art after philosophy

8/11/2019 Art After Philosophy

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When objects

are

presented

within

the

conterf

of art

(;rnd

until

r'cccntly

objects

alr,r':rys

have

been

used)

they

are

as eligible for aesthetic consicleration

as

are

any objects

in

the rvorld,

:rnd an

aesthetic consideration of an

object

existing in

tire

reah'n

of

art

neans that thc

ob-

j('(t'\

c\i:tclrcc or futtcriorrirrg in rn .u-t

('ontext

ii

irrelcvrnt

to

the

.restheti,

judq.'rr,

rrr.

The relation

of aesthetics to

art

is not

unlike

that

of

aesthetics

to architecture.

in

that

architecture

has

a

very

specttic _function

ancl

how

'good

its

design

is

is

prirnarily related to

hor,v

well

it

performs its

function.

Thus,

judgements

on

r,vhat it

looks

like

correspoud

to

taste,

and

wc

c:ln

see

that throughor-rt history different exarnples

of architecture

rre

pr..rised

rt

dillerent

times depending

on the

aesthetics of

particular

epochs. Aesthetic

thinking h:rs

cven gone so far

as to

nrake

exalnples

of

architecture not related

to

art

at all, rvorks of:rrt

irt

thcrttsclve'

(c.g.

tlrc pl rrrrrid.

oI Egyptl.

Aesthetic

considerations

are

indeed

dlways

exftaneous to an object's function or

reason

to

[..

Unlcrs

oF coursc.

Llre

objcct'r

rcJson

to bc i. :rricrl;

.re\tl)ctic.

An

t'rarrrplc oi.r

purely

aesthetic

object is

a

decorative

object,

for

decoration's prirn:rry

function

is

to

aclcl

sorrething

to

so as

to

nrake

nrore

attractive;

adorn; om:rment,

ancl this

relates directly

to

taste. And

this

leads

us

directly to

Formalist

art and criticisnr. Fornralist

art

(painting

rncl

sculpture) is the

vanguard of decoration, and,

strictly

speaking,

one cor-lld

reasonabll,

:rsst-r't

that its

rrt

condition

is

so

rninimal

that

for

all functional

plrrposes

it

is

not

.rrt

rt

-r11,

bur

pure

exercises

in

aesthetics.

Above

all

things

Clernent

Greenberg is

the

critic

of

taste. Be-

hind ever1, one of his

decisions

there

is

an aesthetic

judgernent,

rvith those

judgcuLents

re-

flecting

his t:rste.

And

r'vhat

does his taste reflect?

The

per iod

hc

grel- up iri as a critic,

the

period

real

for hirn:

the flfties.

Giverr his theories

(if

they have

any

logic to them

rt

all)

horv

else

can one account

for

his disinterest in Frank

Stella,

Aci

Reinhar:dt, and others ap-

plicable

to his

historical

schenre?

Is it

because he

is

...

basically unsyrrpathetic on per-

sonally

experiential

gror-rnds ?

Or,

in

other

words,

their rvork

doesn't sr-rit his taste?

But in

the

philosophic

tabula rasd

of art,

if

someone

calls

it

art,

as

Don

Judd

has

said,

it's

art.

Given this, formalist painting

and sculpture

activitv

can

be

granted

an

art

con-

dition,

but only bv

virtr:e

of

its

presentation

in ternrs

of

its ert idcr

(c.g.

a

rectangr-rlarly-

shaped

canvas

stretched over rvooden

supports and stained with

such and such colors, tLs-

ing

such and such fornrs,

givrnq

such

rnd

such

l

visr-ral

experience, etc.).

Lookine

at

contemporary art

in

this

light,

one reaiizes the

minimal

creative

ellort taken

on

the

part

of

formalist

artists

specifrcall,v,

and all

painters :rnc1

sculptors

(rvorking

:rs such toclay) generrll1'.

