asher kohn kyrgyzstan
TRANSCRIPT
“We Must Work Tirelessly to Instill a Political Culture”
Legalistic Aspirations and Realities in Kyrgyzstan
Asher J. Kohn Dec. 2, 2011
1
Part I: Introduction & Background
Kyrgyzstan‟s turn of independence in 1991 was in many ways not a welcome one. The
Soviet Socialist Republic of Khirghizia was the second poorest of all the USSR‟s republics upon
breakup, and a March 1991 referendum saw 88.7% of Kyrgyzstani voters approve a proposal to
remain within the Russian Federation.1 It was no matter; Askar Akayev became the first
president of a new Republic of Kyrgyzstan on August 31, 1991.2 A new Constitution was
approved in 1993, which would be updated in 1996, 2004 and 2007.3 Even in 2005, as Akayev
was swept out of power by a coalition of fellow politicians, the 1993 Constitution remained.4 It
wasn‟t until the 2010 riots that chased new President Kurmanbek Bakiev out of power that a
wholly new Constitution was formed.5
This new constitution, approved by referendum in July 2010, represents if not a clean
break with the past, then certainly a different tack.6 While keeping old legislation intact, it moves
Kyrgyzstan to a parliamentary system where the Prime Minister, not President, is the head of
government.7 However, this constitution is also a strongly aspirational document, defining
1 Genevieve Gunow, Recurring Themes in the Kyrgyz Revolutions, Vestnik: The Journal of Russian and Asian
Studies (Oct. 20, 2011), available at http://www.sras.org/recurring_themes_in_the_kyrgyz_revolutions. 2 Kyrgyzstan‟s official title is The Kyrgyz Republic. The region was incorporated into the Russian Empire as
Kirgizia, was known as the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic as part of the USSR, and announced its 1991
independence as the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. It changed its name to the Kyrgyz Republic in 1993. An alternative
transliteration is Khirghizstan, which can still be found on some documents. For the sake of sorely-needed
simplification, this paper will refer to the country as Kyrgyzstan and its citizens as Kyrgyzstanis. 3 An electronic version of the 2007 Constitution can be found in English translation at http://aceproject.org/ero-
en/regions/asia/KG/kyrgyzstan-constitution-1993-2007/view via ACE Electoral Knowledge Network. 4 U.S. Congressional Research Service. “Kyrgyzstan‟s Constitutional Crisis: Context and Implications for U.S.
Interests” (RS22546; Jan. 5, 2007), by Jim Nichol. Accessed: Dec. 1, 2011. This 2005 event that took Akayev from
power and installed Kurmanbek Bakiyev in his stead is popularly called the Tulip Revolution. 5 OSCE observers back Kyrgyzstan referendum, BBC News (Jun. 28, 2010), available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10432243. 6 Id. It should be mentioned that the referendum installing the new Constitution took place during ethnic clashes in
the south of the country that saw nearly 1,000 dead and 100,000-400,000 refugees. See, “Where is the Justice?”,
Human Rights Watch (Aug. 16, 2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/node/92408/section/1. 7 Kyrgyzstan‟s Proposed Constitution, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Jun. 24, 2010), available at
http://kyrgyzstan.carnegieendowment.org/2010/06/kyrgystan%E2%80%99s-new-constitution/.
2
Kyrgyzstan as it wishes the country be.8 The newly elected President Almazbek Atambaev is
expected to revert rule of law back to presidentialism and, in effect, authoritarianism.9 The future
that this Constitution reaches out to is still ill-defined.
During the drafting process, Nurlan Sadykov stated that in the new Constitution, “[t]he
prime minister will be accountable to the parliament and the parliament will be accountable to
the electorate, the people.”10 This paper will demonstrate how the aspirational Constitution of
Kyrgyzstan is not quite able to answer Sadykov‟s proposition. The paper begins by looking at the
construction of civil society in order to display the vibrancy of non-governmental life in the
country. Then, this paper will briefly survey the elite class of Kyrgyzstan, demonstrating that the
same actors in power at the fall of the USSR are still in power today through an explicit
combination of cooperative measures and exclusionary tactics. Finally, this paper will look at
governmental accountability in two parts, as posited in Sadykov‟s above quote. First, it will
examine the legal and illegal means through which parliament keeps a check on the head of state.
Second, it will examine the relationship between parliament (called “Jogorku Kenesh” in
Kyrgyz, a term that will be used interchangeably with “Parliament” in this paper) and the
Kyrgyzstani people, showing how repression interplays with binding ties to create something
well short of pure accountability.
Simply put, the legal norms in Kyrgyzstan are not quite level with its Constitution. By
exhibiting the difference between civil society‟s and the elite players‟ methods of self
governance, this paper will demonstrate the carrying conceptions and selective enforcement of
8 An aspirational constitution has a “forward-looking viewpoint” that “defines a nation in terms of its future, its
goals and its dreams.” See, Kim Lane Scheppele, “Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for
Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence through Negative Models” 1 INT‟L J. CONST. L. 296, 299 (2003). 9 Quoting Eric McGlinchy in Daisy Sindelar, Hopes for Stability as Kyrgyz Presidential Vote Approaches,
Eurasianet.org (Oct. 29, 2011), available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64406. 10
David Trilling, New Kyrgyz Constitution Strong on Promises, Vague on Checks and Balances, Eurasianet.org
(May 4, 2010), available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/60985; Nurlan Sadykov is the director of the Institute
for Constitutional Policy and one of the framers of the Constitution.
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rule of law. By testing intra-governmental and intra-state accountability, this paper hopes to
show that though the underpinnings of a parliamentary democracy exist, the finished product is
not quite where it purports to be. The Constitution is used throughout the paper to reflect and
diverge from the range of anthropological, sociological, journalistic, and analytical accounts
collated to construct an image of Kyrgyzstani life. By comparing Constitutional articles to the
Kyrgyzstani reality, the gap between the two can be more accurately defined.
Part II: Civil Society in Kyrgyzstan
In October 10, 2010, the one hundred twenty members of the Jogorgu Kenesh met for the
first time as a political body.11 President Roza Otunbayeva spoke to the parliamentarians about
the violence of the spring, national unity, and the role of the interim government.12 She closed
her remarks by encouraging the government present and future to become the country their
constitution promises. “We must work tirelessly to instill a political culture” to match the
constitution, she announced.13
The concern over creation of political culture, while absolutely valid, seems strange at
first blush. This part will demonstrate that arguing, compromising, and making group decisions
is part of Kyrgyzstani culture. Civil society in Kyrgyzstan is strong, quite stronger than in any of
the four other post-Soviet Central Asian states.14 However, the heterogeneity of Kyrgyzstan does
not always work in concert with state concretization, as different groups come to consensuses in
different venues. The rural and urban spheres are quite distinct in Kyrgyzstan and each has their 11
President Otunbayeva‟s Address to the Jogorku Kenesh, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Nov. 10,
2010), available at http://kyrgyzstan.carnegieendowment.org/2010/11/president-otunbayevas-address-to-the-
jogorku-kenesh/. 12
Id. 13
Id. 14
Tiago Ferreira Lopes, Will Kyrgyzstan‟s Tulip Revolution dye or blossom?, Strategic Outlook (October 1, 2011),
available at http://www.strategicoutlook.org/2011/10/will-kyrgyzstan%E2%80%99s-tulip-revolution-dye-or-
blossom/.
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own bustling civil society institutions. The dynamics of civil society in Kyrgyzstan can be seen
in the 2005 and 2010 protests, where revolt came not from the center, but from various segments
of this robust, if inchoate, societal movement.15
A. Rural Civil Society
Rural Kyrgyzstan can be portrayed as a hardscrabble, bleak, landscape hedging closer to
a Cormac McCarthy novel than a complicated home to approximately 3.5 million of
Kyrgyzstan‟s 5.5 million people.16 A 2008 New York Times article, typical of the genre, begins
with “[i]n this remote corner of the former Soviet Union, life has shrunk to the size of the basics:
tomatoes; corn; apricot tress; baby goats.”17 It goes on to describe a shuttered toothbrush factory,
bride kidnapping, a burned thatch roof, and ends with “a round, course loaf of bread.”18 It is true
that pastoral rights are enshrined in the constitution, and a visitor may see ancient rites in the
heavily agricultural and shepherding economy.19 This would ignore the prevalence of cell
phones, technology, and the 21st Century interpretations of Soviet kolkhoz communities.20 Rural
communities have proven resilient, remaining largely self-sufficient without much tampering
15
Noah Tucker, Kyrgyzstan at 20: What Now?, Registan.net (Sep. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.registan.net/index.php/2011/09/28/kyrgyzstan-at-20-what-now/. 16
Population statistics from World Population to Exceed 9 Billion by 2050, United Nations (Mar. 11, 2009),
available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2008/wpp2008_text_tables.pdf; Sixty-five percent
figure from Local Infrastructure Investments Improve Life in Kyrgyz Villages, The World Bank (Jun. 2007),
available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:21358516~menuPK:47540
51~pagePK:51236175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,00.html. 17
Sabrina Tavernise, In a Kyrgyz Garden, Unburied Soviet Memories, New York Times (May 15, 2008), available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/15/world/asia/15kyrgyz.html?ex=1211515200&en=c93a3e4642d55784&ei=5070
&emc=eta1. 18
Id. 19
“Land may also be in private, municipal, and other forms of ownership except for pastures which may not be in
private property.” See, The Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic [Hereinafter: “Const.”] Art. XII, §5; Tengrism, the
“monotheist natural religion whose last traces would be found in shamanism” has a society in Bishkek with 500,000
members. Akayev called it the “national and „natural‟ religion of the Turkic peoples [spanning from East Turkestan
in China to Turkey].” See, Marlene Laruelle, Tengrism: In Search For Central Asia‟s Spiritual Roots, Central Asia –
Caucasus Institute (Mar. 22, 2006), available athttp://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/3837. 20
Scott Radnitz, WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY: PREDATORY REGIMES AND ELITE-LED PROTESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA
215 (Cornell University Press) (2010), [Hereinafter “WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY”].
