army aviation digest - aug 1982

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Aug 1982

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USAARLSCI SUPPORT CENTER

P.O. BOX 620577FORT RUCKER AL 36362 0577

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AUGUST 1982 VOLUME 28 NUMBER*rigadier General Ellis D. ParkerArmy Aviation OfficerODCSOPS, Headquarters,Department of the Army Major General Carl H. McNair Jr. Colonel Benard S Pergerson Jr

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12131416193334

CommanderU.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, AlabamaActing Deputy CommanderU.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, Alabama

Helicopter Aerial Combat Week, CPT Greg RHampton and 1LT Mario H. AcevedoDES Report To The Field: Dynamic RolloverAccidentsACTAAT: Equipment RequirementsReporting FinalPEARL'SForty Years Of Army Aviation, Part 3: Combat,Richard K TierneyViews From ReadersThreat: Soviet Air Defenses Against AttackHelicopters-Part III: ZSU-23-4 Shilka,LTC Brian P Mullady

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38 Changes, 2.75 Inch Rocket System Upgrade,CPT David R Reger page 8Inside Back Cover: ATCAction Line: NoiseAbatementCover: The kills on the AH-1 on the coveremphasize that the primary role of the attackhelicopter is to kill tanks. They also reflect theair-to-air threat recently studied during HelicopterAerial Combat Week at Ft. Hood, TX. See page 2 Honorable John O. Marsh J

Secretary of the ArmyRichard K TierneyEditor

The mission of the U.S rmy viation Digest USPS 415-350) is to provideinformation of an operational, functional nature concerning safety and aircraftaccident prevention, training, maintenance, operations, research and development,aviation medicine and other related data.

Th is publication has been approved by The Adjutant General HeadquartersDepartment of the Army 14 October 1981 , in accordance with Army Regulation310-1 .Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system

as outlined in AR 310-1 . Complete DA Form 12-5 and send directly to CDR. AGPublications Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard. Baltimore, MD 2122 . For anychange in distribution requirements, initiate a revised DA Form 12-5.The Digest is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly

under the supervision of the Commanding General , U.S. Army Aviation Center:Views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Department of the Armynor the U.S. Army Aviation Center. Photos are U.S Army unless otherwise specified . Use of the masculine pronoun is intended to include both genders unlessotherwi se stated. Materi al may be reprinted provided credit is given to the Digestand to the author unless otherwise indicated.

Articles, photos, and items of interest on Army Aviation are invited. Directcommunication is authorized to Editor, s rmy viation Digest, P.O. Drawer P,Fort Rucker. AL 36362. Manuscripts returned upon request.

National Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpoint distribut ion also shouldsubmit DA Form 12-5. Other National Guard units should submit requests throughtheir state adjutant genera l

Those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copies of theDigest can order the magazine from the Superintendent of Documents. U.S.Government Printing Office . Washington, DC 2 4 2 . Annual subscription ratesare 26.00 domestic and 32.5 overseas.


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T HIS MONTH YOU will find that we continuefocus on one of the most important issuesAviation faces today, that of engagementshelicopters. In the lead article, HeliAerial Combat Week," Captain Greg R.and First Lieutenant Mario H. Acevedothe antihelicopter training programlast December at Ft. Hood, TX by the(Air Combat). The objectives"to familiarize the 6th Brigade's aviatorshelicopter systems and tactics, recentdevelopments andvs. helicopter aerial tactics. " There issingly strong consensus that such training

not nice-to-have- it is essential-to-have And aof our visor to the 6th Cav members for theirin air-ta-air training. With the resultsur Mission Area Analysis and Systems Programin the Aviation DevelopmentDepartment of the Army, we should soondoctrine emerge and the training itselfbecome institutionalized across the Army.Preparing for combat is of course, the name of

proud heritage upon which to build. RichardTierney talks about "Combat" in Part 3 of the Aviation history series, 'looking at contrimade in World War II, the Korean War's work on this history seriescomment from all-thoselived it as well as those who follow.While we have focused much in recent issuesthe air-to-air threat, we also must not loseof the fact that all of our enemies are notto be up in the air with us in tomorrow'sLieutenant Colonel Brian P. Mullady hasably described Soviet Air Defenses AgainstHelicopters" in a three-part series, theis offered to you this month. In it, heabout ZSU-23-4, perhaps the most forthreat we face. Thedeserves close attention-to learn howSoviets will employ this gun and how we canthat employment. Threat systems candefeated if you know your enemy.Our key safety thrust for August is contained" DES Report to the Field: Dynamic Rolloverts" by Chief Warrant Officer, CW4 Michael

Mike is a legend in his own time andof our most senior and most respectedaviators, he has some very sage advice.his counsel as he describesforyou a numbert, according to all evidence, should

1982

not have happened. These are truly disturbingand we need to hitch up our professionalism anotch or two and put an end to such occurrences.As I stressed last month, it takes much more thanthe best instructor pilots and safety specialists inthe business; it takes you, each and every crewmember, to prevent needless accidents.Finally, I want to share a brief comment withyou on a tremendous experience I had in lateJuly when I attended the Silver Jubilee Celebration of the British Army Air Corps. Events atMiddle Wallop, England, home of the British ArmyAviation Center, included an International Helimeet in which helicopter crews, both civilian andmilitary from many of the NATO nations, competedin precision helicopter maneuvers and navigation;a symposium on the expanding role of the helicopter in this decade; a great Army-Air 82 airdisplay with literally hundreds of helicopters andairplanes on display; and in-fl ight demonstrat ionsto include many participating aircraft and crewsfrom U.S. Army Europe and our very latest U.S.system, the AH-64 Apache-truly an impressivearray of Army Aviation capabilities. The tacticsand doctrine symposium was particularly timelyin that the commanders of the British helicopterunits in the Falkland Island campaign reviewedmany of their lessons learned. As is now so wellknown, helicopters played key roles in everyoperation-and did their job well. Thus, we saluteour long-time ally on this, the 25th Anniversary',Silver Jubilee of their Army Air Corps, as theycontinue to live up to their motto; "PREPARE."

Major General Carl H. McNair Jr.Commander, U.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, AL


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The opinions expressed in this artic le are thoseof the author and o not necessarily reflect theviews of any Department of Defense agency

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HELICOPTERERI L COMB TWEE K Captain Greg R HamptonFirst Lieutenant Mario H. AcevedoDecember 14- 8 1981

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W THIN TH P ST fewbeen faced with the growingof Soviet rotary wing aircraft.formidable aerial weapon

threat toAviation units because anto beas viable by Soviet rotaryaviation units. As SovietM Belov has noted in a

on howfight helicopters, the best way toheliis to use another helicopter,armed withand air-to-air missiles, com

dedicated to an antihelimission.In future conflicts it will not beto expect Mi-24E andvariant aircraft to fly

of their armor columnsattack helicopters in their holdfiring positions. Real

threat to Armyhelicopter units, the 6thavalry Brigade (Air Combat) pro-

ceeded with an antihelicopter training program entitled HelicopterAerial Combat Week, which tookplace at Ft. Hood, TX , last December.

The objectives of Helicopter Aerial Combat Week were to familiarizethe 6th Brigade's aviators with threathelicopter systems and tactics, recent air-to-air weapon systems developments and helicopters vs helicopter aerial tactics. Additionally, eightselected AH-l S Cobra instructorpilots were given air-to-air live firegunnery and actual aerial maneuverstraining. These instructor pilotswould subsequently pass on thistraining to the attack helicopterpilots within the 6th Brigade duringfuture training. The training wascentered around the participationof two instructor pilots from theMarine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 (MA WTS-l), basedat Yuma, AZ, who provided classroom and flight instruction in aerialevasive maneuvers. The MarineAviation Group 42 (MAG-42) basedat Dallas, TX, provided two CH-53

aircraft and crews which simulatedthreat helicopters during the week'sflight training phase. Additionalclassroom instruction was providedby representatives of the GeneralElectric Company and the GeneralDynamics Corporation addressingtheir work in the development ofnew air-to-air weapon systems.After a brief introduction by COLCharles E Ivey, the 6th CavalryBrigade commander, to the industryrepresentatives, Marine instructorpilots and the aviators in attendance,training began with a briefing onone of the most serious aerial threatsto tactical Army Aviation - theMi-24 Hind attack helicopter andits subsequent variants. Here, thecapabilities and the tactical employment of the Hind were discussedwith particular emphasis placedupon its antihelicopter abilities.The majority of the day wasdevoted to reviewing the two primary antihelicopter weapon systemsnow under development: air-to-airmissiles and rapid fire cannon. Mr.Richard Hein of the General Dy-

T e figures in this r t i l e are for formation purposes only and are notto be used as a basis to try the maneuvers as described More specifiCInformation about these maneuvers should be obtained from the 6th Brigade

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thre tpplying le dandcceler ting

Defense against the ighYo-Yoat close range (500 feet)thre t

tight turn

Defense against the Long Yo-Yoat long range (7,500 feet)

thre t beginsyo yo

nose low

cceler te nd le dLow Yo-Yo

rollbre k into

rolling climb

thre t overshoots

Defense against the Low Yo-Yo at long range r pidtight Turnthre t le ds anduses superior ir speedto close in minimizebro dside


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thre t overshoots

Horizontal Scissors

Defense against the Horizontal Scissorsovershootingturn rel xturn climb

thre t in tight turn

namics Corporation discussed theevelopment and capabilities of theAirborne Stinger system. This missile

speed and longrange, is capable of dealingith both fixed and rotary wing

ircraft in a nap-of-the-earth NOE)environment and thus does notundermine the primary antiarmormission of the Army attack helicopter.However, a missile system hasome shortcomings. For example,it has a minimum engagement range,

an obvious launch signature and

UGUST 982

the launch platform must be pointedat the target prior to launch. f athreat aircraft appears within theminimum missile engagement rangeor if a situation occurs where thethreat attacks from the rear or flankquadrants, then a gun system wouldbe the primary weapon. Mr. ThurowMayhood and Mr. James Wagnerof General Electric discussed theirvarious gun systems in use or underdevelopment and the problems encountered in engineering a helicopter air-to-air gu n system. Mr.Wagner explained that the lethality

reverses

of an air-to-air cannon is primarilyinfluenced by its rate of fire. As thefiring rate increases, so does theprobability of hits during a giventime period. Projectile size also hasa profound influence- the biggerthe round, the more kinetic energywith greater catastrophic targetdamage. Also, a larger round provides a longer engagement rangedue to greater projectile inertia.However, the rate of fire and gunsize must be optimized for the useraircraft, otherwise excessive vibration, weigh t recoil and ammunition


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begin side flare(out of trim condition

~ : ~hreat sees wings downattitude and leads anticipated turnSide FlareQuick Stop threatovershoot smask above threat

maintain airspeedclimb abovethreatc tP Defense against theSide Flare Quick Stop

_

wingover forsix oclockposition

wingove r fo rslash attack

consumption vs storage capacitywould offset the advantages of anyparticular gun.

