article_communication strategies in a second language_definition and taxonomies.pdf

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Review Article

Communication Strategies in a SecondLanguage: Definitions and Taxonomies

Zoltán Dörnyei Eötvös University, Budapest

Mary Lee Scott Brigham Young University, Provo

Dörnyei and Scott

This paper examines trends in second language (L2)

communication strategy (CS) research to date. We give a

comprehensive review of the relevant literature from thelast two decades, with particular consideration of the dif-

ferent ways in which CSs have been defined and of corre-

sponding influences on the organization of strategy

taxonomies. We first outline the history of CS research and

discuss problem-orientedness and consciousness as defin-

ing criteria for CSs. We then offer a comprehensive list of

strategic language devices and describe the major CS tax-

onomies, noting key trends, with special attention to cur-

rent and future research orientations.

173

Language Learning 47:1, March 1997, pp. 173–210

Zoltán Dörnyei, Department of English Applied Linguistics; Mary Lee Scott,Department of Linguistics

We are grateful to Kathleen Bardovi-Harlig, Marianne Celce-Murcia,Gabriele Kasper, George Yule and Tamás Váradi for their helpful comments

on earlier drafts of this paper. Correspondence concerning this article may beaddressed to Zoltán Dörnyei, Department of English Applied Linguistics,Eötvös University, 1146 Budapest, Ajtósi Dürer sor 19, Hungary. Internet:[email protected]


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Researchers first raised the notion of second language (L2)communication strategies (CSs) at the beginning of the 1970s, fol-

lowing the recognition that the mismatch between L2 speakers’

linguistic resources and communicative intentions leads to a

number of systematic language phenomena whose main function

is to handle difficulties or breakdowns in communication. In fact,

even a brief analysis of any spontaneous piece of L2 oral discourse

reveals the importance of CSs in L2 users’ verbal performance:

These speakers (except those at a very advanced, “near-native”

level) tend to spend a great deal of time and effort struggling to

make up for their L2 deficiencies (cf. Gass & Varonis, 1991). The

understanding of strategic language use has, therefore, been an

important research direction during the last two decades, and a

considerable amount of research literature has accumulated on

the nature of CSs, taxonomies of strategic language devices,

variation in CS use, and the practical implications of CS research

(focusing, in particular, on the teachability of CSs).

At the same time, CS research does not lack controversies.

There is no universally accepted definition of CSs; as a result, sev-

eral competing taxonomies of CSs exist, including different

ranges of language devices, from paraphrase to filled pauses, from

code switching to interactional meaning-negotiation mechanisms

(such as clarification requests). In fact, in view of the widespread

use of the term “communication strategy” in applied linguistics—its coverage has by now become “compulsory” in any overview of

L2 acquisition and use—it is surprising how little CS researchers

agree about what exactly these devices are. This paper intends to

provide an overview of CS research with a special focus on two key

issues: the various definitions of CSs suggested in the literature

and the different taxonomies of strategic language devices devel-

oped following these definitions. We selected these two focal issues

because studies discussing other CS-related topics—such as taskeffect, variation according to proficiency level, the relationship

between CS use in L1 and L2, the effectiveness of various CS

types, or the usefulness of CS training—have often produced con-

174 Language Learning Vol. 47, No. 1


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troversial or contestable results due to the diverse conceptualiza-tions of CSs. That is, those studies often made generalizations

based on (partly) different language phenomena, whereas most

researchers would now agree that strategic language behavior is

highly complex, and intervening factors typically have only a sub-

tle and non-uniform effect. Thus, we see the questions of definition

and taxonomy as central to any further development in CS

research.

First, we present a brief historical outline of CS research;

then we summarize the different conceptualizations of CSs, look-

ing into their various defining criteria. Next we attempt to provide

a comprehensive list of the strategic language devices mentioned

in the literature; finally, we present and discuss the most impor-

tant classification schemes of CSs.

Historical Outline of CS Research

Selinker (1972) coined the term “communication strategy” in

his seminal paper on “interlanguage”, discussing “strategies of

second language communication” (p. 229) as one of the five central

processes involved in L2 learning. However, he did not go into

detail about the nature of these strategies. Around the time

Selinker’s paper came out, Savignon (1972) published a research

report in which she highlighted the importance of coping strategies (the term she used for CSs) in communicative language teach-

ing and testing. A year later Váradi (1973/1980) gave a talk, at a

small European conference, generally considered the first system-

atic analysis of strategic language behavior (message adjustment,

in particular). Váradi’s paper, however, was not the first published

study on CSs; although it informally circulated among research-

ers, it only came out in print in 1980. By that time Tarone and her

associates (Tarone, 1977; Tarone, Cohen & Dumas, 1976) had pub-lished two studies specifically focusing on CSs, providing the first

definition of “communication strategy” and offering a taxonomy

(Tarone, 1977) still seen as one of the most influential in the field.

Dörnyei and Scott 175


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The real “career” of CSs started in the early 1980s. First,

Canale and Swain (1980; Canale, 1983) included them in their

influential model of communicative competence as the primary

constituents of one of the subcompetencies, strategic competence.

