“e 4yb · figure 2 - peak monthly strengthreport figure 3 - monthly islandstrength figure4-number...
TRANSCRIPT
..-.
( “-
b .,●
\
Afwutk,
“e $&.4Y -..:,b
(
i.
PREFACE
tg “
Our job ~n Task Group ?.4 was to pr~vide air support to Joint Task
Force SEVU31. The propose of this report is to brfcf what we did in carryi-
ng mt this job, Anyone interested in more dctail”than contained in this
report is referr~.dt.~the histories of the Task Group and of its units. “
Althou&h Headquarters Task Group 7.L was not formally established for
Operation HARDTACK until October 1957,
participation in the opration started
Joint Task Force S13VlW,and within the
h9~Wh Test Group (Nuclear) of the Air
this report covers activities starting
plans and preparation for its
long before that within Headquarters,
headquarters and squadrona of the
Force Special Weapons Center. ThuS,
as early as the Spring and Summer of
1957. The last shot of the HARDTACK series took place at the Eniwetok
Provine Grounds on18 August 1958. Roll-up activities, deactivation of
provisional units, and reassignment of ~rsomel will take place for several
weeks to come.
report has been
publication.
The report
Part
Part
Part
Part
Part
These matters arc routine, however, and therefore this
cut off as of18 August 19S8 in order to permit ear3y
is or~anized into five parts as followst
I summary
II Command
III Personnel & Administration
IV Operations
v Materiel
‘ I take this opportunity to express appreciation to all the officers
and alrmn who have served in Task Group 7.4 so faithfully and well. All
SWS 8SRD 28532//3 -
2
9--
f“’of US ~e happy to have b.en able to contribute to tbe success of Joint
Task Foroe SE~ in the conduct of Operation H.A.RDTMX~
Ctmmmder
AFwulio
3
3
fi
.“ COPYI’lumm
(—1-3456
;9101112-131&18
192021-22
25262728
%’g
333435-36373839Lo&
43-4445464?
48-53n55-70
DISTRIBUTION LIST—
A~ENCIiiS ATTENTION
CJTF-SEVENCTG 7.1 Col Lverycm 7.2 Col Sawi,ckicm 7.3 Cd.r DodsonCTG 7.5 Mr. James E ReevesComdr AFSWPCondr F’c/AFswP Col K. D. ColemanChief Of Staff USAl (AFOAT) Col BomotComdr AFOAT-1 Lt Col SeifertCO* ARDc Maj MarkhamComdr AFswc Swo (Cys 14-15)
~ (Cy 16)WP (Cy 17)SWC (CJf 18)
Comdr L925th Test Group (w-~ ~ement CO1 N-ncoti 492Gth Test Squa&on (S) (TAu)Codr 4951st Support Squadron (T) (TBUCO* &9%d Support Squadron (T)Com&WADC (Effects Element)Comdr AFCRC (IonosphereElement)CO* MCComir SMMACO* MATSComdr Test Services Unit
Lt Col Steinhausslhj B H. COChranOLt Col R. Wi Yundt
Mr. Douglas(sMSIL)Lt Col G. F. WientyesCOIW. H. Neal
Comdr Search and Rescue Elemmt (6MMRS) Lt Col M. C. FrazeeCoti Weather Reporting Element Lt Coz pu~inComdr Weather Reconnaissance Element Lt Col ConradLookout Mountain LaboratoryCINCSAC Maj WellerCINCPACAFPACAF Helicopter Element Capt S. W. HebertComdr MsComdr Mcs Maj GikasCO* APcsBUAERComdr NAswF Cmdr BushnerComdr @80th Strat Reconnaissance Wing Col AdamsCO* MC MCFOComir WESTAF DCS/PlansMr. Ted Johnson, CM, 6th Region, HonoluluLife Bldg$ Honolulu$ T. H.TO 7.L (4950th TG (N) Staff AgenciesHunter MB, Ga. Col KiefferFile
AFwMo
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Participattig Organizations
Preface
Distribution List
Table of Contents
Table of Figures
Part
Part
I - Summag
II” command
Chapter 1 - General
Chapter 2 - Mission
Chapter 3 - organization
Chapter h - Planning &Build-Up
Chapter 5 -Operatioml Phase
Chapter 6 - ~ying Safety
Chapter 7 -Medicd
Part III - Personnel & Administration
chapter 1 - Introduction & Swry
Chapter 2 -Personnel
Chapter 3 - Administrative Services
Chapter 4 -secufitY
Chapter 5 -Comptro~er
Part
Chapter 6 - Ground SafetY
Chapter 7 - Legal & Discipline
Chapter 8 -Protocol
IV - Operations
Chapter 1 - Introduction
PAGE NR
1
2
4
5
7
10
13
14
16
17
21
23
27
3-
3
33
38
k5
46
L8
52
36
- 59
60
62
5
AFuIJHO
-1Part
Part
Part
Part
.
I - None
TABIE OF FIGURES
11 - Command
Figure l- Organization Chart - TO 7.h
Figure 2 - Accident Rate
III - Personnel & Administration
Figure 1 - Monthly Strength Chart
Figure 2 - Peak Monthly Strength Report
figure 3 - Monthly Island Strength
Figure 4- Number of Secur5@ Badges Issued
lHgure5u - Comptroller Charts
Figure 7- &nerd. Order of Attachmnt of GeneralCourt-Martial Jurisdiction
IV - Operations
Figure l-
Figure 2 -
Figur83-
Figure 4 -
Figure 5-
Figure 6 -
Figure 7 -
Figure 8-
Figure 9 -
Figure 10 -
Figure 11 -
Figure 12 -
Figure 13 -
;alendar of Events
m-50 s~
Urcraft Participation
?loud Sampling Accomplishment Chart
Iadiation Eqosure - SampI-ingCrms
3-57B & B-57D FI.yi.ngSUDRIEUY
?J)$&@-s~
3-52 Fl@ng Summwy
P2V Flying summary
B-36 Fl@g Summmy
C-97 Fl@ng Suxmuary
RC-~ Flying Sunm@ry
R%* Fl@g Summary
7
Page No.
18
30
39
40
u
47
.$-%- 6-Q
Sa
,.-.61
7’5
,78-79
80.85
87
89
90
94
94
.97
97
101
102
Mwlm
**
dTa e of Figures
Part
Figure 4 -
Figure 15-
Figure 16 -
Figure 17 -
figure 18 -
Figure 19 -
Figure 20 -
Figure 21 -
Figure 22 -
Figure 23 -
Figure 2k -
Figure 25-
Figure 26 -
Mgure 27 -
mgure 28 -
(Cent’d)
v - Materiel
c-%Flying Sunmxy
L-20 Fl@ng Sunmwry
H-19 Flying summary
H-21 Flying summary
G19 Flying s~
sA-16 Fl@ng Sunm=y
MATS Afil.ift
Air Control Area
Ionizing Radiation Exposures
Positioning Infmmation (ROSS)
Positioning Information (Rose)
K-HOUr Array (Rose)
Progr-d ~SSiOll EXeCUtiOn tit (RON)
Mssion Contiol B- (Rose-Mcks)
Mission Execution Board (Rose)
Figure 1 -
Figure 2 -
Figure 3 -
Figure 4-
Figure S -
figure 6 -
Figure 7-
Figure 8 -
Aircraft Engine Consumption
line
We
AOCP
Pipe
Items on Hand
IteIUSRequested and Issued
Rate
Id.neTime AWE AOCP EMER.
Roll-up
Fuel Consumption
MO-gas and Diesel Consumption
8
Page No.
108
IJO
U-3
lls
117
120
123
w-I-38
ti7
ti8
I-49
150
153
1%
164
166
167
168
169
172
174
175
yA$WHO
(
#
T~le of Figures (Conttd)
Figure 9 - Aircraft On Hsnd
Figure 10 -
Ngure U -
Figure I-2-
Figure I-3-
Figme4-
Figure 15-
Figure 16 -
Figure 17 -
Figure 18 -
Figure 19 -
Figure 20 -
Figure 21 -
-craft In-Commission Rate
Mdntenance W Hours ExpndedTim
Maintenance lb Hours ~nded
General Purpose Vehicle Used
Specisl Purpose Vehicle Used
Air Cargo West Bound
Mge No.
178
la
Indirect 186
Direct The 187
190
192
194
- passenger Movement lfestBound 196
Water Cargo West Bound
Passenger Air East Bound
Mr Cargo East Bound
Water Cargo East Bound
Construct&on Program Thru
197
2a)
201
203
m 62 208-209
(
“ PART I
SUMMARY
.
10
(
fThe mission,of Task ~OUF 704> pro~isionalj was to
..prwide and operate
certain aircraft and to p-otide we,a,therand other sarvices in support of
Joint Task Force SEVEN during Operation HARDTACK in the spring and summer
of 19S8. The Group reached a peak strength of 2262. Althcmghthe Grw
manned some sixteen different operating sites, the bulk of the people
served on FRED Island at Eniwetok Atoll. Some thirty-seven (37) N=y
~crsonnel served i.nTask Group 7.4, Provisional. All of the remaining
p-ople were members of the United States Air Force.
Plann5.ngfor the participation of Task Group 7.4, provisional, in
@-ration HARDTACK began tithin the Air Fbrce Special Weapons Center at
Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mefico early in 1957. In @tober Of that ye=
the Task Group and its operating Elements were formally established. Task
Group personnel began moving into the Forward Area in December and con-
tinued at an ever increasing rate until 15 March 1958 when the Task Qroup
Headquarters and all its Units and Elements became operational in the
Eniwetok Proving Grounds (EPG).
lluringthe five months that the Task Group participated in sustained
support of HARDTACK, its flying and technical elements participated in 35
nuclear tsst events. Of these, 11 took place at E5kini, 22 at Eniwctok$
and 2 at Johnston Island. - On four occasions it was necessary for the
Group to partici~ate in two cvsnts on the same d~. In all, the test
effects and sampler aircraft of the Test Aircraft Unit flew 2n sorties
and 1982hours in direct support of nuclear test operations.
The Group protided weather reporting, weather reconnaissance, and
weather forecasting services to Joint Task Force SEVEN. Weather reporting
stations were set up on eight islands ranging in distance from one hundred
to ci~ht h~mdred miles distance from Eniwetok. Weather reconn~ssancen
(
1
was accomplished with a unit of ten l/E-~0aircraft which flew daily out
to distances of twelve hundred miles from Eniwcto]cand returned- The
-wrnatherforecasting or~anization, of course, played”an important part in
providhy the Task Force Conmandcr with that weather information which
he needed to determine whether or not to shoot.
Air .suTportactivities included the opr=kion of C-54, SA-16, liaison
and helicopter aircraft carryin~ passengers and CarCO in the Forward Area.
At p??k strc?n@h, Task hOUF 7.4 was assimed a total of 78 fircraft
of 16 different t~es. Between 1~ March and 16 August a total of~83°7 :1~~
hollrsw-r? accom~l.ish”d. Four major ?ccid’;ntsw:re suffered involting
on-:Iisison P.ircraft?n(lthreeh[*l.ic3ptcrS.One life was lost as a result
of these
All
to their
accid{~nts.
Units a~d Elements of Task @OUP 7.4s ~o~si~n~~ were r~deFloYcd
home stations as soon as they could be spared from the Forward
Area. On 15 AuQmst the main Headquarters of the Task Group transferred
back to Kirtland Air Force Ilassleafig only a small cchclon to finish
th roll-up of supplies and equipment.
12
Alw.tlul
(
PART II
COMHAND
.
(.
13
Awuno
(
Cha~er 1 - Generalr
Zate in 1956 the 4950th Test &oup (Nuclear)..
Headquarters ~r Research and Development Command
was established by
as part of the Air
Force Special Weapons Center at ltirtlandAir Force B~se. It is a perma-
nent orEanlzation whose mission is to plm for and to protide direction
of air support for full-scale nuclear test programs both in Nevada and
the Pacific. The members of the Headquarters of this group, while
~artici~ating in the PLUMBBOB exercise in Nevada in the Spring and Summer
of 19$7, concurrently initiated pl~ms for Task Group ?.4 participation in
HARDTACK. Upon activation of Task Group 7.4, ~ovisional, by Headquarters
Air Research and Development Command on 1 October 1957, the Commander
and other personnel assi=med to the Headquarters of the ~950th, mere~
assumed similar titles within the newly fomed Task Group ?.~ and continued
doing the job at hand. Thus there was no tjme lost in organizing a new
group of people to do the Headquarters Task
During the period from 1 October until
phase of HARDTACK in the forward area on 15
elements of Task Group 7.4 were established
GrOUp 7.4 job.
the owning of the operational
March, the provisional units and
and organized at their various
21 home bases. Commanders were assigned and planning
~idance of the Commander, Joint Task ~rce SEVEN and
Group 7.4.
Although advance detachments were in the forward
proceeded under the
the Commander, Task
area as early as
February, operational control of these units was not assumed by Task Group
?.h and Joint Task Force SEV_ENuntil their commanders arrived on 12 and
Umrch r~spectlvely; this assumption of command was accomplished smoothly
and without misunderstanding.
Connand arrangements during shots varied depending upon the shot
situation. At no time was t~ere a~ serious cliff”lculty in maintaining
ntwulio
*
iadequate communication between the various operating locations. Thus, it
was possible for the Commander of Task Group 7.4 to comnand all the air
operations while at the
SEVEN fully informed of
same time keeping the Commander Joint Task Force
the situation and responding to his orders.
Flying Safety was a special subject at all levels within the Task
Group. The accident rate achieved was 21-3 per one hundred thousand
fl@g hours. This compares with an Air Force-wide rate during Calendar
year 1957 of 13*6 per
six months of calendar
hours.
one hundred thousand fl@mg hours.and?or the first
yea.r1958 of 10.8 per one hundred thousand flying
(
AFWLJI+(J
15
?chapter 2 - Mission
The mission of Task Gr~up 7.4 durin~ Opration HARDTACK was two-
fold: to operate aircraft for the purpose of collecting data and samples
and to provide certain of the air support sex=dces required by Joint
Task Force SEVEN. This latter function included the operation of air
base facilities at Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls, an inter-island and hter-
atol.1eirlift syste~, weather reporting and forecasting setices~ air
terminal, search and r-scue and communication’services.
3-6
AFWL/HO
.*-
Cha~ter 3 - Organization
Headquarters Task Group i’.bwas organized into three directorates
(Personnel and Administration, Operations, and*teriel) anda s~ll
special staff reporting directly to the Commander and consisting of
the Flying Safety Officer and the Flight Surgeon. The operating personnel
were organized into three units: the Test Aircraft Unit, Test Services
Unit, and Test Base Unit. The organization structure and the general functional
areas of responsibility of each of the three operating units are indicated in
Figure 1.
The Commander of the Task Group was formerly assigned as Deputy Commander
of the Air Force Special Weapons Center and, thus, has been associated for some
time with the atomic weapons research and development program. On 15 July 1957
he was reassigned to the post of Deputy Commander for Overseas Tests in pre-
paration for his subsequent assumption of command of the Task Group. This
arrangement made it possible for him to participate in the field phase of
Operation PLUHBBUB, the 1957 atomic test series conduct~ in Neva** He as-
suned comrand of the
The former commander
served to insure the
k95Gth Test Grow and Task Group ?.h on 1 Otto* 1957.
of the @SOth Test Group became his deputy, a move which
continuity of that unit’s operations.
With the activation of Task Group 7.4 on 1 0ctober19S7, the various staff
officers of the h9SOth Test Group assumed like staff positions uithin Task
Group 7.4, an arrangement which proved particularly effective In the case
of two officers naking up the Commander’s
request manning from resources other than
Weapons Center. The services of a Flight
logical effects of radiation was obtained
Joint Force SEVEN and Headquarters United
17
special
that of
Surgeon
staff it was necessazy
the Air Force Special
with experience in the
to
bio-
by arrangement with Headquarters
States Air Force.
AFWL/HO
(\
—
FIGUIW 1 la
(
_~During the period when Task Group 7.4-was operating at Kirtla~ Ur Force
fBase, assistance was protided by the Staff Judge Advocate of the Ati Force
Special Weapons Center. Arrangements were mde with the Commander Pacific
Air Forces to provide legal assistance when needed at Eniwetok by placing a
qualified officer of his staff on TDY with the Task Group. It proved necessary
to request such assistance on three occasions during the on-site phase of the
operation.
The Test
Its commander
Therefore, he
Aircraft Unit included the data and sample collection aircraft.
was formerly the Deputy Commander of the 49SOth ‘TestGroup.
well understood the problems comected with flying aircraft in
the vicinity of nuclear detonations and through nuclear clouds. His deputy
was the Commander of the h926th Test Squadron (Sampling), one of the units
assigned to,the h9SOth Test Group. This latter officer and his
experienced, through participation in previous operations, with
nuclear cloud sampling. The remaining Elements assigned to t%e
unit were
all aspects of
Test JUrcraft
Unit were provided by various Air Force and Navy commands and came under our
operational control when they arrived at the Eniwetok Proving Ground.
The Test Services Unit was manned and orgsmized by the Xilita.ryAir
Transport Service to protide normal MATS services to the Joint Task Force.
Its commander was an officer with experience in many phases of MATS operations.
Coincident with the arrival of the Commander Test Services Unit in the forward
area he assumed command responsibility for all MATS units based in the Proving
Ground.
The Test Base Unit$ whose task was to provide air base facilities and
local airlift, had as its nucleus the 49~lst SUppOrt squadron (Test)~ and a
detachment of the 24th Helicopter Squadron, PACAF, whose permanent homes are
at Eniwetok. These units were augmented as needed to meet the test require-
ments by their parent comrnandsjthe @33th Test Group and PAW respectively=
19
f(Ammo
.. .
In ad#ition it wa~ necessary to request al% participating units to make a pro-
ra4 contribution of additional personnel needed to augment the field main-
tenance shops.
I
20
MWUHO
(
Chapter ~ - ?lannin~ and .uildup
/Plannin~for~ask ~roup 7eL participation in OFeration ~TAcK
comnwnced in late
test at Eniwetok,
continental test,
1956coincident with the roll-up of that year~s nuclear
Operation
Operation
REDWING, and with the planning for the 1957
PLUMBBOB. The first efforts were directed
at the FreFaration of aircraft} ‘upplyJ construction} transportation> @
budget requirements. These studies led to the development of the data
which was presented at the Joint Task Force SEVEN planning conference
in February 1957 as being.
By mid-1957 a Schedule of
rublished and our officer
our needs for the conduct of our test mission.
Events and a Communications Plan had been
and airmen personnel requisitions had been
forwarded to hither headquarters for action. AS has been mentioned
previously, the activation of the various Task Group 7.4 agencies occurred
early in the month of October 1957. Immediately thereafter the Task
Group held its Logistics Planning Conference which brought the test
participants together with representatives of the various Air Materiel
Areas and the Task Group Materiel stqff for the purpose of outlining
requirements and the steps necessary toward meeting those needs. Mean-
while, the Task Group staff published its first planning directive out-
lining the general operational concepts, undertook rehabilitation of the
air control equi~ent, the AN/USQ 12, arranged for the modification
of additional sampling aircraft, and prepared supplemental budgets
necessa~ to reflect the changing requirements. By the end of the year
the Operations Plan and a draft of the Movement Directive had been com-
pleted and the Commander and his tie~utyhad completed staff visits,to
the forward area. One of the principl. purposes of these tisits was
to make mutually satisfactory arran~ments with the Army Task Group, 7*2S
for the support the; would pro-tideduring the operational period.
21
WHO
tIn early 1%8, the Task Group staff directed its efforts to the
preparation of detailed plans necessary for carrying out each facet of
the ndssion. An advance echelon led by the Deputy Commander arrived at
Eniwctok during the first week
completion of the construction
stations and off-island sites,
incoming units.
in Febru~ to mmitor and expedite .
program, establishment of weather island
and preparation of base facilities for
AFwlml
22
Cha@%r S - Operational Phase
Operation HARDTACK inv~lved the detonation of some 35 nuclear devices.
Of these, 11 were detonated at Eniwetok~ 22 at Bikini Atoll, and two at
Johnston Island. On four occasions two detonations occurred the same day
and 17 occurred on successive days. &total of 257 so~ies were fl~
in connection with the operation. The organizational structure and the
resources made available to Task Group ‘?.hproved adequate to meet its
mission commitments.< FYve of the events: the two underrater shots, WAHOO
and UMBRELLA, and the three high altitude shots, YUCCA, TEAK and ORANGE,
gave rise to some new operational problems but in each instance we were
able to resolve these problems and perform the required missions.
The command arrangements in the forward area were vagied depending
on location of events and operational requirements. The first event was
YUCCA, the high altitude balloon shot conducted at Bikini Atoll. This
event imposed some unusually stringent command and operational problems.
The Task Group Commander exercised command of the air operation from the
Air Operations Center (AOC) in the USS BOXER. His deputy was responsible
for the dispatch and recovery of test aircraft from Eniwetok. He USed the
Air Operations Center at FRED Island, Eniwetok Atoll, as his comnd post-
on subsequent Bikini events, the Bikifi ar @erations Center -s under the
direct on-the spot supervision of either the Task Group Commnder or one of
his senior officers, and the Task Group Commander exercised overa~ control
from the FRED AOO. The Commander of the Test Aircraft Unit was responsible
for the pre and post-mission operation of aircraft on the ah base. He ex-
ercised this control from a radio-equipped vehicle on the ramp itself. ‘he
Fl@ng safety Officer or a senior operations officer mnned the tower during
missions to assist in expediting landings and takeoffs.
23
On-WAHOO and UMBRELLA, when there were especially stringent loCal aircraft
requirements, a
dispatch office
Throughout
Air Force Base.
senior staff officer was also stationed at the central
controlling the helicopter and liaison aircraft.
the operation a rear echelon was maintained at H.rtJ.and
Its function was to monitor and to assist the actions
being taken at that B~se in the support of the operation. In additions
it provided an agency through which the dependents could obtain information
and assistance~ a function which contributed =teriaTly to the morale and
welfare of the families of the men participatfig in the operation.
When it was decided to conduct the high altitude shots, TEAK and ORANGE
at Johnston Island rather than at Bikini, we placed one of our
staff officers on detached service with Joint Task Force SEVEM
operations
to serve as
Base Operations Officer at Johnston Island and later estib~shed commnd
posts at both Johnston Island and Hickam U Force Ease, Honolulu. I~ediate
control of the air operations in comection with the two events was exer-
cised by the Task Group Commander from the AOC in the USS BO~ (a destroyer
was used to provide AOC facilities when they were required at Bikini during
the absence or the BOXIR). &craft participating in NB?SRXKL operated from
Hickam Air Force Base and
control of these aircraft
missions was exercised by
Barbers Point Naval Air Station in Hawaii. Operational
during the takeoff, enroute and landing phase of the
the Deputy Commander, Task Group 7.4, from a command
post located in the Honolulu fir Traffic Center. The Commander of the Test
Services Unit served as the acting commander at the Eniwetok Proving Ground
while the Task Group Commander and his deputy were away participating in NEWSREEL.
Task Group was required to provide planning assistance and aircraft for Operation
LITTLE DAVID, a nuclear rocket test to be conducted at Eglin Mr Force Base
during August.
Afwum
PlaR%ing for this SUppOrt was done by the rear echelon with the assistance
fof several officers of the b926th Test Squadron (Sampling) who were returned
early for that purpose.
Many command functions in connection with Task Group ?.h operations were
norml to those experienced by any
a few problems which merit special
In addition to those stations
commander at Wing level, but there were
comment.
in the Eniwetok Proving Ground itself,
Task Group 7.h manned several other locations for the purpose of making and
reporting weather observations. In several cases personnel of other task
groups were also resident on these islands. The Task Group Commander having
the senior individual permanently assigned was instmcted to appoint that in-
dividual as the personal representative of the CJTF SEVEN to be responsible
for maintaining discipline among JTF-7 personnel and establishing correct re-
lations between the JTF-7 personnel and the local inhabitants. Task Group 7.4
manned eight weather islands and was responsible for the administration on
four of these. Frequent visits were made to the camps. There were nc untoward
incidents during the operation; but in two cases personnel who had indicated
some lack of stabil$ty were replaced to forestall any possible breach of dis-
cipline.
A new arrangement for the dispatch and control
evolved for operation HARDTACK. In the past it had
of liaison aircraft was
been the practice to provide
a preciously agreed upon number of aircraft to the Task Group 7.5 dispatcher
at ELMER (Parry) Island each day. In turn, he re+iispatched these airplanes
as they were needed to meet the requirements of the scientific and construction
personnel of Task Groups 7.1 and 7.5 respectively. Amother group of aircraft
was retained on the strip at FRED to meet all other JTF SEVEN requirements
and to serve as spare aircraft. During HARDTACK the two dispatch functions
were consolidated into a single office known as the Eniwetok Airlift Operations25
AFWIJHO
-d ~
!Of ice, located at FRED. This office controlled the movement of aircraft
through the use of two-way radio with the aircraft andblephone and radio
circuitswith each of the passenger and cargo agents on all the up-atoll
airstrips. The EAOO knew the precise location and status of each aircraft at
all.times and was in a position to
tomers.
During the operation the long
give the best feasible service to all cus-
range construction program at Eniwetok
was reviewed and amended to reflect the projected needs of Task Group 7*k
for future test operations in the EPG. A
the unit manning documents of each of the
Test Group (Nuclear) in order tha-tfuture
the experience gained during HARDTACK.
similar review was conducted of
units assigned to
mnning documents
the 49@th
would reflect
The support rendered to Task Group 7.4by other task groups waa out-
standing. Although the construction program lagged behind schedule prior
to the operation, most of the delays were beyond the control of Task GrOUP
7.5 and all of the essential facilities were c~mpleted prior to the beginning
of the operational phase itself. The housekeeping’suppoti required of the
Armyts Task Group 7.2 was entirely adequate in every respect.
