army aviation digest - sep 1969

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UNITED STATES A

US RL /SCI SUPPORT CENTER

PO BOX 62 577

K 636· PTEMBER 9

VIATION GES

S FETY FOR

COMB T RE DINESS

part three page 36



UNITERMY VI TION

IRECTOR OF ARMY AVIATION , ACSFOR

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

MG John L Klingenhagen

COMMANDANT, U. S . ARMY AVIATION SCHOOL

MG Delk M. Oden

ASST COMDT U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOL

COL Bill G. Smith

DIGEST EDITORIAL STAFF

l TC Robert E. Luckenbill Chief

Richard K. Tierney, Editor

William H. Sm ith

Joe lewels

linda McGowan

GRAPHIC ART SUPPORT

Harold G. l inn

Harry A . Pickel

Dorothy L Crowley

Angelo A. Akin

DIRECTOR, U. S . ARMY BOARD FOR AVIATION

ACCIDENT RESEARCH

COL Eugene B. Conrad

USABAAR PUBLICATIONS AND GRAPHICS DIV

Pierce L Wiggin Chief

William E. Corter

Jock Deloney

Ted Kontos

Charles Mobius

ary W . Windham

BOUT THE COVER

SEPTEMBER 1969

VIEWS FROM READERS

VOLUME 15

YOU TOO CAN ADJUST ARTILLERYCPT Charles E Hoskinson

N

23

ELIMINATE THAT SCROUNGER, MAJ Lewis A Smith

AM I A MACHINE? CW2 David R Shriner

THE ANNUAL WRIT, CPT David B Bradley

WHO IS IN COMMAND? CPT Jerald M. Kowieski

HELP STAMP OUT COMPRESSOR STALLSCW2 Thomas A. Rey

CHARLIE AND D ANNY S WRITE-IN

A LESSON WELL LEARNED, CW2 Kenneth F Wiegand

THEY SHOULD HAVE SURVIVED, CW2 Wayne K. Robert

DOUBLE CHECK IT, MATE, LT John G. Burnside

IS FATE THE HUNTER? MAJ W F. Gabella

MY HOW THOSE GREENS HAVE SHRUNK

MAJ William G Caput, M. D

CRASH SENSE - SAFETY FOR COMBAT READINESS

PREVENTION SENSE

WHERE'S LUCKY? Ted Kontos

PEARL'S

USAASO SEZ

SANFORD ARMY AIRFIELDIns

The mission of the U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST is to provide information of an operatior functional nature concernin9 safety and aircraft accident prevention trainin9 maintenaoperations research and development aviation medicine and other related data .

The DIGEST is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly under supervision of the Commandant, U. S. Army Aviation School. Views expressed herein arenecessarily those of Department of the Army or the U. S. Army Aviation School. PhotosU. S. Army unless otherwise specified . Material may be reprinted provided credit is 9iven toDIGEST and to the author , unless otherwise indicated.

Artie/es, photos and items of interest on Army aviation are invited. Direct communicationauthorized to: Editor U. S. Army Aviation Digest, Fort Rucker, Ala. 363 0.

Use of funds for printing this publication has been approved by Headquarters Departmof the Army, 3 November 19 7.

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Eastern Boulevard Baltimore Md . 21220. For ny change in distributioh requirements initiaterevised DA Form 12-4.

National Guard and Army Reserve units submit r e q u i r e m ~ t s through their State adjutageneral and U. S. Army Corps commanders respectively.

For those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copies of the DIGEpaid subscriptions 4.50 domestic and 5.50 overseas are available from the Superintendent



Sir:

I just read the article Weather Violation -in the February 1969 issueand it appears t9 have some contradictions which result in a superb collectionof barnyard litter. The board statesthat the piiot at no time was flyingsolely on instruments during the 8minutes in instrument conditions. Earlier the statement was after flying intoinstrument conditions." By definition,he couldn't fly without them. I know

from personal experience in a similarsituation that in fact you do rely solelyon the gauges, however briefly.

The board says weather was a factor

because it existed and that the accidentwould not have occurred if the weather

had been better. Then they turn rightaround and say it was not an establishedor probable cause factor. Ridiculous

The pilot's lack of knowledge about

the discrepancies which may have become obvious prior to entering the bad

weather were probably forgotten in hisanxious concentration on the situationat hand. I'm certain they too were definitely a contributing factor.

The conclusion that the main causeof the accident is a violation of a regulation is preposterous. The board's

conclusion would seem to indicate that

if the pilot failed to file a flight plan

or fill out a weight and balance form,he would have an accident. Very brilliant reasoning.

What was the purpose of this article?

MAJ Wilbur R. Mixter

Chief, Maintenance Div

Army Avn Elm USA lAGS

Ft. Clayton, Canal Zone

• Correctly quoted, tbe article reads:

Tbe board f ls tbat at no time duringtbe 8 minutes in instrument conditionsdid the pilot fly solely by reference to

instruments. • • . Tbe board's opinion

was based on tbe fact tbat tbe pilot wasattempting to maintain visual contact

witb tbe ground, evidenced by bis altitude and witness statements that be

circled tbe town twice before flyingaway in tbe direction be crasbed.

f tbe pilot bad lost all outside visualcontact, he probably could not bave

SEPTEMBER 1969

flown for 8 minutes witbout using bis

instruments. However, the weather, asstated, was an obscured 200-foot ceiling, witb visibility one-tentb of 1 nautical mile, and be was flying at approx

imately 50 feet. Paragrapb 1-2r, AR

95-2, defines instrument flight conditions as: Weatber conditions belowthe minimum prescribed for flight onder visual flight rules." Therefore, bydefinition, contact flight can be attempted in instrument weatber condi

tions, though it certainly is not advisable, as evidenced by tbis accident.Paragrapb 11-12b(4), AR 95-5, states:

A weather deficiency should not beassessed as a contributing factor if action was required to avoid tbe elementbut willfully not taken; e.g., pilot isordered to return i f IFR weather isencountered and no unusual circumstances exist to preclude compUancewith the order. The weather in thiscase was seen and avoided by the pilot

. of the number 2 helicopter of this fligbt.The facts proven by this investigation

were: 1. A command regulation prohibited aviators from using helicopter

weather minimums of less than 500-foot ceiling, one-half nautical mile visibility, clear of clouds, and at airspeedslow enough to permit perception of

obstructions in time to avoid collisions,under visual flight rules. 2. Thougb the

hills ahead were seen to be obscured by

clouds, this pilot continued into the

described weather conditions and

crashed. This was clearly a violation of

the command regulation.The purpose of this article was to

iIlu trate the dangers of attempting VFR

flight in IFR weather.-The Editors

Sir:

The article by Captain Alfred SRushatz on physical fitness whichappeared in the April 1969 issue of

the AVIATION DIGEST prompted somethoughts.

CPT Rushatz noted that " . . . par

ticipating in physical exercise an hour

or so after the evening meal should be

an aid for more efficient digestiveprocess in addition to keeping in goodphysical shape ." This point, I feel, requires orne clarification, as most per-ons will find some difficulty in exercis

ing one or even two hours after a mealThe reasons for this are as follows:• Immediately, and for about three

hours after eating, the stomach and the

intestines require a good blood supplyfor proper digestion and absorption of

food substances.

• During moderate or severe exercise the muscles also require a largeblood flow for proper functioning and

the skin uses a large amount to maintain body cooling mechanisms.

• f the digestive and muscular systems are placed in competition for thesame blood supply by exercising too

soon after eating, the efficiency of both

systems will be impaired due to insufficient available blood flow. In addition, the strain on the heart, which iscalled upon to provide a large bloodflow to the two ystems, may be excessive. The reader should experiment and

judge for themselves by comparing

their own pulse rates immediately, andfive minutes following, a quarter milejog at one hour and at four hours after

a large meal. Give it a try And goodexercising

LTC George R. HelselHQ, 25th Medical Battalion(Inf Div)

APO San Francisco 96225

• It is generally accepted by the medical community that strenuous exercisefollowing a beavy meal is to be avoidedThe rest period prior to exercise is an

individual factor, but should be no

sooner than two hours after tbe meal

This is based upon the physiologicalfactors of blood supply required for the

digestive process ver us the blood supply required for muscular activity asindicated above.

Although jogging or swimming sbould

be avoided for several hours after eating, a casual stroll after dinner is definitely an aid in the digestive processand is recommended therapy in the

older population. No pun intendedcolonel.-The Editors



Y ou Too

anAdjust Artillery

Too few aviators are taking advantage of the tremendous firepower

made available to them by the numerous artillery fire bases scattered

throughout Vietnam. By calling on the artillery instead of gun-

ships one aviator may prevent the unnecessary death of others

UT HIS IS Hot Stuff two-two

over Ben Suc. I just receivedautomatic weapons fire from approximately one-five Victor Charlies in woods Request gunships or

tac air, over.This is Square Lobster Cu Chi,

gunships or tac air not available,but artillery coverage is availablefrom Cu Chi. Will you adjust?

Over. This is Hot Stuff two-two . . .

er . . . ah . . . negative ah . . .just forward as an intelligence re

port, out. Every aviator has a responsi

bility bestowed upon him by virtueof the observation capability possessed by his aerial view. This

aviator evidently refused to engage

hostile troops with artillery merely

because he could not recall the

artillery instruction he had received

in flight school. Let's look at a

recurrence of the situation on an

other day with another aviator:

This is Casper five-one over

Ben Suc. I just received automatic

weapons fire from approximately

one-five Victor Charlies in the

woods Request gunship support,

over.

This is Square Lobster Cu Chi ,

gunships not available but artillery

coverage is available from Cu Chi.

Well you adjust? Over.

2

Captain Charles E Hosk inson

This is Casper five-one, roger,

over. This is Square Lobster Cu Chi ,from this frequency go to Charliefrequency; contact Big Boy twozero and send your mission, over.

This is Casper five-one, Wilco,out.

(break)

Big Boy two-zero, this is Casper five-one, fire mission, over.

Casper five-one, this is Big Boytwo-zero, fire mission, out.

Five-one, from Ben Suc, east

three-five-zero, north one-five-zero,one-five VC in trees, quick anddelay in effect, adjust fire , over.

Two zero, from Ben Suc, east

three-five-zero, north one-five-zero,

one-five VC in trees , quick and

delay in effect, adjust fire , out.

Was the foregoing mission sent

by an experienced artillery ob

server? Not at all. It was sent by

an LOH pilot-a warrant officer

recently graduated from the War

rant Officer Rotary Wing A viator

Course of the U. S Army Aviation

School. The artillery training that

he received while going th rough

the school was quickly recalled as

he was told by the artillery advi

sory, Square Lobster Cu Chi , to

send his mission to the Fire Direc

tion Center (FDC) of the Big Boy

element (Big Boy two-zero).

After identifying himself to

FDC, he alerted them and achievcommunications priority on tfrequency by stating Fire msion. Using the short-phase reback, the FDC repeated for poble correction his entire transmsion, as they would each succeing transmission. On his ntransmission, recalling the elemeand order of the call for fire ,aviator sent the remainder of initial request for fire. Let's breit down and see why he said j

what he did.Five one his brevity call nu

ber. Used before each transmsion, it insures that his transm

sions will be positively identifiFrom Ben Sue east three-fi

zero north one-five zero h

method of locating the target w

the known point shift methusing cardinal directions. He rlized that the FDC must have

map of the area, and could p

the center of Ben Suc on th

firing chart (Figure 1). He coalso have used grid coordinate

One-five VC in trees a brinformative description of the

Artillery fi re b ses such s t he oneright are within e sy firing rangealmost every possi bl e trouble spotVietnam. Yet bec use m n y aviatorsnot recall their rtillery adjustment tr

ing this accurate n d de dly f irepowesome ti mes not used

U. S. ARMY AVIAT ION DIGE



get. This allows the artillery S-3to detennine a priority, what ammunition to use and volume of

fires.Quick and delay t he fuze ac

tion with which the observer de

sires to attack the target, subject tochange by the S-3. Quick and delay fuzes will give high and lowair bursts beneath the tree canopy.This is what he wants when hefires for effect, at which time hewill get 50 percent of each fuzeaction.

Adjust fire-tells the FDC thatan adjustment is necessary. t

means the observer can see andwill adjust the artillery rounds andthat the unit may begin firing when

ready; as opposed to fire for effect,which would mean that the targetlocation was accurate enough tobring effective fire on the targetwithout adjustment.

After reading back the call forfire for possible correction, theFDC then plots the data and theS-3 issues a fire order to the guns,extracts of which are sent in theform of a message to observer.

Let's listen as the FDC endsthe message to observer:

FDC: Two-zero, Bravo, tworounds, target Alpha Bravo fourzero-zero-one, over.

Observer: Five-one, Bravo,two rounds, target Alpha Bravofour-zero-zero-one, out.

Now let's break down the message to observer and see what ittells him:

Bravo- B battery will fire theentire mission. In fire for effect,all weapons of the battery will fire;

in adjustment, only two weapons

will fire. Had it been Battalion,Bravo, the observer would have

known that an entire battalion

would fire for effect and two

weapons from Bravo battery would

adjust. The adjustment will be per

fonned with fuze quick only.

Two rounds-this tells the ob

server that when he fires for effect,two rounds will be fired trom tach

4

weapon in Bravo battery. (Mixtureof fuze quick and fuze delay.)

Target Alpha Bravo four-zerozero-one-this gives the observerthe designation of the target forfuture reference, if it is recorded.

The observer, in preparation forthe firing of the first rounds, assumes a flight pattern which willallow him continuous visual contact with the target. Also, since histarget is dispersed , he selects asmall prominent, immovable feature near the center of the targetas his adjusting point. The pointwith reference to which he willmake hi corrections.)

Two-zero, shot, over. Five-one, shot, out.

Shot-this tells the observer thatthe rounds have been fired and

that soon he should be at a pointin his flight pattern which will allow him to observe the rounds.

Two-zero, splash, over. Five-one, splash, out.

Splash-this tells the observerthat the rounds will impact in five

seconds.The observer sees the rounds

(Figure 2) and uses the imaginary

line (gun-target spotting lfrom the guns to the target to m

his corrections.Since the rounds did not hi

adjusting point, the observer wants to establish a range bra

using a quantity which canevenly split to arrive at a 100 mbracket 400 , 200 , 100, etc.);he ultimately wants two vo100 meters apart with the ading point between them, allowhim to add or drop 50 metersbring effective fire on the taConcurrently, he desires to cohis rounds onto his spottingto the nearest 10 meters. Sincnow has a specific point

which to shift, the midpoint

tween the rounds, he gives hiitial subsequent correction (rouwere short and to the right).

Five-one, left two-zero,

two-hundred, over. Two-zero, left two-zero,

two-hundred, out. Left two-zero-the obser

deviation correction with resto his spotting line.

Add tw.o-hundred-the obser's range correction with respe

Figure

U. S ARMY AVIATION DIG



his adjusting point. He estimatedthat a 200 meter correction wouldresult in rounds over the target.

The correction is plotted by theFDC, the observer receives shot

and splash and the next volleyimpacts (Figure 3) over and on

line. Successively splitting his range

bracket, the observer transmits:Five-one, drop one-hundred,

over.Two-zero, drop one-hundred,

out.The next rounds land short and

on line (Figure 4). The observerknows the two preceding volleyswere 100 meters apart, and that byadding 50 meters, he may bringeffective fire on his target. In addition to his correction, he mustchange his method of control to

fire for effect, thus causing the entire battery to fire two volleys.

Five-one, add five-zero, fire for

effect, over.

Two-zero, add five-zero, firefor effect, out.

By establishing a bracket andsuccessively splitting it, the observer has eliminated the necessityof making speculative range esti-

SEPTEMBER 1969

mations. He needed only to determine whether the rounds wereover or short until he split the 100meter bracket, at which time heknew that a 50 meter correctionwould insure that fire for effect

would be within 50 meters, the pre-

scribed accuracy for range. In

addition, bracketing in hilly terraineliminates the requirement for theobserver to send corrections per

taining to elevation changes, a factor which is extremely difficult to

determine from the air.The last correction was plotted

by the FDC, all weapons in thebattery fired two rounds each, theobserver received shot, rounds

complete and splash, the roundslanded, and he counted 5 bodieson the ground (Figure 5).

Five-one, end of mission, onefive enemy casualties, over.

Two-zero, end of mission, onefive enemy casualties, out.

End of mission this immedi

ately releases the unit for othermissions.

One five enemy casualties this

is the observer's surveillance. t

provides valuable intelligence information and is sent throughS-2/G-2 channels.

Artillery coverage is available innearly all sectors of today 's modern battlefield . Knowledge of theprocedures pertaining to artilleryadjustment will allow anyone to

Figure

5



Figure

efficiently and effectively engage an

enemy. Although the artillery hasa language all its own and the mostefficiency is derived from speakingto them in their language, a potential observer can attack a targetby merely transmitting certain ele-

ments of information. Althoughthe mission might take a littlelonger, we can and must acceptthe responsibility of observers byvirtue of our superior observationcapability. Today's aviator, because of the vantage point afforded

Figure 5

him from his aircraft, is more tany other individual soldier,eyes of the artillery. He has

potential of controlling a gramount of the most explos

force the Army possesses. T

ideal situation would, of coube a firm knowledge of artilladjustment procedures and comunications However, the usea few key words will help to member the essential elementsa call for fire.

WHO the observer's ident

cationWHY fire missionWHERE- location of the tarWHAT target descriptionHOW how the observer

tends to attack the target (ishell, fuze, whether he wantsadjust or fire for effect, etc.)

The fire direction center is keto this order of receiving a call fire; but the essential elements,any order, will get the job doIt may take a little longer,mission accomplishment at

fa stest rate possible is also thgoal, so they will provide the mamum amount of assistance to y

After the rounds come out,

best way to adjust them ismethod shown, by moving devtion onto a spotting line and estlishing and successively splittinrange bracket; but any metheven so much as saying, for exaple, east one football field, sotwo football fields , will resultpositive action by the fire directcenter. Actually, the only limtions are the individual aviatimagination and his ability to comunicate.

So , the next time Charlie decito pick on your aircraft, and

fore .you call for gunships or

Air Force and give your adverstime to di-di across the bordremember that you have an hand response by hitting ytransmitter button and calling uone of the greatest killers on

battlefield.

U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGE



Although intricate the Army supply system works smoothly when y u

Eliminate hat ScroungerMajor Lewis A Smith

How MANY TIMES has your crewchief saidto you, That supply room never has anything

I need? How many times have you stopped torealize why that supply room never has anythingyou need?

One of the big reasons may be the scrounger Yes,the scrounger-the guy who doesn't have the supplies right at his fingertips, but he sure knows whereto get some in a hurry.

Tech supply, as we commonly refer to it, is the

element at unit level that keeps new aircraft partscoming in and old ones going out. The tech supplysystem at unit level as established by AR 735-35 is

one of the finest military supply systems ever established. f given a chance to work, the system willsupport an aviation unit under the most adverseconditions. The key is i given a chance to work.

t won't if the scrounger has his way.The scrounger is generally found in two forms.

First there is the poa r-planning scrounger. He is thecrewchief or mechanic who will always wait untilhis aircraft becomes EDP (equipment down forparts) before scrounging the required part. He

knows the supply room does not have the partbecause it didn't have it yesterday, so he doesn'teven bother to check today. He goes straight to hisbuddy who has one locked up in his toolbox.

By not going to the supply room first and lettingthe supply sergeant know he needed the part, nodemand is recorded and no levy is placed on the

supply system. Consequently the supply section will

never have the part on the PLL (prescribed loadlist) .

Of course, the poor-planning scrounger is the first

man to complain to the platoon sergeant, That

lousy supply room never has any parts I need. He's

right too, because no one knows he needs them.

The second type is the long-range planning

scrounger. This individual is generally directly con

nected with the supply system. He costs the Army a

lot of money by stocking every part he can get his

hands on, to include those that are above the maintenance capability of his unit.