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from or movement towards urban space.21
There has not been widespread urbanization in
Kyrgyzstan.22 The heads of family will go to the provincial center for market weekly or monthly
and there are economic ties, but political and legal realities are far different.23
Rural villages outside provincial centers are administered by a kommissar, nominated by
the provincial governor who is in turn nominated by the Jogorku Kenesh.24 The kommissar is
usually a relatively young party member who has ties to that village, but he is also often the only
government presence in town.25
The judiciary is represented by aksakal courts. The word aksakal literally means “white
beard,” and is used as synecdoche to classify the oldest, wisest man in the village.26 In aksakal
courts, two or more parties in disagreement agree to take their case to an elder instead of to a
state court and his decision becomes the law.27
Then-President Akayev created the aksakal courts in 1995 to, according to his speech,
bring back an integral part of Kyrgyz communal life.28 It is just as likely the aksakals were
21
In this paper, “resilience” is defined in the socio-ecological sense as “the capacity of a system to absorb
disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure,
identity, and feedbacks.” See, Brian Walker, C.S. Holling, Stephen R. Carpenter, and Ann Kinzig, “Resilience,
Adaptability, and Transformability in Social-ecological Systems” ECOLOGY AND SOCIETY, Vol. 9, No. 2, Art. 5
(2004), available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art5/. 22
In 1989, 38.2% of Kyrgyzstanis lived in urban areas. That proportion fell to 35.4% by 1999. See, Martin Schuler,
Migration Patterns of the Population of Kyrgyzstan, Espace Populations Societés §5 (Jan. 2007). 23
“In order to go to Talas [the provincial center] we would have to pay 80 Som [the state currency, equal to approx.
$2] in all and come home with an empty stomach.” Interview by Judith Beyer. See, Judith Beyer, “Imagining the
State in Rural Kyrgyzstan: How Perceptions of the State Create Customary Law in the Kyrgyz Aksakal Courts”
MAX-PLANK-GESELLSCHAFT (2007) at 4. Beyer‟s work on aksakal courts is both fascinating and vital to
understanding law in rural Kyrgyzstan. 24
Emil Alymkulov and Murat Kulatov, Local Government in the Kyrgyz Republic, Local Governments in Eastern
Europe, in the Caucasus, and Central Asia, at 571, available at
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN008037.pdf 25
Beyer, “Imagining the State” at 4. 26
Id. at 2. There can be more than one aksakal in a village and there are instances of women taking on this role. 27
Id. at 8. Aksakal courts administer common law and run parallel to the country‟s civil code. The sources for this
common law are traditional, often pieced together from Tengrist beliefs, Islamic Law, Imperial Russian codes,
Soviet memories, and more than a pinch of whole-cloth inventions. Attempts at codification have not been
successful. See, Judith Beyer, “Revitalization, Invention, and Continued Existence of the Kyrgyz Aksakal Courts:
Listening to Pluralistic Accounts of History” 53 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 141, 142 (2006). 28
Beyer, “Imagining the State” p. 8. “Create” is the correct word, as Akayev took a vague, if living, tradition and
codified it in a way that would give state control. The concept of “invented tradition” dovetails with this nicely. See,
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established in law to allay a swell of cases swamping the state courts.29 The introduction of
aksakal courts rapidly led to their domination of the rural legal field.30
Most Kyrgyzstanis do not
have the money or time to travel and have their case heard by the state courts in the provincial
center.31 Local self governance is a right enshrined in the constitution, as local communities are
allowed to “independently resolve the matters of local significance” and they may do this “either
directly or through local self governance bodies.”32 Even though the aksakal putatively ranks
below the mayor, he likely had a large part in the mayor‟s education and upbringing in a society
where deference to age is paramount.33
Low levels of state intrusion go hand-in-hand with this constitutional precept of rural
autonomy. There are government-provided pensions and government-sponsored work, but most
public goods are provided by voluntary labor aid institutions called ashars.34 These loose,
informal bands of men and women will clean streets, repair canals, and the like as well as take
part in the more stereotypical Kyrgyzstani art of gossiping at a chaikhana.35 Leaders of these
ashars, rather than the kommissars are known to step in to help solve inter-communal issues such
as water sharing agreements.36
Benedict Anderson, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM, Verso
(1983). 29
Beyer, “Imagining the State” p. 9. 30
Id. At 8. 31
Id. at 4. 32
Const. Art. 110, §1, 3. 33
Beyer, “Imagining the State” at 15. 34
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 44. Words will be pluralized according to English custom in this paper for
simplicity‟s sake. I do not wish to confuse my audience with Kyrgyz or Russian grammar. 35
Id.; Defining and Measuring Social Capital in Kyrgyzstan, Community Action for Health in Kyrgyzstan at 4,
available at
http://www.cah.kg/reports/Defining%20and%20Measuring%20Social%20Capital%20in%20Kyrgyzstan.pdf.
“Chaikhana” translates literally as “teahouse”. They function as social gathering places, with different segments of
societies informally selecting “their” teahouse, much the same way a bar or coffeeshop functions in the United
States. See generally, Defining and Measuring Social Capital in Kyrgyzstan, supra note 35. 36
Justin Vela, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: Is Batken Province Central Asia‟s Next Flashpoint?, Eurasianet (Jun. 7,
2011), available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63640.
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Civil society has made Kyrgyzstani rural communities far more self-sufficient than the
rurality elsewhere in the region, but, as described later,37 this autonomy has made them
susceptible to later co-option by the local leaders who have made their way to Bishkek.38 While
rural Kyrgyzstan is indeed traditional, actors in rural society have been able to use rapidly
changing legal and political tools to coalesce into society and interact with the state.
B. Urban Civil Society
Kyrgyzstan‟s population is 35% urban and its main cities of Osh, Jalalabad, and Bishkek host
internationally-ranked universities, non-governmental organizations, and all of the institutions,
formal or not, of Kyrgyzstan intelligentsia.39 “Business start-ups and artist collectives…are
staring to sprout across Bishkek,” turning the city into “the Berlin of Central Asia,” and there is a
level of entrepreneurialism and a discourse befitting an ethnically and economically
heterogeneous capital.40 In this context, though, the subdivisions, and the leaders of these
subdivisions, form the structure of urban society.
Cities are subdivided into mahallas, from an Arabic word for “neighborhoods.”41 Unlike
the word or the concept as used in the United States (outside of gated communities), Kyrgyzstani
mahallas are walled in and mixed-use.42 Mahallas are run by a person known as the dumashni,
37
See infra, Part V, §B(3) “Descending Ties” at 29. 38
Bishkek is the capital and largest city of Kyrgyzstan. 39
“For a relatively small city, the number of major universities and technical schools in Bishkek gives it the feel
almost of place like Boston, and a number of these universities produce talented graduates whose diplomas are
recognized around the world.” See, Kyrgyzstan at 20, supra note 15. 40
Christopher Schwartz, Bishkek, the Berlin of Central Asia? Part 1 – Namba.kg, Neweurasia.net (Sep. 19, 2011),
available at http://www.neweurasia.net/business-and-economics/bishkek-the-berlin-of-central-asia-part-1-namba-
kg/. 41
Martin Gramatikov, Do Mahalla Committees and Aksakal courts promote access to justice in Central Asia?,
Access to Justice Blog (Mar. 20, 2011), available at http://ma2j.wordpress.com/2011/03/20/do-mahalla-committees-
and-aksakal-courts-promote-access-to-justice-in-central-asia/. 42
Mahallas only have a few gates in or out and contain markets, restaurants, and utilities as well as homes. This
system of regulation and protection had dramatic consequences in Osh when riots turned violent in 2010. See, Noah
Tucker, Osh, Part I: City of Echo Chambers, Registan.net (Jun. 21, 2011),
http://www.registan.net/index.php/2011/06/21/osh-part-1-city-of-echo-chambers/.
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komitet raisi, or mahalla raisi.43 Organization and upkeep of the mahalla is his responsibility, but
he must also take the temperature of local politics and attempt to restrain any unwelcome
political activity by going from house to house or chaikhana to chaikhana to talk to individuals
and censure unrestrained speech.44
There have been noted tensions between the mahalla raisis, when civil law has smashed
into community standards.45 “By law, we can‟t kick people out,” said one rais, “but sometimes
we must break the law to maintain traditions.”46 These conflicts are commonplace in a country
with aspirational laws; particularly when international aid organizations criticize a practice.47 It is
far easier for the state government to change the law then to change the practice. This is not to
say that all traditional jurisprudence should be gawked at or criticized, just that international
standards are not always as standard as its promulgators may hope. The friction between
international norms and local practices are to be expected and eventually marginalized, not
ignored.
A man named Zaibiddin has made it his goal to form a more Islamic society in his
mahalla in Osh.48 When asked about his philanthropic works, he simply stated, “I help because
the government does not.”49 In other mahallas and in different cities, politicians running for
elected office believe the best medicine is a bit more base. Radnitz describes an Election Day
43
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 45. Switching between Russian, Kyrgyz, and other languages can happen from
neighborhood to neighborhood and for seemingly arbitrary reasons. The lack of a monolithic language has the
byproduct of confusing the terminology in this paper. 44
Id. 45
Do Mahalla Committees and Aksakal courts promote access to justice in Central Asia?, supra note 41. 46
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 50. 47
“Revitalization, Invention, and Continued Existence of the Kyrgyz Aksakal Courts” at 142. Although it is in the
context of Afghanistan, not Kyrgyzstan, Joshua Foust‟s foreigner perspective on the disconnect between practice
and regulation is apt, “The crime here is not that a law is being passed to normalize a routine practice; it is that this
was a routine practice and we chose not to care about it in the first place.” Joshua Foust, Just How Much do We Not
Get it?, Registan.net (Apr. 5, 2009), available at http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/04/05/just-how-much-do-
we-not-get-it/. 48
Zaibiddin elected not to give his full name to the anthropologist. This is a common occurrence, as is anonymous
sourcing, in the secondary sources. 49
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 90.
