Marine column, and a squad leaderin the 3d Battalion, CorporalDonald D. Sowl, was later award-ed the Army's DistinguishedService Cross by order of GeneralMacArthur.

There was a final flourish at theend of the day. A number of theenemy was spotted sneaking upthe reverse slope of one of thehills. A veteran noncommissionedofficer took a squad, deployedthem along the ridgeline, and toldthem to wait silently. When theNKPA soldiers got within 75 feet,the sergeant gave his men the sig-nal, and they poured out a sheet offire. All 39 of the attackers werekilled instantly, except for the offi-cer leading them who was wound-ed and captured. Turned over toSouth Korean police to take backto the battalion CP for interroga-tion, the enemy officer did not sur-vive the trip. As Geer wrylyobserved: "In the future they [the

Marines] would conduct their ownprisoners to the rear."

With all units dug in for thenight, a rice paddy area of 1,000yards between the two companiesof the 1st Battalion was covered bythe preregistered fire of mortarsand artillery in case the enemy hadany thoughts of a night attack. Thebrigade had now covered 29 milesof road (and much more countingthe interminable distances up anddown hills) in four short days. Ithad defeated the NKPA in everyencounter, and here it was poisedfor the short step into Sachon. Nextstop after that was the final objec-tive, Chinju, now within easy reachof the hard-hitting brigade. Again,things looked good—too good.

This time the surprise came notfrom the NKPA in front but fromthe U.S. Army in the rear. Craighad received orders from Kean latein the morning of the day justended, 12 August, to send without

32

delay a reinforced battalion all theway back to the original startingpoint of the task force's drive,Chindong-ni. The Army's 5th RCTwas in trouble again; its "push"towards Chinju had totally boggeddown in what one account called"an epic disaster." With only twobattalions left, Craig noted in hisunderstated way that "the conse-quence was that our right flank.was exposed. There were manyNorth Korean troops in that area,and we were, more or less, out ona limb at Sachon." Now the NKPAwas cutting the main supply routebehind the 5th RCT, and three bat-teries of the 555th and 90th FieldArtillery Battalions had been com-pletely overrun by the enemy. TheMarine battalion was urgentlyneeded to rescue the survivorsfrom the shambles and restore thetactical situation.

The call from Kean began a hec-tic afternoon for Craig. Lynn

.\ Relief Force

Montross in his book, Cavalry ofthe Sky, stressed the crucial mobil-ity Craig enjoyed by repeated useof the helicopter. In a single after-noon, he took off from his CP atKosong, then made two landingsto give orders to his regimentalcommander, Murray, and to Taplettfor the roadlift of the 3d Battalionto the crisis spot. Montross contin-ued the story:

Next, he spotted twocolumns of Marine trucksfrom the air and landed twicemore to direct them to dumptheir loads and provide trans-portation for the troops. HisG-3 [operations officer] andthe battalion commander hadmeanwhile been sent aheadby helicopter to reconnoiterthe objective area and planfor the Marines to deploy andattack upon arrival. Owing tothese preparations, the assaulttroops seized part of theenemy position before dark-ness.

This fluid movement of Craig'senabled him, as a finale, toobserve the start of the sunsetattack enroute to a conferencewith Kean at Masan. While therehe got the disheartening news thatWalker wanted him to withdrawthe brigade at daybreak. It was agloomy ride for Craig back to hisCP where he landed in early dark-ness.

The meeting with Kean not onlyconfirmed the overwhelming prob-lems of the 5th RCT, but alsobrought still more ominous news.The operations of Task Force Keanhad been in the far southwesternsector of the Pusan Perimeter. Nowthe NKPA had crossed the NaktongRiver in the west center of theperimeter, broken the Army's lines,and were threatening to unhingethe entire defense of the peninsu-

la. It was a time of real crisis, andWalker was calling on his battle-proven "fire brigade" to save thesituation. This presented Craigwith an even bleaker picture: hehad to pull the rest of his brigadeout of its successful drive towardSachon and rush it north to stemthe enemy breakthrough.

Withdrawal in the face of anaggressive enemy is one of themore difficult military operations.Newton, commander of the 1stBattalion, had gotten the wordfrom Murray at midnight on 12August to withdraw his men fromtheir hilltop positions and form upon the road below at 0630 the fol-lowing morning. There truckswould move them to their nextcombat assignment—unknown, asusual, to the men who would dothe fighting.

Before it could get to the road,as the 1st Battalion was preparingto evacuate its positions on Hill202, it was hit by a heavy assault.The veteran soldiers of the 6thInfantry Division were experts atnight attacks, and at 0450 theystruck. It was close-in work. For awhile, the outcome was in doubt.Separated from Company A,Company B was on its own. Itsentire left flank was overrun, thecommunications wire was cut, andtwo Marine machine guns werecaptured and turned on the com-pany. Fighting back face-to-face,the Marines called in fire from their81mm and 4.2-inch mortars,together with artillery and 3.5-inchrocket rounds that pinpointed theenemy with fire barely in front ofthe defenders. Finally, at dawn, thesituation was stabilized.

There now occurred "one of themost demoralizing incidents inCompany B's experience for theentire campaign," as Fenton latercommented. Tobin was ready atfirst light to move back and recov-er the wounded and missing men,

33

just as Marine tradition (and Craig)had promised. It was not to be.Iron-clad orders from Walker toCraig to Murray to Newton forcedan immediate withdrawal, in spiteof Tobin's pleadings.

Fenton summarized the unani-mous feeling:

Twenty-nine bloody, sweat-ing miles down the drain. .

The men couldn't believe it. I

couldn't believe it. It didn'tseem possible, with all thelives we'd lost taking thisground, that we'd now justwalk off and leave it. BakerCompany's casualties for themorning's counterattack alonewere 12 dead, 16 wounded,and 9 missing in action. AndI'm certain those last ninewere dead, too.

I found it difficult to seemen, veterans of the last war,older guys, sitting by the sideof the road crying. They justdidn't give a hoot. They weretired, disgusted. People justcouldn't understand this partof the war.

Leaving the 1st and 2d Battal-ions temporarily in the positionsthey had won in the Changchonarea, Craig moved quickly on 12August to organize the deploymentof his 3d Battalion as a relief forcefor the overrun Army field artillerybattalions. The orders from Keanhad come at 1130 and by 1300 theriflemen and an artillery batterywere in the trucks, on their way. Ahalf hour later Taplett and thebrigade operations officer, Lieu-tenant Colonel Stewart, were air-borne to scout the disaster area byhelicopter. They saw plenty oftrouble: artillery pieces in disarray;jeeps on fire; American bodieslying in a stream bed; and, incon-

gruously, one white table set in themidst of it all. The Army had "esti-mated" that 2,000 to 2,500 NKPAtroops had infiltrated the area,smashed the Army artillery units,and were threatening the mainsupply route, so Taplett had origi-nally presumed that there wouldbe heavy combat for his battalionwhen it arrived. At the scene hesaw no evidence of any suchquantity of NKPA, and he stronglydoubted the estimate.

The chaotic situation theMarines now saw had its roots inthe events of the preceding day,11 August. Without opposition,the 5th RCT had advanced justfive miles from where it had start-ed at the infamous road junctionto a small village called Pongam-ni. The 555th "Triple Nickel" and90th Field Artillery Battalionswere in support, but were notprotected or prepared for anenemy attack.

Marine procedures were muchdifferent. Craig later commentedon this:

The artillery had beentrained in Pendleton in themethods of security. Theywere armed with bazookas,.50 calibers, and everythingthat the infantrymen wouldneed to defend a position,and they were well trained indefense of their artillery posi-tions. And they from that[first] day on took up defen-sive positions wherever theymoved.

As a result we never had agun overrun. There wereattempts at sniping and soforth, but we never had agun taken or overrun; where-as I notice that the Army ona number of occasions in theperimeter lost whole batter-ies. It was simply, I think,because the artillerymen

were not trained along thesame lines as the Marines.

At this time, Kean was underheavy pressure from Walker to getthe 5th RCT to leap ahead. So thedivision commander ordered hisregimental commander (ColonelGodwin L. Ordway) to move partof his units quickly forwardthrough the pass near Pongam-ni.Then there was indecision, delay,conflicting orders, and repeatedfailures in radio communications.As a result, part of the regimentwent through the pass that night,and part stopped at Pongam-ni.With his command thus split up,and with enemy fire falling on thesupply route to his rear, Ordwaywas in a difficult situation. It gotworse after midnight on 11 Augustwhen telephone and radio com-munications with the artillery bat-talions was lost and the sounds ofbattle came from their direction.With the NKPA now on the highground above him, Ordway decid-ed at 0400 on 12 August to try tomove the rest of his troops throughthe pass. A massive traffic jamensued. As the official Army histo-ry noted: "During the hour or morebefore daylight, no vehicle inOrdway's range of vision movedmore than 10 or 20 feet at a time."

As the infantry slowly movedout, the enemy quickly moved intothe valley. Now the Army artillery;stalled behind the traffic jam, was asitting duck. NKPA tanks and self-propelled guns were able to"approach undetected and unop-posed, almost to point-blankrange, and with completely disas-trous effects." Enemy infantry fromthe 13th Regiment of the 6thDivision closed in and added itsfirepower. It was a slaughter, andthe artillery was completely over-run. A traumatic phone call fromBrigadier General George B. Barth,USA, the 25th Division artillery

34

commander, to Kean revealed thescope of the disaster and led Keanto order the rescue mission by the3d Battalion, 5th Marines.

Kean also ordered a battalion ofthe 24th Infantry to bring relief byan attack towards Pongam-ni. Thiseffort went nowhere on 12 August,and by the next day it was still twoand a half miles from the artillerypositions. The 555th had lost six ofits 105mm howitzers, and the 90thhad lost all six of the 155mm how-itzers in one of its batteries. Alongwith some 300 men, probably 100vehicles had been captured ordestroyed (although the NKPAclaimed an inflated 157 vehiclesand 13 tanks). The Army had giventhe site the name "Bloody Gulch."

This was the grim situation thatTaplett faced when his helicopterarrived on 12 August. He immedi-ately had the aircraft land and helooked for the liaison officer whowas supposed to meet him, nowthat he was coming under theoperational control of the Army's25th Infantry Division. No sign ofany such person.

To try to get some information,Taplett was finally able to tap intoa telephone line to the divisionheadquarters in the rear and askfor orders. The reply was to "dowhat he thought was proper." Thatvague verbal order was all the lee-way Taplett needed for immediateaction. A helicopter reconnais-sance was followed by a juncturewith his troops. Then he led themby air to the valley from where heplanned to attack the commandingridges.

Less than three hours afterboarding their trucks, the men ofthe 3d Battalion were at theirassembly area, ready to jump off inan attack on a cold, rainy, miser-able day. Taplett aggressivelydelayed only 15 minutes for anartillery preparation and somenapalm runs by Marine Corsairs,

and then moved out the riflemen.Without a single casualty, theysoon reached the top of the firstridge. There they found signs thata substantial body of enemy troopshad made a hasty departure, butthis was a far cry from the resis-tance they had expected from the"2,000" or so enemy troops thatOrdway had estimated hadwreaked such havoc.

At 1900 Barth arrived to takecommand. Not knowing Taplett'sstyle, he asked when the Marineswould be ready to attack. Taplettpresumably enjoyed a responseone can easily imagine, "Sir, we'vealready done that, and my men arenow digging in on top of theridge." Barth graciously congratu-lated him.

The next morning, 13 August,the 3d Battalion attacked to securethe final ridges overlooking thepitiful remnants of the lost artillery.Again, there was no opposition,and by 1000 they were on top oftheir objectives. Craig later com-mented: "We found quite a numberof Army artillerymen scatteredthrough the area, hiding in variousplaces." Besides those rescued bythe Marines, some had fled andstruggled back to safety with the25th Division.

Taplett's men were now readyto go down, clean out any enemy,and retrieve the artillery pieces inthe valley, but the Marines oncemore got orders that they couldnot take the objective they werepoised to seize, but must, instead,move to the rear to meet the newenemy threat along the Naktong.

That marked the final episode inthe Marine mission to aid theArmy's 5th RCT. With all troops,Marine and Army, now pulledback to their starting point atChindong-ni, it was the end of theoffensive to occupy Chinju and, on16 August, Task Force Kean wasdissolved.

