ardex (asean regional disaster emergency response ... · adelina kamal, arnel capili, janggam...
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ARDEX (ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise) 2018 Scenario Development
Natech Disaster Risk Management
Presented in Natech Risk Management Workshop 2018 5-7 September 2018, Berlin, Germany
Fatma Lestari, Agustino Zulys, Sjahrul M Nasri, Agus Wibowo, Achmad Yurianto, Dicky Pelupessy, Riyadh Firdaus, Teguh Cahyono, Satrio Pratomo, Yasuhito Jibiki, Imamura, Jatar Sagala, Risang Vibatsu Adi, Sony
Maulana, Gama Widyaputra, Ambi Pradiptha, Syahri Choirrini, Cynthia Febrina Maharani, Fiori Amelia Putri, Adelina Kamal, Arnel Capili, Janggam Adhityawarma, Mizan Bisri, Agustina Trunay, Dipo Summa
Disaster Research & Response Centre Universitas Indonesia Department of Occupational Health & Safety, Faculty of Public Health, Universitas Indonesia
Outline • Background • ARDEX Scenario Development • ARDEX Scenario Theme, Methods & Location • Industrial Chemical Vulnerability Assessment • Industrial Toxic Chemical, Fire & Explosion
Modeling
Disclaimer: This material is prepared under communication with the AHA Centre and National Disaster Management Authority (BNPB) of Government of Indonesia as the co-organizer of the 2018 ASEAN Regional Disaster and Emergency response Exercise throughout its preparation process. The presentation is not made on behalf of the AHA Centre or BNPB.
Background – Indonesia
• Indonesia lies between 3 tectonic plates
• Surrounded by ring of fire > 160 active volcanoes
• Number of islands > 17,000 islands
• Population > 250 millions people
• Diversity in religions, cultures, ethnics & traditions prone to disaster
Background – Natech Disasters • Natural disasters may initiate technological disasters release of flammable materials,
hazardous materials, toxic chemicals, nuclear radiation and oil spills. • Damaging consequences of natech disaster for public health and safety may be
catastrophes. • Huge number of fatalities, significant environmental pollution, massive damages to asset
and properties, significant nuclear radiation contamination, major business disruptions and impact on country’s reputation.
• The result of the 29th The ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) meeting in October 2016 in Manado, North Sulawesi, Indonesia: Indonesia to Host the ARDEX-18
• ARDEX Exercise Location: Cilegon - Risks to volcano eruption (Krakatau in 1883), earthquake, tsunami & industrial disaster – NATECH Disasters
Example of Natech Disasters in Indonesia – Tsunami Aceh 2004 3.2 Damage to Oil Delivery Terminal at Krueng Raya
The terminal is owned by PERTAMINA (Indonesian public oil corporation), and is managed by its
branch office in Band Aceh. Spilled-oil-containment-dike was made from soil embankment,
enclosing the tank yard as shown in Figure 2. It was 317 m long and had 2.5 m trapezoid base width,
0.8 m trapezoid surface length, and 1.2 m height. There was no tide embankment too.
Table 2 Dimensions of oil storage tanks in the oil delivery terminal
Specification Liquid level at the time of the tsunamiNo. of
tank Applica- tion
Diameter m
Height m
Oil storagekl
Height of Oil
Installa-tion
year
Criteria
applied Damage notes
1 Gasoline 17.07 11.11 250 1.1 1986 API Moved several hundreds of meters
2 Distillate 17.07 11.11 600 2.6 1986 API
3 Distillate 17.07 11.11 0 0 1986 API Moved several hundreds of meters
4 Kerosene 17.07 11.11 1,500 6.6 1986 API
5 Jet fuel 10.98 6.23 200 2.5 1986 API Moved 0.70 meters
6 Jet fuel 10.98 6.23 413 5.3 1986 API
7 Gasoline 18.10 10.98 250 1.1 1990 API Moved 314 meters
8 Kerosene 18.10 10.98 1,600 7.0 1990 API
9 Distillate 18.10 10.98 549 2.4 1990 API
Photo 6 Three tanks drifted about 300 m and one moved 0.7 m
Courtesy of Aceh Province Office
• Oil & Gas Company in Krueng Raya, Banda Aceh
• 3 oil tanks moved to 314 m • Contains: Oil, gasoline, jet fuel,
destillates • Height of Tsunami: 20 m
yard side in the wall section. Distribution bars were Φ9 mm. There was no tide embankment.
