army aviation digest - jun 1986

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Jun 1986

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JUNE 1986 VOLUME NUMBER

1 Mission: Air Traffic Control, MG Ellis D. Parker2 LAMSON 719, Part I: Prelude to Air Assault,CPT Jim E Ph.D.

16 Against All Odds: Theoretical Aspects of MicroburstFlight, Part II, LCDR F. Towers20 PEARL'S22 Above The Best-James M. "Mike" Hudson,

Ms. Sones24 Aviation Personnel Notes: Branch Letter,

M. What Must I Do to Get Promoted?;New Dimensions of Adventure, CW3 Robert H. GratUU Y. : . I ru . Engineering Test Pilot Board Results

27 Army Aviation Museum: Aero Commander U-4A28 DES Report to the Field: Recording Flight Time,SFC R. A. Buck30 The "Girl Back Home" and Army Aviation's H-19

Mr. James32 Dustoff Reunion, COL E. Moore36 MILES, SFC Kenneth N. Westover37 ATC Action l ine: DIDJUNO?, Mr. Forrest H. ~ o l o n h o r n o r38 The Past: What Might Have Been-The Future:What Can Be COL

Cover Terry and the Dil" 2tJl l't: ' Milton CaniffA composite of true action photos taken inVietnam about the time of "LAMSON 719 -thismonth's lead article, beginning on page 2. Photosat top right show a 50 caliber bullet hole in theleft window of a Huey piloted by CW4 Bob Renchand copilot CW4 Mike Harbin. The round wastaken in Laos at LZ Delta, in March 1971 duringLAMSON 719.

Honorable John O. Marsh Jr.Secrf tar'v of the ArmyMajor General Ellis D. ParkerCommanderU.S. Army Aviation Center

Brigadier General Rudolph Ostovich IIIAssistant CommandantU.S. Army Aviation CenterRichard K. TierneyEditor


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Mission: Air Traffic Control

THE RAPID PACE of the modern air-land battle requires timely employment and synchronization of ArmyAviation assets. A key element in this process is Army airspace command and control (A2C2). The proper integration and use of air traffic control (ATC) services, a subsetof A2C2, can provide the Army Aviation commanders theservices required to allow their fleets to operate at theirmaximum potential. In view of this, the Department of theArmy (DA) made the decision to transfer proponency forATC on 6 December 1985 from the Information SystemsCommand (ISC) to the U.S. Army Aviation Center, whichis proud and ready to be the leader for the ATC mission (seepage 8, May 1986 Aviation Digest .

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command withassistance from the Army Materiel Command and ISC, wastasked to provide the transfer implementation plan. Theplan establishes a separate directorate at the Aviation Center that will serve as a DA field operating agency for worldwide Army ATC operations. Also, all ATC units will fallunder the major Army command they support as opposedto the Signal Command. Fixed-base assets will be transferred from the Directorate of Information Management tothe Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization and Security. In Europe and Korea, the tables of distribution andallowances augmentation to the battalions will transfer toU.S. Army, Europe, and Eighth U.S. Army.

A2C2 is the governing concept for the employment of airtraffic assets. At a minimum, A2C2 includes tactical landing systems, airspace management, command and control,and position navigation systems. Within this framework,ATC provides two vital functions: flight following single ship aircraft and instrument meteorological conditions(IMC) recovery operations . Today s quick reaction missionsand lethal threat environment make these missions quitedifficult to perform, yet essential to any Army Aviationoperation. Aviation commanders and ATC elements mustwork closely together to ensure that ATC services are provided in the right places, at the right times, for every mission. As a general rule, due to the threat, IMC flight will

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not be conducted in the division area. However, aVlatlOnand ATC units must plan for inadvertent IMC conditions.ATC units will be heavily relied upon at corps and echelonsabove corps (EAC) for IMC and visual meteorological conditions flight. Also, ATC units should be employed for airspace deconfliction, en route navigation assistance, and assistance at congested areas, such as forward arming andrefueling points. Well thought-out employment of ATCassets will provide both aviators and the controllers theconfidence and satisfaction that they are making the bestpossible contribution to the air-land battle.

The Army Aviation Center is aggress ively pursuing thegoal of properly equipping ATC soldiers. In concert withthe Air Traffic Control Activity, the Aviation Center is up grading current equipment, including outfitting the TSW-7 A tactical tower and the TSC-61 flight operations centerwith new radios, and improving the reliability, availabilityand maintainability of the TPN-18 radar. In the near future,Army Aviation will use the microwave landing system(MLS) as its precision landing system. An MLS groundstation will be installed at Cairns Army Airfield at the Aviation Center and the Troy AL Municipal Airport in the next2 years for the training base. Tactical MLS ground stationswill be provided at corps and EAC. Army Aviation also willuse the global positioning system. This exciting new systemwill provide a passive navigation and landing capabilityworldwide and an unparalleled capability to land anywhereon the battlefield, without a ground emitter, to within 15Mspherical error probable. A y tem now in the conceptphase will automate all airspace management informationto include airspace usage, control measures, mission planning and flight following. The combat support air trafficmanagement system will provide a real-time, reliable airpicture to ensure maximum use and airspace deconflictionamong all users .

The future of air traffic services is filled with excitingopportunities, and the Aviation Center enthusiastically embraces this new mission. Proponency for this function atFt. Rucker provides a most useful framework to ensureATC units are properly equipped to support Army Aviationoperations. I extend a hearty welcome to the fine soldiers ofthe ATC community. rtt


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P RT I: Preludeto i r ssault

IS INDEED important tounderstand what happened before,during and after the most significant airmobile battle fought in theVietnam War- LAMSON 719.This 1971 battle is a milestone in theevolution of Army Aviation air assault tactics because: LAMSON 719 is the on y historical example of contemporaryArmy Aviation operating in a midintensity conflict. During LAMSON 719 morehelicopters received combat damage and were shot down than during any other comparable time inthe Vietnam War The combat assault on Tchepone in Laos involved more helicopters in a single lift than anyprevious combat air assault inArmy Aviation history. Two of the blackest days inArmy Aviation history occurredduring the 45-day operation. LAMSON 719 is the best contemporary example of AH-l Cobragunships conte ting enemy armorin combat.Lessons learned from LAMSON719 contribute to the current anddeveloping evolution of Army Aviation tactical doctrine more thanexperience in any other operationhas in the past 20 years. This article,next month's Part II: The Battle,and August's Part III Reflectionsand Values, clearly show thatArmy Aviation has evolved into amost important member of thecombat and, of course, the maneuver arms of the United States Army.

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LAM SON 7 9

SCALE OF MilESH 50 100 150

The 3-part series reveals that ArmyAviation is a unique organizationthat packs great firepower and provides extensive mobility on the airland battlefield. t depicts ArmyAviation as a young and dynamiccombat force building a preciousheritage as it flies above, andamong the best

Vietnam-era aviators confirmthat most of the current air-landbattle doctrine we read about is ahistorical summary and refinementof techniques employed and testedin the Republic of Vietnam. Army

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Aviation has ot reinvented thewheel in the past 1 years. The experiences in our history offer moreinsights than you might think.Part I of this article is a summary

of the pertinent history of the Vietnam War through the end of 1970.It describes typical types of missions and combat operations conducted by Army Aviation.Next month Part II will describethe LAMSON 719 operationsorder, the operation itself, the battle statistics, the afteraction reportsand the lessons learned. Finally,

Part III concludes with reflectionsand values of lessons learned notonly from LAMSON 719, but alsofrom Army Aviation's involvementin Vietnam from the beginning.Based on invited lectures that I'vegiven to aviation officer advancedcourse classes at the Aviation Center, Ft. Rucker, AL and to otherselsewhere, it is obvious to me thatmany people in Army Aviationtoday know little about Vietnam.We're already well into the next generation of people who were tooyoung to have cogent memories ofthe Vietnam days. Also, there areonly a few capsular references (seePart III in August) that I would recommend for obtaining additionalbackground on Vietnam. For thosereasons, I begin by giving moredetail than may seem necessary toprovide a contextual backgroundaround LAMSON 719. But, thesuccesses, and more importantly,the failures of the operation arebetter understood in context with acomplete LAMSON 719 background. This article describes aspects of the Vietnam War that arecritical in underst anding it but toooften, are deemphasized or overlooked in most references about thewar. For those who already knowsomething about the war in Vietnam the article can widen the perspective gotten from other sourcesand references.

A Troubl ed HistoryVietnam as a country does nothave an impressive history of independence. t was briefly occupied bythe Japanese during World War II,but for more than 50 years it wascolonized by the French.

