Applying the HIPPORecommendations to the Central African Republic:Toward Strategic, Prioritized,and Sequenced Mandates

OCTOBER 2017

Introduction

In anticipation of the expected renewal of the mandate of the United NationsMultidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central AfricanRepublic (MINUSCA) in November 2017, the International Peace Institute(IPI), the Stimson Center, and Security Council Report co-organized aworkshop on October 3, 2017, to discuss MINUSCA’s mandate and politicalstrategy. This workshop aimed to help member states and UN actors developa shared understanding and common strategic assessment of the situation onthe ground in the Central African Republic (CAR) and to use that commonassessment to inform the political strategy and design of MINUSCA. Thediscussion was intended to help the Security Council make informed decisionswith respect to the strategic orientation, prioritization, and sequencing of themission’s mandate. The first session of the workshop began with a discussion of the situation onthe ground in CAR. Experts presented a brief analysis of the security andpolitical dynamics in the country, and participants then discussed howMINUSCA’s current political strategy could be adapted to respond to theevolving context. In the second session, participants discussed the highest-priority objectives for the mission and how to sequence them in order toadvance the political strategy discussed in the previous session.

Conflict Analysis

CAR is currently experiencing an increase in violence against civilians and aslide toward instability. Armed groups and conflict entrepreneurs arepursuing a range of political and economic objectives through violence.Attempts to find a solution through a political process have stalled. Despiteefforts to strengthen state authority outside Bangui, the state is not present inmost of the country. And Central Africans do not trust their government torepresent them or the mission to protect them.SLIDE INTO INSTABILITY

In the first half of 2016, in the wake of presidential elections, violence in CARsignificantly decreased. This decrease was largely due to armed groups andcommunities hoping that the new government would address theirgrievances. However, the initial refusal of President Faustin-ArchangeTouadéra to negotiate with armed groups until they disarmed underminedthese hopes. Since then, violent activity by both ex-Séléka and anti-balakaarmed groups has increased, and the security situation in CAR has deterio-rated, with many civilians targeted on the basis of religion or ethnicity.

On October 3, 2017, the International

Peace Institute (IPI), the Stimson

Center, Security Council Report, and

the permanent mission of Germany

to the United Nations organized a

workshop to discuss the mandate

and political strategy of the United

Nations Multidimensional Integrated

Stabilization Mission in the Central

African Republic (MINUSCA). This

was the sixth in a series of workshops

bringing together member states, UN

actors, and independent experts to

analyze how UN policies and the

June 2015 recommendations of the

High-Level Independent Panel on

Peace Operations (HIPPO) can be

applied to country-specific contexts.

This meeting note was drafted

collaboratively by IPI, the Stimson

Center, and Security Council Report.

It summarizes the main points raised

in the discussion under the Chatham

House rule of non-attribution and

does not necessarily represent the

views of all participants

2 MEETING NOTE

Civilians face threats from armed groups,intercommunal violence, cattle raiding and otherresource-related conflict, and criminality andextortion. This rising violence has led to large-scalecivilian casualties and displaced approximately600,000 people. In August, the UN’s emergencyrelief chief announced that early warning signs ofgenocide were present in the country.1

Many of these conflicts manifest themselves inretaliatory cycles of violence by increasinglyfractured armed groups and self-defense groups.According to one expert, having been preventedmilitarily from seizing political control, the leadersof armed groups are using violence to pursue adiverse array of alternative objectives. Theseinclude exerting control over resource-rich areasand key markets for self-enrichment, gainingpositions in the government, and securing amnestyfrom criminal charges and international investiga-tions. Opportunistic violence and criminality occurin the absence of adequate law enforcement andjudicial mechanisms to hold offenders accountable.Participants also noted that violence rose in thesoutheast part of the country due to the securityvacuum left by the withdrawal of the United Statesand Ugandan operation to counter the Lord’sResistance Army.STALLED POLITICAL PROCESS