Figure 1 Central part of cement factory and movement locus of tanks
No.5 - 10 tanks for heavy oil Tsunami
Closed
Circuit
Silo
Technical
& C.C.R
Coal siloGuard
No.3
No.1 No.2
Pozzolan warehouse
Siltstone
silo
Limestone
silo
Power
plant
Clinker
silo
No.4
Broken
Washed out
Dike
hut
No.3 tank
No.2 tank
Marks of the heavy oil leak
Courtesy of Prof. Ö. Aydan
Photo 1 Factory after suffering calamity as seen from ridge
Pozzolan warehouse
Cement ship
Tank yard (behind the buildings)
the direction of coal silo. Part of factory yard was polluted with leaked heavy fuel oil. Fire did not
occur, maybe, because of the earlier power failure than the tsunami coming.”
The engineer who witnessed these events was on the second floor of a building, named Technical &
C.C.R, in the factory when the earthquake occurred. About 5 minutes after the 1st earthquake, he
went outside to observe situation. He then returned and went outside again after the 2nd earthquake.
After a while, since one guard came running to escape from guard hut located on the sea side, he also
escaped in the direction of higher ground with 15 other persons. There were about 100 persons in the
factory when the tsunami inundated. About 50 of them escaped to higher ground etc. and survived.
Almost none of them had any knowledge about tsunami.
3.1.4 Restoration
It was necessary for cement-transport ships to enter the harbor and to pack cement at the pier
for inland shipment. 1,600 ton of cement a day needed to be sent down to various parts of Aceh
province. According to the HP of LAFARGE7) dated June 23, 2008, resumption of factory
operation was planned in 2009 and would have a production capacity of 1.6 million tons per
year, up from 1.3 million before the tsunami.
Photo 2 No.3 tank. 50% full of distillate Photo 3 No.1 tank remained inside the dike(Courtesy of Penta-Ocean Construction Co., Ltd)
Photo 4 This part of the dike was brokenthrough
Photo 5 The part where No.3 tank broke through the dike viewed from outside.
the direction of coal silo. Part of factory yard was polluted with leaked heavy fuel oil. Fire did not
occur, maybe, because of the earlier power failure than the tsunami coming.”
The engineer who witnessed these events was on the second floor of a building, named Technical &
C.C.R, in the factory when the earthquake occurred. About 5 minutes after the 1st earthquake, he
went outside to observe situation. He then returned and went outside again after the 2nd earthquake.
After a while, since one guard came running to escape from guard hut located on the sea side, he also
escaped in the direction of higher ground with 15 other persons. There were about 100 persons in the
factory when the tsunami inundated. About 50 of them escaped to higher ground etc. and survived.
Almost none of them had any knowledge about tsunami.
3.1.4 Restoration
It was necessary for cement-transport ships to enter the harbor and to pack cement at the pier
for inland shipment. 1,600 ton of cement a day needed to be sent down to various parts of Aceh
province. According to the HP of LAFARGE7) dated June 23, 2008, resumption of factory
operation was planned in 2009 and would have a production capacity of 1.6 million tons per
year, up from 1.3 million before the tsunami.
Photo 2 No.3 tank. 50% full of distillate Photo 3 No.1 tank remained inside the dike(Courtesy of Penta-Ocean Construction Co., Ltd)
Photo 4 This part of the dike was brokenthrough
Photo 5 The part where No.3 tank broke through the dike viewed from outside.