9
atmosphere by explaining that, “Vodka was poured liberally, especially for local elders, whose
influence was disproportionately large.”50 Elites who wish to build a power base go through these
dumashnis.51 There is some bombast to these leaders and their claims, as can be seen when
national politics interfere with their localized spheres. The aforementioned Zaibiddin can talk
about how he wants Sharia law in Kyrgyzstan, but it is well understood that “to have answered
[the 2005 unrest]…with a call to jihad would have struck most Kyrgyzstanis as ridiculous.”52
Another Osh dumashni who promised a compatriot that his mahalla would protest and who
personally paid drivers to bring his constituents to the event saw that “[w]hen the protestors
reached the blockade…some unpacked their bags and began to eat lunch.”53
While it is easy and often interesting to note differences between Kyrgyzstan‟s cities,
they operate quite similarly to each other.54 The divide is usually broadly defined as
“North/South” with Bishkek and Osh at the poles.55 Bishkek is a former Imperial Russian fort
and has all the marks of a Russian city, with public transportation, apartment blocks, and a built
environment that specifically excludes religious space.56 Osh, in the Ferghana Valley, is a
melting pot of Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Uighurs, Tajiks, and many other groups along the spectrum from
one Soviet-created-nationality to another.57 It is a city over three millennia old, and it holds the
last standing Lenin statue as well as a sacred mountain complex where Babur, the first Mughal
50
Id. at 134. 51
Id. 52
Id. at 165. 53
Id. at 117. 54
Local Government in the Kyrgyz Republic at 530. 55
Bruce Pannier, Future Kyrgyz Government Faces Traditional North-South Divide, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty (Dec. 2, 2011), available at
http://www.rferl.org/content/Future_Kyrgyz_Government_Faces_Traditional_NorthSouth_Divide/2025131.html. 56
Maria Elisabeth Louw, The Religious, the Secular, and the Esoteric in Bishkek, American University of Central
Asia (2007). The first sentence of Dr. Louw‟s article is “Doing anthropological research on religion in Bishkek can
be a bit discouraging.”; “The built environment” is defined as “all the structures people have built when considered
as separate from the natural environment.” See, MacMillan Dictionary, available at
http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/the-built-environment. 57
Osh, The London School in Bishkek, available at http://thelondonschool.org/en/osh-and-south.php.
10
emperor, placed a mosque on his way towards conquering the subcontinent.58 The divisions
among and within cities make up the vibrancy of Kyrgyzstan society and the Jogorku Kenesh.59
The particulars may change, but the mechanics of civil society do not - all politics is in
some way local in Kyrgyzstan. Sub-metropolitan level civil society rules the day and takes care
of its own in Kyrgyzstan, and outside forces are seen by local actors as positive or negative
mostly for how they affect them.60 Locals will avail themselves of the money and expertise of
international NGOs, but these NGOs have had little luck in turning their services into political
capital. Many Kyrgyzstanis portray NGOs as only benefitting the intelligentsia and not the
country as a whole.61 For example, the Central Asia Free Market Institute has welcomed Chinese
infrastructure investment from Bishkek, saying “[e]nvironmental protection is something that
only rich countries can afford to be concerned about” while the village Jundu basks in
pollution.62 Continuing on the economic theme, most depositors in a new, Jeddah-run, Islamic
banking system are elderly, non-Muslim Russians who think it is a less risky place to keep their
pensions.63 But if the NGOs are powerless, Russia and the United States are given outsized
abilities, with Russia seen as the protector of the minorities of Kyrgyzstan and the United States
as the all-watching arbiter of the status quo.64 Outside forces, be they NGOs, banks, or foreign
58
This mountain complex, called alternatively Taht-I Suleiman and Sulaiman Too (both meaning “Mountain of
Solomon) is the only UNESCO World Heritage Site in Kyrgyzstan. See, Sulaiman-Too Sacred Mountain, UNESCO,
available at http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1230. 59
The Religious, the Secular, and the Esoteric in Bishkek, supra note 56. 60
Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, “The Dynamics of Change and Continuity in Plural Legal Orders” 53
JOURNAL OF LEGAL PLURALISM AND UNOFFICIAL LAW 1 (2006). 61
Chris Rickleton, Kyrgyzstan: Chinese Refinery Riles Environmentalists, Raises Transparency Concerns,
Eurasianet (Mar. 31, 2011), available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63198. “Country as a whole” should be
seen as not meaning “The Kyrgyz state” but “the individuals within the Kyrgyz state.” 62
Id. 63
Justin Vela, Kyrgyzstan: Islamic Banking Offers Alternative to the „European System‟, Eurasianet (Jun. 14, 2011),
available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63675. 64
United States: “[Central Asians] view the Americans in particular as a pervasive and intrusive octopus, intent
upon breaking into their inner worlds.” See, Christopher Schwartz, “‟If they‟re collecting all of this information,
they‟re surely using it, right?‟ WikiLeaks‟ impact on post-Soviet Central Asia” 5 GLOBAL MEDIA JOURNAL –
AUSTRALIAN EDITION 1, 7 (2011). http://www.commarts.uws.edu.au/gmjau/v5_2011_1/schwartz_Essay.html;
11
governments, are welcomed – but warily. Turning services rendered towards a goal while
avoiding accusations of conspiracy has not been easy.
C. Robust Society, Parallel Networks
The Jogorku Kenesh as an “omnibus elite network” has provided the structure for the
reorganization of civil society.65 The Jogorku Kenesh provide the link between state institutions
and civil society writ large, but elites in Kyrgyzstan attempt to control and co-opt civil society by
working with its local actors. While this dances around governmental obligations, it also has
been proven to be a force for plurality, giving rise to a variety of voices not seen in neighboring
states.66
The give-and-take between local actors and national elites has worked as a protection
network warding off avarice or caprice. The elite-driven networks work as an alternative to
predatory officials or capricious policy by allowing personal ties and preventing a single all-
powerful leader.67 This network of elites usually runs parallel to politics, but in Kyrgyzstan it has
overrun politics.68 The politicization of a rich history of independent social groups and non-
governmental collective activity may seem cause for celebration by international observers at
first. But it also runs the risk of attenuating any dissent, turning ages worth of polite
disagreement into violent refusal.
Russia: “The guy Russia supports will be supported by ethnic minorities. They see Russia as a protector,” quoting
Joomart Saparbayev in David Trilling, Kyrgyzstan: Presidential Vote Could Aggravate Regional Rift, Eurasianet
(Oct. 28, 2011), available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64402; This seems to be the common consensus, but is
strange considering that when Uzbek neighborhoods were being destroyed by marauding gangs, Russia refused to
send in troops or police, calling the 400,000 refugees an “internal problem.” See, Erica Marat, “Kyrgyzstan”
Freedom House Nations in Transit 2011, (2011) at 304, available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/nit/2011/NIT-2011-Kyrgyzstan.pdf [hereinafter “Marat, „Kyrgyzstan‟”]. 65
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 166. 66
Id. at 202. Every other state in post-Soviet Central Asia has been under authoritarian rule. The only changes in
leadership have been in Turkmenistan, when Saparmurat Niyazov (Turkmenbashi) passed away in 2006 and a
bloody civil war that wracked Tajikistan in the early 1990‟s before Emomalii Rahmon was able to hold power. 67
Id. at 20. 68
Tamerlan Ibraimov, ‟Collusion‟ must be replaced by „agreement‟ between the elites, Institute for Public Policy
(Nov. 21, 2011), available at http://www.ipp.kg/en/news/2150/.
12
Part III: The Elites of Kyrgyzstan and their Concretion of Power
Everyone who has held a position of power in Kyrgyzsan is a relic from the Communist
era.69 Even as two presidents have been sloughed off, the current ruling class has remained intact
twenty years, countless riots, and two revolutions. The ruling class has been able to do this by
both strengthening links among themselves and by exclusionary tactics; essentially keeping their
friends close and their enemies impotent.
A. Strengthening Links
Elites in Kyrgyzstan are not interested in systemic change, no matter what the language
of revolution may hint at.70 The strong links between elite actors, discussed elsewhere in this
paper,71 keep those on the fringes of power inside via a sort of centripetal force.72 And while
there are certainly dangers to speaking out against the current regime, well-orchestrated dissent
has twice now caused a governmental downfall. The greater danger is in dissenting alone, not
dissenting too strongly.
These links are most clearly illustrated by the events leading up to the 2005 revolution.
The first victims of then-President Akayev‟s self-fulfilling paranoia was Omurbek Tekebaev.73
After his arrest, Almazbek Atambaev and others chose to stand up for their ally instead of leave
69
The four heads of state have been Askar Akayev (1991-2005), Kurmanbek Bakiyev (2005-2010), Roza
Otunbayeva (2010-2011), and Almaz Atambayev (2011- ). At time of independence, Akayev was elected President
by the Supreme Soviet. Bakiyev was a kommissar in his home province. Otunbayeva was Soviet ambassador to
Malaysia, and Atambayev was the manager of a state automobile manufacturer. Michael Coffey, et al., Who‟s Who
in Kyrgyz Politics, The School of Russian and Asian Studies (May 1, 2010), available at
http://www.sras.org/whos_who_in_kyrgyz_politics, [hereinafter Who‟s Who in Kyrgyz Politics]. 70
Weapons of the Wealthy at 205 71
See infra, Part V, §B(1) “Horizontal Ties” at 29. 72
“Centripetal forces are factors which bind together the people of the state [sic]” Wayne Brew,Political
Geopgraphy, available at http;//faculty.mc3.edu/wbrew/CGEONOTES/CHAPTER12.htm. 73
Tekebaev was then the vice speaker of parliament and ran opposed to Akayev in the 2000 elections. He is now the
leader of the Ata-Meken party. See, Who‟s Who in Kyrgyz Politics, supra note 69.