The French were defeated by theCommunist Viet Minh at Dien BienPhu in 1954. Because of sharplydifferent political philosophiesVietnam was divided by a GenevaAccord into a non-Communiststate in the south and a Communist-controlled state in the north.The Communists or Viet Minh,

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represented only a small percentageof the people, but they had the onlyforce able to effectively fight theFrench. For about a year after theFrench defeat, the population wasable. to move freely across the partition line. More than one millionanti-Communists streamed southwhile only a few thousand Vietnamese moved to the north.The Geneva Accords were supposed to be temporary with a reunification to occur after electionsscheduled for 1956; however, hostilities between the Communists, Nationalists and Buddhists preventedany election from ever occurring.The partition line soon became aclosed demilitarized zone. Afterthis a Communist revolution(directed by North Vietnam) wasstarted in South Vietnam by trainedcombat veterans of the Viet Minharmy that had fought the French.These soldiers, and those enlistedfrom South Vietnam to fight withthem were known as the VietCongoBy 1959 the Viet Cong in SouthVietnam were being directly assisted by units of the regular NorthVietnamese Army. The U.S. Government, as part of the SoutheastAsia Treaty Organization alliance,in conjunction with other countriesincluding Australia and the Republic of Korea, sent an increased number of advisors under MilitaryAssistance Command Vietnam(MACV) control to train and assistthe South Vietnamese. MAC V actually came into being in 1962 as areorganization of an earlier military assistance and advisory group.In 1960 there were fewer than1,000 military advisors in Vietnam.President John F. Kennedy hadbeen burned by the defeat at theBay of Pigs in Cuba in 1961 anddidn't want to see another countryfall to Communism. He authorizedand increased military presencewhich grew to 3,000 troops in 1961.President Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963, but themandate was set and continued by

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President Lyndon B. Johnson andSecretary of Defense Robert McNamara, to increase the Americanpresence as necessary to prevent aCommunist takeover. In 1964, theU.S. Congress adopted the Gulf ofTonkin Resolution, authorizing thePresident to take whatever measures he considered necessary to repel attacks on American forces andto prevent further aggression inVietnam.By 1964, there were about 23,000American troops in South Vietnam. In 1965, the emphasis on thewar shifted. MACV became morecombat operational and the firstAmerican combat division was sentto South Vietnam in the summer of1965. The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) deployed and engaged theenemy with the first extensive andsustained use of helicopters (principally the UH-l Huey) in combat.Helicopters were employed earlierin Vietnam* and, in fact, were usedduring the Korean War on a lesserscale for movement of troops, re-supply and aeromedical evacuation.The development of Army Aviationas we know it today began with thedeployment of the 1st Cav. Clearly,the airmobile and air assault concepts of the 1st Cavalry Division inVietnam demonstrated for the firsttime in combat the enormous flexibility and utility of helicopters onthe battlefield. On countless occasions, from the battle at Ia DrangValley in 1965 to the standdowns in1972, Army Aviation proved to beof paramount importance in waging war in the defense of SouthVietnam.Through the 1960s, as the UnitedStates increased its involvementand support to South Vietnam,Russia increased its military support to North Vietnam, continuallyand several times at higher comparable monetary levels than the support provided by the United States.American strength reached its peakin 1968 at a level of about 550,000troops. From 1969 on (throughPresident Richard M. Nixon's ad-

ministration) troop strength dramatically declined until in April1972 there were fewer than 70,000American troops in Vietnam. Operational control in MAC V returnedto a more advisory rather than directcombat role.

An Effort At VietnamizationDuring the years of Americanpresence in Vietnam, MACV wasresponsible for a program calledVietnamization (term coined in1969 . t sought to train the Vietnamese people about government,agriculture, industrialization, education and soldiering. The early planincluded organizing an army andlocal reaction forces so that theywould be able themselves to conduct the war against the Communists. To do so, an effort was madeto train South Vietnamese soldiersin the maintenance and operationof military equipment to includeweapons, artillery, tanks and helicopters. Many Vietnamese also weretrained in the United States.Unfortunately, most Vietnamesewere not well educated, their technical understanding was primitive,and there was a serious languagebarrier, all of which made interactions, training and operationsdifficult and frustrating for manyAmericans. Progress was slow andwhen the U.S. Army and MarineCorps entered the war with directcombat missions, Vietnamizationwas further curtailed under the notion that the Communists wouldeither back off or be quickly defeated by the large show of American force: Thus, a well-trainedVietnamese force would not be necessary. This was a fatal decisionthat resulted in several years beinglost in developing greater auton-

There were individual Army Aviationunits in South Vietnam as early as 1961. TheU.S. Army's 173d Airborne Brigade also deployed to South Vietnam in 1965. By the endof 1965 U.S. troop strength reached 181,000;in 1966, 385,000; and in 1967,486,000.

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The A Shau Valleyrenowned as the areaof heaviest enemyconcentration andlogistics centers in thenorthern portion ofouth Vietnam.



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LAM SON 7 9omy for the people and experiencefor the Vietnamese Army.In late 1967 and in 1968, the U.S.Embassy helped MACV rejuvenatethe Vietnamization effort. In 1969,MACV was also bolstered in advisory troop strength severalfold tofurther accelerate the formalizedVietnamization program. Manymore Vietnamese were then broughtto the United States to learn how tofly helicopters, drive tanks andmaintain equipment. Finally, it wasobvious that the days of a U S presence in Vietnam were numbered.The Vietnamese were going to haveto learn to fight the war on theirown. LAMSON 719 became the firstserious test of the Vietnamizationof ground combat operations because American ground troops oradvisors would not be allowed to setfoot into Laos where the operationwas to take place.

Throughout the war in Vietnamthe Communists rarely showed concern for their number of combatlosses. Human wave attacks werenot uncommon and generally accounted for some of the few minorbattlefield victories the Commu-nists enjoyed up through 1972.However, it is not lofty or exaggerated to say that from 1961 to 1972,except for LAMSON 719 (whichwas more like a draw), the American and South Vietnamese decisively won every m jor battle of thewar to include the most well-knownbattle, the Tet Offensive of 1968.

The Tet Offensive and LAMSON719 stand out as two different typesof battles that were very distinguishable from the way the warwas otherwise conducted. The TetOffensive involved more than100,000 North Vietnamese Armyand Viet Cong troops. I t waslaunched on 30 and 31 January1968, as an all-out surprise assault,primarily against well-defendedmilitary compounds in more than115 different urban areas throughout the country. The battle wascalled the Tet Offensive, namedafter the lunar New Year in Viet-

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UH 1 lands at a small pad at Mai Loc in 101st irborne Divisionarea of operation. A fire support base can be seen on the distantridge upper right corner).

nam which is the Vietnamese peoples' most celebrated and importantholiday.Before the offensive, the VietCong had announced a 7 -day truceover the holiday to further catchU.S. and South Vietnam troops offguard. The belief by the Commu-nists at the time was that occupation of the major urban areaswould generate a popular uprisingamong the people, mass defectionsfrom the South Vietnamese Armyand the rapid collapse of the government. However, in just a fewdays, except for small sections inSaigon and Hue, the offensive wastotally crushed. Communist lossesranged from 35,000 to 50,000 killedwith 3,000 South Vietnamesekilled, 1,500 Americans killed andmore than 10,000 civilians killed incrossfires or murdered by occupying Communist forces.After Tet, the Viet Cong were totally eliminated as an effective

fighting force. Tet was a decisivevictory for South Vietnam in several respects. It destroyed any credibility for the Communists with theSouth Vietnamese people and itgreatly bolstered the South Vietnamese government and Army.But, the most far-reaching outcomeof the Tet Offensive was a politicalone in the United States. As thebattles unfolded, too many American journalists consistently distorted the events and highlightedthe horrors of war. Everything theCommunists did was embellishedby those members of the media,while the South Vietnamese andAmerican military were treatedwith derision and cynicism, asthough they reported only fabrications.The media's reflections of thewar, coupled with the U.S. Government s failure to effectivelycommunicate the purpose and objectives of the war, spread disillu-

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Strong religious beliefs can be seen in the livesof most Vietnamese, such as Kim Anh Thu.

The Culture of VietnamCaptain Jim E Fulbrook

A lot should be saidabout the culture of theVietnamese people if we areto fully understand thewar and the significanceof LAMSON 719 TheVietnamese are influencedmostly by Confucianismand ancestor worship. Theyare community and familyoriented, not nationalistic.

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Most are superstitious,religious and decidedlynonviolent. They areanti-Communist becausethey fear a loss of freedomthat would prohibit ancestorworship, religious freedomand community traditionslike the Council of Elderswhich dominated the ruralmajority as the principal

form of government. It'sunfortunate that thosefears have been borne outsince the Communisttakeover in 1975 These arethe precise areas in whichthe Communists have placedtheir greatest efforts:reeducating and reunifying(nationalizing) the people.This cultural backgroundmakes it easy to understandwhy millions of Vietnamesesince 1975 have riskedtheir lives to leave theircountry by boat or whatevermeans possible.

The cultural and ethnicbackgrounds of theVietnamese people seriouslyimpacted military operationsin Vietnam. Even theindigenous armies weredivided along ethnic linesto a significant degree.

The principal religionsin Vietnam includeConfucianism, Buddhism,Cao Oai (belief that allreligions are seeds ofwisdom planted by God ),and Cack (Catholic orChristian). There are twomain types of Buddhists:those subscribing toancestor worship and thosebelieving in reincarnation(sometimes called MandarinBuddhists).

The Buddhists whobelieve in reincarnation makegood combat soldiers

because they believe thatif they are killed theirlevel of reincarnation wouldbe high, based on howgreat their valor was on thebattlefield. Buddhists,Confucianists and otherswho followed ancestorworship generally are poorsoldiers. They are nonviolentin attitude, fearful ofleaving their village areaswhere deceased ancestorswould protect them andfearful to die if it were notin the family order.

These cultural differencesare found throughoutVietnam, but there is asignificant differencebetween the people northand those south of OaNang where a majormountain range aids individing the country. AboveOa Nang the averageVietnamese were about2 inches taller thanthose in the south. Thenortherners appear more

Chinese-like and MandarinBuddhism is more prominent.