Tsunami Damage to Oil Storage Tank. Yozo Goto. Y. Goto, “Tsunami Damage to Oil Storage Tanks,” 14th World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, 2008, Beijing, China, ftp://jetty.ecn.purdue.edu/spujol/Andres/files/15-0005.PDF [accessed May.9, 2018]
• Understand the mechanism of ASEAN cooperation in disaster management
• Improve regional and international cooperation in disaster risk reduction management
• Invest on disaster risk reduction to increase disaster resilience
• Invest on preparedness activities to strengthen emergency response process and better result on recovery, rehabilitation & reconstruction
Global
• Implementation of the mandate in AADMER
• Realizing the 2025 ASEAN Vision on Disaster Management
• Understand and Implement the ASEAN Declaration "One ASEAN One Response"
• Implement output of 29th ACDM to ARDEX 2018
• Understand EAS Statement on Rapid Disaster Response
• Train Technical and Tactical Capacity of operational of disaster prevention interoperability in ASEAN region
Regional
• Implementation of Republic of Indonesia Medium Term Development Plan (RPJMN) 2015 – 2019 regarding the goal to increase of resilience, and strengthening the disaster management countermeasure at national and sub-nationals.
• Increase the capacity of Cilegon city, location of ARDEX-18, is one of the 136 cities/districts with high economic growth & high disaster risk index
• The needs to increase preparedness for area with possibility for industrial disaster
• Train technical and operational tactical skills as well as integrated disaster management especially industrial disaster between local government & central government
National
Exercise Urgency
Exercise Targets
The endeavor to integrate the coordination mechanism of the Indonesian Disaster Management Emergency Command System (SKPDB) with regional coordination protocol / mechanism (JOCCA) and other international organizations for the fast of joint responses.
TARGET 1
.TARGET
2
TARGET 3
Additional input for ASEAN regional contigency plan to support affected ASEAN Member State
TARGET 4
Tested the tchnical and tactical ability of personnel in emergency disaster management
TARGET 5
Increased understanding of the role and function of National Focal Point and AHA Center in disaster emergency management.
Test the procedure of resource mobilization and emergency handling both civil and military
ARDEX 2018 Exercise Theme “Strengthening ASEAN’s collective response capacity through national leadership, regional enhancement & international support”
REASONS FOR SELECTING CILEGON AS THE LOCATION FOR ARDEX 2018
EXERCISE
• High risk to the threat of 8.5 M earthquake, which can trigger tsunami due to its location is facing and adjacent to indo-Australian and Eurasian plate subduction zone. Relative to Sunda Strait, it is located in southern direction.
• It is one of 136 city / District Economic Growth Areas with High Disaster Risk Index
• Located on the western peak of Java Island which connects Java and Sumatra Island, with administrative area of 175.5 Km2
• Known as “City of Steel” in terms of hundred of industries on both small enterprises until big company/enterprises, it cause Cilegon prone to disaster as city with intensive economic growth and activity
• Based on disaster risk assessment result, the potential loss total in Cilegon City caused by tsunami disaster was 319.159 billion Rupiah
9
PEMETAAN KAWASAN RAWAN BENCANA KIMIADI PROVINSI BANTEN
18
Sumber : Citra Satelit Google Earth, Tahun 2012
ARDEX 2018 in Cilegon
Source: Mapping of Chemical Disaster Prone Areas. Health Crisis Center. 2016
EARTHQUAKE RISK PROFILE UPDATE: Megathurst Sunda Strait
Legend
Megathrust Sunda Strait
M 8.7; a= 5.99; b= 1.15
Megathrust West-Central
Java
M 8.7; a= 5.55; b= 1.08
Subduction
Fault linesSubduction Zone segmentation
The 2017 Seismic Hazard Map of Indonesia (MPW & PusGen, 2017)
EARTHQUAKE RISK PROFILE UPDATE: Megathurst Sunda StraitSeismotectonicmap of Sumatra and Java Island – Seismic sources influencing Jakarta city(Irsyam et al., 2015)
12
Sumber Gempa
ARDEX-18 | Tsunami ScenarioTsunami Simulation using TOAST Model, Earthquake source M 8.7 from Sunda Megathurst(Courtesy of BMKG)
ARDEX-18 | Tsunami ScenarioTsunami Simulation using TOAST Model, Earthquake source M 8.7 from Sunda Megathurst –Maximum Tsunami Height (Courtesy of BMKG)
IMPACT SCENARIO
• Based on the results of the quick assessment carried out by the Centre and the disasterescalation, the Government of Cilegon activates disaster emergency response status for 14 days.