13
him to his fate.74 They were also arrested, and when Azimbek Beknazarov joined them in jail,
riots in his hometown of Aksy ratcheted tensions up a notch.75 And it wasn‟t until 2003 that Roza
Otunbayeva and Bayman Erkinbaev tipped the scales away from regime legitimacy.76 At any
point in this escalation, the non-jailed politicians had the opportunity to bid adieu to their
colleagues. As discussed later in this part, there are plenty of politicians who have received this
treatment.77
The fact that the likes of Otunbayeva or Atambaev chose to join with their Soviet-
era colleagues rather than face a government without them is telling.
Concerns over rule of law are nothing new in the region,78 but the difficulty has been in
converting such concerns into political capital. Experimentations in free press have been futile
and usually dangerous in Kyrgyzstan and abroad.79 Meanwhile, expediency has triumphed over
any notion of good governance initiatives. After the 2005 revolution, there was a sharp and
continued rise in the number of politicians and journalists assassinated.80 This hasn‟t changed
even after the 2010 riots.81
Old legislation was adopted into the new constitution.82 This was not
because the transitional government wasn‟t allowed to create new legislation; they issued 61
74
Atambaev is a former captain of industry and prime minister, as well as a leader of both the 2005 and 2010
opposition movements. He was recently voted into Kyrgyzstan‟s Presidency. See supra, note 69; Atambaev Sworn in
as Kyrgyz President, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Dec. 1, 2011), available at
http://www.rferl.org/content/kyrgyzstan_new_president_inauguration/24407831.html. 75
Beknazarov is a former lawyer and prosecutor. It was his arrest in 2002 that truly started the Tulip Revolution.
See, Who‟s Who in Kyrgyz Politics, supra note 69. 76
Otunbayeva is a former diplomat and became, in November 2011, the first person to step down from power in
Central Asia. See, Id., supra note 69.; Erkinbaev could have politely been called a “leading businessman” but more
accurately was the heroin channel from Afghanistan into Russia. He was assassinated in 2005. See, Nurshat
Ababakirov, Kyrgyz Parliamentarian Bayaman Erkinbaev Assassinated, Central Asia – Caucasus Institute (May 10,
2005), available at http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/3441. 77
See infra, Part III, §B “Exclusionary Tactics” at 15. 78
See generally, Rico Isaacs, The EU‟s Rule of Law Initiative in Central Asia, Centre for European Policy Studies
(August 2009), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/11483/1/1898.pdf. 79
Eric Freedman, “Journalists at Risk: The Human Impact of Press Contraints” 185 in AFTER THE CZARS AND
COMMISSARS: JOURNALISM IN AUTHORITARIAN POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA, (Eric Freedman and Richard Shafer,
Eds., Michigan State University Press, 2011). See generally, Joshua Foust, The Murdered Journalists of Central
Asia, Registan.net (last updated: Aug 31, 2008). 80
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 205., Marat, Kyrgyzstan at 309-310. 81
Marat, Kyrgyzstan at 309-310. 82
Kyrgyzstan‟s Proposed Constitution, supra note 7.
14
decrees, 20 of which changed property regulations.83 For revolutionaries, the Kyrgyzstani
leadership shows a striking propensity to continue old practices.84
The interest in strong links is not a need, but a political choice. Most of the initial power
came from botched privatization efforts; the state selling their stakes into an imperfect market.85
The wealthy were able to connect with Soviet regime officials, internationally respected activists,
and criminal kingpins to form a ruling class of individuals with their discrete strengths and
weaknesses.86 These elite actors, able to act independently from government, have become the
government‟s legitimacy.87 The final blow to a regime is the loss of these actors, who can
collectively remove themselves from a regime and thus destroy its legitimacy through
cooperation.88 As important as legitimacy is, having a corps of criminal muscle trained as
wrestlers turns the final corner.89
“Powerholders are prone to subvert or ignore formal institutions,” Radnitz explains in his
seminal Weapons of the Wealthy.90 In 2005, Bakiev promised to promote a “Georgian Model” of
fighting corruption.91 The new model was introduced after 800 kilograms of gold went missing
from state coffers.92 Fighting corruption, punishing corrupt actors, and forming a more adhesive
rule of law all sounds great on paper, but in Marat‟s very apt words, “eradicating
83
Marat Ukushov, Kyrgyzstan follows its Constitution?, Institute for Public Policy (May 27, 2011), available at
http://ipp.kg/en/news/2030/. 84
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 204. 85
Id. at 2. This should not come as a surprise to anyone who studies the Former Soviet Union. 86
Who‟s Who in Kyrgyz Politics, supra note 69. 87
Recurring Themes in the Kyrgyz Revolutions, supra note 1. 88
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 17. This “destruction through cooperation” is essentially what happened in the lead
up to the 2005 revolution, as discussed at length in WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY. 89
Id. at 154. 90
Id. at 5. 91
Erica Marat, THE TULIP REVOLUTION: KYRGYZSTAN ONE YEAR AFTER (The Jamestown Foundation, 2006) at 40.
The Georgian Model is described as legislation written to promote the turning over of stolen property to avoid
punishment, described by Beknazarov as,“return what was stolen and sleep calmly.”The concept of using Georgia as
a positive model for corruption fighting was a lot less comical in 2005 than it may be construed now. 92
Id. at 41.
15
corruption…will involve slinging mud.”93 Pointing fingers at one‟s elite compatriots allows them
to point theirs back at you, which risks rending the political fabric.
B. Exclusionary Tactics
Where strong ties keep Soviet actors in power, exclusionary tactics keep new entrants
out. Barriers to entry prevent usurpers from coming into the inner circle of Kyrgyzstani politics.
The careful vetting process has only allowed toadies into the political realm, not independently
powerful actors. The current acting Prime Minister, Omurbek Babanov, is 41 and one of the
richest men in Kyrgyzstan.94 He is connected with ex-President Bakiyev‟s son Maxim and has
been mentioned in closer connections to corruption scandals than even your standard-issue post-
Soviet politician.95 He is the exception that proves the rule; considering the active youth culture
in Kyrgyzstani cities, it is interesting to see how few young individuals there are in positions of
political power. The Ministry of Youth Affairs is the source of much skepticism. Timur
Shaikhutdinov, head of the Free Generation Alliance, said that it exists for young Kyrgyzstanis
to run to an “older, more experienced „uncle‟…forgetting about all the things they talked about
and believed in yesterday.”96
As discussed above,97 privatization was not performed in an absolutely free market.98
Land often went to farm directors, not the farmers themselves, and the state held on to many
93
Id. 94
Chris Rickleton, African-Kyrgyz Kickboxer Makes Run for Kyrgyzstan‟s Parliament, Eurasianet (Sep. 28, 2010),
available at
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62034. It should be noted that the eponymous African-Kyrgyz kickboxer is not
Babanov; David Trilling, Take Two: Kyrgyzstan Finally Has New Government, Eurasianet (Dec. 17, 2010),
available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62594. 95
Omurbek Babanov: “I have no spoken to Maxim Bakiev”, Kloop (May 26, 2011), available at
http://kloop.info/2011/05/26/omurbek-babanov-i-have-not-spoken-to-maxim-bakiev/; There is plenty of well-
written research on the endemic corruption in post-Soviet space. A good introductory book is Misha Glenny,
MCMAFIA: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE GLOBAL CRIMINAL UNDERWORLD (Knopf 2008). 96
Chris Rickleton, Kyrgyzstan‟s Youth: Force for Change or Chips off the Old Block?, Eurasianet (Jun. 25, 2011),
available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63739. 97
See infra, Part III, §A “Strengthening Links” at 12.
16
assets they said were truly privatized.99 Foreign investment, the supposed magic bullet set to
empower the Kyrgyzstani people, was funneled through the few elites who were able to present
themselves as the only local attractive option for these international prospectors.100 This led to
corruption that cut out vast globalized wealth creation in the 1990s;101 Kyrgyzstan‟s GDP shrank
58 percent between 1991 and 2001.102 This avoidance of trickle-down wealth via Foreign Direct
Investment prevented many of the thousands of university graduates from choosing economic
independence, forcing this nascent vanguard into the existing corrupt system.103
These victims of a minor form of oppression are by far the more fortunate ones. More
iconoclastic actors have met much more vicious resistance from the government. In October
2005, Akmatbayev was killed in prison; the assumption among most is that he was killed by
Batukayev.104 Akmatbayev‟s criminal background was considered too much of a liability and a
threat to his fellow politicians.105 The more spectacular story is that of Timur Kamchibekov and
Bayamen Erkinbaev. Kamchibekov was 27 years old in 2005, Erkinbaev; 39.106 Between the two
98
Özhan Çetinkaya and Kurmanbek Joldoshev, “Kırgıztan‟da Özelleştirme Uygulamaları ve Etkileri” TÜRK
DÜNYASI KIRGIZ-TÜRK SOSYAL BILIMLER ENSTITÜSÜ, (May 2006) at3, available at
http://www.akademikbakis.org/pdfs/9/kurman.pdf. 99
Camilla Eriksson, “Changing Land Rights, Changing Land Use: Privatisation Drives Landscape Change in Post-
Soviet Kyrgyzstan”, SWEDISH UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURAL SCIENCES, (Feb. 2006) at 7, available at
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/hlm/prgm/cph/experts/kyrgyzstan/documents/Privatisation.Landscape.Chang
e.pdf. 100
Mehmet Dikkaya and Ibrahim Keles, “A case study of foreign direct investment in Kyrgyzstan” 25 CENTRAL
ASIAN SURVEY 149, 151 (Mar. 2006). 101
Id. at 155. 102
Joshua Foust, A Year After Revolution, Kyrgyzstan‟s Minority Worse Off Than Ever, The Atlantic (Oct. 27,
2011), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/10/a-year-after-revolution-kyrgyzstans-
minority-worse-off-than-ever/247479/. 103
“The number of major universities and technical schools in Bishkek gives it the feel almost of place like Boston,
and a number of these universities produce talented graduates whose diplomas are recognized around the world.