The cultural differencesgave a significant advantageto the Communists. BothNorth and South Vietnambuilt their armies fromvolunteers and conscriptions,but the Communists in thenorth primarily conscriptedMandarin Buddhists(reincarnation believers)

sionment nationwide. That theCommunists could launch such anoffensive, even though it was decisively crushed, was a shock to theAmerican public. Thus the Tet Offensive of 968 marked the beginning of disengagement by theUnited States from a war in whichwe were unbeatable on the battle-

field, but which we could neverwin - at least probably not withouta direct invasion of North Vietnam. A high-intensity conflict is awar between two or more nations

and their allies in which the combatants employ the most moderntechnology and resources of theirmilitary organizations to includenuclear, chemical and biologicalweapons. Decisive engagements between large numbers of troops oc-

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Levels of ConflictIt s important to define and describe the three levels of conflictfound in combat:



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LAM SON 719tracted as in a high-intensity conflict. Examples of mid-intensityconflict include the Korean Warand the 1967 and 1973 Arab-IsraeliMideast Wars. A low-intensity conflict is alimited politico-military struggle toachieve political, social, economicor psychological objectives. It canbe quite protracted and range fromeconomic and political pressure allthe way through terrorism and insurgency. Low-intensity conflictsare generally confined to a geographic area and constrained onthe use of weaponry, tactics andlevels of violence. Low-intensityconflicts include Beirut, Grenada,Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Vietnam during the United States involvement. Of course, the list is depressingly long with each conflicthaving its own unique features.Although three levels of conflicthave been conveniently defined, itshould be realized that these conflict categories actually occur alonga loosely defined continuum. Generally, most wars or conflicts do notremain at one level, but tend to escalate or deescalate over time. Eachbattle or period within a war can bedefined in its level of intensity aswell. Countless examples could begiven of the escalations and deescalations of conflict in any war.However, where the Vietnam Waris concerned, during the UnitedStates involvement, LAMSON 719stands out as the only clear exampleof a mid-intensity conflict or .battle.

LAMSON 719 lasted 45 days andlarge numbers of troops (morethan 50,000 total) became decisively engaged. The significance ofLAMSON 719 has been greatlyoverlooked in contemporary U.S.military history, and in Army Aviation in particular. From the introduction of the UH-l and from the1965 deployment of the 1st CavalryDivision (Airmobile) to Vietnam tothe present, LAMSON 719 also isthe best contemporary example ofArmy Aviation in a deep attackand as a combat and maneuver arm

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ABOVE: A small squad area alongRoute 9 in the valley just eastof Khe Sanh. Photo was taken inthe beginning of LAMSON 719RIGHT: Captured enemy 50 caliber12.7 mm) machinegun

on a combined arms operation incombat. Both of these will be defined and discussed next month inPart II, The Battle.Some people feel that the Tet Offensive of 1968 was a mid-intensitybattle because it was a significantescalation of the war and a largenumber of troops were decisivelyengaged. Granted, from an infantry standpoint, the battles to retakeHue and the Cholon district in Saigon during Tet may be examples ofa mid-intensity level but not whereArmy Aviation is concerned.While Army Aviation was involved in Tet, it was not employedto the degree that it was in LAMSON 719. Most of the Tet battleswere fought by South Vietnamese,U S. Marine Corps and U S. Armyground combat units. Remember,Tet took place in more than 115 ur-

ban areas and was fought more likea multitude of house-to-house skirmishes and small unit actions.Most of the enemy attacks were defeated within 2 days; only the Hueand Saigon battle areas were activefor more than 1 week (about 26days in Hue). Actually, the Tet Offensive is best suited as an exampleof a military operation on urbanized terrain conflict, but such anarticle will have to wait until another time.Low-Intensity Conflict in VietnamThe general and most commontype of engagements in Vietnamwere termed small unit actionswhich mainly involved companysize units or battalion-size operations. Throughout the war theCommunists primarily operated in

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small units within South Vietnam.This was especially true after theTet Offensive of 968 when the VietCong were greatly depleted. Theseunits or cells were frequently composed of only six troops with perhaps only three of them carryingweapons. The primary missions ofthese cells involved harassment andtemporary interdiction, usuallywithout becoming decisively engaged. In fact, the Communistswere so firm about this tactic insome regions that, as captured documents reveal, a ranking personcould be shot if a superior officerencountered a unit in size greaterthan six that was not on a specificoperation. Larger units would beformed as necessary for an operation, but after the operation theunit would disperse into small unitcells once again.Against the South Vietnamese,common tactics of the Communistforces included murder, kidnapping, confiscation of supplies,impressment and other acts of terrorism. The most frequent targetswere the elders in a village because they represented the localgoverning body and, by culture, received the highest respect and fearfor loss of their lives. t was notuncommon for the Communists tokidnap a ranking ancestor thenimpress the younger of the familymembers, sometimes even intosuicide missions as sappersunder the threat of the kidnappedancestor being cock-a-dowed(phonetic pronunciation). Cocka-dow is Vietnamese for being decapitated which, according to theVietnamese culture, would separatethat ancestor's soul to wander aimlessly in the afterlife without ascending in the family order.

Sapper operations involvedeither soldiers or impressed civilians sneaking through tunnels orunder barbed wire at night to entera military compound with satchelcharges and grenades. Once inside,the sappers would plant or throwthe charges to blow up as many

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Aircraft shut down on fire support base in mountains

people and as much equipment aspossible before being killed orblowing themselves up. The mainoperations the Communists conducted against Americans includedhit-and-run skirmishes or ambushes, sapper attacks and the setting of booby traps.In the early phase of Americaninvolvement in Vietnam, too oftenwhen a village was occupied by theCommunists or thought to be sympathetic to them, the U.S. troopswould literally blast the enemyfrom a village or burn it to theground. This usually caused morecasualties and damage to the civilians than anything else. However,after the Tet Offensive, and the MyLai massacre in 1968, a greatereffort was made toward the pacification of the people.As another part of the Vietnamization program, civilians living inthe most rural and mountainousareas were encouraged to resettle indesignated pacification areas, usually in the most defendable geographic location in a regionalprovince. From that location thepeople were guaranteed protection

against the Communists, a place tolive, land for farming, health care,education, etc. Everyone was still toretain ownership of their ancestralproperty in the unpacified areasand would be able to return whenthe war was over. Anyone choosingto remain in the unpacified areaswas given no guarantee of securityor other benefits.

To a significant degree, the pacification program run by MACVwas successful. Even many of theMontagnards or Mountainyards,as they were sometimes called,came to cooperate with the pacification program. Montagnards area primitive, pigmy-like, aboriginalpopulation of ethnic tribesmenwho inhabited areas of the centraland northern mountain ranges inSouth Vietnam. They were excellent, vicious fighters against theCommunists who routinely impressed the Montagnard women,children and elderly tribesmenwhenever they could capture them.

To provide greater security to thepeople, many of the pacificationareas were made off limits to U.S.military combat personnel. In addi-


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LAM SON 7 9tion, these areas and all other established populated areas becamedesignated as control fire zones(CFZs). All military, to include aviation and artillery personnel, wererestricted from firing into a CFZwithout MACV or provincial civilian approval. f a helicopter wasflying in a CFZ and received enemyfire, the gunner had to have a positive identification of the enemy,without any endangerment to thecivilian population, in order to return fire.

On helicopter combat assaultsthe local province chief or a MACVofficer would be required to ride inthe command and control aircraftto make the decision about whetheror not the gunships and troop carrying helicopters could go hot ifenemy fire were received. Hence, asU.S. involvement continued into1970, military operations becamemore and more restricted. WhileCFZs were occasionally frustrating,they were probably the best way toconduct operations in populatedareas. Of course, there were plentyof free fire zones that h d no -strictions on return of fire.Between 1965 and 1970 about 11percent of all deaths and 18 percentof all wounds for U.S. combattroops were caused by booby trapsand mines. For the Communists toavoid decisive engagements andjust peck away at the U S. troopsbecame increasingly frustrating,and a serious no-win situation.Clearly, the only way to defeat theenemy would be to take the battlefarther westward, away from thepopulation centers and into theCommunist strongholds in themountains and plains along theCambodian and Laotian borders.There, the enemy could also befound in greater numbers.

Fire Support Bases and irmobilityConventional military operations in Vietnam were simply notpossible for several reasons. Aside

from the Communist tactics of

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ambush and terrorism, and the absence of front lines, the topography and climate profoundly influenced the timing and types ofoperations that could be conducted. The climate is primarilytropical and quite wet especiallyduring the summer monsoon season when military activity on bothsides was significantly reduced.

The southern part of South Vietnam is called the Mekong Delta,which is flat, swampy and coveredwith rice paddies. Delta areas weregenerally no-go terrain for militaryvehicles and tough going for soldiers on foot. Riverine operations by shallow-draft gunboatswere common in the Delta. Thecapita l city, Saigon, is located northof the Delta in an area known as thePiedmont, which consists of rolling hills and plains. Armor operations were most frequent in thisarea and along the coastal plain.

The coastal plain is a narrowstrip of beaches, river valleys,marshlands and rice paddies alongthe length of South Vietnam. Thecoastal plain is the area of highestpopulation and commerce, and wasthe location of most major U.S.bases and logistics centers.The great majority of the remaining northern half of SouthVietnam is composed of triplecanopy jungle and mountains,some higher than 5,000 feet. Triplecanopy jungle comprises threedense layers of foliage reaching ashigh as 15 feet, 75 feet and 150 feetfrom each layer of bushes and trees.The only effective type of operations that could be conducted inthis terrain was airmobile assaultsby helicopters with small units ofinfantry and artillery.