Second, Færch and Kasper (1983a) published an edited volume,

Strategies in Interlanguage Communication, which pulled

together the most important published papers into one collection

and also contained some important newly written studies (Bialys-

tok, 1983; Dechert, 1983; Færch & Kasper, 1983c; Haastrup &Phillipson, 1983; Raupach, 1983; Wagner, 1983). These two publi-

cations were followed by increased research interest and a grow-

ing number of publications in the 1980s focussing primarily on

identifying and classifying CSs, and on their teachability (e.g.,

Bialystok, 1984; Bialystok & Kellerman, 1987; DeKeyser, 1988;

Færch & Kasper, 1984a, 1986; Harper, 1985; Kumaravadivelu,

1988; Paribakht, 1985, 1986; Scholfield, 1987; Tarone, 1984;

Tarone & Yule, 1987, 1989; Willems, 1987; Yule & Tarone, 1990).In the second half of the 1980s, The Netherlands became the

dominant centre of CS studies as a group of researchers at Nijme-

gen University carried out a large-scale empirical project whose

results both shed light on various aspects of CS use and chal-

lenged some aspects of the previous taxonomies (Bongaerts &

Poulisse 1989; Bongaerts, Kellerman & Bentlage, 1987; Keller-

man, 1991; Kellerman, Bongaerts & Poulisse, 1987; Kellerman,

Ammerlaan, Bongaerts & Poulisse, 1990; Poulisse, 1987; Poulisse

& Schils, 1989; Poulisse, Bongaerts & Kellerman, 1987).

1990 was an important year in CS research because of two

comprehensive monographs by Bialystok (1990) and Poulisse

(1990) (for reviews, see Váradi, 1992). The following five years

brought further empirical and conceptual analyses (e.g., Chen,

1990; Clennell, 1994; Dörnyei & Scott, 1995a, 1995b; Yarmoham-

madi & Seif, 1992; Yule & Tarone, 1991) and several reviews (e.g.,in Cook, 1993; in Ellis, 1994; Poulisse, 1994). Work on the teach-

ability issue also remained in the foreground of research interest

(Cohen, Weaver & Li, 1995; Dörnyei, 1995; Dörnyei & Thurrell,

1991, 1992, 1994; Kebir, 1994; Rost, 1994), and Poulisse (1993, in



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press) made a potentially important attempt to place strategiclanguage behavior in a broader framework of speech production,

adapting Levelt’s (1989) general psycholinguistic model of speak-

ing. Two more projects in the making are likely to become land-

marks in CS research, a volume edited by Kasper and Kellerman,

Advances in Communication Strategy Research (in press; with

contributions from Duff, in press; Kellerman & Bialystok, in

press; Poulisse, in press-a; Ross, in press; Wagner & Firth, in

press; Yule & Tarone, in press; among others) and a book by Yule,

Referential Communication Tasks (in press), discussing a number

of research methodological issues.

Different Approaches to Conceptualizing CSs

The traditional view. Researchers originally saw CSs as ver-

bal or nonverbal first-aid devices used to compensate for gaps in

the speaker’s L2 proficiency. This view is reflected in Tarone’s

(1977) and Færch and Kasper’s (1983b) definitions:

Conscious communication strategies are used by an indi-

vidual to overcome the crisis which occurs when language

structures are inadequate to convey the individual’s

thought. (Tarone, 1977, p. 195)

CSs are potentially conscious plans for solving what to an

individual presents itself as a problem in reaching a par-ticular communicative goal. (Færch & Kasper, 1983b, p. 36)

According to this conceptualization, CSs constitute a subtype

of L2 problem-management efforts, dealing with language pro-

duction problems that occur at the planning stage. They are

separate from other types of problem-solving devices, meaning-

negotiation and repair mechanisms (e.g., requesting and pro-

viding clarification), which involve the handling of problems

that have already surfaced during the course of communica-

tion. Indeed, as Yule and Tarone (1991) pointed out, the

research literature discussing the negotiation of meaning in L2

communication (for reviews: Gass & Selinker, 1994; Larsen-



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Freeman & Long, 1991; Pica, 1994) has been entirely inde-pendent of CS studies.

Tarone’s interactional perspective. The distinction between

CSs and meaning-negotiation mechanisms was somewhat

blurred by Tarone’s (1980) offering a third well-known conceptu-

alization, according to which CSs:

relate to a mutual attempt of two interlocutors to agree on a

meaning in situations where requisite meaning structures

do not seem to be shared. (p. 420).

This definition is potentially broader than Færch and Kasper’s

(1983b, 1984a) or Tarone’s earlier (1977) one. It introduced an

interactional perspective; in Tarone’s words, “CS are seen as

tools used in a joint negotiation of meaning where both inter-

locutors are attempting to agree as to a communicative goal”

(1980, p. 420). This interactional perspective would allow for

the inclusion of various repair mechanisms, which Tarone con-sidered CSs if their intention was “to clarify intended meaning

rather than simply correct linguistic form” (1980, p. 424). Even

though Tarone herself never extended the scope of her CS tax-

onomy to include interactional trouble-shooting mechanisms,

other researchers did specifically list meaning-negotiation

strategies among CSs (e.g., Canale, 1983; Dörnyei & Thurrell,

1992; Dörnyei & Scott, 1995a, 1995b; Rost, 1994; Rost & Ross,

1991; Rubin, 1987; Savignon, 1983; Willems, 1987).

Dörnyei’s extended view. Dörnyei (1995) suggested an exten-

sion of the definition of CSs arguing that because a primary source

of L2 speakers’communication problems is insufficient processing

time, stalling strategies (e.g., the use of lexicalized pause-fillers

and hesitation gambits) that help speakers gain time to think and

keep the communication channel open are also problem-solving

strategies—a point also mentioned by several other researchers

(e.g., Canale, 1983; Rost, 1994; Rubin, 1987; Savignon, 1983). Psy-

cholinguistics and, to a lesser extent, L2 research have exten-

sively studied such stalling phenomena and the temporal

organization of communication in general (e.g., Váradi, 1993; for a



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review, see Griffiths, 1991), but these efforts have not been inte-grated into mainstream CS research. In Tarone’s (1980) frame-

work, pause fillers would fall under production rather than

communication strategies, the difference being that production

strategies “are not used for the primary purpose of negotiating

meaning” (p. 420). Færch and Kasper (1983c) considered pause

fillers temporal variables rather than strategic devices.