Further, their ability to compete in international exchange programs and the political support for these programs has
won students from tiny Kyrgyzstan places in most of the world‟s best universities.” See, Kyrgyzstan at 20, supra
note 15; Kyrgyzstan‟s Youth, supra note 96. 104
Erica Marat, Assassination of Kyrgyz Lawmaker Reveals Links Between Politics and Crime, The Jamestown
Foundation (Oct. 25, 2005), available at
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=31017. 105
Id. 106
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 153.
17
of them they controlled Osh‟s gym-bound wrestling organizations and criminal underground
respectively.107 When the Osh revolts turned violent thanks to the spark of hundreds of angry,
drunk wrestlers, thousands were caught in the crowds.108 This scheming and the ostentatious
threat of violence frightened the likes of Bakiev and Kulov, and Erkinbaev would be assassinated
by the end of 2005.109
Kamchibayev is still alive, but was much more subdued during the 2010
riots.110 The greatest threats have been treated the harshest.
Broader movements, such as the perceived menace of nationalist splintering, have been
treated differently than the more salient threats. This does not mean that they‟ve been treated
with delicacy or deference. Uzbek activists such as Davron Sobirov can see their careers ended
by ambiguous laws against “ethnic incitement” as they try to promote the cause of Uzbek
rights.111 Non-Uzbeks rarely have the political capital to do much about or for the Uzbek
population, even if they have the willingness to take on the more nefarious elements of Kyrgyz
nationalism.112
What‟s more, the Constitution is written to very clearly discriminate against new entrants
to power. Article four, Section four, prohibits the military, law-enforcement, or judicial branches
from joining political parties or otherwise getting involved in politics.113 Similarly, parties may
107
Id. 108
Id. 109
Kyrgyz Parliamentarian Bayaman Erkinbaev Assassinated, supra note76. 110
Id. 111
Id. at 96; Const. Art. IV, §4(5) prohibits “…incitement of social, racial, inter-national, interethnic and religious
hatred.” 112
Foust, A Year After Revolution, supra note 102; “Nefarious elements” as defined as a threat to state integrity.
“The main threat to Kyrgyzstan, ultra-nationalism, can be defined in a number of ways including“that citizenship in
a state should be limited to one ethnic group.” See, Martin Sieff, Kyrgyz Separatism, Islamic extremism threats
overstated, Central Asia Security Newswire (Jan. 27, 2011), available at
http://test.centralasianewswire.com/Security/viewstory.aspx?id=3089. 113
Const. Art. IV, §4(2), prohibiting “membership of those serving in the army, law-enforcement agencies as well as
judges in political parties as well as their statements in support of any political party.”
18
not be formed on a religious or ethnic basis.114 An additional ban on “political parties, public and
religious organizations” who “pursue political goals aimed at forced change of the constitutional
setup, undermining national security, incitement of social, racial, international, interethnic, and
religious hatred” is so broadly written as to incriminate anyone who tries to radically change the
government.115 Except, presumably, the revolutionaries who did precisely this to form the current
government.
Parliamentarians have no immunity, a double-edged sword that is welcomed by the
Venice Commission but also allows unpopular members to be ushered out with a long-dragging
court case.116 Individuals running for office must pay for their campaigns from their own pocket,
and if they do make it to office, are excluded from “economic activities” that have no precise
definition.117 This makes it not only extraordinarily difficult for the non-wealthy to become
politically active, particularly in a government where parties are not aggregate interests of
society but factions of personality, but also makes it a losing try to stay in power. Only the rich
may get in and stay in.118 Radical actors, however broadly “radical” is defined, are left in the cold
or tossed into prison.
114
Const. Art. IV, §4(3), prohibiting “creation of political parties on religious or ethnic basis as well as pursuit of
political goals by religious associations.”; Hizb ut-Tahrir is a Sunni political organization whose goal is to unify all
Muslim states and create a new, global caliphate. They explicitly denounce violence, but are banned as a terrorist
organization in Kyrgyzstan. See generally, Tolkun Sagynova, Hizb ut-Tahrir Emboldened in Kyrgyzstan, Institute
for War and Peace Reporting (Mar. 20, 2007), available at http://iwpr.net/report-news/hizb-ut-tahrir-emboldened-
kyrgyzstan. 115
Const. Art. IV, §4(5). 116
Kyrgyzstan‟s Proposed Constitution, supra note 7; Aivars Endzins, Nicolae Esanu, Angelika Nussberger, and
Anders Fogelklou, “Opinion on the Draft Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic” ¶43, European Commission for
Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), (May 21, 2010). The Venice Commission is formally titled the
European Commission for Democracy Through Law. It is an advisory body of the Council of Europe, advising on
constitutional issues in emerging democracies. 117
Kyrgyzstan‟s Proposed Constitution, supra note 7. 118
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 71.
19
C. A Cohesive - if Calcified - Ruling Class
Despite optimistic comparisons to new democracies in the Former Soviet Union,119
Kyrgyzstan is not Ukraine or Georgia. There is no Saakashvili here. 120 Two different Soviet-
schooled leaders have been removed from office,121 but the structure that they brought with them
remains in place.122 The cohort of now-aged leaders has generally been able to remain cohesive
and portray their actions as united, even if those actions began quite disjointed. What‟s more,
they have been quite successful in eliminating any alternatives to the current rule, if not always
by violent means then certainly by repression. When combined with personalized politics, a
calcified ruling class may present the greatest obstacle towards medium-term change.
Part IV: Is the Prime Minister accountable to Parliament?
The first two heads of Kyrgyzstani government are currently residing in Belarus and
Moscow, with seemingly no interest in returning to their native land.123 In November of 2011,
Roza Otunbayeva became the first Central Asian head of state to peacefully leave office.124 By
all counts, she will be the only one for a long time; concerns over authoritarianism are not
119
Vladimir Radyuhin, Island of democracy in Central Asia, The Hindu (Nov. 14, 2011), available at
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article2627589.ece. 120
Mikheil Saakashvili was 35 years old when he stormed through a parliamentary session in Tblisi, Georgia,
chasing the incumbent President Eduard Shevardnadze out. Saakashvili rose to the podium and drank
Shevardnadze‟s still-warm tea. It was the capping moment to the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia which, despite
the peaks and valleys that have occurred since, was a dramatic changing of the Communist-era guard. See generally,
Levan Berdzenishvili, “A Not-So Rosy Revolution: Georgia Seven Years After the Rose Revolution” National
Endowment for Democracy (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.ned.org/events/a-not-so-rosy-result-georgia-
seven-years-after-the-rose-revolution (includes link to video of presentation). 121
Referring to Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev, ejected from office in 2005 and 2010, respectively. 122
Although a new Constitution was put in place in 2010, the old legislation remains. See supra, note 7.
123 Bakiyev has claimed his legitimacy publicly as recently as April 2010, see, Ousted Kyrgyz leader Bakiyev
„remains president‟, BBC News (Apr. 21, 2010), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8634292.stm;
Akayev, on the other hand, is a professor and researcher at Moscow State University, see, Askar Akayev: The crisis
will force the post-Soviet countries to unite around Russia, Baku Today (Aug. 18, 2011), available at
http://www.bakutoday.net/askar-akayev-the-crisis-will-force-the-post-soviet-countries-to-unite-around-russia.html 124
Asker Sultanov, „Roses for Roza‟ campaign thanks outgoing Kyrgyz president, Central Asia Online (Nov. 1,
2011), available at http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/main/2011/11/01/feature-02.
20
unfounded.125 Even if President Atambaev goes quietly and calmly at the end of his 5-year, it is
unlikely that he will spend those five years only as a figurehead.126
Kyrgyzstan is the least authoritarian state in its region and the constitution now enshrines
a pluralistic, parliamentary, system. The Prime Minister is ostensibly more powerful than the
President and is selected by parliament.127 This deference to parliament is what Nurlan Sadykov
was referring to when he spoke of the prime minister‟s accountability to parliament. But again,
there is a substantial gap between what the constitution proclaims and life‟s realities.
There are legal and illegal means of a leader‟s accountability to his political peers. This is
not the same as “good” and “bad” means, but rather the different ways in which the two poles
negotiate power. Legal means, generally elections, divisions of governmental power, and party
politics are the transparent ways in which the government chooses how to run its country. Illegal
means are primarily the protests and demonstrations that are more opaque but generally more
effective in negotiations with the head of state.
A. Legal Means
Although Kyrgyzstan‟s elections have been seen to be generally free and fair, there is
certainly plenty of ground to gain in that direction.128 International observers have found the past
two decades of Kyrgyzstani politics far more civil, meaningful, and fair than the rest of Central
Asia.129 The Jogorku Kenesh has often been described by international observers as a village
125
Ishaan Tharoor, Why Kyrgyzstan‟s Presidential Election Matters, TIME (Nov. 1, 2011), available at
http://globalspin.blogs.time.com/2011/11/01/why-kyrgyzstans-presidential-election-matters/. 126
Farangis Najibullah, Atambaev Wants to Close U.S. Airbase, But Can He?, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
(Nov. 2, 2011), available at http://www.rferl.org/content/atambaev_wants_to_close_us_airbase_but/24379557.html. 127
Article 86 begins by stating “The faction which has more than one half of deputies‟ mandates, or a coalition of
factions with its participation within 15 days since the date of the first sitting of the Jogorku Kenesh of new
convocation shall nominate a candidate for the office of the Prime Minister.” See, Const. Art. LXXXIV §1 et al. 128
David Trilling, A Fractured But Hopeful Kyrgyzstan Goes to the Polls, Eurasianet (Oct. 30, 2011), available at
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64412. 129
Island of democracy in Central Asia, supra note 119.