26
AFWHO
Chapt%;r6 - Flying SafetyiThroughout the exercise the Task Group
personnel devoted much attention to fl@ng
Commander and other supervisory
safety. During the period when
accidents in the Eniwetok Proving Grounds were chargeable to the Task Group
(21 February to 18 August 1958) a total of 18307 fifing hours were achieved
and four major accidents were experienced for a rate of 21.3. It is worthy
of note that three of the four accidents involved helicopters. Exclusive of
helicopters, the accident rate was only 6.8 per 100,000 hours of flying time.
The attached chart shows our accident rate on a cumulative basis.
Our four accidents involved an L-20 and three helicopters as follows:
a. On the morning of 7 April the pilot of a L-20 took off with a near
empty fuel tank. The engine died soon after takeoff and the pilot stalled
the aircraft onto the reef. Major damage to the aircraft resulted, but t%ere
was no injuqy to personnel,
b. On
to maintain
and crashed
the evening of 7 April the pilot of aH-19T3 aircraft, in an attempt
VFR flight during a heavy rain shower, lost control of his aircraft
in the lagoon. A civilian passenger was drowned in this accident;
the other four people aboard sufived without major injury.
C. on IO July 19~8 an H-21B aircraft crashed into the ocean when the
pilot experienced some Hnd of materiel failure in the control system. The
failure could not be determined precisely as the aircraft sank in very deep
water and could not be recovered. All people aboard the aircraft escaped with-
out injury.
d. on 14 August1958an H-21B aircraft crashed near Yvonne in 35 feet of
water approxl.mately1500 feet short of the runway. No passengers were aboard.
No one was injured. The cause of the accident was the blow out of the master
cylinder which severed the ignition harness of the engine.
27
AFwuna
~Our Group Flying Safety Council was established as soon asf
was started; It met weekly throughout the exercise. Under its
vigorous flying safety programs were conducted by all Units and
the operation
supervision,
Elements. The
program began with flying safety survey of all Units and Elements with con-
tinuous follow-up action throughout the operational period.
Many unusual features of the flying operation in the Eniwetok Proving
Grounds made flying safety a particular important subject. Some of these
were:
a. Mrfield construction at FRED was not completed before we started
to operate. Consequently we had to operate while painting and,grading,
installation of lights, etc, took place.
b.
c.
d.
required
e.
There were roads across the runway at two points.
The parking and taxi areas were cramped.
The tiny diverse type of aircraft operating off the single runway
the coordination of several different-types of traffic patterns.
SA-16ts landed at lagoons where in some cases the markings and
buoys were marginal.
f* There were many flights in the area of
In addition to the four accidents which we
nuclear”detonations.
experienced, many incidents
occurred which could have
a. AB-~ aircraft
actuator. The runway was
led to accidents. Two examples are:
experienced failure of the nose gear hydraulic
foamd and the aircraft landed in the foam.
The nose gear collapsed with only s~ight da~ge to the aircraft. It was later
discovered that many of the nose gear actuators on our aircraft were defective,
The aircraft were grounded until the actuators couldbe tested ard all the
defective ones replaced.
b. A life raft inflated and ejected from AWB-SO in flight. It struck the
left horizontal stablizer and did such damage as to reduce the normal control28
.,/~CJWuw .M
avai}able to the pilot. The aircraft landed safety at Wake.
# ~thO~gh the Task Gro~P7.b, pro~~iOnal, accident rate of ~.3WaS in—
fact higher than the ~ ~orce tide accident rate in 1957 of 13.60 We feel
that our great efforts in the flying safety area were not in vain.
A.wJno
.. -
1;-
0 0m N
9NlAld OOCfOOl M3d
o wsF
SAN30133V
.
30
(
Chapter 7 - Medical...
-J
/ Task Group 7.2 was responsible for providing medical attention to
Task Group 7./1personnel and WaS manned fith sufficient doctors to do this
job well. By and large the command remained extremely healthful through-
out the exercise. ‘dehad no epidemics. The majority of the cases treated
fell.into one of three groups, i. e.
a, Superficial skin infections.
b, Upper respiratory infections.
c. Minor injuries.
Medical.services to Task
provided by the.assignment to
Group 7.b personnel on outlying islands were
each of a medical technician, plus occasional
visits by Task Group 7.2 doctors and the Task GTOUI?7.4 ~ght Surgeon*
Becausr we had a large number of ~~ng personnel engaged in diversified
flying activities, Task @oup 7.4 had assigned to it a Flight Surgeon
from 4 March 1958
with an office in
in taking care of
to the corn~letionof the exercise. He was provided
one of our operations buildings and was very effective
medical problems for our fifing personnel. His activities
were somewhat handicapped by lack of medical technicians; we recommend
that medical technicians be provided for future operations of ttis nature.
From time to time during the exercise medical semi.ces were provided
in emergency situatims on outlying islands where we maintained detachments.
These ssr~ces were Fro~dcd to both tilitary and indigenous personnel arid
included diagnosis, treatment and/or evacuation. Outstanding among these
events were:
a. Evacuation of two cases of acute appendicitis.
b. Evacuation of a
c. Evacuation of a
fallen from a tree.
do Evacuation of a
Wunc
suspected case of sm~lpox.
case of multiple fractures in a boy who had
case “th a huw abscess in his right flank.*
;\
PART III
PFRWNNEL AND ADMN_IS~TION
32
.
Chapter 1 - Introduction and Sumk’y ‘--”
t
To describe the personnel and administrative activities of Task ~roup
7.4, it is necessary to devote some preliminary remarks to the organization
Of the k95Gth Test Group (Nucl=r) which isthe nucleus for Task Group 70b0
Unlike many components of Task Group ?.h, the h950th is not a transitory
organization established only for participation in Operation HARDTACK.
It is a permanent
and directing Adx
organization that is in being for the purpose of planning
Force participation in nuclear test operations both in
Nevada and the Eniuetok Proving Grounds.
In addition to Headquarters, h95Gth Test GrOUP (Nucle=) tiich beco~s
Headquarters Task Group 7.4 for overseas tests, there are four squadron in
the 495Gth. The h93%h Alr Base Squadron at Indian
Nevada, is the
has no role in
primary support organization for all
the overseas operations. The h9~lst
1
Springs Air Force Base,
continental tests and
Support Squadron at
Eniwetok provides h Ease Support in the Eniwetok Provhg Grounds.
The b926th Test Squadron (Saxpling) is permantly stationedat Kirtlandti
Force Base but spends a gocd part of each year TDY either at Nevada or
the Eniwetok Proving Grounds, depending on where the tests are
Ammo
33
be{ng conducted. The mission of the b926th is that of collecting parti-tcu].ateand gaseous SamPl@3 by f~ing S~Cially equip~d J-S? SircrSft
through nuclear clouds. This squadron becomes the nucleus of the Test
Aircraft Unit that is formed at
the 4952nd SupPrt Squadron, is
technicians who are sent TDY to
these sup~rt activities during
each site. The remaining squadron,
made up of military specialists and
either Nevada or Zniwetok to augment
test operations. The h9~2nd has a
normal strength of about 250 ahnen and 12 officers. Its strength and
composition has to be changed after each test; however, because the
auu~entation required at Eniwetok where some items of base support are
the responsibility of the ArrIw(Task Group 7.2) is much different than
that required at Indian Springs Air Force Base where the entire base -
support is a b9SOth responsibility.
During the Summer and Fall of 1957 when the h950th and its subor-
dinate organizations were participattig ~ operation pL~OB ~ Nevada~
the Directorate of Personnel
in revising the Unit Manning
and requisitioning personnel
and Administration was additionally engaged
Document of the h952hd Support Squadron
necessary to au~ent and support the Test
Base Unit (h9~lst Support Sqpadron) in the Eniwetok pz’ovingGrounds
during operation HARDTACK. It was necessary to compute the overall
strength of the Task GrOup and to predict the personnel suFport require-
ments that were not at the time firmly established. Conferences and
meetings were held with individuals who were later to form the Test
Services Unit, Test Aircraft Unit and the Test Base Unit. Strength and
billeti~m fi.~e~ of their respective organizations were discussed.
Emphasis was placed on attempting to get the job done with a mim
of persomel. Estimates were obtained as to length of time that various
3b
AwuHll
..
4
T s would require to move to, set up, and become operational in the
l!kriwetokProvin; Grmmds. Based on these figures, it was possible to
determine movement dates for the various organizations.
With the establishment of firm personnel figures and movement
dates it was possible to retise and make more accurate the prelhninary
budget estimates that were submitted early in 1957.
then possible for the Test Base Unit to predict with
when they could require the movement of augmentation
l%rther, it w-
greater accuracy
personnel from
the b952nd Support Squadron to the EPG. An attempt was made to predict
with the most accuracy possible the exact dates that personnel would
be required in the EPG. This was particularly necess~ because of
an indication in the Sumner of 1957 of a decision by the-Comptroller
General.that TDY in excess of 180 days in future cases might be
regarded by his office as unwarranted. By mutual agreement with the
various services, it came about later that Headquarters Joint Task
Force SEVEN was granted authority to approve extensions of TDY beyond
180 days for those persons for whom replacements were not available
and extension of TDY was essential. Although we were not at the time
able to foresee all the complications the 180 .dsylimitation was to
cause during the operation, it was lmown that our biggest persomel
problem area was going to be in the manning of the Supply area. Not
only were supply personnel required in December, seven (7) months
before the expected termination of the operation; they would also be
required throughout the operation and for two months thereafter during
the roll-up phase. Anticipating this prOblemj arrangements were made
to replace the earliest augmentation personnel sent to the EPG, and to
stagger the movement of the remainder so that a sizable force would be35
AWUHO
. . .
( !’
“., ....
f
‘=availab~e fron December throu@ most of Au=~3t* The many compM-
cations centering around the-180 day TX restriction were intrr.~ified
in June when the decision was made to extend the operation thraugh
Augllsto
The organization of the Directorate of Personnel and Administration
for Task Group 7.4 was as follows:
I CommanderI
‘-I
Director of Persomeland AdministrationLt Col 7016
II
1
I Dep Dir of Personneland AdministrationMajor 7016
Personnel Technician
Msgt 73270
I
r——————— r I I I
Corres Ii@Forms&PubsNsg Center
~ Airmen
-%This function was performed by an officer from Hq PACAF on a TDY basis
as required.
36
-.
‘ fdIt will be noted that no personnel record-keeping function was
estab~shed at Group Headquarters..
The records keeping and basic per-
sonnel function was established in ‘KU for all M4TS organizations and
in TBU, which performed a consolidated function for TAU andTBU elem+m%g~
This type of organization left the small Group Personnel and Administra-
tion staff free to do necessary planning, to promulgate policy andto
publish regulations as well as to supervise the Group Message Center, the
security program, protocol actititie~s the preparation of the ~storYs
and ground safety and comptroller activities. In general, the organization
was satisfactory and no major problems were encomtered.
AFWUHO
3’
(
-.. .
Ch$ter 2 - PersonnelI
Task Grmp 7.~ had the responsil,ilityfor the planning and estab
Iishment of personnel activities to support 3U Officers md 1915
airmen durin~ Operation HmTACK. The attached charts (Figures 1 thru
3) reflect the flow of personnel to the EPG during the Luild-up FhXe
and their Thasing out as the operation neared completion. This move-
ment of personnel to and from the dPG was accomplished in accordance
with pre-determined schedules based on known mission requirements
during the planning and operational phases of HARDTACK.,
In addition to determination of the total numbers and types of
personnel that would be required to execute the Task Group mission,.
it was necessary to provide the best possible-personnel Setices while -
keepin~ numbers of ~rsonnel specialists to a minimum. Consolidated
Personnel Sections were established in Test Services Unit(for all their
attached personnel) and in Test Base Unit (for TBU, TAU and Headquarters
pcrsomel), providing records maintenance, classification and assign-
ment and
the Base
Services
pay and personal affairs services. Also, Test Base UnitJ as
SUppOrt organization, was responsible fOr conduct Of a perSOnnel
(Recreation) program and operation of a Personnel Classtiication
Bo~rd for all Task Group 7.4 personnel.
The Personnel Services Section coordinated with Task Group 7.2 on
schedu~ng of Inter-Task
Special Services Supply,
type of recreational and
Group sports competitions, and maintained a
from which individuals could draw almost every
athletic equipment. In alll more than $2,000
in recreational and athletic gear was purchased for
personnel.
The personnel Classification Board convened by
use by Task &oup
Test Base Unit met
AW1 /Ufl
on four (~) occasions, considering 18 cases involving Task Group personnel.
38
‘-@
f1
Aiwl Inn
-
N
—
10
W
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
(.
m
.
■
m
.
.
)
I
ti
:
.
.
.
.
:I
i
II
■
-
—
0
—
N
—
.
.
.
.
n.
t
.
II
I
■
I
—
—
—
—
[
zwii
4xa\
if
(
—
nN
m MMa
ax
*N
wIn
1Nm
wIA
0
—
u
—
0z4
ii —
FIGURE 3
MWUI19
(
{’
,-< As stated in the preceding Chapterj the 49SOth Test Group (Nuclear)
fhad a dual responsibility for o~ration as a Group under the Air Force
Special Weapons Center and as Task ~roup 7s4 under Joint Task Force sm.
During the initial planning stages of Operation HARDTACK, the 49jOth was
participatin~ in a continental test series at the Nevada Test Site. Deter-
mination of personnel requirements and procurement of personnel for duty
in the EPG had to be accomplished in addition to the normal workload incident
tc a continental test operation.
Personnel requirements within the
by Headquarters, MATS, on the basis of
Test Services Unit were established
planning information made available to
them relative to the scope of their participation in Operation HAJ2DTACK.
Headquarters MATS assumed full responsibility for the manning of all Test -
Services Unit elements from within MATS resources. Those Test Aircraft
Unit and Test Base Unit elements composed of personnel from other than
Air Fei~ceS~cial ?~eaponsCenter resources were also manned by the appro-.
priate Major Air Conrnand.
In order to determine and better estimate the requirements fcr the
augmentation force during Operation HARDTACK~ it was necessary to study
the stren~h figures that applied to Operation WWNG in 19S6. This waa
scmewhat coroplicatedby the changes that had taken place in the organization
o.fthe permanent Eniwetok Air Base Squadron. In I-956jduring Operation
RED?iTNGjit was a large organization with a permanent strength of over ~00
men. Duri~ Operation HARDTACK it was a much smaller organization that had
to be augmented by TDY personnel from the 49S2nd Support Squadron to meet
its increased requirements durin~ the test operation
On 1~~Msrch 19s7, the officer manning requirements for
est.abYishedand a requisition was submitted to Air Research
HARDTi~CKwere
and Development
Comanci, This requisition was based on nrissionrequirements only. BY I!ay
42
, ~wA
AFWHO
(
[
4
1whe the Unit k?mning Documents mm written, insufficient officer space
allocations were available, but requisitions remained valid as originally
approved. This resulted in assignment of some officers on an overage
basis but no major problems arose as a result of such assignments.
Concurrent with finalization of airmen manning requirements in WY195?,
a requisition was submitted, listin~ skills required and desired in-place
dates. This included those b950th positions which are @nned OfiY d~~g
an overseas test period (i.e. MCU, Liaison Supply, etc.). For the most part,
personnel requested were in place per established schedule.
During the course of the Task Group 7.h Logistics Conference in
october 1957, bfief mention was made of the probable futWO need for p~aci~
levies upon units participating h Operation HARDTACK for personnel to aug-
ment
Such
Task
the field maintenance activities, and to support supply rollup operations.
leties would onlybe for people who could notbe provided ~rom within
Group 7.h resources.
In December 1%7, a review of maintenance manhour requirements, as
submitted by each element in Task Group 7.4 rev=led that aPPro*telY
162 specialists in various maintenance areas would be needed in the EGP
over and above those which could be provided from within the 49Smh. On
the basis of these requirements~ levies were placed on Headquarters HATS,
CINCSAC, AFSWC and other agencies, for personnel to report to the Eniwetok
Proving Grounds 1 March 1958. Some difficulty was encountered in @lamen-
tation of this program, and it is believed that earlier identification of
maintenance personnel requirements would be destiable in future test plaming.
were
Personnel for the supply roll-up were procured in the same manner as
the maintenance specialists, reporting 1 July 1.958.
U
43
AFWMO
.-
#$..Movementof Task Group personnel to the Eniwetok Proving Grounds was
effected in an orderly manner, following a pre-set schedule for movement
of each element. The Air Force Movement Directive, published In January,
19s8, contained a detailed breakd~n Of the Task Groups listing assigned
shipment numbers and readiness dates for each increment of personnel depart-
ing the ‘U for the Eniwetok Proving Grounds. Each Major Air Command,
followed by issuing Movement Orders directing movement of their personnel.
In mid-June$ when it became apparent that the operation would extend
over a longer
to review the
for extension
period of time
reaming status
or replacement
placement of 31 augmentation
than had been anticipated, it became necessary
of the ent&e Task Group to determine the need
of persomel in the KPG. We had planned for qe-
personnel whose TDY tours would of mission
necessity & in excess of the 179 day limitation. Extension of the opera-
tional period necessitated estalilishrnentof a programto insure that a much “
larger nusiberof people now required for conduct of the operation either (1)
be returned to the 21 and replacedby parent organization or (2) extended
beyond 179 days under authority granted Joint Task Force SXVEH in the USAF
Movement
The
NWSREEL
Directive.
Task Group 7.4 complement established at Johnston Island for operation
amounted to only six officers and one airman. The bulk of Task
Group 7.4 personnel engaged in NEWSREEL were based at Hickam ~ Force Base
and Barbers Point Naval Air Station. Personnel at these two locations
totalled appro~ately 82 officers and 302 enlisted personnel.
44
AFwl/1’lo
/’
-. ...u
#f&Chapter 3 - Administrative Services
The Task Group 7.4 Administrative Services Activity included a Hessage
Center and Courier Service, a Correspondence Management acitivity, an orders
issuing agency, a publications distribution point, and a muster and safety
reporting activity. During Operation HARDTA~, 79 Task Group directives
were published, and SO Special Orders and/or endorsements thereto were issued,
the latter authorizing”emergency and morale leaves and TDY from EPG.
Durtig the operation, a problem area was encountered involving the
inadequacy of reproduction facilities which were established in the Test
Base Unit. Necessary equipment was on hand,”but trained operators were not
available, causing some difficulty in getting reproduction sertice as quickiy
as desired. Future planning will include a complete reproduction facility,
with trained operators as a part of the Task Group Headquarters.
45
+’Acnl/bu3
.
f<
Chapter h - SecuAty
During Operation HARDTACK, only two security violations were reported
by Task Group 7.4 elements. These involved inadequate safe security ti
which no compromise of classified matter was concerned. This record was
achieved primmily through the cooperation of all Task Group 7.4 agencies
j,lrequiring all personnel to familiarize themselves thoroughly with Air
Force, Joint Task Force SEVEH and Task Group directives regarding proper
security discipline.
During the planning stages of the Operation$ necessary Task Group
Security Regulations were publishedand distributed for the purpose of
providing guidance to all participants prior to their departure for the KPG.
Additional guidance in the foraro~ WPfs, letters and supplements to
directives was designedti insure that necessary security infer-tionwas
available to each echelon. The security criteria were forwarded to the Ta’sk
Group elements sixty days prior to the commence-t of the operational
period.
The Air Police
badging of all Task
permanent Operation
Section of the Test Base
Group personnel. During
Unituas responsible for the
the operational period, lCJ17
HARDTACK badges were issued to Task Group personnel.
1137 temporary badges were also issued for those personnel requiring in-
frequent access to controlled areas. (Reference figure h)
46
. . ... ..._
{\
Awl Iun
J“”~ During the operation it was necessary to hire native labor at the
camps on the vwious weather islands. Arrangements were made to pay the
natives at Kusaie with
the only other”islands
made in cash.
broken lots of food. At Tarawa
where indigenous personnel were
and Kapingamarangi$
hired, payment was
To expedite payment of these laborers, it was necessary to estab~sh
definite methods of payment in each case.
To effect payment in broken lots of food, the island Magistrate
certified to the hours worked and signed for appropriate amounts of food,
which was paid on the basis of the current retail value of simiiliaritems
in the local store.
In the case of payments made in cash, the
authorized the appointmemt”of a Class ‘tAltagent
trip to each canrpsite to make payments.
An additional expense was incurred on the
Finance Officer at Eniwetok
who would make a monthly
island of Naqru, where
the Australian authorities asked payment of guard fees to natives who
guarded aircraft landing at the Nauru airport. Prompt payment was essential
in order to maintain good relations with the Nauru administration; there-
fore
such
payment was effected expeditiously upon receipt of each bi~ for
charges.
Two other minor charges were handled in the same manner as the
ward fees.
The above procedures were considered satisfactory and it is recommended
that similiar procedures be adopted for subsequent tests.
The attached charts indicate funds utilization during Operation
HARDTACK.
L9
)im410
.
#
>a
&
mQ
Eli
I
t
1 * c 9 s
0 0 0 0 00 0 e 0 0 00 0 0- 0 0 00
; o- ~“ m-o- 0
0 0 00to ●
d
Qmo-0wm
N0m
i
mlQN●
NWUHO
, .=-=
f-
— =Ua
Lwu)
~ 0. *.....”*. .::;. ~“...“” **.. * ...*...*. ●**.”...*,,. . ...*...* Q *.**””...● O-O.....: . . ...*.... ::
**.,..”*”.”*”’*”,”” ‘L
z~
.. .. ...**.● ......”” . ...*”● O..***.. . . . ...* ~
., .*.....* . ..””..**..*.* ● *.. ..:::::”.. .**.. . ...*. . ..*..*.. ,. ..**
.: ...0. . ...***... ● **....., . ..*. ...*..... . . . . . . . .. . . . ...*”.*””:: .,.,.
.OO O,.... . **......* ● *” *~.**””. . . . . . . c
4z
. ..9.... ● ..””””..... ....●...””*”” “.= .....**...,...●*..*.***.* ●
......... ...........:::::”.;::::::::: . ...●.......*” ● *~.*@.*... ....*** . .......... ...**. ..0
kc
.............*.*...............*.**.... ........*.......“. ”. ., ***.... . ..**.
. . *..**..*. ● ..*.*.“ .
tI
~4
,“● (. “. I.:... .
,
. .
II I I I I I
og o 0 0
3
0&~ g g : ~
o0- 0 #3g$~;:cg
al Q r- 0
En......,0
● .*.*.
00000- 0
d*m**
dca#<P
iI((
.
hfwmo
2
FIGURE 6
.... .=...
-s”f
Ch~ptcr 6 - Ground Safety “
Task Group 7.4 Accident expe~ience during Operation HARDTACK was.
as fOllCMs:
1. Pcrsor:alInjuries:
HEADQUARTFI~ 3 1 $171.00
TESTAIRCRAFT UNIT 8 0 S6.00
T’FSTBASE (~T 36 1 552:00
TESTSERVICES uNIT 30 6 -1800*00
T~AJJ 77 8 $2S79.00
J
2. Property Damage:
ORGANIZATION VEHICLES AIRCRAFT EQPMl! DOLLAR
DAMAGED DAMAGED DAMAGED C~T
HEADQuARTERs 2 0 0 $ 16.00
TESTAIRCRAFT UNIT o 1 1 ~.oo
TEST BASE UNIT 4 3 2 3882.00
——
TFSTSERVICES UNIT 2 1 0 80.00
TOTAL 8 5 2 $3994.00
L
52
-,”, 1-
. .. .~...“.-
@--”
crossing the runw~= Signs were placed at the entrance to
areas, indicating the trees of vehicles authorized and the
A directive was Fublished by the ~9~lst~ outlinine vehicle
the airfield.
flight line
speed limits.
operations on
Sports injuries accounted for 60% of the minor injuries reported
during the operation most of which occurred while participating in
.swimminC,softball or volleyball.
as a direct result of falls caused
exertion and inexperience. Due to
The majority of these injuries were
by over-exuberance of players, over-
the physical t~.rrainin the swimming
and recresti.onalareas, lacerations and abrasions were predominant. The -
seemingly hiCh percentage of minor sports injuries does not reflect a
deficiency in the program, because a great amount of off-duty time is
spent in some type of sport. The percentage actually reflects an excep-
tional record of treatment of minor injuries, preventing them from becoming
Illostt~elf cases.
55
Afwm
.
Ch %er ? -F
Legal and Discipline
Durjn::the operational pried
a~ainst Task Group 7.I!Jpersonnel:
25 disciplinary actions were taken
HQ TAU TBU TSU TOTAL
Article 1$ 0 1 7 12 20
Most
Summary Courts-krtials o 0 3 2 5
Special Courts-Martials o 0 0 0 0
of the above actions were n~cessa~ as a direct result of intemperate
consu.mptjonof alcoholic bev=rages:..
?)runkand”~isordwly 17
Dri~ng while under the influence 1
Fighting (Drunk) 4_
Theft 1
Miscellaneous 2
Fifty cases were invcsti~ated during the operational period:
Theft and Pilferage 28
Misconduct 22
To insure that a legal capability was readily available, a judge”-
advocate from the 61.t86thAir Base Wing, Hickam Air Force Base, T. H. was
furnished when requested to advise and provide legal assistance to Task
Group 7.4. The jud~e advccate was present at the EPG during two weeks in
M~ch} one W~pk in M=Y~ and ten days jn July. Dwing the organizational
~riod in March a regulation prtainin~ to disciplinary matters was published.
The l.rEa.lofficer held briefings for officers appointed to try summary cou%s-
mart~al, p-rs~n~el officers and clerks designated to prepare charge sheets
~nd ;Uic3 paper~.