Dörnyei and Scott’s extended view. In an attempt to integrate

several lines of previous research, Dörnyei and Scott (1995a,1995b)

further extended the scope of CSs to includeevery potentially inten-

tional attempt to cope with any language-related problem of which

the speaker is aware during the course of communication. This con-

ceptualization aimed at covering all the different types of communi-

cation problem-management mechanisms discussed in the L2

literature. Indeed, Dörnyei and Scott explicitly conceived “commu-

nication strategies” to be the key units in a general description of

problem-managementin L2 communication.

Canale’s extended concept. Canale (1983) offered thebroadest

extension of the concept of “communication strategy”. He proposed

that CSs involve any attempt to “enhance the effectiveness of com-

munication (e.g., deliberately slow and soft speech for rhetorical

effect)”(p.11;cf.Savignon,1983).Thisdefinitionisbroaderthanthe

restriction of CSs to problem-solving devices—therefore going

beyond all the approaches discussed above—but the meaning potential of “strategies in communication” does not exclude such an

extension. Although originally a military term, strategy in general

use has cometo refer tothe implementation ofa set ofprocedures for

accomplishing something; Bialystok (1990) defined this use of the

term as “wilful planning to achieve explicit goals” (p. 1). Thus, a

communication strategy inthemostgeneralsenseisaplanofaction

to accomplish a communication goal; the enhancement of communi-

cation effect is certainly such a goal. An example of the broaderinterpretation of “strategy” surfaces in L1 communication studies,

where CS research has focused on ways of achieving “critical social

goals such as gaining compliance, generating affinity, resolving

social conflict, and offering information” (Wiemann & Daly, 1994, p.



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vii; for review: Daly & Wiemann, 1994). Similarly, methods to man-

age potentially difficult discourse situations (e.g., how to interrupt

someone, how to hold the floor, or how to close a conversation) are

alsocommunication-enhancingstrategies.

Psychological approaches to conceptualizing CSs. The differ-

ent conceptualizations described above share one thing: namely,

they follow a primarily linguistic approach to defining CSs. How-

ever, other researchers, particularly Bialystok (1990) and the

Nijmegen Group (i.e., Bongaerts, Kellerman, and Poulisse), took anentirely different approach. Although their definition of CSs was

similar to Færch and Kasper’s (1983b), they argued that CSs are

inherently mental procedures; therefore, CS research should inves-

tigate the cognitive processes underlying strategic language use.

They claimed that not understanding the cognitive psychological

and psycholinguistic dimensions of CS use, andfocusing only on the

surface verbalizations of underlying psychological processes, would

lead to taxonomies of doubtful validity. Indeed, the proliferation of “different” product-oriented classifications in strategy research

(see below)underscores Bialystok’sandtheNijmegen Group’s argu-

ment. In Kellerman’s (1991)conclusion,

the systematic study of compensatory strategies has not

been properly served by the construction of taxonomies of

strategy types which are identified on the basis of variable

and conflicting criteria which confound grammatical form,incidental and inherent properties of referents, and encod-

ing medium with putative cognitive processes. This incon-

sistency has led to a proliferation of strategy types with

little regard for such desirable requirements as psychologi-

cal plausibility, parsimony and finiteness. (p. 158)

Instead of conducting product-oriented research, Bialystok and

the Nijmegen Group recommended CS research adopt a new

analytic perspective, focusing on the cognitive “deep structure”of strategic language behavior. Yule and Tarone (in press) sum-

marize the duality of approaches taken by researchers—the

“Pros” following the traditional approach and the “Cons” taking

a primarily psychological stance—as follows:



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The taxonomic approach of the Pros focuses on the descrip-tions of the language produced by L2 learners, essentially

characterizing the means used to accomplish reference in

terms of the observed form. It is primarily a description of

observed forms in L2 output, with implicit inferences being

made about the differences in the psychological processing

that produced them. The alternative approach of the Cons

focuses on a description of the psychological processes used

by L2 learners, essentially characterizing the cognitive de-

cisions humans make in order to accomplish reference. It isprimarily a description of cognitive processing, with im-

plicit references being made about the inherent similarity

of linguistically different forms observed in the L2 output.

Poulisse’s speech-production model. A follow-up to Bialys-

tok’s and the Nijmegen group’s approach to place CSs in a parsi-

m o ni ou s c o gn i ti v e f ra m ew or k w a s P o ul i ss e ’s ( 1 99 3 )

conceptualization of CSs within a coherent model of speech pro-

duction. In fact, Færch and Kasper (1983b) had also attempted

this 10 years earlier. However, Poulisse had access to Levelt’s

(1989) model of speech production, which allowed more detailed

psycholinguistic analysis of strategic language behavior than

was possible before. Accordingly, Poulisse reconsidered some

aspects of her earlier work as part of the Nijmegen Group and

came up with a modified process-oriented cognitive taxonomy

(see below).In sum, researchers have generally agreed with Bialystok’s

(1990) statement that “communication strategies are an undeni-

able event of language use, their existence is a reliably docu-

mented aspect of communication, and their role in second-

language communication seems particularly salient” (p. 116).

However, CS research is divided by the various theoretical per-

spectives adopted: Færch and Kasper (1983b) considered CSs ver-

bal plans within a speech production framework; Tarone (1980)viewed them from a discourse analytical perspective and pursued

an interactional approach; Dörnyei (1995) extended the scope of

their definition to include devices that were not strictly meaning-

related; Dörnyei and Scott (1995a, 1995b) equated strategic lan-



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guage use with communication problem-solving behavior in gen-

eral; Canale (1983) proposed to include non-problem-solving

strategies as well; Bialystok (1990) and the Nijmegen Group

regarded CSs as primarily mental events and adopted a cognitive-

psychological approach to their analysis; and finally Poulisse

(1993, in press-b) further developed the psycholinguistic perspec-

tive by integrating CSs in an adapted version of Levelt’s (1989)

speech production framework.