Attempts to find a political solution to the conflicthave stalled. Participants highlighted that, althoughall parties remain committed to the principles andrecommendations that came out of the BanguiForum for National Reconciliation in 2015, thegovernment has failed to build on this initialsuccess. This is due, in part, to a failure by theconflict parties to live up to their commitments.While President Touadéra insisted that all armedgroups lay down their weapons prior to engaging indialogue, four of the largest armed groups have yetto contribute the soldiers they promised to partici-pate in the “mixed disarmament, demobilization,reinsertion and repatriation” (DDRR) pilot projectestablished by the Consultative Follow-UpCommittee. A second challenge to the political process hasbeen the multiplicity of mediation efforts, mainly

led by regional or external actors. These includemediation by the Economic Community of CentralAfrican States, the Organisation of IslamicCooperation, the African Union (AU), and Angola.Nongovernmental organizations such asSant’Egidio have also attempted to mediate an endto the armed violence, with little success. The mostrecent initiative, which has the backing of the UN,is the AU Roadmap for Peace and Reconciliation(the second of its kind). Although the UN has beeninvolved in these processes, it does not play aprominent political role. None of these initiatives has so far yieldedadequate incentives for the leaders of armed groupsto lay down their weapons, and some have beencriticized for their tolerance of amnesty for theseleaders. Some mediation efforts, like that led bySant’Egidio, were weakened by unrepresentativeparticipation and insufficient buy-in bystakeholders on the ground. Armed groups in CARhave exploited these weaknesses and the multiplemediation efforts by engaging in a form of “forumshopping.” Moreover, with political efforts focused at thenational level, there has been a gap in politicalengagement at the local level. Communities on theground are not seeing immediate peace dividendsfrom the national process, and many grievancesremain. Many local communities may not trust thenational process to address their particular needsand concerns because of the localized nature ofmany conflict drivers and their own lack ofrepresentation in discussions at the national level.GOVERNANCE AND CITIZENSHIP

Despite significant efforts by MINUSCA to supportthe extension of state authority, the government ofCAR has struggled to establish its influencethroughout the country. In addition to the physicalabsence of the state in many regions, the govern-ment has failed to communicate an inclusivenarrative that embraces all religious and ethnicgroups as Central Africans. Fundamental questionsabout who qualifies as a citizen of CAR and whoseinterests are represented by its government wereprimary drivers of the 2012–2014 violence, and thegovernment continues to leave them unaddressed.

1 “UN Sees Early Warning Signs of Genocide in CAR,” Al Jazeera, August 7, 2017, available at www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/sees-early-warning-signs-genocide-car-170807215828039.html .

Although violence has been perpetrated alongreligious lines, it appears less driven by ideologythan by feelings of marginalization and exclusion.Many Central Africans do not feel represented bystate institutions, and the Bangui Forum and thenational elections failed to address the concerns ofdisenfranchised parts of the population. Thisfeeling of marginalization persists as state securityforces are overwhelmingly Christian and localadministrative authorities are often passive—and attimes complicit—in the face of ethno-religiousconflict.MISTRUST AND SUSPICION

The growing social fractures and violenceperpetrated along ethnic and religious lines haveamplified mistrust and suspicion throughout thepopulation of CAR. This includes mistrust betweendifferent religious and ethnic groups, which hascontributed to rising violence, as well as mistrust ofthe government by marginalized populations andmistrust of MINUSCA. A lack of trust in MINUSCA undermines themission’s ability to achieve its mandated objectives.False perceptions that the mission is activelyassisting armed groups, or politically favoringeither Muslims or Christians, have contributed todeadly attacks against MINUSCA peacekeepers.The mission’s lack of capacity to monitor media inSango and other local languages reduces its abilityto counter the rhetoric of local media outlets,which is often more critical and suspicious of themission than that of francophone outlets.

Political Strategy

Considering these factors driving conflict in CAR,MINUSCA’s political strategy should focus onhalting and reversing the country’s slide intoinstability and insecurity while rallying the peoplearound an inclusive and locally driven politicalvision. Workshop participants identified thefollowing key elements for MINUSCA’s politicalstrategy:UNITING BEHIND AN INCLUSIVE VISION

CAR must unite behind a vision of inclusive peace.This vision must come from CAR itself and cannotbe forced by outside actors. However, the govern-ment of CAR—whose makeup is unrepresentativeof the population as a whole—may continue to be

unable or unwilling to articulate a narrative ofinclusiveness. In that case, MINUSCA should workat the local level to amplify the voices of communi-ties that seek an inclusive future for CAR. WhileCentral Africans should lead the process ofdefining a vision for their country, MINUSCAcould more vocally advocate for an inclusiveapproach and stand against stakeholders whoundermine efforts to build sustainable peace.LINKING POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TOPROTECTION

