arbac99 (model for administration of roles) ravi sandhu qamar munawer george mason university...

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ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology www.list.gmu.edu

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Page 1: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles)

Ravi Sandhu

Qamar Munawer

George Mason University

Laboratory for Information Security Technology

www.list.gmu.edu

Page 2: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

2© Ravi Sandhu 1999

RBAC96 (simplified)

ROLES

USER-ROLEASSIGNMENT

PERMISSIONS-ROLEASSIGNMENT

USERS PERMISSIONS

ROLE HIERARCHIES

Page 3: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

3© Ravi Sandhu 1999

ARBAC97 DECENTRALIZES

user-role assignment (URA97) permission-role assignment (PRA97) role-role hierarchy (RRA99)

Page 4: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

4© Ravi Sandhu 1999

ARBAC99 EXTENDS ARBAC97

URA99 mobile and immobile membership prerequisite-based revocation

PRA99 dual of URA99

RRA99 no change

Page 5: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

5© Ravi Sandhu 1999

EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY

Employee (E)

Engineering Department (ED)

Project Lead 1(PL1)

Engineer 1(E1)

Production 1(P1)

Quality 1(Q1)

Director (DIR)

Project Lead 2(PL2)

Engineer 2(E2)

Production 2(P2)

Quality 2(Q2)

PROJECT 2PROJECT 1

Page 6: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

6© Ravi Sandhu 1999

EXAMPLE ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE HIERARCHY

Senior Security Officer (SSO)

Department Security Officer (DSO)

Project SecurityOfficer 1 (PSO1)

Project SecurityOfficer 2 (PSO2)

Page 7: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

7© Ravi Sandhu 1999

Motivation for ARBAC99

URA97 consequences Users can use permissions of the role

and junior roles. User become eligible for assignment to

other roles.

Page 8: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

8© Ravi Sandhu 1999

Motivation for ARBAC99

Examples that require decomposition of these two aspects: trainee visitor consultant

Page 9: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

9© Ravi Sandhu 1999

New Concepts in URA99

Mobile Users: user ‘u’ can use permissions of role x and

administrative role can use this membership to put user ‘u’ in another role.

Immobile Users: user ‘u’ can use permissions of role x but

administrative role cannot use this membership to put user ‘u’ in another role.

Page 10: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

10© Ravi Sandhu 1999

URA99 Model

Builds upon the concept of mobile and immobile membership of users.

To formalize this we consider a role x as consisting of two sub-roles Mx and IMx.

The membership in Mx in mobile where as in IMx is immobile.

Page 11: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

11© Ravi Sandhu 1999

Role in URA99

Definition: For a given set of roles R1 we define a role in URA99 as R = {Mx, IMx | x R1}

Page 12: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

12© Ravi Sandhu 1999

User Memberships in URA99

There are four kinds of user-role memberships in URA99. Explicit Mobile Member EMx

u EMx (u, Mx) UA

Explicit Immobile Member EIMx u EIMx (u, IMx) UA

Implicit Mobile Member ImMx u ImMx ( x’ > x) (u, Mx’) UA

Implicit Immobile Member ImIMx u ImIMx ( x’ > x) (u, IMx’) UA

Page 13: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

13© Ravi Sandhu 1999

Precedence Rule in URA99

URA99 allows a user to have all four kinds of memberships in a role at the same time.

only one will be effective by the following strict precedence rule EMx > EIMx > ImMx > ImIMx

Page 14: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

14© Ravi Sandhu 1999

Inheritance of Mobility and Immobility

X1

X2

X1

X3

X2 X3

X1 X2

Single Multiple Divergent

Page 15: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

15© Ravi Sandhu 1999

Prerequisite condition for URA99 Grant Model

URA97 prerequisite condition is quite straight forward.