G-I22 May 195C Pacific Air Forces, by ~neral Order 31j attached ~
Fcrce p-rsomnel assio~.edto Joint T sk Force s~~ to the 6b86th Air Base58
(
f
Wing for courts-surti~
Article 1s, and certain
to a request from Joint
jurisdiction, administration of punishment under
board actions. This attac~ent was made pursuant
Task Force SEVEN to Pacific M.r Forces. On 10 June
19s8 the Commander 6b86th tiBase Wingby General Order 12 redelegate
authority to Commander Task Group 7.~ to convene S-v Courts-*rti~
administer punishment under Article 1s, UCIZl(Figure 7). Prior to the
and
attachment by Pacific h Forces the Commarder Task Group 7.4 was authorized
to exercise special and summary court-martial jurisdiction and to administer i
punishment under Article 1S, UCMJ over personnel assigned or attached to Task
Group 7.4 pursuant to the authority contained in ~~ Bood Message ~~~$-~1
October 19~7 as amended, Task Group 7.4 Operations Orde~ 1-58 md hticle 24s
Ucw ●
57
.1
10June1956
sectionDISCIPLIKARYCONJ!RDL- Recimion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IDISCIPLIMRYCOIWROL.............................................. II
1. DISCIP’KRARXC~O~ ~mere.1Order-no.15,th~theedqtierc,16A-t 1957,partaln~astoa@lmll~ COmtrO1O18re~cloded”
11. DIllCIP~ CONI’ROL.1. Theorgaolcatlowlletedbelow,in-cludlwtheir●bordioatouniteuhicharephysicdlybested10the&vaiiM Id.ande, JohnstonIdland,IOmJeleia,or2aivetokAtoH,areaee~ed orattachedtothe@86thAirSaSoVlaS(PAC.AF),fordieeipli~controlandedmia~stration of military ~uat Ice, iuclwlingthaimpoeitlonot~t~bmeatunderArticle15,sadth.processingof=tterere@rlogaction by en of flcar erercieinggeneralcourts-imrtlelJuriedictloain●ccordeacevitb~omnto betveeatheCommandersconcerned.
2. Oowmal,special,nod•~ cotie-- inlJuriadiationwillb. exercised by the C~der, 6&66thA* EaseWing(PACAF),farallunitelistedbelov, ead theireuhordinateunitetiicbera“~eice.llyloc~tedlatheHaniianlelande,Johantomlel~, KwaJslelm,or2nivetokAtti,Woesotberwieoindicatedbelou.
WE2qPaoiflc~~oreesEq@+6&hAim’ma l?ins@hO-lAircraftDellveryOrou?Det*chaeat12q1X6 AirTranePortWinS(E)c-1.24-2 Mobile TrainingDetachmentEq60@dAirIntelligenceServiceOroupXq&X15th.Air’Pomta.1GroupTam 103,l-h 8pecialUeaponeSQuaAroa6g28tbsecurlt~FliatDe$acbmcnt~,1358thAeronauticalChartandxnfox-matio~squulroll
6001stt?pecie.1Inveetig~tioaeSquadron(Xa)76th.A* Rescue @kadXVJU
~ Weather Reoonnnieeanoe8~uadroa5thCnawauaicationaCoontructioaDat~cbment~ Air~terlelYorcee,PacificAreaBqPacificUCS Area~ lfltWeatharVinglfq326th—A-tiDiYioiOUNq2ndAirRcccucOroupAirFarce-CivilAir I%trolLiaimonOffice30iutTackForce-7~g51stSupportSquadson(Teet)1253rd AAcs t3quXlronOffice of theFieldRepresentative,Far-at19t@thAACSSquadron
L4XATIOl!liickemxirForceBase,T. &?IickamAirForce2-ese,T. FLHickamAirForceBeee,T. Ii.KiC- AirFOrCU~~et~.g.HickamAirForce2aee,T. E.HickamAirForceBase,T. 11.Hick= AirForceSese,T. ILEickamAirForceBaee,T.E.KickeaAirrOrCO8e.esjT.E.EickamAir~orceBaxe,T.H.
Hit- Alx~orcoSaae,T.R.EloknmAtiForce-Se,T.ILHickamAir~orceX-e,T.E.ElckamAirForce=*e,T.H.ticelcrAirForcetie.T.H.UhuelorAirForceSaee,T.H.VbeetlerAlrForceBaee,T.E.~ni&~Air ForceBane,T. H.UheelerAir Force Base) T. E.Camp@tlin,Ronolulu,T. E.Enfwctok AtollEnivetokAtollEnlvetokAtollElckamAirForceBase,T. S.Kwajaleim,~
3* Underthe●upewiaoryauthorityoftheCommander,6kf!6thAirBaneViog(PACAF),thecozzmdersof theunitsindicatedbelowareauthorizedtoconvenewmmerycourte-~ld forthetrialof Air Force personnelintheareaindicated.InaccordancewithAir?’orCeRegulationn-h,AirForcepereonnolinsuchareaaarealeoattkchedfordieclplinarycontrol,includingthe lmpoaitionofpunir+hmantunder Article15.
a. EoivetokArea--Commander,TackOroup 7.4Com.ander, ~951etSupportSquadron(Teet)
b. KWajalelnArea -- Commander,l$@2thAAC9Squadron
c. JohnstonIeland--Conmnder,JohnstonIalnodSam
FOR TSE COM4ANOER:
!1●
DI=RXEVX’IONJS
58
LtColonel,USAFDirector,AdminServicco
J%’
.-
.-
PART IV
OPERATIONS
60
MWUHO
,1)
I‘1’h‘1,, ii; l\,.1’,;111,
11I ‘1I
I I 1 1 I
.11(11
I‘1’
1’1
31
AFWUHO
t ~i??. r“d~~c=eci Part,IV ;f this repcrt ~!illbe tc pcrtray the
opera-....alaspects of the participation of Task GroJp 7.4 in Operation
(HARDTACK. This foreword will trace the scope of Task Group 7.4 opera-
t~ong. Chapter 2 till deal with the organization ok Task Group 7.k’~d
the operational reasons for this type of organization. Part IV will
tkez be broken down intc other chapters which will relate ifiseinede-
taii the ~jor facets of the Task Group operation as follOws: Weather
reportir.gand forecasting, cp9ration of test aircraft, aerial support
fcr the ~peration$ contrcl of air traffic within the Eniwetok Control
Are&~ comrur.icaticnsand radiological responsibilities concerned with
the gaikering and l’xwdli.ngof radiological samples.
Although information was meager at,the time, some ;ery preliminary
plmr.ing on cmrrzications arid-aircraftrequirements for Operatior
HMWTACK was s+~rted as early as October 1956. By tha the Mat Joint
‘TaskFcrcs SEVEN held the first planning meeting fcr Operation HARDTACK
e~ 2@ February l%7j Task Group ‘7.4kad fairly solid requirements .OC
cormnwisations systems and on the numbers and type cf aircraft required
tcr supp3rt.roies. Additions of project aircraft were later made after
Armed Forces Special Weapcns Praject approved the projects
in Operation HARDTACK.
March? & preliminary ‘mxk message was drafted and sezt tG
WSAl?fcr them to publish”directing the major commands cf
t: suppcrt ARDCP wh~ would be dasi~atec? as ths Air Fcrce
Agmcy. This directive wher.published cn 29 April ty Head-
6/))
Awl Inn
(
i@th Test Group (Nuclear) to work directly with major commands in
formulating definite plans for the operation.
In the months following the receipt of this prelhd.nary book mes-
sage9 Headquarters~ Task Group 7.4 was active in the Pla~ing s~ges.
outlining specific requirements and policies for the participating
organizations. Many documents were is=ed d~ing this P~nning P~ses
the following being the most important: Task Group 7.4 Planning
Directive published on
on 6 January 1958; and
9 January 19s8.
The Task Group 7.4
tions Order on 15 March
document for activities
17 October 1957; Task Group 7.4 Operations Plan
Headquarters, USAF Movement Directive on
Operations Plan, Mde effective aS an OPera-
19s8, was to be the directing and guiding
throughout the entire operation. This started
the second phase of Operation Hl@DTACK, that of build-up in the forward
area. At this time, all units came under the control of Task Group 7.4
and the majority of the ttie~
ticing and rehearsing for the
I%e nuclear testing for
of the first event, YUGCA, on
cl’uded35 nuclear detonations
up to the first shot, was spent on prac-
first event.
Operation HARDTACK conuaencedwith the firing
28 April. The test
at Bniwetok, Bikini
(See Figure 1). This is the largest nuclear test
series itself ti-
SXXIJokstin Islands.
series yet conducted
by the United States. Aircraft operated by or under the operational con-
trol of Task Group 7.4 participated in every shot fired during HARDTACK.
In support of the operations the aerial support elements carried 60,901
passengers and 2,626,26S pounds of cargo. These aircraft flew a total of
10,8U flybg-hours from the beginning of the operational phase of
63
AFwlllw
(
@DTACK in March 1958 until its conclusion cm 18 ALWSt 1958.
The sampling aircraft flew2b0 sampling missions and logged
1,635 fifing houm. The effects aircraft flew ~7 successful missions
on 18 shots and logged 3h7 flylng hours. The Asrial Photography Ele-
ment flew 32 missions on certain specified shots and logged 199 fly.
ing hours in support of both documentary and technical photography
requirements. The Weather Reconnaissance Element flew 334 flights
and logged 3,696 fl@ng hours obtaining weather information over =
area that stretched fr~ the Territory of Hawaii to a point west of
Guam and covered well over 10,000~000 square miles, in the Central
Pacific. In addition to the flying activities listed above~ during this
operational phase the Task Group operated weather repor-tingand communications
stations at eight (8) island sites remote from the testing location..
While the operational phase was still in progress~ some elements
completed their projects and rolled up their personnel and equipent and
returned to their home station. First of these was the Navy Effects
Element which completed its scheduled participation on the ELDER shot OB .
28 June. They were followed shortly by the Air Force Effects Element
which completed their mission on the POPLAR Event on 12 July.
When on
shct for the
celled there
Eniwetok and
27 July it was officially announced that PINON, the open
United Nation Observers and news personnel~ had been can-.
were only two (2) very small shots left to be fired at
the two (2) high altitude missile shots tc be fired at
Johnston Island. At this time$ weather reporting requirements were
decreased in the Eniwetok Proving Ground and immediate rcll-up of Weather.
6b
AFWHO
(’
.
Ch %er 2 -Y’s
Organization and Man~wer
The general responsibility
Task Group 7.4 can be separated
1. That of providing test
which Joint Task Force - delegated to
into five (5) general sreass
aircraft to obtain scientific information
from the individti detonations
2. That of providing ah transportation for militsry and civilian per-
sonnel connected with the test series.
3. That of providing supply and maintenance support for all air-
craft asaigned to Task Group 7.4.
and
4. That of providing services such as weather Informatlonp Search
Rescue (sAR) and airport termlnd facilities.
5. That of control-l- all aircraft movement within the Eniwetok
Control Area.
To perform these responsibilities, Task Group 7.4was organized into a
headquarters and three (3) su~rd~ate @ts_ The three (3) s“~rdtiw ‘
units were further subdivided into elements to carry out theb vsrlous
duties.
Headquarters~ Task Group 7.4was organized with a Command Section
and three (3) Dlrectirates; nrsonnel ~ tiistration~ ~ra~ons? ~-+
Materiel. These three (3) Directorates guided the tits fi the~ PI-
for the accomplishment of their mission. m addition to nor~ st~f
activities~ the Operations and Materiel Directorates also carried out
operational duties. The Materiel Directorate operated a Maintenance Control
Unit for coordtiating and expediting the accomplishment of all aircraft
mahtenance.
craft within
headquazzters
The Directorate of Operations actively controlled all air-
the Eniwetok Control Area. Manpower spaces for the entire “
came Nom +&e resources of the 495Mh Test ~OUP (Nuc~e=)
of the Mr Force Specisl lJeapon3Center.
mum
.-=.* 4.X%.
-he Test Aticre.ftUnit was res-@n~ible for providing test aircraftf
to obtain scientific Information from the tidividual detonations. All
atrcraft provided
assigned to TAU.
B-5’7DIsfrOIll SAC)
for the purpose of collection of scientific data were
These included 16 B-5’7~s(ten B-57BIs froxnARDO, six
provided to obtain perticulati and gaseous samples
from the nuclear clouds, two (2) B-36~s$ one (1) ~V and one (1) C-97
provided to obtain technlcsl data from the high altitude detonations, and
one (1) B-52 and four (4) Navy jet fighters provided to obtain effects
Information. Suitable mannl.ngtables for these u.nitswere developed in
cooperation with the commands which furnished the alrcrsft and the personnel
to fill the spaces were provided by these co-s.
Test Base Unit was responsible for providing inter-island and l.nter- -
atoll transpmtatione To perform this mission they were furnished with
five (5) C-54CSS eight (8) L-20fss sti (6) H-19’s and nine (9) H-21~s.
Two (2) of the C-54ts and the eight (8) L-20ts were provided by ARDC.
Three (3) of the C-54ts end all of the helicopters were provided by PACX’.
Augmentation personnel uere assigned to the Test Base Unit fiomthe 4952nd
Support Squadron to cover the increased load of operating the additiond
L-20~s. Flight crews and mahten-ce perso~el for the Wee (3) C-54tS
and the helicopters were provided by PACAF.
Additionslly~ the Test Base Unit was responsible for providing
supply and maintenance support for
Augmentation manning to carry this
the 4952nd Support Squadron of the
all aircraft assigned to Task ~OUP 7.4.
extra load was provided by ass-
4950th Test Group to the Test Base Utit.
The
services
included
Test Services Unit had the responsibility of providing those
normally provided by the Mllitsry JUr Transport Service. These
weather imformation~ search and rescues communicatlonst photigraphy~
.
and airprt termlnsl facilities. The aircraft assigned to this unit
67
NW/tic
veregtin (10) UB-5Q1S for weaih=-=%bnnaiss poses? seven (7) SA-161S.
f~ Se=ch and fiSCUS and weather island resupply mlsslons, thee (3) C-54~s
@ LiJO (2) RE-50~s for photographic missions. Personnel to operate these
aircraft d to carry out the fictions of operattig eight (8) weather
islands, a weather central, W Force cormnunicatlons,allilitary Mr
Transport Service Termlnd and documentary photograph were supplied by MATS.
This was the orgtiization which Task Group 7.4 set up to plan for and
to conduct Operation HARDTACK, See Figure 19 Chapter 3 - Command Section
for a presentation of the organization.
68
Wunc
(
---- -_J-....
Ch&er 3 - Weather Operations
fWeather cmditionsj putic~uly wind dkectlons and velocitles$
are of considerable sign~ic~ce f.nconductiw a nucle= *st series*
Since the possibility of hazard to life and property fiomradloactive
fallout exists in neaz-lyall nuclear detonations the commander
responsible for authoriz~g ~e.deto~tion Of a ~cle~ device must
be completely bformed on the fdl out pattern to k eXpected@ Her
weather factors~ such as cloud cover$ precipitation, and visibility
which might have an adverse effect on the gathering of scientific data,
or which might intensify the local effects of shock and blast must te
considered. To provide Joint Task Force SEVEN with a weather reporting
and fQrecasthg capability to meet these requlrements$ _Commander~Joint -
Task Force SEVEN requ!red Task Group 7.4 to provide and train”the
personnel for a Weather Central Element$ a Weather Reporting Element,
with widely dispersed reporting stations throughout the Centrsl Pacific
area adjacent to the Enlwetok fiovlng Grounds and a Weather Reconnaissance
Element oprating ten (10) WB-50 aircraft and having a capability of
gathering synoptic data over a tremendous area.
As stated above, Task Group 7.4 was responsible to furnish the
personnel to man the Joint Task Force Weather Central Element. The
Weather Centrals however~ was under the operational
Task Force SEVEN. Its mission was to collect, plot
information concerning the Pacific Wean srea~ with
Central Pacific and the Eniwetok Roving Groundj to
control of Joint
and analyze weather
emphasis on the
issue severe weather
advisories and typhoon Warningsj and to ma3ntain technical control of
and to coordinate the land station weather observing and aircraft weather
reconnaissance Progru.
69
MwlJt+o
&e Weather Central Element gath~red its weather data from many
fsOurcesc In addition to the weather reporting stations operated by
the Task Group 7.4 Weather ~port~g ~e~lent~ ~ the ~-50 equlPPed
Weather Reconnaissance Element9 the Weather Central gathered data from
weather units afloat on Task ~OUP 7.3 *1Ps9 weather observations from
Task tioup 7.3 Secuity Patrol a~cr~g U= S. weather ~eau observ@?
stations at MAJURO~ PONAPE, WAKE, and TRUK~ Naval Station at Kwajaleins
“and routine intercept of the Pacific Ocean area weather broadcast network.
The officers assigned to the Weather Central reported to the Joint
Task Force SEVEN Meteorological Centers Pearl Harbors T. H. on 20 January
1958 for sti (6) weeks trafig in tropical weather
airmen assigned reported on 24 February for two (2)
The Element then moved to the forward area arriving
analysis. me
weeks of training. -
between 6-13 March.
The Weather Central became operational 15 March 1958.
During the entire ~pratlon9 briefings were held for the Commander,
Joint Task Force SEVEN end his staff prior to each test event. Stand~d
tfmes for forecasts were H-Hour minus 18 hours, minus 12 hourss and minus
ak (6) hours. At times? when conditions were ma.rglnslor very critical
special.briefings and forecasts were made as required. The following
statistics indicate
these forecasts
Month
April
wJuneJuly
The missicn of
the high degree of vslidity ma5.ntainedin making
Forecasts Hits Busts
39 37 273 6565 62 ;40 39 1
the Weather Reporting and Forecasting Element was
to provide surface and bslloon sounding meteorological observations as
required by the Weather Central on P-y Island. TO accomplish thiss
b~’”
(“
eight (8) reporting stations wz%%siitablished. These were located at,2
I@TiGAllARANGI, NAURU, KUSAIIZ,RONGELAP, UJELANG, WGTHO, UTERIK and
TAIWA. Operation of camp facilities was the responsibility of this
element at KAPINGAMARANG19 NAURU9 KUSAIE and TAIUWA. Task Group 7.5
operated camp facilities at the remaining locations. Activation of these
locations began on 4 February and was completed on 5 April 1958.
On 11 AwU 1958~ the Weather Oentral Element conducted the first
maximum effort shalmdown of all reporting locations. lluri6gthe period
19.30 April 1958 a continuous maximum schedule was Undertaken with.sll
stations participating. Operational commitments~ both normsl and maximum
effort observations were met during the enttie operation.
During May 1958, five (5) personnel from this element were transferred
to Johnston Island to augment the detachment there in support of the
NEWSREEL Project.
During June 1958, the NAURU Weather Station was closed and moved to
Bikini to replace the facilities of the USS BOXER which was deployed to
Johnston Island to support NEWSREEL.
On 27 July9 CJTF-SEVEN directed the roll-up of SU Weather Island
sites except the Bikini site due to the cancellation of the PIXON Event.
It was decided that the Enlwetok and Bildni stations could provide adequate
coverage of remaining events.
The mission of the Weather Reconnaissance Element was to provide
inflight meteorological data$ perform tracking missions and radiological
safety missions as required by Commmderj Joint Task Force SEVEN.
The first WB-50 aircraft arrived at Eniwetok on Xl March 1958. mfs
was the first of ten (10) WB-50 aircraft that had been decided as necesssry
to perform the weather
WB-50 aircraft for the
mission for HARDTACK. MATS supplied all of the
o~ration. The 57th Weather Reconnaissance Squdron,
ffwuno
71
/
(’
~~ally based at Hicksm AFB formed the nucleus of this element, It was
augmented by afrcraft and crews from the 55th Weather Reconnaissance
strength up to the ten (10) required.
ti March, a transition schedule was set up for incomhg crews so
that all pilots would receive ADF letdo~s~ GCA apwoachest ~ day d
night landlngs at Fhlwetok. Practice missions commenced on18 March 1958,
flying one (1) weather track per day i-npreparation for actual missions
commencing 1 April 1958. The weather tracks required from ten (10) to
twelve (12) hours of fllght and consisted of 1S1OO to lS500fle outbo~
legs which were flown at 10,000 feet and then a reverse of this leg, with
at least fo= (4) hous of the return leg f~o~ at 30~oo0 feet~
During the practice phase$ a deficiency in communications between
the aircraft and the high fkequency radio station operated by the Weather
Central at ELMER Islemd was discovered. The problem was resolved by the
addition of more chamelss ~ hcrease from tm (2) to five (5) au~orized~
which allowed sufficient flexibility to establish communlcations”on the
frequency with the best propagation characteristics for the time and @ace.
h
a point
Weather
Aprll~ of the sixty-tie missions flowns the mission credit point,
at which sufficient data had been collected to be useful to the
Centrals was reached in every case. ‘Xhreeflights aborted> two
(2) prior to reaching the mission credit point and one (1) beyo-xlmlsslon
credit point. The flights aborting prior to reaching mission credit
point returned to Eniwetoks changed gear to the stadby aticraft, and ccm-
pleted the mission successi%lly within the required time limlt. Seven of
the mfssions had late take-offs.
72
Afwmo
—_-,..—
(“
-%uring the month of April the ml.ssionrequirements were acceleratedf
from the one (1) per day planned to two (2) per day. On 20 AprU, the
mission schedule was boosted up to three (3) missions per day, two (2)
esrly morning flights and one (1) afternoon flight$ with take~ff times
at 0430 and 0500 for the mornl.ngflights d 1630 for the evening fllght.
In May, the Weather Reconnaissance Element flew seventy-eight
missions of which seventy-three were weather reconnaissance missions~
four (4) were cloud sampler missions end one (1) was
safe mission combined with a weather reconnaissace-
take+ff occurred during May and six (6) aborts were
of the aborts were
of miseions credit
For the month
beyond mission credit point. Two
>
a three (3) hour rad-
Only one (1) late
experienced. TWO
flights aborted short
but were not requfied to be made up.
of May, mission requtiements for D minus 2 and D minus 1
days were increased to three (3) for each day. Ilzreemissions were flown
on eighteen days I.nlfay$two (2) missions on eleven (Ii) days and one (1)
mission on two (2) days. The element maintafied the capability for three
(3) mbsions per day throughout the month but a lull in
during the middle of the month resulted in several days
missions per day were required.
shooting activity
when only two (2)
During the month of June~ seventy-nine missions were flown, seventy-
one being weather missions, four (4) cloud sampler mbsiom~ thee (3)
cyclone reconnaissance missions and one (1) ferry flight. There was only
one (1) late take-off during this period ud of nine (9) aborts five (5)
occurred prior to mission credit point. Only four (4) of these five (5)
required a make up flight to complete the mission. One ferry mission
was flown as a result of an aticrsft aborting the track and landing at
Wake Island. The aircraft was femied to Hicks.mfor repairs and later flew
a weather mission on the return flight to Eniwetik.
nAWUHO
#“ ~‘For June, tission req~rements for D fius two (2) and Dnrlnw one (1)
*S .ernainedat Three (3) per day. During this period, four (4) missions
were flown on tio (2) ~ys$ three (3) per day on s~teen -s, ~o (2) Pere
day on eleven (n) days and one (1) per day once.
During the month of July mission requirements for D minus two (2) and
D minus one (1) days remained at three (3) per x. During this period-79
weather tracks were flown. Operation NEWSREEL at Johnston Island required
tkto(2) weather tracks per day-beginning 25 July. To meet requirements at
toth Eniwetok and Johnston, it was decided b move the pefiodic maintenance
capabilL@ of the Weather Reconnaissance Element to Hickam AFB and to stage
aircrtit there from Eniwetok. One (1) aircraft was to depart Eniwetok
dtily and give weather reports for that area on its outbo-md track. In.
bound % Hickam, it would give a report on Johnston Island area weather.
A flight on a reverse track wo~d depart Hickam daily for Eniwetok, giving ‘
;hc r.quired dsil.ycoverage. h 26 July, however, it W= decided that
weaz”hs~reconnaissance flights were no longer needed for Eniwetok. Between
That date and 1 August, sl.1the WB-SO aircraft departed for Hickam. u
fu-.l.he~NEWSREEL weather reconnaissance was performed from Hickam AFB.
Daring HARDTACK, the ?Jeather
hau.rsand 33.4missims. Of thgse
Reconnaissance Element flew 3696
32bwere weather reconnaissance missions
~=n (LO) were cloud sampler missions. For a complete resume ofWB-SO fly-
i~ activities, see Figure 2.
A highly trained organization of specialists in the Weather Centeral.
Element collected weather data from a varie~ of sources, analyzed this
data and with a high degree of accuracy furnished to Commanders Jotit T~k
Force SEVEN the tiather forecasts vital to the successful.firing of a
74.
AFwutlo
f
R orting and Weather Reconnaissance Elements was started. At the same-.
ttie requirements for cloud sampling were decreased and most of the
personnel and equipment of this element were returned to the states.
By the the that the FIG detice was fired on 18 August, the Test
Aircraft Unit had been reduced to a sampling and decontamination ele-
ment. The Test Services Unit had been reduced to a Search and Rescue
(SAR), Communications, Heather Central and MATS Terminal Element. These
elements were quickly rolled-up and redeployed to the 2X.
C9z
f-
,.
0m. .0*
i=
10r-
$
/
m. .:
0m. .s
m*. .0*
00
AFwutw
/ -----
\
d’.
{nuc ear test series. Over a sustained period of five (~) months, these
specia3J.stsprodded this
which the Weat&r Central
infomnation. A Iionts share of the data from
made its forecasts was furnished by other Task
Group 7.L Elements concerned tith the gathefi~ of weather information.
The Weather Reporting Element with eight (8) island stations outside the
Eniwetok Proting Groud, as well as two (2) from witldrr,functioned smoothly
in its data gatheting respo~i~iu~. The Weather Reco~ss=ce ~em~nt
with its ten (10) WB-50 aircraft flew 324 weather reconnaissance missions
and 3696 hours over an area reaching from Hawaii b points west of Guam,
covering over 10,000,000 square miles of the Central Pacific h fulfilling
its responsibility to the network weatkr information gat-krlng.