Things had gone badly for the5th RCT and its artillery, and thecommanding officers of the regi-ment and the "Triple Nickel" bat-talion were both relieved of duty.Higher Army echelons were notpleased with their leadership orthe morale and combat effective-ness of their men.

Craig, on the other hand, waspleased. He had seen his brigadedrive forward with vigor and pro-fessional skill. His officers wereconstantly aggressive, and the rifle-men had done very well underfire. He noted that his men were"well trained and well led" by out-standing noncommissioned offi-cers and "professional" officerswho "knew their stuff." The reasonfor the brigade's achievementswere clear to Craig:

We were a generation ofofficers who grew up with theMarine Corps' standing oper-ating procedures (SOPs) foramphibious operations. Thesewere my "Bible" when I orga-nized and trained an earlierMarine brigade on Guam dur-ing the period 1947-1949.During World War II we hadrepeatedly tested and refinedour organization and tech-niques in landings all over thePacific. These same SOPsenabled us to deploy toKorea quickly and fight effec-tively when we got there.

Equally important, the support-ing arms had coordinated wellwith the infantrymen, with theclose air support of MAG-33demonstrating a wholly new ele-ment in the Korean War, flyingmore than 400 sorties in support ofthe brigade and other units of theEighth Army. The Marines hadtwice been on the verge of seizing

35

their objectives—first at Sachon-Chinju and then the recovery ofthe Army artillery—only to bepulled back by the strategic needsof the Eighth Army. Geer in hisaccount concluded:

The brigade came out ofChangallon [Changchonlphysically tough and psycho-logically hard . . . . Theyknew the enemy to be avicious, skillfully led andwell-equipped foe that couldinflict heavy casualties in anyaction. They were preparedto meet with heavy losses andto carry on the attack, andwere openly scornful of unitsunable to face these hardfacts of war.

There had been a price, howev-er. The brigade had had a total of315 casualties, with 66 killed ordied of wounds, 240 wounded,and 9 missing in action (when the1st Battalion had not been allowedto recover them).

The action of that week hadbrought results on a wider, strate-gic scale. While there had been afailure to occupy Chinju, TaskForce Kean had nevertheless beenthe first real American offensive ofthe Korean War. In a report to theUnited Nations, General MacArthurstated that "this attack not onlysecured the southern approachesto the beachhead, but also showedthat the North Korean forces willnot hold under attack."

The official Army historyacknowledged in summary that"the task force had not accom-plished what Eighth Army hadbelieved to be easily possible—thewinning and holding of the Chinjupass line," and, omitting any refer-ence to the dramatic advance ofthe Marine brigade, admitted thatthe rest of the task force, "after aweek of fighting, . . . was back

lv. C

approximately in the positionsfrom which it had started itsattack." That history, however,went on to note "certain beneficialresults . . . . It chanced to meethead-on the North Korean 6thDivision attack against the Masanposition, and first stopped it andthen hurled it back . . . . TaskForce Kean also gained the timeneeded to organize and wire in thedefenses that were to hold theenemy out of Masan during thecritical period ahead."

The official Marine history couldafford to be positive about thebrigade's achievements:

The Communist drive inthis sensitive area came clos-est of all NKPA thrusts to thevital UN supply port of Pusan.Up to that time the NKFAunits spearheading theadvance—the 6th Infantry

Division and the 83dMotorcycle Regiment—hadnever suffered a reverseworth mentioning since theoutset of the invasion. Thenthe counterattack by the 1stProvisional Marine Brigadehurled the enemy back 26miles in 4 days from theChindong-ni area to Sachon.

It was estimated that theMarine air-ground team killedand wounded 1,900 of theenemy while destroying near-ly all the vehicles of an NKPAmotorized battalion in addi-tion to infantry armament andequipment. The enemy threatin this critical area was nulli-fied for the time being, and

A Marine skirmish line attacking over exposed ground to a nearby treeless hill-crest. Photo by David Douglas l)uncari

36

Interlude

never again became so seri-ous. Marine efforts assistedArmy units of Task ForceKean in taking new defensivepositions and defending themwith fewer troops, thus free-ing some elements foremployment on other fronts.Finally, the Marines earnedmore time and space for thebuilding up of Eighth Armyforces in preparation for adecisive UN counteroffen-sive.

With the conclusion of the drivetowards Sachon, the Marineshoped for a respite before the nextcall to combat, which they knewwas sure to come. Craig, however,had received orders at 0130, 14August, to move his brigade assoon as possible to a place calledMiryang. Using rail, trucks, andeven an LST, his battalions madethe trip of 75 miles in 26 hours.When the "Fire Brigade" arrivedthere, it was desperately needed ina new crisis.

Before the men moved out forcombat, there was one blessed—though brief—interlude of relax-ation: Marines from the rear, fromstaff positions, even tankers andartillerymen, were fed into thedepleted rifle companies. (Anotherof the many times when there wasa vital payoff for the Marinemaxim, roughly: "No matter whatyour ultimate assignment may be,you will be trained first as a rifle-man!") There was a pleasant groveof trees at Miryang, and the mencould rest in the shade, get theirfirst-ever bath in the river there,eat their first hot food, andexchange filthy, rotted uniformsfar a fresh issue. Fegan comment-ed: "Not only did I smell to highheaven, I also had dried blood allover my jacket."

That rest period was soon over.Upon arrival at Miryang, thebrigade was placed under theoperational control of the Army's24th Infantry Division to meet anew threat. The situation wasindeed critical. Ten days before,author Russell Spurr asserts,General Kim Chaek, front com-mander of the NKPA, hadaddressed his staff. Moving fromthe past (Sachon) battle to theforthcoming (Naktong) attack, hereputedly acknowledged that loss-es had been heavy, with the 6thDivision "reduced by half in thepast week." He then went on toissue a clarion call for victory:

The situation is not irre-trievable. We have committedonly a portion of ourstrength. I am thereforeordering the 4th GuardsDivision to cross the NaktongRiver north of the presentbattlefield, capture Yongsan,and drive on to Miryang. Thisas you can see from the map,will sever the main supplyroute between Pusan andU.S. headquarters in Taegu; ifwe succeed, and I trust weshall, the northern part of theperimeter will collapse. It isdefended largely by puppettroops and we know howthey react when outflanked.

The commander of the 4thDivision was Major General LeeKwon Mu, a hardened profession-al who had fought with theCommunists in China and servedas a lieutenant in the RussianArmy. Awarded North Korea'shighest military decorations, theOrder of Hero of the KoreanDemocratic People's Republic, andthe National Flag, First Class, forhis earlier triumphs in South

37

Korea, Mu had moved his 7,000men into position on 4 August fora crucial attack across the NaktongRiver. The 4th Division was acrack unit, given the honorary titleof the "Seoul" Division for its tri-umphant earlier capture of thecapital of South Korea. Leadingthe way were the 4th, 16th, and18th Infantry Regiments. They hadmoved stealthily into action thenight of 5 August, wading acrossthe Naktong under cover of dark-ness, while machine guns werepulled along on crude rafts. By themorning of 6 August, 1,000 ofthem had established a positionon the east side, soon beefed upby artillery brought across theNaktong on a hidden, underwaterbridge the NKPA had secretly con-structed. This assault had meantthe breaching of the last naturalbarrier which was counted on toprotect the vital lifeline fromTaegu to Pusan. It was at Taeguthat General Walker had his head-quarters for direction of thedefense of the Pusan Perimeter.

This attack had come as a sur-prise to Brigadier General John H.Church, commander of the 24thInfantry Division. The subsequentthreat was obvious. From the hillsthe NKPA had seized it dominatedthe road to Yongsan, five milesaway. Twenty-five miles beyondthat lay Mityang, and then the vitalPusan-Taegu main supply route(MSR). As Toland recorded: "Panicreached the government offices inTaegu." Walker, however, hadremained cool, and the Army hadentered a period of continuousbattle. Some units were overrunand some soldiers had fled asNKPA soldiers appeared on flanksand rear. In a confusing period ofseparate confrontations, Armytroops had been unable to pushthe NKPA here, and at anotherpoint in the north, back across theNaktong.

Enemy Breakthrough

Fire Brigade': Crisis Number 1\vo

That was when Walker called inthe Marines. Thus, on 15 August,Craig met with Church. Walker hadearlier told Church, "I am going togive you the Marine Brigade. I

want this situation cleaned up—and quick!" Craig made his plansfollowing his meeting with Church.The brigade would move out of

Miryang on 16 August to go on theattack. Geer records a British mili-tary observer who saw them get-ting started and sent a dispatch toTokyo. He emphasized a "critical"situation in which Milyang couldwell be lost, then Taegu wouldbecome untenable, and "we willbe faced with a withdrawal fromKorea." In spite of these grimprospects, he got a premonition

38

about the brigade. In spite of the"impossible odds" that he felt itfaced, he described his gut feelingthat it would check the NKPAadvance:

I realize my expression ofhope is unsound, but theseMarines have the swagger,confidence and hardness thatmust have been in StonewallJackson's Army of theShenandoah. They remind meof the Coldstreams at Dunker-que. Upon this thin line ofreasoning, I cling to the hopeof victory.

That night, the tone of the attackwas set when Murray told Newton:"You must take that ground tomor-row! You have to get on that ridgeand take it! Understood?" Newtonreplied: "Understood! Understood!This battalion goes only oneway—straight ahead!"

The brigade was to jump off at0800 on 17 August as part of aplanned full-scale effort by theArmy's 24th Division, reinforcedby the 9th Infantry Regiment.There was a happy history of link-age between the Marines and the9th Infantry. They had servedtogether in the battle for Tientsinduring the Boxer Rebellion inChina at the turn of the century,and again in the 2d InfantryDivision in France during WorldWar I. Now the 9th would operateon the brigade's right, with theMarines as the left wing of theattack. Three objective lines wereassigned to the brigade, with thefirst being Obong-ni Ridge. Craigand Murray made an on-the-spotreconnaissance of the terrainwhich was a jumbled mass of hillsand gullies. Because of the type ofterrain to the left and the presenceof the Army's 9th Regiment to theright, the only, reluctant choicewas a frontal attack.

-t - -

p

- -• V;

action against anyone whoshows weakness.

tion.

The shift to the new crisis areawas a pressure-laden one for theMarines. Stewart, Craig's opera-tions officer (G-3), remembered inlater years that he was advised thatthe Naktong River line had beenbroken through, threatening thePusan-Taegu MSR, and the brigadehad to move there immediately torestore the front. He recalled:

Things were so hectic thatRoise, who was commandingthe 2d Battalion, which wasgoing on the line belowMasan in a defensive position,received minimum orders tomove. In fact, our radio con-tact was out and I wrote on alittle piece of brown paper,"These are your trucks, moveto Naktong at once."

Those were the only ordersRoise ever got to move to theNaktong front. But they were all heneeded in the hectic situation inwhich the Marines found them-

selves, for, when only a portion ofthe promised trucks showed up,many men in the battalion had tomarch until 0130 the next morningto reach the jump-off point fortheir attack a few hours later.

Waiting for the Marines, welldug-in and confident of victory,were the 18th Regiment and a bat-talion of the 16th Regiment of theNKPA 4th Division. Geer quotes aspeech by Colonel Chang Ky Dok,the regiment's veteran command-ing officer:

Intelligence says we are toexpect an attack by AmericanMarines. To us comes thehonor of being the first todefeat these Marines soldiers.We will win where othershave failed. I consider ourpositions impregnable. Weoccupy the high ground andthey must attack up a steepslope. Go to your men andtell them there will be noretreat. I will take instant

39

Preparation by supporting unitsfor the Marine riflemen's attackwas inadequate. Artillery fire wasineffective. When the enemy posi-tions were later examined, the fox-holes were found to be very deep,sited along the length of the ridgeslightly on the reverse slope. Thusshelifire on the forward slopescaused few casualties, nor couldartillery get a trajectory to reachthe enemy on the reverse slopes.Adding to the problem, there wasonly one air strike, Moreover, therewould be little or no natural coverfor the men who had to climbtoward the six hills of Obong-ni,called by the news correspondents"No Name Ridge."