In URA99 it is evaluated for a user u by interpreting x to be true if u EMx ( u ImMx u EIMx)

and x to be true if u EMx uEIMx uImMx uImIMx

Page 16: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

16© Ravi Sandhu 1999

Can-assign relations for URA99 Grant Model

Assignment as Mobile membership is authorized by can-assign-M AR CR 2R

Assignment as Immobile membership is authorized by can-assign-IM AR CR 2R

Page 17: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

17© Ravi Sandhu 1999

EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY

Employee (E)

Engineering Department (ED)

Project Lead 1(PL1)

Engineer 1(E1)

Production 1(P1)

Quality 1(Q1)

Director (DIR)

Project Lead 2(PL2)

Engineer 2(E2)

Production 2(P2)

Quality 2(Q2)

PROJECT 2PROJECT 1

Page 18: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

18© Ravi Sandhu 1999

EXAMPLE ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE HIERARCHY

Senior Security Officer (SSO)

Department Security Officer (DSO)

Project SecurityOfficer 1 (PSO1)

Project SecurityOfficer 2 (PSO2)

Page 19: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

19© Ravi Sandhu 1999

Can-assign-M

Admin. Role Pre. Cond. Role RangePSO1 ED [E,PL1)PSO2 ED [E2,PL2)DSO ED PL2 [PL1,PL1]DSO ED PL1 [PL2,PL2]SSO ED (D,DIR]SSO E [ED,ED]

Page 20: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

20© Ravi Sandhu 1999

Can-assign-IM

Admin. Role Pre. Cond. Role RangePSO1 ED [E,PL1)PSO2 ED [E2,PL2)DSO ED PL2 [PL1,PL1]DSO ED PL1 [PL2,PL2]SSO ED (D,DIR]SSO E [ED,ED]DSO E [ED,ED]

Page 21: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

21© Ravi Sandhu 1999

URA99 Grant Model authorizations

no implication in general that authority to grant mobile membership implies authority to grant immobile memberships.

Page 22: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

22© Ravi Sandhu 1999

URA99 - Revoke Model

URA99 revoke model fixes a lack of symmetry between grant and revoke models.

It deals with revocation of mobile and immobile memberships.

URA99 introduces two relations to authorize revocation.

Page 23: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

23© Ravi Sandhu 1999

Can-revoke relations for URA99 Revoke Model

Revocation as Mobile membership is authorized by can-revoke-M AR CR 2R

Revocation as Immobile membership is authorized by can-revoke-IM AR CR 2R

Page 24: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

24© Ravi Sandhu 1999

Can-revoke-M

Admin. Role Prereq. Role Role RangePSO1 E [E,PL1)PSO2 E [E2,PL2)DSO E [ED,DIR]SSO E [ED,DIR]

PSO1 E1 [E2,PL2)PSO2 E2 [E1,PL1)

Page 25: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

25© Ravi Sandhu 1999

Can-revoke-IM

Admin. Role Prereq. Role Role RangePSO1 E [E,PL1)PSO2 E [E2,PL2)DSO E [ED,DIR]SSO E [ED,DIR]

PSO1 E1 [E2,PL2)PSO1 E2 [E1,PL1)DSO E [ED,ED]

Page 26: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

26© Ravi Sandhu 1999

Prerequisite condition for URA99 - Revoke Model

For revoke model we do not distinguish the mobile and immobile memberships

We interpret x to be true iff u EMx u ImMx u IMx u ImIMx

and x to be true iff u Emx u EIMx u ImMx u ImIMx

Page 27: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

27© Ravi Sandhu 1999

Relation between URA97 and URA99

If all users are restricted to be mobile then URA99 is identical with URA97.

This can be achieved by setting can-assign-IM and can-revoke-IM to be empty.

Page 28: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

28© Ravi Sandhu 1999

PRA99 - Model

Like user, permissions can also be assigned to roles as mobile and immobile.

PRA99 is exact dual of URA99. In PRA99 the implicit permission is

inherited upwards in the hierarchy.

Page 29: ARBAC99 (Model for Administration of Roles) Ravi Sandhu Qamar Munawer George Mason University Laboratory for Information Security Technology

29© Ravi Sandhu 1999

Conclusion

ARBAC99 is first model that incorporates mobile and immobile users and permissions

Basic intuition of ARBAC97 is not altered

It is a useful extension to ARBAC97