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ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCYSTRENGTHENING INITIATIVEASSESSMENT OF THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF BRIBERY OR CORRUPTION, SRI LANKA, 2016.

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Transparency International Sri Lanka (TISL) is an independent, non-governmental, non-profit and non-partisan organization with a vision of Sri Lanka in which government, politics, business, civil society and the everyday lives of citizens are free from corruption. As the fully accredited national chapter in Sri Lanka of the Berlin-based Transparency International (TI), TISL partners and cooperates with TI and its chapters world-wide.

Published in October 2017

www.tisrilanka.org

Author: Jani de Silva, MA, Phd (Lond)

Every effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report. All information was believed to be correct as of December 2016. Nevertheless, TISL cannot accept responsibility for the consequences of its use for other purposes or in other contexts. TISL would like to thank the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC), Colombo, for their cooperation in conducting this assessment. This publication reflects the views of the author only, and CIABOC, Colombo cannot be held responsible for the views expressed, or for any use which may be made of the information contained herein.

ISBN: 978-955-1281-81-6

Transparency International Sri Lanka. All rights reserved.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 01ABBREVIATIONS 02PREFACE 03 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 04INTRODUCTION 11 ABOUT THE ASSESSMENT 11

1. SRI LANKA’S POLICY CONTEXT AND PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION 13 ECONOMY 13 POLITICS 14 SOCIETY 17 LEVELS OF CORRUPTION 18

2. INSITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND PROFILE OF CIABOC 20 FINANCIAL RESOURCES 21 HUMAN RESOURCES 22 STRUCTURE 23 PREVENTION, EDUCATION AND OUTREACH 24

3. KEY FINDINGS 25 LEGAL INDEPENDENCE AND STATUS 26 FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES 28 DETECTION AND INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTIONS 30 PREVENTION, EDUCATION AND OUTREACH FUNCTIONS 32 COOPERATION WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 33 ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT 34 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF CIABOC’S EFFECTIVENESS 35

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 58 RECOMMENDATIONS 59

ANNEX 1: BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT 61 ANNEX 2: INTERVIEWEES 62ANNEX 3: STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTED 63ANNEX 4: REFERENCES 64

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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ABBRIEVIATIONSACA Anti-Corruption AgencyAG Attorney GeneralBASL Bar Association of Sri LankaCC Constitutional CouncilCIABOC Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption CPI Corruption Perceptions IndexCSO Civil Society OrganizationDG Director GeneralFCID Financial Crimes Investigations DepartmentGCB Global Corruption BarometerGDP Gross Domestic ProductJVP JanathaVimukthi PeramunaMP Member of ParliamentNGO Non-Governmental OrganizationPA People’s AlliancePRECIFAC Presidential Commission to Investigate & Inquire into Serious Acts Of Fraud, Corruption & Abuse of Power, State Resources & PrivilegesSLFP Sri Lanka Freedom PartyTISL Transparency International Sri LankaTU Trade UnionUNCAC United Nation’s Convention Against CorruptionUNODC UN Office on Drugs and CrimeUNP United National PartyUPFA United People’s Freedom Alliance

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PREFACEA key aspect of the mission of Transparency International Sri Lanka (TISL) is to catalyse an effective and sustained movement against corruption in Sri Lanka. As part of this, TISL has been conducting research and undertaking advocacy initiatives on select sectors and institutions with the objective of improving governance and anti-corruption capacity. The reestablishment of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery and Corruption (CIABOC) as an independent Commission, following the enactment of the 19th Amendment to the Constitution, has created an environment more conducive to CIABOC - Civil Society collaboration. It is in this environment that TISL has been able to conduct this unprecedented assessment of CIABOC.

Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) such as CIABOC are specialized institutions within their respective national integrity systems, given their mandate to control and prevent corruption. It is imperative that ACAs operate independently, transparently, accessibly, accountably and effectively. In doing so they should enjoy public trust. They must have the legal mandate and institutional strength to operate with a reputation of efficiency, impartiality, objectivity and professionalism.

Transparency International undertook an initiative to engage with anti-corruption agencies in a process of conducting evidence-based research to examine their performance and identify challenges in selected jurisdictions. A robust assessment tool was developed over a period of two years in consultation with numerous experts and practitioners around the world. The tool took into consideration such dimensions of assessment as the legal independence of the ACA concerned, its financial and human resources, investigative capacity, prevention, education and outreach functions, cooperation with related organizations, its accountability and oversight functions and finally, the level of public trust it enjoys.

Using this tool, TISL carried out an assessment of CIABOC, through a process of engagement with all stakeholders concerned. This was a comprehensive study of its performance, using as many as 50 indicators with the above-mentioned dimensions. The assessment was aimed at providing an objective analysis of CIABOC’s potential and performance as well as opportunities for improvement. Under each dimension, it also provides a set of recommendations consistent with the analysis. We believe that the study will be helpful in strengthening CIABOC’s effectiveness. We also trust the study will be useful for other stakeholders interested in understanding the strengths and weaknesses, as well as the challenges and opportunities faced by Sri Lanka’s apex anti-corruption body.

In conclusion we would like to recognise the tireless efforts of independent researcher Dr. Jani de Silva in conducting the study. We would also like to express our gratitude for the technical assistance provided by TI’s Asia Pacific Department and the invaluable peer review provided by TI-Bangladesh. Finally, we are grateful to those who held the office of Director General CIABOC during the assessment period and the staff of CIABOC, as well as a large number of key informants whose insights contributed substantially to the study.

S.C. Asoka ObeyesekereExecutive DirectorTransparency International Sri Lanka

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) suggests that the best way for nations to combat corruption is by enacting legislation for the creation of an independent body dedicated to such a task. Such bodies could enforce and promote anti-corruption policies and principles. A well-functioning oversight mechanism with a focus on anti-corruption is seen as absolutely critical for good governance in any national context. In 2012, Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) heads, practitioners and experts from around the world, came together in Jakarta to develop a persuasive set of rules and standards for ACAs. These subsequently became known as the Jakarta Principles.

Informed by these principles, Transparency International (TI) has developed an initiative which aimed at strengthening ACAs in the Asia Pacific region. The ‘Anti-Corruption Strengthening Agency Initiative’ combines biennial assessments of ACAs with sustained engagement, dialogue and advocacy, at both national and regional levels. Under this initiative, TI has developed a practical and comprehensive benchmarking tool aimed at highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of ACAs. The assessment tool was developed between 2013 and 2015 though a collaborative and comprehensive dialogue between TI, interested staff from ACAs in the Asia Pacific region and a group of experts convened by Transparency International.

Employing this tool, Transparency International Sri Lanka (TISL) implemented an assessment of Sri Lanka’s Anti-Corruption Agency, the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC). The objectives of this assessment were:

1. To provide CIABOC with up-to-date information regarding its performance and opportunities for improvement; and

2. To provide all stakeholders committed to tackling corruption in the island with a better understanding of the enabling and disabling factors which affect the ACA’s effectiveness.

METHODOLOGYDuring the period under review,1 the membership of the Commission as well as the position of the Director-General underwent changes. In line with the 19th Amendment to the Constitution, a new Commission was appointed in October 2015. A new DG had already been appointed in February 2015. Upon her resignation, another DG was appointed in December 2016.

The methodology used in this assessment incorporated all these shifts and comprised of the following steps:

1. A literature survey–this involved a review of legislation, White Papers, studies on relevant issues, journal articles, tabloid and electronic media, including websites and collecting statistical data from state departments and non-state groups.

2. Key informant interviews – these involved discussions with Heads of government departments, Members of Parliament, political party leaders, CSO leaders, journalists and academics active in the anti-corruption field

3. Interviews with the key stakeholder – this involved two extended interviews with the former Director General (DG) of CIABOC (Feb 2015 – October 2016), and two senior members of staff.

4. Discussion and justification of assessment scores with the key stakeholder – this took place at a meeting with former DG on 10.11.2016 and with the new DG (appointed 01/12/2016) on 15.12.2016.

5. External peer-group review (TI Secretariat/TIB).

1. November 2013 – November 2016

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The reference period for the assessment on the Anti-Corruption Agency was three years (November 2013-November 2016). Data collection took place between 1st September and 30th November 2016.

Table 1: Dimensions of Assessment

DIMENSIONS OF ASSESSMENT NUMBER OF INDICATORS

1. ACA’s Legal independence and Status 72. ACA’s Financial and Human Resources 93. ACA’s Detection and Investigation Function 94.ACA’s Prevention, Education & Outreach Functions 95. ACA’s Cooperation with other Organizations 56. ACA’s Accountability and Oversight 47.Public Perceptions of the ACA’s Performance 7

Total 50

METHOD OF SCORINGThe main findings of the assessment were based on a set of 50 indicators, divided into seven categories (see table 1 above). These indicators are fashioned to capture the capacity and effectiveness of the Anti-Corruption Agency, and to identify gaps and areas of opportunity. Each indicator has been assigned one of three possible scores – high (3), moderate (2) and low (1), based on the level of standards set for each of the indicators. In order to arrive at the aggregate score for each dimension, the scores were converted from the 1 - 3 scale to a 0 – 2 scale. Thus all (1) scores become (0), all (2) scores become (1) and all (3) scores become (2). For a clear understanding of the categories as well as the overall score, it has been classified into three groups – ‘high’ for an overall score between 67% - 100%, ‘moderate’ for an overall score between 34% - 66%, and ‘low’ for an overall score between 0 – 33%.

KEY FINDINGSAccording to this assessment, the overall score for Sri Lanka’s ACA or CIABOC is 56.67%, which falls into the ‘moderate’ category. It is just 9 points below the borderline of the ‘high’ score. It suggests that CIABOC only needs to improve its performance on a few indicators to reach a high score. While 19 indicators out of 50 scored ‘high’, 22 fell into the ‘moderate’ category and only 9 scored low. Thus 38% of all indicators are high-performing.

It can be seen that the strongest showing was made by the dimension assessing CIABOC’s Legal Independence and Status (92.8%). Six indicators scored high and one moderate. This indicates that its ability to emerge as an independent and autonomous body is high. The score is marred only by the fact that the procedure followed in appointing Commissioners is not mandated, but depends on any steps the Constitutional Council (CC) may choose to take. The dimension to score the lowest involved CIABOC’s Accountability & Oversight functions (25%). This suggests that while CIABOC in fact enjoys a substantial extent of legal independence, its accountability mechanisms are weak. As a public body funded by the taxpayer, CIABOC needs to exhibit a greater degree of transparency in its internal workings.

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93%

72.22%

50.00%

66.66%

40.00%

25.00%

50.00%

56.67%

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

100%

ACA's Legal Independence &Status

ACA's Financial and HumanResources

ACA's Detection &Investigation Functions

ACA's Prevention, Education& Outreach Functions

ACA's Cooperation withOther Organizations

ACA's Accountability &Oversight Functions

Public Perceptions of theACA's Performance

Overall Score

Figure 1: CIABOC’s Score by Dimension

The next highest dimension deals with CIABOC’s Financial & Human Resources (72.22%) in which five indicators scored high, three moderate and one low. Here the most under-performing indicator did so because of larger macroeconomic and structural factors, such as the proportion of CIABOC’s budget to the national budget. The indicators on the security and stability of CIABOC’s budget and the salary and benefits enjoyed by its personnel also scored moderate. Still, both these indicators are also not directly under CIABOC’s control at the moment. The indicator addressing the level of expertise among investigators scored moderate as well, and this needs to be addressed.

CIABOC’s Prevention, Education and Outreach functions performed better than the overall score (66.66%). Two other dimensions, i.e. its Detection and Investigative functions (50%) and Public Perceptions of CIABOC’s performance (50%) performed more or less comparably to the overall score. Two dimensions scored much less than the overall score, i.e. its Cooperation with Other Organizations (40%) and its Accountability and Oversight function. Since these functions are so critical to CIABOC’s overall performance, this emerges an area of some concern.

In sum then, CIABOC‘s strengths included its legal independence and status, in terms of adequate mandate and legal powers, and the fact that – at this point - the government refrains from interfering in its routine work. In the new political climate which prevails, its investigators have been steadily building up their detection skills. Innovative prevention and outreach programmes are in place. Responsiveness to corruption complaints have improved significantly over the past two years. Most significantly, CIABOC shows a readiness to investigate influential persons without fear or favour. They have also succeeded in persuading women to come forward and complain about offenses committed against them.

The summary of dimension-wise findings is given below.

CIABOC’S LEGAL INDEPENDENCE & STATUSIn this dimension, six out of seven indicators have scored high. The only area of ambiguity is the procedure for appointing Commissioners, who are appointed by the President on the advice of the Constitutional Council (CC). In practice, the CC called for nominations from the public for the post of Commissioners, and subjected nominees to an interview.

But this process is not mandated. Thus the transparency and fairness of the selection process depends on the efforts of the members who comprise the CC at any given point. This is a area of potential weakness. CIABOC’s legal powers which are wide, rests on three legislative acts: (a) the Bribery (Amendment) Act No.19 of 1994 which enables the setting up of CIABOC as an independent commission to deal with bribery in the public sector (b) The Bribery (Amendment) Act No.20 of 1994 which introduces a new offense of

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‘corruption’ and (c) the Assets and Liabilities Law No.1 of 1975. Its mandate is comprehensive and its legal powers are wide-ranging. However, the extent of CIABOC’s operational autonomy is questioned by those civil society groups and trade unions active in the anti-corruption field. The issue of whether the regime is using CIABOC as a weapon against its opponents also remains a charged one, with political figures outside the present coalition-in-power claiming that this is so. But their arguments are diverse and at times contradictory, and in the end, work towards substantiating CIABOC’s categorical claim that they have faced no political interference in their work.

CIABOC’s FINANCIAL & HUMAN RESOURCESThis dimension has also performed well (72.22%). The only indicator scoring low refers to the average proportion of CIABOC’s budget to the total budget, which while it indicates the priorities of the present government, is outside CIABOC’s control. The security and stability of CIABOC’s budget is also under dispute. Still, CIABOC feels its budgetary allocation is entirely sufficient for its needs.2 Another area of moderate performance involves the salary and benefits of CIABOC personnel, which, though accepted as adequate by serving personnel, at the same time prevents CIABOC from attracting the kind of talent which can make a difference in terms of raising conviction rates. Other public bodies and CSOs engaged in the anti-corruption front remain dissatisfied with the levels of expertise of investigation personnel. Though staff selection criteria scored high, the large number of vacancies for investigators at CIABOC testifies to the inadequacy of this method of selection for the quality of staff needed by the Commission. But the focus on training investigators has intensified over the past two years. Prevention and outreach activities have also picked up remarkably.

CIABOC’s DETECTION & INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTIONSThis dimension recorded three areas of low performance. The most significant of these referred to average rates of convictions. While CIABOC feels its legal officers are competent in drafting charges, it admits that they lack the advocacy skills to conduct their prosecutions in court effectively. Thus out of 413 charges brought to court, only 54 convictions were secured.3 CIABOC’s indicator on asset recovery is affected by the low rate of convictions. Another important indicator which scored low involved the failure to separate out the gender profile of complainants. The final indicator to score low involved the willingness to initiate inquiries on its own. This power of initiation, however, was only granted to CIABOC by the 19th Amendment in May 2015.

While CIABOC’s accessibility to complainants and informants, including whistleblowers over the past three years has been creditable, their responsiveness to the complaints received is seen as problematic. Anonymous complaints remain a persistent factor. But up to a third of all complaints have been submitted by groups such as political parties, trade unions and concerned CSOs engaged in anti-corruption activity who represent large constituencies and tend to compile complaints in large numbers.4 Many of them reiterate that their complaints have not been addressed.

Further, unlike before, the present Commission has proceeded to interrogate many influential political figures - including a serving cabinet minister, defence secretary, three former heads of the Sri Lanka Navy – and they should be given credit for this. Against this, critics point out that no convictions have been secured to date.5

CIABOC’S PREVENTION, EDUCATION & OUTREACH FUNCTIONS This dimension scored somewhat above the overall score (66.66%). An important indicator to score low involved research and exploration of corruption risks, contexts and conditions. This indicator is significant. Research into the context of corruption will equip CIABOC staff to target its prevention activities with more precision.

Another indicator which remained moderate involved the proportion of the budget allocated to prevention and outreach activities over the past three years, which did not reach the prescribed target of 1% of the total budget. Still, CIABOC has succeeded in initiating many activities with these funds. A final area of weakness involves the information on its website and the quality of the Annual Report, which does not measure up to standard report-writing criteria.

2. Interview with CIABOC’s ex-DG on 10.11.2016.3. However, CIABOC works with a group of 10 legal consultants who are members of the AG’s dept, and who are seen as very able (interview with ex-DG, CIABOC on 2.11.2016). 4. The JVP’s Dushanna Virodhi Handa says they have submitted around 150 complaints, the Dushana Virodhi Sanvidanaya which is a coalition of many groups, more than 500. The UNP MP Ranjan Ramanayaka also states that he has handed in over 150 complaints. Finally, the Dushana Virodhi Peramuna says they have given in 225 complaints (Ada of 24/10/2016)5. CIABOC maintains that the complexity to such cases demands extensive investigations and extended court hearings, which is why convictions have not been made.

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CIABOC’S COOPERATION WTH OTHER ORGANIZATIONSThis is somewhat troubling terrain. While at one level CIABOC would appear to receive the support of the AG’s department in handling prosecutions – even to the extent of hiring staff from the Department on a consultancy basis – in the end, rates of conviction remain low.

The level of cooperation between CIABOC and the other two other integrity agencies, the Financial Crimes Investigations Department (FCID) and the Presidential Commission to Investigate & Inquire intoSerious Acts Of Fraud, Corruption & Abuse of Power, State Resources & Privileges (PRECIFAC) is low. While they communicate in order to avoid duplicating work, there does not seem to be a coordinated strategy for approaching complex cases or complaints against influential figures. Cooperation between CIABOC and NGOs, including CSOs is somewhat problematic. Some trade unions and CSOS, especially those linked to leftwing political parties complain that CIABOC’s attitude towards the public is adversarial rather than supportive. A few CSOs however, say they were treated with civility, but agree that their complaints have not met with the response they anticipated after the electoral change of Jan 2015.

CIABOC’S ACCOUNTABILTY & OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONSHere the record is dismal. According to its enabling legislation (1994) CIABOC is required to produce an Annual Report detailing its activities, which is to be sent to the President. He then makes it available to Parliament. In practice, CIABOC’s Annual Report was uploaded onto its website for the first time in 2015. While the website is freely accessible, the information provided is somewhat limited. While CIABOC is answerable to the CC, in practice there is no external oversight mechanism in place. Internal procedures seem equally weak. This is a serious structural weakness in an integrity agency.