Murray had an agreement withthe Army's 9th Infantry on the rightflank that the Marines would attackfirst, supported by fire from the9th. He picked Roise's 2d Battalionto lead off. It was a very thin frontline for such a crucial moment:four understrength platoons total-ing only 130 men from CompaniesD and E to lead the assault (withtwo platoons as reserves). "RedSlash Hill" was to be their dividingline.

One platoon of Company E, ledby Second Lieutenant Nickolas D.Arkadis, hit the village of Obong-niat the foot of two of the companyobjectives: Hills 143 and 147.Driving ahead through heavy fire,the platoon fought its way to theslopes beyond. Arkadis' leadershipwas later recognized by the awardof a Silver Star.

Now both companies were outin the open, sometimes forced tocrawl upwards, met with a contin-uous hail of enemy machine gunand mortar fire with barrages of

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2246

Marches had the men well spaced out to avoid unnecessary casualties. As thiscolumn heads toward its objective, the man second from the rear carries aflamethrower, while the man in front of him has a 3.5-inch rocket launcher. This pic-ture was taken during a Naktong battle, showing a burning enemy tank, withthe Marines carefully circling around it to avoid any explosion of its ammuni-

grenades. Casualties mountedrapidly. Joseph C. Goulden tells ofa correspondent who was watch-ing and described the bloodyscene: "Hell burst around theLeathernecks as they moved upthe barren face of the ridge.Everywhere along the assault line,men dropped. To continue lookedimpossible. But, all glory forever tothe bravest men I ever saw, theline did not break. The casualtieswere unthinkable, but the assaultforce never turned back. It moved,fell down, got up and movedagain."

One platoon of Company D,with only 15 men remaining, didclaw its way to the top of Hill 109on Obong-ni Ridge, but it was tooweak and too isolated when rein-forcements simply could not reachit, so it had to pull back off thecrest. Second Lieutenant Michael J.Shinka, the platoon leader, latergave the details of that perilousstruggle:

Running short of ammoand taking casualties, withthe shallow enemy slit trench-es for cover, I decided to fallback until some of the fire onmy left flank could besilenced. I gave the word towithdraw and take all wound-ed and weapons. Aboutthree-quarters of the waydown, I had the men set upwhere cover was available. Ihad six men who were ableto fight.

I decided to go forward tofind out if we had left any ofour wounded. As I crawledalong our former position (onthe crest of Hill 109), I cameacross a wounded Marinebetween two dead. As I

grabbed him under the armsand pulled him from the fox-hole, a bullet shattered mychin. Blood ran into my

throat and I couldn't breathe.

Shinka, after being hit again, didmanage to survive, and was laterawarded a Bronze Star Medal.Another Company D Marine, StaffSergeant T. Albert Crowson, single-handedly silenced two deadlymachine gun emplacements andwas awarded the Army'sDistinguished Service Cross byorder of General MacArthur.

By now, it had become clearthat many of the casualties werecaused by heavy enemy fire com-ing from the zone in front of theArmy's 9th Regiment to hit theflank and rear of the Marines, andthere had been no supporting firefrom the 9th. Other problems arosewhen some men of Company Ewere nearing the crest which wastheir objective and they were hitby white phosphorus shells from"friendly" artillery fire. Then, later,some Marines were hit in a strafingattack by their own Corsairs.

By mid-day the men of the 2dBattalion, halfway up the hills,could do no more, having suffered142 casualties, 60 percent of theiroriginal 240 riflemen. Murrayordered it to pull back, undoubt-edly lamenting the fact that he didnot have a third rifle company in

the battalion, for it might well haveseized the top of the ridge andheld it. Craig stressed this point ina later interview, noting that "with-out a third company, or maneuverelement, the battalion commanderswere at a tactical disadvantage inevery engagement. They lackedflexibility in the attack. On defensethey had to scrape up whateverthey could in order to have areserve."

Pinpointing an example, Craigrecalled:

This condition became crit-ical in the First Battle of theNaktong. 2d Battalion, 5thMarines' assault companiestook heavy losses in the initialattack against Obong-niRidge, the strongpoint of theenemy's bridgehead over theNaktong. Since Roise hadnothing left to use, the attackstalled.

Murray then had to commit1/5 [the 1st Battalion] prema-turely to continue the attack.This took time, giving theenemy a breather right at theheight of the battle. Thatnight, when the enemy hitour positions on the ridgewith a heavy counterattack,

A Marine tank bulldozer clears a destroyed NKPA T-34 tank from the road.National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1338

40

Newton certainly could haveused another company online or in reserve. We werespread pretty thin, and it wasnip and tuck on that ridge forseveral more hours.

The original battle plan hadcalled for an attack in a column ofbattalions, with each battalion tak-ing successively one of the series

of three ridge lines (objectives 1, 2,and 3) that shielded the NKIA rivercrossing It was now painfully obvi-ous that a sharp change must bemade. Accordingly, Newton's 1stBattalion relieved the battered 2don the hillsides at 1600 (17August), with Company A replac-ing E, and B replacing D.

While the 18th Regiment had hitthe 2d Battalion hard, the bravery,

skill, and determination of thoseMarines had caused serious lossesin the enemy's ranks: 600 casual-ties and severe reductions in ser-viceable weapons. With his ammu-nition running low and no medicalsupplies so that most of hiswounded men were dying, theNKPA commander's situation wascritical, as described by Fehren-bach:

He knew he could notwithstand another day ofAmerican air and artillerypounding and a fresh Marineassault up the ridge. Becausehe had a captured AmericanSCR-300 radio, tuned in onMarine frequencies, he knewthat the 1st Battalion hadrelieved 2/5 along the front ofOhong-ni, and he knewapproximately where thecompanies of 1/5 were locat-ed, for the Marines talked agreat deal over the air.

41

The relief movement of the twobattalions was covered by what theofficial Marine history described as"devastating fires" from the planesof MAG-33, the artillery of the 1stBattalion, 11th Marines, and thebrigade's tank battalion. ThenCompanies A and B attacked upthe daunting slopes. Simul-taneously, after Murray had goneto see Church to request a changein the previously agreed-uponplan, the 9th Infantry jumped off inan attack. This eliminated the pre-vious flanking fire on the Marines.

Helped by the advance bom-bardment, the two Marine compa-nies were able to make slow (andcostly) progress towards the crests.Company A attacked repeatedly,trying to reach the battalion'sobjective on the left: the tops ofHills 117 and 143. It proved impos-

1st NAKTONG COUNTEROFFENSIVESITUATION 18 AUG. - OBJ. 1(OBONG-NI)

MARINE FRONT LINES:

BEFORE NK. COUNTERATTACK

AFTER N.K. COUNTERATTACK •.....100 50 0

N.K. RETREAT(DAWN)

sible, in spite of very aggressiveleadership by the officers (andgunnery sergeants who replacedthem as they fell). The companycould get only part way up theslopes when it was "pinned downby a solid sheet of Communist fire

casualties bled Ethel skirmishline white and finally brought it toa stop."

Herbert R. Luster, a private firstclass in Company A, rememberedhis own searing experience in thisbrutal battle:

It was evident no one sawthe enemy but me . . . . I

pulled back the bolt to cockthe action of the BAR, pushedoff the safety, settled back onmy right foot, and opened fire.The flying cliii and tracers toldme where my rounds weregoing. I emptied the rifle.So I pushed the release withmy right thumb and pulled the

empty magazine out, stuck itin my jacket pocket, loadedand raised my BAR to myshoulder. Before I got it all theway up, red dirt kicked up inmy face. A big jerk at my rightarm told me I was hit. I lookeddown and saw blood squirtingonto my broken BAR stock.

As always, there were goryepisodes. Second LieutenantFrancis W. Muetzel in Company Awas in an abandoned machine gunemplacement with his companyexecutive officer and a riflemanfrom the 3d Platoon. He laterrecalled:

The use of the abandonedmachine gun emplacementproved to be a mistake. Enemymortars and artillery hadalready registered on it . .

Without registration of anykind, four rounds of enemy

42

82mm mortar fire landedaround it. The blast lifted meoff the ground, my helmetflew off. A human body to myleft disintegrated. Being rathershook up and unable to hear,I crawled back to the CP. .

About the time my hearingand stability returned . . . Ithought of the 3d Platoon rifle-man . . . . I returned to lookfor him. One of the mortarrounds must have landed inthe small of his back. Only apelvis and legs were left. Thestretcher-bearers gathered upthe remains with a shovel.

On the other side of "Red SlashHill" that was the dividing line,Company B made some progressuntil it was pinned down by heavyfire from a nearby village on itsflank. Captain John L. Tobin waswounded, so Fenton took over ascompany commander. Calling in an

81mm mortar barrage from the bat-talion's weapons company, theriflemen were then able to lungeforward and seize the crests of Hills102 and 109 by late afternoon (17August).

The two battered companies set-tled down where they were and

tied into each other to dig in nightdefensive positions. With the floodof casualties, the resulting man-power shortage caused the far leftflank to dangle dangerously in theair. Newton threw together animprovised unit of men from hisheadquarters and service company

personnel to cover that flank. Themortars and artillery were regis-tered on probable enemyapproach routes, including thecrossing point on the NaktongRiver. Then their harassing firemissions went on all night to try todisrupt the enemy.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1160

Fire from supporting weapons was a crucial element as the rifle companiesattacked. Above: 81mm mortars lay down a barrage. Below: a 75mm recoillessrifle blasts a speq/ic target.

43

At 2000 that night (17 August)the Marines had their first con-frontation with the T-34 tanks ofthe NKPA. These were the tanksthat had had such a fearsome rep-utation erliëi in the war. The menof Company B from their hilltopperch saw four of them comingwith a column of infantry, aimed tobypass the Marine riflemen, and, ina typical enemy tactic, probe tosow confusion amongst rear ele-ments.

The Corsairs of MAG-33 werecalled in. They came roaringdown, knocked out one tank, andscattered the accompanying enemyinfantry. With a determination typ-

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1461

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ical of the hardy NKPA, the otherthree tanks came on.

When the news was flashed toNewton in his CP, he told Fentonto "let them go and they'd be dealtwith in the rear." Back at Craig'sbrigade CP, there were two oppo-site reactions when the newsarrived. A correspondent wit-nessed the scene: "Naval CaptainEugene Hering, brigade surgeon,jumped to his feet. "GodAlmighty!" he said. "The aid sta-tion's just a quarter of a mile fromthere! [Lieutenant (junior grade)Bentley] Nelson [one of the battal-ion's medical officers] won't leavehis wounded! If those tanks breakthrough . . ." "They won't," thegeneral said. "Newton will knowwhat to do."

And he did. Summoning theMarine M-26 tanks and antitankweapons, Newton left the NKPAarmor up to them. Fenton and themen of Company B had a ringsideseat for the clash that followed. Helater wrote:

As the first tank roundedthe corner down toward the1st Battalion CP, it was met by3.5" rocket fire from the anti-tank assault section, and firefrom our 75mm recoillessweapons in position on thehigh ground on either side ofthe road. The tank wasknocked out, and the secondtank immediately came upand tried to go around it. Thesecond, too, was hit in thetrack and skidded off theroad. Our M-26 tanks finishedhim off [after a 2.36" whitephosphorus rocket had rico-cheted inside it, creating afiery cauldron]. The third tankmade the same mistake thatthe second tank made. He,too, tried to go around theother two tanks. One of ourM-26 tanks hit this third tank

with a direct hit. All three ofthese tanks were finished offby our M-26 tank platoon.

Back on the hills, the men of the1st Battalion spent the midnighthours on the alert. The attacks thatday had cost the brigade 205 casu-alties, and, to avoid the punishingMarine air strikes in daylight, theenemy was sure to counterattackduring the darkness.

And it did. At 0230 a green sig-nal flare soared into the sky, andthe enemy hit—and hit hard. Withtheir captured U.S. Army radiotuned to the Marines' frequency,the attackers knew the exact placewhere the two Marine companieswere tenuously tied together, andthey sought to drive a wedge inthere and then envelop each com-pany separately. With Company Aonly part way up Hill 117, machinegun fire from the crest andgrenades rolling downhill covered

the assault troops of the NK1A, asthey ran down throwing moregrenades and spraying submachinegun fire. A rifle platoon was indeep trouble, the mortar platoonwas decimated, the Marine defenseline was penetrated, the companywas split in half, the battalion wasassaulted, and the enemy forcedCompany A to make a partial with-drawal back to a spot near Hill109.