• Other detailed impact scenario is available with BNPB
Casualties
Died 1.268 people
Missing 1.345 people
Injured 14.039 people
IDPs 61.015 people
Trapped in ruins 1.274 people
The Damaged building
Heavily Damaged 10.000 house
Moderate Damaged 3.000 house
Light Damaged 5.000 house
Courtesy: BNPB
https://www.bapeten.go.id/peta/
Radiological Facilities in ARDEX-18 LocationNOTE: Impact to Radiological Facilities only exercised during TTX
19
www.companyname.com © 2015 Planner PowerPoint Template. All Rights
Reserved.
1st Goal – The integration of the national coordination mechanism (MAC Center) with regional coordination protocols / mechanisms (JOCCA) & regional countries and international organizations for joint response speed will be tested.
3rd Goal – Test of
resources
mobilization
procedures on both
civil or military
2nd Goal – The realization of understanding enhancement of National Focal Points role and function for response speed
4th Goal – Realization
(draft) for ASEAN
Regional Contingency
Plan in order to support
the country that impact
of disaster
negara terdampak
Exercise Objectives
Exercise Method
SEMINAR/
LECTURE
R
Workshop
TTX (Table Top
Exercise)
Role Play
DRILL (CPX) Command
Post
Exercise
(FTX) Field Top
Exercise)
CA
PAB
ILIT
Y
GRADUAL FLOW – GRADED - CONTINUES
EXERCISE FOCUS ON
SKILL & TECHNICAL
CAPABILITY
EXERCISES FOCUS ON
SOFTWARE, SYSTEM,
POLICY & PLANNING
DISCUSSION BASED OPERATION BASED
TRAINING
PHASE
SIMULATION
PHASE
SYSTEM TEST
Location TTX & CPX: Hotel The Royale Krakatau,
Cilegon, Banten Province
ARDEX Exercise Locations
FTX Location: Area ± 10.000 M2 with Industries as a background
Source: Mapping of Chemical Disaster Prone Areas. Health Crisis Center. 2016
Chemical Disaster Vulnerability Assessment – Cilegon Cilegon City area that vulnerable/ prone to chemical disaster – effect – 47.920 people
Hazardous and Toxic Material Transportation Route
PEMETAAN KAWASAN RAWAN BENCANA KIMIADI PROVINSI BANTEN
27 PEMETAAN KAWASAN RAWAN BENCANA KIMIADI PROVINSI BANTEN
33
PEMETAAN KAWASAN RAWAN BENCANA KIMIADI PROVINSI BANTEN
9
Zona 1
Zona 2
Zona 3
Zona 4
Jalur B3
Bahan kimia
dari industri
Bahan Beracun
Berbahaya (B3)
dari Jalur
Transportasi B3
Chemical Pipelines
Modeling Industrial Disaster
• Flammable Gas: – Storage tank LPG – Ethylene
• Toxic Chemicals: – Chlorine
• Flammable liquid: – Ethanol – Crude Oil – Gasoline
Modeling Industrial Disaster
Consequences
• Dispersion
• Toxicity
• Fire
• Explosion
Software
• WISER (Wireless Information System for Emergency Responder)
• ALOHA
• Breeze
• FLACS Gexcon
66
b. Fire Radiation
Frequency Analysis – Failure Frequency Database
Type of Failure
• Catastrophic
• Partial
• Part of equipment
Frequency Analysis
• Storage Incident Frequency Report – OGP 2010
• TNO Purple, Yellow, Green & Red Book
23
- Subsidence;
- Kebakaran dari luar, dan lain sebagainya
Konsekuensi yang dapat terjadi akibat dari kebocoran LPG antara lain:
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE)
Fireball
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE)
Kemungkinan atau frekuensi kejadian tersebut dibahas dalam bagian 3.2
Berdasarkan pertimbangan di atas, perwakilan LPG release events dipertimbangkan dalam
penilaian adalah sebagaimana dirangkum dalam Tabel 12.