The procedure for dealing with complaints against CIABOC personnel is also inadequate. Internal mechanisms for investigating complaints against its own personnel seem very weak. Since CIABOC’s investigators are drawn from the police department, they fall under the disciplinary code of the Police Ordinance. They can only be disciplined by the HR Dept of the Police. But there does not seem to be a clear procedure for investigation even by the Police Dept, which often simply transfers officers out rather than take appropriate legal measures against them. Thus the outcome of complaints against CIABOC or its personnel in the past three years is that no punitive action is actually taken. In one instance there has been mention of a ‘probe’, the outcome of which remains shrouded in secrecy. This remains a major area of weakness.

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF CIABOC’S PERFORMANCEAccording to Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer (2016) 43.9% of respondents felt that CIABOC was performing its role well or very well. Against this 26.1% were dissatisfied with its performance. Public confidence in CIABOC’s adherence to due process, impartiality and fairness in using its powers was also mixed. On the one hand, some influential figures who are outraged at being interrogated tend to publicly express consternation at their treatment. On the other, lower-status persons as well as members of critical CSOs feel that CIABOC is attempting to intimidate them. They point out that their complaints – though carefully crafted – have met with no response from the Commission. A significant proportion of those who have had direct contact with CIABOC interviewed by the research team are members of CSOs and political activists who represent organizations. They belong to the category of persons who have filed complaints on massive fraud of gigantic dimensions which the CIABOC, understandably enough in the present political climate, has been somewhat hesitant in investigating. This in turn makes them critical of CIABOC.

The other category of persons who have had direct contact with CIABOC are ordinary citizens. They tend to be intimidated by the somewhat adversarial approach assumed by CIABOC’s Receiving Officers, who, they complain, interrogate them as if they were offenders themselves. While both categories of complainants agree that many anonymous complaints may be motivated by petty revenge, they point out that CIABOC’s receiving officers cannot always assume this, and need to treat every complainant with greater respect and assume a more professional stance.

Among those who had had direct contact with CIABOC accessed by the research team, once again the response was mixed. A UNP MP who is a deputy minister in the government expressed satisfaction with the performance of CIABOC. However, it is not possible to say that those members of CSOs, NGOs and political parties interviewed expressed similar satisfaction.

Finally, the research team was not able to access any female complainants. Still, among raids into complaints of bribery and corruption cited on CIABOC’s website between 2012-16, there are five instances of female plaintiffs who cite demands for sexual gratification in lieu of money, for political favours or administrative services. Of these, two such charges have resulted in convictions, with sentences including two years rigorous imprisonment suspended for ten years. This is an impressive achievement in a conservative Asian society.

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RECOMMENDATIONSLegal independence and status

1. The procedure assumed by the Constitutional Council for the appointment of Commissioners – i.e. calling for nominations from the public and subjecting nominees to an interview process – should be mandated in order to ensure greater transparency.

Human and financial resources

2. CIABOC should proceed to recruit a special unit of approx 8 to10 staff who are equipped to deal with white collar crime – inclusive of chartered accountants, criminal justice professionals and qualitative social science researchers – at suitable rates of remuneration. They should be provided with recurrent training which would help them stay abreast of best practices in investigation and research.6

3. To deal with complicated cases or cases relating to grand corruption –CIABOC should initially recruit a 3 to 4 member experienced legal team led by a leading national-level prosecutor from the AG’s Department to prosecute charges in court. It should also set in place a system of rewards if convictions are secured.

4. Establish a new high court complex, preferably sited in Colombo, which is dedicated to hearing bribery and corruption cases under a trial-at-bar.

Detection and Investigation Function

5. Create an official forum for the exchange of ideas with FCID and PRECIFAC, the Financial Intelligence Unit of the Central Bank, the Auditor General, Heads of the Customs/Excise departments, and if relevant, the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) in order to forge a coordinated and productive approach to complex and large-scale corruption and money laundering cases or suspects who may have influential support in government or through private investors/entrepreneurs, or underworld connections.

6. Should retain a separate register to identify the gender of complainants

Prevention, education and outreach functions

7. Should seek donor assistance to engage in qualitative research into corruption risks, contexts and conditions in Sri Lankan society.

Accountability and oversight functions

8. Produce a high quality Annual Report according to standard report-writing criteria

9. Provide Parliament with progress reports every two months.

10. A preliminary inquiry procedure should be devised by the Commissioners/DG to be deployed In the event of complaints against CIABOC staff. The procedure should ascertain the accuracy of the sequence of events cited in the complaint, and then expeditiously arrange a disciplinary hearing with the Police HR Department, at which either a Commissioner or DG also participates.

11. In the event of evidence of wrong-doing by CIABOC staff, disciplinary action must be taken and publicized on CIABOC’s website.

12. CIABOC’s confidentiality clause should be re-defined to cover only information pertaining to on-going investigations and court cases. There should be provision for senior CIABOC investigative staff to profitably share ideas on how to approach politically-sensitive or complicated cases strategically through a forum with the auditor general and other integrity bodies.

6. A cabinet draft has already been submitted for this cadre, but its composition should include higher quality staff.

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Table 2 - Assessment Summary: Indicators by dimension

DimensionACA’s legalindependence & status92.85%

ACA’sFinancial& HumanResources72.22%

ACA’sDetection & investigation function50%

Prevention, Education & OutreachFunctions66.66%

ACA’s cooperationwith otherorganizations40%

ACA’sAccountability & Oversight25%

Publicperceptions of the ACA’s performance50%

Legal indepen-dence

Average ratio of ACA’s budget to total national budget

Accessibility to corruption complainants /informants, including the public & whistleblowers

Average ratio of operating expenditure allocated to public out-reach and prevention

Govt support to ACA for prosecution of corruption cases

Information provided in and accessi-bility of ACA’s Annual Report & website

Public confidence that govt has given ACA required powers & resources to curb corruption

Mandate Sufficiency of budget

Responsive-ness to corruption complaints

Corruption prevention initiatives

Cooperation between ACA and other integrity agencies

Oversight mechanisms

Public trust in ACA’s adherence to due process & impartiality

Legal powers Security & stability of budget

Willingness to initiate corruption investigations.

No of reviews of organizational procedures, systems & capabilities

Cooperation between ACA and NGOs

Procedure for dealing with complaints against ACA personnel

Trust in ACA’s dignified and respectful treatment of persons under investigation

Appointment of Commission-ers

ACA personnel’s salary & benefits

Average no of cases investigated per year

Frequency of including corruption prevention recommenda-tions in investigation reports

Participation in international Networks

Outcome of complaints against ACA or its personnel

Public perception of ACA’s effectiveness in corruption control

Term of office & removal of Commission-ers

Selection criteria for ACC personnel

Efficiency & professionalism of corruption investigations

Plan for prevention, education & outreach & implementation

Cooperation with ACA’s in other countries

Views of ACA’s effectiveness in corruption- control among persons with contact with it

Operational Autonomy & impartiality

Expertise of personnel in corruption investigation

Average conviction rate of corruption cases

Collaboration with other stakeholders in prevention, education & outreach

Views on ACA’s effectiveness in dealing with complaints in women who had contact with it.

Govt’s reliance on ACA as a weapon against politi-cal opponents

Expertise of ACA’s staff in prevention & education

Willingness to investigate influential persons for corruption

Research and exploration of corruption risks, context & conditions

Training of personnel

Role in restitution, asset recovery, freezing and confiscation

Diffusion of cor-ruption preven-tion information/ campaigns

Stability of personnel

Identifying gender in compiling complaints

Use of social media & website for diffusion of information on corruption prevention

High Moderate Low

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The UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) proposes that national legal systems should take steps to create independent bodies to enforce, implement and promote anti-corruption policies. This proposal is based on the conviction that a well-functioning oversight mechanism with a focus on anti-corruption is absolutely vital for good governance in any national context. Subsequently, in 2012, the Jakarta Principles - which were developed in consultation with a selected number of Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) heads, practitioners and experts from around the world - emerged as a widely-endorsed standard of accountability for an effective anti-corruption agency.7

In practice, assessment against these standards is somewhat sporadic. This is partly due to a lack of political will by governments to scrutinize their own oversight mechanisms. Another reason is the lack of an appropriate and viable tool with which to measure performance. Transparency International (TI) has responded to this opportunity by developing an initiative aimed at strengthening ACAs in the Asia and Pacific region. The proposed ‘Anti-Corruption Agencies Strengthening Initiative’ combines biennial assessments of ACAs with sustained engagement, dialogue and advocacy at both national and regional levels.

Under this initiative, TI has developed a practical and comprehensive benchmarking tool aimed at highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of ACAs. The assessment tool was developed between 2013 and 2015 through a collaborative dialogue between Transparency International, interested staff from ACAs in the Asia Pacific region and a group of experts convened by Transparency International.

Transparency International Sri Lanka (TISL) carried out an assessment of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) of Sri Lanka. The assessment was aimed at providing CIABOC with up-to-date information regarding its current performances and opportunities for improvement in the future. It is also intended to provide a better understanding of the enabling and disabling factors which affect the ACA’s efficacy to all stakeholders committed to tackling corruption in the country.

Consequently, this report comprises the findings of this independent assessment of CIABOC conducted by TISL. In addition to a comprehensive evaluation of CIABOC’s performance in relation to a set of relevant indicators, the report provides some suggested approaches to address the key challenges. This report therefore serves as a guide for both CIABOC as well other interested stakeholders to strengthen and expand the impact of anti-corruption efforts in Sri Lanka.

ABOUT THE ASSESSMENTTISL carried out an assessment of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) between 15 August 2016 and 30 November 2016. The research was led by an independent consultant, Ms. Jani de Silva, Phd (LSE), TISL’s research team and TI Secretariat’s Asia Pacific team.

During the period under review however, CAIBOC’s leadership underwent many shifts. In line with the requirements of the 19th Amendment (May 2015), a new Commission was appointed. A new Director General had already been appointed in February 2015. Upon her resignation in Nov 2016, another appointment to the post was made in December 2016.

The assessment process attempted to incorporate all these developments, and involved five key elements.This included White Papers, analyses of the legislation, legal reviews and discussions in the tabloid and electronic media, including newspapers, journals, official and unofficial statistics, websites etc.

INTRODUCTION

7. The principles can be found in UN office on Drug and Crime, Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies, 26-27 November 2012, available at https://www.uodc.org/documents/corruption/WG-Prevention/Art_6_Preventive_anti-corruption_bodies/JAKAR-TA_STATEMENT_en.pdf.

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Secondly, between 01.09.2016 - 30.11.2016, the research team conducted extensive interviews with key informants, ranging from government departments such as the Attorney General’s Department, the Auditor General, MPs, Members of Parliamentary Committees, the Bar Association of Sri Lanka, academics and anti-corruption groups in civil society (see list of interviewees in Annex 2).

Interviews with the stakeholders were delayed due to overseas travel by the Commissioners and DG. The DG resigned unexpectedly at this point. However, since she had been in place through much of the research period (Feb 2015-Oct 2016), the research team met with her and two members of staff on two subsequent occasions on 2.11.2016 and 10.11.2016. At the second meeting the key findings and assessment scores were presented and discussed.

On the completion of this meeting, an internal peer review was conducted by TISL. Subsequently, a draft report of the key findings and adjusted scores was sent to the new DG, (appointed on 01.12.2016), and the Commissioners on 06.12.2016. The findings and scores were discussed in detail with the new DG on 15.12.2016.

Finally, an external peer review by the Transparency International Secretariat/Transparency International Bangladesh completed the assessment.

The assessment tool is designed to capture internal and external factors impacting on the ACA as well as getting a sense of its reputation and actual performance. Consequently, a comprehensive indicator framework made up of 50 different Indicators has been developed in consultation with experts (see Annex 1). These indicators are developed with the intention of providing a platform to assess the capacity and effectiveness of CIABOC and to identify gaps and areas of opportunity.

The indicators inquire into seven different dimensions (see table 1 below). Each indicator has three possible scores - high, moderate and low – and three defined levels of value for each indicator, depending on the condition assessed. To score each indicator, the research team identified the specific details where necessary, from CIABOC themselves, their website, reports by NGOs and international organizations. Each score was further substantiated by in-depth interviews with other stakeholders in the anti-corruption struggle, concerned government agencies, government departments and civil society organizations.

This report is divided into four sections. Section 1 describes Sri Lanka’s basic economic, political, and social characteristics and the perceived level of corruption. Section 2 explores the legal and constitutional backdrop within which the Bribery Commission operates.

Section 3 presents the key findings and a detailed assessment of each indicator, with comments on key issues and specific gaps have also been identified. Section 4 presents a brief set of conclusions and Transparency International’s recommendations for strengthening CIABOC.

Table 2: Dimensions of Assessment

DIMENSIONS OF ASSESSMENT NUMBER OF INDICATORS

1. ACA’s Legal independence and Status 72. ACA’s Financial and Human Resources 93. ACA’s Detection and Investigation Function 94.ACA’s Prevention, Education & Outreach Functions 95. ACA’s Cooperation with other Organizations 56. ACA’s Accountability and Oversight 47.Public Perceptions of the ACA’s Performance 7

Total 50

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ECONOMYInto the second decade of the new millennium, Sri Lanka remains a lower middle-income state. The island struggles to overcome economic issues faced by many small, multi-ethnic states. The island is situated at a strategic point on the main East-West Indian Ocean shipping routes. In the early-19th century, the British saw this location as an ideal site from which to position themselves in their attempts to wrest military control of the Indian subcontinent. But the age of globalization brings new options. The present government aims to exploit its location to develop the island into a financial and trading hub in South Asia.8

Such optimism about the possibilities of the Sri Lankan economy could only blossom after the ending of the debilitating 26-year-old civil war. In 2009, the United Peoples’ Freedom Alliance (UPFA) scored a resounding military victory over separatist Tamil rebels. The victors seized the moment to call presidential elections, which they won by a decisive margin. But celebrations were short-lived. International condemnation of the human rights abuses said to have occurred during the final, bloodiest stages of the war grew more unremitting over the months. In the triumphalism of victory though, the UFPA would brook no criticism. Consequently, in 2010, the European Union withdrew Sri Lanka’s GSP+ status.9 This was a serious blow to the economy.

At this point the economy - already reeling from the global escalation of oil prices in 2004 to 2007 – faced unprecedented pressure on its balance of payments. Over the next few years, the extreme volatility in global financial markets impacted on Sri Lanka’s exchange rates and interest rates. The economy also faced the adverse effects of climate change in the form of extremities of weather; droughts followed by floods.

Despite such ill omens, the UPFA coalition attempted to address the devastation caused by decades of war by embarking on a massive infrastructure-building strategy. This initiative was financed by commercial as well as concessional foreign funds. The sudden influx of millions of dollars into a dormant economy led to an unrestrained spending spree by UPFA political figures at the national, provincial and local levels. Tender procedures were often by-passed, regulations waived and accounting conventions flouted. But the economy grew at an astonishing average of 7.27% between 2011-14.10

Further, these developments were accompanied by a de facto concentration of powers in the hands of the Presidential family. The President’s brother was Defense Secretary. He wielded power over Sri Lanka’s numerically formidable armed forces, vast swathes of land still under occupation in the Tamil-speaking areas and prime real estate in the capital owned by the army. Another brother was Speaker of Parliament. A third held the powerful Economic Development portfolio which spearheaded the infrastructure building programme. His son, nephews and cousins occupying key political and diplomatic posts led to charges of nepotism and cronyism. This created an environment of mounting claims of corruption against the UFPA at all levels and much public outrage.

In January 2015 a new coalition swept into power, comprised of reformist factions within the UPFA itself and the opposition United National Party (UNP). The UNP-UPFA coalition campaigned on a specifically anti-corruption and ‘good governance’ (yahapalanaya) platform. In the months which followed, law enforcement and anti-corruption agencies began investigating officials and politicians connected to the previous government on charges of corruption. In January 2017, the coalition succeeded in its efforts to recover GSP+ privileges for Sri Lanka’s exports.

1. SRI LANKA’S POLICY CONTEXT AND PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION

8. Bureau of Economic & Business Affairs, USA. 2016 Investment Climate Statements Report 5 July 2016(www.state.gov/e/eb/ris/other/ics/2016/sea/254491.htm (accessed on 19.11.2016). 9. Generalized Scheme of Preferences. These were specially significant for the burgeoning ready-made apparel sector.10. Central Bank of Ceylon, Review of the Economy (2014)

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The economic outlook, however, is not too promising. Migrant remittances grew from US $ 4,116 million in 2010 to US $ 6,980 million in 2015 but the trend is already weakening.11 Exports have declined. The rupee depreciated approx 9% in March 2015.12 Growth has dropped to 4.8%.13 The budget deficit also rose from 5.4% of GDP in 2013 to 7.4% in 2016.14 And in March 2016, rating agencies revised Sri Lanka’s credit rating outlook from ‘stable’ to ‘negative.’15 The UNP-UPFA coalition’s efforts to boost the economy are constrained by this large fiscal deficit which is the product of structural factors such as the slowing global economy as well as reckless spending by previous regimes.16

Still, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew marginally to reach US $ 82 billion.17 Per capita income went up to US $3,925 in 2015, which is still one of the highest in South Asia.18 In the first quarter of 2016 the economy expanded by 5.5% and in the second by 2.6%, compared to the previous year. It is projected to grow approx. 5.3% in 2016.19

While the economy stumbles, the pressure for the UFPA-UNP coalition to take steps to recover the billions of dollars said to have been siphoned off by the ex-President, his family and immediate associates is growing. This poses an even greater burden on integrity agencies such as CIABOC.

POLITICS

Sri Lanka received universal franchise in 1933. When independence arrived in 1948, a parliamentary system was already in place. The island also had a booming plantation economy yielding substantial export surpluses.20 In the early-1950s, a key faction broke away from the pro-capital United National Party (UNP) in power. The new group became the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Over the next decade, a two-party electoral system complete with the requisite capital/welfarist ideological repertoire had evolved.21

This promising start, however was soon shattered by political violence. By the 1970s, Sinhala-speaking Maoist insurgents had launched their first armed uprising and subsequently Tamil separatist rebels unleashed up to four ‘Eelam’ wars.22 These developments have impacted negatively on civic rights over the decades, vitiated democratic institutions and created loopholes for massive corruption to rear its head.

Over the first few decades, successive governments exploited export surpluses to set in place a substantial welfare network, including free universal education, healthcare and a subsidized public transport network. But with the secular decline in the terms of trade for primary products in the 1950s and 1960s, export surpluses began to diminish. A foreign exchange crisis ensued. This led to a decision to close the economy, in a desperate bid to conserve external assets. It marked the beginning of a regulated economy which prevailed over the next two decades. The state began moving into key industries and starting state ventures in strategic industries such as basic metal, cement, timber, ceramics and salt. But the excessive regulation of the economy led to abuses, nepotism and cronyism, all of which resulted in the gradual de-professionalization of the Public Service. It created a situation where in order for the ordinary citizen to obtain any kind of service from the state, officials had to be bribed.