Participants debated the relative prioritization ofsupport for the political process and the protectionof civilians. Some participants expressed concernthat the protection of civilians agenda was drawingthe mission’s efforts and resources away fromsupport for a political solution to the conflict.However, other participants argued that protectionof civilians should not be seen as a standalonemission activity, but rather as a necessaryingredient for the success of the political process inCAR. Communities cannot invest in reconciliationprocesses while they continue to be attacked on thebasis of identity. In addition, communities willcontinue to support armed groups, whichsometimes offer them protection, if they do notthink the government and MINUSCA can ensuretheir security. Moreover, MINUSCA’s activities can simultane-ously serve to protect civilians and advance thepolitical process. For example, MINUSCA’s effortsto prevent an armed group from taking control of apopulation center could both protect civilians fromviolence and incentivize that group to participate inDDRR or other political processes. The missionshould therefore understand the protection ofcivilians not only as a moral obligation to thepopulation of CAR but also as a vital component ofthe political process. Protection and political activi-ties can therefore be seen as complementing andstrengthening each other.EMPHASIZING LOCAL ACTION

Even if the currently stalled political process at thenational level yields results in Bangui, local-levelconcerns risk being forgotten. This is a problembecause much of the current violence in CAR isdriven by local disputes and grievances. If themission focuses its political engagement dispropor-tionately on Bangui, it risks reinforcing the same

Applying the HIPPO Recommendations to the Central African Republic 3

4 MEETING NOTE

dynamics that created the crisis of 2012–2014. MINUSCA should place greater emphasis onlocal-level actions (by its civilian, police, andmilitary components) to protect civilians and onpolitical solutions at the community level. Forexample, instead of supporting the extension ofstate authority via the deployment of governmentfigures from Bangui to the rest of the country, themission could focus on building and supportinglocal governance capacities. The mission shouldlook for opportunities to link these bottom-up andtop-down initiatives in a coherent way.STRATEGICALLY COORDINATINGCIVILIAN, POLICE, AND MILITARYCAPACITIES

The mission should strategically coordinate itsmilitary, police, and civilian capacities to influencearmed groups, the government of CAR, and thepopulation to commit to the political process andinvest in a peaceful future for their country. Thismeans viewing not only the protection of civiliansbut also DDRR, security sector reform, localconflict management, and the mandate to conductarrests as ways to enable the political process.UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICALECONOMY

Economic factors are driving the strategies, tacticaladvancements, and partnerships among armedgroups. MINUSCA should identify whether andhow it can use its capacities to prevent armedgroups from seizing control of assets they canexploit for economic and political gain. This wouldrequire a thorough understanding of the politicaleconomy of the conflict, including armed groups’access to key cattle markets and mining sites.BUILDING TRUST THROUGHCOMMUNICATION

There is an urgent need for the mission tocommunicate its mandate and build trust with thepopulation of CAR. The mission can furtherimprove its strategic communications, includingthrough a more locally focused (not Bangui-centric) approach and through greater communi-cation in local languages.

Prioritization andSequencing

MINUSCA’s upcoming mandate should continueto prioritize the protection of civilians, clarify andstrengthen the mission’s role in the politicalprocess (including mediation efforts), focus onfostering local peace capacities, encourage theeffective use of urgent temporary measures toadvance DDRR and the political process, placerenewed emphasis on security sector reform, andreconsider support to the extension of stateauthority.PRIORITIZATION OF THE PROTECTIONOF CIVILIANS

Growing violence against civilians represents acritical threat to peace and to the political processin CAR, and MINUSCA will be judged on its abilityto prevent or stop atrocities. The Security Councilshould authorize more troops to enable the missionto halt and reverse this trend. With these troopreinforcements, MINUSCA should be in a betterposition to reduce the security vacuum in thesoutheast and respond in a more dynamic andmobile manner to outbreaks of violencethroughout the country. However, MINUSCA’sforces will still be stretched thin; the missionshould apply a preventive approach to protection,relying on forecasting analysis and, when possible,responding with the appropriate civilian, police,and military capacities before violence hasmanifested itself. The dynamics driving violence against civiliansare centered at the local, not the national, level.Consequently, many participants agreed thatMINUSCA should adopt a more decentralizedapproach to the protection of civilians, includingby ensuring that field offices have the situationalawareness and decision-making capacities neededto respond to threats against civilians in a timelyand effective manner.STRONGER ROLE IN THE POLITICALPROCESS

CAR’s political process has stalled in part due tothe proliferation of mediation processes and

uncertainty over who should lead them.MINUSCA has a key role to play in the cultivationof a common political vision for the future of CAR,particularly given its presence on the groundaround the country and its ability to connect localvoices to the national political process. Someparticipants also mentioned the possibility thatMINUSCA “lead from behind” on mediationefforts, though it remains to be defined what thiswould look like in practice. MINUSCA’s exitstrategy must be founded on a credible andmultidimensional political solution. It is thereforecrucial that MINUSCA clarify and strengthen itsrole in the mediation efforts aimed at finding apolitical solution to the conflict.FOSTERING LOCAL PEACE CAPACITIES

