Aristotle

Modus OperandiAristotle

Nature of EthicsEthics, in studying what ought to be in human affairs instead of what is, is a normative discipline.Yet, notice how much of what Aristotle does normatively (as in Politics) is tempered by observation; much of the work is descriptive psychology, not normative speculation.

Exactness of EthicsIn dealing with contingent, Ethics is not exact science and exactness is not to be expected from it. Conclusions are generally applicable, not universally; its arguments cannot be demonstrative. We must start with what is known to us (inductively). General reasoning on practical matters necessarily inexact; do not admit of invariable rules. Particular ethical cases not regular at all; we must attend to circumstances surrounding each case (I.3, I.7, II.2, IX.2).

Aristotles MethodGather opinions.Prune away inconsistencies.Test what is left with proverbs and conventional morality.

Key PassagesOur discussion will be adequate if its degree of clarity fits the subject matter; for we should not seek the same degree of exactness in all sorts of arguments alike, any more than in the products of different crafts (I.3; 1094b13-15).Each of our claims, then, ought to be accepted in the same way [as claiming to hold good usually], since the educated person seeks exactness in each area to the extent that the nature of the subject allows; for apparently it is just as mistaken to demand demonstrations from a rhetorician as to accept persuasive arguments from a mathematician (I.3; 1094b23-27).As far as its name goes, most people virtually agree [about what the good is], since both the many and the cultivated call it happiness, and suppose that living well and doing well are the same as being happy. But they disagree about what happiness is, and the many do not give the same answer as the wise (I.4; 1095a17-21).For while we should certainly begin from origins that are known, things are known in two ways; for some are known to us, some known unconditionally [but not necessarily known to us]. Presumably, then, the origin we should begin from is what is known to us (I.5; 1095b2-4).

Key PassagesHowever, we should examine the origin not only form the conclusion and premises [of a deductive argument], but also from what is said about it; for all the facts harmonize with a true account, whereas the truth soon clashes with a false one (I.8; 1098b9-12).As in the other cases, we must set out the appearances, and first of all go through the puzzles. In this way we must prove the common beliefs about these ways of being affectedideally, all the common beliefs, but if not all, most of them, and the most important. For if the objections are solved, and the common beliefs are left, it will be an adequate proof (VII.1; 1145b4-8)True arguments, then, would seem to be the most useful, not only for knowledge but also for the conduct of life. For since they harmonize with the facts, they are credible, and so encourage those who comprehend them to live by them (X.1; 1172b5-8).

Key PassagesHence the beliefs of the wise (Solon and Anaxagoras) would seem to accord with our arguments. These considerations do indeed produce some confidence. The truth, however, in questions about action is judged from what we do and how we live, since these are what control the answers to such questions. Hence we ought to examine what has been said by applying it to what we do and how we live; and if it harmonizes with what we do, we should accept it, but if it conflicts we should count it mere words (X.8; 1179a17-23).First, then, let us try to review any sound remarks our predecessors have made on particular topics. then let us study the collected political systems, to see from them what sorts of things preserve and destroy cities, and political systems of different types; and what causes some cities to conduct politics well, and some badly (X.9, 1181b16-21).

Disjunctive SyllogismA or B or C.~A.So, B or C.~C.So, B.

ExamplesNext we must examine what virtue is. Since there are three conditions arising in the soulfeelings, capacities and statesvirtue must be one of these.... First, then, neither virtues nor vices are feelings.... For these reasons the virtues are not capacities either.... If, then, the virtues are neither feelings nor capacities, the remaining possibility is that they are states (II.5; 1105b19-1106a12).The states of the soul by which we always grasp the truth and never make mistakes, about what can or cannot be otherwise, are scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, wisdom, and intuition. But none of the first threepractical wisdom, scientific knowledge, wisdom, is possible about origins. The remaining possibility, then, is that we have intuition about origins (VI.6, 1141a3-8).

ExamplesSome think it is nature that makes people good; some think it is habit; some that it is teaching. The contribution of nature clearly is not up to us, but results from some divine cause in those who have it, who are the truly fortunate ones. Arguments and teaching surely do not influence everyone, but the soul of the student needs to have been prepared by habits for enjoying and hating finely, like ground that is to nourish seed. For someone whose life follows his feelings would not even listen to an argument turning him away, or comprehend it if he did listen; and in that state how could he be persuaded to change? And in general feelings seem to yield to force, not to argument. Hence we must already in some way have a character suitable for virtue, for of what is fine and objecting to what is shameful (X.9, 1179b20-32).