By the early-1970s, the stagnation of the economy, rise in landlessness among the agrarian poor and high levels of unemployment – especially educated unemployment – paved the way for the first armed uprising of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).23 The April Uprising was soon crushed. However, the

11. Department of Census & Statistics, Colombo (2016).12. Ibid.13. Ibid. 14. Ibid.15. US Bureau of Economic & Business Affairs, Investment Climate Statements 2016: Sri Lanka.16. According to the US Bureau of Economic & Business Affairs’ 2016 Investment Climate Statements report on Sri Lanka, the government carries a large foreign debt burden and a persistent current account deficit. This Foreign debt comprises of both commercial and concessional debt (including debt owed to China for massive investments on infrastructure). Also, the Sri Lanka governments’ tax revenue to GDP ratio is one of the lowest in the world.17. Department of Census & Statistics, Colombo (2016).18. Ibid.19. Ibid.20. Between 90-95% of Sri Lanka’s external assets were built on the export of three primary crops tea, rubber and coconut. Wriggins, Howard, (1960), Ceylon: the dilemmas of a new nation. Princeton University Press, Princeton21. The UNP has always tended to be pro-capital, while the SLFP nurtured social democratic/welfarist tendencies which unfolded in its electoral alliances with the parliamentary Left. Over the decades though, the UNP has learnt the electoral value of welfarism and the SLFP the need for investment capital for economic development. 22. ‘Eelam’ is a version of the Tamil name for Sri Lanka.23. The JVP was then a Maoist-led New Left grouping which broke away from the Old Left parties such as the Communist Party (CP) and the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaja Pakshaya (LSSSP) who were at that point part of the ruling United Left Front (ULF) coalition. The SLFP remained the leading bloc in the ULF. The JVP’s support base is Sinhala-speaking, and in the coming decades it evolved into an extremist Sinhala nationalist grouping.

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United Left Front (ULF) coalition-in-power, convinced that land hunger was the main motivation for this uprising, embarked on a massive land reform programme. This not only fragmented the holdings of all large landowners, but also impacted on the viability of the plantation agricultural sector. It paved the way for a shift of resources into industry.

In 1977, a swing of political power brought in the pro-capitalist United National Party (UNP). The UNP initiated a new Presidential Constitution, which concentrated powers in the Executive, in particular the office of the President. It allowed the President to appoint persons to key posts in the Public Service, which up to this point had been the prerogative of career public servants. This process began the gradual politicization of the already innervated public sector. It was accompanied with moves to liberate the economy, de-regulate import-export controls and attract Direct Foreign Investment (DFI). Such moves involved establishing Export-Processing Zones(EPZs),which became economic enclaves within which trade union activity was banned.

There were other attacks on civic rights. In 1978, the civic rights of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, leader of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) - the largest group in the ULF coalition - were removed under very dubious pretexts.24 This created a groundswell of dissent which began in the vibrant public sector trade unions and spread to the rest of the economy. By 1981, a call for a General Strike had emerged.

The strike was crushed by locking out 80,000 workers. This development set the stage for an increasingly repressive climate which rolled-back decades of civic rights. The conduct of the Referendum in 1982, which aimed to extend the term of the UNP without elections furthered this dismal trend. Finally in July 1983, the infamous anti-Tamil riot was orchestrated in which up to 1000 Tamil civilians died.

In the wake of the events of ‘Black July’, thousands of young Tamil-speaking men and boys joined a range of militant movements. This created the backdrop for the 1st Eelam War (1983-7). It ended with the signing of the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord in 1987. The Accord was signed due to unrelenting pressure from India.25 It included the Provincial Councils Act of 1987, which became the 13th Amendment to the constitution. The Act allowed for a measure of political devolution to the provinces. This was especially significant for the Tamil-speaking areas, which could then administer themselves Tamil rather than Sinhala as was the case elsewhere in the island. However, this move was seen by the Sinhala-speaking electorate as a concession to federalist demands by separatist militants. Dissent against the ILPA created the backdrop of the 2nd Uprising of the JVP (1987-90).

Table 3 - Policy context of Sri Lanka

DIMENSION DATA DATA SOURCESLand area 65,610 sq km Dept of Census & Statistics, Sri Lanka, 2016Population 20,843,463 Dept of Census & Statistics, Sri Lanka, 2016GDP per capita US $3,925 Dept of Census & Statistics, Sri Lanka, 2016Type of Government Presidential Democracy 2nd Republican Constitution (1978)Voice & Accountability Index (2014)

-0.72 (-2.5 to +2.5 )26 www.theglobaleconomy.com/sri_lanka/wb_voice_accountabilty/

Political Stability Index (2014)

-0.25(-2.5 to +2.5 )27 www.theglobaleconomy.com/sri_lanka/wb_political_stability/

Government effectiveness index (2014)

0.09(-2.5 to +2.5 ) www.theglobaleconomy.com/sri_lanka/wb_government_effectiveness/

Regulatory Quality Index (2014)

-0.08(-2.5 to +2.5 ) www.theglobaleconomy.com/sri_lanka/wb_political_stability/

Rule of Law Index (2014) 0.15(-2.5 to +2.5 ) www.theglobaleconomy.com/sri_lanka/wb_rule_of_law/

24. The actual reason given was her role in extending the rule of the SLFP 1975-77 under Emergency Regulations.25. At this point, India was affected since thousands of Tamil-speaking refugees, including militant activists, were moving into her southern state of Tamil Nadu, which was destabilizing this Tamil-speaking state.26. Voice & Accountability Index captures perceptions of the extent to which citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media. Sri Lanka was ranked 138 out of 192 countries.27. The index is a composite measure as it is based on several other indexes from multiple sources including the Economist Intelligence Unit, the World Economic Forum, and the Political Risk Services, among others. The underlying indexes reflect the likelihood of a disorderly transfer of government power, armed conflict, violent demonstrations, social unrest, international tensions, terrorism, as well as ethnic, religious or regional conflicts. The methodology of the overall index is kept consistent so the numbers are comparable over time. You may also want to have a look at the following indicators: Sri Lanka was ranked 122 out of 191 countries.

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The July Uprising unfolded with excessive violence. Insurgent activists embarked on an assassination campaign which targeted leading political figures in the UNP, and later the armed forces. The UNP responded with great ferociousness. Between July 1987-October 1990, up to 60,000 persons are thought to have been killed.28 The July Uprising was crushed by October 1990. But soon after, the LTTE launched its 2nd Eelam War(1990-95).29 This military initiative ended with the fall of Jaffna in 1995.30 By this time, the UNP had been electorally defeated and the SLFP, which was now the leading partner in the People’s Alliance (PA) was once again in power. The 3rd Eelam war started soon after, and continued until 2000.Throughout this period, leading political figures from both the UNP and the SLFP were subject to assassinations and assassination attempts by the LTTE, including an attempt on Chandrika Bandaranaike, President and leader of the PA, in December 1999. She survived.31

She also survived subsequent Presidential elections. In order to arrest the deterioration of the public sector, in October 2001, the PA brought in the 17th Amendment to the constitution. This amendment established the Constitutional Council (CC) and seven independent commissions. It aimed to reduce the politicization of the public sector and create a space for officials to display greater impartiality in serving the public.32

However, her government fell in 2001, creating a space for the leader of the UNP, Ranil Wickramasinghe, to come in as Prime Minister.33 The UNP negotiated a second Peace Fire Agreement in February 2002. They also presented their pro-capital ‘Regaining Sri Lanka’ initiative, which called for increased liberalizations to tap the opportunities offered by globalization. However, an electoral shift in 2005 brought in the UPFA once again. In response to consistent cease-fire violations by the LTTE - including targeted assassinations of key political/military figures and suicide bombs in heavily populated areas - the PA launched what unofficially became the 4th and final Eelam war in 2007. The war was won in 2009.

Still, after the initial euphoria, it became clear that the termination of the war did not spell the immediate return of civic freedoms. In 2010, the PA also brought in the 18th Amendment which removed the constitutional provision which disallowed the President from contesting elections for more than two terms. It also dissolved the CC and brought all independent commissions under the authority of the President. Even more menacing was the unprecedented step taken by the President to throw his key electoral rival, ex-army chief General Sarath Fonseka - who in fact spearheaded the victorious war – into jail on very flimsy charges.34 This move created a great wave of disaffection throughout the electorate. A new climate of intolerance emerged, in which public political dissent was depicted by the regime in the state-controlled media as akin to betrayal of the Sinhala nation. Private media networks critical of the government were bombed or vandalized by PA-linked goons, journalists and political opponents threatened or even assassinated.35

A year later the regime presented legislation to Parliament which sought to enlarge the powers of the already all-encompassing Ministry of Economic Development. The ministry was headed by the President’s brother. But the Supreme Court rebuffed them. Astonishingly, the regime proceeded to bring impeachment charges against the Chief Justice, and rush these through Parliament, over which the PA now held a two-thirds majority.36 Despite a tremendous public outcry, she was removed. All these developments fuelled renewed calls by international human rights and workers rights organizations to call for investigations into the conduct of the final phases of the 4th Eelam war and subsequent developments.

It was in this fraught climate that a decision to call Presidential elections was made, in order to buoy up the Presidents’ political position internally in the face of rising popular dissension. In view of the fate of his previous rival, he remained confident that his bid would go unchallenged. However, at this point, Maithripala Sirisena, a leading figure in his own cabinet broke away, and campaigned with the opposition UNP. He brought a significant segment of the SLFP vote base with him. After his electoral victory, Sirisena regained control of the SLFP.

28. Lankadeepa Editorial of 247.04.1994 and Mirror of 14.04.1996, among others. This figure is of course contested by the UNP but confirmed by Colombo-based Human rights groups including Amnesty International.29. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) the leading Tamil militant group which dominated the movement over the next two decades.30. Jaffna is the largest city in the Tamil-speaking areas and the heartland of Tamil nationalism.31. She suffered heavy head injuries and lost an eye.32. Sri Lanka Country Report (2003), National Integrity Systems, Transparency International, UK, p 833. Ms. Bandaranaike retained her position as President, as enabled by the 1978 constitution.34. This move echoed the decision of the UNP leader J R Jayawardene in 1978 to abolish his rival’s civic rights.35. During this period, the editor of the critical Sunday Leader was assassinated in broad daylight; a free-lance cartoonist picked up and subsequently killed. Tamil journalist Sivaram was also picked up in broad daylight and later killed. Poddala Jayantha, a veteran Sinhala trade unionist was picked up, beaten by assailants and had both his arms broken. Tamil MP and journalist Raviraj was killed by unknown assailants. The mainstream privately-owned Sirasa TV network was bombed, the Siyatha TV station also suffered a similar fate. Sundry student activists and trade union protesters were also killed during this period.36. This is due to a dubious provision in the 1978 Constitution which allows MPs elected by a given party to shift their affiliation once in Parliament. This has led to much corruption since MPs can be bought over.

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Consequently, for the first time in the history of Sri Lanka’s two-party system, a coalition of the two largest parties remains in place. This enabled the passing of the 19th Amendment, which brought back the CC with renewed powers. Thus while the economy continues to stumble in the context of structural drawbacks, the political outlook is still optimistic.

SOCIETYSri Lanka has a land area of 65,610 sq km. The mid-year population in 2015 was approx 20,966 million. Population density remains stable at 334 persons per sq km.37 A multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, the majority of the population are Sinhala (74.9%), of whom 70.1% are Buddhists.38 The largest minority are Tamils (15.3%) of whom 12.6% are Hindus.39 9.3% of the population are Sri Lankan Moors who are Muslims, and mostly speak Tamil.40 Many urban Muslims are bilingual in Sinhala and Tamil.

Sri Lanka’s socioeconomic indicators are progressive. Unlike elsewhere in South Asia, male and female literacy levels are mostly on par, with men having a very slight edge: 94.1% vs 92.1%.41 Average life expectancy was 74.9 in 2014.42 Infant and maternal mortality remains significantly lower than in the rest of South Asia. The poverty head count ratio based on PPP US $ 1.25 per day, fell from 28.8 in 1995/96 to 6.7 in 2012/13.43 Thus while economic inequalities persists, social trends are encouraging.

Sri Lanka presently tops the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) for South Asia, ranking 73rd out of 188 countries.44 The island’s HDI score rose from 0.679 in 2000 to 0.757 in 2015.45 The average score for South Asia remains 0.607.46

Women are active participants in the labour force. Large numbers of women continue to travel to West Asia and West European states such as Italy and Greece as unskilled labour. This remains a controversial topic in Sri Lanka, since it has enabled the rise of various kinds of manpower-recruitment agencies, many of which exploit rural and under-aged women by demanding heavy ‘fees’ in exchange for foreign employment. This situation creates a space for bribery and corruption since once they arrive, many women find that their passports are confiscated by their employers, who sometimes do not pay them for months on end. In the process, such women undergo gratuitous humiliation and suffering while engaging in domestic work in alien cultural milieus. The government is attempting to upgrade the skills of such migrant workers so as to enable them to obtain better levels of remuneration and work conditions.

Many other female workers are employed in the ready-made apparel-making factories in the Export-Processing zones. While in the early phases of the setting up of these zones, unionization was banned, over the years, the sector has become increasingly organized, and succeeded in winning many rights and benefits for their workers.

Form the 1930s onwards, the dominance of Left parties within the political culture has, in many ways, radicalized Sri Lankan society.47 In particular, the urban working class is militant and trade-union oriented, though the repressions of the 1980-90s has had its impact. New Left parties such as the JVP which enacted violent uprisings in the early-1970s and late-1980s, were completely decimated by the early-1990s.48 However, they have succeeded in regrouping in the late-1990s and entering into parliamentary politics, often elevating the level of debate. The New Left has picked up the ‘progressive’ mantle of the Old Left – now decrepit and discredited - and their contribution to the debate on the need to raise national integrity levels has been most welcome. It was the JVP which successfully brought in the 17th Amendment - espousing a CC and independent commissions - by using their strategic leverage within the (then) SLFP-led UFPA coalition. It is a sad comment on Sri Lankan politics that historically, neither of the mainstream parties – the UNP and the SLFP – have favoured independent commissions, since – when in power - the politicization of the public sector has worked to their advantage.

37. Sri Lanka socioeconomic data (2016), Central Bank of Sri Lanka.38.Ibid.39.Ibid.40.Economic & social statistics of Sri Lanka (2016), Central Bank of Sri Lanka.41.Ibid.42.Ibid.43.Ibid.44.Human Development Report, UNDP (2015).45.Ibid.46.The Hindu, 23/01/2016.47. Interview with Head/Department of History, Colombo University, on 14/10/2016.48. Interview with JVP provincial councilor on 14/10/2016.

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The most problematic aspect of Sri Lanka’s democratic composition remains the Intense culture of hostility between the two component political parties of Sri Lanka’s two-party system – the UNP and SLFP - with a long history of blood-letting on both sides.

LEVELS OF CORRUPTIONCorruption takes place at many level in Sri Lanka. The most common forms of corruption involves bribes paid to avoid bureaucratic red tape and solicitation of bribes by government officials. This situation has its roots in the highly regulated conditions of the economy between 1950-1977. In such a culture, social prestige hinges on not being seen to abide by the rules, such as queuing up for rationed goods or for a routine administrative service. To be seen queuing up implied a lack of ‘contacts’ within administration or access to influential persons. Consequently, nepotism and cronyism spread across the public sector and state corporations, where employment is linked to political affiliation. Further, corruption in the public sector is a consequence of low salaries, which is a phenomenon many South Asian states are facing. Sri Lanka still lacks transparency in selection procedures to posts in the public sector. This stands in the way of a greater level of professionalism.

Until 2001, cabinet ministers were vested with the authority to make all appointments to the public service. Such a system results in the politicization of the public service. In 2001 the 17th Amendment removed this power from the cabinet and vested it in the Constitutional Council. The 18th Amendment passed in 2010, vitiated the powers of the CC. The 19th Amendment once again restored the CC in 2015. Thus over the period 2010-15, a de-professionalization of the public sector has taken place.49 The present UPFA-UNP coalition is struggling to make selection processes more transparent, but is hampered by its own ministers who are under pressure to provide employment to electoral supporters.

Corruption in the public service also constitutes a formidable hurdle for private enterprise. Private companies state that they frequently have to make irregular payments or bribes in connection with access to public utilities and the awarding of licenses.50 According to the World Bank, up to 8% of enterprises that deal with government licensing agencies make such unofficial payments. These amount to 5-6% of the official fee.51

Public procurement is an area marked by a qualitatively higher level of corruption.52 Corruption in public procurements impacts greatly on investors in large projects, and those seeking government procurement contracts. In some instances, public funds are sometimes channeled into private companies, individuals or groups. Government procurements are required to be advertised publicly. Unsuccessful bidders have one week to complain to the Procurement Appeal Board, which may then launch an investigation. Over the last two years, the government has begun investigating such complaints.53

Police immunity is also remains a serious problem, particularly in a situation where high levels of bribery and corruption complaints against police personnel prevail.54 The police force is perceived as the most corrupt public institution in Sri Lanka.55

International corruption monitoring groups insist that Sri Lanka’s judiciary is subject to corruption and manipulation by the political elite.56 Businesses report the judiciary is not independent, public trust in politicians is low and the government is not transparent.57 The independence of the judiciary is undermined by the harassment, attacks and threats meted out to judges.58 Corruption remains common in the lower courts, and persons willing to pay bribes have better access to the legal system. A quarter of Sri Lankans consider the judiciary to be corrupt.59

49. See also Transparency International: National Integrity System Assessment: Sri Lanka 2014.50. Global Competitiveness Report (2014-15), World Economic Forum.51. Governance in Sri Lanka(2013), World Bank.52. Ibid.53. In particular, the previous UFPA-led government (2010-14) is criticised for not following procurement procedures. Consequently, anti-cor-ruption groups have brought in many complaints of such instances. It is not possible to assess to what extent proper procurement procedures are presently in place, but the issue is endlessly discussed on many civic forums as well as the tabloid and electronic media, which creates pressure of the present UPFA-UNP coalition to act in a more circumspect manner. The coalition has embarked on investigations of the trou-bled, million-dollar loss-making national carriers, Air Lanka & Mihin Lanka, the abrogation of key maritime security functions of the Sri Lanka Navy by the Defense Secretary, and the granting of these functions to a private security company (Avaunt Garde), among other things.54. Human Rights Report – Sri Lanka 2013. US Department of State.55. Global Corruption Barometer 2013. Transparency International.56. See Bertelsmann Foundation: Transformation Index – Sri Lanka (2014). Alsowww.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/sri-lanka. 57. Global Competitiveness Report (2014-15), World Economic Forum.58. Freedom in the World – Sri Lanka (2014), Freedom House.59. Global Corruption Barometer 2013. Transparency International.