The current M-197 20 mm cannonis considered adequate in dealingwith the Hind, and a proposal isbeing considered to double its rateof fire from 750 to 1,500 shots perminute. The use of the M-134 7.62mm minigun and the M-128 40 mmgrenade launcher was briefly discussed. The M-28 turret weapon system should not be overestimated asa viable air-to-air weapon. Hosingan aerial target with minigun tracerswill not produce a great deal of

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catastrophic damage despite theillusion of a sheet of fire blanketingthe target. The long time of flightand high angle of fire of the 40 mmgrenade precludes its use as anythingbut a last-chance, close-in weapon .In engagements which are closeenough to use guns, both aircraftwould be maneuvering violently,making deflection and lead estimation very difficult (particularlyfor the 40 mm).A general consensus, therefore,is that a combination of a missileand gun system would be the bestarrangement since each comple-

ments the other. A fire-and-forgetguided missile such as the AirborneStinger would be the primary airto-air weapon , allowing the attackhelicopter team to engage threataircraft at long ranges and yetcontinue their primary mission ofdestroying armored targets. In thoseinstances where he licopters aredecisively engaged at close ranges,then a gun system would be necessary.

In order to provide the 6th Brigade s instructor pilots with someexperience in the difficulties inengaging aerial targets, a firingexcercise against MRCAT (miniaturized radio controlled aerial target)trainers was planned for the secondday of training. The MRCAT is astyrofoam model airplane with a6-foot wing span originally designedas an air defense aerial target. Itsnimbleness makes it a worthy adversary for a high speed ground gunsystem, and it was hoped that itwould be an adequate aerial gunnerytarget.

Eight AH-lS helicopters (fourMod ified S models with the M-28turret system and four ECAS (Enhanced Cobra Armament System)models with the M-197 20 mm) wereused during the firing exercise. Allof the AH-ls were to fire on theMRCAT individually with the Modified Cobras engaging initially froma hover followed by the ECAS aircraft using running fire in a tailchase. These scenarios were selecteddue to range restrictions, yet theyoffered each instructor pilot theopportunity to engage targets in atleast two different types of firingsi tuations. Each instructor pilotwould occupy both the gunner s andpilot s station once during the dayand would have the option of usingany sight system: the TSU, helmetsight or the M-73 sight in the stowedgun mode. It was hoped that aconsensus could be arrived at as tothe preferred firing techniques following the day s training. SixMRCATs were used and they provedto be a great disappointment. Onlytwo flew long enough to be shot at

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;jMIj f f

frwingmanmask d y leadf i ~ c r f t

/ ,: t

Threatnechelon

due to uncontrollability all sixeventually crashed out ofwith FM radio interferencected as the culprit. As a result,was curtailed for the day.MRCAT's usefulness as an antitrainer is probs controlhe fact that it canno t

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exceed 80 knots of forward air speed.A more plausible solution wouldbe the use of a QH-SO helicopterdrone towing a 4 foot by 8 footcylindrical sleeve. One of thesedrones could b e issued to each installation range control agency with apermanently assigned operator andused as necessary by the aviationunits stationed there.Wednesday morning was devotedto classroom instruction on aerialtactics and maneuvers that havebeen developed by the MarineCorps. Major Henry C. Perry andCaptain Lou F. Russo fromMAWTS-l were the primary instructors and provided cockpit instructionlater in the week. Major Perry andCaptain Russo are Marine instructor pilots who are qualified in theAH-lJ, Sand T model Cobras andare the Marine Corps primary airto-air helicopter instructors.Major Perry began by outliningthe development and growth ofhelicopter air-to-air training fromthe initial studies showing a need

for such trammg to the currentrequired air-to-air training for allMarine helicopter pilots. He thenaddressed the series of EVM (evasivemaneuvers) training that would bepracticed on the final 2 days of theweek. Initially one vs. one maneuvers with similar aircraft (AH-l vs.AH-l) would be flown, followed bymore complicated scenarios, referred to as set-ups by the Marines,involving two vs. one and two vs.two using dissimilar aircraft (in thiscase AH-IS vs. CH-S3). The primarytraining points were to turn thesituation to one's advantage byunpredictable maneuvering and theuse of teamwork. Majo r Perry stressed that airspeed is paramount inmaintaining a high energy statefor abrupt maneuvering. However,air-to-air combat between helicopters is not an aerobatic contestinvolving loops, rolls and Immelmann turns. t is violent and shortlived with each engagement lastingless than 30 seconds before someoneis shot down or contact is broken.Each of the individual one vs. onemaneuvers was discussed in depthwith the 6th Cavalry Brigade's instructor pilots, in preparation forThursday's flight training .After pret1ighting the aircraft thatwould be used on Thursday's flighttraining, the involved aviators,cover ship crews, instructor pilotsand Marine CH-S3 pilots met for asafety briefing. Here the rulesof engagement, aircraft separation,airspace management and the allimportant knock it off' call werebriefed. The knock it off' call wasperhaps the most critical safetycontrol measure used while conducting aerial evasive maneuverstraining. f at anytime anyone whowas involved with the training sawan unsafe situation or felt that thedegree of maneuvering was exceeding his own limitations, the knockit off' call would be given. Uponthe call, all maneuvering aircraftwould immediately resume straight,lnd level flight and would clear themaneuvering area. One point to be

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stressed is the importance of havingall friendly and aggressor pilotscoordinate face to face wheneverevasive maneuvers training is conducted. Altitude restrictions thatwere imposed were from a minimum100 feet above ground level (AGL)to a maximum of 1,000 feet AGL.

Major Perry and Captain Russooccupied the AH-l s gunner's seatswhile the 6th Brigade instructorpilots flew in the pilot's station duringboth one vs. one and two vs. twoset-ups. The Marine instructor pilotswould first demonstrate each maneuver emphasizing certain key pointsor techniques, then allow the Armypilots to practice, with each periodlasting about 1 hour.

The flight period began with flattail chases which allowed the pilotsto judge closure rates at differentairspeeds. Turns, climbs and descents were then added as the periodprogressed. The actual set-ups fol-lowed, beginning with both AH-lSsapproaching head on, each thenbreaking to the left and cork-screwing" upward in an attempt toget on the other's tailor 6 o'clockposition. A point to be stressed hereis that continuing to do so wouldeventually have both helicopters ataltitude, out of airspeed and executing pedal turns. Equally importantwas that after about 20 seconds thelearning value of each set-up woulddiminish and, as discussed pre-

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W H I T E ~W ~ l ~

viously, that the time period roughlycorresponds to the approximateduration of most actual engagements.

The first of the evasive maneuverstaught was the High Yo-Yo (figure1 . This technique is used to preventthe overshooting of a threat aircraftwhile in pursuit. Here, the pursuingaircraft uses speed and lead angledeflection to close in as the targetinitiates a defensive break. Oncethe threat aircraft reveals the direction of its break, the pursuing aircraftclimbs, trading airspeed for altitutde,avoids an overshoot and then rollsinto the threat's rear.

To defend against the High YoYo at close range (500 feet or less),break toward the threat and forcehim to overshoot. Before turningso far as to lose visual contact, rollwings level and use a wingover attackto force the threat low (figure 2).

f a greater separation exists (500feet or longer) initiate a nose lowattitude and then begin a defensivepull-up with a rolling climb whichwill cause the threat to overshootat a lower altitude (figure 3, LongYo-Yo).

The Low Y Yo was the nextmaneuver taught. It is an offensivemaneuver that exploits the 6 o'clockposition by decreasing range andincreasing closure rates. To initiatethis maneuver, lower the nose toincrease airspeed and lead into thethreat's defensive turn. As the range

closes, trade off excess airspeed witha cyclic climb to reestablish the tailchase position (figure 4).

Countering the Low Y Y isaccomplished by turning and divingtoward the threat at the first indication of its turning and force a headon pass. Beware The Hind hasbullet-resistant forward windscreensand we don't. Another techniquethat can be used as a defense againstthe Low Yo-Y0, provided you havesufficient airspeed, is to pull up androll into the threat using the wingover attack (figure 5).The Horizontal Scissors camenext. This is a defensive maneuverused if airspeed and nose to tailseparation do not permit anothercourse of action. Here, the leadelement increases its rate of turnuntil the threat either overshootsor moves outside its turn radius. Asthe threat passes, reverse the previous direction of turn and slidetoward the threat. Once behind andbelow, attempt to remain in phasewith the threat's maneuvers (figure 6).

To counter the Horizontal Scissors, do not attempt to turn harderinside the threat's turn radius orreduce power. Relax the turn tomaintain airspeed, climb and waitfor the threat to reverse and crossin front (figure 7 . This will establishyou in a position to initiate a tailchase and employ weapon systems

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in a more stable plane. f by somechance the threat fails to reverseback toward you, initiate a HighYo-Yo and break contact.

