UNDERSTANDING REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DIFFUSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CASE FOR A NON-MONOLITHIC APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONS

Authors:Corresponding Author: Prof. Jorge Mascarenhas LasmarProfessor of International Relations and Head of the Department of International Relations at PUC Minas (Brazil)Address: R. Joao Antonio Azeredo, 320, ap 401BelvedereBH, MGBrazil30320-610Phone: (+5531) 9129-9266

Prof. Danny ZahreddineProfessor of Geopolitics at PUC Minas (Brazil)Address: R. Santa Rita Durao, 700, ap 602SavassiBH, MGBrazil30140-111Phone: (+5531) 88171562

Delber Andrade Gribel LageInternational Law Lecturer at PUC Minas (Brazil) and Director of the International Law Centre, CEDINAddress: R. Sao Joao Evangelista, 198, ap 102Santo AntonioBH, MGBrazil30330-140Phone: (+5531)92024773

ABSTRACTThis paper attempts to map the reach of key universal norms and rules of Human Rights Law in international society while also mapping, at the same time, specific regional interpretations and practices of such norms. By mapping the normative architecture of the primary institution of international law through its key Human Rights’ universal norms and rules it is possible to undertake a geographic analysis of its diffusion and density through out international society. Hence, it is also possible to visually assess the reach of norms we take for granted as being universal. On the other hand, the mapping of regional interpretations and practices of “global” norms allows identifying if these regionalisms do construct coexistent regional clusters of different “international” normative systems within the system-level institution governing international society. This mapping exercise hopes to contribute to the English School research agenda and its discussions of regions by trying to trace a clearer picture of the normative and institutional borders within international society and thus provide an additional tool to understand how regional norms and practice constitute, interact and redefine the global international society.

KEYWORDS: English School, Regions, Regionalism, Human Rights, International Law, Norms, Institutions

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Understanding Regional and Global Diffusion in International Law: The Case for a Non-Monolithic Approach to Institutions1

Jorge M. Lasmar2

Danny Zahreddine3

Delber Andrade Gribel Lage4

Introduction

It is beyond doubt that the regional is increasingly gaining importance in global

politics. Nevertheless, the concept and idea of regions are still under-theorised in

International Relations. In this paper, we start a discussion of an even less theorised

aspect of regions, i.e. the idea of regionalisation. Starting from the English School

framework we develop the idea that some norms, principles and values of the

international society that are taken for granted as being universal are in fact subject

to specific regional interpretations. As a consequence, these different interpretations

and/or applications of supposedly global norms generate distinct localised clusters of

patterned practices. These regional interpretation/application of global norms can

therefore construct new regionalised meanings that deviate from the original global

meaning. Hence, this phenomenon essentially creates new regional systems of

norms within the global primary institution without them losing identity as system-

level norms.

To illustrate this idea, this article will also attempt to empirically test the idea of

regionalization by mapping the reach of supposedly key universal rules of human

rights in international society. Even though this first mapping exercise is not by any

stretch a definitive mapping of the human rights practices and norms in international

society and should be considered just as a preliminary attempt, it does reveals

interesting aspects about the geography of human rights norms that are normally

considered to be – at least formally - universally accepted. By mapping the normative

architecture of the main international human rights treaties, their reservations and the

consent to international human rights enforcement bodies it is possible to undertake

a spatial visual analysis of its diffusion and density through out international society.

1 This paper has benefited from discussions with Barry Buzan, Kevork Oskanian and Laust Schouenborg. We are grateful for their input and our vigorous debate on the issue. Of course all shortcomings remain our own.2 Professor of International Relations and Head of the Department of International Relations at PUC Minas (Brazil). 3 Professor of Geopolitics at PUC Minas (Brazil).4 International Law Lecturer at PUC Minas (Brazil) and Director of the International Law Centre, CEDIN.

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Hence, it is also possible to visually assess the reach of norms we take for granted

as being universal. Additionally, we hope that the mapping of regional interpretations

and practices of “global” norms will allow us to identify whether these normative

regionalisms do construct coexistent regional clusters of different “international”

normative systems within the system-level institutions governing international society.

This mapping exercise hopes to contribute to the English School research agenda by

trying to trace a clearer picture of the normative and institutional borders within

international society, thus providing an additional tool for understanding how regional

norms and practice constitute, interact and redefine the global international society.

Re-thinking Regions in English School

Notwithstanding the recent emerging interest in the study of regions within the

English School thinking, it still remains fairly underdeveloped. As previously argued

by Hurrell, regions feature most heavily either in the English School’s historical

narratives on the expansion of international society or in limited, ad hoc applications

of the School’s conceptual framework within freely defined geographical areas

(2007). The expansion of International Society has, for instance, been narrated as

the universalisation of European norms and practices (Bull and Watson, 1984).

According to this view, regionally specific factors were mostly assumed to have been

either suppressed or assimilated by the centuries of colonial rule resulting in one

more or less undifferentiated second-order society constituted by a wide-reaching set

of primary institutions. Thus, several distinct International Societies were absorbed

and became amalgamated into one (i.e. the European International Society) through

the processes of colonisation and decolonisation. A similar argument is contained in

Buzan and Little’s work on historical, pre-modern international systems: separate

civilizational areas with merely ‘linear’ (limited, occasional and one-dimensional)

interactions between them (Buzan and Little, 2000). This contrasts with the global,

multi-ordinate international society of today.

Nevertheless, there is a body of English School scholarship that recognises the

importance of studying the regional and accepts the fact that the institutions of

international society can vary strongly across the globe. However, the English School

approach of regions remains mostly issue-specific and theoretically diverse.

Examples of regional approaches within the English School include, among others,

European integration (Fei, 2005), the specific influence of rising or established Great

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Powers (Russia, China) on parts of international society (MacFarlane, 2003, Paami,

2007, Zhang, 2001), the role of religion (specifically Islam) in the international order

(Piscatori, 2003), the Middle East (Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez, 2009) and the

varying practices of sovereignty or human rights in international society (Jackson

Preece, 1997, Jackson, 1990, Jackson, 1998). Thus, even though these works

undoubtedly represent a great contribution to the debate on regions, they tend to

analyse specific regions as a single case study and thereby treat the region almost

as a minor-scale international society. Questions about the relation and dynamics

between the regional and the global still remain largely understudied.