Tabel 12. Release Event Considered
Equipment Descriptions Event Descriptions Release Type Hole Size Potential Hazardous Event
Outcomes
LPG Ship Tanker Catastrophic failure Partial failure
Instantaneous Continuous
Rupture 2” leak
Firefire, VCE, flash fire Jet fire, VCE, flash fire, BLEVE
Filling line to LPG Storage Tank (Marine Loading Arm)
Guillotine failure Partial Failure
Continuous Continuous
Pipe full bore 1” leak
Jet fire, VCE, flash fire Jet fire, VCE, flash fire
Marine Loading Arm Guillotine failure Partial Failure
Continuous Continuous
Hose full bore 1” leak
Jet fire, VCE, flash fire Jet fire, VCE, flash fire
LPG Storage Tank Catastrophic failure Partial failure
Instantaneous Continuous
Rupture 2” leak
Fireball, VCE, flash fire Jetfire, VCE, flash fire, BLEVE
Filling line to LPG Road Tanker (Truck Loading Arm)
Guillotine failure Partial Failure
Continuous Continuous
Pipe full bore 1” leak
Jet fire, VCE, flash fire Jet fire, VCE, flash fire
Truck Loading Arm Guillotine failure Partial Failure
Continuous Continuous
Hose full bore 1” leak
Jet fire, VCE, flash fire Jet fire, VCE, flash fire
Di dalam kajian ini, release event yang dipertimbangkan yaitu berdasarkan dari tangki
penyimpanan LPG (LPG Storage Tanks).
3.2 Analisis Frekuensi
3.2.1 Base Event Frequency
Base event frequency yang diterapkan di dalam kajian ini dapat dilihat pada Tabel 13.
Tabel 13. Base Event Frequency
Event Descriptions Failure Rate
(per year) References
Catastrophic failure of LPG storage tanks 2.3 × 10-5
(1)
Partial failure of LPG storage tanks 1.0 × 10-5
(1)
Note: 1. Frekuensi kegagalan (failure rate) diambil dari OGP – Storage Incident Frequency Report No.434 -3,
March 2010.
23
- Subsidence;
- Kebakaran dari luar, dan lain sebagainya
Konsekuensi yang dapat terjadi akibat dari kebocoran LPG antara lain:
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE)
Fireball
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE)
Kemungkinan atau frekuensi kejadian tersebut dibahas dalam bagian 3.2
Berdasarkan pertimbangan di atas, perwakilan LPG release events dipertimbangkan dalam
penilaian adalah sebagaimana dirangkum dalam Tabel 12.
