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Printer-Friendly Format //*The New Arab Way of War**/Proceedings/, March 2003By Captain Peter Layton, Royal Australian Air Force*// /The October 2002 bombing of a nightclub in Indonesia's popular resortisland of Bali, which killed more than 190 peoplemostly tourists andmany Westernersis a grim example of the new Arab way of war. Planningand educating the agents in bomb making and holy-war doctrine took placeover months in several locations. The planners of this bombing andothers have been linked to the Jemaah Islamiya Southeast Asia terrornetwork as well as Al Qaeda./The new Arab approach to conflict is an adaptation of the revolutionarywarfare of the second half of the 20th century.1 Assassinsusing this new way of war now swim among the populations of the world.2 With cheap, unrestricted global air travel provided by Westerntechnology, they can deploy wherever they wish; there are no front linesor safe rear areas. The assassins make effective use of liberalimmigration policies that have permitted large numbers of Middle Easternmigrants to settle in the West. Small numbers of fellow travelers andsympathizers are distributed throughout Western nations, able to beactivated to provide local support, protection, and knowledge fordeploying assassins. Their command-and-control system relies oncommercial communications systems and business application cryptography.This makes their control system strong, redundant, secure, and globaland the assassins hard to detect, track, and target. They do not rely ontheir own technology even for weapons, instead using in situ civilian,commercial equipment for attack.The new Arab way of war is parasitic. Local supporters acquire weaponsand explosives, provide safe houses, arrange transportation, and stealor hire vehicles. Assassins fly in, carry out attacks, and fly outquickly, avoiding arrest. Relying completely on local sources, they canstrike deep into the Western heartlands, mimicking the strategic airattacks characteristic of the West.Foot soldiers employed in this way of war usually are male and middleclass and often well-educated, with strong religious fervor. A goodeducation is necessary to operate independently and covertly in Westernsocieties. The most dedicated assassins come from countries with awell-established, openly anti-Western education system antagonistic tosecular societies, modernism, and human rights. A consuming spiritualpassion, with a commitment bordering on fanaticism, is a valuableattribute for members of a small group when deployed into hostilecountries. Given these warfare techniques, Muslims seem likely to remainthe prime source of recruits.3 Intentionally, there is no obvious state involvement. In his attack, theassassin dies or melts into the crowd, providing no proof of who isresponsible. This tactic is meant to confuse and frustrate a legallyjustifiable response, as the Western paradigm based on the 1648 Peace ofWestphalia assumes a state-versus-state conflict. Avoiding giving theWest a defined, obvious state opponent is a rational strategy peculiarto the Arab way of war.The Arab combat style imposes small financial burden on its parentsocieties, allowing long and protracted wars without inflicting economichardship. Employing only small numbers of personnel with few needs, warscan be financed privately and seemingly remain independent of overtgovernment support. Such entrepreneurs can be hard to trace andimpossible to stop.A major innovation of the Arab way of war is the deliberate targeting ofcivilians. The assassins' rhetoric makes no distinction between civilianand military targets. Attacking civilians guarantees global attention asthe media, reflecting global values, has a horror of the infliction ofcruelty on noncombatants. Attacking civilians is perceived by theassassins as the most direct route to influence global opinion and toaffect the national will of the nations struck. Attacks usually areconducted with considerable skill, timing, expertise, and precision butare designed to kill absolutely indiscriminately. Given this, thestrategic aim of attacks is hard to discern.4 Violencecustomarily is conceived as a means to an end, but the essence in thisstyle of war seems to be inflicting terror. Pakistani Brigadier S. K.Malik notes: "Terror is not a means of imposing decision upon the enemy;it is the decision we wish to impose on him."5 *Inherent Problems*The manner of Arab warfare is intentionally designed contrary to themodern international laws of war. Deliberately attacking civilians,noncombatants, women, and children is against the moral codes of allreligionsincluding Islam. Such actions also violate the ethical codesenshrined in the U.N. human rights charters. The leaders directing suchacts are vulnerable to charges of war crimes and international humanrights trials. Any country that harbors them inherently appears as anoutlaw state operating outside of the civilized world and in defiance ofU.N. conventions.Middle Eastern societies frequently criticize the immoral and laxethical stance of the secular and materialist West. It is ironic thattheir chosen way of war makes their assassins appear immoral andunprincipled, which may be why their commanders seek not to identifythemselves. Anonymity provides safety from accusations of moral bankruptcy.Although the tactics of the Arab system rely almost completely on thecivilian technology and resources of those nations being attacked, theassassins generally originate from another nation-state. A specificgovernment may not support assassins openly, but to thrive the assassinsrely on the acquiescence, sympathy, and often active support of thepopulation from which they came. A society has created them andcontinues to provide financing, safe harbor, and training. Edmund Burkenoted in 1729 that "the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil isfor good men to do nothing." The silence of the good men of the MiddleEast implies a terrible consent.