art7 executive department sec 14

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Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito G. Arcialla vs. Salvador Misonand Guillermo Carague

No. L-79974 December 17, 1987En Banc

FACTS: When Salvador Mison was appointed to the Office of the Commissioner ofBureau of Customs, this petition for prohibition filed by taxpayers, lawyers, membersof the IBP and professors of Constitutional was filed on the grounds that saidappointment is in violation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution for itwas not approved by the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE: Whether said appointment is indeed unconstitutional basing onSection 16, Article VII.

RULING:

Misons appointment is constitutional. Sec. 16, Article VII states that:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of theCommission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces fromthe rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments arevested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of theGovernment whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and thosewhom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest theappointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or inthe heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. x x x

It is clear that the first group shall need the confirmation of the CoA. Also, itcan be seen from reviewing the records of deliberation of the 1986 ConstitutionalCommission that it has been clearly stated that appointments to the second and thirdgroups of officers can be made by the President without the confirmation of the CoA.In the issue at hand, it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of

Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointmentswhere the consent of the CoA is required.

Furthermore, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint theCommissioner of the Bureau of Customs under Sec. 601 of R.A. 1937 which statesthat Sec. 601. x x x The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Customsshall be appointed by the President of the Philippines.

Calderon vs CaraleG.R. No. 91636: Calderon vs Carale

AppointmentCannot Be Expanded by Law

FACTS: In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code.RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and otherCommissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject toconfirmation by the CoA. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nomineesof the sector which nominated the predecessor. Pursuant to the law, Cory assignedCarale et al as the Chairman and the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC, theappointment was not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation.

Calderon questioned the appointment saying that w/o the confirmation bythe CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon asserted that RA6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained inSec16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation bythe Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the Presidentadditional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec 16 of Article 7 of theConstitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by theCoA of appointments extended by the President to government officersadditional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16,Art. 7 of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by theCoA.

HELD: It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, thereare four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4)groups are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other publicministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or navalcaptain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are nototherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by lawvest in the President alone.

T he SC agreed with the Sol-Gen, confirmation by the CoA is requiredexclusively for the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers,consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, andother officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution,

such as the members of the various Constitutional Commissions. With respect to theother officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and to


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those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation bythe Commission on Appointments is required.

"Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list of officerswhose appointments must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, theConstitution would have said so by adding the phrase "and other officers required bylaw" at the end of the first sentence, or the phrase, "with the consent of theCommission on Appointments" at the end of the second sentence. Evidently, ourConstitution has significantly omitted to provide for such additions.

Jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of theConstitution

1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidentialappointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, thoseofficers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in thepresident (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of theconstitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).

2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other governmentofficers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officerswhom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of

the Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congresscreates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in anunconstitutional manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as amongthose whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.

Manalo vs Sistoza312 scra 239

Appointments

FACTS: Petitioner, Jesulito Sistoza question the constitutionality and legality of theappointments issued by former Pres. Corazon Aquino to the respondent senior

officers of the PNP who were promoted to the rank of Chief Superintendent andDirector without their appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointmentsfor confirmation. The said police officers tool their Oath of Offices and assumed theirrespective positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, underthe then Secretary Salvador Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salariesand other emoluments. The petitioner brought before this petition for prohibition, asa tax payer suit to the SC to assail the legality of subject appointment anddisbursement thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of the senior officers of the PNP isvalid even without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

HELD: The SC held that the appointments are valid. The court has the inherent

authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the

limit alienated by the fundamental law. When it does the courts will not hesitate tostrike down such unconstitutionality.

ATTY . ELPIDIO SORIANO III VS. REUBENLISTA, ET AL.G.R. No. 153881. March 24, 2003

Facts: Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted by thePresident to Vice Admiral, Rear Admiral, Commodore, Naval Captain, and theyassumed office without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA).

Petitioner, as a taxpayer, filed a petition with the Supreme Court questioningthe constitutionality of their assumption of office, which requires confirmation of theCOA.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners promotion by the President wasunconstitutional.

Held: Petitioner has no locus standi. A party bringing a suit challenging theconstitutionality of an act or statute must show not only that the law or act is invalid,but also that he has sustained, or is in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining

some direct injury as a result of its enforcement and not merely that he suffersthereby in some indefinite way.

The instant petition cannot even be classified as a taxpayers suit becausepetitioner has no interest as such and this case does not involve the exercise byCongress of its taxing power. Pursuant to Executive Order of President Ramos, thePCG was transferred from the Department of National Defense to the Office of thePresident, and later to the Department of Transportation and Communication(DOTC).