Tabel 12. Release Event Considered
Equipment Descriptions Event Descriptions Release Type Hole Size Potential Hazardous Event
Outcomes
LPG Ship Tanker Catastrophic failure Partial failure
Instantaneous Continuous
Rupture 2” leak
Firefire, VCE, flash fire Jet fire, VCE, flash fire, BLEVE
Filling line to LPG Storage Tank (Marine Loading Arm)
Guillotine failure Partial Failure
Continuous Continuous
Pipe full bore 1” leak
Jet fire, VCE, flash fire Jet fire, VCE, flash fire
Marine Loading Arm Guillotine failure Partial Failure
Continuous Continuous
Hose full bore 1” leak
Jet fire, VCE, flash fire Jet fire, VCE, flash fire
LPG Storage Tank Catastrophic failure Partial failure
Instantaneous Continuous
Rupture 2” leak
Fireball, VCE, flash fire Jetfire, VCE, flash fire, BLEVE
Filling line to LPG Road Tanker (Truck Loading Arm)
Guillotine failure Partial Failure
Continuous Continuous
Pipe full bore 1” leak
Jet fire, VCE, flash fire Jet fire, VCE, flash fire
Truck Loading Arm Guillotine failure Partial Failure
Continuous Continuous
Hose full bore 1” leak
Jet fire, VCE, flash fire Jet fire, VCE, flash fire
Di dalam kajian ini, release event yang dipertimbangkan yaitu berdasarkan dari tangki
penyimpanan LPG (LPG Storage Tanks).
3.2 Analisis Frekuensi
3.2.1 Base Event Frequency
Base event frequency yang diterapkan di dalam kajian ini dapat dilihat pada Tabel 13.
Tabel 13. Base Event Frequency
Event Descriptions Failure Rate
(per year) References
Catastrophic failure of LPG storage tanks 2.3 × 10-5
(1)
Partial failure of LPG storage tanks 1.0 × 10-5
(1)
Note: 1. Frekuensi kegagalan (failure rate) diambil dari OGP – Storage Incident Frequency Report No.434 -3,
March 2010.
Modeling Fire & Explosion LPG Storage Tank
66
b. Fire Radiation
65
ii. Free Air Explosion Over Pressure
Gambar 14. Free Air Explosion Overpressure
64
4.3.1 Hasil simulasi pada pada Tangki Spherical
a. Explosion
i. Surface explosion Overpressure
Gambar 13. Surface Explosion Overpressure
62
4.2.3 Societal Risk Result
Gambar 12. Hasil Societal Risk (F-N Curve) dari Depot LPG Tanjung Sekong
Dari gambar di atas, terlihat bahwa risiko sosial (societal risk) terkait dengan Depot LPG Tanjung Sekong adalah masih di dalam wilayah
ALARP (ALARP region) dari kriteria risiko sosial. Alasan utama untuk ini adalah bahwa fasilitas Depot LPG Tanjung Sekong terletak jarak
yang aman dari populasi eksternal sehingga dampak dari peristiwa berbahaya sebagian besar terkandung dalam batas plant.
61
Gambar 11. Hasil Individual Risk dari Depot LPG Tanjung Sekong
Secara keseluruhan IR personil tertinggi di Depot LPG Tanjung Sekong saat bekerja di operasi normal ditemukan 2.87 x 10-4 per tahun yaitu
aktivitas dari LPG Truck Driver. Beberapa aktivitas dari Fireman, Jr. Supervisor Distribution Bulk LPG, Jr. Supervisor Receiving & Storage/ Control
Room dan Security juga termasuk dalam "As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) region". Berdasarkan Individual Risk Acceptance Criteria,
hasil menunjukkan bahwa risiko terhadap personil dalam " As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) region".
16
2 PROSES DAN FASILITAS DEPOT LPG TANJUNG SEKONG
2.1 Proses di Depot LPG Tanjung Sekong
Depot LPG Pressurized Tanjung Sekong adalah depot LPG yang berlokasi di Serang, Propinsi
Banten, Indonesia. Depot LPG dibangun untuk menyangga kebutuhan LPG di Pulau Jawa.
Depot LPG Tanjung Sekong adalah suatu lapangan penyimpanan LPG berkapasitas 4 x 2500
Metrik Ton. LPG didatangkan menggunakan kapal tanker dan sarana penerimaan, serta
subsea pipeline sepanjang ±800 meter dialirkan menuju Depot LPG Tanjung Sekong,
kemudian disimpan kembali menuju kapal tanker dengan bantuan backloading pump. LPG
bisa juga dialirkan menuju Truck Filling Stasiun dengan bantuan Filling Pump.