Things were not much better inthe Company B zone. With the twoMarine companies split by theNKPA, the enemy assault smashedhard into Fenton's men. A platoonwas overrun under the eerie lightof mortar illuminating shells. Theattackers charged into the CP,

where hastily assembled strayMarines met them in bitter hand-to-hand combat. Possession of thetwo hard-won hills and, in fact, theoutcome of the whole brigadeattack hung in a delicate, tremblingbalance.

Just at that precarious moment,the phone rang in the CP of

On top of Objective Number 3, Marines look down on the Naktong River.National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1401

44

The Enemy Ruaction

Company B. It was Newton, callingto say that the position must beheld "at all costs," and that he waspouring in all the supporting mor-tar and artillery fire he couldmuster. (This apparently preventedthe NKPA from feeding in rein-forcements to exploit the break-throughs.) Newton's main messagewas a brutally frank reminder that,if the Marines retreated, theywould simply have to grind theirway back to the lost positions inthe forthcoming days. ThenNewton asked if they could holdon until daylight could bring relief.Fenton's reply has been variouslyreported: "We have gooks allaround us"; "They've turned myleft flank"; "Don't worry, Colonel.The only Marines that will be leav-ing this ridge tonight will be deadones."

The supporting fire from the 4.2-inch mortar company proved to hean invaluable asset. With its high

angle of fire, it was able to searchout and wreak havoc on NKPAunits shielded in gullies whichMarine artillery fire could notreach. The company's command-ing officer, First Lieutenant RobertM. Lucy, later recalled:

The 1st Battalion wasreceiving a terrifically heavycounterattack. Our companywas zeroed in on the hill andthe valley in front of the bat-talion. When notified of thisattack, we began firing ourprearranged barrages. Later,where only one of these bar-rages had fallen, they count-ed 120 dead North Koreanswith 12 cart-mounted ma-chine guns, who had beenmassed in this little gulleybehind the hill, a ridge infront of the battalion thatwould have caused themconsiderable trouble.

45

With many officers down andaided by the supporting fire, thenoncommissioned officers took thelead in regrouping their units, andso the men of the depletedCompanies A and B stood, andfought, and died, and finally heldtheir ground. Typical of theunyielding defense were the exam-ples of two platoon leaders,Second Lieutenant Hugh C.

Schryver, Jr., in Company B, andSecond Lieutenant Francis W.

Muetzel in Company A. Both offi-cers, although severely wounded,continued to lead their men withthe "fierce determination"described in their citations forawards of the Silver Star. Slowly,toward dawn on 18 August, theenemy attacks weakened. But theMarines had paid a fearful price.Company B had begun the nightwith 190 enlisted men and fiveofficers; the next morning therewere only 110 left, with one officer

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posing gases caused thecadaver to belch. Black bloodfoamed out of its mouth andnose. I promptly lost myentire lunch. By the time theplatoon got through laughing,the tension was broken andthey were ready to go back towork.

still standing. Company A was inworse shape with just 90 menremaining from the 185 at the startof the night.

But the enemy had also paid aheavy price. The sequential attacksof the 2d and then the 1stBattalions and the dogged night-time defense had caused hundredsof NKPA casualties so that, inFehrenbach's words, "the 18thRegiment was shattered beyondrepair."

Craig ordered a resumption ofthe attack at 0700 the next morn-ing, 18 August. None of the menon Obong-ni had had any sleepduring the night past, but theCorsairs were back on station over-head, the enemy was weakening,and both Companies A and Bmoved once more into the assault.Company B worked men to its leftto coordinate with Company A'seffort to seize Hill 117. Four deter-mined NKPA machine gunnersthere held up the advance, so thecompany commander, CaptainJohn R. Stevens, got in touch withNewton to call in an air strike.There was legitimate concernabout the fact that his Marines

were too close, only 100 yardsfrom the target, but a smoke rock-et was fired into the emplacementsfrom the control Corsair, and thenext Corsair put a 500-poundbomb right onto the center of thetarget. The Marines lost one mankilled, but the enemy was totallywiped out, and Company A's fol-low-up rush quickly took controlof the crest. Time: 0734, request airstrike; 0743, bomb delivered; 0748,on the crest.

There was a brief pause—wellremembered by Muetzel:

In an effort to calm themen after all they'd beenthrough, I told them to breakout rations and eat while theyhad a chance. I sat on theside of a hole and dangledmy feet. On the other side ofthe hole lay a dead NorthKorean. He had caught onethrough the top of the headand looked pretty ugly. I was23 years old and to reassurethe men I tried to pull off aJohn Wayne stunt. When Iwas halfway through my canof meat and beans, decom-

46

And back to work the companywent, moving aggressively to takethe remaining hilltops. Resistancewas minimal now, and soon all theheights of bloody Obong-ni Ridgewere in Marine hands. As the menlooked down the reverse slope ofone of the hills, an unusual sightgreeted their eyes. A clump ofscrub pines lay below them, and,as they watched, astonished, the"clump" turned Out to be a groupof camouflaged enemy soldierswho arose and rushed downwardin headlong flight.

The 1st Battalion now countedup the enemy weapons destroyedor abandoned: 18 heavy machineguns, 25 light machine guns, 63submachine guns, 8 antitank rifles,1 rocket launcher, and large stocksof ammunition and grenades.

The seizure of Obong-ni Ridgewas crucial to the elimination ofthe threatening salient which hadbeen driven into the Army's lines.As Geer summed it up, "it was evi-dent the enemy had staked thedefense of the Naktong Bulge ontheir ability to hold that key ridge."

With Objective 1 now securedand the enemy in bad shape,Murray kept the pressure on.Taplett's 3d Battalion moved outthat same morning of 18 August,bound for Objective 2, Hill 207(the next rise west of Obong-ni). Itwas preceded by an intensive bar-rage from air, artillery, tanks, andmortars, including now supporting

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A-157140

With an enemy who was adept at infiltration and night attacks, Marines strungbarbed wire whenever they had an opportunity.

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National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A2189

A "turkey shoot" ended the First Battle of the Naktong. Here a BAR man draws a bead on the fleeing enemy.

fire from the 9th Infantry on theright flank.

A correspondent in the rear wasawed:

The 155s began to roar andthe snub-nosed 105s, and toone side the mortars werebarking, and in front thesquat tanks were slammingaway with the 90mm gunswhose muzzle blast canknock a man down at thirtyfeet, and above the hill,swooping low, the planeswere diving in.

You would see the smokeand fire flash of the rocketsleaving the wings, and thenwould come the great tearingsound the rocket made inflight, and then the roar of itsbursting against the hill. Andafter the rockets had gone,you would see the little rounddots of smoke in the sky as

the wing guns fired, and allthe crest of the hill in front ofHow Company was a roaring,jumping hell of smoke andflame and dust and noise.

With this kind of preparation,"Objective 2 was not much of afight," as an officer in Company Gsaid. There was a grenade flurrynear the crest of Hill 207, but a pla-toon of Company H was then ableto rush the enemy positions, and itwas all over by 1237.

There had been a tide of NKPAtroops running for safety. Now itbecame a flood, increased by mendriven from Hill 207. Everywherethe soldiers of the NKPA's "crack"4th Division on Obong-ni hadthemselves cracked and were flee-ing westward in a disorganized,panic-stricken rout. It became afield day for the Marine artilleryand planes—a thunderous ham-mering that caused massive waves

47

of enemy deaths. There were "allkinds of bodies floating in theNaktong."

Taplett kept driving. Next target:"Objective 3," Hill 311, the last bar-rier before the Naktong River.There was another round ofpreparatory fire, this one featuringa dose of napalm, and one moretime the riflemen moved out.

Things went fairly smoothly forCompany G which, "brushingaside light resistance," was on thecrest by 1730. Not so for CompanyH. It was badly hindered by diffi-cult terrain and an obdurateenemy, and by 1825 was pinneddown and unable to advance.Supporting fire from Company Gand an attempted flanking maneu-ver by its Cahill platoon (which, 10days earlier, had had that reliefmission on Hill 342) were not

Final Victon: Objective 3

Va'

.t 21*2-Wi

So I relieved him. I calledTaplett and said, "I don't evenwant this guy here tonight." Imade him go back on hisown, back to the battalion,and wrote an unsat report,un-officer-like conduct.

It went up to Craig, and theguy was out of country in twoor three days. It was so easyto do things like that then.And he was out of the MarineCorps. You can't do thattoday. You have to have aGeneral Court-martial andeverything else. There wasn'teven a Court of Inquiry.Everyone agreed that he wasa coward, and he was gone.

Rhee at the Purple Heart ceremony.

enough help for H to be able toadvance.

It was the last gasp of the NKPA,however. A heavy round of battal-ion mortar fire early the nextmorning, 19 August, was followedby a triumphant sweep of the hill-top by Company H, and theMarine battle to seize the three keyridges in the Naktong Bulge wasover. One battalion stood on eachof the three objectives, and themen of the brigade met the Armytroops at the river's edge. Marineaviators reported, 'the enemy waskilled in such numbers that theriver was definitely discolored withblood."

During the attack on Objective3, the 3d Battalion surgeon cameacross a horrendous sight, demon-strating the savage brutality of theNKPA. A U.S. Army aid station hadbeen overrun a week earlier, thewounded and bed-ridden menshot and bayoneted, their bodiesthen mutilated. Medics who brave-

ly had stayed there to tend theirmen had had the hands wiredbehind their backs and then weremurdered.

An incident occurred on one ofthese final nights that is veryrevealing of how personnel prob-lems could be expeditiously dealtwith in the "Old Corps"—particu-larly in a combat environment.Bohn had told his machine gunplatoon lieutenant to check care-fully on the positioning and coor-dination of the weapons' sites.When the company commanderdecided to inspect personally, hefound wholly unsatisfactory resultsand crews who had not even seentheir lieutenant. Steaming, hereturned to his CP and hauled thelieutenant in for a very brief con-versation:

I said, "Have you put in themachine gun sections? Didyou get around to check eachsection?" He said, "Yes, sir."

48

The brigade was now relievedby Army units—not alwayssmoothly, but at least the tiredMarines would get some rest.

The victory price for theNaktong Marines was clear: 66dead, 278 wounded, but only 1man missing in action. That lastfigure was the clearest indicationof the value of Marine training andmorale; there had been other unitswith distressingly high percentagesof missing-in-action, but, as EdwinP. Hoyt summarizes in his history,The Pusan Perimeter—Korea 1950"The Marines stood and fought,and they took care of their own."

The final results for the NKPA4th Division were shattering.Fewer than 3,000 men were able toget back across the Naktong, leav-ing more than 1,200 dead behind.The Marine brigade recovered alarge amount of enemy equipment,including 34 artillery pieces (withfive of them being captured Army105mm howitzers), hundreds ofautomatic weapons, and thousandsof rifles. The Army's official historysums it up: "The destruction . . . ofthe NKPA 4th Division. . . was thegreatest setback suffered thus farby the North Korean Army. The

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2238

BGen Edward A Craig receives the thanks of South Korean President Syngman

S

4th Division never recovered fromthis battle."

After the brigade was pulledback off the hills it had won,Fenton described what he felt wasthe key reason for the Marine vic-tory: "the finest batch of noncom-missioned officers ever assembledin any Marine regiment. Not onlywere 75 percent of them combatveterans, he believed, but they hadoften stepped in as platoon leadersand were "outstanding." Fentonexpanded on that:

Squad leaders knew theirjob to the last detail. Manytimes I ended up withsergeants as platoon leadersafter a big fire fight, and theydid an excellent job. I justcan't be too high in mypraise.

In some cases, it wasn't justnoncoms. It was the PFCs andprivates holding the job of afire team leader or squadleader. It was their fine lead-ership, outstanding initiative,and control of the men thatturned a possible defeat intoa sweet victory.