21
gathering where elites can network.130 This concept of a self-regulating and self-defining society
is reflected in the Constitution, where Parliament elects their prime minister.131 The Constitution
now also makes the electoral commission independent, not a body appointed by the President.132
At the beginning of independent Kyrgyzstan, then-President Akayev created a multiple-
party system to “prove his democratic credentials to the international community.”133 In the
beginning, nobody knew quite what to do with the Jogorku Kenesh; the 1995 parliament was
only one-third made up for party members, the rest were independent.134 However, sixteen years
and a constitutional shift towards a parliamentary system have seen a 120-seat Jogorku Kenesh
split between five parties, all currently with 18-28 seats apiece.135 Nowadays, “[the 2011]
constitution isn‟t society,” says Marat Ukushov, a Kyrgyzstani lawyer and creator of the 1993
constitution, but “an ideology of a small group of opposition politicians.”136
Akayev‟s opposition was traditionally the intelligentsia, who organized bring forth the
2005 revolution.137 Bakiev and Otunbayeva may have been the international face, but local elites,
particularly the populist Kulov, were the “aura of authenticity” required for a full putsch.138 Once
this coalescing group was able to gain momentum, protesting fraud became less relevant than
protesting solely to keep face and become part of the burgeoning movement.139
130
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 29. 131
“The faction [of parliament] which has more than one half of deputies‟ mandates, or a coalition of factions with
its participation within 15 days since the date of the first sitting of the Jogorku Kenesh of new convocation shall
nominate a candidate for the office of the Prime Minister.” See, Const. Art. LXXXIV (§1). 132
The Jogorku Kenesh “shall elect members of the Central Commission on elections and referenda; one third of its
members to be nominated by the President, one third by the Parliamentary majority and one third by the
Parliamentary opposition” See, Const. Art. LXXIV §3(4). 133
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 70. 134
Id. 135
Marat, Kyrgyzstan at 306. 136
Uskohov refers to “opposition politicians.” By this he means the group of individuals who ousted Bakiyev from
power in 2010. See, Kyrgyzstan follows its Constitution?, supra note 83. 137
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 66. 138
Id. at 135. 139
Id. at 137.
22
There is pressure for change, good and bad, on the head of state, but the musical chair
analogy is almost too literal in Kyrgyzstan. As the two revolutions in five years have shown, the
head of state is only first among a rotating schedule of equals, in power until he does something
to get himself kicked out. There is accountability and even de jure possibility of impeachment,140
but once elected, there has historically been little stopping the Prime Minister or President from
acting in his own self interest.
Atambaev has been elected to President from his role as acting Prime Minister, a move
that actually promises him less power than before.141 It remains to be seen how Atambaev will
rule as President; most analysts expect him to take on a Putin-esque role after finding a suitable
Medvedev.142 The United States in particular is curious to see how he wields his power; he has
mentioned a desire to close Manas Air Base, a move that would require parliamentary
blessing.143 Considering that the fuel contract for Manas Air Base is one of the greatest prizes of
the Kyrgyzstani economy, he may run into stiff resistance if he decides to move from platitude to
action.144
It is, as of writing, too soon to do anything but project as to how Atambaev will construe
his power as president and how accountable he feels towards what is currently a broad-based
140
“The Jogorku Kenesh shall bring charges against the President and shall make the decision on
his/her impeachment in accordance with the procedures envisaged in the present Constitution.” See, Const. Art.
LXXIV (§7). 141
Atambaev Wants to Close U.S. Airbase, But Can He?, supra note 126. 142
Joshua Kucera, Why Atambaev Might Be Serious About Closing Manas, Eurasianet (Nov. 10, 2011), available at
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64492. This refers to Russian President Vladimir Putin‟s step away from the
trapping sof power while retaining a position in Russian politics as Dmitri Medvedev is head of state. 143
Joshua Foust, Continuing Not to Read Too Much into Atambayev‟s Manas Airbase Politics, Registan.net (Oct.
11, 2011), available at http://www.registan.net/index.php/2011/11/10/continuing-to-not-read-too-much-into-
atambayevs-manas-airbase-politics/. 144
Michael Schwirtz, New Leader Says U.S. Base in Kyrgyzstan Will Be Shut, The New York Times (Nov. 1, 2011),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/world/asia/kyrgyzstan-says-united-states-manas-air-base-will-
close.html?_r=1&ref=michaelschwirtz; A Gazprom joint venture has the current deal, worth approximately
$9million monthly. See, Deirdre Tynan, Kyrgyzstan: Manas Fuel Contract Goes to Kyrgyz-Russian Venture,
Eurasianet (Sep. 27, 2011), available at www.eurasianet.org/node/64232.
23
parliament. It is safe to assume that the current constitution is not written in stone – it is not a
finished document. How unfinished it is remains to be seen.
B. Illegal Means
The illegal means of accountability are the revolts for which Kyrgyzstan has reached
international infamy. Weapons of the Wealthy discusses that if an individual parliamentarian; (1)
has a sufficiently proficient network of clients and peers, (2)
is in a crisis that is sufficiently
urgent, and (3)
finds self-protection sufficiently necessary, then he will key a protest.145
Mobilization is triggered by a threat from the state, but is only done if other, more subdued,
means are not available.146 And once mobilization of a concert of parliamentarians has begun, the
costs of involvement decline and benefits (such as heroism, attention, and more importantly, a
post in the new regime) increase.147
Protests, and the threat of protests, have been the illegal and yet common means to affect
change and to hold the head of government accountable for his actions.148 The prime minister
cannot afford to alienate his parliament, not for fear of censure or impeachment, but for the fear
of an airplane in the middle of the night on a one-way trip to Minsk.149
It is easy to make much of the relatively commonplace protests in Kyrgyzstan, and
indeed, before the “Arab Spring” of 2011 there was a tendency by journalists to follow them
breathlessly.150 It stands to demonstrate, though, that the Kyrgyzstani protests often follow the
145
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 38. This argument is at the crux of Radnitz‟s book. 146
Id. at 33. 147
Id. at 137. 148
“John Heathershaw, an international relations expert observing the poll in Kyrgyzstan, said that the protest
culture was a sign of democratic development in the country.” See, Johannes Dell and Venera Kochieva, Will
election ease Kyrgyzstan tensions?, BBC News (Oct. 28, 2011), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-
pacific-15484302. 149
This is a reference to Bakiev‟s current exile to the capital of Belarus, a country often called Europe‟s last
dictatorship. 150
Will election ease Kyrgyzstan tensions?, supra note 148.
24
form of what has been commonly called “astroturfing” in the United States.151 Wealthy elites
bankrolling a protest is not in and of itself a negative act, but the press and fellow elites must
stand to the fact that the protest need not be a popular movement. Protests allow for half-
measures; using language of protest is one thing, a peaceful demonstration another, and violent
acts; a third. The personalization of Kyrgyzstani politics thus allow adherents to represent an
elite actor while permitting the selfsame actor to refrain from girding themselves in a display of
revolution.
C. Protests and More Polite Demands of Accountability
Parliamentarians and other elites have a variety of ways in which they can call attention
to themselves or give a tug on the president‟s ear. The effectiveness of most of these has yet been
proven. A new constitution offers a parliamentary system that allows for impeachment and
censure of the head of state, but those tools of governmental accountability have not yet been
used. Softer measures have also been ignored; checks on executive power exist on paper but
have been run roughshod in actuality. Even the most seasoned of Kyrgyzstan analysts, local and
international, can only wait with bated breath to see how Atambaev will construe his
responsibility to his parliament.
Protests remain the most viable and most reliable method of holding the head of state
accountable. If at knifepoint, protests give actors bold and powerful enough to use them the
ability to register disappointment in a way the president will feel. Even the threat alone, if
executed correctly, can stymie the prime minister. In the recent presidential election, the second-
and third-place finishers didn‟t petition Atambaev for sinecure or negotiate a parliamentary
151
“What exactly is Astroturf supposed to mean? Typically, that, in the absence of widespread support for a
position, some unseen entity manufactures the appearance of it.” See, Ryan Sager, Keep Off the Astroturf, New York
Times (Aug. 18, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/19/opinion/19sager.html.
25
coalition.152 The first thing they did was threaten protest.153 Such is political life in current-day
Kyrgyzstan, and such is the only form of accountability they have over their leader.
Part V: Is Parliament Accountable to the People?
When discussing how “parliament will be accountable to the people,” the most important
word in the phrase is “accountable.” Ties between parliament members and their constituencies,
among people outside of parliament, and among members of parliament are important but not
terribly illuminating in isolation. Accountability is the result of politicians feeling pressured to
represent the will of the people they represent.154 It is largely an aspirational goal of the
Kyrgyzstani constitution as of now.155 Instead of accountability, popular politics in Kyrgyzstan is
still tainted by very clear repression. Some compromise between upward pressures emanating
from social groups and cynical populism has been formed, but clientelism relationships and peer
grouping has largely defined Kyrgystan‟s political construct156. While the instant relationships
have been particularly fluid, some broader trends can be ascertained. This section will
demonstrate how far Kyrgyzstan is from governmental accountability and avenues through
which accountability could be pursued.
152
Defeated Kyrgyz presidential candidate vows „fight to the end‟, UNHCR Refworld, (Nov. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,KGZ,4562d8cf2,4ec50457c,0.html. 153
Id. 154
Passing the baton of democracy in Kyrgyzstan, United Nations Development Programme (Nov. 4, 2011),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,KGZ,4562d8cf2,4ec50457c,0.html. 155
President Otunbayeva‟s Address to the Jogorku Kenesh, supra note 11. 156
“The clientele and the elites are trying to perpetuate cliental relationships not only for rational reasons but also
intuitively for the unwillingness to live under other forms of societal organization.” See, Political Elites of the
Commonwealth of Independent States in the Dialogue of Civilizations, Rhodes Forum IX Annual Session (Nov. 30,
2011), available at http://www.rhodesforum.org/9-rhodes-forum-2009/panel-1-dialogue-and-global-politics/21-
political-elites-of-the-commonwealth-of-independent-states-in-the-dialogue-of-civilizations.
26
A. Repression in Kyrgyzstan
Repression in Kyrgyzstan is nowhere near as violent, accepted, and at times bizarre as
elsewhere in Central Asia.157 That said, being subjectively “less bad” does not make a system
“good.” Repression of unsavory ideas and projects has been de rigueur in Kyrgyzstan.158 The
state-sponsored sidelining or minimizing of threats to state stability real or imaginary can be seen
as somewhat cynical. This is, after all, a state with multiple revolutions in its recent history.