While the political process progresses at thenational level, MINUSCA should increase itsefforts to stop the country’s slide into instability byfostering local peace capacities. CAR boasts strongand resilient capacities for peace at the local level,including many local peace committees operatingthroughout the country. MINUSCA should prioritize support to theselocal peace capacities and explore opportunities towork with governance actors at the local level tohelp stem violence in the short term as the nationalgovernment works to build its capacity, reform itsinstitutions, and extend its presence in the longterm. MINUSCA should also use its good offices toamplify the voices of the local peace committeesand connect local governance actors to the nationalprocess.URGENT TEMPORARY MEASURES

The mission must make better use of its “carrotsand sticks” to persuade the leaders of armed groupto remain committed to the peace process. Theprospect of arrest and conviction is a powerfulstick. Thus far, MINUSCA’s use of its authority toarrest has been limited. Some criticized the missionfor declining to arrest the leaders of armed groupscongregating in Bria in October of last year and forallowing Ali Darassa, leader of the armed groupUnion for Peace in CAR (UPC), to depart Bambariin February without detaining him. Thesedecisions also contribute to the popular mistrust ofMINUSCA, as many perceive them as evidence ofMINUSCA’s support for the ex-Séléka rebels. The Security Council should reinforce

MINSUCA’s mandate to adopt urgent temporarymeasures and urge the mission to use theseeffectively to protect civilians and as leverage to getthe leaders of armed group to genuinely participatein the political process. Arresting key leaders wouldundermine the war economy fueling the violence,pressure other leaders to engage honestly in thepolitical process, and demonstrate to the popula-tion of CAR that the mission is impartial andtrustworthy.GREATER FOCUS ON SECURITYSECTOR REFORM

Even with troop reinforcements, MINUSCA will behard-pressed to respond to CAR’s security needs.MINUSCA should increase its focus on securitysector reform to promote stability in the country.The mission should explore opportunities tocollaborate with units of the Central AfricanArmed Forces that were trained by the EuropeanUnion Training Mission while carefully applyingan assessment of risks and mitigation strategies inaccordance with the UN Human Rights DueDiligence Policy. MINUSCA should also be carefulto promote the capacity of CAR’s police andgendarmerie (not only the armed forces) andshould place particular emphasis on ensuring theaccountability and inclusiveness of CAR’s securityforces. MINUSCA is well-placed to push forgreater inclusion of Muslims and ethnic minoritiesin the military, police, and gendarmerie and shouldpromote a representative security sector.INCLUSIVE AND REPRESENTATIVESTATE AUTHORITY

MINUSCA’s prioritization of the restoration andextension of state authority should be reconsid-ered. Some workshop participants favoredremoving this task from the upcoming mandate tofree up resources for more urgent priorities, andperhaps adding it back into the mandate after theslide toward instability has been halted. Othersfavored redefining it to focus on promotinginclusive and representative governancemechanisms at the local level, or narrowing theextension of state authority to a smaller number ofstrategically important areas. Regardless of which approach it chooses, theSecurity Council should clarify what is expected ofthe mission with regard to this agenda, which manypersonnel within the mission find unclear and

Applying the HIPPO Recommendations to the Central African Republic 5

confusing. The mission should consider providingmore vocal support for inclusive efforts and morevocal opposition to statements from anystakeholders (including government representa-tives) that promote exclusion and marginalization.

Conclusion

National and international actors, includingMINUSCA, must work urgently to halt and reverseCAR’s slide back into violence. In the face of astalled political process, activity by armed groupsand opportunistic criminality continue to putcivilians at risk and destabilize the country, while

exclusionary rhetoric and widespread suspicionerode trust and further fuel intercommunalviolence. When reviewing MINUSCA’s mandate nextmonth, the Security Council should prioritize theprotection of civilians and increase MINUSCA’stroop ceiling, articulate a clearer role for themission in the political process, strengthen supportto local peace capacities, encourage the mission tomake more strategic use of its mandate to adopturgent temporary measures, strengthen themission’s efforts on security sector reform, andredefine the mission’s role in promoting inclusiveand representative state institutions.

6 MEETING NOTE

Agenda

Tuesday, October 3, 2017

9:00–9:20 Opening Remarks

9:20–11:00 Session 1: Political StrategyIn this session, experts will present a brief conflict analysis, outlining the recent developmentsand the major threats to peace and security in CAR. They will assess both major challenges andopportunities facing the mission and outline the progress that has been achieved. Participantswill then discuss a political strategy for the mission that responds to the threats outlined in theconflict analysis.