The side flare quick stop wasperhaps the closest relating maneuver to NOE flight techniques thatthe Marines taught to the brigade'spilots. This is a defensive maneuverdesigned to cause the threat toovershoot when within 500 feet.Rapidly apply opposite pedal andcyclic input to place the aircraft inan out-of-trim condition while simultaneously reducing power. Once thethreat s committed to an overshoot,accelerate, maneuver to a tail chaseposition and close to within weapons'parameters f you become thevictim of the threat's use of the sideflare, maximize your higher energystate and initiate a rapid climb tomask your aircraft from the threat'sweapon systems. In doing so, youplace the threat 's rotor disk betweenhis turret weapons and your aircraftand this in turn leaves you in aposition to initiate a look downattack (figures 8 and 9).The wingover attack was thendemonstrated. This is an offensivemaneuver that is used primarily inhead-ta-head engagements or slightly angled off the front of the threat(figures 10 and 11). To initiate thismaneuver accelerate toward thetarget at high speed. As the distancecloses initiate a rapid cyclic climb25 to 30 degrees) to attain an altitudeadvantage over the threat and maskhis weapon systems. As you reachthe desired altitude roll in towardthe threat by letting the nose of theaircraft fall below the horizon whilemaintaining positive G loading. Divefor a point about one-half the distance between your position andthe threat's position over the groundand close to weapons' parameters.f this slashing attack is not desiredsimply dive into the tail chase position to engage.To defend against the wingoverattack, climb and turn toward thethreat after its commitment to anose low attitude. This generally

AUGUST 982

results in the two aircraft corkscrewing in an effort to gain the 6o'clock position.Following these basic aerial maneuvers, each of the instructor pilotswas given a free style set-up in whichto practice the maneuvers he hadbeen taught, with the Marine instructor pilots still occupying thegunner's seat controlling the action.

From these maneuvers severalconclusions became apparent. Cockpit coordination s an absolute necessity. Common terminology and theprior division of cockpit duties(clearing for turns, weapons utilization, monitoring instruments, visual acquisition, etc.) have to beaddressed prior to each flight. Aircraft control is paramount to avoidexceeding crew and aircraft limitations. Transient torque and pitchcone coupling were very prominentconsiderations but can be adequatelydealt with provided that a sufficientamount of practice is made available. During these violent engagements the participating aircraft willbe flying very close together thusmaking the gun the primary weapon.The AH-1 S with its helmet sightsystem and turret mounted gunshas the advantage over threat aircraft with fixed weapons or thosesystems that require the gunner tobury his head in a sighting device.This weapon sight advantage isoffset, however, by the AH-1S's poorrearward visibility. An MWO (modification work order) is needed toinstall two rearview mirrors on eitherside of the pilot's station, perhapsincorporating a combination ofconvex and flat mirrors in an aerodynamic fairing. This will greatlyincrease the field of view of thepilot and aid in overall tactical awareness.Once each instructor pilot hadthe opportunity to fly one vs. oneand felt comfortable with the basicmaneuvers, two vs. one and two vs.two set-ups against CH-53s commenced. The MAG-42 pilots havebeen trained in evasive maneuversand have had previous experience

simulating threat tactics againstArmy and Marine aircraft.Flying against dissimilar aircraftadded a great deal of realism to theflight training. The CH-53's agilitybelies its great size, and its superiorairspeed and acceleration make itan excellent threat trainer. Whenoperating without cargo, the CH-53's performance and power reservesclosely resemble those of manythreat helicopters.

The set-ups began with the aircraftapproaching head-on. The CH-53swould maneuver in a tight echelonor welded wing formation that isnormally employed by Soviet attackhelicopters. After the initial headon pass and right break, each teamwould maneuver in an attempt toforce a two on one engagement.Here the main emphasis was todetermine which AH-1S was engaged and which was free. MajorPerry had stressed in his classroominstruction that this determinationwas crucial to successful team engagements. The engaged and freeaircraft had specific role responsibilities:

ngaged Role ResponsibUities Keep the threat in sight Remain unpredictable Deny weapons employment Force the threat to lose sight Clear own 6 o'clock positionFree Role ResponsibUities Track the engaged aircraft andthe threat Clear the engaged aircraft andown 6 o'clock position Maintain a high energy state

Break phase (contact) with thefightAs the aerial engagement progressed the free and engaged aircrafthad to be prepared to change roles.As maneuvering intentions andthreat positions were called out, thefree aircraft maneuvered to preventthe engaged aircraft from reachinga low energy state or allowing thethreat to get at his own 6 o'clock


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position. As a result, in the twoAH-ISs vs. one CH-53 set-up, thethreat was unable to press an attackon the engaged aircraft withoutbecoming vulnerable to the freeAH-l.

In the two vs. two set-up with thethreat aircraft in echelon, theAH-ls would maneuver so that theengaged element would be alwayson the threat's weak side, thuscausing the lead threat to mask hiswingman (figure 12).Meanwhile the free elementwould maneuver to direct the engagement, either forcing a disengagement or driving the fight. Adisengagement could be accomplished by forcing the threat aircraftto lose sight through terrain maskingor through the use of shadow. f thefree element must drive the fighthe should then maneuver to causean engagement by supporting elements-(friendly air defense, A--I0s)or force the threat aircraft into adisadvantageous position. Bewarehowever, because in a matter ofseconds the situation can reverseitself which emphasizes the needfor teamwork and the need to keepa close eye on all threat aircraft.Finally, both crews must avoid "padlocking" or ' target fixation on thesame threat. The One you don't seeis the one that kills you both

The week's training culminatedwith two iterations of attack teambattle-drilron 'Friday afternoon. A3 X 5 mix was briefed on a battlefield situation where an enemyarmored regiment had forced abreakthrough of friendly lines andwas threatening the ground units'rear 'areas. The crews were alsobriefed to be aware of threat airelements that could be operating inthe area Since the attack team knewan 'aerial threat existed they werebriefed to attempt to avoid an aerial'engagement unless actually firedupon by other aircraft. If-the teamwas fo'rced into an aerial engagement, then the fewest possible attackhelicopters were to engage in orderto minimize the' disruption of the

1

primary mISSIon. The scout helicopters were briefed to providesecurity in the battle position andto alert the attack helicopters tothe presence of any threat aircraft.Immediately following the flightbriefing, the aircraft were launchedand proceeded to their ,respectiveholding areas and subsequently intotheir firing positions.As the team began to engage thesimulated armor column, two CH-53s which were orbiting north ofthe battle area were called in by thecover/control aircraft to attemptto locate and engage any attackhelicopters in the area. As theCH-53s came within visual range (4km) they were spotted by the white(light section) scout who called outto the battle captain the headingand number of aircraft inbound.The flight techniques employed bythe CH-53s made it possible toquickly determine which section ofthe attack team would be engaged.The white team was then releasedby the battle captain to engage theCH-53s to protect the red teamelements. As the map in figure 13shows, the white 2 element immediately exited ,his firing position togain airspeed and attack to engagewhile white 1 remained in his hoverhole to attempt a concealed passingshot on the lead threat. White 1fired on the lead CH-53 at about200 meters, pivoting with the targetas it passed through the firing position and then exited to the rear togain airspeed and suppor t white 2.Finally white 2 was spotted by thesecond CH-53 pilot who immediatelyexecuted a Low Yo-Yo to force ahead-on engagement. As the twoaircraft passed each other at 100feet above the trees, both aircraftexecuted high banked turns withthe Cobra coming out to the CH-53's rear. This iteration lasted lessthan a minute from the first visualcontact to the knock it off' call.After the engagement the 3 X 5mix withdrew to a holding area toreorganize, then proceeded forwardto reengage the advancing armor

force. As the attack helicoptersbegan to fire on the tank column,the scouts again sounded the alarm.Two CH-53s approached from thenorthwest in an attempt to disruptthe team's flank. This time the redor heavy team was engaged and asin the first iteration, the fight lastedless than a minute.As the map in figure 14 illustrates,the red team took a more aggressivecourse of action. Red 1 (the overallCobra leader) moved out directlytoward the threat in order to establish airspeed and provide the CH-53 with the smallest visual profile.This proved to be very hazardousand resulted in red 1 s simulateddestruction by the lead CH-53 whohad visual contact with him early inthe battle. Meanwhile red 2 and 3exited their hover holes using terrainmasking and low level flight to gainmaneuvering airspeed. This allowedred 2 and 3 to pick their fights andsaved the situation for the red teamfollowing red lead's unfortunatedemise.Both iterations showed the valueof the OH-58 scouts in an air-to-airengagement even though still unarmed. In both instances their earlyvisual acquisition (often in excessof 5 km) gave the attack helicoptersa distinct advantage. This allowedthe attack team to initiate maneuverin order to engage the aerial threatand thus prevented the completedisruption of the antitank mission.Although not allowed to maneuveragainst the CH-53s, the scout's presence in the battle area was a visualdistraction to the CH-53 pilots whoinitially have a difficult time tryingto locate ny helicopter down inthe trees.Helicopter Aerial Combat Weekintroduced many new concepts tothe aviators of the 6th Brigade. Itwas discovered that energy (airspeed) or the lack of it is one of themost critical keys to survival. Sincethe primary mission of the Armyattack helicopter is to disrupt anddestroy enemy forces as a memberof the combined arms team, and

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since we do not as yet have an airto-air missile system in operation,remaining undetected is the preferred method of air defense. Howeveronce committed, cannon fire andmaneuver must be used to ensuresurvival. Keeping your eyes openand making the first visual contactwith an approaching aerial threatprovide the opportunity to initiatethis maneuvering and gain the tactical advantage.