Gambar 5. Maket Depot LPG Tanjung Sekong
Depot LPG Tanjung Sekong memiliki fasilitas yang terdiri sarana pengiriman dan
penerimaan dari dan ke tanker, 12” pipeline subsea, sarana pengukuran (metering), sarana
backloading, sarana penimbunan LPG di storage tank berbentuk sphere dengan total
volum sebesar 2500 MT, sarana penyaluran dari storage tank ke fasilitas pengisian truk,
terminal automation system dan sarana utility.
Sumber: Quantitative Fire & Explosion Risk Assessment. LPG Storage. Tg Sekong
Ethylene Gas Dispersion
Gas dispersion simulation results for October 2011 (duration of 1 hour)
Gas dispersion simulation results for December 2011 (duration of 1 hour)
Source: Recommendations for Reducing Technology Failure Risks in the Industrial Area of Cilegon City. 2012. BPPT
325 m; 7500 ppm
983 m; 1500 ppm
275 m; 7500 ppm
756 m; 1500 ppm
1,3 km; 600 ppm 1,9 km; 600 ppm
Ethylene Fire Model
Source: Recommendations for Reducing Technology Failure Risks in the Industrial Area of Cilegon City. 2012. BPPT
Gas simulation results that could potentially cause a fire for July 2011.
Gas simulation results that could potentially cause a fire for December 2011.
321 m; 16.200 ppm (60% LEL)
961 m; 2.700 ppm (10% LEL)
158 m; 16.200 ppm
571 m; 2700 ppm
Consideration for EMT
Hot Zone
Warm zone
Hot Zone Cold Zone
Free from contamination and that may be safely used as a planning
and staging area
Transition area : where responders enter and exit the exclusion zone
and where decontamination activities take place
Hot Zone/Red Zone
Warm Zone/
Cold Zone/Safety Zone
• Protective Suite • Only quick and life-saving
treatment • Goal : getting to safer area,
prevent further injury
• Not completely safe from danger
• Depending on the equipment available, expertise of personnel
• Outside immediate danger • Transportation available • Continue care and patient
reassesment • Hands off to the transporting
team
Hot zone
Cold Zone
Hospital A Hospital B Hospital C Health Centre
Basic medical: SAR Team, military, EMT
Medical Transportation: SAR Team, military, EMT
Basic Life Support Advance Life Support : EMT
Medical Transportation:
EMT
EMT ROLES
Conclusion • Cilegon city is facing natech risks: volcano erruption, earthquake
and tsunami and major chemical, petrochemical, oil and gas industries, hence increasing the natech risks to community.
• ARDEX (ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise) 2018 will be conducted to simulate natech disasters in Cilegon, Indonesia.
• The scenario development for ARDEX natech disaster simulation is a challenging process, which involves many stakeholders in Indonesia & ASEAN country regions.
• The ARDEX exercise serves as a scientific and real-world platform to further understand on natech disaster risk management for ASEAN countries.
References
• A. M. Cruz, “Natech Disasters: A Review of Practices, Lessons Learned and Future”, 2016. • A. M. Cruz and L. J. Steinberg, “Preventing Natech Catastrophes: Country Practices and Case Studies
of Chemical Accident Prevention during Natural Disaster”, 2006, https://www.mona.uwi.edu/cardin/virtual_library/docs/1308/1308.pdf [accessed May.9, 2018]
• K. R. Da Silva Nascimento and M. H. Alencar, “Management of risks in natural disasters: A systematic review of the literature on NATECH events,” Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Vol.44, pp 347-359, November 2016.