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Table 4 - Global indicators on corruption in Sri Lanka

INDICATOR RANK SCORE AND RANGECorruption Perceptions Index60 83`/175 37 (1 – 100)Global Competitiveness Index61 73/144 4.2 (1 – 7 )Irregular Payments and Bribes62 91/144 3.5 (1 – 7 )Government Effectiveness Index63 0.09 (-2.5 to +2.5)Control of Corruption Index64 -0.25 (-2.5 to +2.5)

60. Corruption Perceptions Index 2015, Transparency International (www.transparency.org/cpi201561. http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2014-2015/economies/#economy=LKA. 62. http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2014-2015/rankings/63. www.theglobaleconomy.com/Sri_Lanka/wb_government_effectiveness/64. www.theglobaleconomy.com/Sri_Lanka/wb_control _of_ corruption/

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In 1994, a spectacular electoral swing brought the People’s Alliance (PA) coalition into power. The SLFP – the driving force behind the PA coalition - was at this point preoccupied with the reckless disbursement of funds by the UNP in their donor-driven development drive over the previous decade. Bribery and corruption was felt to be rife in the securing of development contracts and the misuse of public funds endemic. Thus, together with human rights, corruption became the main plank on the PA’s platform.

In order to strengthen the hand of the Bribery Commissioner and equip him to deal with the new flows of irregular payments into the economy in the 1990s, it was decided to amend the Bribery Act of 1954. The Bribery (Amendment) Act No 19 of 1994 was mooted, which enabled the setting up of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) as a permanent body. Parliament subsequently also passed the Bribery (Amendment) Act No 20 of 1994, which introduced the new offense of ‘corruption’ into the Bribery Act of 1954. These legislative acts enable the Commission to prosecute persons for offences under the Bribery (Amendment) Act as well as the Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Law No. 1 of 1975.

The key objective of the 1994 legislation was to create an independent and autonomous body which could investigate the insidious forms of bribery which had manifested itself across the public sector. It also aimed at addressing a new range of corrupt practice which had emerged with the opening up of the Sri Lankan economy and the inflow of developmental funds over the 1980s.65 Act No 19 of 1994 Section 5 (a – l) enable CIABOC to discharge a range of functions, such as:

1. To obtain or receive either written and oral evidence, and examine anyone the Commission thinks is necessary to interrogate;

2. To summon any person to be examined by the Commission and to require him/her to answer – either orally on oath or affirmation - any question which the Commission may feel is relevant to the matter under investigation. It may also require him to state any facts relevant to the matter under investigation in the form of an affidavit;

3. To summon any person and require him to produce any document or other piece of evidence he has or is under his control;

4. To give written direction to the manager of any bank to produce, within a specified time, any book, document or cheque issued by them which contains entries relating to the personal accounts of anyone under investigation by the Commission (or the spouse, son, daughter of such a person, or a company of which he is a director, etc), or to furnish certified copies of such documents;

5. To give the Commissioner-General of Inland Revenue written direction to furnish all information he may have about the affairs of the person under investigation (or the spouse, son or daughter of such a person) and to provide a certified copy of such documents.

6. To direct in writing any official in charge of a Government department, the Mayor, Chairman, Governor or Chief Executive of a local authority or Provincial Council to produce any document or certified copies of such documents the Commission may think necessary;

7. To direct any person to furnish a sworn statement in writing which sets out all his movable and immovable property, and those belonging to his spouse, son or daughter. It should also state the way in which such properties were acquired, i.e. purchase, inheritance, bequest, etc.

8. To prohibit any other person to hold in trust for the person under investigation, or a company in which he is a partner from transferring ownership during a specified time period.

9. To give written direction to the Controller of Immigration & Emigration to impound the passport and other travel documents of the person under investigation.

2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND PROFILE OF THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF BRIBERY OR CORRUPTION

65. Bribery & Corruption in Sri Lanka: strengthening the institutional framework. White Paper, USAID, Colombo, 2007)

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Despite these wide-ranging powers, however, in the first six years, CIABOC was unable to make an impact on the high incidence of bribery and corruption which was unfolding during this period. While some of this was due to the on-going military initiatives (Eelam wars II and III), the ruling PA coalition’s grip of political power during this period was also somewhat tenuous, and failure of the Rule of Law to prevail remained a serious constraint on Commission’s authority.66

In 2001, the PA brought in the 17th Amendment to the Constitution, which established a Constitutional Council (CC) and seven Independent commissions, one of which was the CIABOC. This removed the appointment of Commissioners from the control of the President and vested it in the CC. However, in 2010, the 18th Amendment revoked all these powers. It abolished the ten member constitutional council and set up a parliamentary council under the President. It was the 19th Amendment, brought in by a coalition of the PA-UNP which restored the powers of the CC and was able to strengthen the powers of the independent Commissions, including CIABOC.

FINANCIAL RESOURCESCIABOC’s annual budget is decided by the Treasury. Although funds for the Commission are in theory voted on by Parliament, in operational terms the Treasury determines the release of these funds. In the past, this has been a real constraint. However, the present Commission has been much more successful in accessing these funds, due to a greater measure of political will displayed by this government, at least in the initial period.

Table 5 - Average Proportion of CIABOC’s recurrent expenditure to total Government recurrent expenditure for past 3 years

YEAR TOTAL GOVERNMENT RECURRENT

EXPENDITURE [SL RS.]

ALLOCATIONTO CIABOC

[SL RS.]

CIABOC ALLOCATION AS A PROPORTION OF GOVT

BUDGET2014 1,429,179,090,000 180,058,000 0.0125%2015 1,666,785,000,000 245,500,000 0.0147%2016 1,867,399,062,000 231,800,000 0.0124%2017 1,850,368,313,000 236,950,000 67 0.0128%Total 6,813,731,465,000 894,268,000 0.0132%

Source: Ministry of Finance, NBD - Budget Estimates – 2016 – Eng.pdf.

Thus 2015 saw a spike in the recurrent expenditure allocation to CIABOC (see table 5 above), this receded over, the next year. The projection for 2017 appear to signify a very slight recovery. The trend in capital expenditure, (see Table 6 below) however, is clearly declining.

Table 6 - Average Capital Expenditure by CIABOC to total Govt capital expenditure for past 3 years

YEAR TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE

[SL RS.]

ALLOCATIONTO CIABOC

[SL RS.]

CIABOC ALLOCATION AS A PROPORTION OF GOVT

BUDGET2014 595,710,647,000 16,069,000 0.00269%2015 831,215,000,000 46,059,000 0.00554%2016 1,182,750,098,000 8,200,000 0.00693%2017 559,218,295,000 8,650,000 0.00154%Total 3,168,894,040,000 78,197,000 0.00246%

Source: Ministry of Finance, NBD - Budget Estimates – 2016 – Eng.pdf.

66. During the conduct of the local elections in 1997, a PA MP, Nalanda Ellawala was assassinated in broad daylight by a UNP rival and the PA was unable to even take legal action against the suspect (Susantha Punchinilame) despite dozens of eye witnesses, due to the vicious intimidation campaign conducted by the UNP. Random suicide bombs and assassination attempts against senior political figures added to the instability. 67. Projection in 2016 Budget Estimates/Ministry of Finance.

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HUMAN RESOURCES Between 1994-2014 CIABOC had 183 investigators and investigative officers who were seconded from the Police Department, and 170 civil staff.68 This made up a total cadre of 353. In 2015, with a temporary increase in cadre-levels to clear up the backlog, these numbers went up to 431 investigative staff and 371 civilians, with a total of 802. At present, the number of investigators have gone down to 198, which leaves 233 vacancies. Of this 198, 15 are on opening inquiries duties, 81 officers are working on corruption cases, 28 on assets-linked cases, 28 in setting-up raids, and 46 in supervision and administrative activities.69

Over the past two years, CIABOC has developed a consistent focus on training, with weekly in-house training sessions of up to 2 – 3 hours. These are conducted by retired Interpol officers, staff from other internationally reputed investigative bureaus and senior police officers. Investigative staff at different levels are frequently sent overseas for training and re-training. CIABOC’s investigators are also presently undergoing intensive training in IT skills. At the same time, serious efforts are being taken to make them more conversant in English.70

CIABOC investigates incidents upon receiving a complaint.71 It prosecutes offenders against whom there is evidence of bribery or acts of corruption. It also prosecutes offenders against whom there are allegations of recent accumulation of wealth beyond his or her known means. Such complaints must contain basic details about offenders in order for an investigation to commence. The Commission also works on raising awareness of what constitutes incidents of bribery or a corrupt act and prevention activities.

When complaints are received by the CIABOC, they are sent on to the Commissioners. However, sometimes the complaint does not fall within CIABOC’s purview since many complainants tend to send their complaints to multiple agencies in order to seek relief. If the complaint does not come within CIABOC’s remit or lacks sufficient evidence, it is closed. If it does, sent on to the DG who sends it on to the investigations division which is headed by the Director/Investigations.

The Investigations department may pursue one of four options1. Investigate illegal accumulations of wealth2. Lay traps; make arrests as bribe solicitation is in progress3. Investigate allegations of corruption4. Inquire into bribery action after the gratification is awarded.

Once the case is completed, the Director Investigations will report to the DG on the investigation’s findings. The DG will then seek advice from the Legal Branch on initiation of action against these findings. The DG keeps commissioners informed of decisions.

Table 7 - CIABOC Profile

JURISDICTION PUBLIC SECTOR NON-GOVERNMENTFunctions/mandate/powers

legislators Judiciary Police,Military

etc

Other Public service

Govt-owned corps

Public Contrators

Charities/NGOs

All busi-ness/ Some

business

1.Research, intelligence, risk Assessment & detection

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

2.Corruption investigation (in response to complaints)

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

3.Corruption investigation (own initiative)

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

4.Prosecution powers Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

5.Asset recovery/restitutionConfiscation powers

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

6.Prevention powers Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

7.Education & outreachPowers Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

Note: Y = Yes, N = No

68. CIABOC’s Annual Report 2015.69. CIABOC’s Annual Report 2015, and interview with CIABOC staff on 10/11/2016.70. Interview with asst. director, investigations, CIABOC on 10/11/2016.71. The 19th Amendment passed in May 2015, allows CIABOC to initiate its own inquiries. However, they have not yet begun to do so.

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All CIABOC employees have a statutory obligation to protect the identity of the complainants, witnesses and informants under Section 23 of the CIABOC Act and the Assistance to and Protection of Victims of Crime and Witnesses Act No. 4 of 2015.

Table 7 shows that according to law, CIABOC has jurisdiction over all the public (legislators, judiciary, law-enforcing agencies and other public services) and non-governmental (government-owned corporations, public contractors, charities and NGOs and business) sectors.

STRUCTUREThe Commission consist of three members, one of whom is the Chairman.72 Two of the Commissioners are required to be retired Judges of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeal; and one of whom is a person with wide experience relating to the investigation of crime and law enforcement. All Commissioners are appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Constitutional Council.73

They will hold office for a period of five years and shall not be eligible for re-appointment.74 The procedure for the removal of Commissioners is similar to that applied to a judge of the Supreme Court.

Figure 2 - CIABOC’S STRUCTURE

The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is the Director-General (DG) who reports directly to the Commissioners. The DG also manages the investigations and prosecutions subject to the direction of the Commission. He is also the Chief Accounting Officer of the Commission as well as the Chief Administrator (see figure 2 above)

The Commission comprises of three divisions, which are Investigations, Legal and Administration. The investigative section is the largest branch, with positions for 802 investigators, of whom there are only 353 investigators in place at present.

COMMISSIONERS(3)

DIRECTOR GENERAL

SECRETARIAT

LEGAL BRANCHDIRECTOR INVESTIGATIONS

DTY DIRECTORINVESTIGATIONS

CORRUPTION ADMIN UNIT. INVESTIGATORS (4 units)

ASSETS INVESTIGATION UNIT

RAIDS INVESTIGATION UNIT (4 units)

INQUIRIES OPENING UNIT

COURT PROSECUTIONS UNIT

ADMIN UNIT.

ASST DIRECTOR INVESTIGATIONS

ASST DIRECTOR INVESTIGATIONS

ADMINISTRATION

72. Bribery (Amendment) Act No 19 (1994) section 2 (2a) and section 3.73. Bribery (Amendment) Act No 19 (1994) section2 (2b).74. The Commissioner’s tenure is secure and they can only be removed on grounds of incapacity or misconduct and then only by an order of Parliament, supported by a parliamentary majority. [Bribery (Amendment) Act No 19 of 1994, section2 (2a) and (2b)].

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PREVENTION, EDUCATION & OUTREACH FUNCTIONSIn 2015, SL Rs.1,451,000/- was spent on prevention work, which amounted to 0.56% of CIABOC’s total budget for the year. Though this was below the projected target of 1%, much has been done with these funds.

While awareness activities were conducted between 2013-2014, these were somewhat sporadic.75 In 2015, CIABOC stepped-up its activities. They conducted an extensive awareness programme for state sector employees at 14 different locations. These ranged from regional police academies, traffic police headquarters, Department of Prisons and District Secretariats.

In December 2015, CIABOC officially launched their Action Plan, titled ‘Seven Steps to Zero Tolerance.’ This is a comprehensive plan which envisages working with three key demographic groups, i.e. school-going children, school leavers and adults. CIABOC has already submitted a draft cabinet paper for the setting up of Prevention Units to implement their Action Plan and is awaiting approval.

Meanwhile, CIABOC has been working with the National Institute of Education (NIE) which drafts syllabi and teacher-training materials for the Department of Education. The goal is to incorporate prevention and awareness concepts into primary syllabi and text books. Such concepts aim to change collective attitudes to corruption through culturally-relevant graphics, images, metaphors and narratives. These are being taught in primary classrooms, from January 2017. Meanwhile, extensive campaigns in secondary schools have already begun.76

Engaging with school-leavers will be on a more conventional lecture and discussion format, through ‘Youth Mobilizing Against Corruption’ (YMAC) groups organized by CIABOC’s prevention staff. Work with adults will involve the starting of a public dialogue on corruption by using print media and social media. The envisaged Prevention Unit will encompass seven sectors, i.e. the Immigration department, the passport office, the excise department, police department, Identity card unit and local govt institutions and the education sector. While the Unit are not yet in place, pending cabinet approval, CIABOC staff are working with officials in these sectors to identify possible loopholes where corruption could take place. They then recommend how these loopholes should be tightened. This work is however, on-going and it is therefore too early to comment on how effective they may be.77 The Action Plan also aims to work towards revising the law in keeping with the provisions of the 19th Amendment.

74. Such activities involved working with provincial-level councillors and administrative staff. A workshop was conducted at the Galle 75. Kachcheri conducted by an Addl. Solicitor General of the AG’s Department in September 2013, for members of the Southern Provincial Council in September 2013. In May 2014, an awareness programme on bribery and corruption laws was held for the members and civil servants of the Central Provincial Council (www.ciaboc.gov.lk)76. Interview with CIABOC staff on 10/11/2016.77. CIABOC Annual Report, 2015 and interview with CIABOC staff, 10/11/2016.

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3. KEY FINDINGSThe main findings of the assessment are based on a set of 50 indicators, divided into seven dimensions (see Table 1 above). These indicators are designed to assess the capacity and efficacy of the ACA, while identifying gaps and areas of opportunity. Each indicator has been assigned one of three possible scores – high (3), moderate (2) and low (1), based on the standards set for each indicator (see table 7 for details of the standards). For a clear understanding of the dimensions as well as the overall score, they have been classified into three categories – ‘high’ for an overall score between 67% - 100%, ‘moderate’ for an overall score between 34% - 66% and ‘low’ for an overall score between 0% - 33%.

In order to arrive at the aggregate score for each dimension, the score was first converted from the 1 – 3 scale to a 0 – 2 scale. Therefore all (1) scores become (0), all (2) scores become (1) and all (3) scores become (2). This is done because when aggregating the scores and converting them into percentages, the bottom of the scale must always be 0. If the 1 – 3 scale was to be used, then the lowest possible score of any dimension would be 33% (i.e. 1/3). Once the scores are converted from the 1 – 3 scale to the 0 – 2 scale, scores received by each of the indicators of a dimension were added up and then divided by the total of the maximum possible scores for all indicators within that dimension and then multiplied by 100.

For example, the sum of the indicators under the first dimension (Anti-Corruption Agency’s Legal Independence and Status) was 13 (6 indicators received the maximum score of 2 and one received a ‘moderate’ score of 1). The maximum total possible for this dimension is 14 (i.e. 7 indicators x the maximum possible score of 2 for each). Thus the final aggregate score (percentage) for this dimension would be 13/14 x 100 = 92.85%.

According to this assessment, the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) has achieved a ‘moderate’ score. It has an overall score of 56.67%. The dimension on CIABOC’s Legal Independence and Status scored the highest mark (92.85%). Six out of seven indicators scored high. This indicates that its ability to emerge as an independent and autonomous body is high. The dimension on financial and human resources also rated an overall high score of 72.22%. Here five indicators scored high, while three were moderate and one low. The low score related to the proportion of CIABOC’s budget to the national budget, which is perhaps a structural feature outside the Commission’s control at this point.

The dimension dealing with CIABOC’s Prevention, Education and Outreach functions scored above the overall score (66.66%). Two other dimensions, i.e. its Detention and Investigation functions (50%) and Public Perceptions of CIABOC’s performance (50%), scored roughly similar to the overall score of 56.67%. This is due to mixed results in the individual indicators within this dimensions. Its cooperation with other agencies in the anti-corruption sector scored somewhat lower (40%). Finally, one dimension – which relates to the Commission’s Accountability and Oversight functions – scored very low, which is a serious problem in an anti-corruption agency.

This implies that CIABOC has the potential legal independence to play a powerful role in shaping the direction of Sri Lankan politics, economy and society. It needs to build up its human resources a little more. Prevention plans have got off the ground, despite delays in cabinet approval. Its investigative functions and legal role need to be enhanced and the rate of convictions must improve. It needs to innovate better forms of cooperation with other anti-corruption bodies such as the FCID and PRECIFAC. Finally, CIABOC needs to work with parliament on oversight procedures relating to how it goes about implementing its mandate. At the same time, public concerns about the conduct of CIABOC staff must also be addressed, and internal measures have to be devised for dealing with complaints against its own staff.