..76
Nwutlb
d-Ch~ier 4- Test Aircraft
(“ part of-the mission ch=ged h Task Group 7 ●h w= ~ Profi~e~ ~n-..
tain and operate aircraft in support of diagnostic and weapons effects.
test nlissions. These aircraft supported a large number of scientific pro-
jects gathering scientific data. Most of these aircraft were operated by
the Test Aircraft Unit. Some of the *craft in this classification were
operated by the Test Services Unit. These were aircraft supporting tech-
nical and documen~ photography projects. ~gure 3 shows the complete
aircraft participation in nuclear test events. This chart shows all sir-.
craft airborne at H-Hour, both test support and test sircraft, as well as
those test sircraft which were airborne after H-Hour. Test sircraft par- -
ticipation may be divided roughly into four (4) categories: Samplers,
effects aircraft, instrument ctiers and photographic drcrtit.
The mission of the Sampling Element was to collect particulate and ,
gaseous samples from within the nuclear cloud. The nucleus of t~s org=-
izati’onwas the 4Y26th Test Squadron (San@ng), a subordinate unit- of the
h950th Test Group (Nucle= ). The 4926th operated ten (10) B-~7B @craft,
especially modified ta perform its primary mission of collecting samples
from nuclear clouds. For Operation HARDTACK, the Sampling Element was
a~mented by six (6) specially modified B-~7D aircraft of the L080th
Strategic Reconnaissance Wing (SAC). Aircraft of the Sampling Element
participated in all of the nuclear tests in the Eniwetok Proving Ground.
Only the TEAK and ORANGE shots at Johnston Island did not require the
participation of the sampler aircraft.
On a typical ssmplhg mission the sample
scientific observer took off prior to H-Hour.
a part of the test array and was placed in a
AFWtiHO
controller aircrdt with a
This aircraft was considered
safe position
71 ~CY1’REJ,J?AQADrD m
. .
NwL/t40
.
AIWLIW
/,79
. .
:,
t-Z
.
4a
i
.
‘1
a
. “-80
AFWUHO
1
i
1
I
)
. I
.,, .
I I I
Zt3#I I I I 1 I
m-t-*’m
‘ml
1-
;Ol,‘a
F
@
u)
*
m
: lH=t=l= *
m:l;-*. -r
D
t
a
_LIJrd. N
+
’40 ●,<0
0 -“--+2nOmmm j
n
—
—
Q
IQQ
1-“Zw>w
82
(
--l I+
I
i?
j
t)
—
m—
—
—
F>.Qt
❑
1co*
—
m—
—
—
L
T
I
.1Om
J1-Z:LIJc>3u:
>u d
83
.
d-
84
I I
)r
n 1a, a
.
.
.
I
tkbl
B+
m
.-, fun
g-
al( -&d direction from ground zero varying with the expec_tidyield of the de-
“vice to be detonated. After the detmation, the controller watched the
development of the nuclear cloud and observed its drift and configuration.
The sampler aircraft took off at pre-determined times after H-Hour and
were mctored toward the saxpler controller by the Air Operations Center,
The sampler controller then vectored the sampler aircraft into the cloud
at the points where he eqected b obtain the ,desiredsamples.
recorded radiation readings obtained on the special instruments
them to the scientific controller, who took this information on
written record and on-a tape recorder. The requirements of the
The crews
and read
both a
scientific
laboratories were met in most cases during KARDTACK. At some times
weather conditions prevented -mum results from being obtained. On
other shots, failure of the device to perform as predicted made changes
of altitude necessary b obtain suitable samples. Ftgure 4 illustrates
nuclear test events; the desired fissions to be obtained in the samples
and the results obtained. All bars b the right of the required
line indica+-s a sample as great or greater than required. Bars
left show sample sizes smaller than desired.
fissions
to the
o
In planning for Operation HARDTACK, the aircrew reqtiementi for sam-
pler aircraft were computed on the basis of the number of nuclear clouds
to be sampled and the amount of radiation qosure that the crew members
were to get in obtaining the desired sample. The inclusion of several ad-
ditional shots to the program and the miscalculation of exposures on certain
shots resul+tedin some aircrew members receiting maximum exposures before
the end of.the operation. This necessitated the replacement of some of the
B-S7 pilots and the training of additional observers from volunteers among
Task Group 7.4 rated personnel. Figure ~ shows tie radiation exposure of
PRIVACYACT
.
MPFjRIALREh
III(I(IIIIII4I1II
JIII
— III
=u
S-----
00,. u
31450.0
0,”.0
00n
Y I 1 1 I 1
I I II I
I I I 1I i
m
1 al 01
1 Wr w
II ;03:1 2030
I u
1125851540IA, A
I I I r 1 I I
I
I I
~1 I I I -I 01.’ 0- 1
FIGURE ~
CYACTMATERIALREMOVED
‘%q-
(
AFwut+o
$- allmIcSthe~ampler aircrews during Operation HARDTACK.
See Figure 6 for a summary of
during Operation HARDTACK.
The participation of the Naval
the B-~7B and B-S7D flying activities
Effects Elementw~ planned by the
Naval & Special Weapons Facility located at Kirtland ~. They planned
to participate with two (2) A@~s and two (2) FJ41s. The mission of these
aircraft was to measure the structural response and blast loading of the
sircraft when exposed
Participation by
During April, %y and
to nuclear detonations.
the A4.DIsand the FJ41s W= practic~Y identic~a
June the FJ4~s flew seventy-seven hours and the @’s
flew eighty-four hours. These aircraft participated in eight (8) nuclear
detonations and flew sixty-nine sorties practicing for these events. ‘ITMY
also flew eight (8) sorties for missions which were postponed after the
aircraft had become airborne. The events in which they participated were:
CACTUS, BUTTERNUT, KOA, XEIWM30D, MAGNOLIA, TOEACCO, ROSE and WALNUT.
Some of the earlier shots failed to give the predicted~elds and no
worthwhile data was obtained from some of these events.
ever, the WALNUT Event in particular, exce~ent res~~
These sircraft participated in every event as scheduled
no h aborts or pre-take off cancenations.
The
Honolulu
Navy fighters were loaded on the USS B- for
On others, how-
were obtsined.
and experienced
transportation to
on 24 Junej concluding their participation in Operation HARDTACK.
USAF had
This aircrzft was
The effects test-s
REDdINO. On that
tion were carried
only one (1) effects aircraft in Operation HARDTACK.
a B-S2 furnished by the Wright Air Development Center.
were a continuation of the test series conducted during
operation, effects tests head-on and tail-to the detona- _
out. The HARDTACK tests were designed to give data on
. .— *.e“-
0
0
I
~alal
I I I
m
u
im
I I
00. .
s
I
.00. .mN
I
0
I
,.
,
I I
I I II
0
1
o
Awl#Ho
.-
i“ --~side loading effects on the B-S2, particularly on the fin. The aircraft
arrived in the Eniwetok Proving Ground late in March and became operational
early in April.
The B-S2 flew a total of
HARDTACK. It flew in fturteen
176 hours during its participation in
nuclesr destinationsand in twenty practice
missions for these events. The events in which the B-S2 flew were: FIR,
KOA, YEIJJXWOOD, TOBACCO, SYCAMORE, ROSE, M4PLE, WALNUT, REDWOD, ELDER,
OAK, CEDAR, D~WOOD and POPLAR. The Air Force Effects Element had not
intended to participate in so many events. This larger participation was
made necessary because seversl of the earlier shots failed to produce the
expected yield. On the shots which failed to come up to expectations,
this element did not get sufficient ~able data and had to be programmed
for a larger number of shots. See Figure 8 for a summary of the B-52
flying activities on HARDTACK.
With the POPLAR Event, the ti Force Effects ~e~nt co~~eted its
participation in Operation H!JIDTACK. On 16 July the B-52 and its crew de-
parted Eniwetok. It is noteworthy that during Operation HARDTACK, the
B-S2 had no air aborts and no pre-take off cancellations. In addition,
on,28 June, it participated in the REIX@OD Event at BiM.ni with H-Hour at
0530 and in the ELDER Event at lkiwetok with an H-How of 0630; only one
(1) how later. This is the first time that an effects sircraft has par-
ticipated in two (2) events in one (1) day and within one (1) hour of
each other. The B-S2 then participated in OAK the following day, estab-
lishing the remarkable record of participation in three (3) major nuclear
test events in twenty-six hours.
The instrument carr@ng aircraft have been
.
Q\
so styled to differentiate
g~
,
{dthem from the aircraft whose instrumentation measured
- nuclear detonation on the aircraft structure and those that measured the
fissions present in the detonation. These aircraft carried instruments
for a wide variety of
data with will enable
omens associated with
scientific projects for t~e purpose of gathering
researchers to better understand some of the phen-
certsin types of nucl-eardetonations. All.of these
aircraft were carrying instrumentation for projects interested‘in the very
high and ultra high altitude shots carried out under the aegis of the
Department of Defense. Originally, these sircraft were limited to the B-36
aircraft of the VHA/UHA Element, the P2V sponsored by the IiASWI?and the
C-97 aircraft of the Ionospheric Element. Much later during the operation,
other aircraft supporting other projects became active in the test seties
and participated in the last twu (2) Deparhent of Defense sponsored tests.
The tission of the P2V was to obtain basic data concerning itira-red
radiation for high altitude shots and sea level shots for comelation pur-
poses.
me P2V aircraft arrived in the &riwetmk Proving Ground on 31 March
1958. It flew a total of s- hours in April and May before returning to
the ZI. It participated in three (3) practice tissions and two (2) re-
hearsals for the YUCCA Event and in that event. It also flew eight (8)
practice missions for the BU’ITERNUTand KOA Events and in those events.
The P2V then returned to the ZI in May and returned to BarberIs Point NM
in July for participation in the TEAK and ORANGE Events held at Johnston
Island. On 17 July it participated in a practice for the TEAK Event and
in rehearsals for TEAK on 22 and 26 July and made an emergency landing at
Johnston Island, blowing tires on both main landing gears on landing.
Fast maintenance enabled the aircraft to overcome its difficulties in time
AiWlftU3
..
idto participate.
participation for the OWE shot was similar to that for ~, except
that only one (1) rehearsal was held and it was necessary to change the
H-Hour position of the P2V in order for the project to obtain usable data.
The P2V aircraft was positioned by an air controller in the Air Operations
Center aboard the USS BOXER for the YUCCA Event but positioned itself by
its own sirborne radar
shots, an MSQ-lA radar
H-Hour on the last two
on the TEAK and ORAtWIEshots. On both of these
helped the P2V to positively mark his position after
(2) events. See figure 9 for a summary of the fly-
ing
ing
activities of the P2V during its participation in Operation HARDTACK.
The Air Research and Deve~opment Command was responsible for furnish-
the ticraft comprising the Very High/Ultra High Altitude Element.
This responsibility was passed to AJ?SWCat Kirtland APB. These aircraft
arrived at the Eniwetok Proting Ground in March 1958. These aircraft were
to support projects 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4. The respective interests of these
projects were thermal radiation measurements, early fireball.photography
ad thermal radiation spectrum measurements. These projects satisfied
their requirements through special photographic equipment which was in-
stalled on the aircraft. After YUCCA, it was decided that Project 4.1,
which was”interested in retinal burns caused by a high Kltitude nuclear
detonation, would place rabbits aboard the B-361s in such a way as would
expose them to retinal burns from the detonation.
&fter arrival at Eniwetok, the B-36ts beg= t~ practice for the yUCCA,,
ihent-. This event was the detonation of a smsll nuclear device carried
aloft by a free balloon to an sltitude of between 80,000 and 90~000 feet.
AfwA19
+?,-=-----
Oi
0
>Na
u-
1
0
FIGURE 8
W1./no
911
FIGURE 9
4?-qq
9“FJ?, $-~.
The~aircraft had to be positioned within a very C1O
position in sPace relative ~ the de~ce so t~t the f~ed camera ~uted
on the aircraft could photograph the detonation. As the normal airborne
radar would not scan above the aircraft and since the”target was a free
moving bom in the upper tir c~ents, a special instmation of an E-4
radar set with an upward field of scan was made on these aircraft snd a
beacon installed in the equipment carried by the balloon. This eq~pment~
urfcrtunately~ never functioned properly and an alternate method of posi-
tficmng had to be arrived at. Through much practice, a system was devised
wl-~eret!leballoon was tracked by optics and by radar aboard the USS BOXER
and its position passed to the Task Group 7.h contro~erss who plotted ~s
position on their radar scopes. The controllers in turn vectored the
!%36~s to the proper position relati~ to the b~oon and maneuvered the
aircraft into their proper H-How positions. The pilots of th aircraft
also were able ta check the AOC positioning by flying formation on the
balloon visually”while the navigator checked for proper slant range from
the target t~-ough optical instruments. Due to the flash blindness hazard,
tinerlsud. and opticaJ observations had to be abandoned just prior to time
zero and final positioning done by the controller but this ingenious method
of positioning the aircraft against a position in space relative to a mov-
irg ~a-get proved higfly effective and ~1 scientific reqtiements were met.
The positioning problem was not so great on the TEAK and ORANGE shots.
On these events, a large nuclear device was detonated after beirg carried
to heights of 2sO~OO0 and 12s~OO0 feet by a Redstone Missile. The detona.
:,icnwas prcEr-ammnedto occur within a fixed envelope in space. One (1)
aircraft positioned itself lYJusing its own airborne radar while the other
was posit.i~nedby “anliSQ-lAradar on the ground. Air ccmtrollers monitored
AFw@ltJ
.@--S
the fositionin.gof both aircraft and had.the capability to position either
aircraft within specified limits.
The TEAK and ORAN3E Events had
at Bildti and most of
to the possibility of
population within 400
SEVEN decided to move
the necessary
originally been scheduled to be fired
installations had been completed. Due
caudng permanent damage to the eyes of the native
miles of the fireball, Commander, Joint Task Force
these events to Johnston Island and assigned the
codeword WSREEL to the operation there. The NEWSREEL Events were still
a part of Operation HARDTACK and the various Task Groups still retained
their primary responsibilities. As a resfit of these c~es~ the B-36’s
departed Eniwetok in I@, after y~CA, as the ~ =d O-E shots were
rescheduled for 1 August and IS August respectively. These aircraft re-
turned to Hickam Al?Bin mid-hly to resume participation in the NEWSREEL
phase of HARDTACK, staging their mission from that location. Figure 10
gives the pertinent statistics concerning the B-36 participation in
Operation HARDTACK.
The Air Force Cambridge Research Center sponsored the Ionosphere
ment and furnished a C-97 aircraft to support its participation in
Ele-
Operation HARDTACK. Its participation was to be limited to the TEAK and
ORAME shots. This sircraft arrived at Eniwetok shortly before the deci-
sion was made lm move these shots to Johnston Island and returned to the
21 without having participated in the Eniwetok Proving Ground phase of the
operation. It was scheduled to return to Hickam AFB and stage its missions
from there at the same time as the
arrival due to storm damage and an
early practices for TEAK. It did,
B-36 aircraft. It was delayed in its
engine change and missed some of the
however, participate in both events.
96
qb
N
N
I
I
N
I
I
I
I
t
N
N
I
I
N
o
I
I
f-
u)m
I
I
g
0
I
I
I
I
0
0
FIGTJRE10
MWuno
FIGURE 11.
y-
f,
The mission of
tion and associated
this aircraft was to aid in the investigatlon of ioniza-
effects in the high atmosphere caused by a large nuclear
detonation at sltitudes over 100,000 feet. It.took vertical sounding meas-
urements on the ionospheric lqfers after the high altitude detonations
gathering data on radio wave absor@ion and on the physics of the high
atmosphere. See Figure ~ for statistics on the fifing activities of this
aircraft
Quite late in the operations the School of Afia~onMe~cine decided
that its studies
sltitude nuclear
deemed necessary
of retinal damage to the eye caused by exposure to high
detonations needed airborne stations. These stations were
to minixdze cloud cover between shipborne stations and the
de+dnation. MATS was required
abom cloud cover and to place
range frcm the detonation. It
to firnish a C-97 aircraft to carry rabbits
them at a distance of 300 miles horizontal
flew6sorties on practices and rehearsals
and participated in both of the mS- shoti. It flew a total of 39
hours during its participation in HARDTACK.
project 6.13
gtudy the effez%
~q~pmente These
furnished two (2) W2 aircraft to the NIWSWZL Events to
of the high alt~tude detonations on its sir search radar
aircraft staged their missions from Barber)s Pcint NM
and p=ticipated only in the NElt5REZLEvents.
missians at a distance of 200 miles [email protected]
positioning themselves with their own acirborne
They simulated btier patrol
range from the detonations,
navigational equipment. They
fle~.’7 practice ,missionsand participated in both NEWREEL Events flying a
total of 103hems.
To aid in their studies of methods of detection of high sltitude
98
Afwl/Ho 4$
----
nuc9= ‘detonations’
APOAT-1 participated in the NEWSREEL phase of HARDTACK—
with one (1) C-sb aircraft staged
( Reseaxch and Development Command.
mately 300 miles horizontal range
from Hickam AFB .-Ldfurnished by the Air
This aircraft positioned itself approxi-
from the detomtion. The crew positioned
the aircraft with airborne navigational equipment. It flew Lpract,ice
missions and in both mLS- Events. It flew a toti~ of90 hours d~~
its participation in Operation HARDTACK.
It ~= decided that ~ perfo~ the aern~ pho+agraphic work for
HARDTACK three (3) C-54 aircraft and two (2) RB-so ~craftw ofid ~ re-
quired. The Aerial Photographic and Charting Sefice of MATS was directed
to furnish
the 3-S01s
Two (2) of
these aircraft and people. Two (2) of the C-s4~s aridboth of
came from P- Beach AI% and one (1) C-sb came%om Clark APB.
these C.~4% arrived during March, as did one (1) of the RB.~Ols.
The other two (2) aircraft arrivedin April.
The Aerial Photo Element was given the mission of providing aircraft
and crews for as~al pho+agraphy during HARDTACK and to supplement the air
transport activities of the Fixed Wing Element.
The C-54 aircraft of this element flew 616 hours during HARDTACK and
the RB-S!3Is flew 2U hours. The C-S4 hours devoted to airli,ft till be
covered in another chapter. During HARDTACK, the aircraft of”the Aerisl
Phatc Element flew many different types of photo missions. Aerial photis “
of the islands of both Eniwatok and Bikini Atolls were made. A complete
aerial survey of populated stills and islands within a @O file radi~ of
Bikini was made prior to the TEAK and ORAIWE Events being moved to Johnston
Island. Photographs for water landing survey were made of many weather is-
lani sites for use of the SAR Element. Aerial photographic coverage was
made of Jotit.on .lslandprior to the decision to use that site for NIMSRF@.
AFWHO
(
Pre~md post shot crater—
clear detonations during
detonations was included
~rap~ was done, such as
-, -survey photography was,made
the test. Aerial photography of many of the
in the program and much miscellaneous aerial photo-
photography of B-57is and the B-52 in flight and
silhouetted ~sinst a nuclear detonation shots of Naval vessels ~d Nav
jet fighters in flight.
The largest shot participation for this element was on the underwater
sho+~ WAHOO and UNBRELM. On these shots all five (S) of the Aerial Photo
Element aircraft participated. With the completion of the UMBRELLA shot,
the participation of the RB-~Ols was completed and on 11.June they departed
the EFG. On 22 June, one (l),C-54was returned to Clark MB. After the
ELDER shot another C-~4was returned to Palm Beach APB on-30 June. One (1)
C-SLwas retained for use in aerial photography and airlift until after the
last shot. Figure 12 gives a swmnary of fifing activities of the C-S4 air-
craft of this element and Figure 13 gives a stilar summary of the fl@ng
activities of its RB-501s.
This chapter has described
aircraft in Operation HARDTACK.
the missions and the participation of test
This operation was the largest nuclear test
series yet held. Mng the Operational phase, 33 nuclear detonations were
heldin the Eniwetok Proving Ground and two (2) at Johnston Island. Test
aircraft, under the operational control of Task Group 7.4, participated in
every test shot in the operation in support of many
The aircraft had many various missions but could be
(4) different @_pes of missions:
scientific projects.
categorized inta four
1. Samplers, whose missions was to collect partic~ate and gaseo~
samples from the nuclear cloud.
2. Effects “aircraft,whose mission was to aid in the study of the
-agWc’wes”~effects of nuclear explosions on
9 @
I I
T
.-i ,.,,.
101%? @
..
1
?3. Instrument carriers, whose mission was to gather scientific data
about many of the phenomenaassociated with nucle~ detonations.
4. PhotograpMc aircraft, whose mission was to furnish a platfom
.from which still and motion picture photography of nuclear de+mnatio~ and
locatiom connected with nucle= testing could be taken.
During
SiOIISand a
. . ... ,,,A
Operation HARDTACK, test aircraft flew 307 sorties on test mis-
total of 3s90 hours during the entire operation.
.
103
g“Ch~ter 5 - Support Aircraft
Task Group 7.4 was charged with many support responsibilities in
connection with Operation HARDTACK. Among these responsibilities were
logistic support of the weather and rad-safe sites at Tarawa, Naw,
Kusale, Kaphgamarangi, Uterik, Rongelap, Wotho, Ujelang, Wake, Midway$
Kwajalein, Majuro, Trek, and Guam. Airlift sefice had-to be supplied
between the principal Eniwetok Proving Ground sites of Eniwetok and
Bikini and among the islands of each atoll. The logistic support fur-
nished by MATS required the services of an air terminal organization
Responsibility for Search and Rescue operations in the Eniwetok Control
Area was delegated to Commander, Task Group 7.4 by Joint Task Force
SEVEN Operation Order 1-58. These support activities will be discussed
in the following paragraphs.
In planning for Operation
transportation requirements in
HARDTACK, it was recognized that air
support of the test series would be varied,
and would require several different types of aircraft to carry them out.
It was established that re-supply of the weather island and rad-safe
sites would have to be accomplished by both four engin~land based aircraft
and amphibious aircraft. It was decided that the transport requirements
between Eniwetok and Bikini would also be met by using four enghed land
based transports. Personnel transport and light cargo transportation
requirements between the islands of Eniwetok Atoll and certain scientific
support requirements such as rad-safe surveys and recovery of scientific
instruments could best be met, it was decided, by Maison and helicopter
aircraft. As a result of this planning, the book message which directed
104
J,{ ,‘-
AAwunn
-z>&. . .. --
the l!!!ganizationof Task Group 7~/’stated the requirement for eight (8){
c-54 aircraft, eight (8) L-20s, three (3) L-199, and fifteen (15) heli-
copters, either H-19s or H-219 or a combination of the two. PACAF was
required to ~sh three (3) of these W49~ A~C W~S to f~ish two (2)s
and MATS three (3). The three (3) C-54S firnished W~.fATS were to ~
primarily aerial photo aircraft, but were to be used to supplement the
airlift requirements. PACAF was to furnish all of the helicopters.
ARDC was to furnish the eight (8) L-20s and was to arrange with the
Army for the loan of the L-19s. Seven (7) SA-16 aircraft were to be
furnished by MATS for Search and Rescue, and for the amphibious weather
island re-supply requirement. All of these aircraft except one aerial
photo c-54 were in place or arrived during~~arch 19580 _
The control of these aircraft was divided according to the pri-
mary mission each was to perform. Those aircraft which vere to te
primarily engaged in transport operations were placed under the cor.trol
of the Test Base Unit. These included five (5) C-54S and eight (8)
L-20s which were formed into the Fixed Wtig Element, and the fifteen
(15) helicopters, nine (9) lL2is aridsix (6) H-19s, -~tilchformed Detach-
ment #4, 24th Helicopter Squadron. The Test Services Urit had ccntrsl of
the SA-16S which formed the Search and Resc~leElement (SAR)Z a~d the
three (3) WITSC-54S which were a part of the Aeriai Photc Element. The
SAR Element was responsible for weather island re-supply where OCIY iJater
landings could be made. The Aerial ph~to Element C-54S supplemented the
heavy transport requirements of the TBU Fixed IlingElement when their
mission requirements permitted. First twos and then three of the L-20 air-
craft of the Fixed Wing Element were detached to Bikini to provide ainlift
between NAN Island and the PETER-OBOE Island complex.
#wulto
105
\
. .
Ta~Group 7.4 helicopters also provided support at Bikini during the
build-up phase until relieved by a Marine helicopter squadron in late
January 195$.
To coordimte all airlift requirements, the Test Base Unit operated
the Enivetok Airlift Operation Office. This element ~’asmanned by civ-
.
ilians furnished by Task Group 7.5 and military personnel of Task Group
7.4. This element coordinated transportation requirements with the Trans-
portation Coordinating Agent of each Task Group-,and allocated space
available on the various scheduled and special airlift flights. They
also operated FRED Control,
and coordination of liaison
of Eniwetok Atoll.
The C-54 aircraft flew
Bikini and between En”wetok
of HARDTACK, and before the
which was responsible for flight following
and helicopter flights among the islands
re=@larly scheduled missions between Eniwetok and
and outlying sites. During the operational phase
cessation of activity at Bikiti at least two sched-
uled flights a day were made between Eniwetok and Bikini, except that at the
hei:ht of the build-up, three (3)flights per day were required. Wee~Y
flights were made to Nauru and Tarawa, while monthly flights were made to
Truk, Guam, Kwajalein, Majuro, Wake, and Midway Islands. Many additional
flights were made to all of these sites and to other places when special
requirements existed. ifhentechnical complications required that the TEAK
and ORANGE shots be moved fron their planned site at Bikini to Johnston
Island, weekly flights betveen Eniwetok and Johnston Island were instituted.
As this operation neared D-Day, the tempo
and a shuttle between Johnston Island and
the beginning of the operational phase of
of these
Eonolulu
EARDTACK
flights were stepped up,
became necessary. From
in lLarch1958 until
10L.
hFwuHo
..