For any air-to-air training, qualified instructor pilots and trainedand proficient aggressor crews flyingdissimilar aircraft are a must. Equallyimportant is a well organized andcarefully thought out training sequence. Safety considerations werean initial concern but if adequatelybriefed and controlled, air-to-airtraining can be conducted wellwithin existing safety parameters.A training team organized alongthe same lines as the MAWTS lgroup should be formed to train allof the Army s instructor pilots inthe techniques of air-to-air combat.

AUGUST 1982

y training the trainers at one centrallocation, the U.S. Army AviationCenter could simply and inexpensively provide standardized instruction and spread a wealth of experience throughout every aviation unitin the Army. Coupled with effectivetactical doctrine, which is now underdevelopment, Army Aviation canmeet and destroy the aerial threaton any battlefield.During the 1973 Mideast Warthose helicopters that did nothingwhen engaged by an aerial threatwere annihilated; those that maneuvered agressively, including heavily-laden transports survived. All Armyaviators should be proficient in airto-air combat if we are to not onlysurvive but also drive the battle to asuccessful conclusion.Helicopter Aerial Combat Weekgave the aviators of the 6th CavalryBrigade a valuable insight to thecomplexities of air-to-air combat anew skill in the myriad of tasks wemust master to defeat the threat.

ABOUT THEAUTHORSCaptain Greg R. Hampton was commis-sioned in Armor upon graduation fromROTC at Colorado State University in1977. His service has included duty as amechanized infantry platoon leader,weapons platoon leader and tank platoonleader while aSSigned to the 1 st CavalryDivision. Following his completion of therotary wing aviation course as an honorgraduate, he was aSSigned to the 6thCavalry Brigade and has served as ascout and attack helicopter platoon leader.He is now the operations officer for ATroop, 4th Squadron, 9th Cavalry, 6thCavalry Brigade Air Combat).First Lieutenant Mario H. Acevedo wasgraduated from New Mexico State Univer-sity in 1978 with a B.S. in mechanicalengineering He was commissionedthrough ROTC into the Infantry and servedas a rifle platoon leader and heavymotor platoon leader with 7th InfantryDivision at Fl Ord, CA. 1 LT Acevedo iscurrently serving as an attack helicopterplatoon leader with the 6th CavalryBrigade Air Combat), Fl Hood, TX andworked as the assistant project officerfor Helicopter Aerial Combat Week.

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US ARMY

irectorate ofEvaluation Standardization l ~R PORT T THE FIEL AVIATIONSTANDARDIZATION

DYN MIC ROLLOVERCCIDENTS

FROM JANUARY 1972 to January 1982, Army Aviationrecorded 25 dynamic rollover accidents. The average aviatorwould most likely identify the cause of these accidents asimproperly performed slope operations. However, such isnot the case only eight occurred on slopes and the remainderoccurred on level ground. Equally disturbing is the factthat since June 1977 we have experienced a significantincrease in this type accident. During this 4lj2-year period,there have been 17 rollover accidents but only 3 occurredas a result of slope operations. The significant increase inrollover-type accidents is dramatically illustrated by thefact that eight occurred in the past 13 months of the studyperiod and all but one occurred on level ground.

These are accidents that should never have occurred.They involve the most basic of all helicopter maneuvers thepickup to a hover. This maneuver must be mastered by thefledgling aviator before he can be taught to hover andmaneuver for his first solo flight. Furthermore, these accidentshave not necessarily been caused by inexperienced personnel.Pilots in command (PICs) with considerable experience, toinclude maintenance test pilots (MTPs) and instructor pilots(IPs) have been involved in too many instances. We have tobe doing something wrong. Here are a few examples toillustrate the problem: UH-l H. Pilot was performing a hydraulics check in ahigh wind condition, without the assistance of the copilot,when the aircraft became light on the skids, began sliding tothe right and rolled about the longitudinal axis of the rightskid. Corrective action was initiated, but the aircraft continuedto roll onto its right side. Both crewmembers were transportedto a local medical facility where they were treated forminimal injuries and released.

OH-58A. Pilot was practicing for the flyoff of the worldhelicopter competition. He placed the heel of the right skidon the ground, held it there with right aft cyclic, andpivoted around the heel to the right. He attempted to pivotto the left by applying left pedal. The aircraft rolled over onits right side. The crewchief suffered a broken bone in theleft hand. Both crewmembers were evacuated to the hospital.

UH-IH. Aircraft had just completed a limited testfligh t (once around the pattern) to verify correct antitorquepedal positions and was sitting in the grassy area next to the

2

runway. As the maintenance test pilot began to lift off tohover back to the parking ramp, the aircraft rolled over onits right side and the main rotor struck the ground andseparated. The aircraft came to rest inverted and the threecrewmembers exited unassisted through the copilots door.

UH-IH. This was the student pilot s (SP s) first attemptto takeoff to a hover in the UH-l H aircraft. As the aircraftbecame light on the skids, it began a slow left pivoting turn.IP was about to correct with right pedal when SP appliedabrupt up collective. Aircraft pitched nose high with asevere left yaw and roll. IP corrected with forward cycliccausing 30 to 4O-degree nose-low attitude. Subsequent attemptto correct for the nose-low attitude resulted in another nosehigh condi tion causing impact of main rotor blades with theground. Main rotor blade strikes caused the rotor mast toseparate and the aircraft impacted in a left roll nose-low

attitude. As the aircraft came to rest on its left side, the IPreached up and broke out the cabin roof window to facilitateegress. All crewmembers exited the aircraft through thesame cabin roof window. UH-l H. SP was attempt ing an instrument takeoff froma level surface. The SP applied collective pitch abruptly ,causing the aircraft to roll to the right. The main rotorblades struck the ground and the aircraft carne to rest on itsright side. The crew egressed without difficulty and wastransported to the hospital, examined and released by aflight surgeon.

UH-l H. The SP attempted a takeoff to a hover withexcessive right cyclic. The aircraft pivoted about the heel ofthe right skid. A dynamic rollover situation developed witha rapid right roll. Both main rotor blades contacted theground which caused the aircraft to pitch up to about a 20degree nose-high attitude. The right synchronized elevator,the tail skid and the tail rotor blades contacted the ground,resulting in loss of tail-rotor thrust and separation of thevertical fin. The IP applied left forward cyclic and loweredthe collective pitch full down. The fuselage bounced severaltimes as it yawed 260 degrees to the left, resulting in collapseof the landing gear. The aircraft came to rest upright. Thecrewmembers exited the aircraft unassisted and were evacuated to the medical facility.

The foregoing illustrations have much in common alloccurred on level ground. The PICs, IPs and maintenancetest pilots were experienced aviators. The use of improperprocedures was evident in all instances, as was inattentionto duties and complacency. Let s put a stop to these sillymaneuverings. PICs must not permit themselves the luxury



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Chief Warrant Officer, CW3, Michae. B. Farmer tests the aviator s night vision imaging system (ANVIS)before a night-firing exercise in the AH-1 S (Modernized) Cobra at the Army Aviation Development Test Activity(AVNDTA), Ft. Rucker, AL. The ANVIS is the third generation of night vision goggles and is designed specificallyfor aviation as a replacement for the AN/PVS-5 goggles. AVN DTA is one of nine installations and activities underthe Army Test and Evaluation Command which checks the developmental quality of proposed Army materielthroughout the United States and in the Republic of Panama.

Major George Magra th right) and Will iam H.Gradyof the Army Aviation Development Test Activity(AVNDTA), Ft. Rucker, AL inspect an upperwirecutteron the AH-1 S Cobra he licopter. Using a modifiedOH-58 lower wire cutter as the prototype, controlledtesting will determine if the proposed location andconfiguration will interfere with navigation and VHF/FMhoming.

FROM PORTUGALSafety Course Scheduled. An internationalcourse on Aviation Safety Management will betaught 18 to 29 October 1982 in Lisbon. It is to bepresented by the Institute Superior Engineering,Lisbon, in cooperation with the Institute of AviationSafety, Stockholm, Sweden, and will be sponsoredby TAP Air Portugal. For reservations contactFlight Safety Department, TAP Air Portugal,Annexo F Hangar 6 Room 22 Floor 3 Post OfficeBox 5124, P 1704 Lisbon CODEX, Portugal.

AUGUST 1982

A British Auster MK9 aircraft (left) has been reassembled and is now on display at the Army AviationMuseum, Ft. Rucker, AL. The Auster arrived aboard aBritish C-130 Hercules from the Museum of ArmyFlying at the Army Air Corps Centre, Middle Wallop,Hampshire, England, in exchange for a U.S. ArmyL-19 (0-1) (right), with each of the aircraft having a 99-year lease on its new home. The Auster M K-9 wasused by the British Army in Korea. In its original version,deSignated as the MK-1 it served in 1941 as an artilleryobservation aircraft.

CorrectionMajor General John W. Woodmansee was erroneously carried in the June issue of the viationDigestas having served as commanding general,V Corps, USAREUR. He was deputy commandinggeneral, V Corps, USAREUR, before assumingcommand of the 2d Armored Division on 22 Juneat Ft. Hood, TX.