Operations to interdict intoenemy-held strongholds which wereusually in the mountains, employedthe fire support base (FSB) concept. The typical combat operationinvolved the establishment of a selfcontained, self-defended artillerybase, usually on top of a hill ormountain, from which infantry

search and destroy operationscould be supported. The FSB concept reflected a universal truth incontemporary infantry combat:Never conduct operations beyondthe range of artillery support. FSBsprovided rapid, reliable, continuously available fire support, whichwas especially important whenweather conditions precluded airsupport. By their locations, mostFSBs provided additional advantages for communications relay,observation and control of highground.A typical fire support base wouldconsist of a battery of 105 mm or155 mm howitzers, an infantrycompany, four 81 mm mortarsfrom an infantry battalion, andcommunications, administrative,medical and special operations personnel (K-9 teams, psychologicaloperations teams, sniper teamswith night scopes, etc.). FSBs wereusually placed within range of thesupporting fire of another FSB.Each FSB generally supportedthree or more infantry companiesin conducting operations aroundthe base.

The development of the fire support base concept was an innovation that went hand-in-hand withthe increased flexibility and mobility made available by the use of theVietnam workhorse - the helicopter. Many FSBs had no access forresupply and were wholly reliant onhelicopters for support. There weregenerally few roads, and when therewere roads they were usually notsecure. Remember, this was a warwithout front lines against anenemy that favored ambushes andterrorism. Clearly, the helicoptermade possible the FSB concept.Airmobility and air assault tacticsin Vietnam enabled the U.S. Armyfor the first time to move largeforces to specific locations rapidlyand on short notice. FSBs allowedthe Army to progressively strikedeeper into enemy-held terrainwithout the loss of superior firepower.

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iresupport base with a battalion of artillery on it

Army Aviation Missions and UnitsMuch could be written about themissions and units of Army Aviation in Vietnam, but only a shortreview limited to rotary wing operations is necessary here. After 1965,the major types of Army helicopters employed in Vietnam included:The AH-l Cobra gunship, theOH-6 Cayuse and OH-58 Kiowascout and division artillery helicopters, and UH-IC, D and H serieshelicopters.

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Unit sizes and types varied considerably among divisions and thefour corps areas in South Vietnam.They consisted of platoons, detachments, teams, companies, batteries, squadrons, battalions andgroups. At the height of U.S. involvement there were more than5,000 Army aircraft in Vietnam andit is estimated that more than13,000 Army aircraft cycledthrough Vietnam between 96 and1972. A few of the more typical

types of aviation units and theirmissions were: Aeromedical Evacuation (Dustoff Units. At the peak of U.S.troop strength in Vietnam therewere 6 UH-l helicopter ambulances in service. Between 965 and1969 alone some 373,000 militaryand civilian casualties were evacuated by Dustoff helicopters. Whilemany casualties were convenientlyevacuated by other aircraft in thevicinity, the lion s share was han-

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LAM SON 7 9dIed by Dustoff units on a 24-hourbasis in all weather conditions. Cargo Helicopter Units. Anaviation battalion in support of adivision consisted of two cargohelicopter companies of CH-47Chinooks. Their missions includedtroop and cargo transport. Cargohelicopters played an integral rolein the establishment and resupplyof fire support bases primarily bydelivering artillery pieces, ammunition, food and fuel. Assault Helicopter Companies(AHCs). Clearly, the workhorses ofthe Vietnam War were the UH-lHueys of assault helicopter companies. AHC missions included resupply ( ash and trash ), combatassaults, psychological operations,special forces and long range reconnaissance patrol insertions, electronic surveillance, etc. The typicalAHC consisted of 24 to 27 UH-ls inthree platoons - two lift platoonsof UH-IH slicks aircraft and onegun platoon of UH-ICs. Air Cavalry (Cav) Units. Combat divisions in Vietnam wereusually supported by air cav squadrons. Each squadron consisted ofthree air cav troops and one groundcav troop. An air cav troop contained 27 helicopters, 9 to 10 AHIG Cobras or UH-IC gunships, 10to OH-6 or OH-58 scouts and 7UH-ls. The typical mission of a cavunit involved coordinating with acombat brigade for reconnaissancemissions and bomb damage assessment in specified grid squares. InLaos during LAMSON 719, a reconteam often consisted of one lowAH-l gunship and three high AH-lgunships on search and destroymissions. Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA)Units. These units were designatedas batteries and had a total of 12AH 1G heavy hog aircraft. Eachhad rocket pods capable of carryingup to 76 rockets. ARA units workeddirectly for a division artillery andreceived fire missions the same wayas did ground artillery. The aircraftwere usually used to provide close

14

air support to ground units and toassist assault helicopter companieson combat assaults. During LAMSON 719 most ARA teams consisted of three aircraft with theadditional mission of seeking targets of opportunity.Low level flying in Vietnam wasstrictly prohibited and viewed asunsafe by most units up to thestanddowns in 1972. Aircraft weresupposed to fly at 1,500 feet aboveground level in Vietnam and at3,000 feet above ground level inLaos and Cambodia. Tight circlingapproaches and climbouts weretypical for getting into and out oflanding zones (LZs).

Combat assaults also conformedto the altitude restrictions and usually were conducted in tight formations of UH-ls sometimes with asmany as 10 aircraft in one lift. Mostcombat assaults, however, were divided into multilifts with about sixaircraft per lift. Generally, the moreaircraft involved, the more normalwere approaches and departures offlights, although terrain and LZfactors largely determined the assault tactics.Each combat assault had at leastone team of UH-IC gunships thatwould make a racetrack pattern onone side of the flight around the

LZ at an altitude of 500 to 1,000feet, to provide gun cover if needed.Occasionally, a smoke ship wouldbe used to provide addit ional cover.Combat assault tactics mentioned above were effective in Viet

nam when a unit was usually onlysporadically engaged, primarilywith just small arms fire. However,during LAMSON 719, as we shallsee, such tactics were disastrous.Before the end of LAMSON 719,most aviators routinely flew lowlevel. Combat assaults were conducted by single ship landings with30-second separations, and gunships made runs from higher altitudes. The LAMSON 719 battleprobably did more than any otheroperation in the history of the Vietnam War to revert Army Aviationdoctrine to the development ofnap-of-the-earth flight tactics, andto move away from close formationcombat assaults.

The Ho Chi Minh TrailThrough the 1960s resupply andreinforcement of Communisttroops in South Vietnam were accomplished via two primary routes.The most efficient route to resupplythe southern half of South Vietnamwas by cargo ship to the port of

One ofcountlesstrails inLaotianpanhandleknown asth Ho ChiMinh TrailBombcraters arevisibleeverywhere

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Sihanoukville (Kompong Som) inCambodia. Prince Norodom Sihanouk the Cambodian ruler, allowed the North Vietnamese to usethe port, and to construct baseareas and logistical facilities inCambodia near the South Vietnamborder. This was stopped in March1970 when Prince Sihanouk wasoverthrown by an anti-Communistgovernment that ordered NorthVietnam out of the country andsought U.S. support.In May and June 1970, U.S. andSouth Vietnamese forces launched

JUNE 1986

A typic l comb tassault. Insertioninvolved severalaircraft in tightformation l nding in alarge LZ. Most LZsin mount inous areasrequired hoveringinstead of landing,and were sometimesbooby-trapped.Approach to a smallground unit on atypical ash and trashresupply sortie.

a major offensive into the Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia. Theoffensive was a major success.Huge amounts of enemy supplies,equipment and bases were destroyed along with a serious loss ofCommunist troop strength. Coupled with the major loss of troopsduring the Tet Offensive, the NorthVietnamese were severely reducedas a combat effective force in thesouthern IV Corps region of SouthVietnam for years to come.The second and most importantroute for the movement of supplies

and reinforcements from NorthVietnam to the south was the HoChi Minh Trail, named after theNorth Vietnamese leader. By 1970it had been developed into an extensive well-organized network of hundreds of miles of roads and trailsrunning south in a wide corridoralong the border between Laos andVietnam into Cambodia. With theloss of the port at Sihanoukville, allsupplies and reinforcements had tobe moved down the Ho Chi MinhTrail. Not only was this a long, arduous trip, but for some time thetrail network also was continuallybombed by the Air Force, Navy andMarines. Despite these problems,the North Vietnamese had to dramatically increase activity on theHo Chi Minh Trail to try to reconstitute their forces in the south.The Americans and South Vietnamese had turned the war aroundand wanted to continue the offensive. So, in late 1970 an invasion ofLaos, into the heart of the Ho ChiMinh Trail, was considered. An operations plan called LAMSON 719was drawn up. The principal objectives of LAMSON 719 were to interdict and disrupt the flow of enemytroops and supplies along the HoChi Minh Trail in Laos that werecoming into South Vietnam.Operation LAMSON 719 wouldbe the first major test of the Vietnamization effort. It would buymore time and safety for the continued withdrawal of U.S. troops byfurther damaging North Vietnam'sability to launch any offensives.And, it hopefully would crippleNorth Vietnam's strategy for combat operations and enhance peacenegotiations, which were alreadyunderway.

Next month: LAMSON 719,Part II: The Battle.