In fact, the possibility that there is a degree of normative interaction amongst the

international and regional societies’ primary institutions highlights the likelihood of

another complementary side to the study of regions. Regions are usually defined by

a set of intrinsic geographic and institutional characteristics that construct a certain

common identity that both form the idea of region at the same time as

distinguishing/differentiating it from both other regions as well as the global.

Nevertheless, as identities are mutually constructed within international and regional

societies, then the problem can also be approached from the point of view of a

system level international society. It is this latter possibility that is the focus of this

article, i.e. namely that the different interpretations and application of global norms by

states can also construct regional sets of what are essentially common patterns of

practices that, in turn, construct normative regions within the primary institutions of

international society (regionalism).

International Society’s Varying Norms and Institutions

As suggested above, we posit the existence of spatially distinct deviations from the

global-level normative structure of International Society. Regional variations emerge

through territorially bounded, local applications and interpretations of the institutions

of an international society that displays variations in the application of its global

normative fabric, without necessarily obviating its coherence at the global level.

There are at least two possible causes for this spatial variation of norms and primary

institutions. The first, and more obvious, lies in differences in the interpretation and

practical application of the shared norms and values of international society. The

second, and far less obvious, relates to the intrinsically dynamic nature of the

normative structure of interstate society – as contained within its primary institutions.

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In this section, we shall consider these two forms of regional variations in global

norms.

Regional variations in the Operationalisation of the Norms of Primary Institutions

Differences in how global norms are, in fact, interpreted, applied and followed (or not)

can occur due to dissimilarities in how actors understand, interpret, and apply

institutional norms. Different societies/regions can have diverse approaches and

worldviews that affect how they interact: they can be informed by contrasting

interaction cultures, they can possess different interaction capacity and can be

limited by varying interaction technologies. In fact, March and Olsen demonstrate that

institutions are created through a social process of institutionalisation that “involves

the development of practices and rules in the context of using them” (1998:948). This

distinction is relevant since it focuses our attention upon the pragmatic, performative

dimension of normative communication.

Much of the literature on norms that is associated with communication theory takes a

step in the right direction by linking norms and interactions to the construction of

identities. Having said that, it is not only necessary to incorporate subjective

intervening variables, such as interpretation(s) and performance(s) into norm

literature, but also to account for the fact the communication/ transmission of

meaning is not necessarily always clear and without ‘noise’.5 This is crucial because

the same norm or rule can be interpreted and/or operationalised differently across

interstate society. This causes not only a single rule to become a series of different

norms across time and space but also to acquire regional particularities. In short, the

existence of spatial variations in the operationalisation of rules must be accounted for

as this directly impacts norms. In other words, such variations can deeply affect how

we conceptualise and understand the study of regions in international relations.

Thus, it is necessary to understand that in most cases, even rules that are formally

similar can be applied differently according to the particular institutional context in

which these norms operate (Kratochwil, 1989:25-28, Reus-Smit, 1997:556).

Positivists such as Hart and Austin, try to explain this phenomenon exclusively by

5 The concept of noise in communication theory was introduced by Shannon and Weaver SHANNON, C. E. & WEAVER, W. 1949. The mathematical theory of communication, Urbana, University of Illinois Press. and refers to any “barrier to communication that may weaken or destroy a message that is trying to be relayed” UNISON. 2010. Using Effective Communications to Create Direction. The Times 100: Case Study 100 [Online]. Available: http://www.thetimes100.co.uk/studies/file-download--38-253-713.php [Accessed 20th September 2010]..

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showing the material differences that exist between norms and rules (Dworkin,

1967:19). Nevertheless, studies focusing on the empirical application of norms and

rules demonstrate that even rules that are formally similar tend to be operationalised

differently across distinct societies or different periods of time. This is so because

institutions are also formed by the culture-specific principles and values that shape

their creation, interpretation and application (i.e. their normative architecture). In the

same vein, the existence of regionally specific culturally or historically-informed

systems of value can be another reason for a regional variation in the application and

interpretation of global norms.

According to Buzan, a “conventional understanding of values in the social sense is:

the moral principles and beliefs or accepted standards of a person or social group”

(2004b:164). Taken as ‘moral principles’ or ‘accepted standards’, values can thus be

considered as personal or collective cognitive considerations that affect the weight

each actor gives to the possible course of actions available to him/her in order to

achieve a specific objective. In short, as personal or collective cognitive

considerations, values do not necessarily constitute a rational option. Instead we

believe that values can constitute, and can also be defined as, the cognitive

framework that not only guides an actor in his/her rational choice in concrete

situations but that also influences his/her perception of the circumstances/reality. In

this sense, in contrast to principles, values have a strong emotional (cathectic)6

component (Kratochwil, 1989:64). It is therefore values that attribute

“appropriateness or inappropriateness” factor to social norms and rules.

This is important because values can be abstract7 and consequently can easily

traverse state or institutional boundaries and become regional in the contemporary

context. Thus, values hold a great cognitive spillover capacity ‘inter-penetrating’ from

one state to another or indeed from one primary institution to another. Such an inter-

penetration of values frequently pressures states or institutions (albeit in different

ways and to varying degrees) to consolidate norms and create rules aimed at

securing either the originally existing or the newly introduced values/ideas. As a

consequence, the consolidation of values specific to a certain region can impact

shared notions of what is appropriate and what is not, or even how a norm or rule

6 The Webster dictionary defines cathectic as “invested with mental or emotional energy”.7 It is worth noting that values can become less abstract as they are institutionalised into norms or rules or act as principles. For further discussion see Canotilho CANOTILHO, J. J. 1998. Direito Constitucional e Teoria da Constituição, Coimbra, Almedina.; Dworkin DWORKIN, R. M. 1967. The Model of Rules. The University of Chicago Law Review, 35, 14-46. and Miranda MIRANDA, J. 1996. Manual de Direito Constitucional, Coimbra, Coimbra Editora..

