3 20.6 2.8 3.8 6.1 7.6 20.5 9.8 7 sargodha talibwala 9.2 3.4 11.0 -3.2 -8.1 -10.2 24.8 2.8 8 mirpurkhas mirwah 4.4 4.6 7.3 6.5 1.7 15.4 6.6 4.6 9 badin sujawal 7.3 0.6 -3.7 -7.3 -6.0 -10.9 -26.9 -5.3

10 mardan swabi 33.1 -1.8 -6.9 6.1 16.1 27.5 33.4 3.4 11 Basima surab 35.8 29.3 33.4 19.7 34.0 0.0 0.0 33.1

8.6 6.5 4.7 2.9 1.1 10.4 4.1 4.7

Appendix 7 41

Table: Project Rating Calculation [1185-PAK(SF)] Criterion Rating Weighting (%) Amount

A. Project Outcome Assessment

1. Relevance Highly Relevant 3 20 0.60

2. Efficacy Less Efficacious 1 25 0.25

3. Efficiency Efficient 2 20 0.40

B. Sustainability Likely 2 20 0.40

C. Environmental and Social Little 1 15 0.15

Institutional Development

Overall Project Rating

1.80

Relevance is the consistency of the project's goals, purposes, and outputs with the Government's development strategy, ADB's lending strategy for the country, and ADB's strategic objectives at the time of appraisal and evaluation. Efficacy refers to immediate achievement of objectives and the physical, financial and institutional objectives adopted at project approval. Efficiency compares the achievement of project purpose with the use of inputs, based on implementation performance with consideration of the economic internal rate of return or cost effectiveness of the investment. Sustainability focuses on the likelihood that human, institutional and financial resources are sufficient to support achievement results and benefits over the economic life of the project. Environmental, Social and Institutional Development refers to improvements in the executing agency or country to make effective and efficient use of its resources in pursuing economic, environmental, and social activities promoted by the Project.