3 SciencesTheoretical ScienceStudies things necessary (ungenerated, indestructible, and unchanging), such as Deity, heavenly bodies, principles of being, and mathematics.Reasoning is demonstrative: truth of conclusions is guaranteed by nature of reasoning (deductive and syllogistic) and by premises intuitively known to be true.Knowledge is for its own sake, the exercise of which is an end in itself.Non-deliberative, but contemplative, since contemplation is its own reward.Three Types of Theoretical Science: First Philosophy (also called Theology or Metaphysics), Mathematics (Geometry, Arithmetic, Astronomy, Harmonics, Optics, & Mechanics), and Physical Science (Psychology, Geology, Meteorology, Biology, Zoology, etc.).Political ScienceConcerning things contingent (generated, destructible, and changing) that have a source of change in something else, that can be otherwise, that aim at successful intervention in the course of events.Reasoning is probabilistic: truth of conclusions cannot be guaranteed by premises, as premises only very likely true.Knowledge for the sake of non-productive action, the exercise of which is an end in itself.Deliberative and contemplative, since human action requires deliberation.Two Types of Political Science: Political Science (good of state) & Ethics (good of individual in a state).

Productive ScienceConcerning things contingent (i.e., generated, destructible, and changing) that have source of change in something else, that can be otherwise, that aim at successful intervention in the course of events.Reasoning is probabilistic: truth of conclusions cannot be guaranteed by premises, as premises are suspect.Knowledge for the sake of some productive end, the exercise of which brings about that end.Deliberative and non-contemplative, since production requires no contemplation.Some Examples of Productive Science: Poetics (for education in the emotions), Rhetoric (for persuasion), Military Strategy (for victory), Household Management (for a good home), & Medicine (for health).

Ethics and PoliticsEthical aims are the same as political aims. Productive Sciences are subsumable under Political Sciences (that is why the same term used twice). Political Sciences studies (1) what happiness is, and (2) how happiness is to be achieved.Happiness is not product of action (for the sake of something), but a mode of living or end in itself. We do not live for the sake of bringing something about, but live for the sake of living.

Political vs. Productive Sciences (II.4; 1105a26-35)

Productive: Once something excellent () is produced, its excellence resides in product.Political: Once something excellent () is done, its excellence resides not in product, but in agent.

Vs. State (I.8; 1099a4-6 & X.6; 1176a33-b-2)It matters quite a bit whether we suppose that the best good consists in possessing or in using, in other words, in a state or in an activity [that actualizes the state]. For while someone may be in a state that achieves no good, that is, if he is asleep or inactive in some other way, this cannot be true of the activity; for it will necessarily do actions and to well in them.We said, then, that happiness is not a state. For if it were, someone might have it and yet be asleep for his whole life, living the life of a plant, or suffer the greatest misfortunes. If we do not approve of this, we count happiness as an activity rather than a state, as we said before.

EudaimoniaEnd of Living

Fire (Hot/Dry)Air (Hot/Wet)Earth (Cold/Dry)Water (Cold/Wet)Air

Dynamis & Energeia (DA V)But we must make distinctions concerning potentiality and actuality; for at the moment we are speaking of them in an unqualified way. (1) For there are knowers in that we should speak of a man as a knower because man is one of those who are knowers and have knowledge; (2) then there are knowers in that we speak straightaway of the man who has knowledge of grammar as a knower. (Each of these has a capacity but not in the same waythe one because his kind, his stuff, is of this sort, the other because he can if he so wishes contemplate, as long as nothing external prevents him.) (3) There is thirdly the man who is already contemplating, the man shoe is actually and in the proper sense knowing this particular A. Thus, both the first two, potential knowers, but the one by being altered through learning and frequent changes from an opposite disposition, the other by passing in another way from the state of having arithmetical or grammatical knowledge without exercising it to its exercise .

Hylomorphism (II.1)Now we speak of one particular kind of existent thing as substance, and under this heading we so speak of one thing qua matter, which in itself is not a particular, another qua shape and form, in virtue of which it is then spoken of as a particular, and a third qua the product of these two. And matter is potentiality, while form is actualityand that in two ways, first as knowledge is, and second as contemplation is.

Good as TelosEvery art and science (seems to) aim at some good.So, good is an end.

All agree that Eudaimonia is the end, but few agree on what Eudaimonia is. (1095b14-1096a5).Sensual: PleasurePolitical: Honor or ExcellenceTheoretical: Contemplation

Beyond SocratesOn the contrary, the aim of studies about action, as we say, is surely not to study and know about a given thing, but rather to act on our knowledge. Hence knowing about virtue is not enough, but we must also try to possess and exercise virtue, or become good in any other way (X.9; 1179b1-4).See also1103b26-32 & 1105b13-18.