*Potential Responses*The West now has no choice. For many years the Arab way of war wasignored and its brutal methods overlooked, but this option now isimpossible. The societies of the Middle East have forced the West toretaliate with a multifaceted response that is well under way. Thisresponse may be complemented by a focus on on denying the support basethat keeps the assassins operational.A dilemma the West faces is whom to hold responsible for the assassins'attacks. The Western warfare paradigm holds the government of thehostile nation-state responsible rather than the people. In the modernArab conflict style, the people, not the government, often bearresponsibility, especially in situations where the central government isweak, fragmented, ineffectual, or corrupt. The West's indignation mustbe focused on the societies, not just the governments of the nationsfrom which the assassins originate. Members of the societies directly orindirectly supporting attacks must understand they will be heldresponsible and pay a price for their support.There is a pressing need to deter the responsible Middle Easternsocieties from their chosen path of escalating terrorism. Several MiddleEastern states harbor sizable elements that support the Arab way of war.Those that support this method of conflict have been identified by theiractions over several decades. They exist in unfriendly states such asIran and Syria, but also in friendly nations such as Saudi Arabia, whosechildren financed, directed, and undertook the 11 September attacks.This population support base is as vulnerable to attack as are thesocieties of the West. Focusing attention on the support base would becontentious and controversial. However, the West must be innovative andtake advantage of inherent weakness in the Arab conflict paradigm tofrustrate the steady intensification of violence directed against itscitizens.The West could retaliate with random and indiscriminate attacks onparticular Middle Eastern cities, thereby replicating the Arab warfareapproach, but this goes against centuries of Western efforts to limitthe impact of war and is completely unacceptable.6 Not thewhole societies of those Middle Eastern nations involved, but only asmall, discernable sliver of these societies should be held accountableand deterred from further support of the Arab way of war. The assassinsinevitably are from the middle class, with their commanders among themore wealthy members of the country. The middle and wealthy classes havegreat power in their own societies at the local level, and more realinfluence with the masses than their usually despotic governments. Ifthe majority of the middle and wealthy classes determined to no longerdirectly or indirectly support the Arab style of conflict, this wouldhave a significant impact. Without an active support base, and with thepossibility of their activities being compromised at any time,assassins' freedom of action would be curtailed severely.An intense, relentless psychological campaign could be undertakentargeting the middle and wealthy classes of the Middle Eastern nationsinvolved. Mass-marketing methods may offer insight into how to applylong-term, focused psychological pressure. The aim of such a campaignwould be to make each individual perceive being held personallyresponsible and targeted for his or her support of the Arab way of war.The proud, strongly religious societies of the Middle East may bevulnerable to considerable self-doubt about the moral bankruptcy oftheir actions and their pronounced ethical decline compared to theremainder of the world. This effort would complement the other measuresof defense and containment already being undertaken. Consideration alsocould be given to applying economic pressure, restrictions, andconstraints, such as those used against South Africa during theapartheid years.Incentives should be offered as well. Easy means should be provided toallow individuals to relay information concerning members of theirsocieties engaging in acts of war. If individuals or groups tire of thedifficulties caused by supporting the assassins, an opportunity shouldbe given for them to make a positive contribution to overcoming theproblems inflicted. There would be many false reports, but occasionallysomething of real value would be passed. The possibility of thisoccurring would create a sense of vulnerability among assassinorganizations.*Weapons of Mass Destruction*There is a worst-case fear in the West of a Middle Easternweapon-of-mass-destruction (WMD) attack; this fear has led directly to apreventive war strategy. Possessing, developing, or even consideringdeveloping a WMD capability may be considered intent to use in the nearfuture. Although understandable, this is an unwelcome strategy with someinherent flaws. Unnecessary wars may be fought to prevent nations fromdeveloping a capability and the possibility of use; a future uncertaintythus becomes the basis for a certain war today. Preventive war may beinsufficient by itself to stop all attacks; some may occur. Moreover,chemical and biological weapon laboratories are difficult to detect,making their preemptive destruction hard to guarantee.Nuclear threats traditionally have been handled using deterrentstrategies. In this case, a declaratory policy could be devised based onthe threat of retaliation if an attack occurs in the West by nonstateactors using the Arab way of war. In such a circumstance, there could bea strategy of instant, graduated response: nuclear strikes againstseveral of the capital cites of the Middle Eastern nations that longhave demonstrated support for this method of war.7 Theresponse's intensity and discrimination would vary based on the severityof the WMD attack. This approach would be a policy of deterrence throughthe threat of brutal and immediate punishment of particular societies.The strategy is irrational in the sense that it proposes to punish theinnocentalthough these "innocents" would have supported assassins thatundertook a WMD attack, killing potentially millions. It draws on thesuccessful but frightening Cold War strategy in which the populations ofEurope and North America were