• S. Zama, H. Nishi, K. Hatayama, M. Yamada, H. Yoshihara and Y. Ogawa, “On Damage of Oil Storage Tanks due to the 2011 off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake (Mw9.0)”, http://www.iitk.ac.in/nicee/wcee/article/WCEE2012_0238.pdf [accessed May.9, 2018]
• Y. Goto, “Tsunami Damage to Oil Storage Tanks,” 14th World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, 2008, Beijing, China, ftp://jetty.ecn.purdue.edu/spujol/Andres/files/15-0005.PDF [accessed May.9, 2018]
• S. Adiningsih, M. Lestari, A. I. Rahutami, and A. S. Wijaya, “Sustainable Development Impacts of Investment Incentives: A Case Study of the Chemical Industry in Indonesia,” International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2009.
• D. Hudalah, D. Viantari, T. Firman,and J. Woltjer, ”Industrial Land Development and Manufacturing Deconcentration in Greater Jakarta,” Urban Geography, Vol.34. No.7, pp. 950-971, June 2013.
• M. F. Cahyandito,”The Effectiveness of Community Development and Environmental Protection Program in Oil and Gas Industry in Indonesia: Policy, Institutional, and Implementation Review,” Journal of Management and Sustainability, Vol.7, No.1, pp.115-126, February 2017.
• Sumber gambar: Google image
• S, Moon, “Justice, Geography, and Steel: Technology and National Identity in Indonesian Industrialization,” Osiris, Vol.24, No.1, pp.253-277, 2009.
• BNPB, ”Risiko Bencana Indonesia,” 2016, https://inarisk.bnpb.go.id/pdf/Buku%20RBI_Final_low.pdf [accessed May.9, 2018]
• Health Crisis Centre Ministry of Health, “Industrial Chemical Zones – Risk Mapping,” 2016. • BNPB, “Risk Assessment Cilegon City 2016-2020”. • BPPT, “Rekomendasi untuk Pengurangan Risiko Bencana Kegagalan Teknologi di Kawasan Industri Kota
Cilegon (Recommendation for Technological Failure in Cilgeon City for Disaster Risk Reduction),” 2012. • Cilegon City, “Rencana kontijensi tingkat Kota Cilegon, Menghadapi kemungkinan ancaman bencana
gempa bumi dan tsunami (Contingency Plan at Cilegon City, facing the possibility of earthquake and tsunami threat),” July 2010.
• BAPPEDA Cilegon City, Drills for earthquake, tsunami, and technological disaster, 2007. • ASEAN, “Preparation Materials for ARDEX, 2018,” 2018. • Cilegon City, “Usaha-usaha pemerintah Kota Cilegon dalam mengantisipasi bencana kegagalan teknologi
industry (Cilegon City Government efforts in anticipating the catastrophic failure of industrial technology),” December 2014.
• F. Lestari, “Quantitative Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis for LPG storage tank,” 2015, unpublished. • Y. Jibiki, D. Pelupessy, I. H. Susilowati, F. A. Putri, F. Lestari, F. Imamura, “Exploring community
preparedness for complex disaster: a case study in Cilegon (Province Banten in Indonesia),” International Conference on Occupational Health and Safety, November 2017.
• J. Simon and B. Sergio (Editor), "Participatory Technology Assessment: European Perspectives," Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, 2002.
• A. Muhari, F. Imamura, D. Hilman, S. Diposaptono, H. Latief, J. Post and F. A. Islmail, "Tsunami mitigation efforts with pTA in west Sumatra province, Indonesia", Journal of Earthquake and Tsunami, Vol.4, No.4, pp.341-368, December 2010.
• F. Imamura, “Dissemination of information and evacuation procedures in the 2004-2007 tsunamis, including the 2004 Indian Ocean,” Journal of Earthquake and Tsunami, Vol.3, No.2, pp.59–65, June 2009.
References
Thank you Fatma Lestari Email: [email protected]; [email protected] • Disaster Research & Response Centre, Universitas Indonesia • Department of Occupational Health & Safety, Faculty of Public
Health, Universitas Indonesia