I was assigned to an aviation section in the Re

public of Vietnam. Shortly after reporting, the sec-

SEPTEMBER 1969

tion commander decided he needed a new tech supply officer. Since I had some previous experience inthe field, I got the job. One of my first duties as thenew supply officer was to inspect the parts roomLa and behold, there were enough parts in there tobuild a complete U-6. Yes, even the wings, horizontal stabilizer, vertical stabilizer and rudder. Noonly were we not authorized to stock approximately80 percent of the parts on hand, but if such partshad to be installed it would have had to be done aa higher echelon of maintenance.

Let's say for example your aircraft needs a generator. Your supply room doesn't have one and musrequest it for you. The aviation company 100 milesnorth has one on hand because there is a long-rangeplanning scrounger in the supply room. You requesone from your DSU (direct support unit) and aretold it will be a week before the part comes in. Noone knows about the one up north except the longrange scrounger of that unit. A lot of good it is doingyou. So you sit and wait while his sits on theshelf collecting dust the same as it has been doingfor the past six months.

The next question is, What can I as a commandedo about this guy? I don't have time to become asupply expert and inspect supply records all day.But it is simple to determine if your supply sectionis applying the proper procedures.

First pick up a dash 3 from any aircraft in yourunit. Look at any writeup on it that required a par

replacement. Check to see if the part is on yourPLL. f so check to see that the balance on hand hasbeen reduced by the number of parts used on orbefore the date the replacement part was installedon the aircraft. f the part is not on the PLL, havethe supply clerk show you the entry in his document

register where he requested the part from the DSU.f he did not request the part and it was not on yourPLL, then someone in your unit had to scrounge it.

This may seem like a long drawn out procedurebut the whole process should take about two minutes.By employing this procedure over a short period oftime you will find your scrounger. The finger willpoint directly at the individual responsible. Eliminate

his scrounging activities and give the system a chance

to work.



You d better believe i t I couldn t h ve done t alone

IAM A HELICOPTER, aUH l Delta, or as my friends

call me, Huey. Although I amyoung n terms of years, only five

the hours have been long and theskies have been rough.

My L l1 heart has been re

placed many times and my mainrotor is no longer the same. In

fact, there is very little left of my

original self. Yet, I am still thesame helicopter, as can be proved

by looking at my 2408-15 birth

certificate. I am the same old num

ber 64-9718 and proud of it.

I was born of Bell Helicopter

8

CW2 David R. Shriner

in the spring of 1964. From TexasI moved to Georgia and receivedmy introduction into Army aviation at Ft. Benning.

Oh, what old memories comefloating back from Benning. Howmany of you could sit and talk

with, me about the 11 th . Air Assault? We could talk and laughabout everything from blousedflight suits on down. We could talkabout the long hours we spent trying to develop a working solutionout of a new concept called airmobility. We experimented witheverything imaginable and I am

still laughing and wondering at

some of the things you had meto do. Many people said it wouldwork, this idea of a division betransportable by helicopter.

Where are my critics now?there anyone now laughing at or at my division? We left

Benning in 1965 with a thousathings to prove and even mthings to learn, but I left the Stawith the best men and equipmthe Army could send with melearned, and the division learnand while learning, we proved.

I went into combat; I have masheetme tal grafts in my side show of my CAs (combat

U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGE



saults). War stories? Place like theIa Drang Valley? I remember well.I was the first one into that valleyand I was the last to leave. Fr:oma place called An Khe, chopped.out of the jungle for my home,

haye been to every corner of thatland.f it sounds as thoug4 I am

blowing my own hom, I am. I hadmuch to learn as a newcomer, butnow I know. f they gave medalsto such as me, I would proudlywear everything from the GoodConduct Medal to the Distinguished Service Cross.

While in that distant and strangeland I developed a cancer of corrosion in my crossmember and was

sent home to die. At a place calleqCorpus Christi, Tex., and at ahospital called ARADMAC I wasgiven a reprieve. The doctorsthere, some of the best civilian andmilitary maintenance men in theworld, gave me a complete overhaul. Warm sea breezes from theGulf helped soothe my batteredframe and in a few months I wasonce again strong and fit.

You can find me now at EvansArmy Heliport, Ga., a million

dollar home that is as fine as anyhelicopter could ask. I serve thestudents and instructors of the Department of Tactics proudly.

Although you 'have given me anickname and speak fondly ofme, I am only a machine. f I failyou I will not ask for forgiveness,for I cannot; I can only suffersilently. While I have this onechance to speak, listen to what Isay.

You pilots, for both your sake

and mine, must watch and carefor me constantly-both our livesdepend upon it. Do not abuse mefor I cannot protest. I can onlygroan from the depths of my innerself when you suddenly twist onmy throttle and I am over-torqued.

There have been many bookswritten about me for you. Do youknow them? There is very little

SEPTEMBER 1969

you need to know about me that isnot covered in one of my TMs.

My dash 10 should be the lawto anyone who would attempt tooperate me. Within its pages youwill find instructions on how to

direct me to accomplish virtuallyany mission. My book will takeyou step by step through preflighting, starting, flying and stoppingme. Do you want to know howmuch I can carry? How to loadme? How to operate special ~ q u i p -ment? You only have to look.

As I said before, I am only amachine, I can fail. You are onlyhuman, you can also fail. Do youknow what to do when one of usfalls down on his part? This book

will certainly start you off on thecorrect procedure toward savingmy sheetmetal skin (over-stressedand patched though it may be).

You do not have to be exceptionally bright or talented to operateme, only splart enough to followsome basic procedures, once youhave read my book.

I am like you in one respect. Ihave limitations as to the amountof stress I can take. f I am continually over-worked and over

stressed, I ~ n n o t be expected tolive out a normal life span. Wemay struggle on every day but itonly takes once for us to come upshort. We both need rest and maintenance periodically. When youpilots find me ailing, do not askme to press on when I am notable; send me to see my crewchief.

You crewchiefs, you are my keyto survival. Do not use folk medicine on me. Read and heed mydash 20 of remedies. I have been

known to fail at anytime and inmany different ways. f you arefamiliar with my dash 20 it willhelp you diagnose my problemsand tell you how to repair me,step by step.

There are many parts of me thatmay appear unimportant to theuntrained eye. I cannot perform amission without radios. I need my

clock for accurate timekeeping inflight, especially for instrumenflight. I must have a clean unscratched windscreen for cleavision at night. These things anmany more are your responsibility

to me and my pilot. We in tumhave our responsibility to you oncwe leave the ground. From thtime our mission begins with sixpair of eyes on a preflight beinbetter than four, we are a teamsuccess or failure of our missiodepends on how well we work together. t is through the combineefforts of many men that I survivethree years of combat flying, andit will be through the efforts omany more if I survive statesid

combat.I guess I have been fortunat

to have met so many of you so fain my flying. I have had everyonfrom a three star general in tankeboots and 50 hours, through wobbly one with 200 to whisky-four with 12,000 hour

at my controls. f there is one thinI could ask for after having meand worked with such a yarietyof people, it would be for standardization. . .

There are many ways I can bstarted, flown and shutdown anmaybe I am only getting old, buI don't want to be burned up because somec;me who knew it allforgot to check my g o v ~ r n o r ithe normal position. These students who are learning in mewhether they are going to be flyip.me for three years or 30, if theare to survive they don't need toincrease the odds against themselves by taking short cuts. The ol

saying, That's the way we did in myoId unit is out. The inthing to say is, That's the wawe do it in the Army.

You have listened to me rambling long enough. Just remembethat men everywhere regarded mas the best. I have proven my ability, dependability and friendship tall, but I am still a m a c h i n e

9



ITH PROPER tools, a person can do a lot of jobs

well. This also applies to Armyaviators who certainly are provided with many aids-one of themost valua,ble being the annualwrit.

The annual written examinationis a comprehensive test which covers virtually every facet of preparation for and completion of a realistic, if not routine, operational mission. It includes pertinent questions on regulations, weather, flightplanning and filing (both VFR andIFR) and actual execution of theflight.

The fact that it is a comprehensive and realistic training tool has

been heralded by other servicesand various branches within theArmy alike. Some critics have suggested literally that individualbranches would gain by emulatingthis aviation practice and giving,for example, a field artillery annualwrit every year or two to its officers.

t appears clear that we do havea good thing going for Army aviation when we require every ratedsoldier to prove his abilities now

and again, and it should be lookedon by any individual aviator as anexcellent chance to improve himself by pointing up and resolvingany weaknesses.

Grumblings concerning the annual writ basically appear to condense to the idea that the examination was of benefit when therewere many people on ground duty.However, it does not really servemuch purpose when an aviator is

flying continuously, as in the Re

public of Vietnam (RVN) or withan aviation s c h o o ~ This argumentcontinues to the effect that virtuallyeveryone with wings now is primarily concerned with flying, and is

thus up on all this exam materialanyway. There are a number offallacies in this argument.

First, assuming that everyoneprimarily concerned with avia-

10

tion is up on all facets of the jobis not as effective as helping toguarantee this with the help of theannual written examination andother aids such as instrument renewal rides. f it was not necessary

there would not be any full-timeaviators taking the exam two or

three times before successfullycompleting it, and some of us canverify the fact that occasionallythis happens.

The aviator who flies every dayrarely performs, in a year s time,a great enough variety of missionsto encourage use of all the skillshe learned in flight school. t is

even entirely conceivable that anaviator may forget how to read

coordinates,as

he may very wellhave the milk runs of his day-today operational mISSIons memorized from the taxi diagram athome base to the commercialbroadcast stations enroute.

Few of us would allow ourselvesto weaken in regards to basicpilotage or map reading but thereare many other areas where anygiven aviator may very conceivablybe weak. Not many have the opportunity to continually practice

every type of mission which ourwings qualify us for, and an annualwritten examination at the veryleast informs us as to whether or

not we could live up to expectations. t reminds us that there areother missions besides the dailycourier run, command and controlmission or student training mis

sion, and that we are expected tobe able to perform them professionally at any time by virtue ofthe wings we wear.

As an example, let s assume thata captain who has been a contactinstructor pilot at the aviationschool for a year or more is eminently qualified, with no brokenaircraft, no busted students and

two broken wing awards to hiscredit. He has handled every situation with equal aplomb and alwayshas managed to be on time with

•

I THE•

iANNUAL••

i WRIT••• Captain David B radley•......................corrective action. His persospecialty is instructing in autorotional techniques, and he grins

good ones, bounces with ones and recovers rotten onesthe enlightenment of his studeand to the good of the service. is one of our average, excellinstructor pilots, extremely prof

sional in his outlook, but he mnot have filed a DD Form 175months.

In addition he may not knwhere to look for the instruction filling out the DD Form 1block by block. But the

nual written examination wbring these faded skills to surface again, and, if the captis half the professional his recsuggests, it will stimulate him further research and resultgreater knowledge in the field

aviation.As another example of a c

stantly aviating type pilot, takelook at a CW2 who recently wpromoted and just returned frVietnam where he helped establ

glowing chapters in the historyairmobility through his professioal knowledge of his aircraft s cabilities and his assigned missi

This CW2 feels more at hoin a DH 1 than he does in

,green uniform he sports while ceiving the DFC and 33 clustersthe Air Medal. He has operabravely and sanely as a com

U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGE



.

I •~ \ \ ~ • HY ••••••••••W l : \ ~ ? ••••.......

pilot and is justly proud of hissuccess in this ultimate test of asoldier. He is perhaps one of the

first to question the advantage ofan annual writ. He has provenhimself in combat; what furtherproof does the Army need of hisabilities?

The occasional man who thinkslike this CW2 tends to ignore theArmy's need for men in trainingenvironments and in postures ofreadiness in other than combatareas. A flying assignment other

than combat more thoroughly involves the subject of regulations

and study on the aviator's part.Our CW2 may not have used anE-6B for a year, or filed a flightplan for a year or thought aboutsuch rules s basic VFR cloudseparation and minimum visibilityVFR in control zones since flightschool, and he quite possibly neverheard of TERPS [Terminal Instrument Procedures].

An aviator who tries to keep upwith regulation changes often findsit close to impossible in a combat

zone. The annual writ helps himby pointing up rules that havechanged and clarifies vague memories from flight school which havea familiar but less than clear ring.f t ~ e CW2 mentioned above ac

cepts the annual writ as a tool anda challenge to professionalism heis well on his way to becoming awell-rounded aviator.

SEPTEMBER 1969

The last example of the aviatorwho flies daily in the course of hisprimary duty might be exemplified

by a major who has been assignedto Hawaii for two years and hasdone all of his flying for a headquarters detachment. In two yearsthis accomplished and competentaviator has learned literally everything about the islands pertainingto aviation and could probably goanywhere in his area of operationswithout a map or an approachchart, VFR or IFR, and hit hisdestination within three minutes ofhis ETA every time.

The major has been an Armyaviator for some time and is a trueprofessional. He is aware of regulation changes, weather sequences,flight planning and filing and canread a chart, be i t VFR or IFR,

with the best of them. He willprobably only miss one or twoquestions on the annual writtenexam and will learn from thesemissed, as well s from some heanswers correctly. f he should max

the exam he will know that it is

partly because of knowledge gainedas a result of earlier annual writsand the interest they fostered , aswell s the large number of answers he deemed it wi e to look upon this one. There has probablynever been an Army aviator whohasn't learned something whiletaking an annual written examination.

The largest group of aviatorsincluding the above examples, involves the man who flies daily inperformance of his primary duty.This is the man who occasionallyclaims he doesn't need the exam.He flies nearly every day but some

times ends up having to take theexamination twice anyway. The

pertinent factor here is the facthat, for example, an instructorpilot can fly the idiot-circleevery day for a year and never file

a cross-country flight plan. He welmay be currently familiar with onlya small portion of the broad spectrum of Army aviation even if hedoes fly every day. This same man

may be called on tomorrow to leadseven aircraft in a ferry flightacross the United States. The annual writ is one way of insuringthat he can accomplish, right now,any mission.

Finally , the growth of Armyaviation has invariably increasedthe number of flying-desk jobsThis semi-ground duty category Btype assignment, though alignedwith aviation, does not alwaysallow an individual to keep personal skills polished. The annual wri

certainly is as valuable a tool tothese desk aviators s it is tothose on ground duty. As a meansof keeping up with regulationchanges, the writ refreshes andrenews their thinking and keepsthem abreast of the changes inFAA and subsequently Army)

regulations which continually takeplace.

The annual written examinationhas proven itself valuable. It doesnot limit professionalism. t does

help guarantee that the guy sittingin the cockpit with you meets certain standards. For those comingback from RVN and facing theannual writ for the first time, andfor those who learn something new

from it every year, let us welcome

this exam as befits the excellen

and challenging training tool tha

it is.



CEILING: 1,000 feet. Communications: whoknows? N av aid: inoperative. Altitude: 800

feet. Heading: 350 degrees. Fuel: about 30 gallons

remaining. Location: somewhere in the Republicof Korea.

Misoriented Lost Remain calm, lieutenant, or is

that technical knowledge you absorbed in flighttraining still back in the operations room? Hmm,the colonel's crimson face has changed a few drasticshades. It seems his need for this flight has dwindled.

At least, the two sergeant majors have a smile ofconfidence, or is that smile derived from the satisfaction of viewing the colonel's apprehension?

Oh yes, my other passenger, my cohort in crime,my famous map reader, just lost confidence in hiown ability to decipher a map.

Phew The way the colonel snagged that map. Iwonder if he can do any better? What does he needa map for? Didn't he say he had flown this route

many times and could do it blindfolded?Lieutenant You blunderhead Who is in com

mand of this U-6, anyway? Wait, just how did youget into this situation? Let's look back.

After a few months with the 3rd Aviation Detachment, I had a good flying reputation and the eagerness of a young aviator in charge of the world.

During these few months the weather couldn'thave been better for flying. In fact , until this fatefulday, I couldn't imagine what the CO meant whenhe warned me of the unpredictable Korean weatherphenomena.

On this particular day, I could see I wouldn't be

soaring through the Land of the Morning Calm withmy usual bird's-eye view. Almost instrument-type

weather, and I still didn't have my Eighth Armyinstrument checkout. t didn't matter anyway, I wathe only aviator available for the mission.

Drat it. The colonel sure would be mad if I cancelled his flight. But cancel it I would. Summoningmy courage, I immediately proceeded to operationsto call the colonel and give him the status of theflight. Maybe his wrath wouldn' t fall as heavy if Icould still catch him in his office. He was a veryimpatient man and he sure didn't like waiting onyoung lieutenants. Over-the-bar gossip had it that

lieutenants had better give him a wide berth. I hopedto do just that.

"Sergeant, give the colonel's office a call and tellhim we are cancelling his flight," I authoritativelyannounced.

Too late lieutenant. He just called and is on theway out."

"Well, let me call weather and fill out the 175-1,so I can give the colonel a verified reason for cancelling," I said with determination.

12

Who

s nCommand?

aptain Jerald M Kowieski

As I finished the 175-1 weather briefing , thegeant remarked, The colonel is here and soCaptain Murphy with the two sergeant majors."

Good morning colonel. I'm sorry but I will hto cancel your flight due to weather."

" ou what?" (Boy, why did he have to shouloud?) "I've flown in weather worse than this Wis the weather anyway?"

"Sir, the weather is marginal, 1,000-foot ceiwith four miles visibility and a slight chancedrizzle. "

"Why lieutenant, that's VFR. Let's go " (Th

he goes, shouting again.)

But sir, you have 50 miles of mountainous rain to cross and some of those mountains are 5,feet. Those aren't mole hills in my book."

"Lieutenant," the colonel scanned the map,you see this railroad winding between these hfrom Taegu to Seoul?"

"Yes sir," I said meekly, but I have never flothat route, least of all at 800 feet."

"Well lieutenant," he said, as if he'd solved problem, I have. Now let's go " Then he tooside-long glance at the captain and remarked,you feel I can't direct you from here to Seoul,sure the captain here can read a map. Is that ri

captain?""Yes sir," the captain replied. I could sit in

copilot's seat and guide our young driver with map.

"Okay, sir," I said doubtfully, "let's give it a trAs an afterthought I added, "Sir, it will take about 10 minutes to file my flight plan and giveBeaver a quick preflight."

"All right, but hurry up; I'm already late."My preflight and runup checked out fine. That




I 'm sorry Colonel, but I'll have to cancel our flight.

YOU WHAT?

everything was fine except the ADF. There it was ,my one and only nav aid swinging 360 degree s justnot knowing where to stop. No bother, we weregoing to follow the railroad tracks anyway and thecolonel was in a hurry.

Everything was going as the colonel had planned.We whizzed in and out around those hills . I wondered if the passengers noted the ceiling was lowering. It made me perspire excessively to think that ifit got any lower there just wasn't a place to turnaround. Also, what would happen if another crazyaviator decided to fly down from Seoul on the sameroute?

Ah, there's Taejon. Out of the mountains at last.You might say, home free. But wait Where did thatrailroad go

"Captain. Hey captain, sir. I've lost the railroad.What heading do I pick up from here to Seoul?"I asked with all the assurance a young pilot couldmuster. I sure didn't want to circle around lookingfor the railroad and waste more of the colonel'svaluable time.

"Oh lieutenant," he answered in a tone clearlyimplying that I was the major problem, "take upabout a 350-degree heading. That seems aboutright. "

I wished that he hadn't turned that map in somany different directions to get that heading. Ohwell, he did state he knew how to read a map.

"Thank you sir. We should reach Seoul in about45 minutes," I advised.

One hour later, the only distinguishable landmarkamong the rice paddies was a nice wide river runningapproximately east and west (the dividing line between South and North Korea).

"Captain, where are weT'

SEPTEMBER 1969

"I don't know. I lost you on the map after I gavyou the heading." The captain couldn't hear mswear.)

I had been depending on his map guidance. wish I had my ADF. f I only had taken more timon the ground to have it checked by the radio repainnan. t had quit altogether. Well no problemI guess, there's still radar coverage. I should be irange of Osan radar. Maybe I can get a vector toSeoul.

"Osan radar, Anny 767, over." Complete silencensued.