Rufino vs. Endriga

Facts: Two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under rule 45 of the 1997rules of civil procedure.

First case, GR No. 139554, represented by the Solicitor General, collectivelyknown as the RUFINO group seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appealsand the Resolution denying the motion for the reconsideration.

CA's decision (to be set aside)1.Declaring petitioners, ENDRIGA group to have a clear right to their respectiveoffices elected by the CCP board up to expiration of 4-year term2.Ousting respondents, Rufinogroup, except respondent Tantoco, from their respective offices and excluding themtherefrom3.Dismissing case against Tantoco.
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Second case, GR No. 139565, the Endriga group, seeks to assail the Resolutionissued by the Court of Appeals in same case insofar as it denied their Motion forImmediate Execution of the Decision.

History of PD 15:

Marcos - In 1966, Marcos created EO 30 "Creation of the Cultural Center ofthe Philippines" as a trust governed by a Board of Trustees of 7 members to preserveand promote Philippine culture. The original founding trustees were all pointed by

Pres. Marcos1972, after declaration of Martial Law- Pres. Marcos issued PD 15 which convertedCCP into a non-municipal public corporation free from "the pressure or influence ofpolitics" and increased 7 members to 9. EO 1058 issued in 1985 increased 9 to 11.

Aquino - 1986, after People Power Resolution, Aquino asked incumbent CCPtrustees for courtesy resignation and appointed new trustees to the Board.

Ramos - started Endriga group

Estrada 0 appointed 7 new trustees to CCP board with term of 4 years toreplace the Endriga group, except for Tantoco. Thus Rufino group took respectiveoaths of office and assumed performance of their duties in 1999.

Endriga vs. Estrada

Endriga group files Petition for Quo Warranto questioning Pres. Estrada'sappointment of 7 new member of CCP board.

Alleged that under Sec. 6 (b) of PD 15 -"vacancies of the CCP Board shall befilled byelection by majority vote of trustees held at next regular meeting" -only whenthe board is entirely vacant may the President of the Phil. fi ll such vacancies, acting inconsultation with ranking officers of CCP. In the case at bar, only one seat wasvacant due to Ma Osa's expiration term.

4-year term: Endriga group maintained that under CCP Charter, the trustees'fixed 4-year term can only be terminated "by reason of resignation, incapacity, death,or other cause" thus Pres.' action was unnecessary because 10 incumbent trusteeshad the statutory power to fill up by election any vacancy of the board.

Sec. 3 of PD 15 - Endriga refuses to accept CCP is under the supervisionand control of the President as Sec. 3 states -"shall enjoy autonomy of policy andoperation"

CA's decision: declared Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office as CCPtrustees and ousting Rufino group from board.

Sec. 6 (b) of PD 15 is free from ambiquity.

Nor may the President's constitutional statutory power of supervision andcontrol over government corporations restrict or modify application of CCPCharter.

Rufino's Motion for Recon: asserted, by Section 16 of Article 7 of the 1987Consti,that the law could only delegate to the CCP board the power to appointofficers lower in rank than trustees of Board which is in conflict with Sec. 6 of PD 15 -"CCP trustees has the authority to appoint or elect fellow officers of equal rank not oflower"

CA: denied Rufino's Motion and also denied Endriga's motion for immediateexecution of decision.

Hence the consolidated petitions.

MAIN ISSUE OF 1st case:Whether or not Section 6 paragraph B of PD 15 inwhich gives authority to CCP trustees to elect or appoint fellow officers ofequal rank, is unconstitutional (as it is against Sec.16 of Article 7, that only thePresident has the appointing powers of appointing heads of executive departments)

Important Issues related to lesson:1.Invalid delegation of the President's appointing power under the Consti

2.Deprives President's constitutional power of control and supervision over CCP

MAIN ISSUE OF 2nd case: whether or not a writ of quo warranto involving publicoffice such as CCP should be declared a self-executing judgment and deemedimmediately executor under Rule 39, Section 4 of the rules of court.

Section 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15:

Board of trustees - has the power and authority of the corporation.Vacancies shall be filled by election of majority vote by the trustees. Only can thePresident exercise his/her power to appoint if the board becomes entirely vacant.