This

brings

us

to

the realization

that formalist

art and

criticism

accept f,s

a definition of

art

one rvhich

exists

solely

on morphological

grounds. While a vast quantity

of similarlv

looking

objects or irnases

(or

visually related

objects

or

irnages) nlay

seenr

to

be related

(or

connected) bec:ruse of a

sirnilarity of visual/experiential

readines,

one cannot claim fronr

this ar-r artistic

or

conceptual relationship.

It is obvious then

that

fornralist

criticisrn's reliance on

nrorphology

leads

necessarily

r,vith

a

bias torvard

tl-re

rnorphology

of

traditional art.

And in

this sense such

criticisru

is

not

rc

lated

to

a

scientific

nethod

or

a1ly

sort of en'rpiricism

(as

Michael Friecl,

rvith his detriled

clescriptions of paintings ancl

other

'icholarlv

pirraphernalia

lvould

rvant

us to believe).

Formalist

criticism

is

no more than

an

analysis of the

physical

attributes

of

particular

ob-

jects

r,vhich happen

to

exist in

a

morphological

context. tsut this

doesn't

add any

kriou,l-

642

I

ANCUACE

AND

CONCEPTS


3/7

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4/7

aesthetics,

as

we

have

polnted

out,

are

conceptutlly

irreievant

to

art.

Thtts,

any

physic:il

thing

crn

becorne

olt.iet

d,drt,

tl'rat

is to

say,

carl

be

considcred

tasteful,

aesthetically

pleasing'

etc'

But

this

has

no bearrnEi

on

the

objc'ct's

application

to

an

rlt

context;

that

is'

its

f'rrrctionin'g

in

an

art

corltext.

(E.g.

if a

collector

takes

a

painting,

attaches

1egs,

and

uses

it as

a

dininc-

t:rble

it's:rrr

act

unrclated

to

art

or

the artist

becaltse,

(ls

drt,

thf,trvasn't

thc

;ttt'tst's

irttention')

And

rvhat

holds

trr-re

for

Duchamp's

work

applies

as

r'vel1

to

most

of

the art

after

hinr'

In

other

\vorcls,

the

value

of

cubism

is

its

idea

itr

thc

re:rlm

of

art,

not

the

physical

or

vi-

sual

qualities

seen

in

a

spccific

painting,

of

the

p.llticularization

of

certain

colors

or

shapes'

For

thesc

colors

al}d

shapes

are

the

art's

language,

lrot

its

merning

conccptually

:rs art

To

look

r-rpon

a cubist

.itraster:rvork

now

ts

art

is

nollsensical,

conccptually

speaking,

:rs

far

as

art

is

concerned.

(That

visual

infomration

rvhich

\,vas

unique

in

cubisrn's

hnguage

has

nolv

bee'

generally

absorbed

and

has

a

lot

to

do

with

tl'rc

rvay

in

rvhich

one

deals

r'vith

painting

,,lingr,ristically.,'

{E.g

rvhat

a

cubist

painting

meant

expcrirnentally

and

col1ceptuall1'

to'

, y,

cl..tr,rd

Stein,

is

beyond

our

spe

cuiation

because

thc

same

painting

then

nteant

sonle-

thing

clifferent

than

it does

nor.r,'.})

The

value norv

of

an

original

cubist

painting

rs

not

unlike,

1n

nost

fespects,

an

origirral

nlanuscrlpt

by

Lord

B1'rorr,

or

The

Spirit

o/

St.

Lortls

as

it

is

seen

i1

the

Smithsonial

llstitution.

(lncleed,

nrLlseums

fill

the verv

same

function

as

the

Smithsonian

Institr-rtion-u,hY

else

wor-rld

theJeu

dc

Pawne

wing

of

thc

Lor'rvrc

cxhibit

c6zanne,s

ancl

Van

Gogh's

palettes

as

prouclly

as

thc'v

clo

their

palntings?)

Actual

rvorks

of

art

are

little

more

th:rn

historical

curiosities.