I raised by voice a few octaves and called again

"Osan radar, Anny 767 , over." NothingI quickly checked all other frequencies and still

nothing.Finally I had to admit I was misoriented, not lost

I was in South Korea, wasn't I?The ending of this story is not nearly as importan

as realizing the errors that were made and the s

aster that could have happened. Many young aviators could find themselves in a similar situation anpossibly a few older, more complacent types as wel

So consider which of the following you have beeguilty of:

• Taking a flight beyond your capability. We ar

all the best, but who wants to admit what we arcapable of?

• Incomplete flight planning. All routes of a flighshould be checked thoroughly, and all alternatives

• Flying in marginal weather with inoperativnavigation equipment, or for that matter lacking thsmarts to request a copilot.

The young aviator should remember that as pilohe is in command of his aircraft and his decisionmay spell the difference between success and disaster

13



u OWER RECOVERY Can t

you see you're going intothe trees?" the instructor pilotshouted at his student. This student had been having problemsreaching a clear area on simulated

forced landings. He just could notperceive, when making a powerrecovery, where he would havetouched down i he had continuedhis autorotation to the ground.This was the reason the instructorhad always let him descend to thespecified obstacle clearance limitbefore ordering a power recovery.

The gas producer rpm washolding at a steady 60 percent so

t h ~ should be no problem making a power recovery, even thoughthe student had placed them in alow airspeed, low altitude, highrate of descent situation. Thereshould be no problem, or so theinstructor thought just prior to increasing throttle. His rapid throt

tle increase brought about an

immediate response from the en

gine, not n the expected manner

but in the form of loud staccato

machinegun like noises. It was the

characteristic sound of a compres

sor stall and in their situation itwas a sound as ominous as that

of enemy fire. The compressor

stall had brought a rise in exhaust

gas temperature and a decre se

in rpm.

The low altitude and high rate

of descent of the aircraft pre

cluded any chance of reaching a

suitable landing spot, regardless

of the instructor's skill in operat

ing the aircraft. They were totally

committed and went into the trees.There were two obvious factors

involved in this accident: The in

structor pilot allowed the student

to go too far in the maneuver,

placing the crew in a hazardous

situation, and the engine suffered

a compressor stall at this most in

opportune moment when power

was badly needed.

SEPTEMBER 1969

Let us now trace their flightto see if we can determine thereason for the compressor stallwhich put these hapless aviatorsin the trees that morning.

The morning was unusually cold

for that time of year. The instructorand student were beginning anotherday of transition training. The preflight inspection and runup procedure were completed with onlya slight discrepancy noted. Theengine ice detector caution lightremained illuminated and therewas no change in exhaust gas temperature reading when the de-iceswitch on the pedestal was movedto the ON or OFF position. The

instructor incorrectly interpretedthese discrepancies to mean theindicator light was malfunctioningor that the anti-icing system was inoperative. This did not seem to be

of great importance at the time

due to the fact that the .freezing

level had been reported to be

above 4,000 feet and the max

imum training altitude they would

be using that day was below 1,000

feet.After takeoff, the instructor

turned on the bleed air heater tocirculate some warmth into the

bone-chilling air of the cabin. The

training period was almost com

pleted when the instructor initiated

the ill-fated simulated forced land

ing which turned out to be an

actual forced landing.

Investigation shows that the

compressor stall which contributed

to the accident and thereby mak

ing necessary the forced landing,

could have been avoided if theinstructor pilot had been more

familiar with the cause of com

pressor stall and its relationship to

the use of the bleed air operated

accessories and aV3 ilable engine

power.

Compressor stall, also known as

engine surge, is a potential prob

lem in the operation of any gas tur-

bine engine. It is usually broughtto the pilot's attention by its characteristic loud popping noise, accompanied by excessive fluctuationof engine instruments.

The blades on a turbine com

pressor are airfoils and are subjectto stall just like the airfoil on afixed wing aircraft. The pitch on

the compressor blades is fixed,therefore, the angle of attack is

fixed. One may wonder, then, howthe blades can stall if the angle ofattack is fixed. Although the angleof attack is fixed, the rel tive angleof attack will vary with the speedof the compressor and the velocityof the air moving through it. Compressor stalls occur when the delicate balance between the compressor pressure and the pressurefrom the combustor is not maintained. Whenever the pressurefrom the coinbustion chamber exceeds the pressure from the compressor section, the higher pressure in the combustor section willtend to discharge forward or backthrough the compressor and causea momentary airflow stoppage.The relative angle of attack of the

compressor blades is, of coursegreatly increased and the compressor stalls.

There are several factors whichcan contribute to compressor stall,some of these factors are not underthe direct control of the pilot, burather depend on the age and condition of the engine and on the

maintenance performed on the

engine.Engine deterioration ' is a con

tributing factor; erosion of the

compressor blades .or foreign object damage to the compressor will

reduce the amount of pressure i

can supply, therefore, increasing

the chances of compressor stall.

There are several other causes

of compressor stall which are pri

marily of a maintenance nature

since they are due to malfunctions

or material failure. These causes

5



Help Stamp Out ompressor Stalls percent N1 speed or when ambtemperature exceeds 50 d e g r ~ e

• Do not use bleed air duengine restart in flight.nclude a faulty or maladjusted fuel

control. f the fuel control wereto put a large amount of fuel into

the combustor at one time, thepressure from the combustor couldexceed the pressure from the compressor which would have to accelerate before it could match thecombustor pressure. A faulty or

maladjusted bleed air band cancause compressor stall, for it isthrough the bleed air band thatthe excessive pressure is reducedto unload the compressor and allow it to recover from a stall. Adirty compressor has the same

effect as an eroded compressor incausing compressor stall. The dirtycompressor cannot put out sufficient pressure to maintain thedelicate balance of pressures necessary.

Although these causes are notu n d ~ r the direct control of thepilot, I have mentioned them hereto bring to your attention that ifone of these conditions exists, evenif it is pot in itself severe enoughto cause a compressor stall, the

possibility of one occurring is greatly increased. The pilot's actionsonly help to magnify the deficiencies already created.

Compressor stall, if it occurs, islikely to take place during engineacceleration when the pressure canrise in the combustor faster thaQ.

the compressor can a c c e l e r a t ~ tomatch tliat pressure, A power recovery from a u t o f o t ~ t i o n and starting the engine are two situationswhen compressor stall becomesmore apparent. From the description of compressor stall, it can beseen that anything which wouldtend to lessen the amount of pressurized air going into the combustor would contribute to the likelihood of compressor stall.

Any restriction of air in the

gine ~ l e t area will reduce the

volume of air the o m p r e ~ s o r can

16

move and the pressure it can produce. A dirty or clogged engineinlet or engine inlet filters will defi

nitely reduce the available air tothe engine and: can possibly causea compressor stall. The engine inlet and filter area should be inspected visually before ~ n d afterevery flight and all obstructions,such as leaves or straw should beremoved.

Misunderstanding and misuse ofthe bleed air driven componentsis a prime pilot-induced factor incompressor stall. The various systems which operate off the cus

tomer air or bleed air, use airpressurized by the engine compressor and thus they steal theair from the engine combustor.The bleed air, in the UH 1 seriesaircraft, is used to drive the engineand transmission oil - cooler, thede-icing system, the bleed air heating and defrosting system, and onthe D and H models, t ~ e left fuelboost pump.

Misuse of the bleed air cabinheater can contribute to the possi

bility of engine compressor stall.Precautions to be observed inoperating the bleed air heater varyaccording to the model of theengine installed in the aircraft.These precautions should be strictly adhered to and are found in thedash 10 for each model.

With the T-53-L-9 engine:• Do not u ~ e bleed air heater on

takeoff or landing, or during engine restart during flight.

• Do not use bleed air heaterwith IR selector switch in position 3 or 4 when above 85 percentgas producer rpm.

With the T-53-L-9A, 11 and13 engines:

• Do not use bleed air heaterabove 90 percent N1 speed.

• Do not use bleed air heaterwith IR selector switch in positions 2, 3, or 4 when above 85

Due to basic differences inmodels of the T-53 turbine

gines, the restrictions on the usthe bleed air heater with the vous models are·somewhat diffeThe bleed air heater switch shbe in the OFF position dutakeoff and landing and other fconditions requiring maximumgine power available. The bleeheater should not be used duengine restart during flight.

As mentioned, the qe-icing tem uses bleed air for its operaTherefore, when the system is

erating it is important to be to predict its effect on availpower and o'n possible comprestall.

There are two indicator lifor the anti-icing system, bothcated on the segmented caupanel. The ENGINE ICING ldenotes an engine icing condiThe ENG ICE detector light sifies that the system's detector interpretor are inactive. The tem is a f ~ i l s a f e type, causinganti-icing to be continuous wthere is a failure in the detecsystem; therefore, i f there isENG ICE detector warning l

on, and no change in EGT wthe de-ice switch is turned o

off it must be assumed that a

icing is continuous.

Due perhaps to the emphplaced on flying in Vietnam,

not uncommon to find Army a

tors who are not fully aware of

effect the de-icing system orbleed air heating can have

available engine power and

causing compressor stall. A b

understanding of the operation

effect of these systems can

the aviator minimize the possib

of compressor stall and resul

unnecessary accidents and e qment damage.

U. S. RMY AVIATION DIGE



Hello again. This is CharlieChecklist speaking to you from

beautiful downtown Ft. Rucker.Danny s ready to take over, but

first let me remind you to keepthose questions coming in • • •

yeah, sockem to us

harlie and Danny s Write in

D anny, I have found an item in the o v ~ m b e ~1968 UH-1 C Operators Manual (paragraph

2-232) which I want you to clear up for me. The

manual states that the rotor rpm warning light is setat 339 ; however, the UH-1D manual shows a settingof 335 rpm. Should there be a difference in thesetting?

Danny's answer: You are a most observant avistor.There should not be a 'difference in the setting forthe two series of the VB l since the warning systems

are identical. The next change to the VB IC manualwill indicate the high side setting of 335 rpm - - 5.Another change that wjll be shown is an engine rpmwarning setting of 6100 ± 100) rpm. Now that Ihave answered your question, you can bbast to your

fellow aviators about how sharp your vision is. Maybe it will cause them to read a little more closely.

Rumor has it here in RVN that the OV-1 Operators Manual is being divided into four separatemanuals, one for each series. Is this true? . f it is,what about checklists? Will there be one for eachseries?

Danny's answer: Well, I don't know how this rumormanaged to filter all .the way to RVN, but it is true.The new Mohawk manuals are now being preparedand ,will soon be issued for each of the four OV l

series. Charlie tells me that each series will also havea separate checklist.

Charlie, the old flip type checklist which I wasissued at the aviation school when I transitioned intothe U-8 had power settings, voltage readings, rpm,etc., listed in the engine runup section. Recently, my

SEPTEMBER 1969

unit received the new DA checklist and these reaings have been omitted. Why?

Danny's answer: Let me answer your question istead of Charlie. The checklist is only a reminder a s e ~ u e n c e of events designed for aviators qualifiin the aircraft arid is not a replacement for the 1

or IP. The information which was in your old checlist is contained in chapters 3 and 4 of the OperatoManual and you should go to this manual i f you aunsure of a procedure or as to what rpm is used fa certain runup step. J'here is a section in the checlist entitled Performance Check which providamplification of specific steps for those that requiit. I f your unit's V S checklist does not have thsection, then it's not complete.

Hey, Danny Dash 10, haven't I found an error the U-21A Operators Manual? On page 2-25 of tMarch 1969 manual the fuel system schematic showa thermal relief valve and line on the left fuel systemI can't find the line on my aircraft. Something wrong.

Danny's answer: I will accept three licks on tbackside with a 10 . You are correct; this line only used on the right fuel system. Now go back the schematic and look for the followjng additionerrors. The thermal relief bypass valve is showbackwards and the cabin heater fuel intake lineshown coming out of the transfer sump pressure liinstead of the gravity fuel line. All of these errowill be corrected in the next change to the manuMeanwhile, tell the other aviators in your unit n

to get excited if they can't find the line on the lefuel system. I t doesn't have one.

1



A Lesson

ell LearnedA few moment8 dedicated to 8etting altimeters andchecking navigation radios, prior to takeoff, areeasy to forget, especially for the pilot who rarelyflys instruments. But one terrifying experience is

enough to teach anyone a lifetime les80n

HE HOT LINE sounded offwith that familiar signal to

strap on our .38s and scramblethe Hueys.

I didn't realize it then, but Iwas scrambling into my first experience with weather flying.

t was a cool, cloudy evening inNovember. Eight men, includingmyself, had been on standby since0700 hours that morning in ourwood and tin standby hutch located a few seconds from eightUH-1Cs. Two of the UH-1Cs werearmed and prepared for immediatedeployment in support of groundtrQops and air activity. We wereone of two standby fireteams making up an armed platoon called theFirebirds of the 71 st Assault Heli

copter Company stationed at ChuLai, Republic of Vietnam.

Our entire day had consisted ofmissions in support of infantrytroops of the Americal Divisionlocated northwest of Chu Lai inmountainous terrain. A large percentage of those missions had beensearch and destroy, with a few suppression missions against enemy

snipers.

18

CW2 Kenneth F Wiegand

My fireteam leader and I hadnot seriously given thought to theincreasing buildup of weather activity in the area, or reports ofthunderstorms heading in our direction from the vast South ChinaSea. The U. S Marine meteorologysection had been issuing weatherwarnings all day with an estimatedarrival time at 1700 hours.

We did not actually expect tobe scrambled that night due to theforecast weather, but were prepared to go at a moment's notice.

By 1730 hours we had finishedour evening meal and sat lazily inour comfortable hutch smokingand swapping experiences rangingfrom the girl back home to armedhelicopter tactics. Tactics discus

sions usually ended up in a heatedargument among the novice members of the platoon.

We frequently discussed t a c t i c ~their applicability to many vaiieties of situations and possibleways to improve their effectiveness;however, we seldom discussed instrument flying or preparation fora flight which might inadvertentlyfind us flying instruments. Since

we had never experienced the fects of the rainy season on fliconditions, we simply ignored fact that weather would actuaaffect us. After all, one could laat one of the many secure areasthe vicinity before the weatclosed in. t was the beginningthe rainy season and ole mweather had prepared a ruawakening for four unsuspectpilots.

At about 1800 hours I answerthe hot line, the phone connectus to operations. t was the opetions officer with instructions scramble to coordinates XY 1456 and up arrival contact Alp

I waited for Mac to hover onthe taxiway and begin his sl

ascent that made his heav

armed ship seem like a wea

pelican winging his way howith a full day s catch. Thwas the signal to hover my shinto position behind him atake off at the proper interval

begin our emergency missio

Only three minules had elap8

since we had been alerted

U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGES



Lesson Well Learned

Bravo 6 on 31.5 fox mikecompany in contact. I scribbledthe information onto a blackboardlocated near the phone while the

pilots rushed to their aircraft tolight the fires. My team leader

plotted coordinates and copied thefrequency and call sign of the manto contact for further instructions.

By the time I hung up, the fireteam leader, whom I shall now re

fer to as Mac, had plotted the

route of flight by use of visual land

marks. Mac and I discussed the

route plan on the way to the air

craft which were at operating rpm.

We wished each other luck.I strapped on my chicken

board t he armored chest pro

tector-slipped on my flak vest

and climbed into the right seat

position behind the controls of theaircraft. After strapping in andsecuring my ballistic helmet, Maccalled for UHF, FM and VHF

commo checks. We made the finalequipment check, as we had donebefore every mission during thepreceding 10 months, and wereprepared to be on our way. Mac

called Chu Lai tower for takeoff

instructions and was immediately

cleared for a north departure from

the Firebird line.I waited for Mac to hover onto

the taxiway, our active runway.

His aircraft shuddered as it strained

to lift the weight of its XM-3 syster and crew and hover into place.

The aircraft tilted forward gainingspeed slowly and after severalbounces began to fly like a weary

There was no way out except to penetrate the menacing clouds

...

pelican ponderously winging way home with a full day's caThat was the signal to hovership into position. I pulled 34to hover onto the taxiway played the rotor tack betw

6400 and 6200 rpm to skip offground. We always took off arately to gain proper distancecoverage. I called off and notified operations that weon the way. Three minutes passed since we had been ale

We maintained treetop until clearing the control zonethen began our long slow clim1,500 feet, the altitude needepass the first ridge line on ourminute journey into the mount

Upon leveling out my pilot over, holding position on the ship's wing. I suppose this wasfirst time I noticed the thwidely-scattered clouds stretc

20 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIG



t3 000 feet we plunged into what seemed like n eternity

in all directions. The sun was on

the horizon almost out of sight and

the sky to the east was pitch black

with occasional streaks of glaring

white electrons bolting a messageof warning.

Visibility was unlimited beneath

the cloud layers, but at 1,500 feetit was limited due to the innocent

looking puffs we were busily cir

cumnavigating. Mac and I consid

ered the possibility of poor weather

closing in on us, but decided that

we would have enough time to

complete the mission and return

to Chu Lai before the storms

reached the area. The storms were

SEPTEM ER 1969

still quite a distance from the

mainland and it all looked so easy.

We arrived over Alpha Bravo

6 s position at approximately 1840

hours. The company was located

in a completely enclosed valley

with walls towering 2,500 feet onall sides. It was too dark to iden

tify detail in the base of the valley,

therefore smoke could not be used.

Mac asked for .50 caliber tracers

to be fired into the enemy posi

tions, the only way we had to iden

tify our target. They kept us very

busy for the following 25 to 30

minutes until we found our am-

munition stores expended down t

the several hundred rounds o

7.62 ammunition we kept for pro

tection. During the strikes our at

tention was held solely to the mis

sion and there was no concern ove

what was happening above us.When Mac received a job-well

done and a most welcome releas

from the infantry commander, w

guided our ships toward our poin

of entry into the valley. Here

where ole man weather surprise

us.

The small depression in the va

ley wall through which we entere

2



Lesson Well Learned

was completely socked in and,furthermore, the faint sunlight had

disappeared, leaving us in totaldarkness. Only those who have

challenged the darkness in lonelystretches of Vietnam can imaginethis frightening experience.

We spent 10 to 15 minutessearching uselessly for a way, poking in and out of the clouds. Therewas no way out except to penetrateour captor and fly heading, altitude, airspeed and time. Both Macand I were aware of what wouldhave to be done, but didn't admitit until we were on our way. It wasan eerie feeling being trapped bysomething that, until then, hadnever threatened our lives. Duringthose short minutes of flying circlesto gain clearing altitude, I discovered that Charlie was not my greatest enemy I was.

Why hadn't I set my attitude indicator before takeoff? Why didn'tI check my navigation radios andinstruments? The attitude indicatorwas actually no problem for all Ihad to do was center the needle on

the turn and slip indicator, adjustpower and airspeed and adjust thelevel of the wings with the horizonline. It was then that I discoveredthat although the attitude indicatorseemed to be operating properly,it was not reliable.

Everything seemed to happen at

once after that. The VHF and FM

radios failed. I could leceive only

FM, but could not transmit or re

ceive VHF. Luckily, Mac and I

were monitoring the same UHF

frequency and were able to communicate.

We reached 3,000 feet before

plunging into what seemed an eter

nity. We agreed to fly a heading of

050 degrees with 500 feet altitude

separation Mac at 4,000 and myself at 3,500 feet. We knew that

these altitudes would allow us to

more than safely clear the tops of

the highest mountains between usand the coast. My pilot plotted distance to the coast and calculated20 minutes at 90 knots. Mac pene

trated first. As his grimes light disappeared into the darkness, I hada sickening feeling that we mightnot make it.

I waited, giving Mac a five-minute lead for spacing. He triedcheering me up by telling me howeasy it was, and that he expectedto break out at any moment. Macleft the UHF frequency to attemptcontact with Moonman approachcontrol at Chu Lai, while I turnedto 050 degrees and began a climbto my altitude and actual instruments.

Just before cloud contact Ibriefed my crew, telling my pilotto stay on the instruments and myenlisted crew to keep a sharp eyeon everything.

t began raining very hard afterentering the nothingness, and Ifound my heading varying 30 degrees to each side of 050 degreesand my airspeed decreasing from90 to 60 knots. I thought of nothing but keeping the aircraft undercontrol and right side up.