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should be interpreted and applied within or in relation to that specific region. As such,

values are a major analytical variable for the study of regionalisation, as regional and

sub-global changes in shared values that orient the interpretation and application of,

norms, rules and institutions of a community can generate quite significant shifts in

the meaning of a global norm. Thus, identifying which and how shared values are

institutionalised regionally/sub-globally and scrutinising their relation with global

values is an important mechanism for studying spatial variations in the institutions of

international society.

Understanding that institutional norms can vary regionally due to regional differences

in their operationalisation also helps to solve two problems common in most IR

approaches to the study of norms. For one, most theories presuppose that the

communication between the content of the norm and its recipient(s) is

straightforward. However, subjective and contextual interpretations can change the

meaning of a norm even if the formal substantive content of the norm remains the

same. This means that a single global norm can, in fact, mutate into several

substantially deviating interpretations of that norm. Another hitherto neglected factor

is how regional differences in the operationalisation and institutionalisation of norms

into rules (for example through reservations in treaties or through the domestic

adaptation of international law) can also engender disparities between the individual

and regional interpretations of norms on the one hand and the original intended

meaning of international rules on the other.

An interesting example is the global institutionalisation of a series of rules countering

the financing of terrorism and terror-related activities with the Global War on Terror

(GWoT). These rules consolidated the fight against financing terrorism as a legal

obligation in interstate society and in this process institutionalised the financial

monitoring and sanction systems. There was an overall acceptance and

institutionalisation of these new rules by a significant number of actors in interstate

society. Amongst various actors that have accepted these new rules one can identify

both states, the most important international organisations involved with the financial

markets, as well as an increasing number of private financial actors. As these norms

are becoming almost universally internalised within interstate society, they are

inevitably provoking a degree of change in the operationalisation of financial flows.

Thus, at first glance, it appears that the GWoT has triggered a ‘norm cascade’ within

the primary institution of finance. Yet, at the same time, both the reach and the

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normative meaning of this process of generalisation and symbolisation should not be

overestimated.

The institutionalisation - and consequently the operationalisation - of these rules is

not a homogeneous process. These rules were introduced in interstate society by

international organisations mostly in the form of general resolutions and

recommendations that established broad principles but left the implementation and

institutionalisation of these rules to the discretion of individual states and private

financial agents. What has resulted is the institutionalisation of rules that share the

same set of basic principles but with very distinctive normative content. This process

of implementation and institutionalisation has thus culminated in the co-existence of

complex, inconsistent and sometimes even contradictory sets of regional, national

and corporate regulatory regimes. This complexity is further aggravated by the

rapidly changing government guidelines that set the parameters of all these

regulatory regimes.

For example, in October 2007 the American government quintupled the number of

situations that were up to that moment categorised as legal violations. Less than a

year later, the US once again substantially altered the guidelines regulating the

measures for combating the financing of terrorism and introduced, a month later, a

new roll of prohibited transactions (Deloitte, 2009:6). The American ‘freeze list’ alone

currently contains over 9,000 names of individuals, charities, organisations and

companies (Deloitte, 2009:8). At the same time, both the European Union and the

United Nations also simultaneously maintain their own lists (though recent efforts

have been made to harmonise all these freeze lists). To complicate matters even

more, regional legal regimes also influence how these freeze lists and government

guidelines are implemented. Recently, for instance, the European Court of Justice

declared that the UN sanctions lists were illegal within the jurisdiction of the

European Union.8 In short, to reiterate, the institutionalisation of these norms is so

heterogeneous that empirical evidence demonstrates that their application and

implementation leads to rules with very different, and sometimes contradictory,

normative content. So much so that even within the same banking organisation or

financial agency different regional rules are adopted in order to comply with (often)

contrasting local legal or administrative requirements.9

8 See the Kadi case.9 These results confirm the importance of contrasting the existing substantive content of a norm, rule or value with how they are, in fact, operationalised in interstate society. This is because norms can acquire a completely different meaning in their application. This has been a specific gap in most IR literature

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Thus, the main values of the fight against financing terrorism have been

institutionalised as rules with broadly similar principles in interstate society. In

practice however, the resulting rules do not share a single, unified normative content.

In other words, the GWoT undoubtedly figures as a tipping point in that it triggers a

norm cascade of rules countering the financing of terrorism. Nevertheless, upon

closer inspection, this norm cascade is one of form rather than of content. This is

because while formally, the normative content of the norms is roughly the same, the

individual and regional substantive interpretation and operationalisation of these

norms are so diverse that, in practice, they constitute different rules sharing like-

principles and addressing a common problem. This is very clearly a case of a primary

institution accommodating multiple normative solutions for mediating the same social

fact (Kawaguchi, 2003).

Variations in the normative architecture of “global” primary institutions

In the English School literature, the term “international institutions” is noticeably

aligned to a broad pattern of norms, principles and rules that constrain and guide an

actor’s behaviour. According to this usage, institutions are not actor-like

establishments but rather normative bodies with a structure-like role.10 Institutions in

this sense are much more heterogeneous, complex and enduring than mere

organisations or associations. Sovereignty, international law, markets, great power

management, war, diplomacy and environmental stewardship can all be counted as

examples of institutions falling within this understanding. Within English School, both

the terms ‘international’ and ‘institutions’ acquire a special significance. Institutions

are usually associated with Bull’s concept of order, i.e., “a pattern of activity that

sustains the elementary goals of the society of states or international society”

(1977:8).11 More precisely, Bull states that “[b]y an institution we do not necessarily

imply an organization or administrative machinery, but rather a set of habits and

practices towards the realization of common goals” (1977:74). He uses diplomacy,

war, balance of power, great power management, the state and international law all

as examples. In accordance with this use, Holsti defines international institutions as

addressing rules and norms, as most works tend to presuppose that specific norms or rules have a continuous and homogeneous meaning and, as such, do not change their content across time and space.10 In fact, looking at Hayek and Menger, Onuf shows that in economic theory the market was initially treated as a structure and gradually became treated as a complex institution ONUF, N. G. 2002. Institutions, Intentions and International Relations. Review of International Studies, 28, 211-228..11 These goals are security, sanctity of agreements, and protection of property rights BULL, H. 1977. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, New York, Palgrave..