On 20 August Craig learnedfrom Church that the brigade hadbeen detached from the 24thDivision and was now part ofWalker's Eighth Army reserve.There were letters of praise fromboth Walker and Church. The for-mer wrote that the brigade's"excellence in leadership and gritand determination . . . upheld thefine tradition of the Marines in aglorious manner." Church gra-ciously commented to the Marinesthat their "decisive and valiantoffensive actions . . . predominant-ly contributed to the total destruc-tion of the Naktong pocket."Perhaps the recognition the men ofthe brigade appreciated most camefrom their own Commandant.

General Cates' message said: "I amvery proud of the performance ofyour air-ground team. Keep hittingthem front, flanks, rear, and top-side. Well done."

Thus the men of the brigademoved back into bivouac in anarea near Masan known foreverafter as "The Bean Patch." Craig setup his CP there on 21 August andreported back again to Kean of theArmy's 25th Division. The newswas discouraging: all the land wonin the brigade's drive to Sachonwas now lost or under heavyenemy pressure, and the 11thMarines was needed to go backimmediately to the original startingpoint two weeks earlier, Chindong-ni, to fire missions in support ofthe 25th Division.

But for the other Marines it wasa wonderful, restorative change.Some 800 replacements arrived tofill in the painful gaps in the ranks;VMO-6 helicopters flew in hotfood; letters from home and beer

49

miraculously appeared; and newequipment was issued. But notenough of it. Fenton frankly notedthat the equipment they hadarrived with in the Bean Patch wasin "terrible condition." It had dete-riorated badly from exposure toheat, rain, and frequent immersionin rice paddies.

In addition, he commented:

We were having a hardtime getting Browning auto-matic rifles. Many of our BARmen had been casualties, andwe were down to about threeor four per platoon. You justcouldn't get a BAR belt inKorea.

Shoes were another bigproblem. . . . We reached thepoint where we had men run-ning around in tennis shoes.Dungarees were in bad shape

Our packs, which hadbeen dropped at Pusan andwere supposed to have beenbrought to us by the rear ech-elon, never arrived. The onlyway we could get a clean suit

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1469

A high point of the brief interlude in the rest area: mail call!

Another Brief Interlude

-:I

a.

'I

I

of dungarees was to washthem or survey the supply atthe laundry unit when wetook a shower.

There were no shelter halveseither, so the men slept out in theopen. A memorable event was aceremony for the award of 87Purple Heart medals, with SouthKorean President Syngman Rheein attendance. The attrition rateamong the officers had been fear-ful: five of the six company com-manders were wounded and nine

of the 18 riflewere woundedkilled in action.

One platoon leader, SecondLieutenant Muetzel, received twoPurple Hearts (with a Silver StarMedal to come later for his heroicactions on Obong-ni), while thegunnery sergeant of the Recon-naissance Company, a veteran ofWorld War II wounds, received hisfifth Purple Heart. It was a strainto try to look presentable for theceremony, as Muetzel laterremarked:

My leggings had beenthrown away, my trouserswere out at both knees, myright boot had two bulletholes in it, and my dungareejacket had corporal's stripesstenciled on the sleeves. I

grabbed a fast shave withcold water, hard soap, and adull blade. Gene Davisloaned me a clean set of dun-garees, Tom Gibson loanedme his second lieutenant'sbars, and off I went with mytroops.

Commanders and staff of the 5th Marines assembled for aphotograph during a lull in the battle, Pictured in the frontrow, from left, are: LtCol George R. Newton, LtCol Harold S.Roise, and LtCol Robert D. Taplett. Second row, LtColRaymond L. Murray and LtCol Lawrence C. Hays, Jr. Thirdrow, Maj R. M. Colland, LtCol George F. Walters, Jr., Capt

Department of Defense Photo (USMc) A1441

John V. Huff Maj Kenneth B. Boyd, Maj Harold Wallace,Maj William C. Esterline. Fourth row, Capt Ralph M.Sudnick, Lt Robert M. Lucy, Lt Almarion S. Bailey, Lt Leo R.Jillisky, Lt Alton C. Weed, Capt Gearl M. English, WO HaroldJ. Michael, and CWO Bill E. Parrish

platoon leadersand four of the

50

3/'

tfj

While the troops were enjoyingthis temporary lull, some of Craig'ssenior staff officers were sent toTokyo to confer on plans for thefuture use of the Marines.MacArthur had made bold—verybold—plans for a daring end-runaround the NKPA besieging thePusan Perimeter by making a sur-prise amphibious landing far to therear, at Inchon. For this purpose hehad urgently requested the full 1stMarine Division. Elements of it

began arriving in Japan on 28August, but there were massiveproblems to be overcome. The 1stMarines was on hand, but the 7th

Marines would not arrive at Inchonuntil a week after D-day, with onebattalion coming halfway aroundthe world from the Mediterranean.The crucial unit for the forthcom-ing assault was supposed to be thebattled-tested 5th Marines. It hadalready begun shipping its heavyequipment back down to Pusan, asplans were drawn to have it jointhe 1st Marine Division, eventhough it was now fully committedin combat. Morale soared in thebrigade as the men looked forwardto fighting side-by-side with fellowMarines.

Meanwhile, in Tokyo there werevery tense moments. Time wascritically short to mount an opera-

51

tion as complex as an amphibiousassault. There were vigorous dif-ferences of opinion in Army-Navy-Marine meetings as to when oreven whether the brigade shouldjoin the 1st Marine Division. Onone hand, the Eighth Army stafffelt, as the official Marine historybluntly put it, "Army morale wouldbe hurt by taking the brigade awayat a critical moment." And Walkerplaced an "extremely excited" tele-phone call to MacArthur's head-quarters in Tokyo, saying in effect,"If I lose the 5th Marine Regiment,I will not be responsible for thesafety of the front!" Thus there wasstrong Army pressure to substitutean Army regiment for the 5thMarines at the Inchon landing.

On the other hand, MajorGeneral Oliver P. Smith, Com-manding General of the 1st MarineDivision, supported by the threeNavy admirals most closely in-volved, was equally adamant that,for a tricky amphibious landing, hehad to have the 5th Marines whichwas trained for just such an opera-tion. There was a deadlock.

Then, amidst these planningmeetings, harsh reality came crash-ing down to complicate furtherdecisions on the use of thebrigade. The NKPA, realizing thattime was running out for it,

launched a final, convulsive attackto eradicate the Pusan Perimeter.Some 98,000 men in 13 divisionshit five separate points on theperimeter. Walker faced a brutalseries of simultaneous problems.Where should he commit his limit-ed reserves—in particular hisproven Marine brigade? The twothrusts closest to Pusan were oneagainst the Army's 25th Division inthe same area of the far southwest,and another against the Army's 2dDivision in the west central

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A1507

After the First Battle of the Naktong, there was a welcome moment to clean up—with a South Korean boy holding the mirror.

The \KPA Attacks Agaiii

(Naktong) area. A breakthrough tocapture Pusan would mean totaldisaster. (Military analysts in lateryears would speculate that thatmight well have happened ifGeneral Kim Chaek had orderedonly diversionary attacks at four ofthe points, massed overwhelmingstrength at one point, and crashedthrough there.)

The NKPA assigned the 2c1, 4th,9th, and 10th Divisions to destroythe U.S. 2d Infantry Divisionbefore Miryang and drive throughto the vital Pusan-Taegu MSR byway of Yongsan. Smashing intothat division on 1 September, theNorth Korean assault quickly madea 4,000-yard penetration. The com-manding general of the 2dDivision, Major General LawrenceB. Keiser, USA, saw his divisionsliced in half, with his companiescut off or totally overrun, hisdefensive lines hustled backalmost to Yongsan, and enemyinfiltration in his rear. NeitherKeiser nor his three regimentalcommanders had ever led troopsin battle, and now the NKPA had

punched a hole six miles wide andeight miles deep into their division.Obong-ni Ridge, so dearly bought,was back in enemy hands.

Now Walker made up his mind:the new Naktong Bulge hadreturned as his priority threat.Blair's book pointed out the logi-cal, but painful, next step: "Walkercame to a difficult and drastic deci-sion: Once again he would have tocall on Eddie Craig's Marines forhelp. The decision was drasticboth because of the humiliation itwould again cause the Army, andbecause Craig's Marines were avital element in the Inchon inva-sion plan."

That was it. In the morning of 1September, the orders came for thebrigade, including the 11thMarines, to move by train andtruck back once more to theMityang assembly area. The reac-tion of the men was predictable:going back to regain what theyhad already won once.

52

When Craig had set up his CP inMiryang, his brigade came underthe operational control of theArmy's 2d Division. To old timersin the Marine Corps it surelybrought back vivid and ironicmemories of another time andplace, when a Marine brigade hadbeen teamed once before with the9th and 23d Infantry as a proudpart of the Army's superb 2dDivision, 32 years earlier in France.

On 2 September, Craig had aconference with Keiser and theEighth Army's Chief of Staff.General Shepherd later made acomment on this meeting whichrevealed the inherently graciousnature of Craig: "The Army divi-sion commander . . . went toEddie, who was a brigadier, andsaid, 'General Craig, I'm horriblyembarrassed that you have to dothis. My men lost the ground thatyou took in a severe fight.' AndEddie, in his very gallant manner,said, 'General, it might have hap-pened to me.'

The Army officers at the meetingfelt the situation was so desperatethat the brigade should immediate-ly be dribbled piecemeal intoaction, even though one of its bat-talions and its air control sectionhad not yet arrived. Craig, whoalso knew when to make a stand,later remembered, "This was theonly heated discussion I had inKorea with the Army." His stub-born view that the whole brigadeshould go into action as a unifiedair-ground team was finally accept-ed. Its attack would be down theYongsan-Naktong road toward anall-too-familiar objective, Obong-niRidge. The 9th Infantry Regimentwould be on its right, and otherArmy units on its left. Now thebrigade, for the first time,appeared to have flanks that weresecure enough to allow it to attackwith two battalions abreast, Roise's2d on the right and Newton's 1st

Photo by David Douglas DuncanThe price of victory: a jeep takes two wounded men back to an aid station.

11w Marines Attack

on the left. Taplett's 3d Battalionwould block any enemy pushalong the southwest approaches toYongsan.

Meanwhile, between 0300 and0430, 3 September, the 2d Battalionmoved into its forward assemblyarea north of Yongsan, with the 1stBattalion south of the town.

Opposite them, driving hard forYongsan, were the NKPA divisions

which had successfully advancedthis far in the new Naktong Bulge.Immediately in front of the brigadewas the 9th Division. This was nota seasoned, professional outfit,such as the one the brigade hadpreviously broken; rather, it hadup to now been doing guard dutyat Seoul. Behind it, in reserve,came a reconstituted 4th Division,filled with new recruits after the

53

massive casualties the brigade hadinflicted on it in the first battle ofthe Naktong.

The Marine attack was to belaunched early on the morning of3 September. There were problemsgetting things started. Movingthrough Yongsan, the Marineswere hit by small arms fire fromsnipers, but by 0630 they hadworked their way to the westernend of the town, and thought theywere then headed forward to theagreed-upon line of departure fortheir main attack. Not so! Duringthe night the Army troops on theridgeline had "collapsed" and hadbeen pushed back 1,000 yards. At0645 Roise called SecondLieutenant Robert M. Winter tobring his tanks forward and laydown fire to cover the withdrawalof the Army troops. The originalplanned line of departure thusbecame the first objective whenthe Marines attacked.

The 2d Battalion jumped off at0715, securing the right flank ofthe brigade's attack. To soften uphis main objective, Roise calleddown a massive sheet of fire fromtanks, air, mortars, artillery, andmachine guns. The Marinespushed doggedly toward it wadingthrough a rice paddy. Now theenemy's 9th Division quicklyfound its previous pattern ofsteady advances had ground to ascreeching halt.

Craig, as was his wont, came upto check on the action. His obser-vation post (OP) was between thetanks and Roise's OP. Enemy firepounded the area, and Winter waswounded and had to be evacuat-ed—but not before he offeredCraig a bottle of whiskey from histank. Winter was later awarded aSilver Star Medal for his leadershipof his tank platoon that day.

2nd NAKTONG COUNTEROFFENSIVE

MARINE ATTACKS: (3 SEe) (4 SEe)

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalionalso moved out. Its attack routeforced the men knee-deep intotheir own huge rice paddy. Therethey came under fire, but theirsupporting arms searched out theenemy positions. In particular, theCorsairs were able to engulf theNKPA with balls of napalm fire. Atypical time of response was sevenminutes from a strike request toexecution.