{18~August 1958s the C-54 aircraft of the Ftied Wing Element flew over 100%
their programmed fifing hours. Only with the end of the operation in sight
of
did
this tempo slacken. The C-54ts of the Fixed Wbg Element carried 12~78~ Pas-
sengers and l}882J018 pounds of cargo during the operational phase of HAP31~ACKe
To perform these tasks they generated 2522 flying hours. During the months
April through July, C-54~s of the Fixed Wing Element flew more than 80 hous ‘
per month per assigned aircraft. The C-54~s of the Aerial Photo Element aug-
mented this effort by flying 1101 passengers and160,886 pounds of cargos
which generated 29h flying hours. See F@re U for a eummaryof C-54 Fifing
Activities.
The only problems arising from the operation of the C-54 aircraft
arose from over-fl@ng programmed flying hours, which made it difficult
to schedule the aircraft
be desired, and caused a
During the build-up
schedule. The principal
into maintenance in as orderlya fashion as might
few AOCP’S late in the operation.
phases of HARDTACK, the L-20 aircraft flew a busy
areas of L-20 operation were between EIMER and
FRED Islands in the Eniwetok Atoll and between NAN and PETER-OBOE Islands in
the Bikini Atoll. Through July, a schedule of a flight every 20 minutes between
ELXi and FRED beginning at 0740 in the morning and continuing until 1630
in the afternoon was maintained. As the operational phase progressed the
tempo of light aircraft airlift increased and many calls for special
airlift were received in addition to the regularly scheduled flights.
Early in June, in response to the request of Commander, Task Group 7.1,
another L-20 was assigned to Bikini making the division of aircraft five
(5) at F~ and three (3) at NAN Mstead of the SiX (6) to two (2) ratio
107
fwW@
(
i.
$*’
10.-.$
I
1G8 FIGURE14
(
t@ prevailed earlier. May and June were the peak months for the L-20ts.
In May, the L-20’s flew 571 hours and 1,992 missions. These missions carried
4,128 passengers and 8,575 pounds of cargo. ~i% the entire OPeratiOn
from March through August, these aircraft flew 2622 hours and carried
1s,587 ~ssengers and 4~,210 pounds of cargo. See Figure 15 for a SUXZ-
msry of L-20 fl~ng activities.
/’-Detachment #4 of the 24th Helicopter Squadron was enlarged from its
permanent complement of four (4) aircraft to fifteen (15) aircraft for
Operation HARDTACK. These aircraft performed yeoman servfce during the
operation. The fifteen (15) were divided into a flight of six (6) H-19’s ati
another flight of nine (9) H-21’s. The H-19’s were prefemed for rad-safe eur-
veys because the aircraft affo’idedgreater protection from radiation and tie
H-21ts were preferred for normal airlUX because of their greater carr@ng.
capability. The unique performance characteristics of the helicopter made
it an invaluable tool in the accomplishment of inter-island airlift at Eniwetck
in support of the scientific projects. The helicopters also consistently
overflew their programmed flying hours. In spite of the high maintenance
cost in man-hours to produce a he~copter flying hour, the in-commission
rate of these craft was very high. The average of 69 hours per month for
each of the assigned H-211s for the month of Nay is believed ta be an
Air Force recofi
The flow of
by weather. The
during the first
for helicopter utilization.
normal scheduled traffic was smooth, titerrupted only
special airlift requirements, however, were difficult
half of the
“laterequests for scientific
operation due to Task Group 7.4 recei~
recoveries, and many other special missions~
:(29
\
(A
o04
00..0aQ’
00*a)
;i
ccE
110
PHuno
. .
x’-‘)an ~ue to the fact that many of the persomel of many of the
projects did not understate the proper channels through which
scientific
to request
special airlift support. Also early in April a fatal helicopter accident
at night and under adverse weather conditions caused a re-evaluation of
helicopter procedures which subsequently placed restrictions on night
liaison and helicopter fifing. This policy restricted to some extent
the support many scientific projects had planned for and through nds-
understanding the reasons for these operation limitations, some ad-
verse reaction was experienced. Coordination with scientific project
personnel and with supervisory personnel of Task Group 7.1 ironed out
most of the difficulties and misunderstandings and during the last half
of the operation support airlift activities operated very smoothly.
During HARDTACK, the H-19ts flew x262 hours and carried 671O
passengers and 572300 pounds of cargo. The H-211S flew 24s4 hours and
carried 23,328 passengers and 307~l~o pods of cargos See Figures 16
and 17 for summaries of helicopter operations.
The SA-16 aircraft of the SAR Element flew regular weekly schedules
to the weather island sites of Wotho, Kapingamarangi, Uterik, Kusaie,
Rofigelapand Ujelang. These flight had to ke made in amphibious aircraft
because no airstrips were available at these sites. The sA-16 flew 1119
hours on airlift flights. These flights carried 1390 passengers ati
173,701 Pounds of cargo” cer~~ Problems ‘ere
ation but they will be disctised in ‘theportion
to the SAR Element.
encountered in this oper-
of this section devoted
The three (3) L-19 aircraft were used prbrily as executive trans-
ports. Two (2) were based at Parry Island and reserved for use of Joint
l-u
IbWJno
-...
,/’
(’
00. .0*m
0+. .ea)
D0m--
I
m’a*--
u)awezuu)U)~
I
00
F
cLc
. .iE
-2.-J
112 FIGU’F@16
f$wno
,3
f
(’
1
$r-
00mlNa
113
u)mw@zwVIu)aa
Afwutm
(’
f.-
Task Force SEVEN staff officers, while one (1} was based at Eniwetok and
used by Comiander, Task Group 7.4 and certain senior staff officers. See
Figure 18 for a summary of L-19 flying activities.
Seven (7) SA-16 aircraft were required for the SAR and weather island
re-supply mission. The Air Rescue Service of MATS was required to finish
the aircraft and personnel for this effort. The nucleus of tbfs organi-
zation was the 64th Air Rescue squadrons hsed at Norton ~B~ which fur-
nished five (5) of the aircraft. Two (2) others were furnished by the
2nd Air Rescue Group, operating in the Pacific area, one com~ng from
Clark AB and the other from Naha AFB. Two of these aircraft arrived dur-
ing February and the other five arrived at Eniwetok during March.
The SA-16 aircraft flew SAR cover for all of the nuclear detona-
tions in the HARDTACKtest series held at the Eniwetok Protig Ground.
The operational policy was established that the SAR aircraft would be
airborne prior to the take-off of the first mission aircraft and would
remain airborne until after the last mission aircraft had landed.
The SA-16 aircraft have also filled in with special missions when
other aircraft capability was short. Instances are the airlift of tipor-
tant persons to Bikini and,of special si@ficanceJ a flight to fi~~s
New Britain with a flight surgeon and nuclear research specialists to
look into the alleged radiation contamination of a Japanese vessel.
During HARDTACK the SA-16ts flew2168 hous. ~ese fleg ho~s
have involved 79 orbit missions during nuclear test events, five (5)
escort missions, 17 intercept missions of aircraft in distress, ten (10)
Search and Rescue missions, twelve (L?) medical evacuation missions,
l-lb
WHO
m
In I
m
f0)
II
00..*N
I
004..z
i
LrK
115 FIGURE 18
hwwo
..->,=..-
fan‘5other special missions. The details of the island resupply flights
were discussed in the section devoted to airlift. See Figure 19 for a
summary of SA-16 flying activities.
When the SA-16 aircraft first arrived in the Eniwetok Proving Ground,
the mooring buoys at several of the weather island sites were
in such a state of disrepair as to make their use hazardous.
action was taken to replace or repair these buoys. In future
unusable or
Immediate
operations
care should be taken to see that these buoys are in operable condition
prior to the beginning of operations.
Another problem arose in the availability of the Ponape homing beacon.
This beacon was originally ody treed on on-request and operated ofiYfor
a short time while the aircraft was in transit to Kapingamarangi and not
turned on again until one (1) hour prior to the estimated time of return
of the aircraft from Kapingsmarangi. On one occasion, a flight was
forced to return early to Ponape due to loss of all other navigational
equipment and
communication
this occasion
.
ked weather in the Kapingamarangi area. High frequency
with Ponape radio was lost. The flight bck to Ponape on
was uneventful but had bad weather prevailed at Ponape it
is doubfful that the SA-16 could have made a landing in a sheltered area
and would have been forced to make a dangerous open sea landing due to
fuel exhaustion. This situation was corrected through coordination with
the District Administrator of Ponape. This same
should be effected at the earliest time or
another test program in the EPG.
A limiting factor in SA-16 flights to
the gross weight factor for water landings
116
prior
type of coordination
to the beginning of
resupply weather islands was
and take-offs. It was necessary
MwLjtto
@-●
f-”
f-
.. -.
00. .wm
00..n#
1
0*..64m
117 FIGURE 19
*00.mm
m0u
0
00. .Nn
10Q0N
to~perate the SA-16fS at maximum gross water landings and take-off weights
on most of the flights to these sites. This was necessary to insure sufficient
cfuel for return flights and still carry enough pay load to make the flights
practical. Continued operation under these conditions caused severe msti-
tenance problems and caused two (2) of the aircrtit to be returmed
for depot maintenance prior to completion of the test series.
During the NEWSREEL phase of HARDTACK, SC-54 aircraft and crews of
the 76th Air Rescue Squadron bsed at Hickam AFB assumed SAR responsi-
bility at Johnston Island. one (1) SC-54 aircraft was kept at Jo~ston
Island during the build-up and operational phases of NEWSREEL. UsUSllY,
the aircraft and crews were rotated on a weekly basis. These aircraft
participated h all practices and rehearsals and were ati-krne during
the TEE and ORANGE events.
An additional air support fiction required by the operation was the
movement of personnel and cargo into and out of the Eniwetok Proving Gro~
by MATS. Although not under the operational control of Task Group 7.4,
MATS was supported by the Air Terminal Element, Test Services Unit,
which provided the terminal sezwlces requirements. Their responsi-
bilities included the on-loading and off-loading of passengers and cargo,
maintenance and refueling of aircraft and crew control and flight plan.nizlg.
As the heavy flight schedules resulted in aircraft arrivals and departures
at all hours, this support function was an around the clock operation. At
the peak of the testing series, during a one (1) month period, over 200
inbound and outbound flights were serviced while handling nearly 2,000,000
pounds of cargo and 2,500 passengers.
118
#WIJHO
(
fAnother -importantphase of this elementts responsibilities was the
handling
For each
place at
.
of the sample return aircraft,
nuclear detonation at least three (3) C-97 aircraft were in
Eniwetok to return samples collected by the scientific projects
to locations within the United States. Due to shot postponements, air-
craft at times were detained
imposed upon this element to
These sample return aircraft
used’for personnel and cargo
many as twelve (12) aircraft
at Eniwetok and an additional workload was
keep the aircraft in flyable condition.
were in excess of the normal MATS flights
airlift and occasionally there were as
at one time being maintained by the Air
Terminal Element. Limited working space, overcrowded parking ramps,
additional aircraft maintenance caused by high humidity and salt spray
and a
buted
small number of specialists available for trouble shooting contri-
towards making the Air Terminal Element one of the busiest sections
in the Task Group.
During the period starting lMarch and ending 18 August 1958, the
element serviced L98 inbound and outbound flights while handling
13,181 ~ssengers and 28~097~017 PO~S Of cargo” See Fiwe 20 for a
summary of this elementls activities.
In order for operational units to perform their missions they must
always be supported by auxillary units. Operation HARDTACK was not dif-
ferent h this respect and some of the success of the largest nuclear test
series yet performed is owing to this support. The airlift supplied by
the aircraft and elements discussed above placed men and materiel.in the
proper place at the right time. The airlift elements were called on for
119
\tlAFwlmo
. . .
-. *i##ga
—
120
1-
m0
alu)
I I
FIGURE 20
I
.
Afwtlo
. .. . \
T
a @ater measure of support than they had been programmed. From beginning
to the end of the operational phase of HARDTACK the five (5) C-54 aircraft
of the Fixed Wing Element flew more than 1OO$ of programmed flying hours.
The helicopters, particularly the H-21is, are believed to have set an Air
Force record for monthly utilization per assigned aircraft during this
period. Search and Rescue served well in their dual role of providing
protection for distressed aircrews and amphibious airlift services and were
always the first aircraft airborne and the hst to land
array. The Air Tetinal Element furnished the tezmkal
traffic and maintenance wise that was necessary
function operating on schedule. These elements
tribution to the operation.
to keep
made an
from a nuclear test
service ,’both
the air logistic
essential con-
121
AFWUHO
(’
.,*..
*. = -’2
!!(.-,--
C’pter6- Aircraft Control
In Operation .Order1-S8, dated 1 Octobe: 1957, Cormnander,Joint Task
Force SEVEN delegated to Commander, Task Group 7.4 the responsibility for
control of all aircraft flying in the Eniwetok Air Control hea. Aircraft
flying within this area fell into three (3) categories: Test sircraft
participating in test detonations, Joint Task Force SEVEN aircraft flying
locslly and aircraft entering or departing the =ea. These aircraft
categories posed three (3) different control problems, which will be dis-.
cussed in this chapter,
Task Group 7.4, in conjunction with the AACS and representatives of
CAA
snd
was
set
at Honolulu and Wake, set up an air control
BiMni Atolls. (See Figure 21) Control of
exercised by Task Group 7.4.
area around the Eniwetok
traffic within this area
To handle the three (3) types of control mentioned above, there were
up within the Eniwetok Control Area three (3) different controlling
facilities. These were the Eniwetok Air Operations Center, which was the
master control center; a subsidiary control center aboard the USS BOXER
and precise positioning control facilities using MSQ-IA and M-33 radar
equipment in vans.
The Eniwetmk Mr Operation Center (EAOC) was established on 8 March
1958 and assigned the mission of controlling the movement of sJ2 ticraft
in the Eniwetok Control Area on a 24 hour a day basis throughout the test
period. This center served also as the Command Post for the Task Group
Commander during
cept Controllers
test events. Adrcraft were controlled by Officer Inter-
(AFSC 164.1-164.4)utilizing the AN/USQ-12 positio-
122
MWlno
. . . . m
\
/.
\
b
I I I
\
——
FIGURE 21
=’a=0
0t-
123
. .
...
.
?(e pment. In addition to the normal control fac
Controllers were aided in the AOC by Approach Controllers
the Intercept
and a Search and
Rescue Center.
The Bikini AOC was established aboard
the regularly installed radar and IFF gear
the USS BOXER on 11 March using
aboafi this aircraft carrier
operated by Air Force Controllers. This control center was used for primary
control on test events in the Bikini area and as an adjunct to the Eniwetok
Operations Center to control transient aircraft and aircraft flying locally
in the Bikini Area.
The MSQ-U and the M-33s were used for positioning the effects aircraft
on practice missions and test events. The abilityto position aircraft with-
in a matter of feet or tenths of a second on test events with these radars was
necessary because of the criticality of the position of these aircraft at
H-Hour and the need for very accurate after the fact information in order
to interpret properly the effects data obtained.
While the effects aircraft were controlled and placed in proper position
by the MSQ-lA and the M-33 radars, controllers in the AOC monitored the progress
and positioning of the aircraft visually on their radar scopes and aurally on
the aircraftls individual UHF control channel. To aid h this monitoring
the controller drew the aircraft flight path submitted by the project
personnel on his scope indicating time check points, abort points and track,
and position of last possible abort. By closely monitoring the progress of the
aircraft along this flight path, constantly checking its actual position
versus its planned position at any time check point and knowing its make-up
capability, the
position of the
became apparent
Mwtitto
controller could advise the Commander as
aircraft and suggested course of action.
that the aircraft could not be in proper
124
to the momenta~
If,at any time,
position, the
J,pl,!-
1-
it
-.
concerned requiring aircraft to clear for either Wake or Kwajalein with
possible diversion to Eniwetok frcm a specified point outside the control
areq. This procedure proved satisfactory and allowed unintermpted MATS
semica to Eniwetok during the entire test series.
1.27
AFW140
t
Ch~ter 7- Commun.lcationa
Communications for Operation HAR.DTACYwere phn~d and installed
to provide: essential ah navigational aids for stie ~ efflclent .
both outside and inside the TWt Area; control
of all aticraft partlcipat~ h a test event.
to be evaluated in planning communications ati
and preclslon poaitionlng
Other factors which had
electronics (C &E)
facilities were the heavy atmospheric
the very humid cllmata axxlthe highly
the ER2,
radio noise on high fiequencies$
corrosive atmosphere present h
Ming Operation NEWSREEL aticraft were controlled over a much
. greater range than during previous tests. This CO*O1 situation was
complicated by the complete loss of all sky wave radio propagation which
occurred simultaneously with detonation of the
more complete dlsctwsion of all Task GrOUP 7.4
in the followlng par~aphs.
high altitude devices. A
conmnznicatlonsis presented
The responsibfflty for providing and operating sll ARTC communications
and ah navigational aids for Task Group 7:4was delegated to the A/U
Communications ~ement. ARTC traffic for flights outside tie test srea. .
was transmitted to ?kajalein Center using one (1) voice clrctit on the
high frequency single side band system. Early clifflcultles in maintain-
@ contact on this circuit made it necesssry to establish a back-up
radio ctictit from Eniwetok Approach Control to Xwajaletn Center. M
route traffic for weather islands, such as flight @ans for reSUPPIY
aircraft was transmitted through the Weather Islsnd weather ~ ~d~~ew
net.
. 128
AfwulUJ
f
~~ & navigational aids consistedprtncI’@.l.yof a
homers, supplemented by a GCA end TACAN at Enlvetok.,
system of low frequency
The low frequency-
homers were located at Bikini, Eniwetok, Kapingamsrangi, Uterlk, and
Kusale.
The WA at Enlwetck was an AN/UPN-llB incorprat@ modern radar
developments such as moving target indicator and circular pokrlzation
for improved weather penetration. This facillty provided valuable
assistance particularly when worldmg with
effects aircraft after a test.
The TACAN set located on Sand Island
the AOC in recovering jet
operated without difficulty.
~is aid could only be utilized by the &57B ssmplers and the Navy
effects aircraft.
The Air Operations Center (AOC) at Eniwetok was responsible to tie
Task Group Commander for the safe positioning of all a.trcr~ in the
test array. To accomplish this mlqsion, the ANfiSQ-12.manufactured by.
the Hazeltine Corpra~~on was employed. TMS factii;y was able to see ‘ ‘
and present the relative positions of almraft at all times during a
test operation. Basic components.are eight,(8) UPA/35 SCOPS, 1.2. .
channels of UHF communications ad assoolated hot MM telephone sYs@IU.
Seven ah controllers may operate the equlpent simultsneouly. (The
UHF transmitters and receivers sre located in separate vans and oprated
through telephone tie lines). The AN/USQ-12 vas not considered adequate “’
for some of the precise positioning necessary for the effects progTaM.
Rimsry positioning of effects aircraft was in most instances conduc%ed
by the MsQ-1 or M-33 radsrs monitored by the AOC. Each effects aticrti
required a clear UHF channel to its assigned positioning rader thereby
seriously reducing the number of channels available for MC operation.
X29
AFWUHO
K
TMEinconvenience uas ion of the A02 communicationsz
console so that each controller could monitor any comblnatl.onof all U
uHF channels.
The A1.rOperations Center at Bikini was orlglr+lly established on
board the
Destroyer
available
USS E4XER. Later the BMX function
USS EENNER. UHF communications and
were sufficient but despite maximum
was transferred to the
the number of scopes
cooperation and effort
by
as
to
Navy communications personnel, some tiportent navigational aids such
TACAN and the hom-hg beacon were either out for maintenance or unable
transmit due to interfering with scient~ic Projectsa The Am ~
the BAOO utilized a hot line for coordktx aircraft movements ad
operations. This circuit was backed up by a high fiequegcy circuit which
was not completely satisfactory. The ~imary dlfflcultywlth this circuit
was due to the low power being radiated
transmitter.
The telephone cable-in the outside
by the BOXIZR~shigh frequency
cable plant at Enlwetokwas
S.nstalledh a haphazard nwmer. The efistq fac~itles were
supplemented for each succeed@g operation without a firm e~ansion plan.
Klso most sll cables lnuse had at least l@ bad pairs as a result of
electrolytic action. ‘thisshortsge caused concern as to whether or not
ample pairs would be available for the @hot 1~11 ~lephones in the AOC
and lines for control of the remote UHF transmitters located at building
638. It was necessary to mcd~ 13 UHF transmitters to reduce the number
of telephone lties reqdred prior to their becoming operational. M’ter
modMying the equipment, satisfactory communications were established.
AIL requests for telephone service f’ramunits of Task tiOUP 7Q4
could not be fulfllled due to the ncn-availability of telephone cable
pairs in some sreas. amned to run from Bldg. 90
@
AFwutlo
~.
(“~
to e ~in exchange uas not ‘l-nstdledand id~tidniti -rece$y~-that it
Would ~otilbe~.~~~’d-fi:fitil’some’tim iriAugust....lshor~agenec essitatedted the
implementation of controls over the number of telephones that could
be installed in satuated ~eas. Inmost instances during the crltlcal
period, telephone extensions w?re added rather than installing new services.
Teletype and crypto facilities were provided on a joint basis as
were sXL long distance point to point communications. The AACS
Communications Element operated the Task ~OUP 7c4 wtlon of these C~-
cuits and the tdetyp communlcati.oncenter in Building 90. Tele-
communications with SMAW were conducted on a weekly schedule with very
little difficulty.
Communication and Mr Control Facilities on board the USS BOXER
were used by TG 7.4 for ah communication and alrcra.ftcontrol d~ing
Operation NEWSREEL.
original requirements for Task Group 7.4 Communications Included .“
the use of avoke telephone cixcuit from the CIC on the USS BOXER to
Hi.cksmAFB. This circuit could not be established since the USS BOXER
was moved beyoxxithe range of the AN/TRC UHF equipment for operational
reasons. me loss of the AN/TRC
single side bard (SSB) telephone
Command Post on Johnston Island.
equipnent left only one high frequency
circuit from the USS B- to the
At our request Hickam Mrways joined our HI?net ad satisfactory
communication were maintained, during most of the test periods.
Mxcreft participating inthese testiwere dispersed over a much
wider area than on previous operations- Five of the test aircraft
were more than zOO miles from the USS BO= and three (3) h~h frfWuencY
circtits were necessary to control these aticrsft. At the time of
AFwutio
131
“wdeti~lon of the high altit -6- e~~ce sll high frequency Se wave radio
FPrWWtlon was lost. No contact with Hlokam Mrways was possible and
considerable diffic~ty was encountered in passing lnforntton to and
from al.rcraftwlthti range of groundwave signals due to the high
atmos@eric noise level. The HF equlpent
World War II type equipment snd could only
This low power was not considered adequate
for dependable aircraft contiol.
on the USS BOXER was
radiate 100 watts of ??l?~
for the net control station
Communications facilities in the EPG fall into two (2)
dlstihct categories. They are, first the permanent faciMties that
remafn operational throughout the interti
point to point and the homer at Eniwetok.
Islsnd facilities, Eniwetok GCA$ TACAN.
period such as control tower
In the second.srea are weather
To establhh the facilitles
in the second category the material and manpower of the 1st MCS Ebbile
SW@ron located at Johnson AF’B,Japan were used by the MCS Communications
Element. This organization must mai.ntalna mobile capability and 1s
well suited to establish these facilities on a mission basis●
The AN/USQ-12 alr contiol sys~m -ctioned without w I@Or
difficulty and was able to present and record
graphs of alrcra.ftpositions for all tests at
although lacking in dependable high frequency
by means of scope photo-
=iwetok. The USS BOXER
radio voice communications
maintained UHF and IFF contact with aircraft participating in Biktii Events.
The Eniwetik outside cable plant Is in need of complete fehabflitatlon.
The increasing demands for.
fsr exceeded the number of
adjacent to the airstrip.
telephone and intercommunication service has
operational cable pairs particularly in areas
132
AFWUHC
~ The effects of the radic blackout which occurred siruultaneody—
with detonation of ~ne high altitude device must be considered I.nall
future operations where shilsr conditions may be encountered.
,.
Wuno
(
C#pter 8 - Radsafe and Blast Damage Responsibilities
A rigorous program was conducted tk-oughout HARDTACK to insure maximum
data gathefing support without sacrifice of h~ s~ety. This program
deal-tchiefly with the radiological safety of persomel but also embodied
considerations of possible damage to equipment from blast, heat and water
wave action. The program included the followi.ng:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
The
Dosimetry for Task
Pre-shot planning.
Cloud SSJ@i~ .
Sample return.
Group 7.4 personnel.
Post-shot monitoring
most difficult problem in this area was the control of e~osure
h radiation of air and ground crews associated with the nuclesr cloud
sa@ing program. In the end it was necessary to obtain replacement ‘
personnel in order not to exceed maximum pernrissableexposures on large
nunb=rs of people in this program..
Dosimetzy provided for continuous monitoring of the exposure of each
HARD”ACK participant to ionizing radiation through
The:e fiLm-badges were issued to m personnel and
by the person!s duties. Men engaged in activities
the use of . film-badge.
at a frequency dictated
not requiring regulazz
expcsure ‘tcradiation were issued film-badges at six (6) week intervals,
while personnel worting in hazardous environments received film-badges as
often as twice weekly. The badges were collected and read and hi-weekly
r-e-portswere published listing the total radiation exposures. Through
this means, the radiological health of all persomel cculd be monitored and
13b
.>
P
f
c@mander was in position to divert it to a safe position and inform the
Task Force Comnander.
Aircraft uhose positions were not as crttical as the effects
wera directed to a pre-planned H-Hour orbit by the Air Operations
aircraft
Center
Controller and timed around this orbit in order that they might he at
the pre-determined H-Hour position at time of detonation. These air-
craft were positioned by the Air Operations Center Controllers in much
the
the
the
same manner as the Controllers monitored the effects aircraft with
use of a pre-planned orbit and definite time check pofnts. Since
effects of t% detonation on these aircraft was not considered
critical, they had no abort procedures; however~ the positions had tO
be accurately maintained in order for them to receive tliedesired test
re~u~ts. This catego~of aircraft included Search and Resoue (sAR)
aircraft, sampler controller aircraft, photographic aircraft and 5-n-
strument carriers.
