APS/AAAS Report on Nuclear Forensics

APS/AAAS Working Group

Michael May, Chair

February 16, 2008

Purpose and Scope of APS/POPA Nuclear Forensics Report

To provide a clear unclassified statement of the state of the art of nuclear forensics

To assess its potential for preventing and identifying unattributed nuclear attacks

To identify the policies, resources and human talent to fulfill this potential

Forensics and Attribution

Nuclear forensics determines the composition, physical condition, age,and possible provenance and history of retrieved materials

When combined with law enforcement and intelligence data, it can suggest or exclude the origin of materials and of nuclear devices

It is an interactive part of the overall attribution process

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Forensics on Intercepts

Type of Information Developed

Possible source: weapon or weapon material storage, industry, hospital, spent fuel storage, research, etc. Age of some elements since last chemical separation Processing history, including chemical processing, cladding, tools used, etc. Prior chain of custody

Tentative Time Scales

Information Time Scale Method Radioactivity present

An hour or less Dosimetry at scene

Detonation nuclear

An hour or less Visual, seismic, radiation

Uranium or plutonium fuel

Hours to days Possible field measurement

“Age,” production history

Week to months Iterative lab analyses

Nuclear device design

Week to months Reconstructive analysis

International Cooperation Is Essential Four reasons for international cooperation in the event of

a nuclear detonation Comprehensive, accessible international databases and

sample archives are needed to use forensics capabilities effectively

International participation in the forensics process will increase the credibility of attribution

Debris will travel, and analyses will be done, all over the world. Cooperation agreements would facilitate the communication tasks of US leaders

The detonation may occur abroad

A Future International Database Ideally the needed database would include:

All relevant nuclear material information Vetted analytic processes to link information obtained from debris and

intercepts to the database information Fissile materials production and processing information, subject to

security measures to safeguard commercially protected information Information on fissile materials storage sites ( types and quantities of

materials and site security measures), subject to security measures It would be supplemented by a sample archive It would be so managed as to allow full prompt access in case of a nuclear

emergency anywhere in the world

Exercises Are Necessary …

Both pre- and post-detonation exercises are needed Given the complexity of both a post-nuclear detonation

situation and the Federal-State-local response required, exercises are both difficult and necessary

Post-detonation case exercises have been run against the clock by a combination of the DoD, DOE, DOJ/FBI, and intelligence agencies, including sample recovery and analysis, data generation and synthesis, comparison to databases, and all-agency summary conclusions

… But Not Sufficient

But the environment cannot be fully modeled in exercises After a nuclear detonation, forensics as well as other activities may

take place in a chaotic environment While tens of thousands may be dead or injured, millions will have seen

and heard the detonation Some will have to evacuate, most should not Many modes of communications will continue to work outside the

immediate detonation area

Coordination and communications tasks are therefore essential, but even in much simpler nuclear situations (TMI), they were not carried out competently, which led to harmful consequences

Therefore …

Top decision-makers must be involved in some exercises and understand the dilemmas they will face after a nuclear detonation

Forensics and attribution are an important part of those dilemmas, particularly in the areas of communication and expectations management

Policies will need to be developed and tested for dealing with the inevitable pressure for rapid action

While the main burden of government communications will deal with response and recovery, communication on attribution will have major consequences for public confidence and support

National leadership may be the target and exercises must include plans for succession leadership

Can Forensics Help Prevent Nuclear Terrorism? Some links in the chain of actors needed for an act of nuclear terrorism can

be deterred (or encouraged to maintain security) by an effective and well-advertised forensics capability:

A state is needed to provide the fissile material as well as protection during preparation and may be encouraged to maintain security

Specialists who come from a relatively limited pool may be chary of cooperating if they know attribution is likely

For other links in the chain, the effect of nuclear forensics is more indirect: The terrorist group itself may be sensitive to failure and discouraged by

previous successful intercepts Intermediaries for funding, transport, cover, etc. are also needed but are more

affected by intelligence and law enforcement than forensics

Current US Resources Are Inadequate and Unsustainable

Personnel at national labs are highly skilled but too few and may be double or triple booked in a nuclear emergency

Overall diagnostics capability at the labs is down since 1990 through attrition and limited funding

The pipeline to replace lab personnel is nearly empty University programs in radiochemistry are few and small

A Way Forward: Personnel

A viable program in this area would require ~ 35 new Ph.D.’s at the labs in the next 10 years and 3-4/year after that

This requires identifying and funding the most viable university programs through research contracts and graduate fellowships, post-docs and internships

A Way Forward: R&D

The goal of R&D is a rapid, accurate, safe capability to make field measurements, gather samples and maintain chain of custody

Automated portable instrumentation for accurate short-time analysis of all isotopes of interest must be developed, and fitted into systems that can be deployed to the field

A forensic analysis center capable of receiving and analyzing the full spectrum of nuclear and radiological materials is needed to replace the present lab facilities

Recommendations

Fill the personnel pipeline Develop prompt modern field-deployable instrumentation Initiate a concerted effort to develop a comprehensive

promptly usable international database Exercise (including leadership) and evaluate exercise

results Establish an advisory group of experts to review handling

of intercepts and advise decision-makers in an emergency