argument against the principle of possible alternatives

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Is there a successful Frankfurt-style argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities?

I will show that there is a successful Frankfurt-style argument against the principle of alternative

possibilities (PAP). PAP states that "a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could

have done otherwise" (Frankfurt, 1969; 829). To show that PAP is mistaken, the focus will be on direct

moral responsibility. This is a matter of the freedom a person has when choosing whether they should

perform an action. This freedom is not possible if that person is indirectly morally responsible. For

example, Zoe can choose to pour a drink on the floor and therefore is directly morally responsible for

making a mess. However, Zoe does not choose to drop that drink when someone knocked it out of her

hand and therefore is indirectly morally responsible for making a mess. Moreover, people who are

coerced, hypnotized, and/or forced to perform actions are also instances of the latter sense; that agent

is indirectly morally responsible because they did not perform that action freely, and could not have

voluntarily chosen to do otherwise. Since direct moral responsibility are my concerns, I shall omit direct

when talking about moral responsibility.

Consequently, I will argue that a person's choice of alternative possibilities are not necessary for them to

be held morally responsible. In section one, I shall outline a Frankfurt-style argument against PAP. Henry

Frankfurt (1969) originally devised this argument to show that agents could not have alternative

possibilities and still be morally responsible for an action. Next, section two presents Widerker's

dilemma to Frankfurt-style arguments. This dilemma defends PAP by stating that in Frankfurt-style

arguments either (1) the event that occurs prior to a person deciding on whether to perform an action

causally determines that person's action, or (2) it does not. Lastly, section three will demonstrate that

Widerker's defense of PAP fails. This will be done by presenting a sophisticated Frankfurt-style argument

that retorts horn (2) of the dilemma.

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§1

I shall elucidate the aim of Frankfurt-style arguments prior to describing a case that is in the style of

Frankfurt's original argument. In his article Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility (1969),

Frankfurt presents a counterexample to PAP. PAP is used to argue for the incompatibilist position in the

free will debate. This position maintains that free will and moral responsibility are not compatible with

determinism. Determinism proposes that every event is causally determined, if determinism is true then

agents cannot avoid the performance of their actions. As a result, incompatibilists argue that if agents

do not have alternative possibilities regarding their actions, then agents have no freedom over their

actions and therefore should not be held morally responsible for them. Since we want to hold people

accountable for their actions, incompatibilists conclude that determinism is false and that agents must

have alternative possibilities to be held morally responsible. Frankfurt's counterexample to PAP, and

hence incompatibilists, argues that that "there may be circumstances that make it impossible for a

person to avoid performing some action without those circumstances in any way bringing it about that

he performs that action" (1969; 837). What this states is that an agent's ability to do otherwise, is not

required for them to be held morally responsible (Frankfurt, 1969; 836). Hence, contra to the aim of the

incompatibilist, PAP is false because agents can be morally responsible for performing an action and not

have an alternative possibility other than to perform that action.

I shall now describe a case in the style of Frankfurt's argument (1969; 835-836). I shall call this an

Original Frankfurt-Style Argument (OFSA). Alice is deciding whether she should kill her brother in law,

Bob, after he catches her being unfaithful to her husband (Bob's brother). Unbeknownst to Alice, Carl

also wants Alice to kill Bob. Carl possesses powers of telepathy and mind control, and hence can make

Alice decide that she should kill Bob if Alice does not decide so. Through his powers of telepathy, if Carl

reads Alice's mind and sees a certain event prior to her decision of deciding to kill Bob (for example

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Alice's worrying), then Carl will not evoke his psychic powers as this event indicates that she will perform

that action. Conversely, if Carl sees that Alice does not exhibit this prior event of worry, that brings

around Alice's decision to kill Bob, then Carl will use his powers of mind control and change Alice's

mental state so that she decides to kill Bob. As things happen, Alice freely makes the choice to kill Bob,

so Carl does not evoke his psychic powers, and Alice voluntarily kills Bob.