During the last six (6) minutes prior to a detonation the Commander
of Task Group 7.4 kept a constant check on the accurate positioning of
all aircraft in the test array. During this period he was in constant
touch by ‘hot linetlwith the Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN and the
firing party. The Comnander, Task Group 7.4 kept the Conrander, Joint
Task Force SEVEN and the firing party briefed on the safety of the air-
craft posttions. If necessary, this “hot linen was also his method for
obtaining information about shot delays or cancellations.
Methods of control in the Bikini Air Operations Center aboard the
USS BOXER were the same as those used in the Eniwetok Air Operations
AFwl.ma
125
. &
-.
*.
FCenter, except that for
craft from Eniwetok was
Control of the aircraft
approximately 100 miles
*..
-iiBikini events the launching and recovery of air-
handled by the Eniwetok Air Operations Center.
passed fron one center to the other at a point
east of Eniwetok. Additionally, information was
relayed between the Cmmander, Task Group 7.4 in the Eniwetok Air Operations
Center and his representative aboard the USS BOXER.
The control of Task Group 7.4 aircraft flying locally on non-shot.
days was exercised by the controllers in the Eniwetok Air 6perations
Center, assisted by Air Force Controllers operating in the Bikini Air
Operations Center.
To carry out the responsibilityof controlling aircraft entering
and departing the Eniwetok Control Area it was necessary to make an
agreement wit!~Kwajalein on procedures to te followed in the transfer
of control of aircraft between Kwajalein and the Eniwetok Air Operations
Center. Additionally, the Wake FIR was extended southward to border on
the Eniwetok Control Area and therefore similar arrangements had ta be
made with the CAA authorities at Wake. To hrsure control of all air-
craft entering the area, it was stipulated that aircraft would not
enter it until specific clearance to do so had been received from
~niwetok Am either direct or by re~y through the Kwajalein Area
trol Center or the Wake CAA Center.
To insure safety of crews and passengers from possible flash
ness or other effects of a detonation in case of radio failure on
aircraft, and to allow aircraft to clear to Eniwetok
tions like Hawaii and Guam on a D-1 Day, a NOTAl{was
126
from distant
issued to all
the
Con=
blirxl-
the
sta-
ex@3ures exceeding the -mum permissible precluded.
,.
f>
,,
Pre-shot safety planning was accomplished for each event to insure
that men, materi~ and faci~ties WOuld not be SUbjeCted tO avoidable
haz@ais. Of prime consideration was the threat of radioactive fall-out
resulting from the detonations. Prior tm each Wst event a predicted
fsJ1-out area was established and only when this area was clear of inhab-
ited locations was the destinationexecutid. Of the shot delays encountered
during Operation HARDTACK, more than ninety per cent were due ta undesir-
able fall-out indications. These fall-out areas were posted in the Air
Operations Center so that controllers could keep aircraft clear of the
danger areas. Pre-shot planning also dealt with damage predictions con-
cerning blast, heat and water action. On two (2) events at Eniwetok and
one (1) event at Bikini it was necessary to evacuate liaison type aircraft
to preclude blast damage and on one (1) event it was necessary to require
complete body covering for all personnel to preclude the possibili~ of
burns. A constant program was pursued b insure that no one observed
detonations with his naked eyes. The possibility of retinal burns con-
stituted a continual.threat through the entire operation. Through dainage
predication and the precautionary neasures dictated by these predictions,
no unplanned damage occurred to aircraft and only minor damages were in-
flicted on base facilities. .
The most difficult Task Group 7.L radiological problems of the opera-
tion existed in the support of the cloud sampling program. Prior b the
operation
HARDTACK,
man (rem)
and based on the scheduled number of detonations plamed for
maximum permissible exposures of ten (10) roentgens equivalent
for cloud sampling and effects aircrews and five (~) rem for all
135
.
d
f
%-
ot~r personnel were established by the Comander,
,.,
.
Joint Task Force SEVEN.
As the test series progressed, additional events were introduced and the -
personnel exposwes mounted rapidly toward the established timum. Not
o*- the aircrews but the aircraft maintenance persomel and the crews who
recovered and packaged the collected samples were approachl.ngtheir expos-
ure limits. To alletiate this problem, the commanders Task Grow 7s~
requested and was granted permission to extend the maximum exposure limit
of the msintinance and sample recovery crews from five (s) rem to eight
(8) rem and ten
was authorized;
selected fl@ng
of cloud ssmple
(10) rem respective~. No extension beyond ten (10) rem
so additional cloud sampling aircrews were obtained and
personnel at Eniwetok were trained b perform the duties
observers. ~ careful scheduling of all aloud sampling
sircrews and support personnel it was possible to complete the operation
with no serious cases of over exposure. (See Figure 2Z , Chapter 8,
W2cposure of T.AUNuclear and Maintenance Personnel b Ionizing Radiation”
and Figure 5, Chapter 4, ‘~CloudSampler Aircrew Exposure”.)
In support of tb rapid delivery of radioactive cloud samples to lab-
oratories in tl= Zone of the Intefior$ ** coders were instruc~d
and briefed by the Task Group 7. b Nucle= Research officers who ~so mOn-
itored the loading and securing of the samples aboard the return aircraft.
He also established an isolation area within each of the sample return ti-
craft to insure the safety of the passengers and crew. This isolation area
was established ~ marld.ngthe cargo floor of the aircraft at a location
between the cloud samples and the passengers where the radiation intensi~
was ten (10) milXroentgens per hour. Personnel remaining outside this
line could expect to receive no more than one (1) weeks tolerance dose of
136
#wlJHo
Teat Aircraft
IONIZING RADIATION EXPOSU~
b
Unit Nuclear Applications Personnel: *
1 April - 1 August 195~ .
a—--—-.-—6576 m—— —8293 mr————3776 mr
——-6983 mr—- —4579 m
—--403$ m’—1009mr
——- —3173 m
PRIVACYACTMATERIA1REMOVED
—--2276 m.~,7310—-0058——-2731——337$
~g—-—~- 6645——-2786~7225
7132————7345. __.-0---o556 m
{. ------------3107
mmrm’
mrmrnlr
mrmrmmrml’
-------------- 3888
m’
m’
PRIVACYACTMATERIALREMOVED
* HARDTACK I,laxm Permissible fiposure: 10,000 Ililliroentgens.
FIGURE 22A
137
. ‘%illm-
Test Ahcmft
L
“.
w HARDTACK
unit
~()~~NG RADIATION IDWOSUR=PRIVACYACTMATERIALREMOVED
Aircraft E@neetig Persomels*
I April - 1 August 1958
,.,---...—.5653 mr—.2200 mr.—5476 mr_—z* m
-41 ~..—--1850mr——2379 mr—5410 m—1717 m’—4475 ~.—4832 m-—-2954 =—2294 =——2381 m——2511 mr—3500 m.-2146 mr—1470 m—1930 ~.--6355 =—2218 m—2156 m—5229 mr.—26n mr—2291 m—~ mr—~n =—2509 mrA763 ~—.-2744 =—x98 mr—-5098 mr4649 =—-3851 mr—-1$75 =—--7415 m
—2025 mr
—-— —-3260 IW_—2138 w, ,~-6917 mr—— —3972 m
——5376 m— —-5861mr.- —-—~2910 m—— 2@o=-— —--2774 w_.-3o54 mr~7737 m~1904 =~iino =.—5302 mr
—5491 m___--2586 m,___--297o mr_m---l92l w_—2582 =~3077 =_—-3o2o m—-— —--2264 ~
—4177 ~.—-----2350 mr.~7= ~-— —-3587 mr~24% ~—----3947 =.~3059 m~2774 ~~2678 =-—.5L$1 mr~1996 mr
MaximuIu Perdssable &pos~e: 8,000 Mil.liroentgens.
_—2961 m_—4812~3748
mmr
PIWACYACTMATERIALREMOVED~Gm 22B “
flight.—
Post shot monitifing was accomplished by various activities within
the Task Group to insure the earliest possible detection of radioactiw
fsll%ut or damage produced by the detonations. Rad-safe teams con-
ducted island monitoring on Eniwetok hmediati~ following each event and
continued their checks for forty-eight hours or until the danger of fsJl-
out had passed.
Task Group ?.& provided personnel to man four (4) off-atoll.weather
rad-safe sites. These sites at Kuasie, Kapingamarang3.,Nauru and T-a
maintained a continuous fall-out surveillance program to insure earliest
possible detection of this hazard. The personnel assigned to these sibs
were trsined in the United States and were selected caref~ to insup a
favorable relationship”with the native population. Their equipment in-
cluded a continuous~ recording geiger instrument and they submitted
pefiodic radio reports concerning their observations. There were no cases
of adverse falLout encountered during the test series. Monthly inspection
visits were made to these rad-safe activities to assist with instrument
mai.nte=ce and calibration and tm evsluate the collected data.
AU multi-place sircraft flying in the Eniwetik area dting or within
twenty-four hours following an event were provided with a Rad-Safe Monitor
whose due was to keep the aircraft commander advised concerning radiation
encountered on the flight. Those
were required to radio their safe
wave passage.
aircraft positioned in the test array
condition i.nnnediatilyfoIlowing shock
Approhtely one (1) hour after each detonation a helicopter was
dispatched to transport a rad-ssfe re-entry team to or near ground zero to
.139
‘*-ILes bllsh a safe time for personnel to recover instruments and test data—
near the burst. At shut S~
copter transported a rad-safe
more detailed radiation check
helicopter pads.
(6) hmh after the detonation a second heli-
team around the shot atoll to accomplish a
and to assess the be to airstips and
Following test events$ all aircraft returning to Eniwehk which could
possibly be contaminated were monitored and those requiring decontamination
were isolated. The sircrews were immediately sent h the personnel decon-
tamination center, checked thoroughly and decontaminated when necessary.
Contadnated aircraft were snowed to decontaminate themselves in isolation
by radioactive decay when time permitted. This technique insured a ~
of radiation qosure to the decontamination personnel s-ticethe contamina-,
tion intensities appro-tely halved themselves each seven (7) hours.
After decay tk remainder of the contamination was removed from the airoraft
through normal waslrhg with chemicals, water and high press- hoses.
Maqr activities under Task Group ?.!iparticipated in the accomplishment
of a successful.and a safe nuclear test. Through the planning and adminis-
tering of a conservative yet realistic radiological safety program,
Operation HARDTACK was completed with no radiation injuries occuring within
Task Group 7.h
140
#) .
am m?)
.-
&
f
Ch er9- Photography
T The photographic program during Operation HARDTACK necessititti
support from two (2) different sources. Documentary photography was
accomplished by a provisional unit formed by militsI’Yand civilian-.
personnel from the l-352ndMotfon pic~e squadrons Lookout Moun~in
Air Force Station, Los Angeles, California. The 1370th Photo Mapping
Squadron (APCSWITS) West Palm Beach, Florida, provided and operated
three (3) C-54 and two (2) RE!-50aircraft to support airborne documentary
and technical photography. The three (3) C-54tS, two (2) w50is ~
assigned supporting personnel composed the Aerial Photo Element Provisional.
(Reference Chapter 4.)
The Documentary Photography
documentation of HARDTACK. This
Element was responsible_for continuing
photographic effort protided motion
picture
Project
footage
photography for Field Commmd,
(FC/AFSWP)(Military effects of
for the Department of the Navy
AEC consisted of color transparencies,
Armed Forces Special Weapons
Operation HARDTACK) and stock
@ A~. Coverage for the
black and white still negatives
of all detonations plus-stills on the assembly and instrumentation of
four (4) test devices. For the Air Force, selected sequences of the
operation were photographed in”35 mm color using cine~sco~ lens tec~que.
The most extensive coverage by far, was that given to the KAHOO
and UMBRELLA events. For ‘JAHOOevent, forty motion picture and still
cameras manned and remote, in the air, on the ground and at sea were
used. Documentary Photographic Element cameramen also operated the
technical photographic camera racks on all three (3) C-54 aircraft. All
camera equipment operated satisfactorily with only two (2) camera failures
ltll
AlwL/no
,
IEwh h did not affect the overall documentation. A total of 7,500 feet—
of 35 ~ Easwn Color Negative was e~osed on this event.
The U!{BRELLLAevent was the element~s biggest effort during the
enti%e operation. All available cameramen operated forty-four cameras
of all types in the air and on the
photo cameramen operated technical
ground. For this event} documentary
photo cameras mounted in the C-54~s.
All camera equipment operated satisfactorily, except one set of remote
cameras in place on HENRY Island (MUX). These cameras were equipped
with 17 inch lenses directed on three (3) target destroyers. Failure of
these cameras
time circuit.
factorily but
to operate was due to a malfunction of their own electronic
The EGG signal tripped and operated the relay system aatis-
camera motor relays failed to respond. -
Camera failure on HENRY Island (KUI) did not affect the overall.
documentation. Back up remote cameras on GLENN Island covered a
portion of the test destroyers with excellent results. It was later
determined that the HENRY Island sensitized stock loaded in magazines
atop the remote cameras received sufficient fallout to ruin the film.
A total of 8,359 feet of 35 nunEastin Color Negative was exposed for
this event.
Positioning of aircraft to provide aerial photography of the
UMBRELLA and WAHOO were practically identical. One (1) &50 flew a
race track pattern directly over surface zero at 25,000 feet, positioned
to be 1,000 feet short of surface zero at Time Zero. The second R.B--5O
was positioned ten miles Northeast of surface zero at 2,500 feet and
following detonation, turned into the water spray column. Two (2) photo
C-54~S were positioned Northwest of water zero at 20,000 feet horizontal
1.L2
(
.. .,e
H ‘\..
HA~TACK, each event was photographed from the air. During HARDTACK only
nine (9) events were photographed from the air; seven (7) of which
were of interest to the AEC and two (2) of interest to the DOD. A
toti’1of thirty-five (35) aerial photographic missions were flown.
“ The folhwi~ pages illustrate the preparation and execution of a
@pical nuclear test event from the standpoint of Task Group 7.4 Operations.
The”*ROSEEvent was selected for portr~~. The test will be covered from
the preparation of the operation order to the debriefing and critiqw sfter
the last sircraft had landed.
The test aircraft participation was decided upon prior to the opera-
tional phase of HARDTACK and was outlined in Annex B b Task Group 7. b
Operation Plan 1-58. ITM participating aircraft, the projecti wfich they
supported and the general purposes for theti participation were outlined
in the referenced document. Occasionally, changes to the test array as
outlined in Operation Plan 1-S8 were made. The only c~e for ROSE was
the addition of
barrier partrol
~ D minus
lished for each
a Task Group 7.3 p2vj whose~ssion wasfl@W a rad-s~e
post H-HOW to the array*
three (3) days, a supplement operation order w= Pub-
test event. The order for ROSE, Task Group 7.4 Operation
Order 18-58, was first published six (6) days prior to the actual detona-
tion. Some difficulty was experienced in obtaining positioning data and a
safety certificate for these planned positions prior tQ original publicat-
ion date of the supplementary operation order. The positioning data and
safety certifications were the responsibility of Task Group 7.1. The
difficul~ in obtaining this data from Task
most instances due to lIDI1days for shots on
participate being scheduled close together.
Group 7.1 was Unavoidablein
which the projects wanted to
Frequently there was insuffi-
cient time to reduce data
positioning criteria in a
gathered on one (1) shot in time to produce
timely fashion for the next shot. On ROSE, this
145
MWUHO
(
..
g.
4“ ---
r e, one (1) at ls5~ feet; the Other at lotooo feet. The third photi
c-54 was positioned 20,000 feet Southwest of water zero at 9,000 feet.
By this means, complete aerial photo coverage was effected.
, On 22 June 1958,
Island and by 22 July
had been documented.
and still photography
Project NWSREEL documentation began at Johnston
1958, 70 per cent of all participating programs
Remote camera installations for motion picture
were positioned and ready for rehearsal and
functioned satisfactorily on shot events. Element camera teams documented
activities at Waikele Branch, Naval Ammunition Depot, Oahu during the
peri~ U, 12, 1.3,and ~ July 1958. participating progr~s at ~c~
Air Force Base, Wheeler Air Force Ease, and Barbers Point Naval Air
Station were documented during the perhd, post TEAK event. Four (4)
K-24 type cameras with a supply of Ektachrome were positioned near
launch pad for technical evaluation purposes as requested by AEllA.
In addition to the required coverage for Operation HARDTACK and ~
Project NEWSREEL events, considerable effort was expended in obtaining,
for the Bureau of Ships, Department of the Navy, realistic action pictures
for their own production, “Nuclear Defense at Sea’t. This effort reqtird
the positioning
various phases,
decontamination
of cameramen on board four (4) destroyers> and covered
such as gun crews manning battle stitions, mmitoring a“zid
teams in operation, wasMown systems in operation, and
operation of a rad-safe center on boafi the USS RENWILLE. In addition
to the realistic action pictures, phpical damage to destroyers, sub-
urines, squaw and liberty ship were
Aerial Documentary Photographic
not as extensive as that required in
documented in detail wherever possible.
coverage of Operation HARDTACK was
previous operations. Prior to
143
,43
-..--...-*
f
-- . . .....
rJ ~dmbulted j.namendments and additions to the operation or er.
23, 24 and 25.)
General requirements for cloud sampling were documented by the labora-
to~ concerned - in this case, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory - and
given to the Sampldmg Element. Prior to the mission, any changes were dis-
cussed in conference between the Sampling Element Commander and the
scientific representative of the laboratory. At this time, final sampling
requirements were established.
The crowded conditions on the runways and
the preparation of a written llissionlhcecution
taxiways at Eniwetok made
Chart necessary. This C&t
was published on D minus two (2) days ~ the Test Aircraft Unit. This
chart established start engines$ M$ ~-uPs take-off and aPPro~~
landing
Mssion
On
times for the participating aircraft. See lHgure26 for the R~
Execution Chart. .
D nd-nusone (1) day, a general bfiefing was given by the Test Air-
craft unit to u aircrew, - controuers$ ti~er officer and other
responsible agencies. Shot location, time hack, H-Hour time and a weather
briefing were given. Also a reviewof the operation order, a IIblacute’f
display of the H-Hour aircraft patterns were shown and special requirements
snd instruction were given. Following the general briefing, each partici-
pating element conductid its own specialized briefing, going into much
greater detsil on their specific mission requirements.
146
i
..
r
.
FIGURE 23
147
AmLilm
(-
. .-
(I3
aj%4
i?
d●
c-
.I-4
u1)
Q
+
1-1’
4
mwo
. .
ANNEX B TO=TASK GROUP
7*’--(R0sEEvz
(‘3
-s.
llOpI~l[&57 Iv
35,000’ - to be abeam
Q!
of GZ heading 090° T
at=
(1) “CLARK” A@-13,0001 alt - heading344.50T - IZ,800’beyond GZ at Toe
(2) “COMTn FJ44,000’ alt - headi~
short of GZ at To
341.50T 11,270’ b9y0GZ at To.
(3) “BARLEY” A@-lll,omheading 34.2050T 7)950J
beyond GZ at TOO
(4) “KI.MONAnFJ413,000t altheading 338.50T 2~465t ~YO~GZ at To.
GZ at To 35 ~ East
WHO
(-tJIfSTABLEn u-16
tl~~R~fi P2V 2,000f -
To be abeam of GZ heading270° T at To 50 NM South.
e’
—ur:
r
{(
1
(\(
—
!
—
—
oNmo
.
[((f
I
i1.
—
—
u
:c
—(I
,,
I I
L
! 1 m
I 1 1
NHHIm-3
T
ArWHo
“- .:%...
*’
{
.~eAt midnight on D-1 day, the Air Operations Center?
* checks. By Hminus four hours, the Center was completely ~~ed, inc~udi43
the Task Group Commander, operations Officer, air controllers, and Communications%
Officer. At approximately H minus three hours, the Tower Officer was In place
serving as an advisor and coordinator for test array aircraft. At 0310,
STABLE ECHO started engines, taxied at 0315 and took off at 0335 hours* Each
H-Hour array aircraft
the until there were
one (1) B-57B Sampler
on the Mission Execution Chart followed at the assigned
two (2) A@, two (2) FJ-4s, one (1) B-52, one (1) SA-162
Controller, one (1) B-57B Sampler, and a P2V airborne.
Each of these aircraft was under control of the Air Operations Center and
their positions were monitored by the air controllers. The effects aircraft
(B-52, A@, and FJ-4s) were prtirily COntrOllQd by MSQ ‘andM-33 precision
radars capable of very accurate positioning. The Air Operations Center provided
tack up positioning capability ti the event of precision equipment malfunction.
The AOC also had the overall responsibility for safe positioning of all
aircraft. At H minus one hour, the voice countdowm was broadcast over
UHF $Itirdn channel from EIMER Island and all aircraft had their radios
positioned in the ‘tGuardReceiven position, insuring that they were
receiving the warnings prior to detonation. By H minus thirty tiutes all
aircraft airborne at H-Hour were in position. At H minus five (5) minutes}
the Coxmnander,Task Group 7.4 reported to the Commander, Joint Task Force
SEVEN that all aircraft were safely positioned. All radio tran~ssions
with the exception of emergencies and the voice countdown on Guard channel~
were silenced from H minus three minutes until H plus tio (2)‘tiutes. At
H plus two (2) minutes, the Air operations Center called all aircraft for
151
Ammo)31
/-
.-.
-. ~afety check and this hformation was once again r. aye o
Following the detonation, the FJ-4s and @s were cleared to return to base and
land, their requirements having been met. The B-52 remained airborne for.-s
approximately another hour and thirty minutes to complete its
ing the detonation. Starting at H plus fifty-five minutes and
fifteen minute intervals, three (3) B-57 sampler aircraft took
testing follow-
following at
off. The
Air Operations Center vectored them to the airborne Sampler Controller .
who then assumed control and directed the aircraft in their penetrations
of the nuclear cloud. As each aircraft collected its required sampb$
the Controller released them to
their retuxm to the airfield to
The tower gave landing priority
the controller in the ACE who expedited
prevent any unnecessary radiation exposure.
to the sampling aircraft and after landing,
cleared them to the sample recovery area. In this area, the aircrew was
quickly evacuated from the aircraft. The filter paper
by sample recovery personnel and placed in lead ~lpigsn
laboratoriesin the ZI. After all the sampler aircraft
had landed, the SA-16 aircraft was cleared to land. A
Task Force Cam-and Post was made by the Air Operations
was then ramoved
for reti.rntc the
aridthe cmtroller
report to the Joi2t
Center when all
aircraft were safely on the ground. After landing, all effects and
sampling aircrews were debriefed by the Test Aircraft Unit Opraticn.e Officer$
and on the following day a critique uas held for all aircrews and responsihh
ground agencies to determine problem areas generated by the event. See
Figures 27and28 for photographs of the ~ssion control boards in the
Air Operations Center.
MWUHO
152
&
1-.+$!$Ea-”- .—.._._——.-.—-------—-------
___— — .— -
?
\
m,●
+
● ☞
● ☛
4
,
4
k●
, ++
+ ...L
+
-#
*
IIIII
I\IIIiI
i
I
i
153
, <?’
Afwulto
R’
GN
%=
““\ II I 1
—.
1 1’
$0—
I
.
iI
—
—.-
FIGURE 28
WHO
PART V
MATERIEL
. .
L%
.
.. . -
rCha ;l - . ‘--*Introduction.
~ The Materiel objective was to provide 100% logistical support for
all Task Group 7.4elements. Materiel agencies at all levels engaged
in planning, programing, movements} distribution and ro~l-up of‘a
exce%ses. The lbterfel activities encompassed
Maintenance Transportation and Construction.
During the nmnths of December 1957 through
supplies and equipment were procured, shipped~
the fields of Supply,
hlay1958, the required
received and broken out
for use by the Task Group
were greatly expedited by
various elemnts, and the
7.4Elements. he break-out of these itims
the arrival of the advance echelons of the
Base Supply augmentation personnel. These,
arrivals9 which began as early as December 1957,were timed to met
the operational readiness dates of the various elemnts. The Task
Group 7.4 Logistics Ltiison Cffice at Headquarters, SMAMA, succe.~ded
in procuring all essential items of supply and equipment and shipping
in time to meet required in-place dates.
A minor delay in the Materiel build-up ts attributable to the
lab designation of Air Force elements to participate in Cperation
HARDTACK as a part of Task Group 7.4. Althugh ow supply ai~~
maintenance support concepts were finalized by the em of J~Y 195’7:
it was not until October 1957 that the majority of the Air Fcrce
elements were designated. During 29-30 October 1957’a Yaterjel plan-
ing conference was held at Kfitland Air Force Base. This conference
was attetied by representatives of all the then-committed elements.
The purpose of this conference was to discuss and finalize the
materiel support concept and to prepare listings of quantitative
sunport requirements. The period immediately following the materiel
conference was one of intense activity which included finalization
155
[,(kAMtJHO
..-
-f
.-.jt3&
of r rements for 9-il@l_enance, aircraft parking, trans-
Po tion, work and office space. wing the months of November 1957
through January 1958S SUPPIY and ~uiPment require~nts lists were
submitted by the elements, reviewed by the Task Group materiel officei
and ~drwarded to the Task Group Logistics Liaison Office at S’MAMA,
for requisitioning and shipment to
office was the Task Group’s single
supply and maintenance system. As
the Eniwetok Roving Grounds. This
point of contact with the AMC
a result of the late assignment of’
some elements to the Task Group, and the resulting delay in submission
of support requirements some parts of the procurement program reached
crash action proportions. A major factor in the timely solution of
this problem was the fact that the key personnel in the ‘lkskGroup
Logistics Office at SMAMA had previous experience on Operation REDWING.
Results in the logistics supprt area were gmd; aircraft incommision
rate was83.3J; AOCP rate wasl.9 %; and e=rgency supply support was
good. The key bo the efficien~ of the logistics support of Operaticn
HARDTAGK was the Maintenance Control Unit which was manned by personnel
of the Task Group plus a number of augmentation personnel from Task
Group elements.