To arrive at a better understanding of why CSs have elicitedsuch diverse approaches, we look closer at the defining criteria for

“communication strategies” used in the published literature.

Defining CSs

A review of the CS literature reveals that two defining crite-

ria are consistently mentioned, problem-orientedness and con-

sciousness. Although they appear to capture the essence of strategic language behavior, their lack of explicitness has partly

caused the diversity in CS research.

Problem-orientedness

As we have already discussed, “the original insight into CSs

wasbasedonamismatchbetweencommunicativeintentionandlin-

guistic resources” (Váradi, 1992, p. 437); that is, CSs were seen aslanguage devices used to overcome communication problems

related to interlanguage deficiencies. Thus, problem-

orientedness—or in Bialystok’s (1984, 1990) term, ‘problematicity’

—has become a primary defining criterion for CSs, referring to “the

idea that strategies are used only when a speaker perceives that

there is a problem which may interrupt communication” (Bialystok,

1990, p. 3). This undoubtedly key feature of strategic language

behavior is mentioned in most studies on CSs. However, as Dörnyei

andScott(1995a, 1995b)argued, problem-orientednessin general is

notspecific enough; it leavesundefinedtheexact typeoftheproblem,

an area where various approaches show considerabledivergence.



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Originally CSs were thought to handle only one type of lan-guage problem, resource deficits—gaps in speakers’ knowledge

preventing them from verbalizing messages. This restriction to

one set of problems, however, was not reflected in the name given

to these language devices (i.e., “communication strategy”). Hence,

there developed a mismatch between the specificity of the speech

phenomena to which CSs originally referred and the broadness of

the term “communication strategy.” Consequently, several

researchers extended the term to handle the following three types

of communication problems as well:

1. Own-performance problems: the realization that some-

thing one has said is incorrect or only partly correct; associated

with various types of self-repair, self-rephrasing and self-editing

mechanisms (e.g., Dörnyei & Scott, 1995a, 1995b; Savignon, 1983;

Tarone, 1980; Tarone & Yule, 1987; Willems, 1987).

2. Other-performance problems: something perceived as

problematic in the interlocutor’s speech, either because it is

thought to be incorrect (or highly unexpected), or because of a lack

(or uncertainty) of understanding something fully; associated

with various meaning negotiation strategies (e.g., Canale, 1983;

Dörnyei & Thurrell, 1992, 1994; Dörnyei & Scott, 1995a, 1995b;

Rost, 1994; Rost & Ross, 1991; Rubin, 1987; Savignon, 1983; Wil-

lems, 1987).

3. Processing time pressure: the L2 speaker’s frequent needfor more time to process and plan L2 speech than would be natu-

rally available in fluent communication; associated with strate-

gies such as the use of fillers, hesitation devices, and self-

repetitions (e.g., Canale, 1983; Chen, 1990; Dörnyei, 1995;

Dörnyei & Scott, 1995a, 1995b; Dörnyei & Thurrell, 1991, 1992,

1994; Haastrup & Phillipson, 1983; Rost, 1994; Rubin, 1987; Savi-

gnon, 1972, 1983; Tarone & Yule, 1987).

Consciousness

A“strategy” beinga conscious technique used to achieve a goal,

consciousness, therefore, has been the second major defining crite-



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rion for CSs. The main problem with using consciousness in thiscontext, however, is that to speak aboutCSsbeing “consciously used

devices” mixes several meanings of the term. One can be conscious

of a language problem, the intent/attempt to solve this problem, the

repertoire of potentially applicable CSs, the way a CS may achieve

its effect, the alternative plan, the execution of the CS, the use of a

less-than-perfect “stopgap” device (i.e., the CS), or the use of a CS

whenbroughttothelearner’sattentionlater.

“Consciousness” has, in fact, so many different connotationsthat one would best avoid it altogether. Schmidt (1994), when dis-

cussing consciousness in language attainment, recommended

that the term should be deconstructed into several aspects. He

suggested four basic senses of consciousness: intentionality, atten-

tion, awareness, and control. Bialystok (1990) also separated con-

sciousness from intentionality, which she defined as the “learner’s

control over a repertoire of strategies so that particular ones may

be selected from the range of options and deliberately applied to

achieve certain effects” (p. 5).

A second problem with consciousness relates to Færch and

Kasper’s (1983b) argument that “consciousness is perhaps more a

matter of degree than either-or” (p. 35), reflecting the hierarchical

organization of plans and the fact that in most cases a speaker

consciously selects only certain elements in a plan. In addition, as

Gass and Selinker (1994) pointed out, a central feature of lan-guage use is a tendency to automatize high-frequency elements;

therefore, the small set of strategies people use in the numerous

problem-situations they encounter can become routinized. In Wie-

mann and Daly’s (1994) words, some strategies “are overlearned

and seem to drop from consciousness” (p. ix). That is, what was

originally an intentional strategy may become in certain situa-

tions and/or with certain individuals a highly automatized or fos-

silized—hence not fully conscious—device.Drawing on the work of the researchers mentioned above,

Dörnyei and Scott (1995a, 1995b) argued that three aspects of con-

sciousness are particularly relevant to CSs:



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1. Consciousness as awareness of the problem. Only thoseinstances of problem-related language use which are related to

language processing problems that the speaker consciously recog-

nizes as such should be termed CSs in order to distinguish mis-

takes and CSs that may have a similar erroneous form (e.g.,

“typer” used as an incorrectly learnt word or as a conscious

attempt to form a noun from “type”, usually considered to be word-

coinage).

2. Consciousness as intentionality. The speaker’s inten-tional use of the CS separates CSs from certain verbal behaviors

that are systematically related to problems of which the speaker is

aware but that are not done intentionally. (E.g., with non-

lexicalized filled pauses, “umming and erring”, the speaker is usu-

ally aware of the difficulty faced, but uses these devices most of the

time without a conscious decision.)