Beyond Socrates or , study of character and habit. What happiness is and how it is to be achieved.Aims to make men happy (activity), not to know the nature of happiness.Ethics, then, a kind of conditioning of young to prepare them for reason.

Good in Itself vs. Good as MeansSome activities are ends: Contemplation.Some activities aim towards ends:a. Medicine aims towards health.Surgery aims at health.Prescription of regimen aims at health.b. Military strategy aims toward victory.

Arete: 2 TypesExcellence of character (Gr., ethik aret), is a certain stable state of soul that comes about through being habituated to cultivate virtue and avoid viceprimarily under the guidance of virtuous laws.Excellence of thought (Gr., dianotik aret), in contrast, comes about mostly through education over time and involves contemplation of eternal, ungenerated, and incorruptible things (the objects of theoretical science). EN 1103a14-17.

3 Goods for EudaimoniaExcellences (Psychical): The predominant goodsthe virtues.Bodily: health, size, tallness, etc.External: e.g., luck, fortune, wealth, etc.

All are needed for happiness: full stock of virtues and some small stock of other goods.

3 Goods (1.8)Goods are divided, then, into three types, some called external, some goods of the soul, others goods of the body. We say that the goods of the soul are goods most fully, and more than the others, and we take actions and activities of the soul to be [goods] of the soul. And so our account [of the good] is right, to judge by this belief anyhowand it is an ancient belief, and accepted by philosophers.

External Goods (I.8)Nonetheless, happiness evidently also needs external gods to be added, as we said, since we cannot, or cannot easily, do fine actions if we lack the resources. For, first of all, in many actions we use friends, wealth, and political power just as we use instruments. Further, deprivation of certain [externals]for instance, good birth, good children, beautymar our blessedness. For we do not altogether have the character of happiness if we look utterly repulsive or are ill-born, solitary, or childless; and we have it even less, presumably, if our children or friends are totally bad, or were good but have died. And so, as we have said, happiness would seem to need this sort of prosperity added also. That is why some people identify happiness with good fortune, and others identify it with virtue.

Complete Life (I.9)It [happiness] needs a complete life because life includes many reversals of fortune, good and bad, and the most prosperous person may fall into a terrible disaster in old age, as the Trojan stories tell us about Priam. If someone has suffered these sorts of misfortunes and comes to a miserable end, no one counts him happy.

Primacy of Virtues (I.10)But surely it is quite wrong to take our cue from someones fortunes. For his doing well or badly does not rest on them. A human life, as we said, needs these added, but activities in accord with virtue control happiness, and the contrary activities control its contrary. Indeed, the present puzzle is further evidence for our account [of happiness]. For no human achievement has the stability of activities in accord with virtue, since these seem to be more enduring even than our knowledge of the sciences. Indeed, the most honourable among the virtues themselves are more enduring than the other virtues, because blessed people devote their lives to them more fully and more continually than to anything elsefor this continual activity would seem to be the reason we do not forget them

Misfortunes (I.11)Misfortunes, then, even to the person himself, differ, and some have a certain gravity and weight for his life, whereas others would seem to be lighter. The same is true for the misfortunes of his friends; and it matters whether they happen to living or to dead peoplemuch more than it matters whether lawless and terrible crimes are committed before a tragic drama begins or in the course of it .

Magnanimity (IV.3)Still, he [the magnanimous person] will also have a moderate attitude to riches and power and every sort of good and bad fortune, however it turns out. He will be neither excessively pleased by good fortune nor excessively distressed by ill fortune, since he does not even regard honor as the greatest good.

Need of 3 Good (VII.13)That is why all think the happy life is pleasant and weave pleasure into happiness, quite reasonably. For no activity is complete if it is impeded, and happiness is something complete. That is why the happy person needs to have goods of the body and external goods added [to good activities], and needs fortune also, so that he will not be impeded in these ways.Some maintain, on the contrary, that we are happy when we are broken on the wheel, or fall into terrible misfortunes, provided that we are good. Whether they mean to or not, these people are talking nonsense.And because happiness needs fortune added, some believe good fortune is the same as happiness. But it is not. For when it is excessive, it actually impedes happiness; and then, presumably, it is no longer rightly called good fortune, since the limit [up to which it is good] is defined in relation to happiness .