Prima facie, OFSA demonstrates two things. Firstly, Alice is morally responsible for killing Bob because

her decision was not influenced by Carl's presence, which ultimately means that she decided and acted

freely in the process of deciding to kill Bob and actually doing it. Secondly, it demonstrates that she is

not free to do otherwise. This is so because there is a mechanism, namely Carl and his psychic powers,

which ensure that she performs the action of killing Bob. This mechanism's presence in OFSA gives the

agent no alternative possibility because it depends upon whether that agent does or does not exhibit a

certain event prior to the decision of whether to perform an action or not. Thus, it seems valid that

OFSA refutes PAP because it describes a scenario where an agent is morally responsible for an action,

and has no alternative possibilities.

§2

Having presented OFSA, I shall consider Widerker's objection to it. As stated previously, Frankfurt views

that the error of PAP lies in the fact that "there may be circumstances that make it impossible for a

person to avoid performing some action without those circumstances in any way bringing it about that

he performs that action" (1969; 837). Widerker dubs this fact as an IRR situation (1995; 247). Hence, for

a Frankfurt-style argument to disprove PAP it must describe an IRR situation; a circumstance where an

agent is morally responsible for an action, and has no alternative possibility other than to perform said

action. Widerker states that whilst IRR situations falsify PAP, he argues that Frankfurt-style arguments,

like OFSA, are not IRR situations (1995; 251). Widerker's claim that OFSA does not provide an IRR

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situation sets up his dilemma defense of PAP. Focusing on the relation between the prior event that

occurs in Alice before she decides, and the event of Alice actually deciding to murder Bob, Widerker

asserts that in OFSA either (1) the prior event in Alice's brain indicates a determined state of affairs that

Alice will later decide to kill Bob, or (2) it is not (1995; 251). I shall now elucidate each of the horns of

Widerker's dilemma and show how he concludes that OFSA does not refute PAP.

Horn (1) of the dilemma proposes that OFSA assumes a causally determined situation. If this is the

assumption, then OFSA describes a case where an agent's decision (Alice's choice to kill Bob) is a

necessary consequence of an event prior to that decision. What this states is that regardless as to

whether Alice's choice was made freely or was forced upon her, because the mechanism (Carl and his

psychic powers) ensure that a certain action is performed (Alice killing Bob), that action is determined.

This is problematic for those refuting PAP. If an agent's choice was causally determined, and hence they

could not have done otherwise, then the PAP defender could respond to OFSA claiming that the

counterexample begs the question against incompatibilists. In other words, because incompatibilists

claim that people are only morally responsible for actions if they are not determined, and hence have

alternative possibilities, they will say that Alice is not morally responsible for killing Bob because the

events that led to that action were determined. PAP defenders conclude that OFSA does not refute PAP

because it does not give an IRR situation; whilst the OFSA provides a case where an agent has no

alternative possibilities, if incompatibilism is true then that agent is not morally responsible, because

they had no freedom over their action.

Horn (2) suggests that OFSA describes a situation where the agent's decision is not determined by an

event prior to their decision (Widerker, 1995; 250). If events are not causally determined then what

entails is that agents in these described scenarios will have alternative possibilities. This is problematic

because for OFSA to refute PAP it must describe a situation where an agent is morally responsible and

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does not have alternative possibilities. Carl and his psychic powers will only eliminate Alice's alternative

possibilities, and hence ensure that Alice kills Bob, if Alice either exhibits or does not exhibit the prior

event of worrying. Therefore, the mechanism (Carl and his psychic powers) is dependent on this prior

event. However, if OFSA is a situation that is not determined, then the prior event may only indicate

that an action might be performed; if Carl reads Alice's mind and see that she is worrying this prior

event of worry does not determine that she actually decide to kill bob; Alice may worry and decide to

not kill him. Moreover, Alice may worry and in fact decide to kill Bob, but because the events in the

described scenario are not determined it follows that Alice had alternative possibilities available to her.

Therefore, if OFSA is not determined then it does not disprove PAP because it does not give an IRR

situation; the agent has alternative possibilities.

Having giving Widerker's dilemma and showing that OFSA does not show PAP to fail, I shall develop

OFSA so that the situation presented is one that does not presuppose determinism, and hence will

overcome horn (2) of Widerker's objection.