3. Consciousness as awareness of strategic language use.The

speaker realizes that he/she is using a less-than-perfect, stopgap

device or is doing a problem-related detour on the way to mutual

understanding. This separates CSs from cases when, even if

intentionally doing something to overcome a recognized problem,

the speaker may not consider the final product a strategy but

rather a piece of acceptable L2. (E.g., for many L2 speakers ‘literal

translation’ is a regular part of the L2 production process, result-

ing in many good solutions; we would not count these as cases of CS use.)

Dörnyei and Scott, however, claimed that a fourth important

aspect of consciousness, consciousness as control, should not

necessarily be a defining criterion of CSs; an automatized

strategy can be considered a CS proper, particularly because

one purpose of CS training is to enhance automatization

(Dörnyei, 1995). This is, in fact, analogous to the practice

adopted by Færch and Kasper (1983b), who on similar grounds

included the phrase “potentially conscious” in their definition

of CSs.



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Conceptual Definition

ResearchersgenerallyagreethatthemainpurposeofCSuseis

to manage communication problems. The only exception, Canale

(1983), extended the scope of CSs to include communication-

enhancing devices. As pointed out earlier, the meaning potential of

“strategy” allows such a broad interpretation; however, we believe

that communication-enhancing strategies conceptualized thus

broadly are not problem-solving devices proper and should betreated separately. Extending a distinction made by Long (1983):

These strategies are used to avoid conversational trouble or failure

in communication goal-attainment,in contrast to devices applied to

“repairthediscoursewhentroubleoccurs”(p.131),offering“sponta-

neous solutions to immediate, short-term problems” (p. 132)1. The

vast majority of the CS literature is concerned only with the devices

belongingtothesecondtype,thatis,withthemanagementofactual

language-related problems in communication.With respect to problem-orientedness, the extension of the

original conceptualization of CSs, which concerned only one prob-

lem type (handling insufficient language resources), appears

valid in that it maintains the basic criterion of problem-

orientedness. However, it results in the term’s covering a more

heterogeneous set of speech phenomena. Clearly, whether or not

researchers have labelled devices not strictly related to resource

deficits as “communication strategies” has been a matter of termi-

nological decision, very much depending on one’s priorities: Stud-

ies following the traditional conceptualization have limited

“communication strategy” to a fairly homogeneous set of language

phenomena related to speech production; in contrast, researchers

primarily concerned with general problem-management in com-

munication have used the term to cover the handling of a wider

range of communication problems.It is difficult to posit clear-cut criteria with respect to con-

sciousness, because we lack a clear understanding of the role of

consciousness within speech production, particularly in light of

the frequent and significant automatization of certain elements/



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subprocesses in language processing. However, one cannot alto-gether avoid taking certain aspects of consciousness into account

in defining CSs, because problem-orientedness in itself is an

insufficient criterion of strategic language use. Dörnyei and Scott

(1995a, 1995b), offered relatively elaborate and straightforward

consciousness criteria. They argued that a problem-solving device

is a strategy only if it is conscious in three aspects: consciousness

as awareness of the problem, consciousness as intentionality, and

consciousness as awareness of strategic language use.

Inventory and Classifications of Communication Strategies

The conceptual differences among CS researchers surface

most explicitly when they specify the actual language devices they

consider to be CSs. Accordingly, the list of strategies and their tax-

onomies in different studies on CSs vary significantly. In this sec-

tion we pull together all the main language devices mentioned in

the literature under the label “communication strategy”. Then we

present nine different taxonomies of CSs, by Tarone (1977), Færch

and Kasper (1983b), Bialystok (1983), Bialystok (1990), Pari-

bakht (1985), Willems (1987), the Nijmegen Group (based on

Poulisse, 1987; Kellerman, 1991), Poulisse (1993), and finally

Dörnyei and Scott (1995a, 1995b).

Table 1 contains an inventory of strategic language deviceswith descriptions/definitions, examples, and, in some cases, retro-

spective comments by the speaker. The list is based on Dörnyei and

Scott (1995a,1995b); wehave indicated in a special column whether

a particular strategy was included in any of the other 8 taxonomies,

although sometimes under a different name. We have included

explanatory notes about some of theless-known strategies.

Table 2 contains a summary of the 9 taxonomies from Table 1.

The first thing that becomes obvious when comparing the classifi-cations is that they concern various ranges of language devices in

different degrees of elaborateness. On one end of the narrow-

broad continuum are the typologies of the Nijmegen Group and

Poulisse (1993), who explicitly restricted the scope of language



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T a b l e 1

I n v e n t o r y o f S t r a t e g i c L a n g u a g e D e v i c e s w i t h D e s c r i p t i o n s / D

e f i n i t i o n s , E x a m p l e s ( B a s e d o n D ö r n y e i & S c o t t ,

1 9 9 5 a , 1

9 9 5 b ) ,

a n d I n d i c a t i o n s W h e t h e r T h e y W e r e I n c l u d e d i

n A n y O t h e r T a x o n o m i e

s ( T = T a r o n e , 1 9 7 7 ;

F & K = F æ r c h &

K a s p e r , 1

9 8 3 b ; B = B i a l y s t o k , 1

9 8 3 ; P = P a r i b a k

h t , 1 9 8 5 ; W = W i l l e m s , 1 9 8 7 ; N = N i j m e g e n G r o u p

)

S T R A T E G Y

D E S C R I P T

I O N

E X A M P L E

O T H E R

T A X O N O M I E

S

1 . M e s s a g e

a b a n d o n m e n t

L e a v i n g a m e s s a g e u n f i n i s h e d b e c a u s e o f s o m e l a n g u a g e

d i f f i c u l t y .

I t i s a p e

r s o n e r . . . w h o i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a a h o u s e , f o r t h e

b l o c k o f h o u s e . . .