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nc:: ccoa:mCl.>cooc:Co


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PEARL SEquipment nd Rescue survival Lowdown

Elaine ChiboucasKudos are in order1LT Max Mitchell and SSG Michael Bulkley of theAviation Company, 5th Aviation Battalion (P), Ft.Polk, LA 71459, were recently visited by the HealthServices Command Aviation Resource ManagementSurvey (ARMS) Team and the following report wasrendered by the Inspector: The Aviation Life SupportEquipment (ALSE) Shop of the Aviation Company,5th Aviation Battalion, clearly indicated that the ALSEofficer and NCOIC had truly done a most outstandingjob. Undoubtedly their ALSE program is a primeexample of how a program should be developed andimplemented. PEARL was elated to receive this reportand appreciates their outstanding effort as do othersin the ALSE community.Exception Requisition -ANIPRC-90 Survival Radio

The turn-in of subject radio to Sacramento ArmyDepot for repair has heretofore resulted in longturnaround of the item. We have discussed this problemwith Mr. Jim Lewis, the Communications-ElectronicsCommand (CECOM) item manager, AUTOVON992-3919. He has assured us that the repair/replacementof the radio can be speeded up by simply identifyingon the requisition that it is an EXCEPTION REQUISITION for a serviceable radio. The turn-in documentnumber should be cited and a code 26 should be

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photograph by Tom Greeneinserted in columns 55 and 56 of the requisitiondocument. Accompishing these actions will precluderequisitions being placed on back order from activitieswith a low Department of Army management priority.TC 1-62 And FM 1-302

We are still getting questions pertaining to itemserroneously listed with wrong national stock numbersin TC 1 62. Correct NSNs for items listed are asshown herein: AN/ PRC-90 survival radio 5820-00-782-5308; AN/PRC-90 antenna 5820-00-371-6806LS; testset TS2530A/UR - 6625-00-238-0223; test set AN/PRM-32A 6625-01-013-9900.FM 1 302 is currently out for coordination, andeventually will replace TC 1 62. Another FM for mainte

nance, repair and inspection of ALSE is being preparedby the ALSE Training School at Ft. Eustis, VA. FM 1302 covers aviation life support equipment for Armyaircrews primarily in the operations area and wasprepared by the U.S. Army Aviation Center, Ft. Rucker,AL. These documents are but another step in providingto the Army Aviation community information and in-structions pertaining to this critical equipment.ALSE ActivitiesThe Fifth U.S. Army recently completed anotherhands-on ALSE school at San Antonio, TX. About



19/48

93 Army Reserve, Army National Guard and ActiveArmy personnel were given instruction in such subjectareas as establishment of a unit life support shop;ALSE publications; inspection and maintenance ofthe life preserver, first aid kits, individual survival kits,flight clothing, flight helmet, survival vest, survivalradio and ALSE maintenance forms and records; alsocovered was the ALSE retrieval program. A highlightof this training was an overnight training exercisewhere the students got a taste of survival undersurvival conditions. Mr. Al Cargen of the FifthArmy Safety Office and his instructors should begiven an accolade of thanks for their fine performanceof duty. Unfortunately for the Army Reserve, Mr.Cargen is leaving for an assignment with the ArmyNational Guard at Aberdeen, MD. Thanks for a finejob AI, and we know you will continue the fine ALSEsupport wherever you go. We will certainly miss you.ALSE School UpdateFt. Eustis, VA, continues to train Army personnelat their newly organized ALSE school. Recently, theALSE Management Steering Council convened at Ft.Eustis, and had an opportunity to see the hands-ontraining that was being conducted. We also participatedin the students' ALSE graduation ceremonies. Quotasfor this training are available through your local trainingofficers and major commands. Weare still workingtoward a career management field for ALSE and wewill keep you posted via these PEARL articles.Helmet Flyers SPH-4Army activities have reported receIvmg subjecthelmets manufactured by AQUA-AIRE under ContractNo. DLA 100-80-C-2226 which are unusable due tovarious deficiencies. Defense Personnel Support Centerhas agreed to give recipients of these defective helmetsmanufactured under contract DLA-l00-80-C-2226 onlyfull credit. Procedure for return and credit follows:Submit SF 364, Report of Item Discrepancy (ROD) toCDR, DPSC ATTN: DPSC-ITEF, 2800 S. 20th St.,Philadelphia, PA 19101. Return helmets with a copyof SF 364 to: Defense Depot, Mechanicsburg, PA,ATTN: DDMP-JQ (MARK FOR CONDITION CODEL, MECHANICSBURG, PA 17055). Defectivehelmets received from other contracts should bereported by Quality Deficiency Report, in accordancewith Chapter 12, TM 38-750. Above data is also beingdisseminated via DPSC Supply Information Letter.Oxygen Throw-A way Masks Maintenance/InspectionDear PEARL can you tell me what we should belooking for when we inspect the throw-away typeoxygen masks? We know what to look for when weinspect the regular type oxygen masks, but theseother masks have us in a dilemma.

AUGUST 982

Glad you asked that question because we havebeen getting a number of inquiries pertaining to thisarea. We consulted the Air Force and Navy andbasically the following would prevail on throw-awaytype oxygen masks:Check the facepiece for holes, cuts or tears; examinevalve(s) housing for cracks, breaks and damage tovalve seats; check oxygen reservoir bag and tubeassembly for holes, cuts, tears or imperfect seams;check tubing for security of installation and distortion;check tubing for cracks, kinks and evidence of crimptubing marks; check head strap for distortion, elasticity,cleanliness and security of installation; visual daylightinspection of all accessible surfaces which will be incontact with oxygen shall disclose no evidence ofrust scale, dirt, paints, preservatives and organicmaterials such as grease, oil, ink and dye; wipe dustfrom facepiece, using a clean lint free cloth dampenedwith isopropyl alcohol. W ARNING- the presence ofoil and other petroleum base contaminants on oxygenequipment will create a dangerous fire hazard. fthere is evidence of contamination due to air sickness,dispose of the complete mask assembly; after deployment or use, clean and disinfect mask with disinfectant approved by the Surgeon's Office.Lensatic CompassReference is made to message R 221530Z APR 82,from 97 BMW Blytheville AFB, ARI I LGSMS21I tothis office; subject is requisition of health hazardradioactive item NSN 6605-00-151-5337YS. Item hasbeen identified as radioactive and users are herewithalerted to this fact. This item is required and ismandatory and must be installed in individual survivalkits used aboard applicable Army aircraft. Exercisecau tion when using.Nomex ThreadDear PEARL I have been looking for an NSN forNomex thread gray), and was hoping that you couldprovide it The OD thread is available at most unitsbut the gray Nomex thread needed for repair of theone-piece flight suit seems to be scarce.

PEARL is always happy to oblige so here goes:Nomex thread sage green can be ordered as a unittube NSN 8310-00-405-2252 at a cost of$8.96 per tube.As you are probably aware the Army is using USAFTO 14P3-1-112 (Maintenance Instructions for Nomexsingle piece flight suit sage green). The thread specifiedis MIL-T-83193, and can be ordered from DPSC (S9T)using the aforementioned NSN.Seat Belts

Reference is made to the April 1982 issue of theA viation Digest PEARL article OBSOLETE SEATBELTS. That portion of the article, national stocknumber NSN) 1680-00-787-4299, should be disregarded

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PEARL Sas it is in error. Only the seat belt NSN 1680-00-787-6531 should have been included. In order to set therecord straight, we researched the whole seat beltarea and coordinated the following data with TSARCOM Directorates for Maintenance and MaterielManagement: NSN 1680-00-787-4299, this belt muststill be requisitioned as the prime belt for UH-1 Vaircraft only due to configuration required for litterapplication. NSN 1680-00-447-9504, this belt and allsubstitutes are being replaced by NSN 1680-01-128-4488 . Existing stock ofNSN 1680-01-128-4488* will bethe replacement belt for the above NSNs with theexception of the UH-1 V litter application noted above.NOTE: *DO NOT requisition the replacement beltNSN 1680-01-128-4488until officially notified to do so.For further information clarification, points of contactare: Mr. D. Boone Hopkins (AUTOVON 693-3112)and Mr. James E. Alexander (AUTOVON 693-3308).New OfficeDARCOM HQ has established a Commodity Management Office for Clothing and Individual Equipmentas a branch of the Command Control and Surveillance and Support Division of the Directorate forSupply, Maintenance and Transportation. Their missionis to monitor all clothing developmentaVfielding actions,and introduction of new items. Ms. Vivian McKenzie,GS-14, and LTC Bob Surratt, formerly of DefensePersonnel Support Center, are a part of the staff. Thetelephone number is AUTOVON 284-8231/9531. Thisnew office will not be fully operational until 31 October1982.u s Army Logistic Assistance Office TRADOCWe in the ALSE area appreciate the support theU.S. Army Logistic Assistance Office, TRADOC, hasbeen providing through their TRADOC ExecutiveDigest Reports. Colonel William E. Gregerson, MilitaryPolice Corps (MPC) is the chief of this office and canbe reached on AUTOVON 680-3637 or by mail, USALogistic Assistance Office, TRADOC, ATTN: DRXLATR, PO Box 97, Ft. Monroe, VA 23651.Thanks

We would be remiss if we did not pay an accoladeof thanks to Major Jim Foster, HQ TRADOC, Ft.Monroe, VA, and Mr. Ray Birringer, TRADOC ALSErepresentative, Ft. Rucker, AL. Major Foster and Mr.Birringer have and hopefully will continue to provide

outstanding expedited support to the critical area ofALSE. Many of the immediate actions have beenachieved through their get the job done" attitude.We understand, through the "grapevine," that MajorFoster will be leaving soon to attend the Commandand General Staff College. His replacement has notyet been announced, but LTC "Chuck" Lesko willkeep the ball rolling. We also owe thanks to otherALSE Management Council members- FORSCOM'sCW3 Jeff Alley for his effort on prepositioned ALSE,and The Surgeon General's Office COL Bruce Chasefor his support on resolving medical problems theaircrew personnel are confronted with. We also thankall ALSE council members for their efforts andcontinued support. Always remember, PEARL cares.

Carbon Dioxide Cylinders For LiferaftsDear PEARL I have several questions and yourtimely expert answers have always been ofhelp to usfield users ofaviation life support equipment. What sthe importance ofhaving a spring adapter installed inthe carbon dioxide cylinder inflation valve? I havebeen having trouble getting replacement carbon dioxidecylinders for the one-person-type llferaft and I haveordered them under NSN 1680-00-097-0104, but myrequisitions are returned without action. Can you tellme what, ifany hing, I am doing wrong?Someone toldme that I should be ordering the valve and cylinder/assembly underNSN4220-00-565-3276; s that correct?Why can t I have the cylinders refilled locally?