Intent -to insulate the CCP from political influence and pressure, specificallyfrom the Pres. Makes CCP a self- perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control ofthe Pres.SUCH CANNOT EXISTS UNDER CONSTI. Sec. 3's provision of Board initiatingand formulating plocies and activities are still subject to Pres.' power of control.

Section 16 of Article 7 of Consti:source of president's power to appointgives President legislature authority to delegate power to appointHowever, Congress may, by law, vest upon the appointment of other

officers lower in rank (as contended in Rufino's MOC)

President appoints 5 groups of officers:1.Heads of Executive department (with consent from Commission of Appointments)

2.Those whom President may be authorized by law to appoint (and 3. withoutconsent of Comm of App)


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3.Officers of the Government (if the law is silent or head appointing declaredunconsti)4.Lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may, by the law, vest in theheads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards.5.Appointments vested by Consti in Supreme Court and Constitutional Commission

Appointment of Heads of Departments, Agencies, Commissions, andBoards:Appointing powers belong to President, with:

Congress - share such authority as to appointing inferior or "lower in rankthan those vested by law"

Batasang Pambansa can also appoint inferior officersPower to appoint to heads is a matter of legislative grace.President's power is self-executing vested by Consti thus not subject to legislativelimitations or conditions. Others such power are the Supreme Court en banc andConsti Com

Sec. 8 PD 15 - Chairperson of CCP Board is Head of CCP:Chairperson, with confirmation from the Board, has the power to appoint all officers,staff and personnel of the CenterThe CCP may elect membership in Gov t Service Insurance System (GSIS) thoseelected will have same rights and privileges and obligations as gov't service

Exempted from coverage of Civil Service Law and Rules

Sec. 3 - Duties of Chairperson:Appoint, remove, discipline all officers and personnelPerform duties until Board, by majority vote, shall elect another Chairperson

Thus, under COnsti, CCP "head" is Chairperson and has power to appointlower ranked officers

Under PD 15, CCP is a public corporation governed by the Board thus notan agency

Sec. 6 (b) (c) vs. Sec. 16 of Article 7:

HOLDING: Sec. 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 are unconstitutional.

While Sec. 6 empowers remaining trustees to fill vacancies of Board,allowing them to elect fellow trustees... Sec. 16 allows only the heads ofdepartments, agencies, commissions or boards to appoint only officers lower inrank.

Sec. 6 talks about independent appointing powers which conflicts with thePresident's power to appoint - the two system of appointing powers are recurringanomalies and controversies in appointment every time new President assumedoffice.

What is the CCP?

CCP is under the Executive branch, as stated in Revised Admin Code of 1987-"any agency, not placed or order creating them under specific department fallsunder Office of Pres."

President controls CCP

Sec. 17 of Art. 7 -CCP perform executive and not legislative, judicial orquasi-judicial functions.

President's Power to Control:

Applies to acts or decision of all officers in the Executive Branch

Power to control - the power to revise or reverse acts or decisions of a subordinateofficer involving exercise of discretion

Supervision and Control -includes authority to act directly whenever a specificfunction is entrusted by law or regulation of subordinate

Executive branch is unitary thus only the Presindet had executive power exercisingcontrol over entire Executive Branch.

Legislature can't validly enact law outside control of President.

Limitations: Doesn't extend to qyaus-judicial bodies, since proceedings and decisions are

judicial in nature and subject to judicial review, only admin power of Pres. Local government units - only general supervision

HOLDING: Wherefore, we grant the petition of the 1st case wherein we find Sec. 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it authorizes remaining trusteesto fill by election vacancies of the Board. And we find it unnecessary to rule 2nd case.

MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA vs. SENATOR JOVITO R. SALONGA

G.R. No. 86439 April 13, 1989

FACTS: Pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without theconfirmation of the Commission on Appointments because they are among theofficers of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by law toappoint and Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes thePresident to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human RightsOn 27 August 1987, the President of the Philippinesdesignated herein petitioner MaryConcepcion Bautista as"Acting Chairman, Commission on Human Rights."Subsequently, on 17 December 1988, extended the petitioner to a permanentappointment as Chairman of the Commission submitting such appointment (moreaccurately, nomination) to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation.

On 20 January 1989, or even before the respondent Commission onAppointments had acted on her "ad interim appointment as Chairman of the


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Commission on Human Rights" petitioner Bautista filed with this Court the presentpetition forcertiorari with a prayer for the immediate issuance of a restraining order,to declare "as unlawful and unconstitutional and without any legal force and effectany action of the Commission on Appointments as well as of the Committee onJustice, Judicial and Bar Council and Human Rights, on the lawfully extendedappointment of the petitioner as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, onthe ground that they have no lawful and constitutional authority to confirm and toreview her appointment."