I d o n ’ t k n o w . . .

[ l a u g h t e r ]

T , F & K , W

2 . M e s s a g e

r e d u c t i o n

( t o p i c

a v o i d a n c e )

R e d u c i n g t h e m e s s a g e b y a v o i d i n g c e r t a i n l a n g u a g e

s t r u c t u r e s o r t o p i c s c o n s i d e r e d p r

o b l e m a t i c l a n g u a g e w i s e

o r b y l e a v i n g o u t s o m e i n t e n d e d e

l e m e n t s f o r a l a c k o f

l i n g u i s t i c r e s o u r c e s .

[ R e t r o s p

e c t i v e c o m m e n t b y t h e s p e a k e r : ] I w a s l o o k i n g f o r

“ s a t i s f i e d w i t h a g o o d j o b , p l e a s a n t l y t i r e d , ” a n d s o o n , b u t

i n s t e a d I a c c e p t e d l e s s .

T , F & K , W

3 . M e s s a g e

r e p l a c e m e n t

S u b s t i t u t i n g t h e o r i g i n a l m e s s a g e w i t h a n e w o n e b e c a u s e

o f n o t f e e l i n g c a p a b l e o f e x e c u t i n g

i t .

[ R e t r o s p

e c t i v e c o m m e n t a f t e r s a y i n g t h a t

t h e p i p e w a s

b r o k e n i

n t h e m i d d l e i n s t e a d o f “ t h e s c r e w

t h r e a d w a s

b r o k e n ” : ] I d i d n ’ t k n o w “ s c r e w t h r e a d ” a n d

w e l l , I h a d t o

s a y s o m e t h i n g .

F & K , W

4 . C i r c u m l o c u -

t i o n ( p a r a -

p h r a s e )

E x e m p l i f y i n g , i l l u s t r a t i n g o r d e s c

r i b i n g t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f

t h e t a r g e t o b j e c t o r a c t i o n .

i t b e c o m e s w a t e r i n s t e a d o f “ m e l t ”

T , F & K , W , P ;

B : “ d e s c r i p t i o n ” ;

N : a p p r . “ a n a l y t i c

s t r a t e g i e s ”

5 . A p p r o x i m a -

t i o n

U s i n g a s i n g l e a l t e r n a t i v e l e x i c a l

i t e m , s u c h a s a

s u p e r o r d i n a t e o r a r e l a t e d t e r m , w h i c h s h a r e s s e m a n t i c

f e a t u r e s w i t h t h e t a r g e t w o r d o r s

t r u c t u r e .

p l a t e i n s t e a d o f “ b o w l ”

T , W ; B a n d

P : “ s e m a n t i c

c o n t i g u i t y ” ; F & K

:

“ g e n e r a l i z a t i o n ” ;

N : a p p r . “ h o l i s t i c

s t r . ”

6 . U s e o f a l l -

p u r p o s e w o r d s

E x t e n d i n g a g e n e r a l , “ e m p t y ” l e x i c a l i t e m t o c o n t e x t s

w h e r e s p e c i f i c w o r d s a r e l a c k i n g .

T h e o v e r u s e o f t h i n g , s t u f f , m a k e , d o , a s w

e l l a s w o r d s l i k e

t h i n g i e , w h a t - d o - y o u - c a l l - i t ; e . g . :

I c a n ’ t c a

n ’ t w o r k u n t i l

y o u r e p a

i r m y . . . t h i n g .

W : “ s m u r f i n g ”


17/38

7 . W o r d -

c o i n a g e

C r e a t i n g a n o n - e x i s t i n g L 2 w o r d b y a p p l y i n g a s u p p o s e d

L 2 r u l e t o a n e x i s t i n g L 2 w o r d .

[ R e t r o s p

e c t i v e c o m m e n t a f t e r u s i n g d e j u n

k t i o n a n d

u n j u n k t i o n f o r “ s t r e e t c l e a r i n g ” : ] I t h i n k I

a p p r o a c h e d i t

i n a v e r y

s c i e n t i f i c w a y : f r o m ‘ j u n k ’ I f o r m e

d a n o u n a n d I

t r i e d t o a d d t h e n e g a t i v e p r e f i x “ d e - ” ; t o “ u n j u n k ” i s t o

‘ c l e a r t h e j u n k ’ a n d “ u n j u n k t i o n ” i s ‘ s t r e e t c l e a r i n g ’ .

T , F & K , B , W ; N :

a p p r .

“ m o r p h o l o g i c a l

c r e a t i v i t y ”

8 . R e s t r u c t u r i n g

A b a n d o n i n g t h e e x e c u t i o n o f a v e r b a l p l a n b e c a u s e o f

l a n g u a g e d i f f i c u l t i e s , l e a v i n g t h e

u t t e r a n c e u n f i n i s h e d ,

a n d c o m m u n i c a t i n g t h e i n t e n d e d

m e s s a g e a c c o r d i n g t o a n

a l t e r n a t i v e p l a n .

O n M i c k

e y ’ s f a c e w e c a n s e e t h e . . . s o h e ’ s h e ’ s h e ’ s

w o n d e r i n g .

F & K ; W : u n d e r

“ s e l f - r e p a i r ”

9 . L i t e r a l

t r a n s l a t i o n

( t r a n s f e r )

T r a n s l a t i n g l i t e r a l l y a l e x i c a l i t e m

, a n i d i o m , a c o m p o u n d

w o r d o r s t r u c t u r e f r o m L 1 / L 3 t o L

2 .