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Part IIAgainst ll OddsTheoretical Aspects of Microburst Flight

yLCDR Joseph F. TowersABOUT THE AUTHOR

LCDR Joseph F. Towers is a reserve Naval aviator flying as an instructor pilot in the DC-9 with VR-57 at NAS North Island,CA. Commander Towers is a San Diego-based First Officer on the B-767 with American Airlines and an independent safetyconsultant specializing in microburst-induced windshear, flight crew training, and mishap prevention. Commander Towers hasstudied and written extensively on the phenomenon of microburst-induced windshear for the last 5 years. His most recenteffort was compilation of an in-depth paper on the flight-related aspects of the microburst phenomenon. He presented thispaper at the 24th Aerospace Sciences Meeting sponsored by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics in Reno,Nevada, in January 1986.

Commander Towers article on microbursts is being presented in three parts. In Part I in the May issue of Aviation Digesthe discusses weather conditions that spawn this most lethal of the downburst family and specific meteorological phenomenato look for. Commander Towers describes the crash of a massive L 1011 airliner in Texas to demonstrate what microburstinduced windshear can do to an aircraft, particularly during the vulnerable takeoff and approach stages of flight. He stressesthe need for better understanding and awareness of microbursts by flight crews. Such knowledge is important not only fortheir own protection, but because of the importance of warning other aircraft of impending danger from this fast-formingweather phenomenon.In Part II, Commander Towers presents a fundamental aerodynamic explanation of microbursts. In Part III, to be publishedin July, Commander Towers provides some techniques to control flightpath direction of an aircraft caught in extreme microburst conditions.Are microbursts and microburst-induced windshear a danger to Army aircraft, or are they a problem only for larger aircraftthat operate in a wider variety of weather conditions? While the consequences are more likely to be catastrophic for largeaircraft and more lives are at stake, any aircraft can fall victim to a microburst.In April of this year, an Army U 21 was approaching Atlanta International Airport. The tower reported windshear, but theaircraft was already on short final and committed to touchdown. It encountered severe windshear, causing it to touch downwith the left wing low, allowing the propeller blades of the left engine to hit the ground. Fortunately, in this mishap the onlydamage was to the propeller blades.The more you know about microbursts, the safer you will be. You need to know the conditions in which they are most likelyto occur, what happens to an aircraft when it encounters a microburst and what to do to survive. And there s something else,your report of a microburst might be the difference in whether someone else survives-or doesn t.

Aspects of microburst flightN Wthat you re familiar withthe basic nature of microburstsand have some specificmeteorological phenomena to lookfor, let s look at how a microburst canaffect an aircraft during flight.

A micro burst encounter is extremelydangerous during the vulnerabletakeoff and approach because of theaircraft s limited aerodynamic capa-bility and its proximity to the ground.

To fully understand the aero-dynamic effects of an encounter, wewould need complex equations of

16

Thrust~ ~

Weight

ResultantRelative Windh r ~ ~ ~ ift Reduced~ \ : ~ ~ ~detO e

P ~ o ~Weight

Figure 4 depicts the four forces of acceleration acting on an aircraft in flight. During microburst penetration, these forces can become unfavorably unbalanced dueto a transitory reduction in lift produced by an angular shift in the relative wind anda reduction in airstream velocity. The result is an adversely altered flight profile asthe aircraft seeks an equilibrium condition.

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fpmKIASkmJAWSVSIHUDSAOA

Glossaryfeet per minuteknots indicated airspeedkilometerJoint Airport Weather Studiesvertical speed indicatorHeads-Up-Displayangle-of-attack

motion and acceleration. However,fundamental vector analysis will illustrate how an aircraft s flight pathcan change due to an altering of thelift force.

A reconstruction of the PanAmerican Flight 759 disaster shows thatthe Boeing 727 penetrated a weakto-moderate, microburst-inducedwindshear that generated a 14-knotheadwind during the takeoff roll,a downdraft and crosswind shortlyafter liftoff, and then a 25-knottailwind.

The aircraft was airborne for only20 seconds and attained a maximumaltitude of about 150 feet. Duringthis time, takeoff thrust and weightwere constant with negligible changesin drag. Lift was the only force ofacceleration that could have adverselyaltered the flight path.

Lift equals the coefficient of lift(Cd times the dynamic pressure(q which equals Y2 p y2) times thesurface area of the wing (S) and iswritten as: L=CL ( Y2 p Y2 S.

The density ratio (p) and surfaceareas of the wing (S) were constant andcan be eliminated, leaving us withL = CL X y2, or to put it another way,LIFT = (Angle-of-Attack) x (IndicatedAirspeed)2.

Therefore, the remaining variableshaving a deteriorating effect onthe flight path are the coefficient of lift,which is a function of airfoil configuration and angle-of-attack, anddynamic pressure, which is a functionof the square of the airstreamvelocity. A reduction in one or bothof these pilot-controlled variablescan severely impair lift generation.

Thus the New Orleans disasterwas no doubt the result of the aircraft

JUNE 1986

Figure 5 is based on Dr. T Fujita s reconstruction of the microburst winds thatexisted along the route of flight of Pan American Flight 759 at Moisant InternationalAirport in New Orleans in July 1982. Note the dramatic change in wind speed anddirection.

Microburst) ) \ \ 10 0 ,,: 10 ,,) 1( ~ w i n d J J ~ I ~ ~ ~ Headwind~ Y ~ ; ~ ~ J 1\\ ~ ~ J

Up to 200 ::anot / ~ ~ . /Diff. ; ; ; ;Velocities _ ., -1000

500

4km 1km Runway Okm

Figure 6 illustrates how the flight path can change during microburst flight alongwith the aircraft s anticipated changes in pitching moment. This assumes a constant thrust setting, an initially-trimmed condition and no control inputs. Initialheadwind penetration will typically result in increases in indicated airspeed and anincreasing or erratic angle-of-attack. The result is an upward-pitching moment andan INCREASING PERFORMANCE PROFILE. As the aircraft then penetrates thedownflow and tailwind areas, critical losses of indicated airspeed and angle-ofattack will occur. These combined reductions will impair the aircraft s ability togenerate lift. This condition results in a downward-pitching moment and a DE-CREASING PERFORMANCE PROFILE. If the aircraft is not developing sufficient l iftto support its weight, the resultant vector (of l ift, weight, thrust and drag) will cre-ate a temporarily unbalanced force gravitationally accelerating the craft in thedownward vertical plane as an equilibrium condition is sought. During this transition, the flight profile is adversely altered. If such an oscillation is not interruptedby the flight crew or the negative vertical displacement exceeds altitude available,ground impact will occur.

A second-order effect may also occur whereby the flight path is further alteredbecause the aircraft is now flying with increased downward momentum in a descending air mass. The aircraft climb rate capability would then have to exceed therate of the downflow in order for a net climb rate to result, relative to the terrain.A further complication arises whereby the rate of change in the microburst s continuous, variable gust velocities occurs at a rate greater than the aircraft s abilityto attain a stabilized condition. The aircraft s resultant oscillatory motion aggravatesan already critical situation. Furthermore, the normal relationship between indicatedairspeed and angle-of-attack may be altered to an unknown and variable degree.(Adapted from illustration by FASOTRAGRUPAC Media Services.)

17


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temporarily not developing sufficient lift to support its weight becauseof reductions in angle-of-attackand indicated airspeed. The resultantvector (of lift, weight, thrust anddrag temporarily generated an unbalanced force. Gravity dominatedand accelerated the craft downwardas an equilibrium condition wassought. During this low-altitude transition, the flight crew was unable tochange the flight path direction toprevent ground impact.

Roll and yaw rates may developbecause of the wide variation in airflow direction and velocity over varioussections of the airfoil. In a NASAB-57 test aircraft penetration of adeveloping microburst, variationsin airstream velocity were recorded inexcess of 10 knots between one wingtip and the other, along with moderateto severe turbulence.

Heavy rain is another factor toconsider during flight. It can reducevisibility and may distract us fromconcentrating on flight-path control.The magnitude of heavy rain effectson lift generation, drag rise and angleof-attack sensor alignment in unknownand is currently being investigated.Flight safety is further jeopardizedby possible erroneous readings ofpressure-sensitive instruments . Sucherroneous readings may be attributedto variations in static pressurewithin the micro burst . Specifically,during penetration of a low-pressureregion from an area of higher pressure, altimeter readings could indicatean altitude higher than the truealtitude, and a barometric verticalspeed indicator may show an erroneous rate of climb.

Indicated airspeed may also bealtered to an unknown degree. Airspeed indicators are basic pressuregauges. This gauge pressure is thedifference between total pressure at thepitot head and static pressure atthe static ports, which is then calibrated in knots. As the aircrafttraverses regions of varying staticpressure, indicated airspeed may alsoregister a higher or lower value,

18

Representative Encounter with DownburstHeavy Weight Takeoff Configuration

Angle ofAttack

Typical Swept-Wing Jet Transport

Just Before Immediately After

Figure 7 illustrates the reduction in angle-of-attack that can occur during thehighly dynamic conditions of a microburst. This angular reduction in the relativewind may occur continuously with or without a significant change in indicated airspeed. The net effect is that overall lift generation can be significantly reduced.Illustration taken from the Mac Flyer, as adapted from Douglas Aircraft and basedon a U.S. Navy Approach concept.) This illustra tion is fundamental in nature. Digitalflight recorder data taken from Delta Flight 191 (Da as/Ft. Worth, August 1985) revealed a very erratic angle-of-attack, one that would have been extremely difficult,if not impossible, for a flight crew to use. This may be attributed to the extremelyturbulent winds within the microburst.