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93%

72.22%

50.00%

66.66%

40.00%

25.00%

50.00%

56.67%

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

100%

ACA's Legal Independence &Status

ACA's Financial and HumanResources

ACA's Detection &Investigation Functions

ACA's Prevention, Education& Outreach Functions

ACA's Cooperation withOther Organizations

ACA's Accountability &Oversight Functions

Public Perceptions of theACA's Performance

Overall Score

Figure 1 - CIABOC’S SCORE BY DIMENSION

LEGAL INDEPENDENCE & STATUSCIABOC’s legal independence remains its greatest institutional strength. This attribute is valued even by its critics. CIABOC has its own premises in an up-market location in Colombo. It is answerable only to Parliament. Its legal independence is built on three legislative Acts; the Bribery (Amendment) Act No.19 of 1994 which enables the setting up of CIABOC as an independent commission to deal with bribery in the public sector, the Bribery (Amendment) Act No.20 of 1994 which introduces a new offense of ‘corruption’’ and the Assets and Liabilities Law No.1 of 1975, No 29 of 1985 and (Amendment) No. 74 of 1988.

The first two Acts allow Commissioners to interpret what constitutes an act of bribery or corruption within the parameters of the legislation. But they remain silent on money-laundering practices. Still, today Sri Lanka is struggling with a post-conflict economy in which the flow of illicit revenues have reached heights not envisaged in 1994 by those who drafted CIABOC’s enabling legislation. This has led concerned groups such as the Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL) to press for an extension of CIABOC’s legal powers to encompass specific types of money-laundering, i.e. the laundering of funds acquired through bribery or corrupt means. Acquiring such powers they argue, would substantially heighten the chances of securing convictions.78

The Assets & Liabilities Law of 1975 and related amendments require that politicians and public servants declare their earnings at regular intervals. But the receiving authorities for such declarations range from the Elections Commissioner and Heads of Departments to the Speaker of Parliament. This disperses its impact. Further, in recent times these requirements have rarely been complied with. CIABOC alone retains the power to initiate court proceedings into non-declaration of income, unexplained earnings and accumulation of wealth.79 The Act needs to be amended and a unified authority for receiving such declarations should be recognized by Parliament.

78. See Sunday Times, 04.07.2016. Also interview with Addl. Solicitor Gen. Y. Kodagoda, on 7.09.2016. 79. A petitioner can however, draw the attention of the AG, the Commissioner-General of Inland Revenue, the Head of the Department of Exchange Control and the Principal Collector of Customs to any recent acquisition of wealth by any person. (Act No 1 of 1975).

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CIABOC’s mandate is far-reaching and another source of strength. It encompasses the functions of investigation, prosecution, education and prevention. These are reinforced by wide-ranging legal powers, which include the power to obtain oral and written evidence and examine witnesses under oath. They allow authorized officers of the Commission to request relevant information from banks, the Department of Inland Revenue or any other institution.80 They also involve search and entry powers.81 CIABOC can even prohibit persons under investigation from leaving the country.

Still, if CIABOC’s legal independence, mandate and powers are so comprehensive, why hasn’t it performed better in the past? This brings us to the issue of operational autonomy. Its autonomy was directly affected by the 18th Amendment in 2010, which annihilated the powers of the Constitutional Council (CC). This impacted on the independence of Commissions such as CIABOC.82 In line with other pillars of the integrity system, CIABOC found that its powers and mandate had become reduced to a legal fiction. It found itself confined to pursuing low-level public sector employees.83 However, the 19th Amendment of 2015 restored the powers of the CC.

Despite this, critics argue that CIABOC’s operational autonomy is still in practice undermined by the fact that its investigators are paid by the Police Department, and its administrative staff by the Public Services Commission (PSC). This is seen to limit its ability to raise performance levels by shaping incentives-structures. It also affects CIABOC’s ability to discipline its investigative officers, since they fall under the penal code of the Police Ordinance. All these provisions are seen to bring in government regulation through the back door. CIABOC on its part insists that its operational autonomy is not affected by any of these arrangements.

Further, legal journalists, criminal justice professionals and some members of the BASL feel that CIABOC should develop a stronger legal division, which would reduce its dependence on the AG’s Department.84 While CIABOC is actively attempting to recruit legal staff, they are unable to attract applicants of appropriate quality. This then, remains the key problem.

Anti-corruption groups, trade unions and CSOs who were actively involved in efforts to bring down the previous regime, also question CIABOC’s impartiality. In this they are joined by politicians linked to the previous regime who now oppose the coalition-in-power. Such groups continue to wonder if the Commissioners and the DG are following a hidden political agenda of their own. Unfortunately, the unethical conduct of previous Commissioners have lent substance to such negative views.

In the end, such public distrust can only be healed with time and CIABOC’s continued good performance. While the former DG herself is well aware that she was perceived to be a political appointee, she categorically denies the charge.85 This claim is substantiated by the enormous amount of work the present Commission has been able to get through after her appointment in February 2015. This in itself is a firm validation of the political space allowed to CIABOC by the new government.

Procedures for the appointment of CIABOC’s Commissioners have become more transparent in the past two years. This is due to the active intervention of the CC. The Bribery (Amendment) Act No. 19 of 1994 states that the Commissioners will be appointed by the President on the advice of the CC and have a fixed term of five years.86 Commissioners have tenure and cannot be removed except on grounds of proven misconduct or incapacity.87 In the event, the CC called for nominations from the general public. They proceeded to interview nominees in order to assess their perceived integrity, reputation and ability, submitting their chosen list of candidates to the President. Here the CC’s efforts can be seen as an attempt to restore the prestige of independent commissions, against a backdrop of the intense politicization of the public sector which has taken place over the past decade.88 Still, this process is not mandated. It relies on the desire for transparency among members of the CC. Finally, the Director General (DG) who is the chief executive officer, is appointed by the President, in consultation with the commission.89 This procedure again creates a loophole for criticisms of political links to the executive to emerge.

80. Bribery (Amendment) Act No 19 of 1994, Section 4 (2) (a) and (b).81. Bribery (Amendment) Act No.19 of 1994, Section 5 (1) a – l and (6).82. The 18th Amendment dissolved the 10 member Constitutional Council and replaced it with a 5 member Parliamentary Council. Independent Commissions were brought under the direct authority of the President.83. See CIABOC website (www.ciaboc.gov.lk/investigations)84. CIABOC at present engages up to ten legal officers from the AG’s department on a consultancy basis to support its own staff.85. Upon her resignation on 18th October 2016, the ex-DG stated categorically in an in interview with the Sunday leader of 24.10.2016, that she had faced no political interference whatsoever during her time at CIABOC. See also Ceylon Today 23.10.2016 and Sunday Leader 24.10.201686. The Act stipulates that the Commission shall consist of three members, two of whom shall be retired judges of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeal and the third, a person with wide experience in the investigation of crime and law enforcement.87. Bribery (Amendment) Act No.19 of 1994,Section 2 (2) (a) & (b).88. While many trace this process of politicization of the bureaucracy to the 1978 constitution, the trend which began in the 1980s picked up renewed momentum over the past decade, with the massive influx of external funds which flooded in for reconstruction activity in the post-conflict phase.89. Bribery (Amendment) Act No.19 of 1994, Section 16 (1), (2) & (3).

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This brings us to the question of whether the regime uses CIABOC as a weapon against political opponents. Predictably, factions of the UPFA who are outside the ruling coalition continue to charge that it uses CIABOC as a weapon.90 Alternately, as observed above, critics from the left argue that the (perceived) weaknesses in CIABOC’s performance is due to a lack of training of its staff and lack of resources to meet challenges. Yet another line of criticism maintains that there is a measure of self-censorship on the part of either the Commissioners or the DG who may feel that those who appointed them expect them to toe a certain line.

In the end, the presence of so many divergent strands in the discursive field tend to counter the relative weight of each. They illuminate the fact that even what actually constitutes political bias is in dispute among CIABOC’s critics.91 Since all these arguments contradict each other, they work to neutralize each other. They in fact strengthen CIABOC’s position, expressed by former DG, Ms Wickramasinghe, that they faced no political interference, and have remained impartial in performing their duties.92

FINANCIAL & HUMAN RESOURCESThe dimension on CIABOC’s Financial and Human Resources scored 72.22%. While many indicators scored high, the one on CIABOC’s budgetary share received a low score. This is because allocations did not reach the prescribed target of 0.2% of the national budget over the past three years.93 Though there was a sharp improvement in 2015, the share fell back once again to 0.0124% in 2016 (see table 5 above). Therefore the average proportion of budget allocations over the past three years remains 0.032%.

Still, the indicator on the security and stability of this allocation fell into the moderate category. Since the UNP-UPFA coalition made corruption a key plank in its platform, budgetary allocations to CIABOC were expected to rise. In fact, while the allocation for 2015 did rise to 0.0147%, it fell the next year, only to rise very slightly in the projections for 2017 (see table 5 above), which perhaps justifies assigning it to the moderate category.

But is this allocation sufficient for CIABOC to perform its functions? This is a matter of some dispute. Many of the radical but numerically small political parties and CSOs who were involved in the effort to bring regime change feel that CIABOC’s budgetary allocation is insufficient in terms of the challenges it faces. CIABOC, on its part, says that the present budget is entirely adequate. Previous Commissioners have complained of the lack of vehicles for investigators and officers to conduct raids.94 But the present Commission is satisfied with the transport arrangements in place, in which the Police supply them with vehicles when required.95 Further, over the past two years, many other basic inadequacies such as the lack of computers and other electronic equipment have been overcome. And though CIABOC does have a serious problem in the lack of office space for investigators, they have been granted an adjoining allotment for building expansion. Thus the sufficiency of CIABOC’s budgetary allocation scores ‘high’.

Salary and benefits received by CIABOC personnel remains an area of relative weakness (‘moderate’). As mentioned above, CIABOC’s investigators and legal officers are paid by other public bodies. In addition, CIABOC pays officers investigating bribery cases a risk allowance of 25%. Investigators are also rewarded when convictions are secured. Legal officers receive a monthly allowance from CIABOC in addition to what they are paid by the PSC. Still, salaries are low, in keeping with salaries in the public sector. This structure has not enabled CIABOC to attract the kind of legal talent which could raise rates of convictions. This is therefore another slight bone of contention between CIABOC and other groups in the anti-corruption sector, who feel a higher level of remuneration is required to attract staff of appropriate quality.

Staff selection procedures are merit-based. But entry requirements into the Police Department from which investigators are seconded are low (O/Ls or less) compared to the rest of the public sector. CIABOC subjects them to an entrance test. The large number of vacancies for investigators speaks for the high standards imposed by CIABOC relative to the aptitude of applicants.

90. On 19th April 2015, some PA legislators opposed to the coalition protested against CIABOC’s anti-corruption investigations by sleeping on the well of Parliament. This caused a great public uproar and was seen as an effort by them to pervert the cause of justice.91. See Keerthi Tennekoon in Ceylon Today 14.10.2016; Island (Editorial) 15.09.2016; Sunday Times 26.04.2015.92. Interview with ex-DG (2/11/2016). See also Ceylon Today 23.10.2016 and Sunday Leader 24.10.2016. 93. This computation does not incorporate capital expenditure allocations, since these cannot be spent on activities and programmes.94. Prasanna Rodrigo in Sunday Times of 28.2.2010; Nirmala Kannangara in Sunday Leader of 22.2.201495. Interview with ex-DG on 2.11.2016.

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The issue of the level of expertise CIABOC staff should have, is also subject to a difference of opinion. On their part, the above-mentioned groups and other anti-corruption stakeholders in the public sector are dissatisfied with the ability of investigators who they feel lack the basic numerical skills to take down complaints accurately. Investigators are thought to lack basic IT skills, mathematical aptitude, accounting expertise or auditing ability. These skills are thought necessary in the pursuit of white collar crime such as money laundering where intricate paper trails have to be tracked down. This would require the help of international agencies such as Interpol, Scotland Yard and the FBI. They suggest, therefore, that CIABOC should engage more highly-skilled and qualified staff at higher rates of remuneration. Such staff, they feel, should include those with a background in criminal justice, criminal sociology, banking, computer-programming & systems analysis as well as forensic auditors and chartered accountants.96

CIABOC’s former DG responds to this criticism by saying that whenever a need arises for inputs by more highly-skilled personnel, it has the contacts and capacity to retain them on a consultancy basis. Still, she points out, the need for such highly - skilled staff does not occur everyday.97 She was convinced that - due to a decision made by CIABOC’s management in early 2015 to create a more enabling working environment - investigative staff are now mostly competent and improving all the time. As part of this move, the Commissioners and DG refrained from interfering with the work of investigators, so that they could build confidence. Once investigators realized that their independence would be respected and their work would not be interfered with, their ability to make impartial and independent decisions developed steadily over the past two years. This helped to improve their investigative skills.98 Such a claim is supported by the fact that 5,002 files were attended to by CIABOC over 2015, while 3,021 were closed after due consideration.99 Against this, in 2013, 1,797 files were closed but no investigations completed, and likewise in 2014, 937 were closed but no investigations done.100

Despite such achievements, it is clear that CIABOC’s management also appreciates the need for higher quality staff, at least in some areas. Thus in April 2015, it submitted a draft cabinet paper, to enable the recruitment of a special unit of approximately ten members, including accountants, custom’s officers and intelligence personnel. This has finally been approved by cabinet, but recruitment is still on-going.

Subsequently, in September 2016, CIABOC submitted another draft cabinet paper, which envisaged a new intake of 300 investigative officers, to be recruited on more elevated criteria - at the level of BA/BSc. It was also proposed that they should have a minimum of one years’ training in either the police department or any of the armed forces (including gun training). It is intended to provide them with legal training as well, by staff from the AG’s Department.

This however, is the crux of the issue. While CIABOC has certainly raised its level of performance, it’s own assessment of its staff needs do not match-up to the expectations of CSOs and NGOs in the larger anti-corruption effort in terms of the kinds of complex investigations (relating to billions of dollars rather than millions of rupees) they feel CIABOC should be undertaking. These reservations have confined the score of this indicator to ‘moderate’.

CIABOC’s expertise in prevention, education and outreach activities on the other hand, scored high. Staff training also scored high. In addition to on-going training activities, the new DG who took office on 1.12.2016 is also already focusing on intensifying training, including training workshops for legal personnel.101

Finally, CIABOC’s staff stability also rates a high score. Staff levels have remained very stable over the past ten years, with minimal staff turnover. This stability has also generated a high level of institutional loyalty. Nonetheless numbers remain very much below institutional requirements.

96. Interview with Chairman, COPE on 20th October 2016;, Auditor General on 21st September 2016; with Convenor, Voice against Corruption on 15th September 2016 and Gen. Secy. Ceylon Teachers Union on 14th September 2016.97. Interview with ex-DG CIABOC on 02.11.2016.98. Interview with ex-Dg CIABOC on 02/11/2016.99. See CIABOC Annual Report (2015) p 28, which states that 8,203 complaints were dealt with, of which 3,201 were closed down.100. See CIABOC Annual Report p 24.101. Interview with DG on 15/12/2016.

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DETECTION & INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTIONThe dimension involving detection and investigation scored 50%. Its performance was mixed. Three indicators scored high, three were moderate and three were low. Low-performing indicators included the willingness to initiate corruption investigations, which was a new function only assigned to CIABOC under the 19th Amendment in May 2015. It has not been acted upon yet in view of the massive backlog of complaints. But it also included the indicator on the average rate of corruption convictions over the past three years. This emerges as an area of concern. Finally, the low score of the indicator on compiling complaints according to gender suggests that CIABOC remains insensitive to gender-linked problems faced by women.

CIABOC’s accessibility to complainants and informants, whistleblowers and members of the public is creditable. It received 9,382 complaints in the three years from 2013-2015.102 This makes for an average of 3,127.3 complaints per year, in a population of 20,966 million. This implies that approx. 0.0149% of the national population took steps to complain about corruption in their environment, and is an improvement on previous years.

This trend unfolds against a background of some ambiguity in projections by corruption indices on Sri Lanka. The 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranked Sri Lanka 83 out of 154 states, notching only 37 points out of a possible 100. This score has remained stable over the past 3 years.103 According to the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) 2016, 43.9% of respondents felt that Sri Lanka’s CIABOC was doing well or very well in fighting corruption, while 26.1% did not.104

Local surveys are more nuanced and indicate that public perceptions of corruption have actually decreased sharply over the past year. A community perceptions survey on policing conducted by the Asia Foundation, Colombo, in January 2016 shows that perceptions of corruption as a key factor affecting policing dropped from 24% in 2014 to 6% in 2015. Political interference as a factor affecting policing also dropped from 56% to 39% (see table 8 below). In such a context, the above complaints ratio assumes greater significance. It becomes higher relative to perceived levels of corruption.

Anonymous complaints, however, remain a persistent factor. The desire for anonymity is perhaps linked to a lack of confidence or feelings of insecurity among complainants. In the GCB data on Sri Lanka, 30% of respondents were not confident enough to venture an opinion on levels of corruption or CIABOC’s performance. This goes up to 33% among female respondents.105

Table 7 - Community Perception on key factors affecting policing in Sri Lanka (2015)

YEAR CORRUPTION POLITICAL INTERFERENCE

TOTAL

2011 26% 57% 83%2012 17% 17% 34%2013 28% 54% 82%2014 24% 56% 80%2015 6% 39% 45%

Source: www.police.lk/images/other/community_police_perception_survey_2015.pdf(extracted from National Community Perception Survey – Sri Lanka 2015, Asia Foundation, Colombo, p 46)

CIABOC has a hotline on its website. Most complaints by individuals remain anonymous. However, approximately a third of complaints are made by political parties, trade unions and concerned CSOs who represent large constituencies and tend to be proportionately numerous in their complaints.106 Such complainants tend to call press conferences before and after filing their complaints, in order to pressurise the Commission. This signifies their greater confidence in the new political climate which has evolved over past two years, as well as their greater access to CIABOC.

102. CIABOC Annual Report (2015).103. Corruptions Perceptions Index 2015, Transparency International, Berlin.104. Global Corruption Barometer, 2016 Transparency International (forthcoming)105. Global Corruption Barometer 2016 (forthcoming) – Sri Lanka data. 106. The JVP’s Dushanna Virodhi Handa says they have submitted around 150 complaints, the Dushana Virodhi Sanvidanaya which is a coalition of many groups, more than 500. The UNP MP Ranjan Ramanayaka also states that he has handed in over 150 complaints. Finally, the Dushana Virodhi Peramuna says they have given in 225 complaints (Ada of24/10/2016)

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With regard to whistleblowers, the initial phase of CIABOC’s ‘Seven Steps’ initiative involves selecting a group of ‘integrity officers’ in each government institution to act as whistleblowers. The new Right to Information (RTI) law contains relief for whistleblowers. This in itself assigns greater validity to the act of whistle-blowing, and may encourage more people to come forward, in a context where many fear losing their jobs if they do. In this new climate it was felt that CIABOC’s initiative merited a high score.