Of continuing concern was the nnnitoring of various aircraft
modification programs. In some cases the late finalization of modifi-
cation requirements resulted in crash programs. In addition consider-
able delay was encountered in negotiating with the nmdification activi-
ties in the firming up of realistic completion dates. By continual
monitoring of the various codification programs, all aircraft were able
to meet
The
Control
required Eniwetok Proving Grounds in-plaoe dates.
establishment and operation of the Thsk Group Maintenance
Unit was”begun during Operation REDWING. Utilizing the
157
AFWHO
---
(
f
..
experience gaind on Operation R~WING plus the guidance contained in
~ 664, Organizational and Field Maintenance, the Task Group Mainten-
ant>.Control Unit functioned, throughout Operation HARDTACK, as a
single control agency by which we were able to put to best use our
limited supply and maintenance capability. The overall efficiency of
the Materiel effort is reflected in the outstanding readiness rate of
aircraft and related equipment maintained throughout the operation.
Further$ during Operation ~WING, the then-organized Task Group,
prepared a long range construction program which consisted of a
number of projects for improvement of facilities in the Eniwetok
Proving Grounds. lhis document was finalized in AW9t i958.
Throughout the period from August 1956 ~ Awfl 195g this program was
given continuous attention. As a result of continuous follow-up
action, most of tie esstiiial projects were completed in ti~ for
Operation HARDTAGK.
158
....
(
f
Cha 2 - supply. “ <,
Section A - Mission
Supplies and equipnmt as projected to be needed for an 120 day oper-
ation were procured and propositioned in the Eniwctok Proving Grounds.*
The requirements were developed by each participating element to provide
100% logistical support during their presence in the EM. Headquarters,
Task Group 7.4
pose vehicles,
ground support
the EPG by the
distributed to
developed the requirements for special and general pur-
petroleum products, spare aircraft engines, and aircraft
equipment. All air and water shipmnts were received at
Air Force Wse Supply. These shipments were expeditiously
advance echelons of the participating elemmts or inte-
grated into base stocks as appropriate. The original spare parts require-
mmts were not adequate to support the extended operation. mus, it was
necessary to procure additional quantities to support the extended HARD-
TACK operational phase and Operation NEWSREEL. The overall supply
effectiveness throughout the entire operation was excellent.
Section B - Supply Organization and hnction
The supply agencies consisted of a staff supply officer in the
Group Headquarters, a materiel control officer working in the Mainten-
ance Control Unit, Supply Liaison Branch at SMAMA, a unit supply in
each element ati an Air Force
of the Test Base Unit.
The ‘Msk Group 7.4 Supply
Base Supply actitity, which was a part
Liaison Branch consisted of seven (7)
personnel at the Sacramento Air Materiel Area, McClellan Air Force
Base, California. This unit works directly with the SMAMA Operation
HARDTACK project monitors at the various AMC depots, and the Head-
quarters, Joint Task Force-SEVEN Liaison Officers at Travis Air Force
AMUH9
Base, California, and Naval Supply Center, Oaklaxxi,California. l%is
159
,
<
(
-
“6” ‘ .’*rovides a centil. u Htrol point on a year around basiS
a~ insme. contlnulti of supply procedures during both interim axd●
operational periods.
The Air Force Base Supply (AFB 2872) was organized and operated.
acc~idance with Air Force Manual 67-1. The Base SUpply manning was
in
augmented to provide the capability to process the 26,000 line items of
incoming supplies and equipment. ‘Iheaugmentation personnel were re-
quired throughout the operation including the roll-up phase.
The Materiel Control Unit closely monitored the issue of supplies,
expedited priori- requirements and furnished supply assistance to the
element supply agencies.
The staff supply officer monitored the overall supply effectiveness,
initialed procedures and polices as needed to improve supply service$
developed new requirements for the extended operational phase and
Operation NEWSREEL, provided guidance and assistance and nmnitored the
materiel roll up program.
Section C - Special Supply Procedures
Materiel requirennts for Operation HARDTACK were developed as
follows: Each participating elemsnt developed materdul requirements
based on 120 days operation in the EPG. These requirements excltied
K)L and spare engines, refueling units, fire trucks, special and
general purpose vehicles which were developed by Task Group ‘7.4. me
elemmt req~e~nts were submitted as ‘A” and ‘BW kits. ~e nAn kits
consisted of enroute and immdiate requirements on arrival in the EPG.
The ‘An kit contained primrily aircraft spares, blank forms, limited
“office supplies plus aircraft ground support equipment not included in
the ‘Bn kit. The ‘Bn kit consisted of 120 days aircraft spares, air-
craft ground support equipment that could not be furnished by the ele-
1(0
AFWHO
(
...- .-s”---
f
nen nd all other CM “’tiyrequired in the EFG. The des-
i, ation of all mission essential items at the time requirements
listings were submitted permitted the Liaison Officer to utilize
effectively the short lead ti~ to insure shipment of these specific.
item”~’.As a result, all essentidl item requirements’were satisfied
and 92% support was provided on all other requirem=ts.
Late identification of som participating elements resulted in
crash development of requirements for these elements. In these cases
there was insufficient time for the Headquarters to screen thoroughly
HBH kit listings for completeness, accuracy and adequacy of quantities.
As a consequence some excesses were procured.
~e format for submission of requirement could be improved as
follows: Prepare the ‘Bn kit in sections: Section 1, a listing of
peculiar aircraft spares, Section 2, cost category 3 and all classes
of expendable supplies except office supplies and common Ar~/Air Force
blank forms; Section 3, all office supplies, furniture, machines and
equipment, ad Section 4, special purpose vehicles, general purpose
vehicles, aircraft ground support equipment, test equipment and special
tools. ‘Ihe‘Bn kit listing should, contain only items not’available
from the element and home station assets.
The provisioning of the 6th Weather Squadron was handled separately
from all other elements. All requirements were obtained at or through
OCAMA, segregated into site kits by the 6th Weather Sqtidron and shipped
to the ER2. ~ese requirewnts include all property necessary to sus-
tain five (5) separate off-island camp sites. Upn conclusion of pre-
vious operations, this property was returned to supply sticks. This
headquarters proposed that upon completion of this Operation, all re-
useable property-be retained axxlshipped to OCAMA for rehabilitation
161
Afw14io
(
.- ‘--
f
and rage pending-f operations. This proposal was
a roved by Hq, M. Project BITTMl PILL has been established to
acco~lish the rehabilitation and storage of the operations property.
16 foot Wherry Boats were obtained from the U.S. Navy to meet‘*
the”krequiremnts of the Weather/F@d-safe sites. ~e”se boats were
used to sweep the lagoon aircraft landing areas$ ferry passengers
ad cargo between xmored aircraft and shore, tow disabled aircraft
to safety and to yet any ercergencyrescue requirements. The Wherry
Boats were not entirely satisfactory for these purposes. They
lacked stability to navigate in moderately rough lagoon waters. In
addition the size and design of these boats precludes installation of
two (2) outboard motors, required to tow an SA-16 aircraft. Features
desired in the boats needed for use at the Weather/Rad-Safe sites are:
1.
2.
3*
4.
5.
6.
Padded gunnels.
A minimum of 50 horsepwer.
Mu&mm stability.
M.inimumdraft.
Simplified maintenance.
Be capable of handling eight (8) passengers ami/or 1200
pounds of cargo.
A spare aircraft engine program was developed during
Total spares were predicated on the expected flying time
November 1957.
planned for a
120 day period. All engines except H-19, H-21 afi portion of the C-54
engines were supplied by AFC in built-up configuration. Approximately
25% of the total spares programmed were propositioned at Eniwetok as the
initial requirements. An additional 25% was positioned at SMAMA as
back-up stocks. SMAMA shipped a replacement engine upon notification
of an issue by APB 2872. The reparable engine was shipped from A.PB2H2
162
,0
,.
MWwo
-..F
f
%=-A.-+- .
to appropriate de~-zmt removed the QEC from the re-
able engine, built-up a new serviceable engine a~- shipped to
SMAMA to replenish the back-up stock. The system worked very well,
however, the orignial quantities proved inadequate due to the ex-‘.
tens%m of the operational phase. Additional SA-16~RB-50 and.-WB-5O
engines were added during the operational @ase. (See figure 1 ).
All enCines were co~ooned by SMAMA prior to shipment. This
provided good protection from the elements and enabled us to use
outside storage.
lhat all engines
ability prior to
Two (2) suggested improvements to the program are:
be inspected by SMAMA for completeness and service-
cocooning and/or shipping, and that all engine forms
and records be attached outside of the cocooning. ‘lhiswould permit
access to these documents without removal or opening of the cocooning.
Section D - Supply Operation in the EFG
Hq, JTF-SEVEN Administrative Ofier l-58, Hq JTF-SEVEN, lettir J-4/
400.3, 15 May 1958, Subject: Delineation of Supply and Service Support
in the EFG, and previous Administrative Orders contained
ology concerning the logistical responsibilities of Task
support.of Task Group 7.4. During tie build-up phase it
vague termin-
Group 7.2 in
became apparent
that Task Group 7.2 interpreted the JTF-SEVEN Administrative Order
differently from Task Group 7.4. The referenced Hq, JTF-SEVEN letter
was published to clarify logistical responsibilities and to eliminata
duplicate stockage objectives and like facilities. T!heprovisions of
this letter are being gradually integrated beginning concurrently vith
the roll-up phase.
The Task Group
satisfactory. OUr
clothing, however,
7.2 Supply support
tatil requirements
for this operation was generally
for hot lockers ard Class ‘X”
were not filled until late in the exercise. Task
163
Atwu!m
I I 1 I 1 1
FTGURE 1
p164
I
. ._* . -a.. I
f
Grou :2 k advlse&. ..gf Class ‘Xn clothing are nearly
e usted, and that it is probable that Class ‘Xn clothing will not ber
available for issue on future test operations.
In several instances common ArWiAir Force vehicle spares and other
co- items were procured by Task Group 7.4 although ~sk Group 7.2
was the designated supply agency. Task Group 7.4 procurement was
necessary in order b satisfy WP$ work stoppge ati other Wgent
reqtiremnts.
The 26,000 line itemsof supplies and equipment received byAFB
2872 to support this operation were integrated into base stocks. The
aircraft maintenance work stands, tugs, generators, and other items
of equipment common to mre than one type if aircraft were retained in
a central pool. The equipment peculiar to a specific type aircraft was
issued to the appropriate element. The nBn kit spares were retained in
AFB 2~ stocks and issued on as required hsis. The storage available
to AFB 2872 becam critical with the input of the 26,000 line items.
This was solved by utilizing outside storage for items suitable for this
typ storage. Approximately 30 conex containers were used to provtde
additional inside sterage space.
The existing
operation. (S&e
The decision
organization as augmented adequately supported the
figures 2, 3, 4, ad 5.)
was made in late March 1958 to use Johnston
a new operating site. This phase of the operation was known
ation NEWSREEL.
Task Group 7.4 was designated the sole agency to arrange
Island as
as Oper-
total
-UHO
JTF-SESTENlogistical requirements at Hickam AFB, TR. ~e bulk of supply
and maintenance requirements at Hickam AFB were available from local
and Em assets. 136 line items of WB-50 spares were procured from the
165 /!5I &
i
:>L.’_* ..4.
( ‘,’~+=-
Idzz
[
w:
m
:ccu
iI 1 I I I I 1 I I I 1
0 0 0 0 t!) 0 0 0 0
: 0 0 00 z 0~
g:gg0 0 0 0- 0- 0. 0.
*- da“ u- m- * 0 9 u ●- o- m-* * m n m u w---
—
—
—
Mw-mo
FTGUR.Eu%
2
(
.=-&-
-..--,.. ___=a a @
T
I 1 ,
1
1 1 ,.-, .-,,
-0
UJL’.-r
I 1 1%1--1-1’
Q
} I I I I I I I I I I
0 0 0 0 0000000
0 Ogg0000000o~od)-o-~-o-
0- q *“ ~- n-n-**mm
0 m a-
FIG~ 3167
0000Uao
AMwl
...... ,.a .,_
I,,
1
I I I
I I {
—
o
— —
8-.N
k
aaa
Y’[L
,.
I L \
Nwfno
.+---- *-
Staf
- -“”Land prepositioh~d. AFB to support the WB-50 aircraft.
TI#resihiiI property Was turned lXI~ MB Z@ as
H~ckam. The roll-up and disposal of this property
Hickam AFB.‘.
~sk Group 7.410gistic responsibilities at Johnston Island itself
it became excess
was accomplished
consistid of furnishing approximately 100 separate items of aticraft
ground handling equipmmt, peculiar weather station equipment and
certain other selected items. Air Force peculiar spares, except those
required from MATS aircraft were furnished from the EFG. The MATS
spares were furnished by the 1502nd Air Transport Wings Hickam AI’B,Ill.
l’heequipment items for Johnston Island were obtained from the EPG and
Hickam AFB except for 22 line items, which were requisitioned from the
States for delivery direct to Johnston Island. The Johnston Islati Base
Command accomplished roll-up at that site. !Mere was no stock record
account at this location and all property furnfshed fromWG (MB 2872)
was on a hand-receipt basis. me shipping documents were prepared for
the disposal of this property byAFB 2872 and forwafied to Johnston
Island. l’hedocuments were married to the items and shipment affected.
Section E - Supply Effectiveness
The mission category andprecedcnce assigned to Task Group 7.4
coupled with the services of the AM special project supply system
provide an adequate foundation for accomplishing the supply support
mission. All local procurement action was handled by the SHAY?
Procurement Directorate, All central proc~wed and General S_UpPlies
Stock Fund items were obtained from the appropriate Ah Force prime
depots, and Task Group 7.2. An Operation HARDTACK supply and
Maintenance Project Monitor was designated at each depot to insure
accelerated processing of all requirements. Hq, N also designated a
1?0
AFwulw
(\
,$ ---- ---s--.
f
co ,+””-d Operation -=, Monitor to assist in all serious
p lem areas. This system provided the necessary management tools to
accomplish the mission of providing complete supply and maintenance
support for all USAF Units participating in nuclear tests in the Em..%The special supply procedures and the
were adequate to support this operation.
provide a basis for future refinement and
Section F -
supply organization employed
The experience
improvement.
Roll-Up
gained will
26,000 lime items of supply and equipment were received byKFB 28?2
in support of the operation. These items were In addition to the ltAm
kit and organizational items that accompanied participating elements.
Limited roll-up was commenced mid-way through the Operation. me (1)
man was employed full time begining late April to identify duplicate
depot shipments and other excesses. b average of 89o tons of excess
and reparable property was disposed of each month from May through
18 August 1958. Disposition of all material was predetermined in order
to accelerate the roll-up program.
Arrangements were
condition to a single
the roll-up program.
made with NW to ship all vehicles in an “as is”
destination. Tnis arrangement greatly accelerated
Local fabrication of three (3) standard size
packing boxes was accomplished during June and July. These boxes PIUS
the conexs and containers saved from ticoming shipments provided the
majority of’container requirements. A total of 98 personnel from par-
ticipat~ elements were retained to assist TBU h the roll-up
A total of 1,961 line items were shipped to the 21 during
operational period (See Figure 6). Since the cut-off date of
program.
the
this
report is the same as the last shot dati (18 August 19s8), final roll-
up figures are not included.
l?l
Afwl./tlo
I
T00cd--
Idu)Is
::
FIGURE 6
172
AiWJno
“f - “’”””””.;$$$kE#-.C ptsr 3 - Supnly of FQL Products.
The Petroleum products were available as required to satisfy Oper-
ation HARDTACK requirements. Limited bulk storage facilities, however,‘.
nec~’ts$tateddaily nxmitoring of stock balances and frequent adjusting
of petroleum tanker schedules to insure the nnintenance of minimum
operational requirements. (See fi~e 7 and 8, fuel c@ J~tion).
l’heexisting bulk storage capacity is 614,500 gallons JP-4; 774,500
gallons AvCas; 78,000 gallons M&as and 158,0~ gallons of diesel. NO
difficulty was experienced In maintaining adequate stocks of MoCas and
diesel; however, during periods of intensified flying stocks of JP-4
and AvCas becam critical. The daily issues, stock balances, projected
daily requirements and petroleum re-supply tanker schedules were re-
viewed daily to identify actions necessary to preclude depletton of
stocks. The storage space did not always permit the isolation of tested
fuel and on occasions it was necessary to contaminate tested fuel with
new fuel in order to accept delivery of nnxi”mumquantities from the
tanker. Arrangermnts were made with the petroleum testfng laboratory
at Pearl Xarbor, !ITl,to test our fuel samples and to report results
expeditiously. The support rendered was ‘excellentwe were able to
avoid using untested fuel, although on occasions fuel was serviced
into aircraft within hours after receipt of the analysis results.
As part of the support of the Weather Islands, (Kusaie, Rongelap,
Kapingamarangi, Tarawa, Nauru, Wotho, Utirik, Ujelang), it was
necessary to preposition drums d MOGas and diesel fuel. Qumtlties
estimated were
requirements.
adequate and were in place in tire to meet our operational
WHO
173
(
(.
*
...---- ---
.,
.-E’IGURE
175/’
hfWtjHO Iq5
>..=.,..e#
a=
f
“-“&Bddition to t-: ... f fuels placed on the Weather Islands,“
i was necessary to preposition a quantity of drumrd AvGas at Ponape.-.
The fuel was used to refuel SA-16 aircraft enrout8 to Kapingamarangi on
island resupply missions. Because of extension of the test operation‘,---
and a number of unanticipated flights, fuel stocks at Ponape were ex-
hausted by June 1958. Through negotiations with the Weather Bureau at
Ponape we were able to secure AvGas at a cost of $.47 per gallon.
Although this cost was high; it was a cheaper solution than shipping
a srnll quantity of drummed AvCas to Ponape.
‘Iheprogramwi modifications to the bulk storage facilities will
aid the fuel management, but during future tests, daily monitoring of
fuel status and expeditious testing by the fuels Iaboratiry will prc-
bably still be required.
Mwwl
176
-- ~~.
f
Cha /+- ?kintenan*-
Section .4- Eis9ion
The maintenance tissicn was to mintain assi~ned aircraft, ground
support equipmnt, special purpose vehicles, and soresgrcund and all‘L“*
air cbynunications equipnent in a =imun state of readiness. There
were a total of seventy-eight (78) aircraft of sixteen (16) different
types and 342 units of aircraft ground support equtpmnt included in
the ‘J’as]:Group 7.4 inventory. An additional wcrk load was created in
providing turn-around maintenance for Farticlpating U.:. Navy aircraft,
based at Kwajalein, NATS and transient traffic. (See f~gure 9 ,).
Section B - Organization and Functicn
The basic structure of organization and functicn closely paralleled
the stmdards contained 5nAir Force Mamal 66-1. There iers, however,
some r~ner deviations instituted in order ta tailor the najnterance
efforts to the untque nissicn. The mhterxince crgur=.zsticmincluded a
s+aff mtir.tenance officer in the Task Grouu Feafiqurtars, a Maintenance.
ControJ Unit md an organizational maintenance section in each element.
‘TheStaff Ylintenance Cfficer formulated requtre=nts for hth
augmentatim personnel and support equipmnt reqi~hxl in the EIY3.
The Cross requ~remnts rlevelcpedby
corre?.atedand reduced to a minimum
anticipated ‘vorkloads.
pmtjcipating elerents were
net quantity co~atible with the
~Je Staff Maintenance Cfficer serwxl as advisor to the ~irectcr of
Kafieriel;standardized mintenmce policies md practices; mint.ained
sta+,isicslCkta, mcmitcred reports and distributed technical publi-
c2ticns.
The ?hirter,anceContrcl Unit assi~ned direct~y tc T:.skCroup }!ead-
cjumters, was actfviated concurrent with the arriv:l of the Advanced
177
Wuna
7
Afwuno
FIGURE 9
178
f\
.
(
‘n 5Fe::+@d!BM-6“rEch unit was established as a focal point to
c elate the overall maintenance effort. This unft maintained current
status of aircraft~ aircraft ground support-equfp~nt$ scheduled ~inten-
ance specialists and controlled flow of work into Field Maintenance shops.‘.
In a?hiition,priority requisitions were validated in”those instances
where the required item was not in local stocks. me ~thods and pro-
cedures employed insured the most effective and efficient utilization
of personnel ati equipment throughout the entire operation.
The Elemnt Maintenance activities performed the specific functions
of directly supervising and prforming maintenance to the aircraft and
other equipment.
Section C
All organizaticmal maintenance
ues accomplished in the open. The
- Aircraft Y?irtenance
and some of the field nmintenance
single existing hangar was used as an
aircraft repair facility to the maximum extent practicable It WaS,
however necessary to provide ten (10) 20X.40portable buildings to
satisfy minimum shop, supply and technical adrinistiative requirements.
The hangar and detached sndler buildings provided minimum
space to accommodate base shops.
Salt water corrosion presented a continuing prObleIIIin
inside
the EPG.
A vigorous corrosion control program, includirg frequent fresh water
washjng, was practiced on all aircraft. This program retarded but did
not eliminate salt water corrosion. There were rany and varied air-
craft malfunctions directly attributable to corrosion, although a
significant effort was expended to minidze corrosion effects.
During the entire operation there were forty-four (44) reciprocating
engires
changes
and seventeen (17) jet er.g~nechanges. The number of eng~ne
were well within proportion to hours flown.
179
WHO
.–..:-.---.A-
t?
re were tvo ou . ~ blems stemming from design or mter~el
fa ure. One such problem was a B-57D aircraft landing gear failure. ne
pilots of two separate B-57D aircraft experienced difficulties inflight,
In extending the nose gear to ‘down and locked’tposition. The nose gearL
of o;~-aircraft collapsed upon landing. Inspection revealed cracks in
the barrel of the nose gear actuator, resulting in a loss of hydraulic
fluid. At this timeall B-57D aircraft were grounded except for actual
cloud sampling missions. An emergency unsatisfactory report was sub-
mitted to !JRAMAand four (4) spre actuators and three (3) actuators
rermved from aircraft were flown to NAMAP, Tachikawa Air Base, Japan
for Depot Inspection. The depot inspection detected cracks in three (3)
of the seven (7) units tested. NAMAP provided depot inspected replacement
actuators for the B-57D aircraft, permitting the lirr~ted‘flying status
to be rescinded. Additional depot tested units were expeditiously pro-
cured from !WIAMAto replace the B-57B actuators. Later, a similar
deficiency was fcwnd to exist in the B-5’7B&Dmain gear actuators. An
energency Unsatisfactory Report was submitted to WRAYJland concurrent
crash action taken to procure depot inspected replace~nt actuators. The
replacements items were received axrlinstalled expeditiously.
The other problem involved SA-16 aircraft of the SAR Element. Two
(2) SA-16 eircraft developed extensive hull damage that was beyond our
capability to repair. These aircraft were evacuated to depot repair
facilities. The damage consisted of hull vrinkling in the bow belov
the pilot compartment. One (1) aircraft was evac~ated +a a depot
repajr facility ~ncl replaced. The other aircraft was evacuated ta SNAP
for repair nnd return to the EFG. The water landings at near maximum
gross landj.rgl~e~~htand the long down wind take off distances, peculiar to
som j:;lz~dsites contributed to the wri~kling of the hulls.
180
AFwlMD
+.-&%-
4=
i?‘-‘“&a result of a r fly weather reconnaissance missions
in. he Johnston Island area_in support of Op=ation NEWSREEL, It was
decided that the Weather Reconnaissance Element (Hovisional) periodic
main,~nance capability would move to Hickam AFB, ‘l’H.
~?kns, which were formulated in June 1958, provided that weather
reconnaissance missions would be launched from Eniwetok and terminated
at Hickam AFB and vice-versa. Missions were so scheduled that an air-
craft due for a periodic inspection would land at Hickam APB and go
into the periodic maintenance facility for necessary inspection and
maintenance.
lle home base of the Weather Reconnaissance Ele=nt (Provisional)
was Hickam AFB where permanent type facilities~ i.e. hangarsj work
space, etc, were available. Two (2) officers, 139 airren and equipment
were nmved from Eniwetok
the periodic maintenance
WB-50 aircr8ft commncd
to Hickam AFB during July 1958 to estiblish
facility. Periodic inspection of the first
on 16 July 1958.
Section D T Special Purpose Vehicle and Aircraft Ground Support
Equipment Maintenance
The total units of Special Purpose Vehicles and Aircraft Ground
Support ~uipment maintained was
These units were ndntained in a
control and maintenance.
three hundred and forty-ho (3@).
common pool to facilitate operational
Salt water corrosion was unavoidableand required the expenditure
of considerable maintenance man hours to minimize the effects. some
equipment failure is attributable to corrosion.
Another continuing problem was the lead tim required to procure
replacement parts and spares from local purchase sources. Many local
purchase items we”re obtainable from a single source and in som cases
181
AFwuuo
(
-. ./ --+-.
r*‘ %facture requ & to fabricate and deliver. Thusj
c trolled cannabillzation was practiced in order to raintajn acceptable
equipment readiness rates. The spare parts support of special purpose
and aircraft ground support equipment could be imwoved by earlier‘&
det~-nation of spares to be pre-positioned and ti~ely initiation of
supply actions.
A small number of units sustained minor damage in shipment, which
was corrected as the units were prepared for operation. The instances
of inj~ to units due to mishandling or carelessness in the ERi were rare.
A vehicle and aircraft ground pwer equipment inspector was dispatched
from Sacrament Air Materiel Depot at the end of the test phase to deter-
mine serviceability and disposition of excess equipmmt. The result of
this inspection was the salvaging of approximately forty (40) units of
special purpose vehicles and aircraft ground powered equipwnt. The
balance of units were retined to SMIMA for repair and return b stock.
A high percentage of this salvaged equipment was a direct result of
corrosion.