§3

For this development to successfully respond to the dilemma defense, the described situation must

involve a mechanism that is not dependent upon a prior event. To develop OFSA so that it overcomes

horn (2) I shall follow Mele and Robb's article Rescuing Frankfurt-style Cases (1998; 101-105). In this

Sophisticated Frankfurt-Style Argument (SFSA), the described situation will involve an indeterministic

sequence of events that results in an agent's performance of an action, and a determined sequence of

events that also results in that agent's performance of said action. Here, the deterministic sequence is

the mechanism that ensures that the agent performs the specified action. The sequence will cause the

action only if the indeterministic sequence does not result in the action (Mele and Robb, 1998; 102). I

shall now present the SFSA, which follows Mele and Robb's response to Widerker. In Alice's choice of

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whether she should or shouldn't kill Bob, she engages in a decision making process. This decision making

process is indeterministic and will result in either her choice to kill Bob, or not kill Bob. Unbeknownst to

Alice, Carl used his psychic powers to initiate a deterministic sequence in her. This sequence forces Alice

to decide to kill Bob and perform that action. This deterministic sequence does not consider any prior

event that Alice may exhibit, Carl simply evokes his psychic powers of mind control and not his powers

of telepathy. Thus, when Alice kills Bob, Carl will believe that her action was a result of his psychic

powers. It is important to note that Alice is completely unaware that Carl initiated this deterministic

sequence in her, thus it does not influence her indeterministic decision making process. As things

happen, Alice's indeterministic process resulted in her freely deciding that she should kill Bob, and Carl's

deterministic psychic powers played no role in that result.

SFSA overcomes horn (2) of the dilemma defense because Carl evoking his psychic powers and initiating

the deterministic does not depend upon a prior event; Carl evokes his powers regardless as whether

Alice does or does not decide to kill Bob, this ensures that Alice has no alternative possibilities.

Moreover, SFSA gives a situation where an agent's decision is not causally determined; whilst the

deterministic process ensures that the action of Alice killing Bob occurs, it does not influence Alice's

indeterministic process of deciding to perform that action. Alice freely chooses to kill Bob, and is morally

responsible, because Alice is unaware of Carl's presence and hence is not influenced by him. Therefore,

SFSA describes a scenario where an agent is morally responsible and could not have done otherwise,

and hence PAP fails since SFSA gives an IRR situation.

Widerker could respond saying that SFSA does not refute PAP because it does not present an IRR

situation (2006; 55). Widerker argues that there are two problems with SFSA. Firstly, Widerker questions

how it is the indeterministic sequence causes Alice to kill Bob and not the deterministic sequence (2006;

55). This is problematic because if the deterministic sequence decides Alice's action then Alice did not

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cause the decision, and therefore Alice isn't morally responsible for killing Bob because she did not have

control over that action. The second problem is that if we assume that the deterministic sequence is

pre-empt, it is possible that Alice could decide not to kill Bob and hence the deterministic sequence will

not ensure that Alice kills Bob (2006; 55). In their awareness of these two problems, Mele and Robb

develop SFSA further to respond to Widerker's objection (1998; 104-105). I shall apply their

development to SFSA; suppose that Alice's brain has two different decision nodes; the firing of N1

represents that Alice decided to kill Bob; the firing of N2 represents Alice did not decide to kill Bob.

These nodes fire when either the deterministic and indeterminist sequence occur and hit a decision

node Alice's brain. Alice acts in a certain way if a node fires. Depending on what node is fired and by

what sequence will determine whether the deterministic or indeterministic sequence caused Alice to

decide to kill Bob. If both sequences hit N1 at the same time, Alice's indeterministic sequence fires N1

because the indeterministic sequence would preempt the deterministic sequence. The deterministic

sequence would make Alice decide to kill Bob, if the deterministic sequence fires N1 and the

indeterministic sequence fires N2. The deterministic sequence would prevail because this will ensure

that Alice kills Bob. The fact that sequences are pre-empted and prevail get around the two problems.