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the “context within which the games of international politics are played. They

represent patterned (typical) actions and interactions of states, the norms, rules, and

principles that guide (or fail to guide) them, and the major ideas and beliefs of a

historical era” (2004:16). Holsti gives the examples of trade, diplomacy, war,

international law, the state, sovereignty, territoriality and colonialism while

simultaneously underscoring that this is by no means an exhaustive list. Buzan, in

turn, draws attention to the fact that although the English School authors use different

definitions of institutions, a general agreement on certain key features and roles can

be identified, namely:

“that they [institutions] are relatively fundamental and durable practices, that

are evolved more than designed; and

that they [institutions] are constitutive of actors and their patterns of

legitimate activity in relation to each other” (2004b:167).

In seeking to both consolidate the “conceptual clarity” in the study of institutions

(Buzan, 2004b:175) and to contribute to the English School’s research programme,

we adopt the term primary institutions to denote “relatively fundamental and durable

practices that are constitutive of actors and their patterns of activity in relation to each

other”. Likewise, the term secondary institutions will be used to designate “an

organisation or establishment founded for a specific purpose” (Buzan, 2004b:164) or

even “implicit or explicit principles, norms [,values] and decision-making procedures

around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”

(Krasner, 1983:2).

Primary institutions are more than just mere conglomerations of norms. Different

primary institutions have distinct functions, goals and roles. Each specific primary

institution is composed of a unique system of norms and values that give shape to

equally unique patterns of interaction. In fact, as Finnemore and Sikkink observe,

while the idea of norm “isolates single standards of behaviour”, the concept of

institutions “emphasize[s] the way in which behavioural rules are structured together

and interrelate” (1998:891). Thus, primary institutions are brought into being by the

consolidation of a systematic architecture of norms, rules and values.12

Characterising this architecture as systematic indicates that an institution’s cognitive

identity is formed and determined not only by its normative content but also by the

“shape” of its specific normative architecture. By architecture we mean the particular

12 Note that the architecture can be both consciously constructed and socially evolved.

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distribution of attributed meaning, the operational procedures and values involved in

an institution in a given time and social-space. In other words, the way these norms

are organised and the manner in which they interrelate with each other within an

institution holds a special meaning and helps to shape the institution’s own identity.13

Therefore, norms and institutions work as symbolic structures that mediate different

motivations and delineate patterns of behaviour. These patterns, in turn, construct

and become part of an actors’ perception(s) of reality and consequently constitutive

of their very identity. Since social reality is ever-changing, institutional norms are

bound to transform as institutions tend to adapt their norms in order to preserve their

functional objectives/goals. In turn, these transformations can have positive or

negative consequences as the shifts can either increase or a decrease the capacity

of the norm and institution to mediate social reality. Moreover, changes in the norms

and values of primary institutions can occur at multiple levels as social changes can

impact different normative levels of the same institution in many different ways.

At the most fundamental level, the fact the primary institutions vary their normative

architecture to adapt to regional social reality poses some interesting, and pertinent,

questions to the English School’s way of thinking. If regional characteristics can

engender significant changes in primary institutions of interstate society, what does

this tell us about how useful and/or stable primary institutions are as a concept? Even

more significantly, if regional interpretation/application of norms can transform and

inform primary institutions, does this mean that the primary institution of international

society are in essence a patchwork of regional social structures and, if so, does it

really qualify as ‘structure’? Is there such a thing as an (global) international society?

Thus, it is important to consider regional variances as a component of the shape of

the normative architecture of global primary institutions; the interpretation and local

application of global norms; and the non-linearity of norm life-cycles, all of which help

13 Some examples in the legal context can help to illustrate how institutional architecture matters. Imagine that the Brazilian constitution specifies certain rules about private property. Imagine that another country with a similar legal system has the exact same rules in its legal system but not in its constitution. Would it make any difference? The answer is yes. Brazilian rules would be subject to a series of procedural instances that are only applicable to constitutional law. Now imagine that the other country also has the same private property rules in its constitution. Would it be applied likewise? The answer is probably not. The Brazilian constitution in its preamble states that human rights are a guiding principle for domestic law. Thus, the private property laws have to be understood and applied by judges as being part of the human rights law. They would have to comply with procedures applied to the so-called “social function of property”. In this case, a person’s home is protected from being confiscated as all the property law is subjected to some features applicable to human rights rules (non revocable, immediate application, etc). The same applies to labour law. But what if the other country has the same guiding principle? Would the law then be applied the same way? Once again the answer is probably not. What is understood by social function would inevitably differ from country to country, from social context to social context.

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explain the phenomenon of normative change and geographic differentiation in

interstate society. Taking these considerations into account is also the first step

towards a non-monolithic approach to primary institutions by defining the overall

normative structure of such institutions as a nebula of norms composed by both

‘hard’ and ‘soft’ aspects in its structural quality. This approach enables us to rethink

our understanding of the relationships between normative change, regional and sub-

global normative variations and the interstate social structure. It also helps

accounting for the regional variations of global norms advancing our understanding of

both primary institutions and normative regionalism in general.

Taking a cue from Lakatos’ discussion about research programmes, it is possible to

imagine that the norms, values, rules, principles and procedures of primary

institutions are constructed and organised not only as a central normative core but

also around such a core. Thus, core sets of values and norms would be those that

determine the functional requisites/goals and form the normative identity of the

primary institution. Being defined by these core rules, the primary institution would

“protect” its capacity to mediate social reality and achieve its functions/goals through

a peripheral set of norms arranged around this core that, functioning as a ‘protective

belt’, would adapt not only to new social realities but also be sensitive to

accommodate regional variations.

Such a conceptualisation can provide an analytical and theoretical tool for helping

English School studies focus upon the regional variances of global-level primary

institutions, both in terms of variations in the operationalisation of a given norm, as

well as in terms of understanding how a single institution can have different

normative densities across geographical regions. In other words, how a single norm

or primary institution of international society can be more or less internalised across

regions or how different norms and values of a single primary institution can reflect

different degrees of internalisation and hence exhibit regional variations. Although

such an approach would definitely increase the complexity of analysis related to

primary institutions, it can also have a deep impact upon how the English School

understands not only the normative limits/borders of, but also membership in,

international society.