held hostage for the good behavior oftheir governments. In this new application, the citizens of severalMiddle Eastern nations would be held responsible for their own actions,rather than the actions of their governments. The societies' futureswould be in their own hands. The sole alternative at present ispreventive war; as noted, this strategy may not be sufficient,practical, sensible, or long-term. The WMD threat is so serious that amultifaceted approach is needed to prevent it.This approach is solely for deterrence, not war fighting, and would beanother constant, worrying reminder to the Middle East's middle andwealthy classes that if they allowed the worst to happen to the West,they quickly would pay a heavy price. The strategy articulates whatinevitably would happen; a declaratory policy would ensure there were nounfortunate misunderstandings.8 There also should be an incentive to motivate Middle Eastern societiesto change their ways and be taken off the instant-response list. TheArab way of war starts in the schools and educational facilities ofparticular nations. Twenty years after a society stops teaching childrento hate and kill, and twenty years after the last attempted terroristattack by the members of that society, their capital should cease to betargeted.The Arab way of war has been devised to defeat the Western construct bymaking use of its inherent weaknesses. In so doing, the Arab method hasits own intrinsic internal contradictions and weaknesses that can beexploited in response. The vulnerability of the support base in severalMiddle Eastern nations is one of these. A relentless psychologicalcampaign to dissuade the middle-class and wealthy members of thesespecific societies from supporting the Arab way of war may complementother current offensive and defensive activities. Deterrence, at leastagainst the WMD threat, also may be worth considering.*The Author:*Group Captain Layton is a career Royal Australian Air Force officer withexperience in attack, reconnaissance, and maritime patrol aviation. Hecurrently is an operational requirements staff member.*Notes:*1. The term /Arab way of war/ is used here only as Arab societiesinitially developed and adopted this mode of warfare in the early 1970sand remain its principal exponents. In recent years, some other non-ArabMiddle Eastern societies have adopted this way of war. The term istherefore used in a similar way to the /American way of war/, whichfocuses on mass and high technology, and Davis Hanson's /Western Way ofWar/, emphasizing decisive combat by heavy infantry. Other nations canand have made use of the American and Western ways of war. There arespecific characteristics of the Arab way of war that set it apart fromthe styles used elsewhere in the world. [Back to article ]2. The word /assassin/ seems particularly applicable to the footsoldiers of the modern Arab way of war. /Assassin/ is used here as onewho kills, or attempts to kill, by surprise or secret assault; or onewho treacherously murders anyone unprepared for defense. The name comesfrom the Assassins of the East, followers of the Shaikh al-Jabal (OldMan of the Mountain). This was a Muslim order active in Persia and Syriaabout 1090-1272 whose members believed their religious duty was toharass and murder their enemies. The word derives from medieval Latin/assassinus/, which is derived from the Arabic /hashshashin/, and firstappeared in English early in the 1600s. [Back to article ]3. Islam is not the problem causing the present conflict between theWest and the Middle East. Islam is only the principal religion of thosesocieties currently attacking the West from the Middle East. [Back toarticle ]4. The strategic aim of the assassins has been cited as forcing U.S.military forces to leave Saudi Arabia, creating national uprisings tooverthrow various Middle Eastern governments, forcing Israel to leavethe occupied territories, persuading the United States to cease aid toIsrael, radicalizing the lower classes in certain Middle Eastern states,bringing about a new caliphate, and determining an ideological conflictbetween Islamic society and modernity. Not all can be the strategic aimsof the assassins. Strategic coherency and consistency, or evenmaintenance of a defined aim, does not appear to be a feature of the newArab conflict paradigm. [Back to article ]5. Brigadier S. K. Malik, "The Quranic Concept of War," quoted in YossefBodansky, /Bin Laden: the Man Who Declared War on America/ (Roseville,CA: Prima Publishing, 2001), p. xv. [Back to article ]6. But there have been many instances in Western history where patiencehas been exhausted suddenly and merciless, ruthless responsesundertaken. The Arab way of war could yet reap this whirlwind for theMiddle East if attacks by assassins go too far. History suggests thisline will not be known, or even articulated, until after it is crossed.This is one of the difficulties with dealing with democracies thatopposing political systems have problems comprehending. [Back to article]7. Attention would need to be given to not unintentionally punishingMuslims by damaging or destroying Islamic holy sites. [Back to article ]8.There appears to be a quaint belief in some areas that if there weresuch a nonstate attack, the world would not realize whom it was. Whoelse practices this style of war? A WMD attack would generate anoverwhelming desire for revenge and a compelling need to respond harshlyand immediately. The response would be a nuclear spasm attack before anyinvestigation ever began; the originators would be deemed apparent toall from their style of conflict. [Back to article ]/ 2003 U.S. Naval Institute. All rights reserved./ * Military.com Network: o Military.com o Defense Tech o DoD Buzz o SpouseBuzz * Services: o Army o Marine Corps o Navy o Air Force o Coast Guard o National Guard * About Military.com: o About Us & Press Room o Advertise With Us o RSS o Help o User Agreement o Privacy Policy o Mobile o Site Map * AdChoices | Like us on Facebook , follow us on Twitter and join us on Google+ 2014 Military AdvantageA Monster Company.