These revolutionaries are broad-based, but represent a closed field. Even the vox of revolution
will mutually agree to mute a few voices.
In many instances, the curtailing of institutions‟ independence is the clearest form of
repression. Universities and mosques are controlled, if not monitored, by the state.159 Imams are
appointed by Kyrgyzstani authorities and university courses are often attended by police as well
as students.160 These traditional vectors of dissent and information are generally not trusted, and
neither are the state-run news agencies.161 The most trusted place for information on what‟s
157
Islom Karimov of Uzbekistan has been known to boil political opponents alive as well as fire on civilians and
blame the deaths on al-Qaeda-associated terrorist groups, see, Abulfazal, From Turkish protests to calling upon
Canadians – Stop dictator Karimov!, Neweurasia (Sep. 7, 2011), available at http://www.neweurasia.net/politics-
and-society/from-turkish-protests-to-calling-upon-canadians-stop-dictator-karimov/; Nursultan Nazarbayev has
brought Kazakhstan to the chair of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe without having a single
contested election, see, Robert Coalson, Six Months into OSCE Chair, Kazakhstan Found Wanting in Kyrgyz Events,
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Jun. 30, 2010), available at
http://www.rferl.org/content/Six_Months_Into_OSCE_Chair_Kazakhstan_Found_Wanting_In_Kyrgyz_Events/208
6883.html; Before his 2006 death, Saparmurat Niyazov of Turkmenistan named months after family members and
built a gold statue of himself that would rotate to face the sun, see, Marat Gurt, Turkmen statue turns its last, The
Independent (Jan. 19, 2010), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkmen-statue-turns-
its-last-1871995.html; The long-dead Mullo Abdullo, a rebel during Tajikistan‟s civil war, has made a strange habit
of making the news every few months in his native country, see, George Camm, Tajikistan: Mullo Abdullo Again?,
Eurasianet (Sep. 16, 2010), available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61950; Anything in Kyrgyzstan pales next
to these examples. 158
Muzaffar Suleymanov, Kyrgyzstan‟s familiar path: Press repression, ousted leaders, Committee to Protect
Journalists (Apr. 8, 2010), available at http://www.cpj.org/blog/2010/04/kyrgyzstan-media-crackdown-bakiyev-
ousted.php. 159
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 165. 160
Id. 161
Kyrgyzstan: Media Harassment Engendering Expanded Self-Censorship, Eurasianet (Mar. 21, 2010), available
at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav032210.shtml.
27
going on throughout Kyrgystan in many smaller villages is the chaikhana that the intercity taxi
drivers frequent!162
The courts and the legal system as a whole are so untrustworthy as to be seen not even as
just another channel for state repression, but the most nefarious arm thereof. “Courts were
known to act on behalf of the powerful,” Scott Radnitz writes of the Akayev years, “but rarely
protected individual rights.”163 This is a reality hardly stuck in the past. The Tulip Revolution
that removed Akayev from power was not a “broad-based uprising of the middle class seeking a
greater role in determining the direction of the country,”164 as was promised by the democracy-
promoting rhetoric of the day, but was rather just a reshuffling of elites.165 The 2010 revolution
was followed by violence best described by Natalia Yefimova-Trilling:166
[Osh is] a scruffy provincial town of 260,000 nestled along a major
drug-exporting route from Afghanistan. In June 2010, Osh had been the
epicenter of interethnic carnage that left more than 400 dead and
thousands homeless.167 For months afterward, the bereaved passed around
photos of scorched, mutilated bodies that had once, possibly, belonged to
people they loved. The city's burly mayor and local security forces were
accused by three Western inquiries of doing too little to prevent the
bloodshed, at a minimum, and possibly abetting it. They denied the
162
Judith Beyer, Kyrgyzstan: referendum in a time of upheaval, openDemocracy (26 Jun. 2010), available at
http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/judith-beyer/kyrgyzstan-referendum-in-time-of-upheaval; Since taxi
drivers go from town to town, and particularly to the provincial centers so often, they are the most connected
individuals in rural Kyrgyzstan. Their stories of the country outside the particular village will likely be more
interesting, if not much more accurate, than what state-sponsored media says. 163
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 43. 164
Id. at 163. 165
Id. 166
Natalia Yefimova-Trilling, Twitter vs. the KGB, Foreign Policy Dispatch (Nov. 11, 2011), available at
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/10/kyrgyzstan_twitter_journalism. This article cites, in order, the
three below citations via hyperlink. 167
Alisher Khamidov, Kyrgyzstan: Remembering Osh Violence Without Reconciling, Eurasianet (Jun, 10, 2011),
available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63661.
28
charges.168 The trials and investigations that followed the fighting,
according to Human Rights Watch, were marred by "threats, violence, and
serious violations, such as arbitrary arrest, torture, and ill-treatment.169
The violence, corruption, and repression represented by the June events and those
preceding them are certainly worthy foci of legal interest in their own right. Their existence
demonstrates a terrific blow to the elected officials‟ accountability to their people. Just in the
second half of 2011, there have been reports of KGB agents harassing and assaulting
journalists,170 Uzbek businesses being taken away from them and turned into Kyrgyz
establishments,171 and court cases of high-profile individuals being closed to the public.172 The
laws, such that they exist, cover selectively.
At the constitutional level, the five year terms for parliamentarians is criticized as being
excessive and for insulating parliamentarians from their constituencies.173 Vote thresholds
currently stand at 5% nationally and .5% in each of the seven provinces, Osh, and Bishkek.174
This means that a party must take at least 5% of the national vote and .5% (that is, one half of
one percent) of the vote in each province of Kyrgyzstan as well as in the cities of Osh and
Bishkek in order to hold a seat in parliament.175 This has been cause for concern among fringe
168
“Where is the Justice?”, supra note 6; “The Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan: Asia Report No. 193” INTERNATIONAL
CRISIS Group (Aug. 23, 2010), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan/193-
the-pogroms-in-kyrgyzstan.aspx; “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the Events in
Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010” KYRGYZSTAN INQUIRY COMMISSION (May 3, 2011), available at http://www.k
ic.org/images/stories/kic_report_english_final.pdf. 169
Distorted Justice, Human Rights Watch (Jun. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/embargo/node/99472?signature=d1f8ee5e698707afc7ac55dafbe5be0b&suid=6. 170
Twitter vs. the KGB, supra note 166. 171
Justin Vela, Where the Restaurants in Osh Have New Names, Eurasianet (Jul. 12, 2011), available at
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63866. 172
Journalists Barred From Attending Trial of Kyrgyz Official‟s Son, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Dec. 2,
2011), available at http://www.rferl.org/content/press_barred_from_bishkek_mayors_sons_trial/24393100.html. 173
Endzins, Esanu, Nussberger, and Fogelklou, “Opinion on the Draft Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic” ¶42. 174
Marat, Kyrgyzstan at 305. 175
Id.
29
parties, outside observers, and Kygyzstanis outside of the core elite.176 What‟s more, the same
legislation at levels below the constitution is in place today as was in place in 2004.177 Any
attempts to replace Kyrgyzstan‟s commonplace repression with true governmental accountability
will be a slow and grassroots-oriented process. And it would have to take advantage of the
already-present allegiances described below.
B. Allegiance Networks
As discussed previously,178 the robust civil society in Kyrgyzstan has allowed for strong
ties to be created among individuals in a class and between social classes. The conversion from
civil society to allegiance networks is one from potentiality to power, where trust is turned into
political action.179 This next section will examine horizontal, ascending, and descending ties to
discover where accountability comes in to play.
1. Horizontal Ties
Horizontal ties are defined as the allegiance that individuals have towards others in their
class or social network. It is best seen in two segments; parliamentarians working together in
governmental acts and poor rural communities sticking together to survive.
Kyrgyzstani politics are largely vertical, meaning one person controls their party wholly.
This is because horizontal ties remain inchoate and politicians have not been able to build up
great trust between each other. Their personal fiefdoms only unite when under great stress, and
not for the simple reason of pushing through new legislation. This is described by Radnitz as a
176
Id. 177
Kyrgyzstan‟s Proposed Constitution, supra note 7. 178
See infra, Part III, “Civil Society” at 3. 179
Vladimir Fedorenko, Nepotism and Weak Institutions in Kyrgyz Politics, The Washington Review of Turkish and
Eurasian Affairs (Jun. 2010), available at http://www.thewashingtonreview.org/articles/nepotism-
kyrgyzpolitics.html.
30
collective action problem, and the new constitution aspires towards the strong rule of law
required to go hand-in-hand this allegiance towards each other.180
In Kyrgyzstan things work peculiarly. The opportunity for violence, whether in its more
theatric or visceral forms, is very real. Assassinations are a threat, as several politicians have
learned.181 As discussed earlier in this paper,182 group mobilization of elites is a counter to this, as
elites can act as brokers to communicate the threat and relieve the threat on one by building a
consensus around him.183
Horizontal ties run for the poorer population of the country as well. “Good relations with
ones‟ neighbors are essential to survive grinding poverty,” Radnitz writes.184 And although
ethnicity, kinship, and religion are often seen by external actors to be the keys to rural society,
simple communal proximity is the most resilient.185 The rest are not much more than just trailing
indicators.186 Where elites succeed is when they can convert this communal resiliency for their
own ends, expanding their networks into villages and relying on the locals to look to each other
and form role models to decide how to approach the elite‟s ends. This is best explained by the
careful process in which elites make descending ties.
2. Descending Ties
Descending relationships describe the ways in which elites built a popular support base
by proffering goods political or physical to the lower classes. The concept as laid out in
Kyrgyzstan is that if one desires to work outside or supplant infrastructural power, then one must
180
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 18. 181
THE TULIP REVOLUTION at 97-99. 182
See infra, Part III, §A “Strengthening Links” at 12. 183
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 197. 184
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 121. 185
Id. at 22-23; “Resilience, Adaptability, and Transformability” supra note 21. 186
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 22-23; Trailing indicators are defined in the economical sense, as “indicators
which tend to change only after an economy has already changed, or has begun to follow a particular pattern or
trend.” See, “Lagging Indicators” http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/lagging-indicators.html.