After what seemed like hours,Mac informed me that he could

not contact Moonman control. .We

talked like magpies just to keep thefrightening loneliness out of our

minds. Even though we had our

crews to talk with, it was still com

forting to hear a voice from outside the ship.

I flew 050 degrees for eight

minutes before being informed thatwe had broken out. t was clear

but totally dark outside the cock

pit until several artillery flarespopped out of nowhere. I had no

idea where we were, who was fir

ing flares or where the gun-target

line was.About this time I thought it

best to recheck my instruments.

Engine and transmission inments, flight instruments,pounds of fuel it was thenoticed the magnetic compassdicating 180 degrees. Thewas not reliable I turned my

to 050 degrees by the mag cpass and penetrated the cloagain. To this day, I don't kwhere we broke out. All I kis that it was a large circularpression in the ceiling and artiwas on to something beneath

Many thoughts passed thromy mind during the followingminutes. Would I ever see friends and family again or wwe fly around in the clouds our fuel supply exhausted,

crash into the thick jungle?I held 3,500 feet, 90 knots,

degrees and prayed.Then Mac triumphantly

nounced he had broken out Tam Ky and would hold unarrived. We felt helpless hano idea where we were or ifwould be fortunate enoughbreak out.

Twenty minutes had pawhen my crewchief shouted he had visual contact with a l

blurred light at our 10 o'clockposition. My pilot looked upconfirmed the contact. I told to take the aircraft and hstraight for it while I stayed oninstruments. It was Tam Kymistakably.

Mac and I rejoined over the and began the short trek to Lai in blinding rain.

Fifteen minutes after shudown in our respective revetmat the Firebird line, avionics

busy replacing the FM, VHF, nigation radios, attitude indicand RMI in my aircraft.

A very convincing lesson

learned that night and, believe

since that day I have never fa

to check my navigation and fl

radios before takeoff in any

of weather. One terrifying exp

ence is enough for one lifet

22 U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGE



They Should

Have SurvivedThree fatal mistakes on the part of the crew turned

what should have been a survivable crash into a death

trap through which none lived. The gunner didn t snap

his chin strap, the crewchief hadn t used his seat belt

and the aircraft commander neglected to use i carrier

for his breastplate, which during impact broke his neck.

CW Wayne K Roberts

Don t letl t t l ~ thinglike thisdo a big

T HREE OF THE four crewmembers should have survived.

This thought has haunted meever since was president of anaircraft accident investigationboard. The aircraft, a UH-ID

carrying a crew of four, crashed inthe Republic of Vietnam under thefollowing circumstances:

the aircraft commander had1,027 hours total flying time500 in UH-l) and had been in

country six months.• the pilot had 600 hours total

flying time ( 325 in UH 1) andhad been incountry two months

• the crewchief had been out ofschool four months and a crewchief for one month

• the gunner had been incountryfor 5 months.

The aircraft commander hadflown 8 hours in the previous 30

• • • • • • • • • • • • • •••••••••••••

days and had been off the two daysbefore the accident. He had flown30 minutes the day of the accident,after eight hours sleep. The pilothad flown 112 hours in the preceding 30 days. He had eight hours

sleep before the flight.The accident occurred one

fourth mile north of the fire support base that was the aircraft sdestination. Personnel at the fire

support base heard the crash andsent out a patrol which secured thecrash site.

thing like • • • •The aircraft sustained major

damage to all components and allfour crewmembers received fatalinjuries in the crash.

The aircraft had been on a sin

gle ship resupply mission. t haddeparted home station at 0730.Weather, as reported by a weatherobserver at the fire support base,was 500 feet with three-fourths ofa mile visibility in mist. Windswere from 110 degrees at 10 to 12knots.

t was the custom in this unit tostay low level in these conditions.The aircraft commander had flown



They Should Have Survived protrude about one-eight oinch when the quick disconcoupling is fully locked. The pling will shut off the flow ofwhen it is disconnected but it not normally leak if not

engaged.

under these conditions for threemonths and it was his habit toremain low level.

The aircraft hit tall trees on a

heading of 280 degrees about 200feet from its final resting place.There was a path of wreckagefrom the point of impact to thefinal resting place. The point ofimpact was at the top of a smallhill. The path of the aircraft Wa

downhill and downwind, andthrough the treetops without solidcontact for the first 100 feet.

The first really noticeable thingabout the wreckage was the apparently low rotor rpm at impact.

There was damage o both blades,but the blades and main rotor

head were still on the aircraft. The

.THIS

blades were at full pitch and strikemarks indicated they had been atfull pitch during the initial impact.This was shown by the limited

damage to the leading edge andspar and the deep scars and ripson the bottom of the blades in thehoneycomb area.

This implied a power loss. Thereason for power loss was discovered upon opening the left enginecowling. The main fuel line fromthe fuel filter to the fuel controlunit was disconnected at the outletof the fuel filter. This type of linehas a quick disconnect at thispoint. The quick disconnect is the

type with three pins located 120degrees apart around the circumference of the barrel. These pins

This item should be checkeeach daily and preflight inspecf the pins are not protruding

coupling is not locked and

vibrate loose causing an enfailure due to fuel starvation.

t was noted that the main

line had been disconnected duan intermediate inspection

night before while changingmain fuel filter.

A maintenance operat

check required to completeintermediate inspection was formed by the flight crew im

A quick disconnect on the fuel line had not been fully enga

resulting in fuel leakage and a subsequent power loss.



diately prior to takeoff; the crewchief was observed checking theengine area for leaks.

A question arose as to why theaircraft entered the trees with such

high rate of forward speed. Evenat low level, the pilot should havebeen able to slow the aircraft to amore acceptable speed prior toimpact.

Examination of the cockpit arearevealed that both light bulbs inthe rpm warning light had beenremoved. There was no entry onthe DA Form 2408-13. The DA

Form 2408-14 was found in themiddle of a thick stack of blankforms in the back of the book. Thefollowing writeup was on the

2408-14: "rpm warning lightburned out." There was ' an on

requisition statement next to thatwriteup. This entry had been madetwo weeks prior to the accidentand had not been approved by asupervisor. The 2408-12 and2408-13 were the first two pagesof the book. There was no 2408-18in the book.

The rpm audio circuit breakerwas pushed in. The rpm audio

switch was in the off position.Examinatipn of the switch revealedit was not the proper type. Thecorrect switch is spring loaded tothe on position with a small electromagnet in the off position. Theelectromagnet will release theswitch when there is a power interruption to it. t automaticallygoes to the on position when therpm comes within the normal operating range, precluding a take

off with the audio s y s t ~ m deactivated. The type of switch actuallyinstalled was a regular toggle

switch that remains in the lastselected position. Maintenance rec

ords do not iQ dicate when or whythis type of switch was installed.

Neither pilot had flown this par

ticular i r ~ r f t in the previous 30

days. A light that does not come

SEPTEMBER 1969

on is less likely to e noticed thanone that does. Personnel who observed the takeoff stated that therunup was very brief, allowingonly enough time for the crewchiefto quickly check for leaks.

Because of the above facts, it isfelt the pilots had neither a lowrpm light nor audio warning system operating and were unawareof this fact The rpm control warning box checked okay on a benchtest indicating an audio warningwould have been available if theswitch had been iq the on position.

Cause Factors

Maintenance:

• The quick disconnect was improperly installed and inspected.

This is considered the direct causeof the accident.

• The rpm warning light bulbswere not replaced after havingbeen written up 21 days prior tothe accident. Replacement of justone of the two bulbs would haveprovided the pilots with a visualwarning.

• Installation of an impropertoggle switch eliminated the lastautomatic safety device.

Inspections: The condition ofthe fuel line quick disconnect wasnot detected by the technical inspector following the intermediateinspection by the crewchief duringhis daily or by the pilots duringtheir preflight.

Operations: There was not a

proper runup or cockpit check before the takeoff. A good runup or

cockpit check would have revealedthe inoperative light and the audio

switch in the off position plus thelack of an audio signal belownormal rpm.

Supervision: Maintenance supervisors allowed a serious conditionto go uncorrected for 21 days.The write-up on the 2408-14should have remained on the dash13 where it was more likely tocome to the pilots' attention.

A dditional Information

The gunner was killed by ablow to the head after loss of hishelmet. There were no impactmarks on his helmet. His helmetwas very loose and had not been

fitted by the flight surgeon. Hischin strap required extreme pressure to snap and unsnap. t wasnot snapped when found. He wasnot wearing gloves. He was wearing jungle fatigues and jungleboots.

The crewchief was not using hisseat belt which was found connected and drawn tight across theseat. The crewchief's body wasthrown from the ~ i r c r f t at impactand found in a tree. He was wear

ing gloves,j u n ~ l e

fatigues andleather boots.The pilot did not have a carrier

for his breastplate. He slipped itbetween his body and the shoulderstraps. He was thrown forward atimpact and the inertia reel lockedthe shoulder barness in that position. He leaned back but thebreastplate stayed forward as therewas nothing to pull it back. On

the second impact, he again wasthrown forward and downward.

His chin struck the breastplatebreaking his jaw and neck, killing

him.The aircraft commander was

killed by massive crushing whenhis area of the cockpit deformedwhen striking a tree. Neither thepilot nor aircraft commander woreNomex flight suits or leather boots.Both wore gloves.

There was no failure of any seat

or restraint device. The deforma

tion of the aircraft in the areas ofthe crewchief, gunner and pilotwas not excessive. These threepositions should have been survivable.

While this particular accidenthasn't happened yet I have observed every single one of thecause factors within the last six

months. t could happen to you

25



h e k

moretting little

his he rt skipped



a



Double Check It ate was really all right. In additiothis crosscheck, you might noted your engine oil temperatI f the cause of the fluctuation a low oil level, the temperawould also increase, though

wouldn't indicate as rapidly ascaution light. The same princholds true with the transmissionindicators.

had taken him aside and said:Always double check son, or you'll

be checkmated. It didn't mean awhole lot at the time, but nowHasty couldn't get it out of hismind.

What can I double check? heasked himself. It's obvious thatwe are low on oil, or are we? Butif we are low on oil pressure, howcome the caution light isn't on?

He reached down and pressedthe caution toggle switch to thetest position. Sure enough, the oilpressure caution light came on

bright and strong. He wonderedwhich was the more reliable sys-tem, the caution light or the pres-sure gauge. He resolved to learnmore about the indicating systemsand what they actually meant if heever made it back.

The crackle of Comanche 6boomed over the fox mike radio,Looks like we've put them out of

commission for a while; we'repopping smoke.

Hasty noted the yellow smoke,wind direction and started his cir-cling approach. Five minutes hadpassed since the gauge first startedfluctuating and it was still flapping.The caution light still wasn't illu-minated so Hasty made the deci-sion to try to make it home.

Three anxious minutes later theammo had been dumped to theappreciative ground pounders andHasty was out of the LZ. Nowbaby, he thought, if you'll just

hold out another 30 minutes we'rehome free.

The flight, although uneventful,proved to be a nerve jangling ex-perience.

After the warm food and hotcoffee settled his nerves, Hasty

looked up the company mainte-nance officer. He explained how

close he had come to disaster in

28

his ailing Huey. The MO lookedat him and quietly suggested, Sup-

pose you get a good night's sleepand we'll talk about it tomorrow.

Early the next morning, Hastyand the MO crawled into the cock-pit of the Huey. From their pre-flight inspection it was determinedthat the oil level was normal. Ob-viously, the cause of the anxietieswas either the oil pump or theindicating system. The MO ex-plained that the pressure indica-tors in the cockpit reflect the pres-sures of the oil lines through a de-

vice which electrically transmittedthe reading to the instruments inthe cockpit. Now, the MO ex-plained, the easiest part of theindicating system to check, andgenerally the most troublesomepart, is the guage. So, we'll checkit first, and then the transmitter. fboth are working correctly, we'llcheck the pump itself.

After taking the gauge from thepanel, Hasty spotted a frayed wireleading into the cannon plug.When the aircraft was run up andthe frayed wire was moved, thesame oscillations occurred as werepresent the night before.

I'm not surprised that you wereworried about it, said the MO.

Fortunately, the engineers de-

signed one, and sometimes two,

backup systems for most of our

instruments. They have also de-signed visual light indicators which

tell the pilot of a situation which

may need attention (amber cautionlights) or warn im of an emer-

gency situation (red lights) re-

quiring immediate action, once it

has been established, through cross-

checking, that it is not a false

alarm. In this case, you noticed

that the caution light, which is acompletely separate system, indi-

cated to you that the oil pressure

I've seen pilots who shut dtheir aircraft in the middle of runways just because of fluctuaoil pressure, and they didn't ethink about crosschecking the tion light or the oil temperaturdon't know how many times whad to recover aircraft from boondocks because of this s

problem.Now don't get me wrong,

MO went on, putting in a worcaution, whenever you suspegauge of indicating incorrectlshould be checked out. But idea is that the mission dictwhat should be done.

Hasty began to analyze the icators on the panel. What abthe EGT gauge; what crosschis available?

Well, said the MO, the Etorque, and Nl are all indicaof engine performance; we shbe able to check one againstother to see if any emergeexists. Take the EGT for instaif it were truly fluctuating, theand torque should also fluctuOf course, should the EGT gaor the torque meter go out, power should be avoided i f limtions could be exceeded.

How about the fuel quan

gauge? Suppose the fuel quagauge suddenly dropped to z

Autorotation?

Hardly feasible unless you

a hole in your fuel tank the siza football; otherwise the

couldn't drain out that fast. Hagain the double check comes

the picture. Look to see i ftwenty minute warning light is

U. S ARMY AVIATION DIG



f the light is not on and you'vedetermined it is functioning properly, there is an indicator problem.Sure, the gauge needs checking,

but you should know how long it

would be safe to continue to fly

and you've still got the warninglight.

Taking the cue, Hasty demonstrated his knowledge of the fuel

boost pumps, I f the fuel pressure

dropped to zero, we might have

transmitter or gauge problems in

stead of actual fuel pressure problems.

That' s right, agreed the MO,

if the fuel boost pressure drops to

zero but neither boost pump warn

ing light is on, it's safe to assumethere is an indicator problem. Onthe other hand, if the lights went

on but the gauge was all right,

we'd probably be having trouble

with the lights.

If both lights came on and the

gauge read zero, we would prob

ably have lost both boost pumps.This is unlikely, but if it happens,

we can still fly we must, however,

observe certain limitations. For all

the Huey models, we must stay below 4,600 feet pressure altitude.

In addition the B model Huey

is limited to five minutes fuel when

the 20-minute warning light is

on. f we follow these rules, we

are safe to continue flight, prefer

ably to a secure landing zone.

The MO went on with his explanation, Let's also consider the

engine-driven fuel pump. This is a

dual element pump, or, if you pre

fer, two pumps enclosed in thesame housing and driven by acommon drive shaft. This pump

supplies fuel to the engine and it

will do this even if both boostpumps fail. The boost pump alonethough, cannot sustain the engineif the engine-driven pumps fail.

Hasty wanted to know how thisengine-driven pump could be mon-

SEPTEMBER 1969

itored. The MO explained that

one way is with the engine fuel

pump warning light on the caution

panel. However, he cautioned,

we are only being told that oneof the pump's two elements isn't

producing pressure. Either elementof the pump is capable of sustaining flight and there is no need to

set down immediately. The pilot

should fly the ship to the first available maintenance facility where

the pump can be checked out and,if necessary, replaced.

If both elements fail, or the

common shaft fails, the engine willquit and the engine fuel pump lightwill probably never indicate that

there is a problem. The lights arecontrolled by a switch that is activated by a difference in pressure.

If neither pump produced anypressure, there would be no difference between the two, and the

lights would not come on.

The M 0 continued to explain

the idea of crosschecking to Hasty,

I f the N 2 tachometer acts up,

check the N 1, EGT and the torque.I f they don't reflect the indications

on the tachometer you can assumethat it isn't the engine, but the indicating system that is acting up.

Also, when the hydraulic cau

tion light comes on in flight, don'timmediately switch the hydraulicsoff and try to make a running landing. There is a good possibility that

the hydraulic caution light is thevillain. The caution light will prob-

ably come on about the same timethe controls become stiff, if thereis really something wrong. t ibest to wait until the controls indicate the hydraulics are really ofbefore you try anything like a running landing.

Hasty was very interested andcould hardly wait to ask, How

about the chip detector cautionlight?

That is one of the few cases,said the MO, where there is nochoice but to believe that the indicated contamination has occurredLanding as soon as possible is thonly choice you may have, keeping in mind that the majority odetection lights come on as a re

sult of electrical problems or normal wear of the engine. Still, your

may be the one which doesn't fi

either category.

Another point that many avia

tors don't understand is that theemergency fuel control cautio

light is not connected directly to

the fuel control, but to the emergency auto governor switch. When

ever the light is on, the only thingthis indicates is that the switch i

in the emergency position. A fuecontrol or governor failure can be

ascertained only by monitoring th

engine instruments and tachome

ters, because no light will comon.

Later, over a cup of coffeeHasty reflected on the information

that he had tried to absorb. Mosof it was merely common sense

On each system they had discussedthere was a primary instrumen

plus another instrument or cautiolight that could be used to crosscheck a suspected system failure

or malfunction, except the chip de

tector system. It all boiled downto just one little item, summed up

as a parting shot by the MOMate, if you don't want to be

checkmated, then you'd bettedouble check.

29



s Fate The Hunter?

. all the skill and daring and airmanship in theworld w ll not offset a moment s inattention or neglect

RECENTLY WE have witnessed a thinning of the ranks

of outstanding aviators. In pulpmagazine parlance they wentWest. Their names read like anhonor roll in an aviation hall offame: Paul Mantz, famed moviestunt pilot for three decades; astronauts Elliot See and CharlesBassett; Captain Max Schumacher,Los Angeles' flying traffic-reporter;X-IS test pilot Joe Walker ofNASA; and, the famed Swiss glacier pilot, Hermann Geiger.

t is interesting to note that threeof the five accidents which took

the lives of these truly remarkableaviators were midair collisions.Captain Max Schumacher, the

only professional helicopter pilotof this group, had his life snuffedout in a midair at night nearDodger stadium when his helicopter collided with one belongingto the LA police. The ex-Marineaviator was a glib traffic reporteras well as an outstanding helicopterpilot and had a wide following onthe West Coast.

The tragic death of famed testpilot Joe Walker ended a trulyshining aviation career. Althoughhe possessed only 4,998 hours offlight time, Walker had been themainstay of the X-IS program andhad qualified for astronaut wingsby virtue of the altitude records heset in that sleek, black bird.

Walker died when his F-I04

30

Maior W F Gabella

collided with an XB-70 during aformation flight, picture-taking session. The copilot of the XB-70,Major Carl Cross was also killedwhen he failed to eject. Bob White,the XB-70 pilot, ejected but suffered arm and internal injuries tothe extent he may never fly again.

The human as well as the dollarloss of this collision was staggering-three highly experienced andvaluable test pilots, a $700 milliontest aircraft, plus the cost of anF-I04.

For more than a decade, Swissaviator Hermann Geiger had per

formed scores of high altitudesearch and rescue flights in theSwiss Alps. His skill and couragesaved dozens of lives and earnedhim the title of Angel of the Alpsa n appellation he modestly dis

dained.

Beginning with a stripped-downSuper Cub on wheel-ski gear,Geiger pioneered high altitudelandings and takeoffs on Alpineslopes and glaciers. Flying amongthe high peaks in a light, un

supercharged aircraft demandedthe utmost in skill, daring andalert airmanship. Geiger had asuperabundance of these qualities.

Yet, like Schumacher, Walkerand Cross, Geiger met a prematureend in a midair collision. A gliderstruck Geiger's light aircraft justafter he had broken ground on a

takeoff run. The collision altitwas less than 100 feet abground.

Mantz and astronauts See Bassett met different fates. Macrashed in an experimental aircmade from the tailboom of a CPacket during filming of the movThe Flight of the Phoenix. T

astronauts clipped the top offactory roof while making an Iapproach to St Louis' LambField.