These tools can help drawing an even more systematic picture of the nature and

complexity of primary institutions and assist not only in identifying and characterising

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different social aspects of regional interstate societies, but also their transformations,

as well as their geographic (regional or sub-global) variations.

Regionalising Tendencies in International Society: The Diffusion of Human

Rights Conventions

If we understand the primary institution of international law in such a non-monolithic

systemic cluster of norms composed of a core and a periphery nebula, then by

establishing what are the main core and periphery norms of this institutions it might

be possible to geographically map its cognitive reach using a geographic information

system software (GIS). Thus, in order to map supposedly universal norms and

identify any possible traces of regionalism, we now turn to the main regional and

international human rights conventions in an attempt to visualise how the consent

with these norms are distributed in international society. It is important to note,

however, that what we term ‘human rights’ differs from the broader cosmopolitan

conception of human rights or humanitarian law as a value, idea or philosophy.

Instead, for this study it refers specifically to the legal system of rules known as

human rights, and as such, constitutes a subset within international law.

We hope this mapping will provide an insight of how deeply/shallowly different states

and regions internalize these universal norms. Of course, any mapping would provide

but an imperfect image as not only it is impossible to empirically establish and

quantify all the norms of a primary institution, but also the choice of which norms to

map and their placement in the core or periphery of the institution can be subject to

discussion. Additionally, this analysis would also require a very careful investigation

of the states’ practice regarding that specific norm. However, we take this as a first

step and believe that this is a very valuable exercise that can further develop our

understanding about the institutional shape and dynamics of international society and

possibly even eventually lead to a map of solidarity/pluralism in interstate society. If

nothing else, the present mapping draws a clear picture of the normative density of

shared universal human rights conventions.

We started by identifying on map 1 what are the main (core) international treaties on

the subject. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for

Human Rights, ten treaties of human rights can be considered as core: those

conventions of the International Bill of Human Rights (i.e., the Universal Declaration

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of Human Rights 194814, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

1966, and the international Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

1966) plus the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of

Genocide, International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial

Discrimination, Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against

Women, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment, Convention on the Rights of the Child, International

Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families,

International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced

Disappearance, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

Other important core indicators that were also considered as to give a clue of the

degree of internalization of international human rights norms by states included the

consent to “additional protocols” to those treaties (as they represent the state’s

acceptance to be monitored by the respective treaty monitoring bodies), and the

state’s consent to be subjected to the international human rights courts. This is

shown on maps 2 and 3, which encompass the ratification of regional human right

treaties that includes mechanisms of enforcement, and map 4 that shows the

ratification of additional protocols. To make the model more accurate, one would

need to add regionalization factors as intervening variables, such as state

reservations on those treaties and/or normative modifications that affect the treaty in

the process of incorporating it into domestic law. Reservations can also be an

important indicator of regionalization of global norms because, by definition, their

function is to bend how the norms of a treaty are applied to the state that ratified it. A

general overview of the number of reservations on the core treaties of human rights

that impact their normative content is shown in map 7.

As such, it is possible to map the formal consent with universal human rights rules in

international society by attributing each of the above-mentioned factors a different

weight as a variable. The variation on each attributed weight aimed to reflect where

(in either the core or periphery) that specific norm or practice is situated in the

normative nebulae. This was then empirically applied to each state. By feeding this

data into GIS software, we could draw a picture of both the universal/regional

character of human rights as well as map the density of these norms throughout

international society. The maps below show the preliminary results.

14 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is actually not a treaty but a resolution of the United Nations’ General Assembly.

14

In the first map, we considered the combined ratification of the 10 main universal

human rights treaties by states.

FIGURE 1

At first sight, map 1 seems to suggest that there is a near universal acceptance of the

international human rights instruments. In fact, 142 countries ratified 70% of the ten

main international human rights treaties. That is to say that 73.5% of the members of

the United Nations agreed to the legislation in question. The size and vast spatial

distribution of the spheres shown in the map as well as the intensity of the shaded

grey area reveals an apparently homogeneous diffusion of these norms even though

there is a higher density in Europe and Latin America.

FIGURE 2

This higher density in Europe and Latin America becomes more apparent when we

consider the international regional human rights instruments. Although regional by

nature, the compliance with existing international regional human rights norms is very

significant for two important reasons. First, it not only reveals a near lack of regional

human rights instruments in the Middle East, Asia and Oceania but also pinpoints the

patently low adherence of the United States. Second, and most importantly, the

regional instruments are considered key in implementing regional human rights

courts. The consent to these courts’ jurisdiction can be an important indicator of the

degree to which states internalise human rights norms as key regional human rights

treaties create regional courts with binding powers as a mechanism of enforcement,

compliance and control.

It is also crucial to recognize that there are important qualitative differences amongst

the regional human rights systems that also reinforce the idea of regionalism in the

application and practice of human rights in international society. For example, The

European Court of Human Rights is the only regional system in which individuals

have direct access to the court (after the protocols 9 and 11). Another interesting

example is the case of the African Human Rights instruments that are, unlike the

general debate on human rights, centred on the rights of peoples rather than on the

rights of individuals in order to be better suited to mediate the specifically African

social reality.

15

FIGURE 3

As we sum up the consent to both regional and main universal human rights

conventions in map 3, a normative fracture become clear in the spatial diffusion of

these norms in international society. Map 3 reveals a pattern of significant

concentration in Europe and Latin America and, to a lesser degree Africa. A time

series analysis of ratification offers a possible explanation for the high normative

density in Latin America: the urge of many countries to be seen as democratic and

playing according to the “rules of the game” after an extended period of military

dictatorships in order to be fully accepted as members of international society.

FIGURE 4

In an attempt to also observe the more practical commitment of states to the above

instruments, we also mapped states ratification of additional protocols. The

importance of these protocols lies in the fact that they create enforcement

mechanisms within the United Nations system. These maps are revealing as they

clearly illustrate the limited compliance to instruments that supposedly increase the

commitment of states with universal human rights norms (also reflected on map 3).