However, CIABOC’s response to such complaints over the past three years received a moderate score. Until end-2014, its receptiveness has been low. Nevertheless, the appointing of a new DG and a new Commission in 2015 created a more energetic climate. This made it possible for investigations to be expedited. Faced with the uphill task of investigating a backlog of 9,752 complaints along with those received during the year (altogether, 13,665 complaints) the new Commission experimented with different investigation methods. In the process, the ex-DG was able to innovate a new, hybrid approach by January 2016, which greatly increased output. A total of 8,203 files were attended to by the DG. 3,021 of these were closed after due consideration.107 However, it should be mentioned that many TUs and CSOs engaged in anti-corruption activity reiterate that their complaints have still elicited no response from CIABOC.108 This constitutes an important omission, which brings down the score of this indicator to moderate.

CIABOC’s willingness to initiate complaints scored low. However, the average number of cases investigated by CIABOC rated a high score. While the average for the period 2005-2014 is not impressive, as mentioned above, over the past two years, there has been a sharp increase in the rate.

The efficiency and professionalism of CIABOC investigators over the past three years also scored moderate. On the one hand, the number of total complaints received in 2015 was 3,913, and the number of complaints closed was 3,021. This is a positive efficiency ratio. However, many plaintiffs are dissatisfied the level of professionalism shown by CIABOC. This is because they claim that its staff, as ex-police officers, tend to view complainants such as themselves as potential suspects. This was so especially for those who came in to complain about corruption in the educational sector, with special reference to Principals and other staff demanding bribes to admit children into schools. Also, there is a popular perception that anonymous complaints, despite being framed with detailed information, were not addressed by CIABOC.109 All these factors were seen as constituting a lack of professionalism. It was this perception which pushed the score down to moderate. CIABOC’s ex-DG on her part reiterates that investigators have shown marked improvement over the past two years and a high level of staff commitment has been achieved.110

Against this, the average rate of conviction for corruption cases investigated over the past three years scored low. While 413 cases were filed in the High Court and the Magistrate’s Courts over the past three years, only `54 resulted in convictions. This works out to an average rate of 13.07%, which is very low. It suggests a need for a higher level of professionalism in the filing of cases (see table 8 below). The rate of convictions actually dropped from 46.15% in 2014 to 12.6% in 2015. It has not picked up significantly over the first 10 months of 2016. The drop may have to do with the complexity of charges filed.

Table 8 - Average rate of convictions to charges filed by CIABOC (2014-2016*)

YEAR NO. OF CHARGES FILED

NO. OF CONVICTIONS AVERAGE CONVICTION RATE

2014 52 24 46.15%2015 119 15 12.60%2016* 91 15 16.48%Total for period 413 54 13.07%

Source: CIABOC (2016)*Up to October 2016.

107. CIABOC Annual Report (2015).108. Interview with convenor, Dushana Virodhi Handa (15/09/2016) and Gen.Secy, Ceylon Teachers’ Union (14/09/2016).109. Some of these complaints are based on whistleblower information and address corruption in the ministries and state corporations.110. Interviews with ex-DG, CIABOC on 2.11.2016 and 10.11.2016.

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CIABOC’s former DG insists that legal officers are competent at drafting charges, but admits that they lack advocacy skills in terms of defending their suit in court. This is due to a lack of experience. It is expected that this situation will improve with increased exposure of legal staff to more complex cases.111 CIABOC‘s low rate of convictions also affects its role in asset recovery. When a conviction is reached, all monies and assets seized in the course of investigations are channelled into the Consolidated Fund, along with penalties and fines charged by court.

CIABOC’s willingness to investigate influential persons for corruption without fear or favour, however, scored high. Still, this remains a very complex and nuanced issue. Unlike in the past, the present Commission has taken steps to call many influential political figures of the previous government – including a serving cabinet minister, an ex-Defence Secretary, three former Heads of the Sri Lanka Navy - to make statements before it. But critics outside the present government continue to accuse CIABOC of being part of a government-sponsored witch hunt.

The evidence for such a claim, however, is weak. Further, CIABOC has had to face sharp challenges inpersuading such persons to come before it, including in some cases, resorting to legal action. But it should be mentioned that while charges have been filed, over the past two years, there have been no convictions of influential persons.

CIABOC’s present DG responds to this criticism by pointing out that the public’s sense that investigations are not yielding results does not mean that progress hasn’t been made. This is because - unlike the police - CIABOC does not require the court to direct the progress of the investigation at each step, i.e. by granting permission to detain suspects, search premises, check bank accounts etc, since all these powers are granted to CIABOC by its enabling legislation. Therefore the work takes place behind the scenes, as it were. The media does not have access to key moments in the investigation. Consequently the media is not in a position to inform the public that a ‘breakthrough’ has been made, which creates the impression that there has been no progress.112

Finally, CIABOCs role in identifying the gender of complainants also scores low. This is because CIABOC does not in practice retain information on gender, due to the large proportion of anonymous complaints. However, even though complaints maybe anonymous, it should be possible to identify the gender of the complainants themselves on a separate register. The failure to do this implies that CIABOC does not grasp the gendered nature of many crimes against women.

PREVENTION, EDUCATION & OUTREACH FUNCTIONSThe performance of this dimension is well above the overall score (66.66%). Three indicators scored high. These included corruption prevention initiatives, the implementation of CIABOC’s Plan for prevention, education and outreach, and collaboration with other stakeholders in the anti-corruption sector. The indicators scoring moderate included the average proportion of operating expenditure allocated for prevention and education work, the number of reviews of organizational procedures, systems and capabilities, the frequency of including corruption recommendations in investigation reports, the dissemination of corruption prevention information and the use of its website and social media for disseminating such information.

A low score was received by the indicator assessing research and exploration of corruption risks, context and conditions. This indicator is important since it can allow CIABOC to target its prevention activities more specifically, and therefore emerges as an important area of opportunity.

The indicator measuring the proportion of CIABOC’s operating expenditure devoted to public outreach and prevention during the past three years scored moderate. CIABOC’s total operating expenditure amounted to SL Rs. 247,500,000/- in 2015, which is the only year with publicly-accessible records for operating expenditure.113 The expenditure on bribery prevention (Rs. 1,451, 000) is however, taken from its budget for capital expenditure, which is something of a budgeting anomaly.114 This works out to 0.54%. It brings CIABOC uncomfortably close to the boundary between moderate and low scores. Still, much has been achieved with these funds and this should be appreciated.

111. Interview with ex-DG, DIABOC, on 10/11/2016.112. Interview with present DG on 15/12/2016.113. CIABOC’s operating expenditure was calculated by adding-up total re-current expenditure, training & capacity building, and bribery prevention. See CIABOC’s Annual Report (2015) p 36. 114. CIABOC’s Annual Report (2015), p 36.

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Corruption prevention initiatives over the past three years rated a high score. Between 2013-14 awareness activities were conducted, but these were somewhat ad hoc. However, as mentioned above, in 2015, CIABOC stepped-up its activities.115

CIABOC celebrated ‘Anti-Corruption Day’ in December 2015 with the former DG launching the anti-corruption website I-paid-a-bribe, which aims at crowd-sourcing corruption complaints. An awareness campaign in the form of an anti-corruption walk was also organized for the first time. On Anti-Corruption Day, December 2016, CIABOC organized a workshop for approx 800 public servants expected to be involved in the conducting of provincial elections in early-2017, on what constitutes electoral corruption. Provincial level politicians also participated. CIABOC is presently organizing a legal workshop for its legal officers. All these initiatives together enabled a high score.

The number of reviews of organizational procedures, systems & capabilities conducted by CIABOC to prevent corruption during the past three years rated ‘moderate’. The frequency of including corruption prevention recommendations in investigation reports during the past three years also scored moderate. Though CIABOC staff state that recommendations are structured into the investigation reports, it was not possible for the lead researcher to corroborate this, by accessing a report format. This precluded a higher score.

CIABOC’s plan for prevention, education and outreach and its implementation received a high score. Collaboration with other stakeholders on prevention, education and outreach activities also rated a high score. CIABOC’s use of campaigns to disseminate prevention information also scored high in view of the level of organizational activity outlined above. However, use of website and social media for corruption dissemination information also scored moderate, for lack of activity. CIABOC does not use social media at present.

Finally, research and exploration of corruption risks, context and conditions rated a low score. CIABOC does not have a budget for research and exploration of corruption risks. Its website displays research done by other organizations engaged in anti-corruption work, but no independent research has been initiated.

COOPERATION WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONSPerformance in this dimension is slightly above the overall score (60%). One indicator scored high and the other four moderate.

The only indicator to score high referred to the extent to which CIABOC participates in international networks. The Commissioners, DG and senior staff all participate often in UNCAC, UNODC and SAARC-related events. They also take part in INGO-related andprograms organized by Transparency International Sri Lanka. Staff ranging from Directors of Investigation and Asst Directors are sent abroad frequently for training, to well-known institutions in India, the UK and the USA.

The government’s support to CIABOC for prosecution of corruption cases scores moderate. This is because despite a relative absence of interference from the AG’s Department in its work, and despite the fact that CIABOC in fact hires legal personnel from the AG’s Department on a consultancy basis, average prosecution rates remain low.

Cooperation with other integrity agencies also scored moderate. Two other integrity agencies exist. The Financial Crimes Investigation Department (FCID) which is a unit within the Police Dept, was gazetted in early-2015, after the electoral victory of the present coalition, to focus on large scale financial crime. The Presidential Commission to Investigate and Inquire into Serious Acts of Fraud, Corruption and Abuse of Power, State Resources and Privileges (PRECIFAC) on the other hand, has a slightly different focus. Also set up in the wake of the electoral victory, it deals with the massive abuses of state power and misuse of state property which (allegedly) transpired during the time of the previous government.

CIABOC points out that they share legal staff with PRECIFAC, which in practice ensures that cases handled by one agency are not duplicated in others. However, this is only an informal arrangement. PRECIFAC also constantly checks if CIABOC is following up on cases which PRECIFAC has received. This is due to the fact that complainants tend to seek relief by applying to multiple agencies at the same

115. See Section 2.

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time. However, there does not seem to be any real collaboration in investigations; nor any fruitful exchange of information on high profile or complicated cases or a common strategy towards politically sensitive cases involving ‘influential’ suspects. Such cases may have underworld support, or contacts with high-level political figures, or even be high-level political figures themselves, or have contacts with both the underworld and politics. Dealing with this kind of suspect may require a unified approach by all integrity agencies if they are to prevail.

CIABOC’s failure to forge strategic alliances with other integrity bodies may have to do with the fact that it is tied by its confidentiality clause. Such confidentiality clauses sometimes tends to create a somewhat insular environment in which the organization concerned becomes very secretive and reluctant to share information.

Cooperation with non-governmental organizations, however, scored moderate, which is an area of some concern. This is due to complaints by some trade unions and CSOs mentioned above - especially those linked to leftwing political parties - that CIABOC’s attitude towards the public is somewhat adversarial rather than supportive. This is vehemently denied by CIABOC.116 But CIABOC front office staff may themselves be unaware of the extent to which the public finds their demeanour intimidating rather than encouraging. They may be preoccupied with trying to extract from the complainant what they feel is relevant information in order to put together a comprehensive complaint on paper. Further, they may feel that the complainant is motivated by petty revenge rather than pubic-mindedness when making an entry. This is supported by the large number of complaints which are made anonymously.

Still, as a public institution funded by the tax-payer, CIABOC staff cannot assume that complaints are motivated by self-interest alone. Even though their experience as investigators may lead them to think so, they need to remain professional and treat complainants as public-minded citizens until such time as they prove themselves not to be so. It should be mentioned that other CSOs say they were treated with civility, but go on to attribute this to the fact that they have an organization behind them.

ACCOUNTABILITY & OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONSThis dimension rated the lowest score (25%). This is a serious area of concern. Two indicators scored moderate and the other two low.

Information provided in and accessibility of the annual report and website scored moderate. According to its enabling legislation (1994) CIABOC is required to produce an Annual Report detailing its activities, which is to be sent to the President, who then makes it available to Parliament. In practice, CIABOC’s 2015 Annual Report has, for the first time, been uploaded onto its website. However, this does not compensate for lack of information on the history of its activities as a public-funded institution accountable to the public. Hard copies of previous reports are difficult to access.117

The 2015 Annual Report spelt out its mission and provided some information on its budget, number of investigations carried out over the past five years and staff vacancies. Its website is freely accessible, but the information provided is limited to a hotline and email access to the DG and the Commissioners, number of completed investigations and convictions. The website also lacks basic information on the activities of the institute, and as CIABOC staff admit, is not always updated.118

Oversight mechanisms also scored moderate. CIABOC is answerable to Parliament. It is expected to provide the relevant parliamentary committee with progress reports every two months. However, the 19th Amendment which contains these oversight provisions was only passed in May 2015. In practice, therefore, these procedures have only just begun to fall into place. This is an area of opportunity which CIABOC should pick up, since the very process of reporting on the progress of institutional activities in itself requires a self-assessment of them which would not otherwise happen.

117. The research team was not able to access even hard copies of previous reports, despite many efforts.118. Interview with CIABOC staff on 10.11.2016.

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Procedure for dealing with complaints against ACA personnel scored low. Here the record is very problematic. There is no procedure for investigation by another public agency. In fact, a complaint of bribery against a previous CIABOC Chairman (2010-15) was investigated by the accused himself and dismissed. As evidenced by the number of articles in the electronic and tabloid media which are sharply critical of his conduct, this issue generated much public outrage.119 CIABOC is not able to discipline its investigators, who come under the Police Ordinance. Disciplinary hearings have to be initiated by the Police HR Division. This is a cumbersome procedure.

In May 2016 the Sunday Times stated that CIABOC was probing the conduct of an investigator (Inspector A.H.M. Gamini Abeysinghe) accused of leaking confidential information. The outcome of this probe remains shrouded in secrecy, and in general, CIABOC’s internal procedures lack transparency. Thus the indicator on the outcome of complaints against CIABOC or its personnel in past three years also scored low.

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF CIABOC’S PERFORMANCEThis dimension rated a moderate score (57.4%), which again is an area of some concern. The only indicator to score high, related to perceptions of CIABOC’s effectiveness in dealing with complaints among females citizens who had direct contact with it.

The research team was not able to access any female complainants. However, the Sri Lanka data on the 2016 GCB (forthcoming) reveals that 42.8% of female respondents thought that CIABOC was doing well or very well in fighting corruption, while 24.1 were dissatisfied. An equal number (24.8%) were unable to form an opinion. Thus a much greater percentage of female respondents were optimistic about CIABOC’s performance than not.

Further, it was noted that among the inquiries into complaints of bribery and corruption cited on CIABOC’s website between 2012-16, are five instances of female plaintiffs who cite demands for sexual gratification in lieu of money, for political or administrative services. Of these, two such charges have resulted in convictions, with sentences including two years rigorous imprisonment suspended for 10 years. The first was initiated in August 2012, but the indictment only took place in March 2016. The other was made in September 2013, and the perpetrator was sentenced in January 2016. This is a 40% conviction rate, which is much better than the overall convictions record. Clearly then, while women complainants have brought charges against demands for sexual gratification before, it is only in the past two years that these have borne fruit in the courts. This indicates that the present CIABOC staff takes complaints of demands for sexual gratification seriously enough to see plaintiffs through to court.

Indicators assessing a range of perceptions from the degree of public confidence that the government has given CIABOC the powers/resources it requires for curbing corruption, in the Commission’s adherence to due process and its impartiality, confidence in CIABOC’s respectful treatment of persons under investigation, its effectiveness in corruption control, all scored moderate. This was because they evoked a mixed response.

Public confidence that the government has given CIABOC sufficient powers elicited a range of responses. According to the GCB’s (2016) Sri Lanka data, 43.9% of respondents thought that CIABOC was doing well or even very well. 26.1% were dissatisfied and 30% did not want to venture an opinion. Against this, as mentioned above, a community perceptions survey on policing by the Asia Foundation, Colombo in Jan 2016 shows a sharp shift over the past year: public views on corruption as a key factor affecting policing dropped from 24% in 2014 to 6% in 2015. Political interference as a factor also dropped from 56% to 39% in the same period (see table 6). This implies that perceptions of corruption as well as political interference within public institutions such as the police has declined radically over 2015 (i.e. 100% -[6%+39%] = 55% of respondents have confidence in the political climate) This rates a ‘moderate’ score.

This note of optimism ran through all key informant interviews. Professional groups ranging from criminal justice practitioners, academics, trade unionists and journalists agree that CIABOC does have sufficient legal powers. At the same time, they qualify this assertion by pointing out that CIABOC lacks adequate resources – especially high-quality human resources. The fact that CIABOC is dependent on the Police Department to supply it with investigators is thought to be unsatisfactory. Its legal resources are also thought to be wanting, which increases its dependence on the AG’s dept. This is seen to impact negatively on conviction rates.119. This incident was quoted by many key informants to justify their reservations on CIABOC.

36

Public confidence in CIABOC’s adherence to due process, impartiality and fairness in using its powers also scored ‘moderate.’ This is again due to mixed responses to this question. As the Asia Foundation survey mentioned above indicates, perceptions of corruption as well as political interference within public institutions such as the police has declined radically over 2015. On the other hand, there is there is close media interest in CIABOC’s activities. Here the issue of its impartiality and adherence to due process and fairness remains problematic. In fact, a succession of senior political figures expressed such consternation about CIABOC’s (alleged) failure to adhere to due process or be impartial that the then-DG felt obliged to tender her resignation. The fact that she did, ironically, is testimony to the fact that she felt that she did adhere to due process and attempted to be impartial. At the same time, these incessant charges and counter-charges should be seen against a fraught political culture which has emerged in the post-conflict situation. A near breakdown of law and order and the abject politicization of public institutions prevails. This has created enormous public anger against politicians and public servants who are perceived to be culpable. In such a context, the public continues to make demands that corrupt politicians should be brought to justice which may be quite unrealistic in the short term.

CIABOC’s treatment of persons under investigation also scored moderate. The research team could not access such persons. But as mentioned above, many political figures investigated by CIABOC have complained of their treatment to the media. It was in fact the (allegedly) disrespectful and inappropriate conduct of the interrogation of a senior cabinet minister (for a relatively minor charge) which set into motion the train of events which led to the resignation of the then-DG Ms Wickramasinghe on 17.10.2016.

Finally, views of persons who have had direct contact with CIABOC also scored moderate. Persons who had contact with CIABOC fall into two main categories: (a) ordinary citizens and (b) members of CSOs and political activists who represent organizations. The second category in particular, have filed complaints on massive fraud of gigantic dimensions which the CIABOC, understandably enough in the present political climate, has been somewhat hesitant in investigating. This has lead to polarized responses, and those who had high expectations of massive fraud being investigated remain critical about CIABOC’s performance.

Ordinary citizens on their part tend to be intimidated by the somewhat adversarial approach assumed by CIABOC’s Receiving Officers, who, as mentioned above, they complain, interrogate them as if they were the offenders themselves. Many complainants construe such an adversarial response as a lack of impartiality in that CIABOC seems to respond better to higher status complainants or those with an organization backing them.