As

lar

as

r;r/

is

concerned

van

Gogh's

paint-

ings

aren't

worrh

any

morc

than

l-ris

palette

is.

They

are

both

collector',s

items

Art

,,lives

thr-ough

influencing

other

art,

not

by

existing

as

the

physicai

residue

of

an

artist,s

ideas.

The

reason

why

different

artists

fl-om

the

past

are

bror'rght alive

again

is

be-

cause

soille

aspecrt

of

their

work

becomes

'irsable

b1'

living

artists

That

there

is

no

truth

as

to

rvhat

.rrt

is

seenls

quite

unr:ealized'

what

is the

fiurctron

of

art,

or

the

nature

of

art?

If

\ve

continue

our

analogy

ot

tne

forms

art

takes

as

being

art's

language

one

can

realize

then

that

a

\r'ork

of art

is a

kincl

of

propositiort

presented

within

the

context

of

art

as

a

comlllent

on

art'

-works

of

arr

are

al.)alytic

propositions.

That

is,

if

vicu'cd

within

their

context-as

art-

they

provide

no

inforrnation

\vhat-so-ever

about

any

nl:ltter

of

fact

A

Nork

of

rrt

is r

t:ru-

tology

in

tl-rat

it

is

a

presentation

of

the

artist's

intention,

that

is,

he

is sayine

that

a

partic-

ular

rvork

of

art

l.s

art,

\vl]ich

means,

ts

t

deinitiott

of

art.

Thus,

tliat

it is

art

ls

trLle

a

prtorL

(u,l]ich

is

rvhat

Judd

means

when

1-re

states

thf,t

if

someoue

cal1s

it

art,

it's

art )'

Indeed,

it

is

nearly

inrpossible

to

discttss

art

in

general

terms

rvithout

talking

in

tautolo-

gics-filr ro attempt

,,,

ir rp

art

bv

a'y

other

handle is

to

merely

focus

on

f,nother

as

pect

oI

quality

of

tl'.

p,opo,ition

rvlriclr

is

usually

irrelcvant

to

the

:rrt

lvork,s

.,aft

condi-

tion.

one

beelns

to

realize

that

art's

art

condition

is

a cotrceptual

state'

That

the

language

forrtrs

r.vhich

the

artlst

tiarnes

his

propositions

in

arc

often

private

codes

or

ianguages

ts

an

ilevit:rble

outcone

of

art's

freedonl

from

1 orphological

constrictious;

and

it

follor'vs

fi-onr

this

tbat

o'e

has

to

be

familiar

rvith

contenporary

21rt

to

:rppreciate

it and

understand

it.

Likervise

one

understands

why

t[e

n-ran

on

the

street

is intolerant to

lrtistic

art

and

al-

rvays

der-nands

art

in a

traclitional

language'

(And

one

unclerstands

rvhy

formalist

art

seils

like

hot

cakes. )

only

in

painting

and

sculpture

dicl

the

artists

al1

spcak

the

saure

language'

d44

LANGUAGE

AND

CONCEPf'S


5/7

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6/7

think

of

it

as

art? If

he doesn't

take

the responsibility

of it

being

art, who

c:rnj

or

shor-rlcl?

His

rvork certainly

appe:lrs

to

be

err-rpirically

verifirble:

lead

can

do

arrd

be used

lor

manv

physical

activities.

In

itself

this

does

anything

but

lead

us

into

a

dialogue

about

the narure

of

art.

In

a sense

then

he

is a prin-ritive.

He has no

idea

about

art. Hor,v

is it

then

that

rve

knorv

about

his

activiq '?

Because

he

has

told

us

it

is

art by

his:rctions

o-fter Itis

activitv

has

taken place.

That

is,

by

the

fact he

is with

several galieries,

pLlts

the physical

r:esidue

of

his

activity

in

museums (and

sells thenr

to

art

collectors-but

as we have

pointed

out,

coi-

lectors

are

irreievant

to

the

condition

of art

of a

work). Tl-rat

he

denies his

r,vork is

art

but

plays

the artist is

more

than

just

a paradox.