I ’ d m a d e a b i g f a u l t [ t r a n s l a t e d f r o m F r e n

c h ]

T , W , N ;

F & K : u n d e r

“ i n t e r l i n g u a l t r a

n -

s f e r ” ; P a n d B :

“ t r a n s l i t e r a t i o n ”

1 0 . F o r e i g n i z i n g

U s i n g a L 1 / L 3 w o r d b y a d j u s t i n g

i t t o L 2 p h o n o l o g y ( i . e . ,

w i t h a L 2 p r o n u n c i a t i o n ) a n d / o r m

o r p h o l o g y .

r e p a r a t e f o r “ r e p a i r ” [ a d j u s t i n g t h e G e r m a n w o r d

‘ r e p a r i e r e n ’ ]

B , W ; F & K : u n d e r

“ i n t e r l i n g u a l

t r a n s f e r ” ; N :

u n d e r “ t r a n s f e r ”

1 1 . C o d e

s w i t c h i n g

( l a n g u a g e

s w i t c h )

I n c l u d i n g L 1 / L 3 w o r d s w i t h L 1 / L 3 p r o n u n c i a t i o n i n L 2

s p e e c h ; t h i s m a y i n v o l v e s t r e t c h e s o f d i s c o u r s e r a n g i n g

f r o m s i n g l e w o r d s t o w h o l e c h u n k

s a n d e v e n c o m p l e t e

t u r n s .

U s i n g t h

e L a t i n f e r r u m f o r “ i r o n ” .

T , F & K , B , W ; N :

u n d e r “ t r a n s f e r ”

1 2 . U s e o f

s i m i l a r -

s o u n d i n g w o r d s 1

C o m p e n s a t i n g f o r a l e x i c a l i t e m w

h o s e f o r m t h e s p e a k e r

i s u n s u r e o f w i t h a w o r d ( e i t h e r e x i s t i n g o r n o n - e x i s t i n g )

w h i c h s o u n d s m o r e o r l e s s l i k e t h e t a r g e t i t e m .

[ R e t r o s p

e c t i v e c o m m e n t e x p l a i n i n g w h y t h e s p e a k e r u s e d

c a p i n s t e a d o f “ p a n ” : ] B e c a u s e i t w a s s i m i l a r t o t h e w o r d

w h i c h I w a n t e d t o s a y : “ p a n ” .

1 3 . M u m b l i n g

1

S w a l l o w i n g o r m u t t e r i n g i n a u d i b l y a w o r d ( o r p a r t o f a

w o r d ) w h o s e c o r r e c t f o r m t h e s p e a k e r i s u n c e r t a i n a b o u t .

A n d u h w e l l M i c k e y M o u s e l o o k s s u r p r i s e

o r s o r t o f X X X

[ t h e ‘ s o r

t o f ’ m a r k e r i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e u n i n t e l l i g i b l e p a r t

i s n o t j u

s t a m e r e r e c o r d i n g f a i l u r e b u t a s

t r a t e g y ] .

1 4 . O m i s s i o n

1

L e a v i n g a g a p w h e n n o t k n o w i n g

a w o r d a n d c a r r y i n g o n

a s i f i t h a d b e e n s a i d .

t h e n . . . e r . . . t h e s u n i s i s . . .

h m s u n i s . . . a n d t h e M i c k e y

M o u s e . . . . [ R e t r o s p e c t i v e c o m m e n t : I d i d n ’ t k n o w w h a t

‘ s h i n e ’ w

a s . ]

1 5 . R e t r i e v a l

I n a n a t t e m p t t o r e t r i e v e a l e x i c a l i t e m s a y i n g a s e r i e s o f

i n c o m p l e t e o r w r o n g f o r m s o r s t r u

c t u r e s b e f o r e r e a c h i n g

t h e o p t i m a l f o r m .

I t ’ s b r a k e e r . . .

i t ’ s b r o k e n b r o k e d b r o k e .

F & K


18/38

1 6 a . S e l f - r e p a i r

M a k i n g s e l f - i n i t i a t e d c o r r e c t i o n s

i n o n e ’ s o w n s p e e c h .

t h e n t h e

s u n s h i n e s a n d t h e w e a t h e r g e t b e . . . g e t s b e t t e r .

W

1 6 b . O t h e r -

r e p a i r

C o r r e c t i n g s o m e t h i n g i n t h e i n t e r l o c u t o r ’ s s p e e c h .

S p e a k e r : . . .

b e c a u s e o u r t i p w e n t w r o n g . . . [ . . . ] I n t e r l o c u t o r :

O h , y o u

m e a n t h e t a p . S : T a p , t a p . . .

1 7 . S e l f -

r e p h r a s i n g

2

R e p e a t i n g a t e r m , b u t n o t q u i t e a

s i t i s , b u t b y a d d i n g

s o m e t h i n g o r u s i n g p a r a p h r a s e .

I d o n ’ t k

n o w t h e m a t e r i a l . . . w

h a t i t ’ s m a d e

o f . . .

( T a r o n e & Y u l e ,

1 9 8 7 )

1 8 . O v e r -

e x p l i c i t n e s s

( w a f f l i n g ) 3

U s i n g m o r e w o r d s t o a c h i e v e a p a

r t i c u l a r c o m m u n i c a t i v e

g o a l t h a n w h a t i s c o n s i d e r e d n o r m a l i n s i m i l a r L 1

s i t u a t i o n s .

( T h i s C S w a s n o t i n c l u d e d i n D ö r n y e i & S

c o t t ’ s , 1 9 9 5 a ,

1 9 9 5 b , t a x o n o m y )


1 9 8 7 )

1 9 . M i m e

( n o n l i n g u i s t i c /

p a r a l i n g u i s t i c

s t r a t e g i e s )

D e s c r i b i n g w h o l e c o n c e p t s n o n v e r b a l l y , o r a c c o m p a n y i n g

a v e r b a l s t r a t e g y w i t h a v i s u a l i l l

u s t r a t i o n .

[ R e t r o s p e c t i v e c o m m e n t : ] I w a s m i m i n g h

e r e , t o p u t i t o u t

i n f r o n t

o f t h e h o u s e , b e c a u s e I c o u l d n ’ t r e m e m b e r t h e

w o r d .