~ C ~ ~ Z ~ ~ yH e j l c t \ ~ ~ \ t / /~ u r s t ---OutburstlAS ~ n t r - - lASIncrease ~ ~ / 1\\:::---- Drop. - / / ~ t TailWindl- 'Dr i f t BurstI Right

Crosswind BurstFigure 8 shows the effects of downburst and outburst upon an aircraft during afinal approach. Of these, the most dangerous effects are the down burst, crosswindburst, and tailwind burst encountered near the ground. Outburst is defined as

being the strong outflow created when a down burst hits the ground and spreadsout. Courtesy of Dr Fujita; illustration modified by U.S. Navy Approach

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when given the same total pressureat the pitot head.

Pressure profiles withinthe microburstThe pressure profiles within themicroburst are very unusual. Dr. Fujitaattributes this strange pressurechange to the conversion of total pressure into velocity pressure according

to Bernoulli s Theorem.So, according to Dr. Fujita, what wehave is a pressure field characterizedby high pressure at the microburstcenter which is encircled by a ring oflow pressure. The low-pressure ringis surrounded by a high-pressure ringlocated just inside the outer boundary of a microburst. Outside this areathe pressure drops to the environmental level

f an aircraft were to encounter apressure differential (when compared tonormal environmental pressure forthe corresponding altitude) along itsflight path, the rate of climb ordescent registered on the vertical-speedindicator would depend on the rateof change in pressure along the flightpath, regardless of the true inertialdirection of the aircraft.Pressure-sensitive flIght instrumentswould indicate what they sensebased on dynamic and static pressure.The problem is that this may notnecessarily be representative of the truemotion of the aircraft in inertialspace as it traverses sharp pressuregradients.

During micro burst conditions, apotentially deadly situation exists inwhich an aircraft may be robbedof indicated airspeed to where it s nowbelow the approach or departurespeed. As pilots, we ve been obsessedmore with loss of airspeed thanflight path control. That s a dangerouspreoccupation. Furthermore, we veh d little or no awareness of the effectsthat a dramatic change in angleof-attack can have In light of this,it is possible that the loss of severalaircraft may have been caused byattempts, either consciously or uncon-

JUNE 1986

sciously, through pitch attitudereduction, to attain a specific approachor takeoff airspeed.

(Part III, the conclusion oCommander Towers article, will appearn the July issue.) ,

\\ ~~ ~ J ~ 0

tTakeoff Roll Liftoff First Contact

I I ILocal Time 1608:40 1608:50 1609:00Figure 9 is a three-dimensional illustration of a microburst courtesy of Doug/asAircraft Company. An overlay of high and low pressure regions has been addedalong with the approximate flight path of an American Flight 759. Could the absence

of voice communication during the last 15 seconds of flight be attributed to anerroneous indication of climb on the aircraft s vertical speed indicator, therebygiving the impression of impending recovery?

Figure 10 depicts an aircraft in extremis due to a microburst encounter. Such asituation demands immediate and aggressive flight crew responses to redirect theaircraft s flight path to avoid impact. (Painting courtesy of Blake Radar, U.S. NavyApproach September 1982.)

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PEARL SPersonal Equipment And Rescue/survival owdown

PEARL.:S Dawna Salazar, holds a survival food packet,which is included in the Army aircraft survival kits. Thepacket contains about 870 calories and consists of threedried, compressed cereal bars, a chocolate fudge bar, soupand gravy base, instant coffee and sugar. The instructionsstate: Eating slowly w ll give more satisfaction.

Staying livef you were forced down in the wilderness, orenemy territory, could you survive? Sure you can, butyou may end up doing things you never thought youcould. The Air Force Survival School instructors atFairchild AFB, located several miles outside of Spo

kane in eastern Washington, are staffed by a nucleusof officers and 230 enlisted instructors. These instructors often come from Montana, Wyoming andother places where life is rugged. Many of them wereskilled in hunting, fishing and trapping before theyenlisted, and the Air Force rounds them out as fullfledged survival, escape and evasion experts. Thissurvival school is tailored to aircrew personnel regardless of the type aircraft they fly We in the Armycan get quotas to this good school. Should you befortunate enough to go, you will have to work hard

2

but the experience you will receive will certainly bebeneficial should you ever be in a serious survivalsituation. Properly trained aircrew personnel shouldbe able to survive just about anywhere.The Arctic is very, very difficult to survive in. Andyet, it's something against which you can fairly wellprotect yourself. A barren desert probably presentsthe most grim survival challenge. You can get yourselfwarm in the Arctic, but it's very difficult to get yourself cool in the desert; and, you need water. The average person can last for 30 days, roughly, withoutfood. But, you do need waterWhile techniques differ according to climate andterrain, the goals are the same.Survival is survival; it means staying alive, stayingin as good a condit ion as you possibly can, in order tofly and fight again. That s basically the bottom lineof why you need to learn and live survival.The Air Force course typically begins on a Wednesday morning with orientation followed by lectures onthe will to survive, the ability to survive and survivalmedicine.The following days bring more lectures - desertsurvival, arctic survival, survival in the tropics and inthe water. Then come hands-on lessons in operatingradios, flares and signal mirrors. Next, the studentstest their skills in Colville National Forest, which provides a remote and rugged setting.Finally, it's graduation day. Late in the afternoon,the students file into an auditorium at Fairchild.Lieutenant Colonel Driscoll, a former Vietnam prisoner of war, strides onto the stage. For half an hour,he tells the story of his captivity. It's a tale Driscollhas told many times, and each time the students arespellbound. Here's a man who has had to deal withtorture, beatings, atrocious food and humiliation for7 years. Their 17 days of training suddenly seemawfully mild.

We in the Army ask, "Why doesn't the Army havesuch a course for our aircrew personnel?" We do havesuch a course, but it's shorter; our survival courseruns only 6 days. It is sponsored by the Sixth Armyfor Army Reserve Component aircrew personnel andit is conducted by the Oregon Army National Guardat Camp Rilea, which is about 84 miles west of Portland, OR. The point of contact is Major Pat Kelley,AUTOVON 586-4133; PEARL believes anothercourse will be conducted in early spring. You shouldwork through your unit training officer to secure a

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quota. There also are other survival courses beingconducted throughout the Army for water survival,arctic survival, cold weather survival and desert survival. We don't want to duplicate any of the Air Forcesurvival courses because of the costs and manpowerinvolved.XM-43 Aviator's Protective MaskThe XM-43 aviator's protective mask consists of aform fitting faceblank with lenses mounted close tothe eyes; an integrally attached chemical/biological(CB) hood and skull-type suspension system; an inhalation air distribution assembly for regulating theflow of air to the oral nasal cavity, lenses and hoodassembly; a pressure compensated exhalation valveassembly for maintaining an overpressure in themask/hood assembly at all times; an electronicmicrophone for communicating while in the aircraft;and a portable motor/blower filter assembly for supplying filtered air to the face piece/hood assembly.The new mask provides the required CB protectionand allows for compatibility with the Integrated Helmet Display Sight System and the optical relay tubeof the AH-64 Apache aircraft. The mask will be wornby attack helicopter aviators and will provide the aviators the required respiratory/skin protection fromCB agents, toxins and radioactive fallout particles.Point of contact for additional information is Mr. JoeGraczak, AMCPM-ALSE, AUTOVON 693-3210.New Happenings at Ft. Eustis

The ALSE supervisors' course is now available atFt. Eustis, VA and is open to officers and warrantofficers. It carries an additional skill identifier of IFfor warrant officers. This course also will soon beexpanded to senior noncommissioned officers.Anti-G-Suit ProtectionAnti-G-Suit protection is a must if you are undergoing test pilot training or if you are assigned toEdwards Air Force Base, or other high performanceaircraft test facilities as a test pilot. A blackoutfrom loss of G protection can occur in an average of15 seconds. Use the G suit when you need it; it isavailable from the Air Force and the Navy.Downed Pilot Rescued

Pilots Tom Doyle and Jeff Lewis, accompanied byRoy Bailey and Doug Boody, were recently on aroutine test flight in an S-76B corporate helicopter.Bailey, an electrician, noticed something unusual inthe swamps below. When I first saw it I thought it

was a survey cross, Boody, a crewchief, said. PilotDoyle suggested they go back and check it out. Uponcloser inspection by the crewchief, they saw someonestanding on the belly of an overturned single enginePiper Tomahawk plane, waving furiously. Doylecouldn't land and didn't have a hoist because of thehelicopter configuration. They hovered overhead, butwere afraid the plane's wing would rise into the rotorblades. Doyle motioned for the pilot to get in thewater and away from the downed aircraft. Crewmembers Bailey and Boody then pulled the pilot into theS-76B cabin. Student pilot Sassano was on a solocross-country flight, he said, when his engine quitand he was forced to land . The plane flipped on contact. There is a message in this article, carry an emergency locator transmitter or at least a survival radio.Luckily, these pilots were in the right place at theright time and were able to effect a safe rescue.

AN/PVS-5 Night Vision Goggles UpdateAlthough this is not considered an ALSE item perse, we are providing this information because it isused by aviators. The major problem at present iswith the defective face mask assemblies that arecracking with use. CECOM representatives are continuing to provide operator and organization maintenance training on night vision devices, AN/PVS-5AN/PVS-4, and AN/TVS-5. Point of contact isAMXEU-L-CECOM, Mr. White, AUTOVON 421-6685.