Serra

secretly

feels

that

arthood

is

arrived

at empirically.

-What

onc finds

all

thror-rghor-rt the rvritings

of

Ad Reinhardt

is this

very similar

thesis

of

art-as-art,

and

that

'irt

is

always dead,

and

a

'living'

art is

a

deception.

Reinhardt

had

a

very

clear idea

about

the

nature

of

art,

and l'ris

importance

is

fal

fronr

L.eing rccognizcd.

Forurs

of

art that

can

be

considered

synthetic

propositions

are verifiable

by the

rvorld,

that

is

to

say, to understand

these

propositions

one

nlllst

leave

the tautological-like

Il-arne-

work

of

art

and

consider

outside

information.

But

to consider

it

as

art

1t

is

ne.essrrv

to

igllore

this

same

outside

information,

because

outside

information

(experiential

c1-ialities,

to

note)

has

its

own intrinsic

worth. And

to

comprehend

this r,vorth

one

does

not

need

a

state

of irt

condition.

From

this it is

easy to realize

that

art's

viabiliq,

is

not

connected

to

the presentation

of

visr-ral

(or

other) kinds

of

experience.

That

this

nray

have

bc-en

one

of

art's extraneous

flrnc-

tiotts

in

the

prececiing

centuries

is

not

unlikely.

After

all, rlan

in

even

the nineteenth-

centllrv

lived

in

a fairly standardizecl

visr-ral

environment.

That

js,

it

was ordinarilv

predictable:

as

to what

he r'vould

be

conring

into

cont:rct

rvith

clav after

da,v.

His

visual

environrnent

in

the

part

of

the

world

in

rvhich

he livc'd

was fairly

consistent.

In

our

tirne

rve have

an ex-

perientially

drastically

richer

environnlent.

One

can

flv all

over

the

earth in

a

rnatter

of

hours

and

days, rrot

months.

We have

the cinema,

and

color television,

as

lvell

as the rnal-

made

spectacle

of

the

lights

of Las

Vegas

or the

skyscrapers

of

Nerv York

City.

The rvhole

world

is

there

to

be

seeu,

and

the rvhole

r,vorld can rvatch man

rvalk

on

the rnoon

lrom

their

living

rooms.

Certainlv

art

or

objects

of paintine

and

sculpture

cannot

be expected

to compete

experientially

with

this?

The

notion

of

'use

is

relevant

to

art

and its

language.

Recently

the

box or cube

forn-r

h:is

beeu

used

a great

deal lvithin

the

context

of art.

(Take

for

instance

its

use

by

Judd,

Morris,

LcWitt,

Bladen,

Smith,

8e11, and

McCracken-not

to rnention

the

quantiry

of

boxes

and

cubes

that

came

after.)

T1're dillerence

betrveen

all

the various

uses

of the

box or

cube

form

is directly

related

to the

differences

in

the

intentions

of

the

artists.

Further,

as

is par-

ticularly

seen

in

Judd's

rvork,

the

use

of

the

box or

cube

forrn

illustrates

very

weil our

ear-

lier

claim

that

arr object

is

only art

r,vhen

placed

in

the context

of

art.

A

fer,v

examples

rvill point

this

out.

One could

say

that

if one

of

Judd's

box

forms

u,as

seen

filled

rvith

debris,

seen placed

in

an industrial

setting,

or

even

merely

seen

sitting

on

a street

corner,

it

-'vould

not

be identified

rvith art.

It follorvs

then

that

understanding

and

consideration

of it as

an art

work

is necessarlt

a

priori to

viewing

it

in

order

to

,,.see',

it

as

a

rvork

of

art.

Advance

information

about

the

concept

of art

and

about

an

2rrtist's

concepts

U+6

LANGUAGE

AND

CONCEPTS


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