The moral of all this shouldabundantly clear-all the skill daring and airmanship in the wo

are no substitute for a momeinattention or neglect of the space surrounding the aviator whhe is aloft. The working envirment of the aviator is crowded becoming more densely populaall the time.

The airspace surrounding Araviation's major training complecan be bewildering to fledglaviators logging their first fhours of solo time. To avoid ea near miss the fledgling (and senior aviator too) should adhreligiously to the following:

• Discipline Lock-on to proper entry and departure atudes and patterns in-and-aroutraining complexes.

• Alertness Analysis of nemiss and midair collision statistindicate that both occur more of




MY HOW THOS

Maior William G. Caput M D

YOU SA Y YOU can't get intolast year's greens; you have

trouble climbing into t h ~ front s e ~ tof a U-6; and your frie lds are referring to you as jolly? Sounds likeyou may be suffering from themost common disease ·of aviators-obesity.

It's hard to get a man to admitthat he's fat. Generally, he prefers

to think ·of himself as a littleheavy," "large framed," or "musc u l ~ r . To admit being fat is toadmit failure, and to recognize thatyou're on the decline--on a highway marked by declining vigor, declining resistance to disease, declining appeal to the female anddeclining longevity. Many of theills laid at the door of advancingage actually s h o ~ d be blamed on

obesity.It is true that good nutrition is

essential to good health. And, unfortunately, the public has cometo consider a little plumpness asan indication of health. But actually, overweight--even a little-is

a health hazard. Tpe more you'reoverweight, the gr@ater the hazard.

Obesity' is t h ~ bane of Armya v i a t ~ r s . A r ~ c e n t study carriedout n the P h y ~ i G a l Exam Division

32

at ft. Rucker, Ala., revealed thereare almost as many overweightaviators as lean aviators. The studyshowed thC:lt overall, one out ofeight Army aviators ·could not passthe weight requirements of theflight physical if the weight standards were rigidly adhered to. Thisfurther drops to one out of five i fthe group is l i m i ~ e d to ' those who

have been rated five years or more.I have been told many times bystudents that the flight trainingprogram really s w ~ t s out thework. I agree with this, for while it

sweats out the work, it doesn't

sweat out t h ~ fat. There is more

weight put on t h ~ n taken off dur

ing the course. In connection with

our overweigQt study, w ~ followed

a class of students to try to mea

sure this impression. We obtained

the weightat

the time of~ n t r n c e

in the course and again at t h ~ endof the course. I can say as a class

they put on close 'to one-half ton

of fat.

What is obesity? First, let me

~ e f i n e obesity. WeQs defines

as a ~ t a t e of being P.V@fWeight ofbeing excessively fat: ..

Dgrland's M ~ d i c a l Dictional '

U s. RMY AVIATION DIGE



GR NS H VE S RUNK

THEY?

SEPTEMBER 1969

nce you ve been fat, you must continuallyexercise self-control in eating and drinking

defines it as having an excessiveand disproportionate amount qfadipose tissue in relation to boneand muscle tissue. Whichever youprefer, it simply means having toomuch fat in one s body. Don t mis-understand, obesity is not exclu-sively being 5 or more poundsover the ideal weight. v ~ n as littleas 10 extra pounds representobesity.

What causes obesity? Simplystated, the body will gain weightwhen the food intake exceeds thatwhich is utilized by the body. The

human body requires food (car-

bohydrates, protein and fat) to

serve as the fuel for its function.

The food supplies, among otherthings, the calories necessary for .

this human metabolic furnace. The

average aviator requires approxi-

mately 3,000 calories per day to

meet his body s requirements. To

maintain a state of equilibrium, he

naturally must consume enough

food to supply 3,000 calories.

When excess calories are con-sumed over those which are

burned, the excess is converted to

fat at the rate of ~ b o u t one ounce

of fat for every 300 calories. n

individual consuming just 3calories a day more than he neewill have, over a year s timgained about 25 pounds. t is

slow but sure process.How much is too much? T

major insurance companies hadeveloped an ideal weight table bcorrelating longevity with bodweights, and their tables for ideweight are about 10 percent beloArmy aviation standards.

We can also measure fat quatitatively. t is rather difficult atime consuming but can be doneither through radioactive watdilution techniques or by whobody water submersion techniqueutilizing Archimedes principle antaking advantage of the fact thfat displaces water differently thbone or muscle tissue. The figuwe come up with as the optimupercent of body fat is about 1percent. Percentages of fat greatthan this figure begin to refleobesity. This system has the avantage in that it permits us measure the amount of fat in large individufll. who really may all bone and muscle and may considered overweight solely bcause of hi m a s s i v ~ bulk.



Qbesity is a d e t r i ~ e n t to everyone s health.

Obesity is a detriment to everyone s health but it also carriessome special dangers for flyingpersonnel. There are both imme :

diate hazards as well as long termhazards to being overweight. Themajority of young aviators are notparticularly concerned with thelate effects of prolonged obesitywhich may occur 15 to 20 years inthe future. Now they re robust andhealthy and can carry 10, 15 or 20pounds extra weight without anysignificant restriction in their activity. But as they get older this excess fat will become a greater burden and will begin to compromise

their health and vitality.We . physicians in the field of

aviation medicine are vitally concerned with the long term ·-effectsof obesity on flying personnel. Weare seeing for the first time theeffects of overweight on a largegroup- of aging WorId War II andKorean War pilots in the AirForce. There is a large number ofthese people in their 15th t9 25thyear of fiying and now in the 40 to50 age group whom we are able to

observe. Many of the medicalproblems of this aging group canbe attributed in part to a prolongedlife pattern of being overweight.

We are concerned because theArmy has a tremendous investment in you. Your value to theArmy five years after being ratedrepresents a figure closely a p p r o x i ~mating one million dollars. f aftersay 15 years in the military yourflying career is terminated prematurely short of your full potential

because of the medical complications of prolonged obesity, you havelost and the Army has lost. Evenbeing as little as 10 percent overweight for a period of 15 to 20years gives the fat fellow a distinctstatistical disadvantage over thelean chap in terms of developingdisease and even death itself. Let

4

me be explicit. I m not talkingabout developing the medical complications of obesity in the 60s,I m talking about developing them

in the 40s, and on occasion even inthe late 30s-a time when you areat the prime of your life and themos t valuable to yourself, yourfamily and the Army.

Heart disease is the number onecause of death in the United States.A man s prospects of being struckdown by a heart attack are increased enormously by obesity.Even if you re only 10 percentover the ideal weight, your chancesof having a fatal heart attack are

50 percent greater than if yourweight were normal.

Brain hemorrhage or stroke isthe number three cause of death inthe United States. A man is 57percent more vulnerable to a strokeif he is overweight.

Diabetes is closely related toobesity and represents a 150 percent increase in incidence amongthose of middle age who are overweight.

Kidney disease, diseases of the

blood vessels and arthritis are allassociated with an increased incidence in the face of obesity. Evensuicide shows a similar effect ofobesity. The fat man is 30 percentmore likely to take his own lifethan one of normal weight.

Of course the longer you r ~ m i nobese the more significant the hazard and depending upon severalfactors you may be voluntarily cutting from 5 t 20 years off your lifeexpectancy. A statistic which was

always impressive to me was thelife i n s u r ~ n c e company observation that a man 50 pounds overweight at the age of 5 0 has only a50 percent chance of living to ageof 55. A rather significant findingin view of the fact that on the average a man can expect to live toabout 67 years of age.

What are the special dangersobesity for fliers? Let s discuss immediate hazards to an aviatorbeing overweight.

Fatty tissue is notoriously cable of selectively dissolving nitgen gas from the blood andlikely to release excessive amouat high altitude. At best, such released at altitude can cabends. At worst, at high altituand especially in case of sudd

decompression-the freed bubbof gas can push little particlesfat into the blood stream whthey can be carried to the heor the brain and cause death. Su

cases have occurred in the Naand Air Force in high performanaircraft. Now I know exactly wyou re saying and I realizedon t fly high enough to ever velop the bends. But let me cautthose of you who are scuba diveThere are cases on record of dividuals who went scuba div24 to 48 hours prior to a flight asubsequently developed bends ding a flight. The majority of thflights were below 15,000 fe

Strangely enough, all of these pple were overweight.

Another immediate hazard obesity to an aviator and probathe most practical of the group,the fact that a fat man is mvulnerable in an airplane c r ~First, because of his size he mhave trouble evacuating a crippaircraft. Picture yourself tryingbail out of the front seat of a Uwith the engine on fire. It s haenough for a lean little fello

Second, because of his bulk, presents a greater surface areainjurious objects and thus increahis chance for injury. Third, cause of his mass, he exertsgreater force against his restrasystem during a controlled craFor example, a 160-pound mexperiencing 15 Os in a control

U. S. RMY VI TION DIGE



• nd n occup tion l problem for m ny vi tors

crash will exert 2,400 pounds offorce against his seat belt and tiedown chain. On the other hand, a230-pound man experiencing 5

Gs in a controlled crash will exert3,450 pounds of force against hisseat belt and tiedown chain. f theseat belt is rated at 3,500 poundsthe fat fellow may find himself afree floating object, bouncing aboutthe cockpit like a pinball. Whilemilitary seat belts are theoreticallyrated higher than this (5,000

pounds) many of the seat belts on

the market for private aircraft andautomobiles fall short of the abovefigures. Lastly, if an aviator is injured in an aircraft accident,statistically he heals slower, hasmore complications and generallydoes poorer than a comparablelean individual.

Considered against this background, a fat fellow is at a disadvantage over his lean counterpart in almost any situation.

What can be done about overweight? The best thing of all is

prevention. A few lucky souls caneat like horses all their lives andremain trim. For the rest of us,there comes an age-between 25and 40 years-when it suddenlybecomes very easy to put on excessweight. Usually you can detect thisyourself, with occasional weighings, and th n is the time to cutdown on your intake. Eliminatebetween-meal snacks and foodsrich in calories. Beware especiallyof cocktail parties At any cocktail buffet, one can easily stow

away enough calories to cover hisneeds for two or three days Aserious and determined drinkercan do even worse, for alcohol is

a rich source of calories.Once prevention has failed, and

you've become attached to yourfat, removal is a long and painfulprocess. The only practical way toeliminate fat is to reduce the in-

SEPTEMBER 1969

take of high caloric food. This is

the cornerstone of weight reduction. Pills, exercise and fad dietsmay be helpful and at best areonly a supplement to a reducedfood intake.

We stated previously that anArmy aviator requires about 3,000calories per day to meet his body'srequirements. f he consumes lessthan this his body will obtain thenecessary calories from his storedfat supplies to make up the difference. This excess fat will be converted into calories at the rate of300 calories per ounce of storedfat. Just the converse of the waythe fat was formed when caloricintake exceeded that which wasburned.

In practice if we take an overweight individual and place himon a 1,000 calorie per day diet hemust make up the deficit caloriesfrom his fat stored to meet hisbody's requirements. He essentially converts seven ounces of fatinto calories per day and theoretically at the end of a month heshould have lost about 3 poundsof weight. I say theoretically because the conversion is not exactlyon a 1: 1 basis. In reality a loss ofa few pounds less would be expected. This is a sound medicalapproach to the problem. Ideally aloss of 10 t 12 pounds per monthis the optimum rate for a reducingdiet.

The usefulness of exercise in aweight reduction program is avaluable adjunct to diet therapy.

Butif

not coupled with a simultaneous reduction of food intake,the program will be doomed tofailure. The combination of thetwo form the best overall method.Don t misunderstand my regard forexercise, for while I feel it may beover-rated in a weight reductionprogram, exercise for the man

who is at his ideal weight is essen-

tial to maintain overall body tonand conditioning and is to be highly commended.

What forms of exercise and howmuch is best? Cycling, runninghandball, wrestling and weighlifting burns about 10 calories pe

minute. Swimming, gardeningdancing and walking briskly burnabout five calories per minutwhile golfing or bowling requirlittle more energy than driving car or playing bridge, about threcalories per minute. Even sleepinrequires about one calorie pe

minute. A vigorous 30-minutworkout each day of gymnasiumtype activity will burn about 30calories or about one ounce of fatThe hooker here is that it alsincreases one's appetite, hence, wsay that reducing food intake

the important factor.In summary, obesity appears t

be the occupational hazard of thArmy aviator and may represenboth an immediate and future hazard to him in terms of healthlongevity and value to the ArmyIn physiological terms it's easieto gain weight as we approach an

pass 25 years of age and it becomes very difficult to lose. Th

only practical way to eliminate fais to reduce the intake of higcalorie food. Once down to a proper weight you must watch youdiet indefinitely or you will regaithe weight. An informal diet ansimple avoidance of over-eatinwill often suffice to reduce youweight. f not, you should get

definite and well-planned diet fromyour flight surgeon. The most important qualities for a successfudiet are self-discipline and selfdenial. Once you've been fat, youmust continually exercise self-control in eating and drinking. f youallow yourself to remain obese youare endangering your health, youcareer and your very life.

35



36

Safety for ombat Readine

This is the thir article of a three-part series adapted from a three-hourUSABAAR presentation made to the Command and General StaffCollege and Army War College. Presentations were made by COL RussellP. Bonasso director; LTC Jack D. Peavy chief Aircraft AccidentReview and Analysis Department; LTC Howard L. Collins chief EducationDepartment; and LTC Henry E. Dreher chief Plans Division.While rated aviation personnel may find some of this informationelementary remember that it is intended for nonrated commanders.You can help the aircraft accident prevention program by directing these

articles to their attention.

U S RMY AVIATION DIGES



control of noncomb t ccidents

CCIDENTS ARE SYMPTOMATIC of sub-. standard behavior. Substandard behavior can

only be corrected and controlled through effectivemanagement and enforcement of discipline. Commanders and managers must be able to identifypotential problem areas before they can apply themanagement tools at their disposal. These problemareas cover a wide range of personnel and equipment factors. Once identified, these are subject to

control. Noncombat accidents indicate a need formore emphasis on maintenance quality control,effective operational planning and supervision.

The seriousness of the noncombat attrition problem in R VN can be portrayed in one simple statement 20 percent of our aircraft inventory in RVN

s damaged or destroyed in noncombat accidents

every year.

This staggering attrition rate has caused greatconcern at all command levels. One command letterstated: The accident loss rate and the recurrenceof preventable type accidents is of such magnitudethat it tends to reflect on aviator professionalism,

supervision, discipline and ability to manage re-sources.

The question is, to what extent can we controlthe factors that cause noncombat attrition? The

answer has to be based on an analysis of the truesource regions of our accident cause factors. We usethe term source regions to indicate that there is moreto accident investigation, reporting and prevention

than pinpointing personnel errors. The following

SEPTEMBER 1969

cr sh s ns

the following 28 pages prepared

by the U.S. Army Board for AviationAccident Research

USARV statistics reflect recent cause factor dis-tributions:

Pilot factor accidents .Maintenance factor . . .Materiel factor .Other and unknown .

58

3.5

28

10.5%

100

Insofar as these figures statistically present immediate cause factors in noncombat accidents, they areundoubtedly correct. However, when these samefigures are used to determine priorities in accidenprevention programs, they may create erroneousimpressions. Are aviators really 15 times as bad as

maintenance personnel? Are materiel malfunctionsactually responsible for 28 percent of our mishaps?What role does supervision play?

Let's take a look at a more meaningful breakdownof accident types, as published by USARV.

FY 1968 DOLLAR COSTSBY ACCIDENT TYPES

1 Materiel failure2 Obstacle strikes3 Lost rpm/ overgross4 Midair/ meshed rotors5. Inadvertent IFR

NUMBER

2131611132327

537Other accident types (8) 213

Totals: 750

COSTX 1000)$29,830

23,33114,2327,4675,838

$80,69828,769

$109,467

37



The original USARV chart was simplified by listing the first five major accident types in order ofdecreasing cost and by combining the eight lesserones under one general heading. These five accident

types accounted for about 70 percent of the totalnumber of noncombat accidents and 75 percent ofthe total cost.

Let s begin with an analysis of the underlyingcauses of the costliest accident types-materiel failure. When you read that 28 percent 213) of theseaccidents involved materiel failure, you might be ledto believe that some of our equipment leaves muchto be desired. However, our equipment is not as badas implied by these statistics, nor quite as good aswe would like to think. We may well have beenblaming materiel, when we are actually dealing withself-induced failures.

The UH-l engine is a good example. Late in FY

1968, the consumption rate of T-53 engines becameso serious that the Deputy Commanding General,USARV, warned all responsible commanders that it

might be necessary to ration flying hours unless the

following steps were taken:

1 Elimination of unproductive flying time (ex-

tended orbiting of lift flight caused y poor planning;

unnecessary C C aircraft; nonessential resupply

missions, etc.}. One commander was able to substan

tially reduce the number of tactical emergency re

quests for supply missions by requiring the subordi

nate commander who declared a tactical emergencyto explain the reason in detail to him the followingday.

2. Elimination of engine damage caused y in-

gestion of foreign objects and sand. He felt that

wherever possible, those areas used in helicopter

operations should be prepared and maintained to

minimize engine damage. In the field environment,

this is the responsibility of the supported commander.

38

S FETY FOR COMB T RE DINESS

control of

noncombat ccidents

In more permanent areas, the installation commader/coordinator is responsible. Aviation unit commanders must insure that their aviators use preparelanding areas when it is tactically feasible. Commanders must plan for and habitually use peneprim

or landing area membrane when required to contrdust and foreign objects on helipads and landinareas.

3. A liowing sufficient time for thorough inspetions and maintenance. t was the deputy CG s polithat aviation units should be given the maximudaylight time at their home base for maintenancconsistent with demands for tactical employmenHe observed that some commanders required suporting aircraft to arrive at pickup points by dalight; remain alert at pickup point for several houbefore they were employed; fly troop lifts durindaylight hours; fly supply missions after dark; anthen return to their home base. In these cases, suport units were compensating for their lack of planing with the speed and flexibility of helicopterHe emphasized that planning must begin the nigbefore and be completed before the aircraft arequested, or at least before the aircraft arrive fpickup. To insure adequate planning and proper uscommanders should set a time limit on holding avition units. Units should be required to launch theoperation within 15 minutes after aircraft reportintime, unless an unexpected change has taken plain the tactical situation. Unless aviation units agiven more daylight time at their home base, aircraavailability will continue to decline.

The deputy CG s guidance was that every commander should carefully plan helicopter use and thsuch use must be valid and essential, resorted to onif the mission could be accomplished by no othmeans. Necessary time for proper maintenance mube programmed and provided. Clean and dust-frlanding areas must be prepared and maintained.

U S ARMY AVIATION DIGES



These recommended steps imply that our problemis not so much the engine itself but the way it is

used, or rather misused. In a similar letter, the 1stAviation Brigade commander stated that only 17percent of our engine failures are due to componentfailure. The remainder, 83 percent, can be directlyor indirectly attributed to operational abuse poorplanning inadequate facilities cmd substandard main-tenance. Further pro()f of the self-inflicted nature ofthe engine problem is the following quotation fromthe same brigade letter: Why is it that one unit hasengine failure after engine failure, while anotherunit operating in the same environment has none or,at worst, very few?

I t is logical that the answer to this question mustlie in the manner in which these aircraft were employed and maintained.

The subject of engine failures is not our only areaof ~ o n e r n when dealing with materiel failure typeaccidents. The complexity of present helicopters requires thorough and frequent inspection of many ofthe dynamic components. Lubrication and othermaintenance services are necessary at regular intervals. Any disregard 9f these essential tasks can result in accidents. One of our aircraft requires a

SEPTEM ER 1969

2 percent of ou r

ircr ft inventory in RV is

d m ged or destroyed in

noncomb t ccidents every ye r

special inspection of the main rotor blades every pours of flying. This is not a desirable situation, b

it is one with which we must live, at least temporariif missions are to be accomplished.