External Goods Needed (X.9)But happiness will need external prosperity also, since we are human beings; for our nature is not self-sufficient for contemplation, but we need a healthy body, and need to have food and the other services provided. Still, even though no one can be blessedly happy without external goods, we must not think that to be happy we will need many large goods. For self-sufficiency and action do not depend upon success.

3 Conditions for Right Actions (II.4)Knowledge: Actor must know what he is doing,Will: Actor must deliberately choose to do what he is doing, and Conditioning: Actor must choose what he does because of his moral stability.

3 Contenders for Arete (II.5; 1105b19-28)Next we must examine what virtue is. Since there are three conditions arising in the soulfeelings, capacities and statesvirtue must be one of these.... First, then, neither virtues nor vices are feelings.... For these reasons the virtues are not capacities either.... If, then, the virtues are neither feelings nor capacities, the remaining possibility is that they are states.

Whence EthicsEthics ( ) gets name from habit (), not from nature (). Falling stone analogy.Things by nature have potentiality, then actualized.Excellences first exercised, then implanted by repetition.

List of Virtues (II-V)Vice of ExcessExcellenceVice of Defect1. Fear and confidence (III.6-9):foolhardinessbravery (a) cowardice2. Pleasures and pains (III.10-12):self-indulgencetemperance () insensibility3. Giving and taking money (IV.1):prodigalitygenerosity () stinginess4. Amount of money (IV.2):vulgaritymagnificence () niggardliness5. Honor and distinction (IV.3):vanitymagnanimity () pusillanimity6. Small honors (IV.4): love of honorno name () indifference to honor7. Anger (IV.5):irascibilityindignation () sedateness8. Truthfulness (IV.7):boastfulnesstruthfulness () self-deprecation9. Amusement (IV.8):buffoonerywit () boorishness10. Pleasantness with people (IV.6):obsequiousnessfriendliness () ill-temper11. Fear of dishonor (IV.9):*********shame ()*********12. Pleasure and Pain (X.1-5):spiteproper indignation () envy13. Justice and Injustice (V):**********justice () injustice

Problem of No PrinciplesThe Virtuous Person

Appeal to Medicine (X.5)To the excellent person, then, what is wished will be what is wished in reality, while to the base person what is wished is whatever it turns out to be [to that person]. Similarly in the case of bodies, really healthy things are healthy to people in good condition, while other things are healthy to sickly people, and the same is true of what is bitter, sweet, hot, heavy and so on.For the excellent person judges each sort of thing correctly and in each case what is true appears to him. For each state has its own special view of what is fine and pleasant, and presumably the excellent person is far superior because he sees what is true in each case, being a sort of standard and measure of what is fine and pleasant (III.4; 1113a25-35).But in all such cases it seems that what is really so is what appears so to the excellent person. If this is correct, as it seems to be, and virtue, for example the good person insofar as he is good, is the measure of each thing, then what appear pleasures to him will also be pleasures, and what is pleasant will be what he enjoys. And if what he finds objectionable appears pleasant to someone, that is nothing surprising, since human beings suffer many sorts of corruption and damage. It is not pleasant, however, except to these people in these conditions.... Hence the pleasures that complete the activities of the complete and blessedly happy man, whether he has one activity or more than one, will be called the human pleasures to the fullest extent. The other pleasures will be human in a secondary and even more remote way corresponding to the character of the activities

Appeal to Medicine (X.3)What is healthy, sweet, bitter, etc. to one ill is distorted by illness.What is proper moral conduct to one immoral is distorted by immoral soul.We define health by examining healthy person.So, we define morality by examining moral person.As we have often said, then, what is honorable and pleasant is what is so to the excellent person; and to each type of person the activity expressing his own proper state is most choiceworthy; hence the activity expressing virtue is most choiceworthy to the excellent person (X.6).

Contemplation (X.7)For, this activity is supreme, since understanding is the supreme element in us, and the objects of understanding are the supreme objects of knowledge. Besides, it is the most continuous activity, since we are more capable of continuous study than of any continuous action. We think pleasure must be mixed into happiness; and it is agreed that the activity expressing wisdom is the pleasantest of the activities expressing virtue. At any rate, philosophy seems to have remarkably pure and firm pleasures; and it is reasonable for those who have knowledge to spend their lives more pleasantly than those who seek it. Moreover, the self-sufficiency we spoke of will be found in study above all.... Besides, study seems to be liked because of itself alone, since it has no result beyond having studied. But from the virtues concerned with action we try to a greater or lesser extent to gain something beyond the action itself.