This kind of seamless coordina-tion in the Marine air-ground teamwas a source of great envy by theArmy commanders who saw itsdecisive results. As Colonel Paul L.Freeman, USA, commander of the23d Infantry (well off to the rightof the brigade), wrote to GeneralMatthew Ridgway in Washington:

The Marines on our leftwere a sight to behold. Notonly was their equipmentsuperior or equal to ours, butthey had squadrons of air indirect support. They used itlike artillery. It was, "Hey,Joe, this is Smitty, knock offthe left of that ridge in frontof Item Company." They hadit day and night. . . General,we just have to have air sup-port like that, or we might aswell disband the Infantry andjoin the Marines.

By 1100 the 1st Battalion was atthe base of its ridgeline objective.Working its way upwards underthe protection of supporting 81mmmortar fire, Company A poised fora final charge. As soon as the firelifted, the men sprang forward,screaming, shouting, firing everyavailable weapon. To their amaze-ment, a whole company of NKPAsoldiers in front of them, shakenby the noise and the sight of charg-ing Marines, leaped in a panic outof their concealed foxholes on theforward slope and fled back

towards the crest of the hill. Thenthe long hours of practice on therifle range really paid off: Marinemarksmen coolly picked off mostof the enemy as they ran.Company A immediately rushed tothe crest. It was noon. In CompanyB, Fenton later observed:

The 1st Battalion was ableto move and seize the ridgeline without encounteringheavy opposition. I don'tbelieve the enemy realized

54

that we had a battalion to theleft of the road, because hewas prepared to take thathigh ground himself. We beathim there by a good 10 or 20minutes and caught him com-ing across another rice paddyfield. We really had a "turkeyshoot."

Firing now from the heights, theMarine riflemen put on anotherdisplay of precise marksmanshipthat must have stunned the simple

Photo by David Douglas Duncan

A distraught Cpl Leonard Hayworth pleads for more grenades, finds none, andmust return empty-handed to his hard-pressed men.

peasant soldiers of the NKPA: the"yellow leggings" could kill withaimed fire at 400-500 yards. (Just asthe Marines in that earlier brigadein France had stunned theGermans at Belleau Wood withtrained rifle fire that killed at longrange.)

What the 1st Battalion did notfinish off, the 105s of the 11thMarines did. Those of the enemywho were left withdrew to Hill 117in front of the 2d Battalion, but anartillery barrage was called downon them in transit, and wreakedmore havoc.

In the 2d Battalion zone ofattack there were some hardmoments. When Company D wasgetting started in its assault, a trag-ic episode occurred. (Today, it iscalled "friendly fire" and results in

great publicity. Fifty years ago, inthe early days of the Korean War, itwas regarded as just one of thoseunfortunate things that happenedbecause close combat is alwaysunpredictable.) The official Marinehistory did not even mention it,but it was seared into the memoryof Private First Class Douglas Kochin Company D:

Down the road from thenorth rolled four or fiveAmerican tanks . . . . All of asudden a machine gunstitched a stream of fire acrossthe company's rear. I rolledover on one elbow andlooked behind me. Someoneyelled, "God, they're shootingat us." Instead of firing on thetop of the hill, the tanks

chose to fire at the bottom ofthe hill. I saw a puff ofsmoke. Just that quick a shelllanded near me. It rolled meover into a little gully. I laydazed. God, I thought, we'regonna get done in by ourown goddamn outfit. While Ilay with my head down, threeor four more shells hit nearby

A lot of men had beenhit.

Naturally, this kind of ghastlymistake was temporarily shatteringto the company, until the officersfinally got their men moving again.But Koch and the others went backto their attack "still in shock."

This occurrence was, fortunate-ly, a rarity. Elsewhere that morningof 3 September, Marine tanks were

Capt "Ike" Fenton, caught by suiprise, described the grimmoment: "We had been in one hell of a big battle. It was

55

raining. The radio had gone out and we were low onammunition."

Photo by David Douglas Duncan

doing yeoman's work. They tookon NKPA antitank weapons, sur-prised three T-34 tanks and wipedthem out, then eliminated twomore in the afternoon. This clean-up enabled the M-26s to concen-trate their fire to good effect onenemy weapons and troop posi-tions confronting the riflemen.

Marine air was also very active.With the squadrons shuttling sothat one was always on hand tohelp, seven close air support mis-sions were flown for the twoassault battalions. Other Marineplanes, guided by OYs, strafed andbombed, knocking out, amongother things, 16 enemy gun andmortar positions.

Back on the ground, CompanyD's first objective was Hill 116, totry to cut off the enemy reinforce-ments coming over from the 1stBattalion's zone. Facing two NKPAbattalions, the company founditself in a bloody battle. It was

finally able to gain the crest of thenorthern spur of Hill 117, andthere it dug in, isolated, some 500yards from the rest of the 2dBattalion.

As the enemy troops filtered intothe zone of the 2d Battalion, themen of the 1st Battalion were ableto make good progress in the after-noon, with Company B reachingits part of Objective 2, a peakacross the MSR from Hill 117.Company A, using a fancy tripleenvelopment seized its part, Hill91, by 1630, and so all hands pre-pared for the usual night counter-attack. Well they might. The 1stBattalion's right flank was danglingin air; it was trying to cover a frontof nearly a mile; and its two riflecompanies were 200 yards apart.The 2d Battalion was in an equallydangerous position, stretched overa 2,000-yard front, bent in a rightangle, with Company D complete-ly isolated.

56

Three things saved the Marines'precarious position. First, a bevy oftheir engineers moved in to sow abelt of antipersonnel mines, wiredhand grenades, and blocks of TNTalong the flanks. Secondly,VMF(N)-513 came on station withits F4U-5N Corsair and F7FTigercat night fighters. Equippedwith sophisticated radar, it was theonly squadron to fly single-engineplanes over Korea at night. Flyingmore than 2,000 hours of nightmissions in one month, it deliveredthis particular night six close airsupport strikes controlled from thetwo infantry battalions. Thirdly, adeluge of rain, accompanied by icywinds, further hindered any plansthe battered NKPA troops mighthave contemplated for a counterat-tack.

As the Maiines waited thoughthe miserable, rainy night, eventhough they had driven two victo-rious miles west of Yongsan, their

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thoughts must have turned to thecasualties of the past day: 34 killedand 157 wounded. Muetzel in the1st Battalion later voiced whatmust have been a common senti-ment after almost a month ofgrinding combat:

[Men] came, were killed,and were carried away .

I knew this couldn't keep upWe, me, all of us were

eventually going to get it; itwas just a matter of whenand how bad. . . . It was justa god-awful mess—inade-quate replacements, insuffi-cient ammo, worn-out clothesand boots. No one much gavea rap about anything. Outsidediscipline was no longer athreat. What could the brassdo to us that was worse thanwhat we were doing? Each ofus withdrew into our family—

the squad, the platoon, thecompany, the regiment, thebrigade, the Corps. Everyoneelse, bug offl

This same day, 3 September,witnessed a final showdown in theTokyo planning meetings. A com-promise solution to the deadlockemerged. Walker would get Armyreinforcements and could tem-porarily use the Marine Brigade tomeet his Naktong crisis. But itwould have to be withdrawn bymidnight 5 September to join the1st Marine Division for the Inchonlanding.

Back with troops, in order tokeep the pressure on the nextmorning (4 September), Murrayhad ordered Taplett's 3d Battalionto pass through the depleted 2d

Battalion and resume the attack at0800 with the 1st Battalion on itsleft. In 20 minutes, Taplett's menreached their first objective, thenquickly took Hill 116 with almostno enemy resistance. Next, the bat-talion's main objective, Hill 117,was overrun by a pincer move-ment of Companies G and H.Incredibly, it was all over by 0840.No real enemy resistance hadturned into a withdrawal, and nowthere were signs that was turninginto a disorderly rout—a weirdcontrast to the bruising encountersthe Marines had had the daybefore.

The 1st Battalion was simultane-ously moving with equal rapidity.Shortly after starting, it occupiedwhat appeared to have been a CPof the NKPA 9th Division. Tentswere still up, equipment wasstrewn around, and two aban-doned T-34 tanks in perfect oper-

Marines meet almost no opposition as they top this hill in the Naktong River area on 4 September 1950Department of Defense Photo (USMc) A8175

57

( ()flhi Ii Liii ig iii c \a ilL

The Final Day

ating condition were captured (thefirst such to be taken and turnedover to U.S. Army Ordnance forexamination). The men in the bat-talion's steady advance saw thebodies of many dead NKPA sol-diers and piles of abandoned ordestroyed equipment, souvenirs oflow-flying Corsair strikes and accu-rate fire from the 11th Marinespoured on the retreating enemy.Among the litter were capturedAmerican guns, tanks, mortars, andvehicles which were returned tothe 2d Division. The official Marinehistory described "a picture of dev-astation unequaled even by theearlier defeat of the NKPA 4thDivision." This time it was the 9thDivision's turn to be hammered bythe brigade.

By 1515 Newton's companiesstood atop their first objectives,now less than 2,000 yards from theold killing ground on Obong-niRidge. Moving in coordinated tan-dem with them were Taplett'scompanies, which had pivoted tothe west after seizing Hill 117.

Learning of the Marines'progress, Keiser gave Craig the go-ahead to have his brigade push onfurther toward Objective Two.Moving aggressively, using airstrikes when held up, the 1stBattalion worked its way to thedesignated area (between Hill 125and Observation Hill), securingCloverleaf Hill by 1800.

Thus the brigade had advanced3,000 yards and gained its objec-tives. Hoyt summarized the strate-gic importance of this: "TheMarines had stopped the enemy'sadvance, saved Yongsan and the[MSR] road beyond [it], and put theNorth Korean 9th Division intoretreat."

As the Marine battalions dug infor the night they were in exposedpositions similar to the precedingevening. Newton's men were 1,000yards in front on the left, stretched

paper-thin along a line almost amile long. Taplett's men were nobetter off. Out of contact with the1st Battalion on their left and theArmy's 9th Infantry on their right,they curled up in a perimeterdefense.

Expecting the usual NKPA nightcounterattack, the Marines againhad their engineers put out a pro-tective shell of mines, booby traps,and trip flares. There was heavyincoming shelling during the night,but that slacked off after a visitfrom the night fighter planes ofVMF(N)-513. The rain poureddown, but the enemy infantryapparently had been hit too hardduring the day, and there was noassault.

When men are under heavypressure in close combat littlethings can loom large in theirminds. Fenton gave an example:"It had been raining all night, andthe battalion had managed to getsome hot coffee up to us, but justwhen the coffee arrived, we gotthe word to move Out. We weren'table to distribute any of the coffee.This turn of events didn't do themorale any good. The men weresoaking wet."

A more fundamental event tookplace that same night. Reluctantlyfollowing instructions from Mac-Arthur, Walker issued an order thatthe Eighth Army would have torelease all of its Marines at the endof the following day.

To finish off what the brigadehad so successfully begun, Craigordered both battalions to moveout in a final attack the morning of5 September. Before the 1stBattalion could get started, therewas an unpleasant moment. TwoU.S. Air Force F-Si fighters camescreaming in over the Marines,strafing them. Miraculously, only

58

one man was wounded.The 3d Battalion started the day

by showering a rain of fire from itshigh ground down on an NKPAattack on the 9th Infantry off to itsright flank and rear. The 105s fromthe 11th Marines joined in, and theattack was shattered.

Now both battalions were readyto charge. And they did. The 1stBattalion jumped off at 0820 withthe objective of capturing Hill 125and Observation Hill, the brigade'ssegment of Phase Line Two.Obong-ni Ridge was then to be aspecial objective. Moving fastagainst light resistance, Newtonhad his men on his two target hillsby 1100, and there Murray haltedthem until the 9th Infantry couldcome up to tie in on their right.

Meanwhile, the 3d Battalion wasalso moving ahead. Bohn had sug-gested that Company H, now com-manded by Captain Patrick E.