Failure to accomplish the required blade inspetion caused an accide'nt which resulted in the loss seven lives and the complete destruction of the hecopter. What valid reason could justify a failure accomplish this important inspection? The inspectirequired the use of a special electronic device whicwhile on hand, had become inoperative. The urgenof combat and the desire to accomplish the assignmission unduly influenced a maintenance organiztion which conducted the inspection visually, nrealizing that the fatigue area of so much concewould usually originate inside the blade where it wnot readily visible. The maintenance officer lowerhis maintenance standards to provide the muneeded aircraft for his commander. Both were ifluenced by the urgency of the mission. We're suneither individual felt his deviation from estaplishstandards would result in such an accident.

e hope you have no illusions about the immuniof helicopters to abuse and poor maintenance. T

catastrophic failure rate of the helicopter, compar

Required blade

inspection was not

performed due to

mission urgency

and need for aircraft

3



SAFETY FOR COMB T R EADINESS

control of

_.. __ noncombat ccidents

to that of fixed wing aircraft, is at least 30 to 1

Statistically, these accidents generally fall under thebroad category of materiel failure type accidents,since they result from the loss 'of some dynaJlliccomponent in flight. We now realize that many ofthese accidents are a direct result of poor maintenance practices.

In many cases, the ground commander unwittingly

influences the aviation unit and maintenance detachment commanders to accept a degree of degradation

of maintenance standards in order to provide thesupport requested. The tactical situation sGmetimesdoes require such degradation. When this occurs, thecommander should be advised of the possible con

sequence and should make the 4ecision which in-

volves acceptance of the calculated risks i n v o l v ~ d .Commanders are usually provided operatioI1al control of aviation units in support of operations. Withthis control comes the responsibility to use theseresources wisely, effectively and safely in the c c o m ~plishment of the mission.

How, then, can we reduce the w ~ s t e which weloosely place under the c t ~ g o r y of materiel failure?

Enforce professional and universal cpmpliance

with performance limitations.

emand that managers and commanders respect

the limits imposed by maintenance requirements.

We've discussed the costliest accident type. Let'snow look at the accident type that follows closelysecond place obstacle strikes.

Aircraft losses in this category are mainly the result of helicopter operations in confined areas, unsuitable landing zones and congested parking and

refueling areas. The damage sequence usually startswith a strike by one of the dynamic components(either main or tail rotor) or a fuselage collision

with a hidden obstacle. The natural tendency of accident investigation boards is to treat this type ofaccident as any other collision. T h ~ y l l probably listthe direct cause factors as inattention poor technique

or poor judg ent on the part of the crew. Under theinoffensive heading of contributing factors, they maylist supervision in the form of a flight l e ~ d e r whomade a downwind approach, or a tactical commander who condoned hazardous conditions in the

40

parking areas. Some accident reports may mentionlack of crew coordination. Recommendations to prevent recurrence are only cause factors in reverse.

The a c c i d ~ n t report's first stop on its progresthrough c h ~ n e l s is the unit commander or appointing authority. Regardless of his concurrence or nonconcurrence with the board's findings, he must listhe actions taken to prevent recurrence. Considerinthe large number of mishaps in this c a t e g o r yhundreds of recommendations must have resulted i

hundreds of written corrective actiop.s-mostly of repetitive nature. Unfortunately, without the desireeffect, these accidents continue to OGcur with regularity.

There is a definite need to inform ground commanders about the vulnerability of helicopter totail rotor strikes in confined areas. A propeller cacut its way through tree ' branches without damageon the other hand the tail rotor is extremely sensitivapd any contact with underbrush may cause loss otail rotor control, with its catastrophic potential.

t is understood that commanders are unable toprovide engineer e x ~ v t i o n of every landing zonused in the tactical employment of troops aroundthe battlefield. Where possible, every effort must bmade to' select suitable areas initially. Continuouimprovement in landing zones must be made as insurance against the loss of aircraft through obstaclstrike accidents. We are not saying the ground commander is responsible for all obstacle strikes. Probably the most inexcusable strike accidents are thoseoccurring in and around revetmepts, often with lossof life. Pilots practically always playa role in thesaccidents, but so do congestion, lack of clearly established hover lanes, nonstandardized revetment layouts, dust and a general lack of discipline.

One good example of this type accident concerneda helicopter that was to be used in a command andcontrol mission. After all passengers were securedthe pilot started the engine. The aircraft commandethen took tbe controls and applied pitch to moveaway from the revetment to a position for takeoffThe helicopter assumed a nose high attitude beforthe aircraft commander realized the right rear skid

was caught on the pierced steer plankipg used as

U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST



surface material in revetments. The main rotor bladesstruck the revetment, the helicopter continued to rolland the rotor blades then struck the ground.

The investigation board labeled this accidentpilot error, in that the aircraft commander failed

to recognize the unsafe condition in time to take cor-rective action. The board labeled the skid shoes

catching in the PSP surfacing material a a con-tributing factor. The board's recommendations in-

cluded replacement of PSP surfaces in landing padsand revetments with a less hazardous material atthe earliest practical time.

_The reviewing official concurred in the pilot ettor

cause factor. He did acknowledge that listing the pri-mary cause of the accident as f'ilot error shouldnot serve to lessen the role of the PSP in this acci-dent. Action was immediately started to repiace thePSP pads.

No doubt this particular accident might havebeen prevented if all crewmen aboard were perform-

ing clearly outlined duties. This is certainly one areain which we, of the aviation community, do not haveabsolutely clean skirts After several years in thecombat environment, we have not established clearlydefined duties and responsibilities for each rated andnonrated crewmember aboard our aircraft. This fail-ure to establish rules for all crewmembers is also afailure to use all available eyes.

This deficiency is now being corrected and in-dividual duties for each man are being established.

SEPTEMBER 1969

Right rear skid

caught psp of revetment

floor. Action wasimmediately started

to replace psp pads

These .duties will be included in operators' handbooks for each type aircraft.

In summary, accidents resulting from obstaclstrikes can be reduced by:

1 Standardizing arid enforcing operational procedures in LZs refueling and parking areas.

2. Establishing crew duties.

3 Demanding compliance with minimum satifactory standards for the layout of parking facilitie

and refueling areas to include dust suppression.4. A lerting ground commanders to the sensitivi

and vulnerability of the dynamic components of helcopters.

Lost rpm/overgross helicopter flight is dependenon rotor blade speed or rpm. When the rpm decreases below the minimum necessary for flight, thaviator loses control of the helicopter and it descendto earth. Rotor rpm can be adversely affected bdownwind conditions, density altitudes and oveloading. Each of these factors can demand mor

power from the engine than it has available, anrotor rpm is lost.

Why should we be plagued with accidents resuling from these things with which aviators are intimately familiar? Certainly, they are aware of thadverse effects of atmospheric conditions. They alshave some rough Idea of the weight of passengerand cargo to be transported. Notice, we said rougidea of the weight involved. Unfortunately, thisanother area not adequately covered in our presen

4



aircraft. While ammumtlOn and other commoditieshave established and easily identifiable weights, theweight of other items of equipment must be estimated. Often, estimates made by ground personnelor aviators turn out to be conservative and this results in overgross conditions for the prevailing densityaltitude. In itself, this should not present an unsurmountable problem. Established procedures throughout RVN require aviators to conduct performance

checks of their heliCopters' ability to lift the load,without loss of rpm, just prior to takeoff. Frequently,

however, it is not feasible to perform this checkunder heavy enemy fire during an emergency evacuation mission. This is a calculated risk to be evaluatedby the aircraft commander. The nature of such emergencies is sometimes questionable. For example,there was the ambulance driver who picked up aman with a broken arm and killed himself and hispatient in a wreck on the way to the hospital. Somesituations really are a matter o life and death, butlet's insure this is truly the case when we place thelives of four crewmen in jeopardy for an extraction

or tactical emergency.One fortunate circumstance concerning loss of

rotor rpm is that it does provide some warning ofimpending trouble. The helicopter will respond tocorrective actions if they are taken in time. We sayfortunate because the experienced aviator is frequently able to identify the symptoms and initiatecorrective action to save the aircraft. It demands ·theutmost in professional skill and judgment, as well asconsiderable luck. All who have survived this nearaccident situation realize they are betting their skilland judgment against the manufacturer's performance data each time they attempt a takeoff with an

overgross weight for existing atmospher.ic conditions.Unfortunately, the odds on this gamble are not infavor of the aviator and he will eventually be involved in an accident. Relatively mexperienced aviators, usually junior in rank, are often placed in positions to accept loads based on the desires of thesupported unit. Far too frequently they become accident statistics because of their desire to accomplishthe mission.

An aviator flying a UR ID helicopter found him-

42


control ofnoncombat accidents

self in just such a predicament. t was imperativethat 1,200 pounds of mess supplies and Red Crossitems, plus four passengers, be delivered in a singlemission. There wasn't time for two trips. This helicopter lost rpm, bounced several times in a feebleattempt to become airborne and crashed on its sideIt burst into flames, destroying those urgently required supplies. Fortunately, the passengers and

crew escaped with minor injuries. We didn't have

time to do it right the first time, but we always havetime t do it again

Early in FY 1968, the 1st Aviation Brigade commander made an observation concerning this type ofaccident: Sixty-five UH ls were involved in majoaccidents as a direct result of overgross conditionsin the first half of this fiscal year more than enoughto equip two assault helicopter companies.

Many of these overgross/loss of rpm accidentsoccur during landing. Loss of lift, with the resultinginability to fly becomes even more disastrous whenit occurs while attempting to land on a pinnacle or

in a confined area. Any downwind condition in a

landing zone will adversely affect a heavily loadedhelicopter. Here, the commander or planner plays avital role in selecting landing zones and determiningthe direction of landing for assault elements. Certainly, the tactical situation must be conSidered, andthere will be occasions when only a downwind approach will be practical. When this occurs, eachhelicopter payload must be adjusted accordingly.

One aviation group commander became so plaguedwith accidents resulting from poor landing zoneplanning and downwind operations that he wrote acommand letter to his subordinates, which stated:When a mishap occurs involving downwind opera

tions, the air mission commander will forward astatement through channels to me that he advisedagainst such operations, but was directed to proceedas a matter of tactical necessity by the supportedground commander. This action did not increase hispopularity, but it did reduce his accidents. Was hemission oriented? Was he an effective manager oresources?

Accidents resulting from overgross weight/loss orpm can be reduced by:

U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST



1. Basing operations on the performance dataprovided by the manufacturer.

2. Standardizing and enforcing the use of per-formance checks.

3. Taking the guesswork out of helicopter opera-tions with instrumentation that responds to gross

ome comm nders requiresupporting ircr ft

to fly troop lifts during d ylight

hours nd supply missions

fter d rk

compens ting for their

l ck of pl nning with the speed

and flexibility of helicopters

SEPTEMBER 1969

weight, density altitude and power available.Midair/meshed rotors: These accidents are simila

to obstacle strikes, with one exception instead osome stationary object, the aircraft strikes anotheaircraft in the air or on the ground. The results aregenerally more expensive and more deadly. Whenthese accidents occur on the ground, in congestedand dusty parking or refueling areas, previous com

ments and recommendations apply.

Meshed rotor blade accidents also occur in tactical landing zones. Usually they are a result of a lackof positive control on the part of the tactical commander. Landing zones must be organized withground guides who can provide separation betweenhelicopters. All vehicles operating in and aroundheliports and landing zones must be controlled. Manyhelicopters have been disabled by vehicle whipantennas. These accidents can be prevented by establishing and enforcing operating procedures whichlimit and control vehicle movement around aircraft

You might expect that most midair collisionsoccur during multiple ship formation flights, since

the exposure and potential for collisionis

at its peakduring these missions. This is not the case Experi-ence shows that aircraft operating in formation areseldom involved in collisions. Positive control, theknown relationship between aircraft and the rigiddiscipline required in such flights account for thecomparative safe operation.

Midair collisions do occur during assault operations, but they occur between aircraft orbiting abovethe landing zone. When this happens, it always seemsthat there are more command and control helicoptersparticipating in major tactical assaults than there arelift ships engaged in the movement of troops. Every-

body wants to see and discuss over the air theprogress of the operation. Commanders can assisin reducing these accidents by restricting the participation of command and control aircraft to the mini-mum essential. Is t really necessary that the S-2

the S-3 and the S-4 each have a separate C C helicopter? A reduction in the number of C C aircrafwill result in reduced exposure to midair collisionsand in the conservation of flying time for moreessential missions.

43



S FETY FOR COMBAT READINESS

control of

noncombat accidents

Oversaturation of airspace also results from oversaturation of the terrain with heliports. We havecome to think that it is impossible to drive a fewmiles by ground vehicle. One operational area hastremendous midair collision potential because ofnumerous heliports, landing pads and runwaysscattered throughout a vast complex. It seems eachheadquarters must have its own personal heliport.It is convenient Here, we've been extremely fortunate Although numerous near-miss reports havebeen recorded, there has been only one midaircollision.

f you are in a position to do so, we recommendthat you limit the number and proximity of heliportsin your area. Insist that ground vehicles help to relieve oversaturated skies.

You may be thinking that we are trying to placethe blame for midair collisions on the shoulders ofground commanders. This is not our intent. However, as we have stated, there re areas in which youcan assist. Aviators and aviation commanders havea gr ve responsibility to enforce air discipline in aprofessional manner. They cannot tolerate any dis

regard for established policies, practices and pro

cedures.

A command vehicle in a road convoy struck a

land mine and made a call for a dust-off helicopter

to evacuate the wounded. The call was monitored

by an OH-6 that was in the area on a C C mission.

The OH-6 headed toward the scene and the scout

team leader was called and ordered into the area.

Both helicopters were on a westerly heading. The

scout team leader arrived at the scene first , approximately 5 feet above the trees. The C C OH-6 was

to the left, above and behind it, descending. Bothwere in a turn to the right. After 180 degrees of

turn, the second helicopter overtook the first and

they collided, killing all occupants of both.

One of our senior aviation commanders in RVN

recently made this statement: "There is an apparent

reluctance on the part of commanders to take puni

tive action when warranted. By winking at poor

habits , poor techniques or poor discipline, we allow

44

lax or unskilled pilots to put themselves and inncent personnel in jeopardy."

Exaggerated? Fourteen people were killed in twformation collisions because we tolerated the cockoverconfident behavior of pilots who had habituaignored established rules for separation.

In addition to those corrective actions previoumentioned, collisions can be controlled by:

1. Enforcing compliance with directives.2. Treating every dangerous departure from wr

ten and unwritten standards as a breach of disciplinInadvertent loss of external reference: These ac

dents are particularly destructive, and often fabecause they are characterized by unplanned loss visual reference, followed by loss of control or fliginto terrain obstacles. The loss of visual referencan occur at night, in weather below visual mInmums or during takeoffs and landings in duconditions.

We say that Army aviation has an all-weathcapability. This is true for fixed wing aircraft opering from established airfields equipped with instrment landing facilities. Rotary wing aircraft calso fly under instrument weather conditions withoexternal references, but their pilots must be providwith navigational aids to enable them to get fropoint A to point B. Helicopters, like airplanes, muhave some type of instrument landing aids at thdestination. These aids are seldom available at laning pads and landing zones in tactical environmen

Most of our loss-of-external-reference accidenresult from this loss of reference in close proximto the ground. This is our major problem. Loss outside references at higher altitudes provides av

tors with time to transition to flight by referenonly to instruments. At a few feet above the grounlittle time is available for this transition and judment is easily distorted. The aviator in this conditiis easily influenced by a phenomenon known as vtigo or spatial disorientation. He becomes a victof illusions concerning his flight attitude. When adquate instrumentation is provided and when taviator has sufficient composure and time to forhimself to overcome these illusions, he can esca

U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGES



this dangerous situation and regain safe flight.An accident occurred during a zeon light and star

light scope mission. The nature of the mission wastailor-made for the loss of external references. The

mission called for an OH-6 equipped with a starlightscope to ly at approximately 200 feet. A UH-1equipped with a zeon light was to ly at approximately 600 feet and slightly ahead of the OH-6.That particular night, no visual horizon was present.The OH-6 pilot was maintaining flight reference and

orientation on theUH I.

The UH-1 pilot called theOH-6 pilot and advised that he was making a rightturn to check an area that looked suspicious. Bothhelicopters started a turn. During the turn, the UH-1pilot turned off his searchlight. The pilot of the OH-6lost sight of the UH-1 and all external references.He made an attempt to orient himself by his instruments, but experienced vertigo. Either he did not believe or did not properly interpret his flight instruments. The aircraft crashed at an airspeed of ap-

SEPTEMBER 1969

idair potenti l is greater with numerousheliports in ne r proximity

proximately 90 knots. Personal gear, individuaweapons and aircraft parts were widely scattered, bu

the pilot and observer escaped with minor injuries.Helicopters are not now provided with sensitive

instruments able to display accurate airspeeds inslow flight. They cannot provide accurate altitudereadings close to the ground. Helicopters, therefore,will not really have all-weather capability until theseaids are provided.

One hundred and twenty-four persons have been

killed in Vietnam in rotary wing accidents wherevertigo or spatial disorientation was a factor. Duringthe last 7 years, accidents of this type have increasedmore than sixfold What can you do to decrease thissevere loss? You must realize that flight close to theground in marginal weather conditions is an inherently unsafe act and should be attempted only whendemanded by the most grave tactical situations.

When such flights are necessary, you should alsorealize that the aviator must be provided the latitude

45



which permits him to perform a l80-degree turnand return to his point of origin without fear ofridicule. Only the aviator knows his capability in suchsituations. Trust his judgment and hope that he is

able to accomplish the mission. Failing this he willat least be able to return safely.

You can also assist in reducing these accidents byproviding training aircraft to your supporting aviation unit commander so that he can conduct a continuous instrument training program for newly ar

rived aviators. He will then be able to provide abetter qualified aviator to handle critical situationsas they arise.

Commanders have a responsibility to maintainhelipads and heliports in safe operating conditions.Dust to a hovering helicopter can be just as deadlyas a solid fog bank.

The ultimate goal of the commander is to accomplish his assigned mission. He must carefully expendhis resources when engaging the enemy in order todeplete the fighting strength of the adversary andswing the balance of power in his own favor. Suc-cessful combat is primarily a matter of resource

managementAviation assets are but one additional element of

combat power which must be viewed with the sameconcern as men tanks and artillery. The needless

waste of equipment through noncombat accidentsresults in a depletion of combat power. A comm nd

safety program enhances mission accomplishmentthrough preservation of assets

A prevention program is but an additional management tool. n integrated and coordinated safetymanagement effort is the key to keeping the balancein favor of the conservation of assets. There isnothing mysterious about the operation of liftingdevices or the efficiency of powerplants under varying atmospheric conditions but operation of ouraircraft is critical. Unlike ground vehicles they areunforgiving. Managers must face up to the limitationswe have discussed.

The entire Army is mission oriented. Is it anywonder then why Army aviators today are enthusiastic about accomplishing their missions and whythey habitually fly their aircraft in Vietnam at the

6


control ofnoncombat accidents

ragged edge of the performance curve? Of coursnot. They are part of the Army team. However wremind you that 60 percent of the accidents in Vienam involve brand new warrant aviators. This is nmeant as an indictment. These young Americanabout 19 years old have tremendous esprit. Thewill try to accomplish any mission assigned themCommanders with the advice of their aviation ofcers must insure that assigned missions are necesary and are within the capabilities of aircraft ancrews.

MG Ellis W Williamson CG 25th Infantry Divsion had this to say about the use of aviation asset

U S RMY VI TION DIGES



"The cost of aircraft losses through accidents or

hostile action is ultimately paid by the ground unitcommander. This price is paid in the form of de

creased available aviation assets to support the tactical mission. . The ground commander, therefore,must be vitally concerned and intimately involvedwith the aviation safety program.