ISSUE: Whether or not the president's appointment of the petitioner's adinterim appointment needs confirmation by the CA.

HELD: Under the Constitutional design, an ad interim appointment does not apply toappointments solely for the President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their verynature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review ofthe Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments areto remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the nextadjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely tomake, that is, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, can notbe ad interim appointments.

The Court holds that petitioner Bautista is the lawful incumbent of the office

of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights by virtue of her appointment, assuch, by the President on 17 December 1988, and her acceptance thereof, is not tosay that she cannot be removed from office before the expiration of her seven (7)year term. She certainly can be removed but her removal must be for cause and withher right to due process properly safeguarded.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Bautista is declared to be, asshe is, the duly appointed Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights and thelawful incumbent thereof, entitled to all the benefits, privileges and emoluments ofsaid office. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by the Court againstrespondent Mallillin enjoining him from dismissing or terminating personnel of theCommission on Human Rights is made permanent.


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Lacson-Magallanes Co. vs Pano & Exec Sec PajoG.R. No. L-27811

Delegation of Control Power to the Executive Secretary

FACTS: Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture inDavao. The said land was a forest zone which was later declared as an agriculturalzone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to LMC of which he is a co-owner. Pao was afarmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of Lands

denied Paos request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition henceit was elevated to the Office of the President. Exec Sec Pajo ruled in favor of Pao.LMC averred that the earlier decision of the Secretary is already conclusive hencebeyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary is anundue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain anyprovision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to theExecutive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President toact personally upon the matter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the ExecSec and may it be further delegated by the Exec Sec.

HELD: The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is

his control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men ofhis confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismissthem at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is hisauthority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his departmentsecretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on thecorrectness of a decision of a department secretary. Parenthetically, it may be statedthat the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President's power ofcontrol over the executive departments. And control simply means "the power of anofficer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done inthe performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that ofthe latter."

It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the Presidentmust exercise in person. Not as correct, however, is it to say that the Chief Executivemay not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does notcommand that he perform in person. Reason is not wanting for this view. ThePresident is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive andadministrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unitwhich assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that "underour constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and byauthority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or evenreverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, includingthe Director of Lands, may issue.

De Leon vs. Carpio178 SCRA 457 (1989)

"Alter-ego" Doctrine

FACTS:Estavillo and de Leon are two NBI agents terminated by then Minister ofJustice Neptali A. Gonzales. Upon appeal to the Review Committee, the said bodydeclined to act on their petitions for reconsideration on the ground that it had lost itsjurisdiction with the ratification of the new Constitution. They were advised instead to

seek relief from the Civil Service Commission.

The Merit Systems Protection Board of CSC held that their dismissals wereinvalid and unconstitutional, having been done in violation of their security of tenureunder the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the Board ordered their reinstatement.

However, respondent Carpio, as Director of NBI, returned the orders issuedby the Secretary of Justice to CSC without action, claiming that they were null andvoid for having been rendered without jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Director of the NBI can disobey an explicit anddirect order issued to him by the Secretary of Justice

HELD: It is an elementary principle of our republican government, enshrined in theConstitution and honored not in the breach but in the observance, that all executivedepartments, bureaus and offices are under the control of the President of thePhilippines.

The Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over themembers of the Cabinet who, in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus andother offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department. Theconstitutional vesture of this power in the President is self-executing and does notrequire statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much lesswithdrawn, by the legislature.

Theoretically, the President has full control of all the members of his Cabinetand may appoint them as he sees fit or shuffle them at pleasure, subject only toconfirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and replace them in his discretion.Once in place, they are at all times under the disposition of the President as theirimmediate superior. Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the variousdepartments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President.Hence, their acts, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are,unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts ofthe Chief Executive. (Villena v. Secretary of the Interior)

In the case at bar, there is no question that when he directed therespondent to reinstate the petitioners, Sec. Ordonez was acting in the regulardischarge of his functions as an alter ego of the President. His acts should therefore

have been respected by the respondent Director of the NBI, which is in theDepartment of Justice under the direct control of its Secretary. As a subordinate in


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this department, the respondent was (and is) bound to obey the Secretarysdirectives, which are presumptively the acts of the President of the Philippines.