ALSE Inspection, Maintenance and RepairsWith the firm support we are getting from theALSE training facility at Ft. Eustis, the AviationCenter at Ft. Rucker, AL, the Reserve forces, including the Army National Guard and the overseas elements, and the Aviation Life Support EquipmentManagement Steering Council, we are strongly moving forward in our quest for what is needed to makeArmy ALSE second to none. Air Force, Navy andArmy manuals/technical orders and NAVAIRs arepublished pertaining to almost every item of ALSEavailable. Currently, the Army does not have sufficient people to adequately maintain this equipment tothe desired standards. The establishment of some sortof ALSE facility named by qualified personnel is anabsolute necessity. Key to a successful ALSE programcould be centralization/consolidation wherever practical. Equipment to be inspected must be accessibleand readily available for inspection, maintenance andrepair.

If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue/survival gear write PEARL AMC Project Officer ATTN: AMCPO-ALSE4300 Goodfellow Blvd. St Louis O 63120-1798 or call AUTOVON 693 1218/9 or Commercial 314-263-1218/9.

JUNE 1986 21


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BOYETH E ~ T

ur ing his more than 4 200 hours of flying for the Army,maintenance test pilot James M. Mike Hudson has put hisaviation skills on the line many times. But, it was his extraordinary performance in November 1984 that earned him an Armyaviator's prized badge of honor, the Broken Wing AviationSafety Award.

Hudson, a Department of the Army civilian assigned to the120th Army Reserve Command (ARCOM), Ft. Jackson, SC iscredited with safely landing his T-42A Cochise airplane afterone of the two engines suddenly exploded and caught fire.

Mike did an extraordinary job to save the crew and aircraftfrom any further damage;' says Bob Medley, aviation safetymanager for Second U.S. Army at Ft. Gillem, GA. The goodthing about Army flight training is that it teaches you to react inan emergency;' he said.

Hudson was on a routine maintenance test flight awaitingclearance for approach to Columbia Metropolitan Airport whenthe explosion occurred, emitting an 8 to 10 foot ball of fire. Twocylinders were blown out of the engine, one shattering the propeller. The fire quickly spread to the wing and was intensifiedwhen a piston broke through the cowling and severed theprimer fuel line.

My primary concern was to get the fire out, or get downbefore the wing burned off; Hudson said. His first reaction wasto shut the fuel off, which helped bring the fire under control.


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James M. Mike Hudson

Despite the violent pitching of the aircraft and minimal visibil-ity from the smoke and spewing oil, Hudson was able to regaincontrol of the airplane and maintain the maximum allowablepower to keep the airspeed up. Meanwhile, crash and rescueteams were standing by at Columbia Metropolitan Airport

Once emergency flight procedures were complete, Hudsonlanded the aircraft, shutting down all of the plane's electricalsystems and stopping without brakes to prevent any sparksfrom setting off another fire, which could have destroyed theaircraft.

A test pilot has to take the attitude that anything and every-thing can happen and react as best he can;' Hudson said. Itend to want to play devil's advocate with everything, even in mypersonal life. I guess it's a matter of my makeup:'

Also aboard the aircraft was copilot Major Van Jones. Accord-ing to Hudson, the two had flown together before through otheremergency situations, so they were used to working as a team.

The Broken Wing is given in recognition of extraordinary skilland judgment in recovering an aircraft as a result of mechanicalfailure or other emergency.

As a combat helicopter pilot in Vietnam in 1968, Hudson wasshot down three times while he was serving with the FirstCavalry Divis ion (Airmobile). He is currently a reservist with the120th ARCOM.Ms. Mary Kay Sones, Public Information Office, Headquarters, Second US Army, Fort Gillem , GA


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VI TIONPERSONNEL NOT SBranch LetterTo All Company Grade Aviators:I thought I would write a note to you in the fieldand let you know that the Military Personnel CenterMILPERCEN) is alive and well. For those of youwho call us with your requests and questions, youknow how busy the phone lines are. Since my arrivalhere in June 1985, I have noticed a common trend inthe requests and inquiries from nearly all the com-pany grade officers . I hope to answer some of thosequestions and provide you some useful informationin this letter.

Tl ze Role Of The Assignment Officer: In a recentletter an old friend told me that he felt that the officerin the field didn t believe that the assignment officerwas concerned with his individual needs. That is farfrom the truth; but remember, just as you make diffi-cult decisions and unpopular demands on your sol-diers, so too must we in the course of our job. You arecharged with meeting a pickup zone time, keepingyour aircraft in a mission ready status, and a host ofother requirements that your reports are written on.Remember that we are human just like you are. Wehave to meet the Army s requirements above all otherconsiderations. However, the first item consideredwhen we make an assignment is the officer s prefer-ence statement. Having a current one in your file isthe best action you can take to influence your nextassignment.The Advanced Course: All officers must attend anadvanced course in residence, and there are only threeexceptions to the rule: resignations, constructivecredit or approval by the commander, MILPERCENfor exceptional reasons. You must attend by youreighth year of active federal commissioned service.Combined rms Service Staff School: Those offi-cers in year group 79 and later must complete Phase Iand attend Phase II in residence prior to their ninthyear of active federal commissioned service. There areno exceptions

Tour Extensions: Branch is approving these on avery limited basis, and only after the local commandhas init iated the request. Overseas requests and exten-sions for command may be exceptions, but will be

4

handled on a case by case basis.Records: Your selection for schooling, promotionand all other personnel actions is based on your fileat MILPERCEN. Your Officer Record Brief (ORB)tells us what you have done. t is your military resumeand keeping it current is your responsibility. A veryimportant item in your file is your photo. Weight andmustaches are very sensitive issues and carry morenegative impact than positive. Keep your photo cur-rent to make sure that it represents you well. It is theonly human element in your file, and introduces youto every reviewer.Success: Do your job well, get good reports andyou will advance. f the ORB tells us what jobs youhave held, then your reports will reflect how wellyou ve done. We consider a report with good com-ments from the rater and a senior rater block check ator above center of mass to be a respectable officerevaluation report. There are some jobs that youshould all strive to hold. These are: platoon leader,executive officer, primary staff at the battalion orhigher level, operations officer, and command. Youshould hold at least three of those jobs before youcome into the zone for major.

Good reports from tough demanding jobs keep youcompetitive for promotion. Promotion is not a re-ward for past performance, but recognition of poten-tial for future advancement. t is up to you to displaythat potential.

One of the most critical and toughest Army Avia-tion jobs is the maintenance officer s. Should youvolunteer or be selected to track in this field, consideryourself in a very select group. Aviators in this area ofconcentration are as competitive for 04 and 5 pro-motion as any track.There are also some very select nominative posi-tions to which some of you may be assigned. Otherthan command, the two most difficult positions tonominate an officer to are Reserve Officers TrainingCorps and Recruiting Command. You are not beingcast off into the boiling sea if you are selected for oneof these positions. Those of you who did not get theopportunity to command in aviation may want tovolunteer for a recruiting command.



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Assignments: You will not be considered for reassignment until 6 months prior to your normal rotation date. f you are on orders to the advanced courseyour assignment will be projected 60 days prior toyour report date. As I mentioned earlier, keep yourpreference statement updated. Phone calls just slowthe process.Aviation Branch Hotline: We now provide information on available assignments, professional development and other items of interest on our AviationBranch hotline. A recording containing up-to-date information can be obtained by dialing: Commercial(202) 325-7150, or AV 221-7150. You will hear a recording asking for a 7 digit number. At the tone dial:278-2861 (CPT-AVNl): Captain Assignments578-2861 (LTS-AVNl): Lieutenant AssignmentsAt the completion of the message, you can leave amessage if you desire.I wish you all good flying and the best of luck inyour jobs. f you haven't asked for a copy of yourORB in a while, send your requests to the followingaddress. USAMILPERCEN200 Stovall StreetATTN: DAPC-MSR-SAlexandria, VA 22332-0400f you have any further questions feel free to write orcontact your assignment officer.

Sincerely,Captain Jimmy M. RabonAviation Branch, CAD

What Must I do to Get PromotedThe latest sergeant first class promotion list hasbeen published, and now the questions start. Staffsergeants are asking, "Why wasn't I promoted?"Commanders and supervisors are wondering, "Whywasn't Sergeant Smith promoted? He's the best staffsergeant we have."These questions have been asked before and will beasked again. Let's look at the results of the fiscal year(FY) 1986 Sergeant First Class Selection Board.

Of the total 8,106 noncommissioned officers(NCOs) selected for promotion, 7,659 were selectedfrom the primary zone. Of the total selected from theprimary zone, 2,532 were considered in the primaryzone for the first time, while 5,127 had previous consideration - some as many as 7 times.Two important factors impacting on selection areneeds of the Army and the quality of soldiers being

JUNE 986

considered as reflected by their file.First, the needs of the Army may change from yearto year. Remember, you now compete only againstthose in your military occupational specialty (MOS).The number of projected vacancies at the next highergrade determines the number that are to be selected.This is called the select objective, and there is one foreach MOS. With Force Modernization and changesto the force structure, the number needed in eachMOS may vary from year to year.Second, the quality of NCOs competing for selection has improved. Therefore, is your file complete?Check it yourself before the board convenes. See if allyour awards and decorations are listed and that all ofyour enlisted evaluation reports (EERs), academic reports and course completion certificates for residentand nonresident courses that are eligible to be in yourofficial military personnel file (OMPF) are present.Make sure someone else's documents are not filed inyour OMPF.