"The ground commander is responsible for decisions which directly affect the safe operation of Armyaviation assets. t is he who determines the degree ofrisk acceptable in the accomplishment of his tacticalmission. t is he who makes the final selection of theLZ for combat assaults. t is he who selects and de-

SEPTEMBER 1969

OH-6 pilot lost

outside references, and

experienced v e r t i g ~Despite severity

of crash, pilot and

observer escaped

with minor injuries

velops the field heliport. t is he the user the cus-tomer ho must fully understand the capabilitiesand limitations of aviation support in order to use

it safely and effectively in attaining victory on thebattlefieid."The challenge facing all of us is to eliminate all

preventable noncombat accidents. e cannot affordthe continuous spiral in dollar costs and reducedcombat readiness due to aircraft losses. We mustproperly use aviation assets allocated for missionaccomplishment. ur goal must be a zero accidentrate. t can be done t has been done t must bedone

7



PR V NTION S NS

48 U S RMY AVI TION DIGE



he following accidents are presented to illustrate what happens when the lessons contained in thethree-part series - . Safety for Combat Readiness - are not applied

CONGESTION

AFLIGHT OF SEVEN UH-IDs, made up ofeleJllents from two assault helicopter com

panies, was landing in a PZ to pick up its first lift oftroops. On final approach to the PZ, the flight ofseven in staggered trail right formation was joinedby tqe eighth helicopter, placing four helicopters oneach side of the formation. As they landed, the lasthelic9pter had to land at an angle behind the thirdh e l i c ~ p t e r on the right side because of a 4-foot dikeat the edge of the PZ and a canal to the right. Thethird helicopter on the right side landed extremelyclose to the helicopter ahead.

When the troops were loaded, the AC of the third

helicopter on the right side lifted off for a hovercheck. He completed the hover check and wasputting the helicopter back down when his mainrotor blades struck the tail rqtor of the helicopterahead. The AC of the helicopter that was struckfelt two vibrations and his helicopter began to comeapart. Debris from it struck and severed the tailrotor and 90-degree gearbox and cut the controlcables in the tail boom of the last helicopter parkedat an angle. .

This 200,000 accident, a l t h \ ~ g h caused by oneaircraft commander parking too close behind anotherhelicopter because he was aware of the dike behind

and the tast helicopter, could have been prevented ift h ~ PZ had been selected and prepared for the number of helicopters to be used.

R V T M ~ N T SA UH IH pilot t e n n i n t e ~ a night approach and

started to hover into a revetJpent on the pad. I Je

asked his crewchief for clearance and when the crewchief cleared him, he turned into the revetment andhis tail rotor struck the main rotor of a parked

SEPTEMBER 1969

UH IH in the next revetment to the rear, causing

t h ~ 90-degree gearbox and tail rotor to separatefrom his helicopter. Directional control was lost andt4e helicopter spun to the right, landing hard andcollapsing the left skid. As the tail rotor f l ~ w awayit damaged both helicopters extensively, resulting ina 40,000 accident. Investigation showed the causeof this accident to be' failure to maintain clearancebetween helicopters. Contributing factors were:

1 Revetments were too close together

2 he landing pad did not have sufficient lighting

3 The pad did not have guidelines for hoveringand parking

wZ..J

W

o

Dikes and canal resulted in crowded PZ

DIKE LINE APPROX. 4 FT HIGH. 2 FT WIDE)

49



PR V NTION S NS

BUILT-IN HAZARD

A UH-IH was on a mission to deliver medicalsupplies to an advisory unit. The advisory unit landing pad was set up at the edge of a river, surroundedon three sides by buildings. When he reached hisdestination, the pilot made a low reconnaissance ofthe landing area and started his approach. Duringthe approach, the AC warned him about a building

to the right of the pad and the pilot made a 10-degree correction to the left.

As he neared his touchdown point, the pilot flaredand struck the riverbank with his tail skid at a point21 feet short of the pad. The tail rotor struck concertina wire and broke away from' the 90-degreegearbox. At this point, the AC took control andattempted to level the helicopter. t made approximately three violent spins to the right and crashedonto a small dock approximately 40 feet from theconcertina wire. The crew escaped, but the helicoptercaught fire and burned.

This $228,000 accident was caused by an im

proper approach and the failure of the AC to recognize and correct for it. The concertina wire placed

in front of the landing pad was a contributing factor

to the severity of this accident and the investigation

board recommended the wire be removed entirely

from the approach en of the pad

WIRES

A UH-ID loaded with cargo and three passengerswas on a resupply mission. The AC made a hovercheck and was only able to maintain a steady 6400rpm. He landed, offloaded one passenger and twoduffel bags, then attempted to take off.

C: I backed to the edge of the pad and my rpmremained stable. I started my takeoff, reached translationallift and s ~ r t e d to climb by the time I reachedthe edge of the pad. The climb took no additionalpower and I cleared the first row of powerlines.

Just as we passed over the wires, I felt the helicopter shudder and heard the rpm start to drop. Ilowered collective and added forward cyclic, but therpm continued to drop. I told the crew to hang on,

50

that we were going in.I began looking for a place to land as the rp

continued to bleed rapidly. At about 25 feet, pulled the remaining pitch to cushion the landinand the helicopter yawed sharply to the right. applied full left pedal and at about 10 feet from thground, I saw the rotor head and blades landing front of the helicopter

Investigation revealed that this $126,000 accidewas caused by an attempt to take off with approxmately I ,350 pounds in excess of maximum allow




• _ ~ . • '._ .J .. , ? _ _ _

Additional hazard, concertina wire justoff approach end of pad, caught UH·l tail rotor

able gross weight. The report stated that supervisionwas not a factor, but it recommended that wiresaround the helipad be buried to provide adequateemergency landing areas. A description of correctiveaction taken included this statement: A new helipads under construction. Until it is completed, only re-duced loads will be lifted from the old pad.

An analysis of the engine from this helicoptershowed that the engine failed due to the failure ofone or more N 2 turbine blades. The blades failedthrough high temperature intergranular creep and

SEPTEMBER 1969

overstress mechanisms. This type of failure is the

result of excessively high temperatures, time andstress. Once these blades have been subjected toexcessively high temperatures, only time and normaloperating stresses are required to bring about failure.Since the N 1 turbine blades, the N 1 nozzle assemblyand the N 2 nozzle assembly did not indicate that an

overtemperature condition had occurred in this engine, it is probable that the overtemperature condition of the N 2 turbine blades occurred prior to theinstallation of the N 2 turbine in this engine. Thisparticular N 2 turbine assembly had 300 hours ofoperating time before it was installed in this engine.

Despite the overgross condition, this engine failure

would have required an emergency landing. Withwires covering all possible emergency landing sites,a successful forced landing could not have beenmade .

CROWDED LZ

The crews of a flight of five UH-1 Hs were advisedthat their destination LZ would accommodate thefive helicopters by a command and control aircraft.On final approach to the LZ , the AC of the leadhelicopter informed the flight that the LZ did not

appear large enough for five helicopters and the pilotof the fifth helicopter made a go-around.

The AC of the second helicopter elected to remain

at a low hover because of the excessive slope ofthe terrain in the LZ. The No. 3 helicopter waslanded as close as possible to No.2 to leave enoughlanding room for the fourth helicopter. Nos. 2 and3 were at an angle, facing a ridge, with No.2 at ahover and No.3 on the ground.

Because of turbulence and center of gravitychanges caused by troops unloading at a hover, theAC of No.2 allowed his tail to swing right, placinghis tail rotor in the main rotor disc area of No.3.

A main rotor blade of No.3 struck the tail rotor ofNo.2, causing the 90-degree gearbox to separate.The helicopter then started an abrupt turn to the left

and rolled on its left side.One of the recommendations resulting from the

investigation of this 54,000 accident was that betterorientation be given to ground troops about boardingand exiting helicopters. A n additional recommenda-tion might well have been better selection and prep-aration of LZs.

HAZARDOUS PZ

A UH 1 H was on a mission to extract soldiers

5



PR V NTION S NS

from a very small PZ. During the third pickup, thehelicopter was hovering with one skid on the groundbecause of the sloping terrain and brush on the PZ .As the last of six soldiers boarded, it started a slowturn to the right, with full left pedal applied. Not

recognizing this emergency as a failure, but assuming his problem was caused by wind, the AC pulledpitch and became airborne before the helicoptercould strike other nearby troops. He was unable toregain control after becoming airborne and crashedin a heavy jungle approximately 60 feet from the PZ.

This 228,000 accident, which also resulted in

three major injuries, was caused by a mechanicalfailure in the pitch change control system of the tailrotor. Contributing to the accident was the fact that

the Z was not only not level but it was coveredwith brush and stumps that prevented the pilot from

putting the helicopter down. The presence of tro

on the Z also prevented him from making an a

rotation when the emergency was first recognized

AREA SELECTION

A UH IC gunship AC started a takeoff from2-foot hover with 6700 rpm from behind a dand over a large dry rice paddy that was apprmately 100 feet long. His flight path took him ofour more rice paddies which were about 50

long and separated by I8-inch dikes. As forwmovement started, the helicopter began to settlewhen he reached the first dike, the AC had to

in a little more pitch to get over it. He was alreat maximum power and by pulling in more pihe bled rpm. This condition was aggravated ascontinued to pull more pitch to get over each sceeding dike.

Wires (note poles) surrounding helipad at center of photo denied emergency landing areas. When h

52 U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGE



After crossing the first two dikes, the AC realizedhe was going to have to abort his takeoff, but he didnot want to land in one of the smaller paddies becausethey were covered with water and he felt the helicopter would slide forward and hit a dike. He electedto try for a larger paddy which was partially dry,the fifth paddy from the point of takeoff, slightly tothe right of his flight path and separated by a 2-footdike. As he approached, his rpm was down to 5600

and he began to lose directional control. He pulledmore pitch, attempting to clear the dike, and the helicopter yawed to the right and settled in. The skids

hit the dike and the gunship came to rest on its leftside.This 217,000 accident was caused by the AC's

failure to abort the takeoff while he was still in

control of the helicopter. A contributing cause was

aircraft commander had no place to land and helicopter hit wires

SEPTEMBER 1969

the selection of a heavily diked area as a landing nd

takeoff point for gunships

STUMPS, SLOPES AND OVERGROSS

A UH ID and two UH IHs were each carryingsix combat-equipped soldiers from a PZ at an approximate 100-foot elevation to an LZ at an approximate 2,000-foot elevation. The AC of the UH ID

made the necessary hover check in the PZ, bu

neglected to consider the altitude in the LZ, othethan to assume that the fuel consumed in gettingthere would compensate for the difference in altitude.

There was no warning given during the preflighbriefing that the LZ contained many stumps andsteep slopes. It was on a pinnacle which fell awaysharply on three sides, with 12- to 15-inch grasscovering the area.

53



PR V NTION S NS

lZ containing many stumps and steep slopes

fell away sharply on three sides

The AC made his approach to the LZ and cameto a high hover with 6400 rpm. At this time, thepassengers began to leave by stepping out on the

skids and jumping to the ground. This was a slowprocess because the passengers were not only jumping to a steep slope, but had to pick their spots carefully to avoid landing on stumps. This momentaryhesitation while they were on the skids caused thehelicopter to sway laterally, contributing to a lossof lift. At this point, the helicopter had started tosettle and was drifting backwards downhill. Due tothe lack of reference points, the AC and pilot wereunaware of this drift. As it drifted downslope, themain rotor blades got closer to the ground and theAC started a right pedal turn, then hesitated amoment while applying left cyclic. The helicopter

turned 360 degrees , landed hard on the steep slope,rolled over and came to rest inverted. The two remaining passengers were thrown out and injured.One had a broken arm and the other had seriousback and internal injuries.

This 228,000 accident involved many factors,among which were:

1 Failure to consider the difference in densityaltitudes between the PZ and LZ.

54

2 Failure to consider the lack of ground effeat the pinnacle LZ and the resultant power requirments to hover out of ground effect. The helicopt

was 850 pounds overgross for hovering out of grouneffect.3 Lack of information about the LZ prior

flight.4. The AC's inability to recognize a rapidly d

teriorating situation and take timely corrective actio5. The overwhelming desire of the AC to com

plete the mission, which overshadowed his judgmein flying the helicopter.

6 Supervisory factors, including patnng UH ID with two UH IHs and using the same lofor all three helicopters. The AC of the UH I

had limited experience and was assigned a pilot wh

was new to the UH ID.he accompanying photograph shows the he

copter after the accident and the steep slopes an

many stumps

OVERGROSS FOR FENCE

A UH IB gunship with a crew of four, an XM-1900 pounds of fuel, 6,000 rounds of 7.62 ammuntion , 13 rockets and approximately 375 pounds miscellaneous equipment was taking off for a mi




sion. It was hovered from the unit's rearming pad toan open rice paddy near the perimeter of the campand a hovering takeoff was started. A barbed wirefence, 4 to 6 feet high, crossed the flight path approximately 100 feet from the point where the takeoff was started.

As the helicopter reached the fence, effective

translational lift had not been achieved and the pilotflared to lift over the fence. As the helicopter crossedthe fence , the rpm dropped to 5800 and the Ac tookcontrol and made a running landing in a small ricepaddy. The helicopter touched down level, slidthrough two rice paddies, hit a dike and rolled onits left side.

The cause of this $118 ,000 accident was listedas the attempt to take off at a high density altitudewith approximately 700 pounds over the recommended takeoff weight. However, among the recommendations resulting from the accident investigationwas that an adequate takeoff area be cleared and

used by all heavily loaded helicopters.OVERGROSS FOR TAKEOFF

A UH-l C completed its gunship mission, landedat a forward base, refueled with 800 pounds of fueland the pilot prepared to take off for the flight to hishome base. The helicopter was hovered laterally tothe center of the takeoff lane. During this maneuver,the rpm bled to approximately 6000, but this wasattributed to the fact that the AC had pushed leftpedal during the sideward hover to look for anotherhelicopter. The pilot landed on the takeoff lane,then began his takeoff. As the helicopter brokeground and started forward, the rpm dropped to

approximately 6200 and the takeoff was continuedwith approximately 9 inches of ground clearance.

Approximately 100 feet from the takeoff point, arutted muddy area, which was a ground vehicle traffi lane, crossed the takeoff path. As the helicopterreached this area, the AC abruptly applied additionalcollective to clear it and the rpm dropped to approximately 5800 after clearing the muddy area. At thispoint, the AC took control and continued the takeoff.Approximately 300 feet from the muddy area, another obstacle, a two-strand concertina fence, wasencountered. The fence was cleared at the expense ofan additional 200-rpm loss.

The helicopter hit the ground 40 feet past thefence, bounced and hit again 60 feet further on. I t

bounced again and started a spin to the right due tothe lack of antitorque control from the low rpm. It

hit the ground a third time after turning approximately 180 degrees and rolled on its left side.

This $217,000 accident was caused by failure tocompute allowable gross load, failure to perform ahover check to insure the helicopter was within gross

SEPTEMBER 1969

weight limitations for existing conditions, failure toabort the takeoff when the rpm became critically lowand control applications by the AC while the pilotwas in control of the helicopter.

A reviewing official said: It is apparent that thisaccident occurred because the AC failed to abort thetakeoff wheri the rpm continued to decrease below

minimum safe operating limits. However, it shouldbe pointed out that the present tactical mission is

such that gunships are required to operate in anoverloaded condition on a daily basis. f the UH-l Cgunship is to continue to be employed and, unlesswe are willing to risk the high probability of recurring accidents, such as the one in this report, wemust either accept a less effective performance ontarget by reducing the basic load of ammunition, or

we must install a more powerful engine which is

more compatible with the mission requirements.Although evidence was not found to clearly indi

cate that the takeoff was attempted with a quartering

tailwind, the fact that there was no wind indicator inthe company s forward area should be included inthe findings as supervisory error on the part o thecompany. It is noted that this situation was imme-diately corrected when brought to the company s

attention . .UNNECESSARY RISK

An OH-13S pilot was on a volunteer mission to gointo an insecure area to pick up enemy weaponsand documents. Infantry had swept through the areaseveral times, but the pilot knew where there was aspecific area that had been missed. Two OH-13Spilots volunteered and were allowed to undertake

the mission.After they reached the area, one pilot landed in

a rice paddy adjacent to the area and was recoveringweapons and equipment while the second pilot flew

overhead cover. The second pilot then decided togo lower to see what he could spot from the air. He

hovered over the area at about 6 to 8 feet. The areawas bordered by palm trees, but was large enoughto hover in and turn the helicopter. The ground washeavily cratered from artillery.

After hovering for approximately 10 minutes, thetail rotor struck an object, causing the tail rotordrive shaft to disengage. The pilot lost control, the

helicopter yawed to the right, the main rotor strucka tree and the OH-13S crashed.

This $32,000 accident was caused by hoveringtoo close to the bushes and shrubbery in the area,which resulted in a tail rotor strike. The findings ofthe investigation board also listed the pilot's strongdesire to do a good job, which caused him to takeunnecessary chances.

A reviewing official stated: It is evident that in

55



PR V NTION S NS

the conduct of this mission the pilot took a greaterrisk than was necessary to accomplish his mission.

He accepted an unnecessary risk by allowing his desire ·for mission accomplishment to crowd out hisgood judgment. This is another case of the acceptance of unnecessary risk by ignoring or ignorance ofproven and established flight techniques and procedures. The trees and obstacles were there and visibleto the pilot. The flying that followed should havebeen in accordance with known hazards and accomplished in such a way that the margin of safety wasin favor of the pilot and helicopter.

Supervisory error is considered to be involved inthat there is a tendency for this type of approach toflying to be accepted as common practice. There is

not enough emphasis placed on taking only that riskrequired to accomplish the mission. The end resultsare too often condoned when in fact the risks couldnot be justified by operational necessity. New andinexperienced aviators, confronted with ready acceptance of unnecessary risks, soon find themselvesattempting the same and, due to their lack of experience, are often unable to cope with the situations inwhich they find themselves. They are in fact lulledby supervisors and experienced aviators into believing that these techniques are routine and commonpractice. This practice has to be stopped and positivecommand action is necessary to insure that pilots

do not take chances they do not have to take andthat the acceptance of high risks is not commonplace,but weighed carefully against the mission andsituation .

WEATHER RISK

Two OH-6 pilots completed a resupply missioI1

and were headed back to base at dusk.Surviving pilot: We left the base enroute to the

resupply point at 1840. Along the way, we encountered numerous rainsRowers and low ceilings.I arrived at the resupply point about 5 minutes aheadof the other pilot because he had to circumnavigatesome bad weather along the way. I unloaded my

cargo and headed back.A short time later, as I was crossing a highway,

the other pilot called and asked me to turn on myrunning lights. I did and he said he had me in sight.At this point, he must have been about 1 minutebehind me. As I continued, the weather lookedworse so I turned 45 degrees left to a direction inwhich the weather looked better. I told the otherpilot that I was slowing to 60 knots and he acknowl-

56

edged. I told him I was going to try to get into obase from the west.

Just after crossing a village, I called the othpilot, gave him my heading and told him I was gointo try to get into the base. It was about a minu

~ a t e r when I ran into ground fog. I told the othpilot I was making a 180-degree turn and acknowledged. This was the last communicationhad with him.

Part of ~ h e way through my l80-degree tum,decided to climb and try and break out on top.broke out at 3,500 feet indicated and headed webecause the weather looked better in that directioI was running low on fuel so when I found a hole come down through, I put the aircraft down, spe

the rest of the night at that location and headed fbase in the morning when the weather cleared.

Qf lestions asked this pilot:

What did you think had happened to the otllpilot?

I thought he had returned to another base anshut down. .

Do you know what his fuel status was?He had plenty of fuel because he had refuele

just before we started that last mission. About how far from the crash site were yo

when you went IFR?In the same area.How long had the other pilot flown that d ( ~ . y ?About 5 hours.What were the weather conditions around th

base when you were returning?It was getting dark and foggy.

Weather officer: To swnmarize the type weather conditions we experienced in this area duing the day, we had nearly continuous scattererainshowers with light drizzle and fog and generalvarying ceilings, from 200 to 700 feet.The OH-6 that crashed hit tree which was th

highest and most sparsely vegetated obstacle in th

area. The main rotor hit the tree as the helicoptpassed to the left of it and the OH-6 plunged to thground from 15 feet. The skids embedded in thground and it tumbled forward, breaking into pieceand killing the pilot who was the only occupant.The cause of this $56,000 accident was found

be the pilot's attempt to maintain VFR under IF

conditions. Among corrective actions listed by reviewing official was: Ground commanders a




weighing the risks involved against mission priority

(i.e., aviator experience, weather and aircraft limi-

tations.)