On map 4, we can observe the ratification of three core additional protocols and four

non-core additional protocols. It is interesting to note that the upper map shows a

heterogeneous distribution in both the spatial diffusion as well as in the normative

density again with a greater concentration in Europe and Latin America. The lower

map does have a more homogeneous distribution, which suggests that states are

more prone to consent with less central enforcement mechanisms than with core

ones.

FIGURE 5

As we amalgamate the ratification of both blocks of additional protocols, a belt of low

normative density is clearly formed linking the countries of Southeast and South Asia,

passing through the Middle East and finishing up at the United States of America – in

a zone somewhat similar to Mackinder’s “Inner crescent” or Spykman’s “Rimland”.

This normative architecture brings into question the idea of a homogeneous

widespread universality of the international human rights legal instruments.

16

FIGURE 6

Map 6, in its turn, exhibits the clear difference between the ratification of universal

human rights conventions and the acceptance of enforcement mechanisms that

would increase the commitment of states. The dark circles represent the ratification

of universal human rights conventions and the size of the circles indicate the number

of ratifications. The light circles represent the ratification of additional protocols that

create mechanisms of enforcement and their size also indicates the number of

ratifications. Hence, in the cases in which the dark circles predominate over the light

ones, there are proportionally a greater number of ratifications of universal human

rights conventions than additional protocols. On the other hand, in the cases where

the light colour predominates, it indicates the ratification of both universal

conventions and additional protocols. We can see the clear existence of regional

differences in the patterns of ratification of both types of instruments. Map 6

highlights that two of the strongest economic powers, i.e. the United States of

America and China, present a clear gap between the consent to universal

conventions of human rights and the near zero consent to additional protocols or

mechanisms of enforcement.

Another interesting spatial pattern revealed is, once again, the belt of low ratification

of additional protocols that is formed along the above-mentioned ‘Rimland’. This once

again confirms the existence of a low-density normative belt. It is also hard not to

note that this is an area that has been historically marked by a great number of socio-

political conflicts. Thus, this map suggests that the dissemination of human rights

values, norms and rules in international society are still influenced by political issues

and considerations and even more so in the case of the above mentioned belt.

FIGURE 7

Finally, the United Nations’ Guide to Practice on Reservations define reservation as

“a unilateral statement […] to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions

of the treaty in their application to that state or international organisation” (UNILC,

2011:2). Thus, reservations can also provide important signs of regionalisation of

international norms. Hence, when cataloguing the reservations made by states on all

main international human rights treaties we classified them under two categories:

procedural (those which did not directly affect the normative content of the treaty)

and material reservations (those which did affect the normative content of the treaty).

17

In map 7, we only considered material reservations as they change the normative

content of the treaties in a specific way. What map 7 reveals then is a high

percentage of reservations per treaties in both Europe as well as in the case of states

that ratified fewer treaties. In the former case, this result may be explained by the

high complexity of the Communitarian (European) Legal system and the consequent

need to make these international instruments compatible with both European and

domestic law. In the latter case, states that ratified less human rights treaties

proportionally implemented more material reservations thereby inversely following

the normative fracture line and bolstering the hypothesis that these states had a

lower de facto commitment to these norms.

As a whole, these maps corroborates the results of the qualitative analyse of

differences in the regional compliance and deviations of the universal norms. At this

stage we considered the state ratifications of other universal and regional human

rights treaties; contents of reservations; measures to internalize and implement the

international conventions as domestic law; public declarations; alongside with the

number of complaints against the state in both the international courts and monitoring

bodies as indicators for the periphery norms of Human Rights. Both qualitative and

visual data seems to suggest that while the rules and legal procedures of what can

be seen as ‘solidarist international law’ may formally have a near universal reach and

thus legally apply to all, the overall de facto internalization of solidarist values in the

international society still remains shallow. More significantly, we can infer that the de

facto internalisation of solidarist international law has an irregular geography

suggesting that the primary institutions of international society can display important

regional variances in their ‘global’ norms, values and rules. In the case of human

rights, this is because while the legal procedures, treaties and other formal aspects of

solidarist international law are almost universally accepted, there are striking

differences in the degree to which states internalize and comply with the values

underlying these legal aspects. Solidarist international law values operate with

strongly internalisation mainly within European international society where they are

broadly accepted, but they are still contested or not fully internalised beyond that

group even though these values are innately cosmopolitan and have a strong

solidarist appeal.

Such contestation partially exists because some states/cultures not only do not

recognise the universalist claims of (European) solidarist international law but also

18

may see them as vanguardist/imperialist. But this contestation can also be explained

by the fact that although these values are innately cosmopolitan and have a solidarist

appeal they are in tension with a somewhat pluralist creational environment even

within Western international society.

Solidarist international law can pull states

equally in the direction of either solidarist or pluralist projects in interstate society.

This is because the ‘solidarism’ in solidarist international law is still thin and lacks an

efficient enforcement system. Not only are the rules of solidarist international law

constantly breached by states but also states have deliberately designed a normative

system that lacks efficient mechanisms of coercion and enforcement, which serves to

further undermine the credibility of these values. In short, only a few legal

mechanisms of enforcing solidarist international law exist in reality. Moreover, there

are very few legal bodies that individuals can turn to in order to legally challenge a

violation of their solidarist legal rights in the international realm. The European Court

of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (through the

mediation of the Human Rights Commission) are presently the only two such

international tribunals active as the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights

Court remains very limited in its practice.

Within the scope of the United Nations (UN), although the Security Council (SC) can

address human rights violations when they represent a threat to international peace

and security, human right issues have been mainly addressed by UN human rights

bodies and so-called ‘treaty bodies’ which “consist of a committee of independent

experts that monitor compliance by the state parties [along] with the obligations they

assumed by ratifying [universal human rights] conventions” (Buergenthal, 2006:789).

However, these UN human rights bodies and treaty commissions have no binding

powers and compliance is monitored through the submission of state reports and

specialist recommendations. As such, mechanisms of control are limited to the

publication of these findings in order to mobilise public opinion and exercise ‘the

power of embarrassment’, so as to pressure states into altering their behaviour.