You should know better than anyone else what youare authorized or have accomplished. Do you haveany old Articles 15 in your OMPF maintained at theEnlisted Records and Evaluation Center? f you do,get them out of your file. AR 27-10 gives proceduresfor transferring old Articles 15 that occurred at ajunior enlisted grade, and have served their purpose,from the performance portion of your OMPF to therestricted portion. The restricted portion does not gobefore a selection board.Check your photograph: You should be standing atattention, your uniform must fit properly and be theright uniform Many female NCOs have pictures thatshow them wearing the skirt with oxfords instead ofblack pumps. Other pictures show NCOs with hairtoo long, mustaches too long or no brass. Make sureyour photograph is correct, and that it depicts theway you want the board to look at you.Are you physically fit? f you are overweight, loseit f you can't pass the Army physical report test,work out get in shape and pass it

Study your military skills and do the best you canon your skill qualification test (SQT). Raise your general technical area aptitude score if it is below 100Continue your civilian education, and ensure it isproperly reflected on your personnel qualificationroster and OMPF.Duty performance is the most significant factorconsidered by the board members. Seek out thetoughest leadership jobs. Be a squad leader, platoonsergeant or, if you are a master sergeant, a first ser-

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geant. f your current duty position has you supervising several people, make sure the duty description andnarrative portion ofyour R reflect that leadershipinformationIn summary, there is no single item that guaranteesyour promotion. You must be strong in all areas. Do

well in all your jobs. Seek the tough leadership jobsfor that extra plus. Stay physically fit. Take yourSQT, if available, and score high. Keep your officialrecords current. The opportunities for promotion arethere, but so is the competitionNew Dimensions of Adventure (CW3 Robert H.Gratbowski, Warrant Officer Division,MILPERCENThe AH-64 Apache program, for those with a desire to seek high adventure, is an exciting opportunityto equal the accomplishments of those who knew thechallenging times of early aviation. Perhaps there areno more leather jacketed aces; pioneers of an unexplored sky. There are, today, aviators of unusual skill,competence and training, dedicated to the task ofpioneering a new age in the sky where lasers, computer controlled components and deadly weaponssystems are the norm. That is quite a leap into a newdimension of operation. Most, perhaps as recently as10 years ago, would have considered the AH-64 asbelonging to the realm of science fiction. Today, theArmy is training in and fielding this aircraft.There is room in the AH-64 program for very special aviators - aviators unafraid of a radically newapproach to mission performance - aviators capableof mastering complex systems in potentially hazardous environments. Aviators who, with the same foresight and daring of their compatriots of leather jacketdays, are willing to open new vistas of aviation.

The program is not easily entered. An applicantmust be qualified as an attack helicopter pilot andhave a minimum of 2 years attack helicopter experience. Further, the applicant should be in a Conditional Voluntary Indefinite or Regular Army careerstatus (waiverable in exceptional cases). f those basicqualifications are met, the applicant may submit arequest, on DA Form 4187 for integration into theAH-64 program. The request must be favorably indorsed through channels to the appropriate careermanager at MILPERCEN. Once the 4187 is receivedat MILPERCEN, the applicant's official military personnel file will be reviewed. After passing this thorough screening process, the applicant's name will beplaced on the waiting list for the program.

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t is also important to remember that there is a3-year Active Duty service obligation associated withthe course and, once trained, the officer must anticipate repetitive tours in AH-64 attack battalions.Although not necessary for selection, an officer evaluation report stating an officer's potential for maximum service to the Army as an AH-64 rated aviatorcannot hurt the overall chances of that officer's acceptance into the program.

Adventure is definitely not dead. t is alive andthriving in the world of Army Aviation. f you wouldwalk this path, this new call to glory, then give closeconsideration to the AH-64 program. The aircraft ofthe future is waiting for you to climb aboard.For further information on the program, commissioned officers should contact Captain Bob Carter atAUTOVON 221-0433/7822, and warrant officersshould contact CW4 Euel Henry at AUTOVON 221-7835/7836.1986 Engineering Test Pilot Board ResultsThe 1986 Army Aviation Engineering Test Pilot Selection Board met in February to select aviators toattend the U.S. Naval Test Pilot School (USNTPS),Patuxent River, MD. The selectees are:

CPT Eric S. DeanCPT Robert A. DoyleCPT Jack L. KimberlyCW3(P) Mark E. MetzgerCPT Nancy J. SherlockCPT David F SwaffordCPT Henry H. Waller IIIThe selection of Army aviators for participation inthe program is made by an annual Officer PersonnelManagement Directorate (OPMD) board. Those selected attend the Army Test Pilot Orientation Courseat Edwards Air Force Base, CA, to receive an aca

~ e m i and flight refresher. At the USNTPS, they willundergo a comprehensive ll-month course specifically designed to produce a proficient engineering testpilot.The next OPMD Engineering Test Pilot Board isplanned for February 1987. DA Circular 351-84-3,"Army Aviation Engineering Test Pilot Program"(currently under revision) contains the prerequisitesand application procedures. The deadline for applying for the 1987 selection is 31 December 1986. For

further information, write or call MAJ Hinds,MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-OPA-CV, 200 StovallStreet, Alexandria, VA 22332-0400; AUTOVON 221-8156/7 rC



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O L- 2,500000JUNE 1986- 2035 000cash and pledges

c r ~ _ J ; v iatio 1USEUM

JUNE 1986

This is a series about the Army Aviation Museum Foundation funddrive. Currently, plans call for building a modern complex to houseyour Army Aviation Museum. Since last month additional donations

have been received. However, we still have a ways to go, as thebarometer above shows. If you would like to help build the Army

Aviation Museum's new home, you are invited to send a taxdeductible contribution to: The Army Aviation Museum Foundation,

Box 610, Ft Rucker, AL 36362-5000. If you desire additionalinformation call Mr. Ed Brown at 205) 598-2508.

Aero Commander U-4A

A Look At What s In Your MuseumThe U-4A originally designated L-26B was 1 of 15 pur-

chased by the U S Air Force and used for staff transporta-tion. The Army bought one. It is equivalent to the U S ArmyU-9B model and was turned over to the Minnesota NationalGuard for duty. The U S Army Aviation Museum acquiredthe standard Aero Commander 560A from the MinnesotaNational Guard in 1965

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VI TIONST ND RDIZ TION

Recording Flight TimeSergeant First Class R A BuckDirectorate of Evaluation and StandardizationU.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker AL

WIT TH INTRODUCTION of the mainstay of Army Aviation, the helicopter, our system of recording flight time became morecomplicated. Today we have aircraft equippedwith extremely sophisticated electronic systemsdesigned to enhance safety and expand the mission capability of our aircrews and aircraft.Our current system of keeping flight records isnot designed to track all the information necessary to monitor an aviator s skills. Today wetrack flight time for an aviator using the DAForm 759 and 759-1. The problem arises fromthe fact that we only track his time in very broadterms. By looking at an aviator s DA Form 759we can tell how many hours he has and breakthose down by pilot, copilot and instructor pilot.We also know whether this time is fixed wing orrotary wing, single engine or multi engine. If wewant any more specific information we have togo back through his DA 759 1 forms and extracthis time by type aircraft and flight condition.This can turn into a complicated and timeconsuming process.For the enlisted crewmembers, this system iseven more ambiguous. We have no direct guidance on how to maintain their records. We

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track their total flight time, but do not recordany special qualifications or experience. With anaircrew training program being developed for theenlisted crewmembers we will have to maintainadditional and more specific information onthese individuals, creating a need for a new andmore accurate system of maintaining flight timeand flight records.With regard to aviator crewmembers, a newsystem is being developed that not only tracksthe aviator s time by duty symbol and flight condition, but also by type aircraft. The revised DAForm 759 incorporates a chronological listing ofthe aviator s qualifications and flight hours,broken down by duty symbol in each aircraftsystem. A separate DA Form 759 1 will be maintained for each separate aircraft the aviator isrequired to operate. This form tracks the individual s total flight time in a specific aircraft byduty and flight condition symbol. It is thereforepossible for an aviator to have more than oneDA 759 1 form for each close-out period.For enlisted crewmember noncrewmemberpersonnel, a more specialized system for flightrecords maintenance is being developed. Flightrecords designed for crewmembers noncrew

U S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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members will use a DA Form 759 and DA Form759-3. The DA Form 759-3 is a new form designed to track flight time and maintain flightpay computations for all individuals who mustfly for pay. t is a combination of the old DAForm 759-1 and a flight pay computation worksheet. When the individual is due a closeout, aconsolidated DA Form 759-3 will be completedand maintained in his records. This will providea continuous record of his flight time and flightpay qualification.The revised flight records system for enlistedpersonnel is also designed for those individuals - scout aerial observer, aerial observer andflight engineer who must accomplish assignedtask and flying hour requirements as outlined inaircrew training manuals. For these individuals,you will still use the DA Form 759-3 as a worksheet, but will not use it as a consolidation sheet.Instead, their closeout will be done the same asis an aviator s using the DA Form 759-1. Thisbecomes necessary so we can track their time byduty and flight condition symbol, as required bythe ATM.With increased emphasis on computers in theArmy, a new system of maintaining flight

army aviation digest - jun 1986

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