You have asked some very important questionsand we will answer them in the order you asked them. Aspring adapter must be installed in the carbon dioxidecylinder inflation valve to allow the packed raft to"breathe" while being carried aboard an aircraft flyingat high altitudes. In the past, carbon dioxide cylindersfor one-person life rafts were ordered under NSN1680-00-097-0104 from B-17. Because it was difficultto have them locally recharged due to lack of carbondioxide high pressure recharging equipment, they arenow ordered under NSN 4220-00-565-3276 as a valveand cylinder/assembly from S9C. Weare taking anotherlook at this to determine if it would be cost effective tostock the 0104 cylinder and have them locally rechargedYour local Fire Department formerly had the rechargingcapability but, because of the new type of fireextinguishers, most of them might not still have thiscapability. We hope this information will be helpfuland will resolve some of the problems you have beenencountering. TM 55-1680-317-23 P provides detailedinspection and maintenance information.

If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue/survival gear write PEARL OARCOM ATTN : DRCPO-ALSE4300 Goodfellow Blvd. St . Louis MO 63120 or call AUTOVON 693 3307 or Commercial 314 263 3307

8 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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gunned it. I was in the air almost as soon asthey let go.Captain Allcorn took off first (in L 4 No.204) and made a 360-degree turn before joining up with the other two aircraft. The planwas to fly to Fedala where a racetrack was tobe used as a landing strip.

The Cubs flew at about 2,000 feet to a point3 miles from the shore where they were firedupon, and narrowly missed , by the USSBrooklyn. The Army aviators immediatelydived for the surface and flew what might becalled nap-of-the-sea toward the shore.Meanwhile, almost all the 200 ships in theinvasion convoy opened fire with 20 mmguns on the three L-4s, despite the fact thatthey were painted with invasion markings.

Lieutenant Butler, flying one Cub withCaptain Devol riding as observer, and Lieutenant Shell, piloting the other L 4 , headednorth away from the invasion site. Later theylanded near a French fort and were takenprisoner for a brief period.

Meanwhile Captain Allcorn, flyingbetween the swells and taking fire from shorebatteries, flew along the coast. When he wasoff Fedala he pulled up and headed inland.Immediately units of the 2d Armored Divisionpeppered his L 4 with 30 caliber machinegunbullets, disintegrating its windshield andblowing away portions of the cockpit. Herecalled, I stayed as low as possible and as Igot farther inland I realized I was not goingto get to the racetrack and that I was gettingahead of the Allied advance.

2

LEFT: Captain Ford Allcorn flies his L-4Cub from the USS Ranger during theinvasion of North Africa in 1942.BELOW: Lieutenant William Butler frontseat) and Captain Brent Devol prepare totakeoff from the USS Ranger during theinvasion of North Africa in 1942. TheirL-4 Cub was named Elizabeth.

Suddenly a burst of fire from a VichyFrench machinegun hit Captain Allcorn inthe leg. At the same time the L-4 burst intoflames and Captain Allcorn had to slip theairplane into the ground in a controlled crash.He crawled from the cockpit and draggedhimself about 50 feet across the ground to apoint where he watched the L-4 explode andburn.

Captain Allcorn, aided by friendly civilians, was taken to an American aid station.Later X-rays revealed he had been hit fivetimes in the leg by 25 caliber slugs. In additionto being the first Army aviator in combat,Captain Allcorn was the first to fly a Cubfrom an aircraft carrier, the first Army aviator to be wounded in combat and the first tobe shot down-not a dubious honor under thecircumstances.

Besides the four who flew from the Ranger,there were other Army aviators from the firstthree pilot classes who participated in theinvasion of North Africa. These includedLieutenants John W. Oswalt, Bob Ely,Eugene Gillespie and Robert Johnson.In late November and early December anumber of Army aviators were attached toBritish units which were heavily engagedwith the German Africa Corps in Tunisia. twas during this period that Lieutenant PaulA. Dewitt became the first Army aviator tofly an artillery mission in a Grasshopper inWorld War II.

In January 1943, the first air observationpost sections were organized within Ameri-

U S RMY VI TION IGEST


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can tactical units in North Africa. LieutenantOswalt organized the 1st Armored DivisionAir Section while the 1st Infantry Division swas initiated by LieutenantJesse Overall III.Meanwhile, Captain Delbert Bristol orga-nized a senior tactical headquarters in IICorps to control employment of the divisionair sections. He also handled aviator assign-ments and flight records, and established thefirst Army Aviation parts supply system in acombat zone.As the Army aviators became more proficient they developed more and more missions in support of the ground forces. Theirability to gather intelligence, coupled withthe fact that they could trigger instant anddevastating firepower from artillery), was ofgreat importance , as illustrated by an incident that occurred in March 1943.After Army aviators haduncovered a major thrustbeing launched by the Ger-man 10th Panzer Division, they were able to direct a withering artillerybarrage that helped stopthe assault. A penetrationof the Allied lines wasaverted.

The ingenuity of peopleassociated with ArmyAviation was directly responsible for its growth

and success. An example was Captain Devolwho had flown from the deck of the USSRanger. He constructed a flight deck on anLST (Landing Ship Tank) taking only 36hours of work. The runway was 2 feet wide

An L 4 Cub flies from the deck o an LST duringMediterranean invasion rehearsals.

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FORTY YEARS O ARMY AVIATION

and 70 yards long. It was constructed oftimbers covered with metal landing stripmesh. Four Cubs took off from an LST in theSicilian landings. The operation was successful and the LST aircraft carriers wereeffectively used at Anzio and in SouthernFrance. Captain Devol was awarded theLegion of Merit for his work.

Field expediency also was demonstrated inItaly by Army aviators as related in the storyof the Futa Pass Ski Jump airstrip. Due torugged mountain country it was extremelydifficult for Fifth Army Commander GeneralLucius K. Truscott to visit units under hiscommand. Traveling by jeep was not practica l , so General Truscott made frequent use ofthe Cub to get about in the Futa Pass area.General Truscott's headquarters was a 30minute jeep ride (and an often-times impassable river) away from the nearest airstrip.Disturbed over this, General Truscott told hisair officer, Captain Jack Marinelli, to get anairstrip built near the command s t- and the sooner the better. After muchstudy , the airstrip was built on a mountainside. It was 735 feet long and 30 feet wide. Theupper end was 98 feet higher than the otherend, and the whole airstrip had the appear-

ance of a ski jump. The lower part endedabruptly with a sheer 2,000 foot drop-off tothe valley below.The interesting feature, according toCaptain Marinelli, was that we had to usefull throttle to taxi to the top of the strip afterlanding. But you could also take off down thestrip without power.

Many general officers made frequent use ofthe Cubs, especially General Mark Clark,who on one occasion had his pilot, CaptainEugene P. Gillespie, land his L-4 on theBoulevard Carrageola in the heart of the cityof Naples. Many Neopolitans were astounded,but the general made it in time for an urgentmeeting that he could not get to by othermeans of transportation. A short while later,in the assault on Rome, General Clark andhis pilot, Lieutenant Colonel Jack Walker,made the famous L 4 landing near Romeinside a school courtyard formed by buildingsand an 8-foot brick fence. When it was time todepart, Colonel Walker assured the generalthat he had enough room to take off. Hedid, General Clark recalled, by a margin of3 inches.During the assault on Rome, Captain JohnOswalt landed his L 4 on a racetrack on the

The fifth Army's Ski Jump : airstrip was built at Futa Pass, Italy, in 1944.



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INSET: The L 5 Sentinel joined the fighting at about the time Rome fell to the Allied forces.ABOVE: Lieutenant Dave Condon and his L 5 at Utah Beach on Day 1.

outskirts of the city to contact lead tanks andarmored cars. Within minutes Captains BillHolden and Bill McKay landed to help coordinate the attack. After Rome fell, Army aviators flying L-4s pressed the surveillance ofthe German Army as it retreated north. During the pursuit, the first L 5 Sentinels, heaviertype liaison planes, were employed in increas-ing n urnbers by the Fifth Army.

The addition of the L 5 brought manycomments at the front. Some felt the L 5 wastoo heavy and should not be used, whileothers thought the L 4 was underpoweredand preferred the L-5. But both airplanes hadtheir good points. The L 4 was extremely maneuverable and able to get in and out of manymore confined areas than the L-5. On theother hand, the L-5 carried more of a payload,and it had a few instruments and a lightedinstrument panel which made it more effective in night operations.

During the invasion of France in June1944, most of the Army's liaison planes weredismantled and loaded on trucks that weremoved across the English Channel on ships.However, a few were flown across.

Captain James Gregorie, 4th Infantry Di-vision Artillery Aviation Officer, landed at

UGUST 982

Utah Beach with the 4th Infantry on D Day.The next day he found a suitable area for anairstrip and sent a message to LieutenantDave Condon to have the division's L-4s andL-5s flown from England.

The L-5s carried enough fuel to make thetrip, but it was necessary to equip the L-4swith oxygen tanks filled with fuel and attached to the back seats. A fuel line runningfrom the oxygen tank to the main tank gavethe L-4s 20 additional gallons of gas. By thetime the aircraft arrived in France the division s artillery was set up, but the guns werenot registered because hedgerows limited visibility. Since the primary concern was to getthe guns registered and firing, CaptainGregory and Lieutenant Condon immediatelytook off in an L 5 and registered the firstartillery fire on Utah Beach.

Meanwhile Major J. Elmore Swenson andhis 29th Air Force, as he called his 29thInfantry Division Artillery Aviation Section,arrived at Omaha Beach. In minutes MajorSwenson was directing the first artillery firein that area.