While both categories of complainants agree that many anonymous complaints may be motivated by petty revenge, they point out that CIABOC’s receiving officers cannot always assume this, and need to treat every complainant with greater respect and assume a more professional stance.

37

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te

and

soci

al

med

ia fo

r di

ssem

inat

ing

info

rmat

ion

on c

orru

ptio

n pr

even

tion

AC

A’s

coop

erat

ion

with

oth

er

orga

niza

tions

(40%

)

Gov

t’s s

uppo

rt to

AC

A w

ith th

e pr

osec

utio

n of

co

rrupt

ion

case

s(m

oder

ate)

Coo

pera

tion

betw

een

ACA

& ot

her i

nteg

rity

agen

cies

(low

)

Coo

pera

tion

betw

een

ACA

and

civi

l soc

iety

gr

oups

(mod

erat

e)

Parti

cipa

tion

in in

tern

atio

nal

netw

orks

(hig

h)

Coo

pera

tion

with

AC

As in

oth

er

coun

tries

(low

)

AC

A’s

acco

unta

bilit

y an

d ov

ersi

ght

(25%

)

Info

rmat

ion

prov

ided

in a

nd

acce

ssib

ility

to

ACA’

s An

nual

R

epor

t and

w

ebsi

te

Ove

rsig

ht

mec

hani

sms

Proc

edur

es fo

r de

alin

g w

ith

com

plai

nts

agai

nst A

CA

pers

onne

l

Out

com

e of

co

mpl

aint

s ag

ains

t AC

A or

its

pers

onne

l

Publ

ic

perc

eptio

ns

of A

CA’

s pe

rfor

man

ce(5

0%)

Publ

ic c

onfid

ence

that

the

ACA

has

been

giv

en

suffi

cien

t pow

ers

and

reso

urce

s fo

r cur

bing

co

rrupt

ion

Publ

ic c

onfid

ence

in

the

ACA’

s ad

here

nce

to

due

proc

ess,

im

parti

ality

and

fa

irnes

s in

usi

ng

its p

ower

s

Con

fiden

ce in

its

adh

eren

ce

to d

ue p

roce

ss,

impa

rtial

ity a

nd

fairn

ess

amon

g th

ose

who

hav

e ha

d di

rect

con

-ta

ct w

ith th

e AC

A

Con

fiden

ce in

the

ACA’

s ab

ility

totre

at p

erso

ns

bein

g in

vest

igat

ed

with

dig

nity

and

re

spec

t

Publ

ic p

erce

ptio

n of

the

ACA’

s eff

ectiv

enes

s in

co

rrupt

ion

cont

rol

Perc

eptio

n of

AC

A’s

effec

tiven

ess

in

corru

ptio

n co

ntro

l am

ong

pers

ons

with

dire

ct

cont

act w

ith th

e AC

C

Perc

eptio

n of

AC

A’s

effec

tiven

ess

in

deal

ing

with

co

mpl

aint

s am

ong

wom

en w

ho h

ad

dire

ct c

onta

ct

with

it

38

Tabl

e 9

- DET

AIL

ED IN

DIC

ATO

R S

CO

RES

1. A

CA’

s Le

gal I

ndep

ende

nce

and

Stat

us (7

indi

cato

rs)

IND

ICAT

OR

VA

LUES

IND

ICAT

OR

HIG

HM

OD

ERAT

ELO

WJU

STIF

ICAT

ION

OF

SCO

RES

1. A

CA’

s Le

gal i

ndep

ende

nce

Inde

pend

ent

agen

cySe

para

te a

genc

y ou

t-sid

e m

inis

tryW

ithin

pol

ice

or

min

istry

CIA

BOC

is a

n in

depe

nden

t Com

mis

sion

ans

wer

able

onl

y to

Par

liam

ent (

Act 1

9 of

199

4 Se

ctio

n 26

). Its

lega

l ind

epen

denc

e is

sub

stan

tial,

and

rest

s on

3 le

gisl

ativ

e Ac

ts; (

a) A

ct N

o.19

of 1

994

whi

ch e

nabl

es th

e se

tting

up

of C

IABO

C a

s an

inde

pend

ent c

omm

issi

on to

dea

l with

brib

ery

in th

e pu

blic

sec

tor (

b) T

he B

riber

y Ac

t No.

11 o

f 195

4 (a

men

ded

in 1

994)

whi

ch in

trodu

ces

a ne

w o

ffens

e of

‘cor

rupt

ion’

and

(c) t

he A

sset

s an

d Li

abilit

ies

Law

No.

1 of

197

5. C

ritic

s po

int o

ut

that

the

fact

that

CIA

BOC

’s in

vest

igat

ors

are

seco

nded

from

the

Polic

e D

ept a

nd a

dmin

istra

tive

staff

from

the

Publ

ic S

ervi

ces

Com

mis

sion

is a

con

stra

int t

o its

aut

onom

y, a

nd b

rings

in

gove

rnm

enta

l reg

ulat

ion

thro

ugh

the

back

doo

r. C

IABO

C d

enie

s th

at th

is is

so

and

is w

ell

satis

fied

with

the

exte

nt o

f its

lega

l ind

epen

denc

e.12

0

Sour

ces:

Act

No

19 S

ectio

n 4

(2) (

a),(b

) and

(3) o

f 199

4; th

e As

sets

and

Lia

bilit

ies

Law

No.

1 of

19

75. A

lso

Inte

rvie

w w

ith fo

rmer

DG

(10/

11/2

016)

; int

ervi

ew w

ith A

udito

r Gen

eral

(21/

09/2

016)

, w

ith a

ttorn

eys

in th

e AG

’s D

epar

tmen

t, m

embe

rs o

f the

BAS

L an

d le

gal j

ourn

alis

ts.

2.AC

A’s

man

date

Focu

s on

in

vest

igat

ion,

pr

osec

utio

n,

educ

atio

n

&pre

vent

ion

Prim

ary

focu

s on

in

vest

igat

ion

Educ

atio

n &

prev

entio

n w

ithou

t in

vest

igat

ion

CIA

BOC

’s m

anda

te e

ncom

pass

es a

ll fo

ur fu

nctio

ns o

f inv

estig

atio

n, p

rose

cutio

n, e

duca

tion

and

prev

entio

n.

Sour

ces:

CIA

BOC

’s A

nnua

l Rev

iew

(201

5), p

34;

Brib

ery

(Am

endm

ent)

Act N

o.19

& A

ct N

o 20

of

199

4. A

lso

inte

rvie

ws

with

CSO

lead

ers.

3.AC

A’s

lega

l pow

ers

Exte

nsiv

e Po

wer

s (A

rrest

and

se

arch

, pro

bing

of

ban

k A/

Cs,

sa

fe-d

epos

it bo

xes,

inco

me

tax

reco

rds

, pr

oper

ty, s

earc

h an

d en

try o

f pr

emis

es, e

tc)

Som

e po

wer

sFe

w o

r non

eC

IABO

C’s

lega

l pow

ers

are

wid

e-ra

ngin

g, in

clud

ing

the

pow

er to

obt

ain

oral

and

writ

ten

evid

ence

, exa

min

e w

itnes

ses

unde

r oat

h, re

ques

t rel

evan

t inf

orm

atio

n fro

m b

anks

, Dep

t of

Inla

nd R

even

ue o

r any

oth

er in

stitu

tion,

pro

hibi

t sus

pect

s fro

m le

avin

g th

e co

untry

, ent

er a

nd

sear

ch p

rem

ises

, rig

ht to

issu

e su

mm

ons

and

sear

ch w

arra

nts

with

out a

cou

rt or

der,

etc.

The

BASL

is p

ress

ing

for a

n ex

tens

ion

of C

IABO

C’s

lega

l pow

ers

to e

ncom

pass

the

laun

derin

g of

fund

s ac

quire

d th

roug

h br

iber

y or

cor

rupt

mea

ns, i

n or

der t

o en

hanc

e ch

ance

s of

sec

urin

g co

nvic

tions

.121

Sour

ces:

Inte

rvie

w w

ith e

x-D

G (1

0/11

/201

6); a

lso

inte

rvie

ws

with

mem

bers

of t

he B

ASL

and

the

AG’s

Dep

t. C

IABO

C’s

Ann

ual R

epor

t (20

15);

The

Brib

ery

(Am

endm

ent)

Act N

o.19

of 1

994

Sect

ion

3, S

ectio

n 4

(10,

(2) &

(3) a

nd S

ectio

n 5.

120.

CIA

BOC

’s e

x-D

G p

oint

s ou

t the

re a

re d

iffer

ent m

etho

ds o

f rec

ruiti

ng s

taff

to C

IABO

C. A

t pre

sent

, the

lega

l offi

cers

bel

ong

to a

‘clo

sed’

ser

vice

and

inve

stig

ator

s be

long

to th

e Po

lice

Dep

t. Bu

t onc

e th

ey’re

rele

ased

to

CIA

BOC

th

ey b

ecom

e ‘a

utho

rized

offi

cers

’ and

ther

efor

e ca

nnot

be

rem

oved

by

the

IGP

with

out t

he c

onse

nt o

f the

Com

mis

sion

.12

1. S

ee a

lso

Sund

ay T

imes

(4.7

.201

6); C

eylo

n To

day

(29/

2/20

16).

39

IND

ICAT

OR

VA

LUES

IND

ICAT

OR

HIG

HM

OD

ERAT

ELO

WJU

STIF

ICAT

ION

OF

SCO

RES

4. A

ppoi

ntm

ent o

f AC

A’s

Com

mis

-si

oner

sIn

depe

nden

t co

mm

ittee

usi

ng

obje

ctiv

e cr

iteria

an

d tra

nspa

rent

pr

oced

ure

Min

iste

rial

com

mitt

ee u

sing

ob

ject

ive

crite

ria,

but p

roce

dure

not

tra

nspa

rent

PM/P

resi

dent

m

akes

dec

isio

n&

proc

edur

e is

not

tra

nspa

rent

The

Brib

ery

(Am

endm

ent)

Act (

1994

) sta

tes

that

Com

mis

sion

ers

will

be a

ppoi

nted

by

the

Pres

iden

t on

the

advi

ce o

f the

CC

and

hav

e a

fixed

term

of 5

yea

rs. I

t als

o st

ates

that

the

Com

mis

sion

sha

ll co

nsis

t of t

hree

mem

bers

, tw

o of

who

m s

hall

be re

tired

judg

es o

f the

Su

prem

e C

ourt/

Cou

rt of

App

eal a

nd th

e th

ird a

per

son

with

wid

e ex

perie

nce

rela

ting

to th

e in

vest

igat

ion

of c

rime/

law

enf

orce

men

t.

In p

ract

ice,

the

CC

follo

wed

the

proc

edur

e in

oth

er c

ount

ries

in th

is re

gard

and

cal

led

for

nom

inat

ions

from

the

gene

ral p

ublic

. The

y pr

ocee

d to

inte

rvie

w n

omin

ees

in o

rder

to a

sses

s th

eir p

erce

ived

inte

grity

, rep

utat

ion

and

abilit

y, s

ubm

ittin

g th

eir c

hose

n ca

ndid

ates

to th

e Pr

esid

ent.

How

ever

, thi

s pr

oced

ure

is n

ot m

anda

ted.

The

refo

re th

e le

vel o

f tra

nspa

renc

y re

mai

ns a

n op

tion

whi

ch is

dep

ende

nt o

n th

e in

itiat

ive

(and

libe

ral c

ompo

sitio

n) o

f the

CC

.

Sour

ces:

the

Brib

ery

(Am

endm

ent)

Act N

o.19

of 1

994,

Sec

tion

2 (2

a), (

2b) &

(3) i

nter

view

s w

ith m

embe

rs o

f the

BAS

L, A

G’s

Dep

artm

ent a

nd a

cade

mic

s. A

lso

inte

rvie

w w

ith e

x-D

G

(10.

11.2

016)

5. C

omm

issi

oner

’s te

rm o

f offi

ce &

re

mov

alFi

xed

term

with

te

nure

(diffi

cult

to

rem

ove

with

out

prop

er c

ause

Fixe

d te

rm w

ith

with

out t

enur

e,

but n

ot d

ifficu

lt to

rem

ove

Com

mis

sion

ers

No

fixed

te

rm a

nd

Com

mis

sion

ers

can

be e

asily

re

plac

ed

Com

mis

sion

ers

enjo

y a

fixed

5-y

ear t

erm

whi

ch is

tenu

red

and

cann

ot b

e re

mov

ed e

xcep

t on

grou

nds

of p

rove

n m

isco

nduc

t or i

ncap

acity

. The

y ar

e no

t elig

ible

for r

e-ap

poin

tmen

t.

Sour

ce: B

riber

y (A

men

dmen

t) Ac

t No.

19, S

ectio

n2 (5

) (a)

and

(b),

(6).

6. A

CA’

s op

erat

iona

l aut

onom

y an

d im

parti

ality

Hig

h (n

o po

litic

al

inte

rfere

nce)

Lim

ited

(som

e po

litic

al

inte

rfere

nce)

Low

( hi

gh

leve

l of p

oliti

cal

inte

rfere

nce)

CIA

BOC

’s e

x-D

G d

enie

s th

at th

ere

was

pol

itica

l int

erfe

renc

e in

the

daily

ope

ratio

ns o

f the

C

omm

issi

on. S

he s

tate

s ca

tego

rical

ly th

at d

urin

g he

r ten

ure

of 1

9 m

onth

s sh

e fa

ced

no p

oliti

cal

inte

rfere

nce

wha

tsoe

ver.

How

ever

, she

resi

gned

her

pos

t on

17.1

0.20

16 in

resp

onse

to a

crit

ical

co

mm

ent b

y th

e Ex

ecut

ive.

122

CIA

BOC

’s im

parti

ality

, how

ever

. is

cont

este

d by

man

y C

SOs,

trad

e un

ions

and

pol

itici

ans

oppo

sed

to th

e go

vt. T

he u

nfor

tuna

te c

ondu

ct o

f pre

viou

s C

omm

issi

oner

s ha

ve a

lso

fuel

led

publ

ic p

erce

ptio

n th

at C

omm

issi

oner

s/D

G a

re p

oliti

cal a

ppoi

ntee

s. T

hey

furth

er c

ompl

aine

d th

at C

IABO

C w

as n

ot im

parti

al in

oth

er w

ays;

sin

ce it

s st

aff w

ere

draw

n fro

m th

e po

lice

dept

, fro

nt-o

ffice

sta

ff te

nded

to re

plic

ate

the

som

ewha

t adv

ersa

rial a

ttitu

de o

f the

Sri

Lank

an p

olic

e to

war

ds th

e pu

blic

. Ord

inar

y co

mpl

aina

nts

tend

to b

e in

terro

gate

d as

if th

ey w

ere

the

offen

ders

th

emse

lves

. Thi

s is

thou

ght t

o im

pact

on

CIA

BOC

’s im

parti

ality

. It w

as fe

lt th

at C

IABO

C

pers

onne

l dis

play

ed g

reat

er im

parti

ality

/pro

fess

iona

lism

tow

ards

soc

ially

-adv

anta

ged

grou

ps o

r th

ose

with

an

orga

niza

tion

supp

ortin

g th

em.

Sour

ces:

Ann

ual R

epor

t 201

5, in

terv

iew

with

Ex-

DG

(2/1

1/20

16);

Con

veno

r, C

eylo

n Te

ache

rs’

Uni

on (2

2/9/

2016

); G

ener

al S

ecy.

Pub

lic S

ecto

r Nur

ses’

Uni

on (1

4/19

/201

6) a

nd C

onve

nor,

Voic

e Ag

ains

t Cor

rupt

ion

(15/

09/2

016)

. See

als

o Su

nday

Lea

der (

23/1

0/20

16) a

nd L

anka

deep

a (2

0/10

/201

6).

122.

Thi

s w

as a

gen

eral

com

men

t mad

e by

the

Pres

iden

t to

all a

nti-c

orru

ptio

n ag

enci

es a

nd n

ot a

imed

at C

IABO

C in

par

ticul

ar.

40

IND

ICAT

OR

VA

LUES

IND

ICAT

OR

HIG

HM

OD

ERAT

ELO

WJU

STIF

ICAT

ION

OF

SCO

RES

7. G

over

nmen

t’s re

lianc

e on

AC

A to

us

e co

rrupt

ion

as a

wea

pon

agai

nst

polit

ical

opp

onen

ts

Gov

ernm

ent h

as

not u

sed

ACA

as a

wea

pon

agai

nst p

oliti

cal

oppo

nent

s

Evid

ence

of l

imite

d us

e of

AC

A as

a

wea

pon

agai

nst

polit

ical

opp

onen

ts

Evid

ence

of

wid

espr

ead

use

of A

CA

as a

w

eapo

n ag

ains

t op

pone

nts

This

is c

ompl

ex te

rrain

. In

the

pres

ent p

oliti

cal c

onte

xt, f

or th

e fir

st ti

me

in h

isto

ry, t

he tw

o m

ain

parti

es in

Sri

Lank

a’s

two-

party

sys

tem

hav

e fo

rmed

a c

oalit

ion,

blu

rring

line

s on

who

is ‘i

n’ th

e re

gim

e an

d w

ho b

ecom

es a

n ‘o

ppon

ent.’

CIA

BOC

, in

the

past

has

mos

tly te

nded

to fo

cus

on re

lativ

ely

min

or o

ffend

ers

rath

er th

an th

e ‘b

ig fi

sh.’

How

ever

, und

er th

e ne

w c

limat

e th

ey h

ave

begu

n to

inte

rroga

te in

fluen

tial fi

gure

s.

This

pro

voke

s th

ose

outs

ide

the

coal

ition

to c

ompl

ain

that

CIA

BOC

is b

eing

use

d as

a w

eapo

n ag

ains

t opp

onen

ts o

f the

regi

me.

At t

he s

ame

time,

oth

ers

argu

e th

at th

e pe

rcei

ved

wea

knes

ses

in C

IABO

C’s

per

form

ance

– fa

ilure

to s

win

g co

nvic

tions

in c

harg

es a

gain

st ‘b

ig fi

sh’ -

are

due

to

a la

ck o

f tra

inin

g of

its

staff

and

lack

of r

esou

rces

to m

eet t

oday

’s c

halle

nges

. Yet

ano

ther

lin

e of

crit

icis

m a

sser

ts th

at th

ere

is a

mea

sure

of s

elf-c

enso

rshi

p on

the

part

of e

ither

the

Com

mis

sion

ers

or th

e D

G w

ho m

ay im

agin

e th

at th

e Ex

ecut

ive

whi

ch a

ppoi

nted

them

exp

ects

th

em to

toe

a ce

rtain

line

.