Furthermore, a “great weakness of the UN system, particularly its Charter-based

system, is its susceptibility to politicization. Politicization has resulted in the frequent

condemnation of certain violators of human rights while others, some even more

blatant, escape criticism” (Buergenthal, 2006:791). The contrasts in the UN approach

for the situations in former Yugoslavia and in Darfur are a striking example of this

discrepancy (Neuer, 2006:1). Thus, the United Nations’ timely intervention in

19

Yugoslavia sharply differs from its response in Darfur

where the UN took nearly two

years before it reacted to what has been termed the “greatest case of mass human

rights abuse” (Neuer, 2006:1) in recent history. Unlike universal bodies such as the

UN, the regional human rights court and the ICC are exceptions when it comes to

exercising binding powers, but even so, their intentionally designed limited reach

restrict the powers they possess and employ in reality.

Furthermore, the system of sanctions exercised by both these bodies in the case of

non-compliance remains weak. The consolidation of solidarist international law was

achieved by careful normative design on part of states and lacks efficient

mechanisms of coercion/enforcement. Solidarist international law rules are limited by

both state interests and ideas of territorial sovereignty, as well as a deep fear of what

implications ‘harder’, more onerous, laws would have on both of these. To reiterate,

Suganami and Linklater (2006:132) argue that the absence of efficient mechanisms

of coercion/enforcement to protect solidarist values is, at least partially, rooted in the

deep-seated fear that relaxing pluralist principles would enable stronger states in the

international system to promote their own interests under the cover of protecting

solidarist international law. At the same time, stronger states in turn may fear that

strong solidarist international law rules would potentially limit their powers by

generating more onerous laws for international order. This attitude has therefore

fostered a calculated and careful institutionalisation of solidarist international law on

part of the states in international society. Thus, although enforcement is not a

necessary condition for solidarism (Buzan, 2004:152-154), the deliberate lack of

enforcement powers limits the effectiveness of solidarist international law rules and

may be seen as one of the main reasons why states agree to be bound by such rules

in the first place. Thus, the lack of willingness on part of states and entire regions to

implement effective mechanisms of coercion/enforcement in combination with the

selective application of solidarist rules may not only reflect a reasoned calculation

about costs, capabilities and/or responsibilities, but may also signify a lack of sincere

belief in those values by many states and regions. Either way, the internalisation of

solidarist international law follows an unequal geography amongst regions and

remains overall relatively shallow in international society.

Conclusion

20

This article starts by discussing how the theoretical study of regions is still

underdeveloped within the English School framework. While there are some

important studies about specific regional international societies and theories such as

Regional Security Complex Theory have, they remain disparate, developing in the

absence of clear conceptualisations of ‘regions’ and specially of the interaction

between the regional and the global. Although important for the debate these

disconnected approaches have not yet provided the English School with the

necessary concepts and theoretical framework for developing this research agenda

in a scenario in which the regional specificities of international politics are becoming

ever more evident. With the study of the regional becoming an important trend in

International Relations, this leaves the English School with a considerable conceptual

blind spot. As pointed out by Buzan (2004a) and Hurrell (2007), there are strong

reasons to argue against an exclusively global, “one world” approach and the

necessity of “bringing geography back” into the English School. Additionally, vital

questions such as how to apply the concept of regions to central concepts of English

School such as ‘International System’, ‘International Society’ and ‘World Society’ (or

interhuman, interstate and transnational societies in Buzan’s approach) are still

largely unaddressed and represent an important omission or even a “strange silence”

(Zhang, 2002) in the historical narrative of this intellectual paradigm of IR.

However, this article focuses mainly on another aspect of the regions: regionalism.

The idea of regionalism rests upon the assumption that primary institutions are not

homogenous in their operation and normative design. Instead, we propose that the

normative design of a primary institution is somewhat similar to a nebulae: it contain

a relatively immutable and monolithic core that determines its function and role in

international society; but it is also constructed at its periphery by more variable

norms, values and principles that tend to protect and facilitate the application of the

core norms and values of the institution in practice. Moreover, this variable

‘normative periphery’ undergoes spatial patterning within international society, and it

is this that we term ‘regionalism’. By defining such geographically patterned

frameworks, this work takes the view that the practices, norms, principles and values

of the institutions governing international society are subject to specific applications

and interpretations that deviate from their global ‘meaning’ in geographically defined

regional ways.

Understanding the specificities of the non-monolithic normative architecture of

primary institutions and its regional variations also helps to answer some of the

21

questions about the structural/conceptual value of the primary institutions. If global

primary institutions can vary regionally, this raises key questions about the

usefulness/stability of the very concept of primary institutions and if social structure is

characteristically fluid. Moreover, if a social structure is characteristically and

permanently fluid as well as varies regionally, is it really structure? Throughout this

article, we found ample evidence that global primary institutions have the ability to

vary regionally without loosing their global level identity.

Thus, even though the regionalism undoubtedly impacts the primary institutions of

interstate society they tend to retain their normative identity. However, addition of

regional variations in global norms and institutions acts as a driving force to generate

a more complex interstate society. At the same time, primary institutions were found

to be stable in spite of possessing an inherent and permanent degree of normative

fluidity that is capable of accommodating regional differentiations. This is a key

finding of this work and is amply substantiated with empirical data. In short, despite

an inherent normative fluidity and regional variances, primary institutions can (and

do) still form, and function as, structure(s).

The core-periphery normative architecture of primary institutions offers an interesting

explanation for this phenomena: the structural and “global” property of primary

institutions and their normative identities are preserved by the continuity of their

normative core (hard aspect) which has its capacity to mediate reality protected by

the adaptability and variation of its peripheral norms (the protective belt) to both an

ever-changing social reality and regional social realities (fluid or soft peripheral

aspect). The changes and transformations of such nebula of norms (and perhaps

even of core norms) to adapt to new social or regional realities can, therefore

engender either a degenerative or a progressive process impacting both the

institution’s capacity to influence actor behaviour and its overall authority within a

given international society. Clusters of differences/similarities in the

operationalization of norms of the soft normative belt of the primary institutions can

come to delineate relevant elements of the social identity of regional societies within

the global international society. Therefore, the regional can be a far more important

component of international society itself than previously thought.