As the Allies began penetrating theBrittany Peninsula, the liaison airplanes of-ten were the only source of contact with the

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4

TOP An L 4 is dwarfed by an LST in NewGuinea. L 4s saw action throughout thePacific in World War IIABOVE: Wrecked Japanese Zeros line anairfield in Tokyo used by L 4s at theconclusion o the war.

rapidly advancing armored columns. Theplanes also flew out in front of the Alliedadvance, keeping track of the enem y s posi-tions. In addition, the cubs directed supplycolumns and flew food ammunition, andmedical supplies to patrols and / or troop units.

As in Europe, the roie of the Cubs becameincreasingly more important to the groundcommanders in the Pacific. The liaison pilotsfighting the Japanese demonstrated just asmuch ingenuity and initiative as their coun-terparts did in Africa and Europe.

During the invasion of Okinawa the lightplanes effectively opera ed from the BrodieDevice mounted on an LST. Named for itsdeveloper Lieutenant James Brodie it consis-ted of four masts which supported a stronghorizontal steel cable that provided a straight,smooth, clear run way for landing and takingoff. A trolley with an attached sling under-



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The Brodie Device was used on LSTs to land and launch /.. 4s.

neath caught a hook mounted above thecenter of gravity of the airplane. The trolleyran along the cable and allowed landing andtakeoffruns. The airplane was raised from orlowered to the deck by tightening or slacken-ing the cable .

In the Pacific the device was mounted onLST No. 776 which also became known as the

USS Brodie. t was at Okinawa that thedevice paid off. There was an urgent requirement to set up artillery units in the KeramaRetto Islands to bombard the Japanese onnearby Okinawa. Photography and aerialobservation were needed by the artillery bat-teries, but there was no place to set up alanding strip. That ' s when the USSBrodie steamed to the rescue. t launchedand retrieved numerous airplanes througho utthe invasion, and not an Army aviator orplane was lost.In the Pacific the liaison pilots also directedtransport planes and ground troops, droppedfood and ammunition to surrounded troops,and guided tactical air strikes.

The Korean arWhile World War II proved the value of

Army Aviation in support of the ground

AUGUST 982

forces, the Korean War proved that its potential was unlimited. With the introduction ofnewer airplanes and helicopters, the Koreanbattlefield spawned new ideas on airmobilityand aerial medical evacuation.

In the early stages of the war L-4s, L-5s,and some L-16s were used. But they were soonreplaced with the newer L-17 Navion, L-19Bird Dog, L-20 Beaver and the L-23 Seminole.

The single engine L-17 did a good job incourier work, but was not designed for use incombat. In late 1952, it was replaced by thetwin engine L-23 which was used primarilyfor the transportation of commanders andstaffofficers. The L-20 was used for transport-ing equipment, supplies and troops; while theL-19, which arrived in Korea on 16 February1951, became the favored airplane for reconnaissance and VIP transportation. t provided much better visibility, and everyoneappreciated the heater which made it morecomfortable to fly.When the H-13 and H-19 helicopters arrivedin Korea in 1950 and 1951, ground commanders quickly became aware that theycould perform any diversified jobs in thecombat zone. They offered airmobility andexcelled in aerial medical evacuation.

The 6th Transportation Company (Helicopter) with its H-19 Chickasaws was the

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ABOVE An H-19 UH-19)Chickasaw o the 6thTransportationCompany lands in 1953in Korea with suppliesfor the 5th RegimentalCombat Team.RIGHT: H-13 medical evacuationhelicopter in Korea in 1952.

first Army helicopter transportation company to support units in combat. H-19s wereflown from Japan to Korea in groups of fivebetween 11 February and 24 March 1953. By20 March, the 6th Transportation Companyhad enough H-19s in country to fly its firstcombat mission in which it supplied forwardelements of the 3d Infantry Division. The13th Transportation Company Helicopter)arrived in Korea on 1 May 1953 and was theonly other Army transportation helicoptercompany in Korea during the war.The airmobile value (and potential) of theH-19 cargo helicopters was probably beststated by General Maxwell D Taylor, theEighth Army commander. During the war'scampaign, he stated that he could not havemaintained the right flank of the front of the-MLR (main line of resistance) in its positionwithout the assistance of the cargo helicopters. Some units had been forced back behindthe main supply route and supply would nothave been possible without the helicopters.

6

Helicopter evacuation of the wounded inKorea was not the result of a preconceivedplan. I t was more the result of expediency.The Eighth Army noted the effectiveness ofmany heroic medical evacuation missionsthat were flown in June 1950 in H-5s by theAir Force's Helicopter Detachment F, ThirdAir Rescue Squadron.

At the the request of Eighth Army, theSecond Helicopter Detachment arrived from

Japan in November 1950 at Tague, Korea,with its H-13 Sioux helicopters. The firstArmy helicopter evacuations took place 3January 1951 when First Lieutenants WillisG Strawn and Joseph L. Bowler each pickedup wounded American soldiers 60 miles eastof Seoul and returned to an American hospitalat Seoul.

But the Second Helicopter Detachment,commanded by Captain Albert C Sebourn,did not receive its baptism of fire until 14January 1951 when its four pilots and fourH-13s evacuated 23 critically wounded soldiers from a surrounded battalion. Despiteintense enemy small arms fire over a /2 hourperiod, all of the wounded were evacuated 25miles to safety.

When active hostilities ceased on 27 July1953, helicopter detachments under the con-trol of the Army Medical Service had evacuated 21,212 casualties. In addition, divisionaviation elements had evacuated many more;and the 6th and 13th Transportation Companies Helicopter) had achieved an enviablerecord in mass aeromedical evacuation.

Because offorward helicopter medical evacuation, the wounded reached medical assist-ance quicker and fewer of them died than inany previous war. And the H-13, livingwith and aiding the wounded throughout thewar, was richly and deservedly honored bythe n i c k n m ~ Angel of Mercy affectionately bestowed upon it by the troops.



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The first CH-21 Shawnee flown by MajorRobert J D i ~ l a r d commander o the 57thTransportation Company arrives nVietnam as it takes o from the deck o theUSNSCore.

VietnamDuring the administration of President

Dwight D Eisenhower the United States became more and more concerned about Communist activities in Southeast Asia. PresidentEisenhower sent military advisors to Vietnam,but the situation continued to worsen.

In 1961, President John F. Kennedy, concerned over the United States' responsibilitiesas a member of the Southeast Asian TreatyOrganiza t ion (SEATO), sent GeneralMaxwell D Taylor to Vietnam to survey thesituation. He reported a critical lack of mobility in the jungle-covered area; and on hisrecommendation, Army helicopters were sentto Vietnam.

On 21 November 1961, the USNS Coredeparted for Vietnam with the 57th Transportation Company (Light Helicopter from FortLewis, W A, and the 8th Transportation Company (Light Helicopter from Fort Bragg,NC. The small flight deck was loaded tocapacity with CH-21s sealed in cocoons asprotection from salt water spray.The voyage ended on 11 December 1961 at adock in Saigon. As quickly as possible thecocoons were removed and one by one theH-21s flew from the deck, down the MekongRiver to Saigon International Airport. MajorRobert J. Dillard, the 57th commander, flewthe first H-21.

Both the 57th and 8th Transportation Companies began training exercises with South

AUGUST 982

Vietnamese troops on 22 December. MajorMilton P. Cherne of the 57th TransportationCompany reported on the first airmobilecombat action in which his company particijointly with the 8th. On 2 January 1962, theyflew 1,036 Vietnamese soldiers into a hole inthe jungle, about 300 by 150 yards. Themission was a success, routing the surprisedViet Cong and enabling the capture of aconsiderable amount of equipment vital tothe Viet Cong operations around Saigon.

The mission was performed with greatspeed and success, helping to convince theVietnamese staff and commanders, of thegreat potential offered by the helicopter inairmobile operations. They had already beenimpressed by operations of the Army's U-1AOtter and CV-2 Caribou fixed wing transportairplanes that had preceded the helicoptersarrival in Vietnam.

The first CV-2s arrived in Saigon in August1961. Two years later there were two Cariboucompanies, totaling 32 airplanes, in Vietnam.They filled the gap between the helicoptersand the larger Air Force C-123s by landing onshort, unimproved airstrips. By 1964, the CV-2s were fully involved in the daily operationsof the South Vietnamese Army.

Army Aviation operations grew rapidly,and by the end of 1964 it had 400 aircraft and3,700 soldiers in Vietnam. The OV-l Mohawkarrived in 1962 and conducted reconnaissance and surveillance missions. In 1964, theUH-l Hueys arrived, and by the end of theyear there were 250 in country. The Hueyphased out the H-21 and H-34 and became theworkhorse of the Vietnam War, movingtroops and cargo, developing into an armedattack helicopter, and picking up the role ofthe Angel of Mercy OH-13 helicopter ofKorean War fame.Before mid-1965, organic Army Aviationdid not exist in Vietnam. Its operations wereprimarily in specific geographical areas andit was under the control of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. But things beganto change in the second half of the year. The

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1st Cavalry Division Airmobile) began arriving at An Khe in the Central Highlands ofVietnam in August 1965. By 3 October thefull division with its 15,787 officers and enlisted, 434 aircraft, and 1,600 vehicles was atAn Khe. By November it was heavily engagedin combat near the Cambodian border at theIa Drang Valley.

The bitter fighting raged for 35 days beforethe Viet Cong withdrew. But military planners had a peek at the seemingly unlimitedpotential of the concept of Army Aviation. Ina little more than 1 month, an Army division-with its aircraft engaged in heavyand devastating combat operations-itselftransported 5,048 tons of supplies to troops inthe field; moved 8,216 tons from seacoastdepots to its tactical resupply points; wholeinfantry and artillery battalions were movedinto, around, and out of combat areas; andabout 2,700 refugees were evacuated. Only 59aircraft were hit by ground fire and only 4were shot down, 3 of which the divisionrecovered.