Section E - Commmjcations
During the early part of the operation, daily, weekly and monthly
preventative maintenance schedules for the communications and AN/’USQ-l2
radar equipment within the AOC was devised. Fortunately, with but one
exception, enough backup equipment was available so that outages were
held to an absolute minimum. ‘I’hebulk of maintenance was accomplished
on an as required basis, we did, however schedule wiintenance to the
extent that back-up equipment and operational commitments would permit.
The Field Maintenance Communications Shops maintained the airborne
cotununicationsand radar equipment as well as the vehicle radio sets.
In the interest of expediency, malfunctioning units were remved from
182
NWJno
48=”
ft ‘“+’’’””’*ircraft and irmne replaced with serviceable units from pre-
i~sue sticks. The nmlfunctioning unjt was repaired in the
placed in serviceable pre-issue stock. Aircraft affording
to~adar and communicationsunits during flight were issued
‘Ybe installed should a malfunction occur.
bas~shop and
accessibility
a spare set to
The radio and inter-coxnunicationsystems were installed ad serviced
by the Field kjntenance Communication Shops with assistance from Task
Group 7.2 Signal Section. This system consisted of inter-cornboxes in all
the Elemnt Engineering Offices, Field Maintenance Shops and Base Supply
Expediter Section. Radios were installed in the Maintenance Control
Officerst vehicle and five (5) flight line pick-ups.
Section F - Execution
The aircraft readiness rate attained and sustained
Force standard (See figure 10).
exceeded the Air
The personnel skflls and eqtipment provided each activity was
adequate to execute the maintenance mission. lle varying techniques,
personnel skills and organizational structures in each element necessitated
some adjustment to weld together all activities and achieve a coofiinated
and effective maintenance capability. The succession of a D-1 status over
a period of several days precluded performing major maintenance. The
release from a D-1 status was followed with intensa ndntenance activitys
on a 24 hours day basis on occasions.
Frequently, the field maintenance shops personnel worked double shifts
to meet the requirements of the participating elemnts. On D-1 nights,
maintenance specialists maintained an around the clock vi~il to accomplish
last minute correction of malfunctions. Pre-issue stock items were kept at
a maximum level on D-1 and D days, thus affording mirdxum replacement time
~LjH()-1.
103
FIGURJI10
184
AFwl Inn
(- ““--”-*The maintenance personnel of all units worked long hours under adverse
conditions to meet the mission requirements.’ (See figure 11 and 12 Mainten-
ance Man-Hours Expended).
L“T“-\
185
/’r-, %
‘\, .,. ,
t-
—
>>~ul
D
q
33t’n
D0Sn*-
*
00.,m0*-
m
00. .(u00
00. .0aQQ-
x0A
MwLfHo
—
—
—
>4x
-...
—
00. .ar-CQ
—
010. .0Nm
—
Jvwum
(
-~”--~~=~’r--“fCh.,
Section A - Mission—
The mission of the ‘Eansportation Section, Task Group 7.4 on Opera-
tion HMOTAGK was as follows:‘.ax provide General Purpose Vehicle Support.
2. Provide Special Purpose Vehicle Uupwrt.
3* Arrange for movement Task Grcup personnel (approximately (12M),
via NATS from the GCHUS to the EFG.
4. Arrange for movement of
5. Arrange for movement of
heavy items via surface lift to
pricrity ~ir cargo via MATS to the EPG.
Special Rqmse Vehicles and other
the IW2.
6. Arrange for booking of Task Grcup 7.4personnel and cargo on
Inter-Intra and off atoll fli~hts.
7. Arra~e for mo.~etcentof pssen~ers and priorfty cargo to the
~}~s on ~ rolI.uP sched~e aftir completion of Operation HARDTACK.
6. Arrange for rol~-up ncvement of Special Purpose Vehfcles, trailers
and other heavy items to the CCNUS via surface lift.
Section B - General Purpose Vehicle Requirements
General Furpose Vehicle Require~nts for Cperation HARDTAGK were
firmed U“ in Fehruaq 1957 and fo~arded to Hq~ J~-m: for aPPronl*
A tctal of 137 vehicles were requested. Types requested were 1/4 ton
(jeeps), 1/2 tin trucks (pick-up), 3/4 ton weapons carriers 1 1/2 ton
trucks, and 2 1/2 ton trucks. A list of 116 vehicles
approved by JTF-SEVIN in June 1957 vim Substitutes
trucks for 3/4 tin weapons carriers.
The above requirements submitted for Cperation
on the prev~ous operation and allowances were mde
that were ex~ect&d to be added.
1U3
of
were tentatively
1/2 ton pick-up
HARDTACK were based
for new elements
Wtul
cf;t=A;;li- - ‘e8eaddi-
~Weather Squadron requested they be
ocated additional vehicles including two (2) Dukws.
tional requirements were forwarded to JTF-SEVEN and they were approved.
Final approval was received from JTF-SEVEN for 119 General Purpose
Ve;%qles in Janusw 1958. These vehicles were made’available through
Army Supply ch~nnels and were shipped to the EKi in the last qm~t-er of
1957. me Test Wse Unit Installations Officer made arrangements with
the ArxIwto commission these vehicles as they were required.
‘he Transportation Officer was represented by the Assistant Staff
Supply Officer in the Advance Echelon. This officer drew the general
purpose vehicles from the TBU and issued same to the various elements.
This phase of the operation was carried out as planned and the elements
received their allocation of vehicles ve~ shortiy after arriving in
the EPG.
Task Group 7.4 personnel were issued Military Drivers license and
operated its own vehicles. Task Group 7.2 dispatched and provided
maintenance
some of
minute that
believed it
support for these vehicles.
the units that had requested jeeps decided at the last
they would like to have 1/2 ton pick up tmcks. It is
would be to the advantage of the next operation to have
nme pick-up trucks and less jeeps. (A breakdown of general purpose
vehicles by organization is shon in fi~e 13).
Section C - Special Purpose Vehicle Requirements
14.4pieces of special purpose equipment were programmed for the
Operation. These vehicles were requested by letter to ARDC through
AFswc . At the time, these vehicles
Base Squadron had serveral vehicles
Supprt Squadron (Test). 18 of the
were requested the 4935th Air
excess as also did the 4951st
4935th vehicles were marked for
M9
AWUHO
HARDTACK.,
Jlllf--=i’’ti-v’”’’”‘SS’GNMENT,“
1/4 TON 1/2 TON 4 1/2 TON 2 1/2 TONJEEP P/u 6x6 TOTALS
HQ. TG7.4 14= a 22
TAU 14 12 2 2 30
TB~ 12 16 4 S2.
TsU 12 19 2 s 36
wv
HQ. TO. 7.4 14 8 ,22
4926 TH 8 7 1 16
40S0 TH(SAC) I 1 I s
WADC 2 I 1 4
NASWF I I 2
AFCRC(C-97) I 1“
4925 TH(B-36) I I z
AFOAT- I I I z-
4951 ST 9 10 s 22
4952 ND 2 s 5
24TH HELRON 1 2 3
HQ. TSU 3 I 4
64 TH ARS( SAR )
2 3 I 1 7
AIR PHOTO 2 I 3
DOC PHOTO I I
57TH Wx I 3 I ,1 6
6TH WX S0 3 6 9
MATS I 2 sTERMINAL
AACS 3 I 4
PACAF I 1
ToTALS 52 56 e 5 I 20b 4
FIGURE 13
190hfwuno
(_
-4-----’ --~. -ro “-””’*ion HARDTACK ) of the /+951stvehicles were mrked to
main at Eniwetik for the Operation. The net requirement to AR-DCwas
reduced to 126 vehicles. Part of these vehicles came from ARDC ex-
cesses at other stations and the reminder cam from Mallory AFD, which\.
was~he prime dept for vehicles..
A deadline date of 1 Janmq 1958 was set for deljveIY Of all
special purpose vehicles to the Oakland Port. All vehicles mde the
deadline date and were shipped to arrive in the EPG by February 1958,
which was well before the start
Arrangements were made with
bOITOW a 15,000 pound fork lift
aircraft engi~es. This vehicle
of the Operation.
the lTAS,North Island, California to
with special attachment for nnunting
was shipped on the aircraft carrier?
USS BOXER from San Diego, California. A panel truck us~ by the SAC
Unit for denitregenation of high altitude crews and four (4) decon-
tamination trucks were also shipped on the USS l?OXIR.
me special purpose vehicles were kept in common pool and were
issued to the units to fill their day to day requirements. *.intenance
Control Unit controlled the dispatch of these vehicles. (Figure lh
shows the number of vehicles on hand by type).
Section D - Movement of Passengers and Freight to Em
I.fienTask Group 7.4 Logistic Conference was held in October 1957$ the
Task Group Transportation Officer distributed instructions to all units
setting forth requirements for forecasting movements of pssengers and
cargo by both air ad water. The first report was received in November
and then continued up through Mrd and then discontinued since mst of
the Units were in place in the EPG by this time. These reports proved
very helpful in the Transportation Sectiony ~sk GrOUF 7.4 in forecasting
requirements for air and surface lift.
‘.ii1
Awl./luJ
(
/-“ ““--~”.-:..
JAN FED MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUQ
Io 8 6 6 6 5 3
40 S6 S3 30
Il. 16 16 16 16 2,
I
TRACToR, TowlNC AIRCRAFT
TRACTOR, WAREHOUSE (ti6 ) la I It9 40
;Rh OR, ill/2-lo Tom 6
wRECKER, M-246 III I
r 18 a 8 8
\REFUELIN6 UNIT F-6 2 II 12 12 II 10 II
sooo 6ALLa
REFUELINO UNIT F-3 2 4 9 Is 12 12 10
~
I TRAILER , 25’6 40’ I 4I
4I
7
h-u’--JJ
75o t3ALLON I 1 [ 1
i.TL1FoRKLIFT 1-7 I/Z TON
,21. -I A*L=
CRANE, GARWOOD 20 TON o
f
I CRANE, Ro~T~ouT v-lo I 01
Ii I 1
6RANE. tiYSTER 18,000 LB. I 2 sI
3
STREETSWEEPER o 0 0
FIRE TRUCK 530B
TRuCK PUMPER 2V2T M*6I ~ E z E z
o s 3 3 3TRUCK . DECoN MSAS o t
,
..
1
TOTALS I60 ~ 1~$
NWUHO
(==’”* was S1OU during the months August 1957
ugh November 1957 and averaged only ten (10) tons a nmnth. In—
December, the alr tonnage picked up. January, February, March, April
and May were peak months averaging 85 tons per month.
‘~e movement of Task Group 7.4 passengers via MATS was accomplished
in an orderly manner. About 100 airmen of
were shipped in November and December 1957
Support Squadron (Test). In Janua~ 1958,
the 4952nd Support Squadron
to augment the 4951st
the Advance Echelons of the
various elenmnts started to move and peak months were February and
March. Elements were responsible for movement of their personnel from
home station to the Aerial Port at Travis Air Force Base, California.
Some of the elements used aircraft of their own Command in moving
personnel to the port. Others used commercial transporti-tion. Personnel
from Hq, Task Group 7.4, 4926th Test Squadron (Sampling), and 4952nd
Support Squadron were mewed to Travis AFB in groups of 20 by C-47 air-
craft furnished by AFSWC. A total of 1200 ~sk Group 7.4 personnel
were moved to the E= tia MATS.
In the Westbound Air Cargo, it will be noted there is a peak
months of January, February and March, which was the shipping of
in the
IIBII
kits for the elements and other support equipment for the start of the
Operation. Also note another build-up in Westbound Air Cargo shipments
in May and tune. This was due to the shipmnt of replacement aircraft
engines by alr from the depot to the EFG. (See figure 15, Air Cargo
Westbound.)
The Chart on Westbound Air Passenger hbvement shows a peak in
January, February and March which is when the mjority of the 1200
passengers moved by MATS had reached the EFG. Then another build-up is
indicated on the chart in June and July in the Westbound Air Passenger
193
+
4AFwl./tbo
/-
->1
FIGURE 1519&
WUHO
:’~~~””+ to replacements arriving in the EI% for
ntation personnel who were se_nthome at the end of their six (6)
months period. Due to the extension of the operation through July and
August, it was necessary to replace these personnel in June and July.
(sJ&@re16, Air $%ssenger Mvement Westbound). “
The hajor part of the water cargo was the 120
vehicles which arrived at the port in January and
January and February. Water cargo reached a peak
special purpose
were shipped in
in January, February
and March when
shipped. (See
Section E -
A position
the bulk of the heavy items of support equipnmt were
figure17, Water Cargo Westtiund.)
Air Transportation. (Inter, Intra-Atoll and Off Atoll)
was created by JTF-SEVEN called a Senior Transportation
Control Agent (STGA). ‘his position was held bya civilian employed by
Task Group 7.5. This person was placed directly under the J’IT’-SEVlN
Transportation Office and responsible only to that office with no obli-
gation to any Task Group. me duties of the S’ICAwas to receive require-
ments for movemnt from the Task Groups and to make decisfons as to
priorities of movement.
Each Task Group designated an Officer as a Transportation Control
Agent. (TCA). ‘l’hisOfficerls responsibilities was to receive require-
ments for movemnts from the subordinate units and book them with the
SIYA. The STCA consolidated all his bookings from the TCAts and then
made a decision as to what passengers and cargo would go.
No problems were encountered on the scheduled lift to Bikini. ‘I%ere
were sufficient flights scheduled daily to take care of everyone who
had reason to go. Three (3) flights were scheduled daily at first and
after two (2) xmnths, the number of flights was reduced to two (2) due
to lack of patronage.
195/
..
FIGURE 16
196
NWUMO
.
‘i—
—
—
H
FIGURE 17197
MWuna
. .
f“- --.-.
%<..- ““”” .
ghts to the We - . safe Islands were scheduled cnce a veck
u“ a flight departing’daily for a different island. Flights to Nauru
and Tarawa were serviced by C-54 aircraft but were l~mited to the number
of passengers they could take due to a large crew of eight (8) and theL
\numbe of persons who could be billeted at the camp ”site. A total of
seven (7) passengers were permitted on these flights.
On the SA-16 flights to Kapingamarangi (weight limit 1777), Utirik
(weight limit 2107), Kauaie (weight limit 2291), Rongelap (weight
limit 2225), Wotho (weight Iifit 2634) and Ujela% (weight li~t 3~7g)~
the total weights for passengers and cargo was limited as noted above.
This usually meant a total of five (5) seats for passengers and the
aircraft was filled out with freight including such items as rations,
housekeeping supplies, PX supplies, f~lm and mail. -
On 75% of the flights scheduled kth C-54 and SA-16 aircraft> ~
the Weather Rad-Safe Islands there were more official passengers booked
than could be transported. I%iorj.tieswere determined by the STCA and
be decided which passengers would
one week were slipped to the next
On approximately June 1958,
go. Passengers
and as a result
Commander, Task
policy in effect that personnel off duty would be
that could not go
many cancelled out.
Group 7.L placed a ~
permitted to travel
to the Weather Rad-Safe Islands and to Kwajalein and Guam on a “space
available” basis. This was controlled thro~h Task Group 7.4 (~A) and
seats were evenly distributed anxmg the
strength. These spaces were limited to
Section F - Roll-Up Shipment of Cargo
Task Groups according to
deserving airmen and officers.
and Passengers to CCNJS
The majority of the passengers indicated on the figure as moving
Eastbound in January through April were PCS returnees to the CFNUS from
the 4951st Support Squadron (Test). About five (5) personnel were
198
~,’,”
L<>
AWL/no
:F’v ‘s period due to emergency or morale leave.
1) each film couri r was booked each week ta return exposed film
to~Lookout Mountain Laboratory in Hollywood, California. In April and
May, the C-97 and B-36 aircraft sup~rt crews were booked to leave after
the$ aircraft had\
the 4952nd Support
reaching a peak in
departed. In May and June, augmented personnel of
Squadron started to the stabs. Starting in J~yand
August, the main My of the operation was returned
to the states via MATS. On 1 July 1958, the MATS I~ustrial ~ding
System was placed in operation. ‘lhishad very little effect on our
operation. l%is meant that all ~Y personnel afi cargo moved by MATS
in support of Operation HARDTACK was billed to a JTF-SEVEN fund
citation by M4TS. A stamp was provided by JTF-SEWZN to validate all
personnel orders ad shipping documents. (See figure 18; Passengers
Air
and
Eastbound.)
There was very little air cargo moved Eastbound in January, February
March, but
chart reachjng
of the tonnage
engines, being
starting in April, a steady build-up is indicated on the
a peak in July, August and September. The major part
nmved in April.,May and June was reparable aircraft
returned to the depot for overhaul. In July, 20 tons
of cargo was shipped-to Hickam. This cargo consisted of “Bw kits for
B-36, c-97 and WB-50 aircraft. The roll-up of air shipment on high
priority hi-value items started in late July and continued through
August and September. (See figure 19, M-r Cargo Eastbound.)
The
special
pAaJcin
roll-up of heavy surface lift was started in June when several
purpose vehicles were declared excess. Surface lift reached a
August and September when the USS BRCISTRGM, heavy lift vessel
was brought in to return the reminder of special purpose vehicles to
the COMJS. Unfavorable winds nade it necessery to ship six (6)SA-16
199
WUno
“{\
a4
(naId(9zuu)(0g
I
AFWUHO
al
FIGURE 18
200
FIGURE19201
(“f’
<“* -.-.--.=----
air t from Hawa””’”” C[I!7JSvia surface lift. Special arrange--..
s were nude with -SEVEN Surface Transportation Section to ship
~ese aircraft aboard the aircraft carrier USS
face lift.
%i our (4) H-21 helicopters? firee (3) H-19B
BOXIHlas opportune sur-
helicopters, five (5)
F-6 Re’~eling Units and 84 tons of general cargo was shipped to Japm
via surface lift in late August and e=ly September 1958. (See
Figure 2~ Water Cargo Eastbound.)
Section G - sulmllary
A total of 119 general purpose vehicles were issued to Task Group
7.4. They were distributed among the major units and the Task Group
Headquarters, according ~ their requirements as follows:
Hqs, TG 7.4 22-
TAU
TBu
TSU
A few minor adjustments
month of the operation.
30
32
36
in allocations between units were mde the first
.
Special Purpose Vehicle support was provided to the Task Group by
arranging for shipment of 144 pieces of equipment to the EFG in January
1958. 50% of these vehicles were issued on a per~nent basis and the
reminder dispatched on call as required by Maintenance Control Unit.
The movement of approximately 1200 paggengers from their home
station in the 21 to the arrival Port of Embarkation at ‘I!ravisAFJ3was
accomplished by Unit aircraft and commerical transportation. ‘Me
transportation Section Task Group 7.4 arranged for booking Of these
personnel on MATS
Approximately
with JTF-SEVEN Liaison Officer at T?ravis.
350 tons of air cargo was shipped out of Travis AFB
20&
MulJHn
<“--‘;
*--,.-...==...< .-
Ii0
( FIGURE 20
203
AFWUHO
y!f!iii:pJanuary 1958 through 30 Anrfl 1958. ‘l’he
as aircraft support kits and spare aircraft
engines, which was shipped direct from s~~f”
AII Special Purpose Vehicles) van tw trflilersand Ofier heawi
equ*
nt was moved to the Port of Embarkation, Naval Supply Center at,.
Oakland, California via rail? co~-rical truck or drive awW’” ~is
equipment was shipped via MSTS surface lift to the EPG.
Transportation of ‘Msk Croup 7..4personnel a~ cargo to Biki~ and
the Mcather Rad-Snfe Islands was arranged by the ~~sk Group 7.4
Transportation Control Agent who was the Task Group 7.4 Transportation
Officer. The Task Group 7.4 (TVA) received requests for move~nt bY
phone and forwarded them to the JTF-SEVEN (S’l?2A)by
Bikini was twice daily. Service to the !~eather-Rad
weekly.
phone. Service to
Safe Islan:lswas
Movement of passengers to the COFUS from the EPG was accelerated in
July and August. When a total of over 900 persons were shipped via
MATS. ‘Ihcsepersonnel were booked through the ArxqyTransportation
Section. MATS scheduled one to
57 persons per aircraft to move
The shipping section of the
three flights a day with a cap~city of
these pcrsonnelo
4951st Support Squadron (Test) arranged
for receiving high-value cargo to be shipped by air. The Transportation
Officer, Task Group 7.4, and the shipping Officerj Test ~se unit)
sqreened this cargo to restrict it to priority cargo. The majority of
roll-up air cargo was shipped in August and Septemkr 1958.
The majority of the heavy roll-up items such as vehicles, van
trailers and large crates were shipped on t!e USS BROS’IROMwhich de-
parted the EPG in late August 1958. This cargo was turned over to
the shipping section of the Lgjlst Supprt Squadron (Test) who in turn
2o11
it N.7Sstored urtil surface 1ift was 3rranged.
N3VUHU
‘*
\
205
!...
~ burjnl the ofirational phase of 0:.~ati~n’Redwing, Headqw-rters ‘TaA.
Group 7..4prepared and submjtted to c~~’~nder~ J~-S~;E~; as coj~pletea
10
\
range construction proCran as could be foreseen nt +,hattire.
A fi~la’refinement of this cor.structionplan was submitted to Commnder,
JTF-HW7’ by our letter, Subject: T:]skGroup 7.)+Developrcnt Plan
(Revised), 15 Aurust 1956.
Cur construction program was combined with the pro~rars of the
other Task Groups, into a sin~le JTF-SEVTN program, which w,?:;forwar-led
to the (%airrran,United States Atomic EnerN Commission, for further
pr0cess5~~.
Throu@out the period September 1956 to March 1958 continuous fOllOW
up action “instaken to insure the completion of construction projects
prjor to the beginning of Operation HARDTACK. This follow up action
included joint action with Holmes and Narver, the AEC Contractor in the
?PC:and the USAEC, to finalize sxi approve construction dz-awirgs,ar.i
to e::tablishtarCet dates for coqoletior?. The mjor project involved
I.lasthe e~t,ensi~nof the existing runvay, Wid!?~.!~ Of &Xi-w:*:TsQrd
t~r~ ~rcnmd areas, and addition of ramp parking space.
Tn spite of continuous action to effect the timely con:;et~:~? cf (Fe
a~rficlcl cOnmlex, some l.;Ork, i.e. rurmay li~htin~, runway rw?.rt-in~,1
x, J,ISyet to be accomplished at the beginning cf the !-!ARDT’AC?oper-
ational ~riod.
Continued attention to the M% construction requirements is essential
to the ti?ely co?wletion of projects. It is exf.remel;$i~portant th=.t
as mny constructions projects as possible be completed cluri~gthe nff-
.yearbetween test operations.
~(33
MbulJhl)
KZ7Tnmnn(ier,JTF-SWEF advised of a planned con-
struction conference to be held in the EPG during the Spring of 1958.
Accordingly, considerable thou~ht was given to additional construction‘*
kreq “ ements, over and above those listed in letter? Headquarters? Msk,,.,
Group 7.4, Subject:Task Group 7.4 Development Plan (Rev3sed), 15
August 1956. In addition, the Test Base Unit (4953st Sunnort Squadron
(Test) was advised to be~in considering its requirements for additional
construction in the El%.
In March and April 1958 several conferences were held in the EFG,
attendei by representatives of ]Teadquarters,Task Croup 7.4, Test
Base Unit, Test Aircraft Unit and Test Services Unit. From these
meetings was formulated an overall construction plan which included all
construction items not scheduled for completion in FY58, plus a number
of new projects. All of these projects were re-considered as to
validity and were listed in the order of priority for completion.
(See figure 21). This listing was submitted to the Commnder, JTF-
:~lp,r!,by our letter, Subject: Task Group 7.4 Construction Plan for
the Period Ending 1 J1.ily1962, dated 12 .4pril1958.
!)uringthe JTP-S?WN Construction Conference, held in April 1958,
the construction programs of all Task Groups was nresented to and
,j~stifiedbefore representatives of JTF-SZ’.KT. Upon co~letion of this
conference, JTF-SEVEF consolidated all requirements, jn the agreed
order of priority for conyletion, and forwarded them to the Chairman,
US.4TC,by letter, file Comi~600.1, dated 2S June 1958.
207
fl46:8’
1.
\2.
\3...
4.
5.
6.
7.
p.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
1/+.
15.
16.
17.
lE.
519.;
’20.
z].
??!./.
— TITLE
Expand K)L Farm.
Yew Hanrar, With No (2) Lean-To Additions.
Rehabilitate Old FOL Farm and Replace Office Buildings.
Maintenance Run-Up Pads and Blast Fences.
Replace Control Tower.
Replnce !iawinsondeWeather Facility.
Additional Communications and Electronic Shcp Space.
Replace AACS Supply and Maintenance Building.
Repl~ce quarters for Comrnnder, Task
Rehabilitate Field Ykintenance Shop,
Construct Aircraft T~re ‘hrehouse.
Construct Airlift Support Building.
Group 7.1+.
Building #82.
Replace Building #632 with a ~.~dron F1.i~htLine ~X~in- ,tena~ce Building.
Construct a Seaplane Reaching Ramp.
Replace Building #6?l, Carpenter Shop.
Replace Building #90C,Gen~r~torShed.
Repl~ce Building 91A, @ld Crash Fire Station.
Construct Ten (10) 128-F’angarracks.
Construct Unit Supply BuildinE.
Construct Headquarters Building for TW, TAU and TSU.
Pave Area Around Building #679.
Install Additional Ramp Power.
AiwlJHo
... ,
23. Extension to Building x, Ifor Base Yeqther.
21,. Replace Ruilfiinrs//640,633, 606, 607, 6M, 6°9 lnd 611.\?\ Construct a MATS Passenger Termi~al.
.
26. Pave IIATSCargo Area.
27. Construct Fire Watch Tower on !hildjn~ //6T5.
28. Pn.veRunways on JANET and YVC!T~.
29, Construct a Crash Boat Pier.
30. Ccnstruct Pier for l%L Sea Tires.
.
SW 83RD 28532//5-
--w
. . . . .
“.