Discussion questions: What does an analysis of the conflict in CAR tell us about the drivers ofthe conflict? What are the primary obstacles to successful implementation of reconciliationmeasures? What is the current understanding of local capacities and effective local arrange-ments for peace? What is the political strategy underlying MINUSCA’s current mandate? Isthat political strategy still viable, or does it need to be revised? How, for example, can themission protect civilians in this context of renewed ethnic violence? How can the UN helpdefine and support the return of state authority in such an environment? What role should themission play in regionally led initiatives? What are the primary obstacles to and opportunitiesfor the successful transfer of tasks to the government and the country team? How can theSecurity Council remain engaged in support of MINUSCA’s political strategy and of long-termsolutions building on capacities for peace with the support of the UN on the ground?

ChairYoussef Mahmoud, International Peace Institute

SpeakersIgor Acko, United States Institute of PeaceNanette Ahmed, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping OperationsLouisa Lombard, Yale UniversityEnrica Picco, Independent Consultant

11:00–11:15 Coffee Break

11:15–1:00 Session 2: Prioritization and SequencingIn this session, participants will identify the mission’s highest priority objectives in order toadvance the political strategy defined in the previous session. Participants will also discuss thesequence in which priority objectives should be undertaken. By sequencing the objectives,participants will aim to ensure that the mission is not burdened by too many tasks at the sametime. Participants will also aim to sequence objectives so that the mission is not asked to carryout certain tasks prematurely, before the conditions for their success are in place.

Discussion questions: On the basis of the secretary-general’s latest report and subsequentdevelopments, which objectives in the current mandate should be prioritized? What aspects ofthe currently prioritized and sequenced mandate have the mission implemented successfully?What obstacles have prevented the mission from translating mandated tasks into action, and

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what conditions need to be in place for those tasks to be carried out? How can MINUSCA’smandate better allow the mission to adapt to changing conditions on the ground?

ChairIan Martin, Security Council Report

SpeakersSamuel Gourgon, Permanent Mission of France to the United NationsNanette Ahmed, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

9

Mr. Igor AckoUnited States Institute of Peace (USIP)

Ms. Nanette AhmedUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations (DPKO)

Ms. Aïssata AthieInternational Peace Institute

Mr. Gianluca BattagliaPermanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations

Mr. Michael BonserPermanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations

Mr. Arthur BoutellisInternational Peace Institute

Ms. Lina BunisPermanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations

Ms. Jun ChiPermanent Mission of the People's Republic ofChina to the United Nations

Mr. Eric Chung-LimUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations (DPKO)

Mr. Evan Cinq-MarsCenter for Civilians in Conflict

Ms. Lesley ConnollyInternational Peace Institute

Mr. Arnaud de CoincyUnited Nations - New York

Mr. Paul DeutschmannPermanent Mission of France to the United Nations

Ms. Namie Di RazzaInternational Peace Institute

Dr. Adedeji EboUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations (DPKO)

Mr. Yann EhrhardUnited Nations - New York

Mr. Renaud GalandUnited Nations - New York

Ms. Aditi GorurHenry L. Stimson Center

Mr. Samuel GourgonPermanent Mission of France to the United Nations

Ms. Christina HackmannUnited Nations Development Programme(UNDP)

Mr. John HirschInternational Peace Institute

Ms. Julie JollesUnited States Mission to the United Nations

Mr. Ivan KhoroshevPermanent Mission of the Russian Federation tothe United Nations

Ms. Grace KpohazoundeUnited Nations - New York

H.E. Ms. Ambroisine KpongoPermanent Mission of the Central AfricanRepublic to the United Nations

Ms. Louisa LombardYale University

Dr. Youssef MahmoudInternational Peace Institute

Ms. Hillary MargolisHuman Rights Watch

Participants

10

Mr. Ian MartinSecurity Council Report

Ms. Delphine MechoulanInternational Peace Institute

Lt. Col. Francisco Thó MonteiroPermanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations

Dr. Alexandra NovosseloffInternational Peace Institute

Ms. Enrica PiccoIndependent Consultant

Ms. Laura PowersInternational Peace Institute

Mr. Christophe PradierUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations (DPKO)

Ms. Laura RutishauserUnited Nations Development Programme(UNDP)

Ms. Sabina SteinUnited Nations Department of Political Affairs(DPA)

Mr. Eran SthoegerSecurity Council Report

Dr. Sarah TaylorInternational Peace Institute

Ms. Madeline VellturoHenry L. Stimson Center

Dr. Marie-Joëlle ZaharUniversité de Montréal

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