TIRED AND HUNGRY

After flying 31;2 hours and completing a resupplymission, a UH-ID was en route to a base for fuel.It reached the base and the AC was flying low levelacross the end of the base at 70 feet and 80 knotswhen the engine stopped. The AC selected a landing area that appeared to be level and toucheddown with an airspeed of approximately 30 knots.

After touching down, he saw that the terrain wasextremely rough and there was a big depressionabout 35 feet ahead in his path. He successfully lifted the helicopter over the depression andthe right skid hit a mound of dirt on the other side.Both chin bubbles were broken and mud filled thecockpit. The helicopter continued to slide throughthe mud approximately 30 feet, turning 65 degrees.The tail boom was broken off

Investigation revealed that the cause of the emergency which resuited in this $104,000 accident wasa loose coupling half of a fuel line quick disconnect which resulted in fuel starvation.

The day before the accident, fuel difficulties werecorrected by a new fuel control box. The technicalinspector, mechanic, crewchief, gunner, pilot andAC stated they had not removed the quick disconnect. The helicopter was given an intermediate inspection 4 days before the accident. The crew chiefstated that the disconnect was checked at that timeand was secure. Between the time of the intermediateinspection and the accident, the quick disconnectwas removed and not properly secured.

The findings of this investigation included:successful autorotation could possibly have been

made if the creW had been properly rested at the

time of the accident. During the previous 4 hours,

the pilot and AC had less than 3 hours sleep. They

took off at 6 on the day of the accident and

neither had breakfast.

Unfortunately, the report of this accident did notcontain a flight surgeon's statement about physiological factors, though a command regulation requiredsuch a statement. The flight surgeon's analysis couldhave been especially enlightening about the effects ofinsufficient rest and food.

INDICAtIVE OF MENTAL ANDPHYSICAL FATIGUE

A UiI-iD had been flying resupply missions, with

SEPTEMBER 1969

Emergency was caused by loose fuel line quickdisconnect. Aircraft commander and pilot had lessthan 3 hours sleep during previous 24 hours and

took off at 0600 with no breakfast

a release time of 1500. The release time was extended to complete the mission and at 1640 the pilotwas making an approach to an outpost. He madehis approach into the wind to the outpost helipadand terminated at a 2- to 4-foot hover. As he did,the helicopter started to turn to the right. The pilotapplied left pedal to stop the turn, but got no response and the turn continued.

The AC then took control and applied full leftpedal, with no response. By this time, the helicopterhad completed one to two complete 360-degree turnsand the AC attempted a hovering autorotation. The

terrain over which the helicopter .had moved whilespinning was eroded and it landed left skid low,rolling on its left side.

The emergency which resulted in this accident wascaused by a failure which allowed a tail rotor control tube to come loose, causing loss of antitorquecontrol. Other findings listed by the report includedthe pilot's delay in recognizing the loss of antitorque

control; the lack of a suitable area for a successfulhovering autorotation; and a possible contributingfactor of fatigue on the part of the pilot, causinghim to react slowly during the emergency.

Flight surgeon: . . . The pilot had flown 17.5hours in the previous 24 hours, with about 6 hourssleep. The AC had flown 7.5 hours in the previous24. Both stated they were not fatigued and I couldfind no evidence of this on questioning. However

57



PR V NTION S NS

the 8.5 hours o flying preceding the accident is most

indicative o mental and physical fatigue, especially

in the pilot's case, considering the 9-hour day pre

ceding the day o the accident.

Reviewing official: Unit commanders areclosely monitoring crew flying hours to equitably distribute the total flying hours of units among all unitaviators to assure the maximum amount of crewrest for each individual. In some cases, tactical necessity has caused the prescribed limit to be exceeded.These cases are weighed on an individual basis topreclude pilot fatigue. In addition, aviators havebeen instructed to advise their controlling agencieswhen they are approaching the 10- or I5 hour limitations established by parent unit regulation and torequest a determination about whether or not theywill continue with the mission. . . .

FLASHLIGHT MAINTENANCE

With a crew of four and two passengers aboard,a UH ID entered a left 20-degree bank at 85 knots.While in the turn, the tail rotor failed, the airspeeddropped to 40 knots, and the helicopter spun to theright, impacted in level attitude, burst into flamesand rolled on its left side. The two passengers andtwo crewmembers were killed. One crewmemberescaped with a minor bruise and contusions. The

other had serious burn injuries.The emergency which resulted in this $228,000

accident was caused by a ball peen hammer whiwas left under the tail rotor drive shaft cover durimaintenance and an inadequate daily inspection. T

severity of the accident was caused by failure follow the emergency procedures outlined in tdash 10 manual.

Corrective actions taken were:1 Requirement for all aviators to read and uderstand proper corrective actions for all types of trotor malfunctions listed in appropriate dash lOs ftype helicopter flown.

2. Demonstration and practice of simulated trotor malfunction procedures by each aviator upassignment and during required standardizaticheck rides.

3 Compiled list of crew duties to be performduring normal and emergency operations; duties be discussed, studied and rehearsed by each crewmember.

4. Supervisory requirement for crew chiefs amechanics to use appropriate checklists or manuain performing required inspections or maintenanc

5. Requirement for preflight inspections toaccomplished with cowlings and drive shaft housiopen.

Maintenance officer: Maintenance and inspectierror is obvious. Maintenance was performed night, with no protection from the elements. T

only lighting available was hand-held flashlighRecommend lighting sets be made available fnight maintenance.

Maintenance and inspection factors are evidenced by hammer

left under tail rotor drive shaft cover. Maintenance was done at

night without adequate lighting

58 U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGES



S

TARING OUT AT the heat waves rising fromthe hard baked ground, SFC Buck Stuart

squirmed his 200-pound frame around on his sweatstained canvas stool, raised a beefy hand and slapped

. viciously at a mosquito whining near his ear. He

inhaled the musky, dank odor of the steaming hut

and swallowed, thinking how good a cold beer wouldtaste. Fair skinned and blonde, he suffered cruellyfrom the burning sun. He pulled a wet handkerchieffrom his fatigue pocket and mopped the streamingsweat from his broad face. The field telephone on

the table before him tingled and he grasped thereceiver. "Operations, Sergeant Stuart." He strainedto hear. "Sorry, major. You'll have to speak louder.This phone's still giving us trouble

"Yes, sir, I can hear you now. No, they stillhaven't found a cause for the accident. Yes, it'shard to understand, especially with that crew. The

AC had 5,000 hours and more than 1,700 in Hueys.He flew VIPs around in the States before he camehere. The pilot had almost s much experience.

"Yes, sir, the weather was VFR, no other aircraftwas involved and the investigators haven't foundany indication of hostile fire.

"Maintenance? That'd be the last thing I'd suspect.John DeLoach was crewchief, you know, and theyjust don't come any better. He had more than 18years experience and a fine record. Since he 's beenassigned here, maintenance downtime has been cutalmost 30 percent. t must have been some kindof materiel failure, but the wreckage was so badlyscattered, it's going to be hard to tell for sure.

"Yes, sir, eight passengers in addition to the crew.I'll let you know s soon as we find out anything."

Stuart replaced the receiver and glanced up s asergeant in flight clothes entered. "Help you?"

I'm looking for a friend of mine who's assigned

SEPTEMBER 1969

WH E S

LUCKY?Ted Kontos

to your unit. Sure will be glad to see him again. Igot a letter from him 3 weeks ago, before I left theStates. From what he said, you have a fine unit. Inever knew Lucky to get so excited about an assignment. He's been here nearly 9 months. I guess he 'llbe leaving for home soon."

The sergeant walked closer to the table. "Wish Icould have gotten over here sooner. I even tried toget assigned here, but it didn't work out. I wouldhave liked working with Lucky again. I workedwith him in Korea and he taught me more about

maintenance than all the schools I ever attended.And I've been through a bunch.

"Anyway, I finally made it over here. Even if wecan't work together, we can see each other andtalk over old times. We were born and raised in

the same town. You should have seen him in highschool. He was a real go-getter and smart. He couldalways figure things out, like when he was playingfootball. He really worked at it. I guess that 's whyhe was the best quarterback we ever had. I remember one time when we were up against the toughestteam in the state. They had been state championsfor 2 years in a row. They were big and fast and hada passing defense that wouldn't quit. The coach keptsending in plays and we were holding our own,hitting their weaker side. We had managed to pickup enough yards for a couple of first downs whenthe referee hit us with two IS-yard penalties. Then,you know what Lucky did? He ignored the coach'sinstructions and threw a bomb on a first and 40,mind you. You know, it worked. Those were theonly points scored in that game. But, was the coachever mad He threatened to bench Lucky.

"Lucky was the same way in just about everything.There was always a better way, at least for him.Maybe part of it was pure dumb luck, but it always

59



W R S LUCKY?

worked out. It didn't matter what he did. Like thetime he put fertilizer on hi father's lawn in themiddle of summer. We all laughed and told himhe'd be up all night watering, or the grass wouldburn up. Kno w what? It clouded up and rained for3 straight days. Everything he did alway came out

right. It didn't matter what it was.There was another time when he bought an old

Cub that had been sitting in a farmer's pasture forno telling how long. The engine was gone and thefabric was hot , the little that was left after the cowshad eaten what they wanted. It took $200, all themoney he earned that summer, to buy that plane.We all kidded him when he towed it to his house.After he got to checking around and found out whathe had to do to get it fixed up and how much it wasgoing to cost, I think he figured maybe we wereright this time. But he didn't let on. Every day he'd

piddle with that plane, cleaning it until it was ready

for covering. Call it what you like, but just aboutthat time, a fellow was coming in for a landing atthe airport in a tiff crosswind and lost control. He

ground looped and tore both wings off his Cub.When he found that Lucky had that plane, he hurried over and paid him $350, just for the two wings.Then Lucky turned aro und and sold the fuselage toanother guy for $100. Ho w about that for luck?You can ee how he got his nickname.

That Cub is what gave Lucky his start in aviation. He went bugs over planes and flying after that.Couldn't wait to get in ervice."

The vi iting sergeant drew a cigarette from his

pocket. Got a light?" He touched the cigarette tothe flame and inhaled. "Thanks. Lucky's wife doesn'tcare much about flying. She just doesn't tru t aircraft. I told her she never had to worry about him,not with his know-how and luck.

You should meet hi wife. She's a doll And

I've never seen two people more devoted to each

other. Every time you see them together, it's like

they ju t got back from their honeymoon. They have

two kids, a girl and a boy. The girl will be 13 before

he gets back and little Lucky is 10.

I wonder what kind of surprise h 11 have for

him when he get back this time. She's an artist, youknow. She doe n't really work for anybody, she just

does paintings for people she likes. And she oil

colors photograph . She's real good , too. Her water

colors used to win fir t prize every year in school.

She earned enough money while he was in Korea

to furnish the den like he always wanted, plush

recliner and all. No telling what she'll have for him

thi time.

60

"Getting back to aircraft, this guy's a genius. H

can troubleshoot an engine or system in his minlike he was looking at a blueprint. Better than thlike he was inside the system. He never neededTM. f all mechanic were like him, the Army coujunk pecial tools lik torque wrenches and air pre

ure gauge and save a bundle. Lucky never had au e for them.

"J ust for kicks, two of us followed him withtorque wrench after he in taIled new plugs in a nincylinder radial. My buddy would set a dial tytorque wrench on each plug and start tighteninI'd watch and yell when the plug started to turn

he could check the dial. And you know what? Eveone of those plugs was torqued within limits. Allwere turned above the minimum and not one wover-torqued. Try that sometime

You know how some people kick tires? N

Lucky. He can look at one and tell you just abo

how much air pre sure it's got.He was a geniu at figuring out hundreds of wa

to ave time. Take a simple job like installing a neset of spark plugs. You know how the chools teayou to clean them in solvent , inspect them, chethe gap and all that? Well , Lucky just drains somgas in a bucket, sloshes those plugs around, takthem out and in no time the gas has evaporatwhile he's looking them over. Next thing you knohe's putting them in. Like he says, the factory het the gap and if a packaged plug has been damag

enough for the gap to have changed, then you c

bet the insulator is in bad shape. You 're going

spot that. nd what if a bad plug does get installeYou 'll catch it when you pull a power check.

"I recall one time when Lucky had to get a Hu

ready for a flight. Thi wa out in the field , mind yoand they were really pu hing him. The CO wa

hi way to pick it up and get out before a fromoved in. It hadn't even been serviced yet, andLucky had were some barrels of fuel. He hookup the handpump to a barrel and cranked like maHe had that Huey serviced, preflighted and rea

to go 5 minutes before the CO got there. Fuel cotamination? No sweat. Like Lucky says, that's wh

filter are for. You 've got them from start to fini

in the fuel system from course to fine. f they cantrap what little sediment might get in from one suervicing, then what's the use of having them? All yo

have to do is keep up with your inspections amake ure the filters are kept clean and serviceab

SFC Stuart lifted his hand to interrupt the lotirade and asked, Who is this guy?"

"Didn't I tell you? It's DeLoach, Lucky Joh

Deloach. I sure will be glad to see him."




PEARL Spersonal equipment

and rescue survival

low own

SEPTEMBER 1969

rom H WK MONTHLY S FETY REVIEW

hy Wear NomexACCIDENT ONE

FROM A FLIGHT surgeon 's statement in an

accident report : "All three occupants were seento exit the aircraft with clothing afire, but under theirown power, by the pilot of the second ship. Afterremaining in the air for several minutes makingemergency calls , the pilot of the second ship landed.

He stated that at the time none of the downed crewhad their light helmets on. However, he noted that

none of them had burns in the areas covered by thehelmet. The pilot of the downed aircraft remarked

to the pilot of the second ship, I f only I had wornmy Nomex.'

"Both the pilot and crewchief succumbed as aresult of severe burns. The severity of the burnssustained was directly attributable to the failure of

all three crewmembers to wear Nomex protectiveclothing. Had the suits been worn, these needlessdeath could have been avoided."ACCIDENT TWO

A helicopter was on a resupply mission , carrying

passengers and cargo. As it touched down on a mountain landing pad, the pilot lowered collective with

the nose coming up. At this time, the aircraft commander took control. As the helicopter came off thepad it started spinning counterclockwise, rolled down

the mountain and caught fire.The crewchief, pilot and copilot got clear of the

burning helicopter. The pilot's clothing was on fire

as he exited the burning wreckage and he died several days later of burn injuries. He was not wearing

a Nomex light suit. The copilot who was wearing aNomex suit suffered only minor burns.

From June 1969 USARV AVIATION PAMPHLET

FIREWATER AND FLYING

Major Anthony A. Bezreh, MC

Pete climbed out of the sack slowly, very slowly.When his upper torso reached the vertical position,

he grabbed his head with both hands to make surethat it wouldn't fall off. There was a sort of driedout feeling in his innards; his eyeballs looked like aRand-McNally road map; and his mouth felt like thebottom of a birdcage. Pete mustered up enough determination to make it to his fe"et and carefully navi

gated his way out of the hooch. "Guess I really hungme one on," he muttered to himself. No matter howI look at it, this is going to be one miser"able day."

Poor Pete What a condition to ly in. Of course,he's flown in this condition before and, so far, he is

6 1



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2 3 4•• 1. .

5 6 7 8 9 1

12 13 14 15 16 17 18

19 2 2 22 23 24 25

26 27 28 29 3 3

Nancy Sinatra



f

*

U S S O S e z

The U S Army Aeronautical Service Office discusses

64

TM change on radar approaches

New FAR distribution method

on Radar Approaches: A Precision Approach (PAR) provides pilots with highly

accurate approach guidance in the azimuth, elevation and range parameters. Rate of descent

necessary to maintain glide path is affected by speed in the approach and the angle of glide

slope (G.S.) flown. A rate of descent can be reasonably forecast by evaluating reported

wind for its effect on ground speed and consulting the Rate of Descent Tables

published in the Terminal Instrument Approach Procedure booklet. The G.S. angle for each

PAR runway is provided in the IFR-Supplement along with the Decision Height (DH) andvisibility minima.

A Surveillance Approach (ASR) differs from the P AR in that it provides positive information

only in azimuth and range parameters. This information may be less accurate than tbat

provided by the PAR because of different type radar sets used. Altitude information,

when provided, is recommended altitudes for specified range points along the final segment of

the approach. t is not mandatory that an aviator abide by these altitudes. He may

descend to authorized Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA), subject to interceding step-down fixes,

should he so elect. The recommended altitudes are provided only as a guide, to enable the

aviator to establish a reasonable rate of descent for the final approach and to assist in arriving

at the MDA at or before reaching the missed approach point (MAP).

Due to Change 8 of TM 2557·29 effective 1 July 1969, altitude information on the ASR

final is no longer automatically provided. Aviators must initiate a request prior to reaching final

to receive this information at Army, Navy and FAA facilities. Air Force facilities will not

provide altitude information for an ASR final approach.

Federal Air Regulations: Due to a recent change in the method of distributing the F ARs

(Federal Air Regulations) it will now be necessary for each Army unit to order

these publications from the Government Printing Office with local funds. All the F ARs are being

incorporated into 11 volumes. Each volume will contain several associated F ARs. FAR 91

will continue to be issued along with the FLIP Planning Sections.) As these volumes

become available, notices will be publishedin

the Army Aviation Fight Information Bulletin(TB AVN1 series) and in this column. You should direct your order to: Superintendent

of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 20402. Revision service to the FAR

volumes will be automatic.

FaCility chiefs and controUers-do you remember the August issue? That new tool of the trade,

TM 95-200 (Air Traffic Control Facility Operations Manual) dated April 1969, has been pub.

lished and distributed. Better get your copy




S NFORD

RMY IRFIELD

T INSCRIPTION on the

monument reads: Sanford

Army Airfield, in memory of

Maior Jack W. Sanford, Senior

Army Aviator, Co 'A,' 502d

Aviation BaHalion, killed by

hostile action on 16 June

1965 however, there is muchmore that can be said about

this man who became a legend

in Army aviation circles.

That fateful day in June

could have been iust another

day for Jack Sanford, flying

over what appeared to be a

peaceful Mekong Delta insearch of the enemy. However,

on this particular afternoon he

received a call to scramble his

heavy fire team of Huey gun

ships to search for an American advisor who had been

captured. Minutes later he was

leading his team in a low re

connaissance to investigate a

sampan thought to be carrying

an American. While making a

pass, and without warning, his

aircraft crashed and exploded.

Members of the team made

desperate aHempts to get into

the area where Sanford's ship

went down, but the enemy hadplaced 60 mm mortar fire on

approaching aircraft, making

it almost impossible to land.

Finally, one aircraft managed

to land under cover of sup

pressive fires. Sanford and the

two members of his crew were

picked up and quickly evac

uated; however, Jack Sanford

had been hit three times and

died on the way to Saigon.

Maior Sanford was a man of

the highest ideals and nevergave up on any proiect he at

tempted. His aspirations and

dedication to his country were

uniquely high and without ex-

.1 '''' 1 ,, , £

i J ' :J - , t S4 k JNO

MAJOR JACK W. SANFORD

ception he achieved whatever

he aspired to. He epitomized

the spirit of Army aviators

worldwide and particularly the

Army aviator flying the skies

over the Republic of Vietnam.

During his illustrious career

Jack Sanford was awarded theSilver Star, the Distinguished

Flying Cross with the 1st Oak

Leaf Cluster, the Bronze Star

Medal with V device and

more than a score more, which

are indicative of his contribu

tion to a free people. It ishoped that everyone stopping

at Sanford Army Airfield atLong Binh near Saigon, will

recognize the true importance

of the memorial that has been

erected. They will understandthat Jack Sanford and the thou

sands of men responsible for

the excellence of Army avia

tion will be remembered.

BG Allen M Burdett Jr. left),commanding general, 1st AviationBrigade, and LTG Frank T Mil-dren, deputy commanding gen-

eral, U S Army, Vietnam, viewthe monument to the late MajorJack W Sanford during the offi-cial dedication of Sanford ArmyAirfield at Long Binh Post