Wildman, serve as a base of fire topin down the enemy, while hetook Company G around theextreme left flank in an envelopingmaneuver. "It worked beautifully,"as he later reported, but then:

As we were coming up,getting assembled . . . theNorth Koreans picked up onwhat we were doing. Theyhad one of those old Russian[Maxim] wheeled machineguns, and I could see theirofficer. He was wheeling it upwith his people. Jones sawhim at the same time and heblew it up with the first roundof 75 recoilless . . . . It wassheer luck.

As soon as that happened,of course, we went smokingup, got over the top, andonce we got to the top. . . wejust rolled them up. It wasoutstanding.

So it was, that Company G was

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in good shape on Hill 91, expect-ing to race ahead. Not so. Ordersfrom Taplett at 1230 directed it towithdraw to Observation Hill andhold up there. The convergence ofthe 1st Battalion and the 9thInfantry had pinched out the 3dBattalion's area, so Company Hjoined in a sideslip behind the 1stBattalion to put the 3d Battalion onthe left flank of the 1st, preparato-ry to a combined attack on Obong-ni Ridge. It, too, was told to stay inplace; there would be a delaybefore any assault on Obong-ni.

With the heavy rain and ensuingfog Marine close air support wasgrounded, and this gave the NKPAan opportunity to launch a viciousdaylight counterattack on the 1stBattalion. Company B, after an

advance of 3,000 yards, was nowlocated on a ridge line of Hill 125,parallel to and only 400 yards fromObong-ni. At 1420 an avalanche ofenemy fire hit it. It was enfiladefire, mortars and machine guns,smothering both the reverse slopeand the forward slope of the com-pany's position. Fenton's commentwas curt: "We were pinned down,and we couldn't move."

At 1430 the enemy infantrycame on, some 300 strong. Fentonneeded help, supporting fire andlots of it, but at this precisemoment of peril all five of hisradios, as well as the battalion'stactical radio, went dead in thedownpour of rain. An enlisted run-ner, 22-year-old Private First ClassWilliam A. Wilson, was rushed off

to the 9th Infantry, which had nowcome abreast on Company B'sright flank. His message wasurgent: "We need maximum sup-porting fire from your artillery, andwe need it right now!" Meeting upwith the adjacent Army companycommander, Wilson was pointingout the target areas when the Armyofficer was struck down bymachine gun fire and had to beevacuated. So the Marine coollypicked up his radio and directedthe Army artillery fire to plasterObong-ni and the adjoining enemytargets.

A runner had also been sentdown to the MSR to warn theMarine tanks there that three NKPAT-34 tanks supporting the attackwere coming towards them around

Marines assist wounded North Korean prisoners into jeep which took them to medical aid on 4 September 1950Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2130

59

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the same bend that had been thescene of the previous tank battletwo weeks earlier. The messagewas not in time. The lead enemytank surprised the first Marine tankwith its gun aimed left at Obong-ni. Several 85mm rounds knockedout the Marine tank. Its mate, try-ing to edge around the first tank,was also knocked out.

Then, out of the blue, a 3.5-inchrocket team, dispatched by Fenton,arrived at the carnage, soon joinedby the battalion rocket team. Inshort order, they destroyed the firsttwo enemy tanks, and then thethird attacker, which turned out tobe an armored personnel carrier.This made a total of eight steel

hulks littering 'The Bend."While this dramatic tank con-

frontation was taking place,Fenton's infantry confrontationwas also reaching a climax. Helater described the tense situation:

I found it necessary toplace every man I had in thecompany on line. Rocketmen, corpsmen, mortarmen,every available man went online to stop this counterattack.To make matters worse, I

began running low on ammu-nition. I was practically out ofhand grenades, and thingsdidn't look too rosy for us.

Just at this time LtCol

George Newton, my battalioncommander, who had proba-bly guessed my situation, senta much-welcome platoonfrom A Company with fiveboxes of hand grenades. Theenemy had closed so rapidlythat we just took the handgrenades out of the case andtossed them to the men onthe line. They would pull thepins and throw them. Theenemy closed to less than 100yards.

Adding to the intense pressure,the radios had not been function-ing. Finally, at this crucial juncture,one radio was coaxed into service.

Marines examine two Soviet-made T-34 tanks destroyed by3.5-inch rocket teams of the 1st Battalion 5th Marines, at"The Bend." The enemy tanks had supported the vicious

60

North Korean daylight counterattack to blunt the battalion sassault on Obong-ni Ridge.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC)

Ocra1ionaI Rcstilts

Fenton quickly gave it to his for-ward observer for the 81mm mor-tars who called for immediate "firefor effect." When the mortars hadfinished deluging the NKPA attack-ers, there were only 18 rounds ofammunition left.

Duncan was with Company Bduring its wild battle and sawMaster Sergeant Leonard R. Youngpositioning the men along thecrest. (The later citation for a SilverStar described Young as "exposedto withering fire, [he] walkedupright back and forth . . . placingmen.") Then, Duncan wrote:

He was shot. A machinegun bullet went right throughhis chest, knocking him intothe mud. But not before hehad given Ike Fenton the bestthat an old sergeant couldgive his company comman-der. He was still alive whenthey dragged him in acrossthe slope.

When they placed himupon a rough poncho-litterhe looked up at Fenton, whostood with his hand touchingthe dripping canvas, andwhispered, "God, I'm sorryCaptain! I'm really sorry! Butdon't let them fall back!Please don't let them fallback." Fenton still had notsaid a word when the litter-bearers disappeared into therain, and out of sight downthe hill.

A crucial factor in the final, suc-cessful outcome of this strugglewere reinforcements which cameover from Company A: two pla-toons of riflemen, plus machinegunners, and mortarmen. Togetherwith the combination of Armyartillery fire and Marine 81mmmortar fire (which finally camewithin 50 yards of Company B),this broke the back of the NKPA

attack, and secured the Marinepositions.

Now, from their vantage point,the Marines could see the NKPAwithdrawing from Obong-ni. Itwas an obvious signal that theenemy was thoroughly defeated,and the door was open for a quickand easy push all the way throughto the Naktong River.

But the withdrawal deadline dic-tated by MacArthur had nearlyarrived. All units were held up inposition. The brigade counted upits casualties for that final day ofbattle, 5 September: 35 killed, 91wounded, and, proudly, nonemissing in action.

At 1600 the battalion comman-ders all met with Murray to get theofficial word. Craig's directive wasconcise: "Commencing at 2400 5September Brig moves by rail andmotor to staging area Pusan forfurther operations against theenemy."

Relief and withdrawal at nightfrom enemy contact is not as easyin practice as it is on paper. Hoursafter they were due, two Armylieutenants finally showed up torelieve the two companies of the1st Battalion. Each had only ahandful of men and very fewweapons. As Muetzel recalled:

An Army first lieutenantappeared with about 30 menwho'd been scraped togetherfrom a headquarters unit . .

I took the lieutenant to thevery crest of the hill and hadhim dig in in a circle. Heasked me to leave him ourammo for a 57mm recoillessrifle he had. Marines didn'thave 57s, so he had a weaponand no ammo. He asked hissergeant to bring up their onemachine gun. The sergeanttold him it had been left backat the CP. I left behind aboutfour cases of hand grenades.

6i

So the battle-worn Marinesslogged wearily through the mudand driving rain for three and ahalf miles to the rear. West ofYongsan, they finally boardedtrucks, and by dawn 6 Septemberthey were on their way to Pusan,bone-tired but glad finally to leavethose cruel hills of the Perimeterbehind them.

As the truck riders' thoughtsturned to their fellow Marines, theymourned the loss of good men andclose friends. Those hills had costthe brigade 148 killed in action, 15died of wounds, 9 missing inaction (7 of these were later foundto have been killed in action), and730 wounded in action, for a casu-alty total of 902. Included in thistotal was a special category of menwho had moved side by side withthe Marines in combat, earningtheir undying admiration: the Navycorpsmen who had 22 casualties.

Looking back at what they hadachieved in one short month, how-ever, the men of the brigade couldlegitimately feel a sense of pride.They had traveled some 380 milesand mounted three difficult opera-tions, each time facing and over-whelming heretofore successfulenemy forces who had numericalsuperiority.

The initial brigade drive toSachon had represented the firstcrisis in which a unit of the EighthArmy had been able to stop coldand then push back an enemyoffensive: 26 miles in four days.Enemy casualties: 1,900.

The second crisis was a call forthe "Fire Brigade" to stem theNKPA's dangerous breakthrough inthe Naktong Bulge. There it literal-ly destroyed the enemy's 4thDivision, with the Marine air andartillery arms contributing greatlyto the slaughter. In addition, large

From Pusan to hiclioti

quantities of captured U.S. Armyweapons were seized andreturned. MacArthur spoke of theenemy division as "decisivelydefeated . . . suffering very heavylosses in both personnel andequipment."

In the third crisis, the SecondBattle of the Naktong, the brigadehad again been rushed in to meetthe swift advance of the NKPA 9thand (a reconstituted) 4th Divisions.When its counterattack smashedthe enemy units in a mere threedays, in conjunction with impor-tant U.S. Army attacks, the officialArmy history quoted prisoners assaying that this was "one of thebloodiest and most terrifying deba-cles of the war for a North Koreandivision." As a result, "the 9th and4th enemy divisions were not ableto resume the offensive."

Over the period of that singlemonth, the enemy had paid a dev-astating price, an estimated 9,900total casualties, and massive lossesof equipment at the hands of theMarines.

The achievements of the brigadewent far beyond dramatic tacticalvictories in the Pusan Perimeter. Ithad demonstrated in its mobiliza-tion a remarkable ability to pulltogether and ship out a largeMarine combat unit in a pressure-laden, short time frame (six days).

It had also demonstrated a vari-ety of other lessons in Korea: thecrucial efforts of previous combattraining on noncommissioned offi-cers and officers; the value of theintangible, psychological factor ofMarine esprit de cops; and the daz-zling effectiveness of a tightly inte-grated aviation component. Called"the best close air support in thehistory of the Marine Corps," theoperational statistics of MAG-33showed a total of 1,511 sortiesflown by the three squadrons, with995 missions being close air sup-port not only for the brigade, but

also for U.S. Army and SouthKorean units. In addition, the OYlight planes and the Sikorsky HO3Shelicopters of VMO-6 had tallied318 and 580 flights respectively injust the month of August.Moreover, the helicopters' success-ful first combat role had proventhe certainty of their large scale usein the years to come.

An evaluation of all these factorsled the official Marine history tosummarize the overall, operationalresults of the brigade: "A carefulexamination of any of these opera-tions in which Marines engageddiscloses that a single failurewould have a profound effectupon the entire UN effort."

The individual unit commanderswho had led the brigade in its bat-tles had a more forceful convic-tion. They felt that they had "savedthe beachhead."

The final chapter in the story ofthe 1st Provisional Marine Brigadeis one that is less dramatic than itsbattles, but one which illustrates itsorganizational flexibility and skill.Again, as at Camp Pendleton pre-viously, it had too much to do intoo little time. Arriving in Pusan on7 September with over-tired men,worn-out equipment, and under-strength from casualties, thebrigade had to cope with a thou-sand details to get ready to moveout in a very few days for its nextdemanding combat assignment.

Sleeping in the open on thedocks, the men ate on board thetransports upon which they soonwould sail. (Although Craig and hisofficers later recalled the troopssleeping in the adjoining ware-houses.) Bohn remembered thehuman side of this return to "civi-lization." The ship that hadbrought him and his men to Pusanwas once again there at dockside.

62

The Navy officers came ashore andinvited Bohn and all his officersand men to come on board, andthen welcomed them with "steaks,hot food" and "all the PX stufe' theMarines had not seen in a longtime and badly needed now.

Bohn went on to describeanother way that their deficiencieswere remedied:

I'm probably not being suf-ficiently critical of the MarineCorps supply system because,if it hadn't been for the Army,we'd have been in trouble.We stole everything, includ-ing jeeps . . . . We saw somerail cars on the siding. MyMarines just went in there andlooked. Whatever the hellthey wanted, they took. TheArmy didn't seem to mindthat. Stole beer, too. And itworked.

It worked to such a degree thatall the jeep trailers in another bat-talion were emptied, then stackedfull with beer on ice—perfect forthe hot, humid, summer weather.First, a big party for its own men,then for the sailors on the shipupon which they would embark,the Henrico. Then, however,things sort of got Out of hand.Muetzel saw a jeep driven by twoMarines race by, closely pursuedby two MPs. The jeep went off theend of the dock into the water.