31
have revenue independent of governmental pay.187 It is important for politicians to be seen as a
leader, not just a politician, if they want to built such a support base. In order to be seen as this
sort of leader, they must offer services above and beyond purely governmental expectations.
Turning revenue into a social support base then requires not just exposure, but a
“portfolio of private, public, and symblamatic goods.”188 Seeking a social support base requires
not just fame seeking, but also involves a moral dimension and a necessity to grow a reputation
as a benefactor.189 Wrapping oneself in the display of moral rectitude is then a key to growing
and sustaining this base of support. Elite actors use charity as public exposure, as a way to
remind their home regions that they still stand for them and that they are actively bound to their
constituencies‟ well-being.190
An outward show of morality can be one and the same as an internal cynicism. With the
unreliability of elite-level horizontal ties, descending ties are nothing less than an investment in
security.191 Kyrgyzstan is an unstable country, and the two revolts in six years intimate that more
revolutions could certainly be coming. Elites are simply better off building personal allegiances
than devoting their energies towards state-building. There is an awareness by elites that they
could benefit in the long run by restricting some of their wealth in order to gradually subvert
allegiance to the state.192 These descending ties thus are more than just political capital to be used
in elections, but a daily product of power, property, and prestige.193
187
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 24-25. 188
Id. at 85. 189
Id. at 26-27. 190
Id. 191
Id. at 201. 192
Id. at 77. 193
Id. at 201.
32
3. Ascending Ties
Ascending ties are defined as the interactions that allow people to demonstrate their
allegiance to and expectations for their leader. In Kyrgyzstan, these ties are the very ways in
which accountability is brought into being. People in Kyrgyzstan have a stake in the prosperity
of their elites. 194 Not only because he has “bought them off” in some way through charitable
donations, but also because of the payoffs of a protest.195 A balancing test can be weighed
between the specter of unemployment and hopes of potential; in a country as poor as Kyrgyzstan
such a test would weigh heavily towards patronage.196 The limited provision of public goods by
the state makes citizens susceptible to non-state actors.197 Ashars can only do so much, and
international aid organizations cannot be relied upon on a perennial basis.198 Instead, villagers act
as though that the wealthy have a moral obligation to help them.199 It stems from a social
contract, not a demand for handouts from the rich or even from the government. An
understanding exists that if villagers will demonstrate in the streets, barge into the President‟s
resident, or at the very least vote for a politician in elections, they expect their leaders to be
outwardly moral.200 This morality includes religious and philanthropic donations, speeches on
propriety, and personal munificence.201 When referring to their representative in Jogorku Kenesh,
villagers “mean from [their representative‟s] own money, not in [a] public service capacity.”202
This personal connection results in the clearest form of bottom-up allegiance. After an
elite actor who had invested in a social support base lost out in the 2005 elections, there was
194
Id. at 92. 195
Id. at 127. 196
Id. 197
Id. at 7. 198
Kyrgyzstan will not rely on foreign aid – Otunbayeva, Ria Novosti (Jul. 5, 2010), available at
http://en.rian.ru/exsoviet/20100705/159692046.html. 199
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 87. 200
Id. 201
Id. 202
Id. at 89.
33
tremendous outcry from his hometown.203 This even occurred as recently as November 2011
when, after falling quite clearly and unreservedly to Atambayev in the Presidential Elections,
Kamchybek Tashiev brought out his protestors.204
Popularity via ascending ties is not a pure function of money invested, and certain actors
can gain traction among the lower classes through sheer charisma. Feliks Kulov has never been
the favorite of his peers, as his numerous arrests and the laws tacitly forbidding his ascension to
presidency or premiership show.205 But the population of Kyrgyzstan trusts and respects him far
more than those who stand beside him in power.206 Conversely, the 2005 arrests of people such
as Atambaev et al. may have stirred parliamentarians into hue and cry, but the arrests did not
bring the Kyrgyzstani population into protest.207 The ties between individuals and societal groups
exist, and there is genuine devotion of a constituency towards its leader in some cases. But
converting those ties to a political system and not just the individuals‟ benefit has been a
tremendous sticking point as well as a hurdle to new entries into the political sphere, as discussed
previously.208 With the country divided into personalized factions, someone cannot rise to power
without seriously aggravating a powerful actor by stepping on his toes.
In a country where “legal nihilism has reached all aspects of state and social life,”
civil society is the only regulatory framework existent.209 Protests, no matter who leads them, are
the only form of redress in a country where a compromised court system is a given, and the only
203
Id. at 156. 204
“About 100 supporters of presidential candidates K. Tashiev and A. Madumarov began protest meeting at Osh”
Kabar.kg, (Nov. 2, 2011). http://www.kabar.kg/eng/regions/full/2580. 205
Kulov was arrested in 2000 and 2001. See, Who‟s Who in Kyrgyz Politics, supra note 69; Const. Art. LXII, §1
delimits the demographics of presidential candidates, stating they must be “…no younger than 35 years of age and
not older than 70 years of age, who has a command of the state language and who has been resident in the
republic for no less than 15 years in total…” (Emphasis added). 206
The TULIP REVOLUTION at 93. 207
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 206. 208
See infra, Part III, §B “Exclusionary Tactics” at 15. 209
Kyrgyzstan follows its Constitution?, supra note 83.
34
way to visibly perform mass politics.210 Here it sands to remember that the Constitution was
drafted by the former opposition, who did not want to see their gains lost in new protest.211
Constitutional law prevents individuals from being forced into participation.212 The Constitution
also honors assemblers with “the right to submit notice to state authorities” to ensure peaceful
conduct.213
For the constitution‟s platitudes that “[t]he people of Kyrgyzstan are the bearers of
sovereignty and the sole source of state power in the Kyrgyz Republic,” the political culture is
not quite there yet.214 Article three also ensures the “supremacy of the popular power, represented
and ensured by the Jogorku Kenesh and the President elected nation-wide” but it gives no tools
to implement this supremacy.215 The constitution is extraordinarily aspirational in this regard.
Personal allegiances are currently the status quo, as people have demonstrated devotion to an
individual, but much more tenuously to that individual‟s party or even the party system.
Compared to these allegiances, there has been far less accountability and the ascending ties
demonstrated in this section are still quite weak. The two are hardly synonymous, and the
Constitution acts as though these personal allegiances have been transformed into political
accountability with scant regard to the facts on the ground.
C. Adherence, Accountability, and the Yawning Chasm Between Them
There is no doubt that ties exist in Kyrgyzstan, and the difficult steps moving forward,
theoretically, would be turning these ties into accountability. Descending ties that bind a base to
a particular elite actor are particularly strong. These ties have been the key to widespread action
210
WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 15. 211
Id. 212
There is a guarantee of prohibition “On coercion to participate in a peaceful assembly” See, Const. Art. XX,
§4(8). 213
See, Const. Art. XXXIV, §2. 214
Const. Art. I, §1. 215
Const. Art. III, §1.
35
and the ensuing turmoil of protests in the past decade. Unfortunately, these ties are also deeply
personalized. They have not been converted to party politics in any but the most cosmetic
fashion. To turn these ties to accountability and make party adherents feel capable of demanding
change and not only requesting aid from their leaders will take time and finesse. This change
remains a potential avenue of great growth. The road to party politics is the road to a government
up to international norms. It could also just as easily lead to uproarious failure. It could lead to
the gradual elimination of alternatives, as a single leader rises to authoritarian power.
Part VI: Concluding Remarks:
Bringing Local Norms towards International Standards
Sadykov‟s aspirational statement promising that “[t]he prime minister will be accountable
to the parliament and the parliament will be accountable to the electorate, the people,” shows
how much further there is to go.216 Institutions of governance exist within the strong and robust
civil society, but these are not the institutions preferred by the entrenched elites. The 2011
constitution is the first to even show the potential to fully ensconce these formal and informal
institutions.217 Co-opting contemporary institutions will likely be a much more beneficial
solution than creating parallel political institutions and may also be able to assuage concerns over
governmental corruption and repression.218
The chasm is wide between current-day Kyrgyzstan, with its swaths of society beyond
state governance, and the Constitution which implies popular politics and rule of law. Sadykov
216
New Kyrgyz Constitution Strong on Promises, Vague on Checks and Balances, supra note 10. 217
And that could perhaps be only the inability of proving a negative, that is, there is no way to categorically prove
that civil society is not part of political life 218
John Ishiyama, “Political Party Development and Party „Gravity‟ in Semi-Authoritarian States: The Cases of
Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan” 4 TAIWAN JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY 33, available at
http://www.tfd.org.tw/docs/dj0401/033-054-John%20Ishiyama.pdf.
36
remarks on the accountability required to put parliamentary rule into place, but not the
implementation required to further accountability.
Personalized politics are, at this stage, a given in Kyrgyzstan. Co-option of civil society
institutions would depersonalize politics and bridge the gap by creating legislation which would
bring the Constitution closer to Kyrgyzstani reality. International norms are well and good, but
they also lead to authoritarian tendencies.219 A legal system that adheres closer to reality allows
Kyrgyzstanis purchase into the political system that purportedly represents them and makes
ground-up change more possible, if not more hasty. Regulating civil society and bringing local
actors into a formal political process could give Kyrgyzstan a truly democratic way forward.
219
Desires for stability and reliability have led to ossified leaders in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, as well as much
teeth-gnashing from Washington, DC think-tanks on these issues. See, Joshua Foust, Why the U.S. Should Work with
Uzbekistan, The Atlantic (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/10/why-the-us-
should-work-with-uzbekistan/246221/; Joshua Foust, The Unicorn Principle and Regional Strategy, Registan.net
(October 25, 2011), http://www.registan.net/index.php/2011/10/25/the-unicorn-principle-and-regional-strategy/.