T , F & K , B , P , W ;

N : u n d e r e i t h e r

“ a n a l y t i c ” o r

“ h o l i s t i c

s t r a t e g i e s ”

2 0 . U s e o f f i l l e r s

4

U s i n g g a m b i t s t o f i l l p a u s e s , t o s t a l l , a n d t o g a i n t i m e i n

o r d e r t o k e e p t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n

c h a n n e l o p e n a n d

m a i n t a i n d i s c o u r s e a t t i m e s o f d i f f i c u l t y .

E x a m p l

e s r a n g e f r o m v e r y s h o r t s t r u c t u r e s s u c h a s w e l l ;

y o u k n o w ; a c t u a l l y ; o k a y , t o l o n g e r p h r a s e s s u c h a s t h i s i s

r a t h e r d

i f f i c u l t t o e x p l a i n ; w e l l , a c t u a l l y , i t ’ s a g o o d

q u e s t i o n

.

2 1 a . S e l f -

r e p e t i t i o n

5

R e p e a t i n g a w o r d o r a s t r i n g o f w

o r d s i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r

t h e y w e r e s a i d .

[ R e t r o s p e c t i v e c o m m e n t : ] I w a n t e d t o s a y

t h a t i t w a s

m a d e o f

c o n c r e t e b u t I d i d n ’ t k n o w ‘ c o n c r e t e ’ a n d t h i s i s

w h y “ w h

i c h w a s m a d e , w h i c h w a s m a d e ” w a s s a i d t w i c e .


1 9 8 7 )

2 1 b . O t h e r -

r e p e t i t i o n

R e p e a t i n g s o m e t h i n g t h e i n t e r l o c

u t o r s a i d t o g a i n t i m e .

I n t e r l o c

u t o r : A n d c o u l d y o u t e l l m e t h e d i a m e t e r o f t h e

p i p e ? T h

e d i a m e t e r . S p e a k e r : T h e d i a m e t e

r ? I t ’ s a b o u t e r . . .

m a y b e e r . . .

f i v e c e n t i m e t e r s .

T a b l e 1 ( c o n t i n u e d )

I n v e n t o r y o f S t r a t e g i c L a n g u a g e D e v i c e s w i t h D e s c r i p t i o n s / D

e f i n i t i o n s , E x a m p l e s ( B a s e d o n D ö r n y e i & S c o t t ,

1 9 9 5 a , 1

9 9 5 b ) ,

a n d I n d i c a t i o n s W h e t h e r T h e y W e r e I n c l u d e d i

n A n y O t h e r T a x o n o m i e

s ( T = T a r o n e , 1 9 7 7 ;

F & K = F æ r c h &

K a s p e r , 1

9 8 3 b ; B = B i a l y s t o k , 1

9 8 3 ; P = P a r i b a k

h t , 1 9 8 5 ; W = W i l l e m s , 1 9 8 7 ; N = N i j m e g e n G r o u p

)

S T R A T E G Y

D E S C R I P T

I O N

E X A M P L E

O T H E R

T A X O N O M I E

S


19/38

2 2 . F e i g n i n g

u n d e r s t a n d i n g

6

M a k i n g a n a t t e m p t t o c a r r y o n t h

e c o n v e r s a t i o n i n s p i t e

o f n o t u n d e r s t a n d i n g s o m e t h i n g b

y p r e t e n d i n g t o

u n d e r s t a n d .

I n t e r l o c u t o r : D o y o u h a v e t h e r u b b e r w a s h

e r ? S p e a k e r :

T h e r u b b e r w a s h e r ? . . .

N o I d o n ’ t . [ R e t r o s p

e c t i v e

c o m m e n

t : I d i d n ’ t k n o w t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e w o r d , a n d

f i n a l l y I

m a n a g e d t o s a y I h a d n o s u c h t h i n g . ]

2 3 . V e r b a l

s t r a t e g y

m a r k e r s

7

U s i n g v e r b a l m a r k i n g p h r a s e s b e

f o r e o r a f t e r a s t r a t e g y

t o s i g n a l t h a t t h e w o r d o r s t r u c t u r e d o e s n o t c a r r y t h e

i n t e n d e d m e a n i n g p e r f e c t l y i n t h e L 2 c o d e .

E . g . : ( s t r a t e g y m a r k e r s i n b o l d ) : ( a ) m a r k i n g a

c i r c u m l o c u t i o n : O n t h e n e x t p i c t u r e . . . I d o

n ’ t r e a l l y

k n o w w

h a t ’ s i t c a l l e d i n E n g l i s h . . .

i t ’ s u h t h i s k i n d o f

b i r d t h a t . . . t h a t c a n b e f o u n d i n a c l o c k t h a t s t r i k e s o u t o r

[ l a u g h s ]

c o m e s o u t w h e n t h e c l o c k s t r i k e s ;

( b ) m a r k i n g

a p p r o x i m a t i o n s : i t ’ s s o m e e r . . .

i t ’ s s o m e k i n d o f e r . . .

p a p e r ; ( c ) m a r k i n g f o r e i g n i z i n g : . . . a p a n e l

[ w i t h a n

E n g l i s h

a c c e n t ] , I d o n ’ t k n o w w h e t h e r t h e r e ’ s a n a m e

i n E n g l

i s h o r n o t [ l a u g h t e r ] j u s t i t ’ s a p a

n e l f l a t ; ( d )

m a r k i n g l i t e r a l t r a n s l a t i o n : i t ’ s e r . . . a s m a l l e r m e d i u m f l a t

a n d i n , w e c a l l t h e m b l o c k h o u s e , b u t i t ’ s n o t i t ’ s n o t m a d e

o f b l o c k s

; ( e ) m a r k i n g c o d �

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