Bermudez vs Torres

Facts: Petitioner Oscar Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlacand Officer-in-Charge of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor, was a recommendee of

then Sec. of Justice Guingona for the position of Provincial Prosecutor. Privaterespondent Atty. Conrado Quiaoit had the support of then Representative Yap of theSecond District of Tarlac. Quiaoit was appointed by Pres. Ramos to the office. Quiaoittook his oath and assumed office. Bermudez refused to vacate the Office of theProvincial Prosecutor. Nonetheless, Quiaoit, performed the duties and functions of theOffice of Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner Bermudez challenged the appointment ofQuiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation ofthe Sec. Of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Section9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code provides that allprovincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the Pres.upon the recommendation of the Secretary.

Issue: Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretaryof Justice to the President can be held fatal to the appointment of Quiaoit

Held: An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating orselecting by one having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge andperform the duties and functions of an office or trust. The appointment is deemedcomplete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been compliedwith and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective.

The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing authorityhas the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment,deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessaryqualifications and eligibilities.

When the Constitution or the law clothes the Pres. with the power toappoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarilycarrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. The Pres. is the head ofgovernment whose authority includes the power of control over all executivedepartments, bureaus and offices. Control means the authority of an empoweredofficer to alter or modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer hasdone in the performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of thelatter, as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. The Pres. has the powerto assume directly the functions of an executive department, bureau and office. Itcan therefore be inferred that the Pres. can interfere in the exercise of discretion of

officials under him or altogether ignore their recommendations.

The phrase upon recommendation of the Secretary found in Sec. 9, Chap.II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code should be interpreted to be amere advice, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in characterand not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. Therecommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in nature. The Pres., beingthe head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with theaction of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionaryauthority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope ofhis authority.

Constantino & the Freedom From Debt Coalition vs Gov. Cuisia ofBSP

Qualified Political Agencywhen not applied

FACTS: During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a scheme toreduce the countrys external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreigndebts. Three restructuring programs were sought to initiate the program for foreigndebts they are basically buyback programs & bond-conversion programs).Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor children who are Filipinocitizens, together w/ FFDC averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemesare onerous and they do not constitute the loan contract or guaranteecontemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the Constitution.And assuming that thePresidenthas such power unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President,the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in theperson of the President.

They argue that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affectthe Filipino nation requires that the President alone must exercise this power. Theyargue that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically named bythe Constitutionthe Monetary Boardreinforces the submission that not respondentsbut the President alone and personally can validly bind the country. Hence, theywould like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme.

ISSUE: Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power tothe respondents.

HELD: There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that thepresident may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country w/ priorconcurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever and the factthat a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the presidentcan delegate this power to her direct subordinates.

The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement thedecision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by thefact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing thegovernments debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of

Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk andcost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. If the


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President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power,he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on awelter of time-consuming detailed activitiesthe propriety of incurring/guaranteeingloans, studying and choosing among the many methods that may be taken towardthis end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate,obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending thenegotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place ofexecution to sign the documents.

This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence ofcabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accordedand would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the government. Theact of the respondents are not unconstitutional.

ExceptionThere are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by

subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutionalpowers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must beexercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate theexercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his powerto suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law and the exercise byhim of the benign prerogative of pardon (mercy).

There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptionalcircumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamentalfreedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over thoseexercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, thesuspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning powernotwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within thisspecial class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of theconstitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be ashowing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptionalimport.

Ruben Villaluz vs Calixto ZaldivarG.R. No. L-22754

Control PowerRemoval PowerAppointees

FACTS: Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office in1958. In 1960, Congressman Roces alleged that Villaluz was an ineffective leader andhad caused losses to the government. He indorsed the removal of Villaluz. The ExecSec suspended Villaluz and ordered a committee to investigate the matter. Afterinvestigation, it was recommended that she be removed. The president then issuedan AO removing Villaluz from his post. Villaluz averred that the president has nojurisdiction to remove him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to beremoved considering that he is an appointee of the president.

HELD: The President of the Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and removehim since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive orunclassified service under Sec 5 of RA 2260; being a presidential appointee, Villaluzbelongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government and as suchhe can only be investigated and removed from office after due hearing by thePresident of the Philippines under the principle that the power to remove is inherentin the power to appoint .

There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the

President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers andemployees who belong to the executive department if they are presidentialappointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can be justified underthe principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint but notwith regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for asto them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision ofour Constitution which says that `the Congress may by law vest the appointment ofthe inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department.

art7 executive department sec 14

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