In this model, it is possible to argue for the existence of both close interactions, as

well as different levels of relationships, between the global international society and

regional international societies. The global international society can be thought of as

22

being comprised of a core set of practices, values and norms that construct the

normative identity of global primary institutions. These core norms of the global

primary institutions also mediate social reality through a peripheral set of norms. As

these peripheral norms can accommodate regional variations and differences, it is

within this intersection i.e., between the peripheral global norms and regional

particularities, that significant normative interactions between regional and global

practices happen in international society. However, regions evolve not only in

response to their regional or internal dynamics but also due to their interaction(s) with

other regional and global international societies. With these interactions, regional

norms and practices can become incorporated, amalgamated and transformed

within, or indeed even be rejected by, global institutions and its normative core.

Needless to say, these interactions are not necessarily smooth and frequently also

(co)exist in a state of tension with - and can even challenge - what are assumed to

be core global norms and practices.

Thus, regional variances of global norms are important in shaping the normative

architecture of global primary institutions. Thus to reiterate, global and regional

societies can, and do, co-exist though not always in a straightforward or harmonious

manner. This means that regional international society can be either supportive or in

dispute with international society. In other words, global international society can

either allow the development of regional international societies or prevent them. The

possibility of a strong normative clash between contradicting regional or global

practices and institutions is ever present. Additionally, although the normative

architecture of primary institutions and its norms are mostly evolved, it can also be

deliberately designed. Consequently, as instances of colonialism and imperialism

throughout history made clear, it is equally plausible that in certain circumstances

states attempt to portray particular regional values, norms or practices as being

universal and endeavor to frame them as core universal norms and institutions.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that the existence of tensions does not mean that

regional international societies undermine global international society. On the

contrary, the strength of international society is at least partially founded upon its

capacity to accommodate and co-exist with regional societies without loosing its

identity, even in the face of increasing regionalization. Being global is not exactly the

same as being homogeneous. Much of the strength of global norms depends on the

23

states’ internalization of these norms and values. It also depends on the expansion of

the cognitive borders of these norms, which occurs by offering new elements of

identity that may attract actors who did not previously share this identity or

expectation. In this process of expansion, it is possible to engender a consolidation

(i.e. deeper internalisation, a thickening of values and rules, a broader acceptance,

etc) of the global norm in question. Furthermore, the capacity of global norms to

adapt, accommodate and accept regional particularities while preserving their core

identity can constitute a great attraction for actors that are deeply embedded in

regional practices.

Of course given this interaction between the global and regional, a key question that

emerges and must be tackled is whether regions exist prior to the acceptance and

application of norms by a group of states or if the acceptance and application of

norms by a group of states is the defining element of a region. As mentioned above,

regions are usually defined by a set of intrinsic geographic and institutional

characteristics that construct a certain common identity that both forms the idea of a

region at the same time as distinguishing/differentiating it from both other regions as

well as the global. Hence regions can exist prior to the acceptance and application of

norms by a given group of states. Their previous existence can in fact be responsible

for the occurrence of regionally shared values, which create a patterned common

interpretation of global norms. However, even though this study focuses on the

phenomena of regionalism rather than regions, it demonstrates that common

institutions, norms, practices and values are as important a component of regions as

are geographic characteristics. Thus, as identities are mutually constructed within

international and regional societies, the application of norms by a group of states can

also become a defining element of regionalism and eventually evolve into a region. In

defining a region the sense of identity becomes as important, if not more significant,

than the geographical element. This understanding also opens up the theoretical

possibility to think about “normative regions” which would, in turn, allow one to

consider regions within transnational society. Different interpretations and application

of global norms by states can construct regional sets of what are essentially common

patterns of practices that, in turn, can eventually construct normative regions within

the primary institutions of international society (regionalism).

Finally, the ultimate purpose of this article was to be a first step in widening the

English School’s research agenda on regions – one involving the comprehensive

24

mapping of the institutions of international society using the flexible toolbox

elaborated above. As such, this article should be seen as just the first step in a far

longer and more complex journey.

25

Annex 1: Regional Conventions used in Map 2

American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San José, Costa Rica”

Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic,

Social and Cultural Rigths "Protocol of San Salvador"

Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty

Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture

Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons

Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication

of Violence Against Women “Convention of Belém do Pará”

Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Political Rights to Women

Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of

Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities

Inter-American Convention against Racism, Racial Discrimination and Related Forms of Intolerance

Inter-American Convention against All Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance

Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Forms of

Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance

Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism

African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights

African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child

Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa

Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

Protocol to the Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

European Social Charter

Protocol n. 2 to the Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, conferring upon the

European Court of Human Rights competence to give advisory opinions

Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

European Social Charter (revised)

26

Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,

concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances

Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women

and domestic violence

Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings

European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or

Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Protocol No. 2 to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture

and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Annex 2 – Universal and Regional Conventions Used in Map 3

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Convention on the Rights of the Child

International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of

All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families

International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San José, Costa Rica”

Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights

in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rigths "Protocol of San Salvador"

Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty

27

Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture

Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons

Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence

Against Women “Convention of Belém do Pará”

Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Political Rights to Women

Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination

Against Persons with Disabilities

Inter-American Convention against Racism, Racial Discrimination and Related Forms of Intolerance

Inter-American Convention against All Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance

Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Forms of Crimes

Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance

Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism

African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights

African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child

Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa

Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

Protocol to the Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

European Social Charter

Protocol n. 2 to the Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,

conferring upon the European Court of Human Rights competence to give advisory opinions

Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

European Social Charter (revised)

Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,

concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances

Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women

and domestic violence

Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings

European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or

28

Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Protocol No. 2 to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture

and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Annex 3 – Additional Protocols Used in Map 5

Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

aiming at the abolition of the death penalty

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of Children, Child prostitution and Child Pornography

Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

Annex 4 – Conventions Used in Map 6

A) “Core” Human Rights Conventions

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Convention on the Rights of the Child

International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers

and Members of Their Families

International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance

29

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

B) “Main” Additional Protocols

Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

aiming at the abolition of the death penalty

30

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