8

Army Aviation operations notorganic to a division were organizedunder the 1st Aviation Brigade, the

Golden Hawks. Brigadier GeneralGeorge P. Seneff Jr., became thefirst commander when it wasorganized as the U.S. Army Bri-

gade (Provisional) on 11 March1966. He was still in commandwhen i t became the s tAviation Brigade on 25 May1966. The 1st Brigade grew to23,000 officers and enlisted by

1970. When the last Americantroops departed Vietnam 29March 1973, the brigade s colorswere brought to Fort Rucker, AL,

where they were received on 6 April1973 by the Aviation Center Com

mander, Major General Alan M BurdettJr., himself a former commander of theGolden Hawks.

At its peak the 1st Aviation Brigade wasthe largest single Army Aviation commandin the world. Although the commanding general of the brigade commanded the nonorganicArmy Aviation elements in Vietnam, operational control of given units remained withthe supported commander. The brigade combined the best features of centralized anddecentralized control , which is in fact theheart of the concept of Army Aviation. The164th Combat Aviation Group, operating aspart of the 1st Aviation Brigade, was supporting three Vietnamese divisions of theVietnamese IV Corps in the Mekong Deltawith three aviation ba ttalions. Each day thebattalion commanders checked in with thedivisional headquarters to ensure that theirArmy Aviation thrust was geared to supportof the ground effort-primarily the Infantrywhich relied on the helicopter for support.They maintained a continuous commandcontrol link between the supported elementsand the brigade headquarters. This philosophy permeated the 1st Aviation Brigade,whether its support was being rendered to

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On 6 April 1973 MG Allen M Burdett Jr.,commanding general o Ft Rucker, AL, andformer commander o the GoldenHawks, receil'ed the 1 st Aviation Brigadecolors from LTC James T McQueen,commander of the colors detachment. (,SM

American, Vietnamese or other Allied troops.Similar relationships existed for the 12th and17th Groups supporting other Vietnamesecorps.

For religiously sticking to its Army Aviation concepts of support of the ground battle,General Creighton Abrams, commander ofU.S. Forces in Vietnam, paid the highest oftributes to the 1st Aviation Brigade by saying:

It has always been interesting tome to note that the aviators andmen of this Brigade have been takeninto the brotherhood of the combat

arms. Not by regulation, not bypolitics, but they have been voted inby the Infantry the charter

members of that secluded club, thecomba arms.

Early in the war the Army's transporthelicopters were being protected by Air ForceB-26 and T-28 aircraft which flew escort.Meanwhile, the Army was experimentingwith attempts to provide protection by mounting light machineguns in the doors of its CH-21 transports. This proved ineffective, but theemergence of the UH-1 Hueys armed with 30caliber machineguns and 2.75-inch rockets

AUGUST 982

Francis Aquinaldo (center) and SG AllenBrewer, the top enlisted men o the brigadeheadquarters, accompanied colors to Ft.Rucker. (,SM Clifton Wagner (left center) oFt Rucker awaits reception of the colors.

brought about the formation of the UtilityTactical Transport (UTI) Helicopter Company (see PART IV, ARMED HELICOP-TERS, Armywide Growth).

The UTT fielded some 20 armed Hueys inVietnam in 1962 to fly escort and provideprotective fires for the CH-21 transports. Assoon as they replaced the Air Force escorts,the number of light helicopters hit by groundfire dropped significantly. Most of the tacticaldoctrine used later during helicopter assaultmissions was developed by the UTT.

Since this was such a success, it was notlong before each separate lift company had 7to 10 armed Hueys, thus providing organic

rmy viationMedal of Honor wardeesMajor William E. AdamsMajor Patrick H Brady

Warrant Officer Fred FergusonChief Warrant Officer Michael J. Novosel

Warrant Officer Louis R RoccoSpecialist 4 Gary G Wetzel

Sergeant First Class Rodney J.T. Yano

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FORTY YE RS O RMY VI TION

escort and suppressive fire. As a consequence,the UTT was redesignated the 68th AviationCompany and later the 197th AirmobileCompany.

The role of the armed helicopter grew inVietnam after the introduction of the armedUH-l. But the Huey was slow and its ammunition capacity limited. The situation improved,however, when the first six AH-1 Cobras(then called Huey Cobras) appeared on thescene in September 1967 at the 1st AviationBrigade. Designed as attack helicopters, theCobras were much faster, more maneuverablegun platforms than the UH-1s. The AH-1swould prove their worth time and again untilthe end of the U.S. presence in Vietnam.

Airmobility became more and more important, and by the late 1960s no major battlewas fought without helicopters providingtransport, reconnaissance, surveillance, com-

An AH l Cobra attack helicopter in Vietnam

munications and firepower. In fact, theconcept of Army Aviation had proven sosuccessful that the Army formed a secondairmobile division in Vietnam.

On 1 July 1968 the 101st Airborne Divisionwas converted to the 101st Airborne DivisionAirmobile). t played key roles in the 1968,Tet Offensive and a series of combat operations in I Corps tactical zone, to includeOperation Delaware near the A Shau-Valley.(Following the war in Vietnam, the 1st Cavalry Division was discontinued as an airmobiledivision. However, an airmobile/air assaultcapability was retained when on 4 October1974 the 101st Airborne Division Airmobile)was reorganized into the 101st Airborne Di-vision Air Assault).

In the early hours of 3 January 1968, theViet Cong VC) and the North VietnameseArmy launched the Tet Offensive aimed at


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seizing power in South Vietnam and causingthe defection of major elements of the Armyof the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). One ofthe enemy's chief objectives was to seizeSaigon's Tan Son Nhut Air Base. More than3,000 enemy soldiers had slipped into Saigonand launched an attack at about 3:25 AM.Bloody hand-to-hand fighting broke out.Within 3 minutes after the alert at Tan SonNhut, four armed helicopters were airborneand attacking the enemy. Meanwhile, MajorGeneral Robert R Williams, 1st AviationBrigade commander, was airborne in a command and control Huey checking into the12th Combat Aviation Group control net. Hesoon learned that the enemy, some in VietCong pajamas and others in standardNorth Vietnamese Army (NVA) uniforms,were attacking at 100 points along a 500-milefront.

The armed UH-1s, plus the few AH-1sin country at that time, were widely acclaimed as having played a key role in stopping the Tet Offensive. Later that year the 1stCavalry Division (Airmobile) broke the NV Asiege of Khe Sanh. By the end of 1968, theNVA and VC had been so badly hurt thatthey were unable to launch a major campaignover the next 2 years. This setback would nothave been possible without the firepower andmobility provided by Army Aviation. In fact,without Army helicopters the war mighthave been lost in early 1968.

After the impressive victories in 1968, theAmerican policy quietly shifted to turningthe war over to the ARVN and withdrawingAmerican forces. To protect the Americanwithdrawal, President Richard Nixon directed that the enemy's sanctuaries in Cambodia be destroyed. The resulting attacks in1970 by American and ARVN airmobileforces in conjunction with ground thrustswere most successful. The effectiveness of theairmobile assaults in the enemy's backyardbrought high praise from many high rankinggeneral officers. Lieutenant General John J.Tolson III, who had once commanded the 1st

AUGUST 982

Cavalry Division (Airmobile), said that the1st Cav airmobile operation far exceeded allexpectations ... But as U.S. forces were beingwithdrawn, the LAMSON 719 engagementawaited Army Aviation.

In 1971, as American forces were well ontheir way out of the Vietnam War, a largescale attack, dubbed LAMSON 719, waslaunched at the Ho Chi Minh Trail by ARVNground forces supported by U.S. Armyhelicopters in the transport and air cavalryroles.

The air assaults were met with intense andhighly sophisticated NV A antiaircraft weapons systems. Losses of helicopters were heavier than normally had been experienced inthe South Vietnamese environment. Formany years critics of the Army's airmobileconcepts had been claiming that helicopterswere too vulnerable in combat. The LAMSON719 events triggered a renewal of theircriticism.While the Army was concerned about thelosses, it was reasoned they were not excessive in light of the highly sophisticated battlefield environment of LAMSON 719. In fact,one of the most encouraging points to comeout of the LAMSON 719 exper ience concernedthe attack helicopters' successful encounterswith enemy tanks, which occurred on numerous occasions while the helicopters were flying reconnaissance. The standard procedurewas to engage the tanks until the Air Forcewould take over. When the fighter-bomberswere not available, the AH-l Cobras wouldengage the tanks-and at least 10 tanks weredestroyed. Had antitank weapons been available to all of the AH-1s and UH-ls, manymore enemy tanks \Yould have been killed.

The Army has not forgotten the lessons ofLAMSON 719. Today it has fielded newer,more modern, more survivable helicopterssuch as the UH-60 Black Hawk that carriesan infantry squad of 11 fully-equipped combattroops, and the improved CH-47D Chinookwhich can support more of the logisticalmission; also the greatly improved AH-1S

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FORTY YEARS O ARMY AVIATION

fully modernized Cobra and the emergingAH-64 Apache attack helicopter, both ofwhich can destroy enemy armor; plus thenew scout the AHIP, which stands for ArmyHelicopter Improvement Program and translates into a greatly improved OH-58 thatmeets the Army s immediate scout helicopterneeds. To those developments add constantlyimproving air assault tactics and flight tech-

nAH l obra attack helicopter

3

niques, ever improving training and standardization programs, plus other hardwareimprovements such as mast-mounted gunsights. All of this gives Army Aviation thecapability to fly and fight in adverse weatherconditions, to engage and defeat armor, andto survive against the sophisticated weaponsof the modern battlefield.

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VIEI 'AIR DEfENSESAgau st t t a c ~ Helioopters

ITED STATES aircraft have ne