Then two other Marines, whohad climbed over the fence aroundthe dock area, returned in impres-sive style. They were driving ahuge Brockway bridge transporterwhich they had "acquired." Theyquickly abandoned it at the MPcheckpoint—leaving it nicely plug-ging the entrance to the dock untila qualified driver was later found.Muetzel went on to say:

While we were waiting to

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National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-GR-A2193

After an all-night ride from the front lines, over-tired Marine linkup with the 1st Marine Division for the upcomingmortar crews assemble at the Pusan docks and prepare to assault on Inchon.board a US. Navy transport. In a matter of days they would

board the Henrico, we wererequired to turn in all the cap-tured vehicles we were dri-ving . . . . This left us unac-ceptably short of motor trans-portation. Consequently,vehicles were purloined fromthe Army. The worst offense Isaw was the theft of the MPcompany commander's jeep.After a fast coat of green paintand phony numbers wereslapped on, it was presentedto Lieutenant Colonel George

Newton, our battalion CO.

These shenanigans were, ofcourse, only a counterpoint to theserious business at hand. To fill thegaps in the rifle unit, a large batchof replacements was on hand.These 1,135 officers and menwould provide the manpower togive each battalion the third com-pany which had been so sorelymissed in the past battles. Now, forthe first time in Korea, the 5thMarines reached full strength: 3,611

63

men. Although the fresh replace-ments' shiny new utility uniformscontrasted sharply with the bedrag-gled veterans, they soon fit in.Craig later commented that thenew men "were integrated into thebattalions without difficulty." Someof them were regular Marines andsome were trained reservists, andCraig went on to say:

Their [future] performanceof duty was comparable inmany ways, outside of, per-

haps, their weapons trainingand their tactical training inthe field . . . . It speaks verywell for the type of trainingand the adaptability of theMarines, both as individualsand as units, that such com-panies could be formed in theUnited States, join an activebattalion just before landing,take part in that landing, andoperate efficiently throughoutthe following campaigns.

In addition, a complete fourthregiment was attached to thebrigade at this time. This was the1st Korean Marine Regiment, 3,000strong. The manpower was wel-come, but there was just one prob-lem. Craig explained: "TheseKorean Marines had never beenissued arms, although they hadbeen trained in their nomenclatureand upkeep. They were, however,well drilled and had good disci-pline and spirit . . . arms wereimmediately issued."

For the brigade's well-used sup-porting arms, there was an inten-sive drive to clean up and serviceall the heavy equipment—tanks,trucks, and artillery pieces. For theinfantry battalions, one criticalneed was new weapons. Manyrifles, BARs, and particularlymachine guns had been fired somuch that the barrels were burnedout, so replacements had to beissued.

Clothing was a disaster. Dung-arees were rotted all the waythrough from rain and sweat, withthe camouflage design faded out.Boots were "falling apart."

This kind of urgent need ledMuetzel to strong measures. Hebadly wanted a new pair of boots,for the ones he wore had two bul-let holes in the uppers and solescompletely worn through. Withnone available from Marine sup-plies, he headed for the Eighth

Army quartermaster. There hefound a group of "scruffy" Marinesbeing sharply told off for beggingby an immaculate (rear echelon)Army major. The Marine groupgave up and left, but Muetzel,looking like a "refugee" he admit-ted, persisted.

When the neatly-dressed majorturned to go back to his office,Muetzel pushed into the buildingwearing his steel helmet, a dunga-ree jacket and pants with gapingholes, and tattered boots, and car-rying a submachine gun and a .45pistol on his hip. Now standingface to face, the major saw the lieu-tenant's bars on Muetzel's collar,glanced at his disreputable uni-form, and started to say that hecould not issue any boots. That didit! Muetzel burst out:

I told him, simply, that I

was just off the line, I wasgoing right back onto the line,I was an infantry platoonleader, I didn't have a hell ofa lot to lose, and I wanted apair of boots right then andthere! When he looked at myboots and noticed the bulletholes, he went right back intohis stock and brought out anew pair of Army parachutejump boots . . . . I was readyto fight for those boots andthat major knew it.

All during this time, the seniorofficers were involved in a differ-ent type of activity. They werecloseted, preparing the after actionreports, organizing the issue ofsupplies for re-equipment, thrash-ing out an embarkation plan, andfamiliarizing themselves with everyplanned detail that pertained totheir unit's role in the forthcominglanding. Craig pushed them hardand soon—all too soon—the fewdays allotted had rushed by, and itwas time to ship out. Starting the

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afternoon of 11 September, thetroops began filing on board ship.The next day, the convoy sailed.Then, at 0001, 13 September, thebrigade was deactivated andbecame part of the 1st MarineDivision, bound for the historicamphibious assault at Inchon.

The brigade was now gone, butnot forgotten. There was formalrecognition of its achievements bytwo governments. The first was aKorean Presidential Unit Citationwhich recorded "outstanding andheroic performance of duty on thefield of battle." Referring to theNaktong victories, the citation said:"The brigade attacked with suchdetermination and skill as to earnthe admiration of all . . . . The gal-lant Marine forces were instrumen-tal in preventing the enemy fromcapturing their objective and cut-ting the north-south lines of com-munication. .

The second award was a U.S.Presidential Unit Citation. This wasa lengthy paean of praise for boththe ground forces and the aviationunits. It commended "extraordinaryheroism in action . . . relentlessdetermination . . . sheer resolutionand esprit de corps . . . the brilliantrecord achieved. . . ." The awardcovered not only the brigade'sground units, hut also MAG-33 andits squadrons.

They were fitting tributes to aspecial group of men who hadtruly earned a remarkable series oftriumphs.

It would be a long war for theMarines in Korea, and there wouldbe other much more famous battlesto come, but the die was cast inthose crucial first weeks of combatin August and September 1950. TheMarine Corps had again decisivelydemonstrated that it was truly a"force in readiness," and that itsrugged training and traditionalesprit de corps could lead it to vic-tory in "every clime and place."

1.

•. :.

aptain John C. Chapin earned abachelor of arts degree with hon-

ors in history from Yale University in1942 and was commissioned later thatyear. He served as a rifle-platoonleader in the 24th Marines, 4th MarineDivision, and was wounded in actionin World War II during assault land-ings on Roi-Namur and Saipan.

Transferred to duty at theHistorical Division, HeadquartersMarine Corps, he wrote the first official histories of the 4th and 5thMarine Divisions. Moving to Reserve status at the end of the war,he earned a master's degree in history at George WashingtonUniversity with a thesis on 'The Marine Occupation of Haiti, 19 15-1922."

Now a captain in retired status, he served for many years, start-ing in 1983, as a volunteer at the Marine Corps Historical Center.During that time he wrote the history of Marine Fighter-Attack(VMFA) Squadron 115. With support from the Historical Centerand the Marine Corps Historical Foundation, he then spent someyears researching and interviewing for the writing of a new book,Uncommon Men— The Sergeants Major of the Marine Corps. Thiswas published in 1992 by the White Mane Publishing Company.

As part of the Historical Center's series of pamphlets commem-orating the 50th anniversary of World War II, Captain Chapinwrote accounts of Marine operations in the Marshall Islands, onSaipan and Bougainville, and Marine aviation in the Philippines.

THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines inthe Korean War era, is published for the education and training ofMarines by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. MarineCorps, Washington, D.C., as part of the U.S. Department of Defenseobservance of the 50th anniversary of that war. Editorial costs have beendefrayed in part by a 8ift from Chief Warrant Officer 4 Bertram Z. Lee,USMCR (Ret), in honor of his son, Sergeant Joshua Lee.

KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HIS TORYAND MUSEUMS

Colonel John W. Ripley, USMC (Ret)GENERAL EDITOR,

KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

Charles R. SmithEDITING AND DESIGN SECTION HIS TORYAND MUSEUMS DIVJSION

Robert E. Struder, Senior EditorW. Stephen Hifi, Visual Information Specialist

Catherine A. Kerns, Composition Services Technician

Marine Corps Historical CenterBuilding 58, Washington Navy Yard

Washington, D.C. 20374-50402000

PCN 19000315000

SourcesThere are two basic official sources

for the story of these early days in thePusan Perimeter. For the Marine Corps,Lynn Montross and Capt Nicholas A.Canzona. USMC. The Pusan Perimeter,vol. 1 of U.S. Marine Operations inKorea (Washington: Historical Branch,G-3 Division, HQMC, 195 ). For theArmy, Roy E. Appleman, South to theNaktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950), United States Army inThe Korean War (Washington: Office ofthe Chief of Military History, Departmentof the Army, 1961).

Also published officially is: LtColGary W. Parker, USMC, and Maj Frank M.Batha, Jr., USMC, A History of MarineObservation Squadron Six (Washington:History and Museums Division, HQMC,1982).

Three articles that are very helpfuland share a common publisher are:Ernest H. Giusti, "Marine Air Over thePusan Perimeter," Marine Corps Gazette,May 1952: Lynn Montross, "The PusanPerimeter: Fight for a Foothold," Marinecorps Gazette, June 1951; Col NicholasA. Canzona, USMCR. "Marines Land atPusan, Korea-August 1950," Mari;zeCorps Gazette, August 1985; and MajFrancis I. Fenton, Ir., USMC, "ChangallonValley," Marine Corps Gazette,November 1951.

There is a wide range of commercial-

ly published books. Among those thatcontained useful material are: JohnToland, In Mortal Combat-Korea. 1950-1953 (New York: William Morrow andCompany, 1991); Lynn Montross,Cavalry of the Sky-The Storl' of U.S.Marine Helicopters (New York: Harperand Brothers, 1954); Edwin P. Hoyt, ThePusan Perimeter-Korea 1950 (NewYork: Stein and Day, 1984); DavidDouglas Duncan, This Is War' A Photo-Narrative in Three Parts (New York:Harper and Brothers, 1950-51); ClayBlair, The Forgotten War (New York:Times Books, 1987); Max Hastings, TheKorean War (New York: Simon andSchuster, 1987); T, R. Fehrenbach, ThisKind qf War (New York: Macmillan,1963); Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: TheUntold Story of the War (New York:Times Books, 1982); Robert D. Heinl, Jr.,Soldiers of the Sea: The United States.tlarine Corps, 1775-1962 (Annapolis:United States Naval Institute, 1962); andRobert Leckie, Conflict (New York:Putman, 1962).

A recent publication is by BGen UzalW. Ent, USA (Ret), Fighting On TheBrink: Defense of the Pusan Perimeter(Paducah, Ky: Turner PublishingCompany, 1996).

Particular acknowledgment is madeof the valuable quotations in DonaldKnox, The Korean War-Pusan to Chosin-An Oral History (New York: HarcourtBrace Jovanovich, 1985) and AndrewGeer, The New Breed-The Story of the

U.S. Marines in Korea (Nashville: TheBattery Press, 1989).

In a different category is a bookwhich the author affirms is based onactual Chinese sources: Russell Spurt.Enter the Dragon-China's UndeclaredWar Against the US. in Korea, 1950-51(New York: Henry Holt, 19881).

Personal interviews were helpful inmeetings with: MajGen Robert D. Bohn.USMC (Ret); MajGen Charles D. Mize,USMC (Ret); and Col Robert D. Taplett,USMC (Ret).

Information also was contributed byMajGen Raymond L. Murray, USMC (Ret).and Col Francis 1. Fenton, Jr., L'SMC(Ret), who kindly furnished postwarcopies of The Guidon, a newsletter of BCompany, with personal memoirs ofcombat.

The oral history transcripts at theMarine Corps Historical Center focusmainly on later events in Korea, hut dohave some observations by Craig,Murray, Bohn, Stewart, Sivert, Lucy, andLtCol Charles H. Brush, Jr., USMC, relat-ing to the early days, In the PersonalPapers Collection [now located at theMarine Corps University] there is a longmemoir by PFC Herbert R. Luster whowas a BAR-man in Company A (l918-1A44). The files of the Reference Sectioncontain much information pertinent toindividual biographies and unit histories.Acknowledgement also is made to CotDavid Douglas Duncan, USMCR (Ret),for the use of his dramatic images.