Widerker could respond to this development saying that PAP is still not refuted because it does not

present an IRR situation. Widerker would claim that the deterministic sequence makes it impossible for

Alice to avoid deciding to kill Bob, and hence he the developed case still begs the question against

incompatibilists. If Alice's indeterministic process did not result in her decided to kill Bob then the

deterministic process will force her to do this, because she is unaware that she is being forced,

Incompatibilists will claim that PAP is not refuted because Alice is not morally responsible since she did

not choose to perform that action. Thus PAP remains valid.

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There is general consensus that "no non-question begging example [of Frankfurt-style arguments] can

be constructed that does not involve at least some alternative possibilities"(Capes, 2010; 63). Due to

this, attention is turned to whether the remaining alternatives are morally significant enough to

transforms agents from being not morally responsible to being morally responsible, here the alternative

"grounds" the agent (Capes, 2010; 63). Drawing on Pereboom's ideas(2000; 128-130) I shall evaluate the

developed SFSA to see whether the alternative possibilities are morally significant enough so that Alice

can be deemed morally responsible.

Consider that Alice is a free agent and the only way that she would decide to not kill Bob will be due to

moral reasons; because she is adamant that she wants and is going to kill Bob, the moral reasons that it

is wrong to kill someone will have to occur in her with enough force to make her not decide on

performing that action. This moral reason does not causally determine whether Alice will decide to kill

Bob or not, and the second horn is of the dilemma defense is resisted. Alice must be willing to consider

the moral reason as to why she should not kill Bob, This process is indeterministic since it could either

result in the decision or her killing bob or not killing Bob; there is an alternative possibility that she could

at the last minute decide to not kill Bob if there is enough force from these moral reasons. Hence this is

the moral responsibility that incompatibilists care about; Alice must be freely decide whether or not she

should consider these moral reasons, and ultimately decide whether act on them (and not kill Bob), or

act against them(and kill him). To ensure that Alice does kill Bob, the deterministic sequence of Carl

using his psychic powers is initiated regardless as to whether Alice exhibits a prior event, Carl just evokes

his powers of telepathy (which are blocked off from Alice's consciousness), hence Alice has no

alternative possibilities. In this case, if Alice considers the moral reasons to not kill Bob and decides

against them, then she will kill Bob and be morally responsible for that action because whilst Carl's

presence made her not able to do otherwise it did not affect her decision. Conversely, if Alice considered

the moral reasons to not kill Bob and decided that they had enough force to cause her to not kill him,

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then the mechanism will force her to do so. The fact that Alice is even having to consider the moral

reasons of the alternative possibility (not having to kill Bob) grounds her in being morally responsible for

that action even if she did not choose to perform it. This is because she is freely deciding whether or not

to perform am action that is obviously morally wrong. Therefore, this developed and evaluated SFSA

gives an IRR situation; Alice freely decides to perform an action, making her morally responsible, any

alternative possibilities that are forceful moral reasons in the described scenario ground her to be

morally responsible even if she did not choose to perform that action, however there will not be

alternative possibilities due to a deterministic mechanism.

Having presented a sophisticated Frankfurt-style argument that overcomes horn (2) of the dilemma

defense objection, and is developed such that it is an indeterministic IRR situation, which accommodates

for the moral responsibility that are the concerns of incompatibilists, I conclude that PAP is false.

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Bibliography

Capes, J., 2010., 'The W-Defense'. Philosophical Studies, 150, pp. 61-77.

Frankfurt, H., 1969. 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility'. The Journal of Philosophy, 66(23),

pp. 829-839.

Mele, A & Robb, D., 1998. ‘Rescuing Frankfurt-style Cases’. The Philosophical Review, 107, pp. 97-112.

Pereboom, D., 2000. 'Alternative Possibilities and Causal Histories'. Philosophical Perspectives, 14, pp.

119-137.

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Widerker, D., 1995. 'Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities'.

The Philosophical Review, 104(2), pp. 247-261.

Widerker, D., 2006. ‘Blameworthiness and Frankfurt’s Argument Against the Principle of Alternative

Possibilities’, in D. Widerker & M. McKenna (eds), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities:

Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. England: Ashgate, pp. 53-73.

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