The

pers

iste

nce

of s

o m

any

dive

rse

criti

cism

s w

hich

con

tradi

ct e

ach

othe

r in

fact

tend

s to

ne

utra

lize

the

forc

e of

eac

h an

d re

info

rces

the

notio

n th

at th

e in

stitu

tion

is re

lativ

ely

impa

rtial

. C

IABO

C re

spon

ds b

y po

intin

g ou

t tha

t the

y ar

e pr

esen

tly in

vest

igat

ing

high

ly-p

lace

d fig

ures

w

ithin

the

gove

rnm

ent,

as w

ell a

s ke

y m

embe

rs o

f the

pre

viou

s go

vern

men

t. At

leas

t one

suc

h fig

ure

has

publ

icly

adm

itted

that

he

was

, in

fact

inte

rroga

ted

over

a c

ompl

aint

.

Sour

ces:

Inte

rvie

w w

ith e

x-D

G (2

.11.

2016

); al

so In

terv

iew

with

con

veno

r, Pu

blic

Sec

tor N

urse

s’

Uni

on (1

4/09

/201

6); C

hairm

an, C

OPE

(20/

10/2

016)

; Sun

day

Tim

es (2

6/04

/201

5);`I

slan

d (E

dito

rial)

(15/

09/2

016)

; Cey

lon

Toda

y,(2

4/10

/201

6).

41

2. A

CA’

s Fi

nanc

ial a

nd H

uman

Res

ourc

es (9

indi

cato

rs)

IND

ICAT

OR

VA

LUES

IND

ICAT

OR

HIG

HM

OD

ERAT

ELO

WJU

STIF

ICAT

ION

OF

SCO

RES

8. A

vera

ge ra

tio o

f AG

A’s

budg

et to

to

tal g

ovt b

udge

t for

the

past

thre

e ye

ars

Abov

e 0.

20%

Betw

een

0.10

%-

0.20

%Be

low

0.1

0%Th

e av

erag

e pr

opor

tion

of C

IABO

C’s

bud

get t

o to

tal g

over

nmen

tal b

udge

t ove

r the

pas

t 3 y

ears

is

0.0

132%

. Thi

s th

eref

ore

falls

into

the

low

cat

egor

y (S

ee ta

ble

3).

Sour

ces:

Min

istry

of F

inan

ce, B

udge

t Est

imat

es –

201

6 (w

ww.

treas

ury.

gov.

lk)

9. S

uffici

ency

of A

CA’

s bu

dget

in

term

s of

per

form

ing

its fu

nctio

ns

Mor

e th

an

adeq

uate

(8

0%-1

00%

of

budg

et re

ques

ts

appr

oved

Adeq

uate

(66%

-79

% o

f bud

get

requ

est i

s ap

prov

ed

Inad

equa

te (l

ess

than

66%

of

requ

est

Appr

oved

And

relie

s on

fu

ndin

g by

C

SOs

and

dono

rs

CIA

BOC

sta

tes

that

its

budg

etar

y po

sitio

n is

ver

y sa

tisfa

ctor

y an

d th

at th

ey h

ave

no c

ompl

aint

s.

Thou

gh a

t the

beg

inni

ng o

f 201

5, o

ffice

equ

ipm

ent s

uch

as c

ompu

ters

wer

e la

ckin

g, o

ver

the

past

two

year

s th

is s

ituat

ion

has

impr

oved

con

side

rabl

y. W

hile

the

Com

mis

sion

stil

l lac

ks

suffi

cien

t offi

ce s

pace

for i

nves

tigat

ors,

they

hav

e be

en g

rant

ed a

n ad

join

ing

bloc

k of

land

for

build

ing

expa

nsio

n.

Sour

ces:

Inte

rvie

w w

ith e

x-D

G C

IABO

C (0

2/11

/201

6); C

IABO

C’s

Ann

ual R

epor

t (20

15);

inte

rvie

w w

ith A

udito

r-Gen

eral

(21/

09/2

016)

; als

o in

terv

iew

s w

ith c

once

rned

jour

nalis

ts a

nd

acad

emic

s.

10. S

ecur

ity &

sta

bilit

y of

AC

A’s

bud-

get d

urin

g th

e pa

st th

ree

year

sBu

dget

is

guar

ante

ed,

base

d o

n pr

evio

us y

ear’s

al

loca

tion

and

has

not b

een

redu

ced.

Budg

et h

as n

ot

been

redu

ced

in th

e pa

st th

ree

year

s

Budg

et h

as b

een

redu

ced

durin

g th

e pa

st th

ree

year

s

Sinc

e th

e ne

w g

ovt w

hich

sw

ept i

nto

pow

er in

Jan

201

5 m

ade

corru

ptio

n a

key

plan

k in

its

plat

form

, the

allo

catio

ns to

CIA

BOC

impr

oved

in 2

015

over

pre

viou

s ye

ars

(0.0

147%

). H

owev

er,

this

leve

l fel

l to

0.01

24%

in 2

016,

but

impr

oves

slig

htly

to 0

.028

% in

pro

ject

ions

for 2

017

(see

Ta

ble

5).

Sour

ces:

CIA

BOC

’s A

nnua

l Rep

ort (

2015

); M

inis

try o

f Fin

ance

, Bud

get E

stim

ates

201

6, (w

ww.

treas

ury.

gov.

lk);

inte

rvie

ws

with

aca

dem

ics

and

lega

l pro

fess

iona

ls.

11. A

CA

pers

onne

l’s s

alar

y an

d be

nefit

sC

ompe

titiv

e sa

lary

and

be

nefit

s

Adeq

uate

sal

ary

and

bene

fits

Low

sal

ary

and

limite

d be

nefit

sC

IABO

C’s

inve

stig

ator

s ar

e pa

id b

y th

e Po

lice

Dep

t and

its

adm

inis

trativ

e st

aff b

y th

e Pu

blic

Ser

vice

s C

omm

issi

on. S

alar

ies

rem

ain

low,

in k

eepi

ng w

ith s

alar

ies

in th

e pu

blic

se

ctor

. How

ever

, CIA

BOC

pay

s offi

cers

inve

stig

atin

g br

iber

y ca

ses

a ris

k al

low

ance

of 2

5%.

Inve

stig

ator

s ar

e al

so re

war

ded

whe

n co

nvic

tions

are

sec

ured

. Leg

al o

ffice

rs re

ceiv

e a

mon

thly

al

low

ance

from

CIA

BOC

in a

dditi

on to

wha

t the

y ar

e pa

id b

y th

e Pu

blic

Ser

vice

s C

omm

issi

on

(PSC

). C

IABO

C s

taff

expr

esse

d sa

tisfa

ctio

n w

ith p

ay c

ondi

tions

and

ben

efits

to th

e re

sear

ch

team

. Des

pite

this

, CIA

BOC

has

not

bee

n ab

le to

attr

act t

he k

ind

of le

gal t

alen

t whi

ch c

ould

ra

ise

rate

s of

con

vict

ion

in c

ourt.

Sour

ce: I

nter

view

with

ex-

DG

(2/1

1/20

16) a

nd C

IABO

C s

taff

(10.

11.2

016)

; als

o w

ith A

udito

r G

ener

al (2

1/09

/201

6), B

ASL

and

lega

l jou

rnal

ists

.

42

IND

ICAT

OR

VA

LUES

IND

ICAT

OR

HIG

HM

OD

ERAT

ELO

WJU

STIF

ICAT

ION

OF

SCO

RES

12. A

CA’

s se

lect

ion

crite

ria fo

r st

affM

erito

crat

ic

and

trans

pare

nt

proc

edur

es

Lim

ited

degr

ee

of m

erito

crat

ic

& tra

nspa

rent

pr

oced

ures

Patro

nage

and

no

n-tra

nspa

rent

pr

oced

ures

CIA

BOC

’s in

vest

igat

ors

are

seco

nded

from

the

Polic

e D

ept,

to w

hich

ent

ry re

quire

men

ts a

re

low

(O/L

s or

less

) rel

ativ

e to

the

rest

of t

he p

ublic

sec

tor.

CIA

BOC

sub

ject

s th

em to

an

entra

nce

test

. Th

e la

rge

num

ber o

f vac

anci

es fo

r inv

estig

ator

s sp

eaks

for t

he h

igh

cut o

ff po

int r

elat

ive

to

the

aptit

ude

of a

pplic

ants

.

CIA

BOC

poi

nts

out t

hat t

he d

iscr

etio

n al

low

ed th

em to

set

recr

uitm

ent s

tand

ards

has

incr

ease

d gr

eatly

in re

cent

yea

rs a

nd th

is s

houl

d be

app

reci

ated

. It h

as a

lread

y pr

esen

ted

a dr

aft c

abin

et

pape

r out

linin

g el

evat

ed s

elec

tion

crite

ria fo

r a n

ew in

take

of 3

00 in

vest

igat

ors

to m

eet s

taff

need

s, w

hich

set

s th

e ba

r at a

firs

t deg

ree,

and

at l

east

1 y

ear’s

trai

ning

in

any

of th

e ar

med

fo

rces

.

Sour

ces:

Inte

rvie

w w

ith E

x-D

G (1

0/11

/201

6); C

IABO

C A

nnua

l Rev

iew

(201

5) p

33.

13. L

evel

s of

exp

ertis

e of

AC

A’s

Cor

rupt

ion

inve

stig

atio

n pe

rson

nel

Hig

h le

vels

of

expe

rtise

Lack

s ex

perti

se in

so

me

area

sLa

cks

expe

rtise

in

man

y ar

eas

Ther

e is

muc

h di

ssat

isfa

ctio

n am

ong

CSO

gro

ups

and

prof

essi

onal

s w

ithin

gov

t dep

artm

ents

w

ith th

e ab

ility

of C

IABO

C’s

inve

stig

ator

s, w

hose

num

eric

al s

kills

see

m to

them

to b

e in

adeq

uate

to e

ven

take

dow

n co

mpl

aint

s co

mpe

tent

ly. In

vest

igat

ors

are

thou

ght t

o la

ck IT

sk

ills, n

umer

ical

ski

lls, a

nd a

udit/

acco

untin

g ab

ility.

CIA

BOC

acc

epts

that

this

may

hav

e be

en s

o in

the

past

, but

den

ies

that

suc

h a

situ

atio

n st

ill pe

rsis

ts. T

he e

x-D

G s

ays

that

the

skills

of i

nves

tigat

ors

have

impr

oved

ove

r the

pas

t with

co

nsis

tent

in-h

ouse

trai

ning

and

are

stil

l im

prov

ing.

Whi

le th

ey d

o la

ck h

ighl

y-qu

alifi

ed s

taff

for

com

plex

inve

stig

atio

ns, s

he in

sist

s th

at th

ese

case

s ar

e re

lativ

ely

few

at p

rese

nt, a

nd th

ey h

ave

the

mea

ns to

hire

hig

hly

-qua

lified

con

sulta

nts

for s

peci

fic ta

sks

as n

eede

d.

Still,

the

conc

erns

of o

ther

sta

keho

lder

s in

the

anti-

corru

ptio

n fro

nt c

anno

t be

dism

isse

d.

Sour

ces:

Inte

rvie

w w

ith e

x-D

G, C

IABO

C (2

/11/

2016

); w

ith C

IABO

C s

taff

(10/

11/2

016)

; als

o in

terv

iew

with

Cha

irman

, CO

PE (2

0/10

/201

6); C

onve

nor,

Cey

lon

Teac

hers

’ Uni

on (2

2/09

/201

6)

Gen

. Sec

y. P

ublic

Sec

tor N

urse

s’ U

nion

(14/

19/2

016)

, Con

veno

r, Vo

ice

Agai

nst C

orru

ptio

n

(15/

09/2

016)

; Aud

itor-G

ener

al (2

1/09

/201

6). A

lso

inte

rvie

ws

with

crim

inal

just

ice

prof

essi

onal

s,

and

jour

nalis

ts.

14. E

xper

tise

of A

CA

Pers

onne

l in

cor

rupt

ion

prev

entio

n an

d ed

ucat

ion

Hig

h le

vels

of

expe

rtise

Lack

s ex

perti

se in

so

me

area

sLa

cks

expe

rtise

in

man

y ar

eas

Falls

into

the

high

cat

egor

y si

nce

in te

rms

of e

duca

tiona

l qua

lifica

tions

, CIA

BOC

’s c

leric

al s

taff

who

are

recr

uite

d by

the

PSC

are

exp

ecte

d to

hav

e a

first

deg

ree.

Whi

le in

the

past

ther

e w

as

little

focu

s on

pre

vent

ion,

ove

r the

last

two

year

s, th

e ne

w C

omm

issi

on a

nd D

G p

lan

to s

et u

p a

Prev

entio

n U

nit,

with

a s

trate

gy ti

tled

‘Sev

en s

teps

to z

ero

tole

ranc

e’. A

dra

ft ca

bine

t pap

er

has

been

pre

pare

d to

set

up

such

uni

ts. T

houg

h ca

bine

t app

rova

l is

pend

ing,

wor

k is

on-

goin

g.

CIA

BOC

has

wor

ked

with

the

Nat

iona

l Ins

titut

e of

Edu

catio

n (N

IE) -

whi

ch fo

rmul

ates

syl

labi

an

d te

ache

r-tra

inin

g m

ater

ials

for t

he D

epar

tmen

t of E

duca

tion

– to

inco

rpor

ate

corru

ptio

n aw

aren

ess

conc

epts

into

prim

ary

scho

ol s

ylla

bi. T

hese

cam

e in

to e

ffect

in J

anua

ry 2

017.

Thi

s in

itiat

ive

has

been

wel

com

ed b

y C

SO a

nd tr

ade

unio

n le

ader

s.

Sour

ces:

CIA

BOC

’s A

nnua

l Rep

ort (

2015

) and

inte

rvie

w w

ith e

x-D

G (2

/11/

2016

); in

terv

iew

with

G

ener

al S

ecy.

Pub

lic S

ecto

r Nur

ses’

Uni

on (1

4/19

/201

6) a

nd C

onve

nor,

CaF

FE (1

4/09

/201

6); K

Te

nnak

oon

in C

eylo

n To

day

(14/

10/2

016)

.

43

IND

ICAT

OR

VA

LUES

IND

ICAT

OR

HIG

HM

OD

ERAT

ELO

WJU

STIF

ICAT

ION

OF

SCO

RES

15. T

rain

ing

of A

CA

pers

onne

lW

ell-t

rain

ed

staff

with

m

any

train

ing

oppo

rtuni

ties

Som

e tra

ined

pe

rson

nel w

ith

limite

d tra

inin

g op

portu

nitie

s

Trai

ning

is s

een

as u

nim

porta

nt

and

negl

ecte

d

CIA

BOC

has

a c

onsi

sten

t foc

us o

n tra

inin

g. In

-hou

se tr

aini

ng s

essi

ons

take

pla

ce a

a w

eekl

y ba

sis.

Tra

inin

g is

con

duct

ed b

y re

tired

Inte

rpol

offi

cers

, sen

ior p

olic

e offi

cers

. Inv

estig

ativ

e st

aff

at d

iffer

ent l

evel

s ar

e al

so s

ent o

vers

eas

for t

rain

ing

and

re-tr

aini

ng. D

urin

g 20

15, R

s. 3

27,7

50

was

spe

nt o

n tra

inin

g an

d ca

paci

ty b

uild

ing.

Whi

le m

any

conc

erne

d gr

oups

act

ive

in th

e an

ti-co

rrupt

ion

field

com

men

t tha

t CIA

BOC

sta

ff w

ould

ben

efit b

y hi

gh-q

ualit

y IT

ski

lls, f

oren

sic

audi

t and

cha

rtere

d ac

coun

ting

expe

rtise

, C

IABO

C p

oint

s ou

t the

nee

d fo

r suc

h in

puts

is li

mite

d at

the

mom

ent (

see

indi

cato

r No.

13).

Furth

er, t

hey

poin

t out

that

CIA

BOC

’s s

taff

are

pres

ently

und

ergo

ing

inte

nsiv

e tra

inin

g in

IT

skills

and

muc

h eff

ort i

s be

ing

mad

e to

mak

e th

em m

ore

profi

cien

t in

Engl

ish.

CIA

BOC

’s le

gal

office

rs a

re a

lso

unde

rgoi

ng tr

aini

ng o

n a

wee

kly

basi

s, b

y st

aff fr

om th

e AG

’s D

epar

tmen

t.

Sour

ces:

Inte

rvie

w w

ith e

x-D

G a

nd C

IABO

C s

taff

(10/

11/2

016)

; CIA

BOC

Ann

ual R

epor

t (20

15);

inte

rvie

w w

ith A

udito

r-Gen

eral

(21/

09/2

016)

and

ex-

secr

etar

y, P

REC

IFAC

(10/

09/2

016)

; als

o in

terv

iew

s w

ith le

gal p

rofe

ssio

nals

, aca

dem

ics,

jour

nalis

ts a

nd c

once

rned

pub

lic s

erva

nts.

16. S

tabi

lity

of A

CA’

s pe

rson

nel

Low

turn

over

an

d ra

tes

of

resi

gnat

ion

(0%

-5%

per

yea

r)

Mod

erat

e tu

rn-o

ver

and

resi

gnat

ion

rate

(b

etw

een

5%-1

0%)

Hig

h tu

rn-o

ver

and

resi

gnat

ion

rate

(ove

r 10%

)

CIA

BOC

’s s

taff

rem

aine

d ve

ry s

tabl

e ov

er th

e pa

st 1

0 ye

ars

and

ther

e ha

s be

en li

ttle

turn

over

. Th

is s

tabi

lity

has

also

gen

erat

ed a

hig

h le

vel o

f ins

titut

iona

l loy

alty

. Fur

ther

, CIA

BOC

can

not

sack

em

ploy

ees

– di

scip

linar

y he

arin

gs fo

r inv

estig

ator

s ha

ve to

be

cond

ucte

d by

the

Polic

e H

R

Div

isio

n an

d ad

min

istra

tive

staff

by

the

Publ

ic S

ervi

ces

Com

mis

sion

.

How

ever

, in

orde

r to

addr

ess

the

real

ities

of t

he 2

1st c

entu

ry, i

t has

bee

n de

cide

d to

rais

e th

e st

aff in

take

by

at le

ast 3

00 in

vest

igat

ors.

Sour

ce: I

nter

view

with

ex-

DG

(2/1

1/20

16) a

nd C

IABO

C A

nnua

l Rep

ort (

2015

), p

33.

44

3. A

CA’

s de

tect

ion

and

inve

stig

atio

n fu

nctio

n (9

indi

cato

rs)

IND

ICAT

OR

VA

LUES

IND

ICAT

OR

HIG

HM

OD

ERAT

ELO

WJU

STIF

ICAT

ION

OF

SCO

RES

17. A

CA’

s ac

cess

ibilit

y to

co

mpl

aina

nts

& in

form

ants

, inc

ludi

ng

whi

stle

blow

ers

and

the

publ

ic o

ver

the

past

3 y

ears

ACA

is h

ighl

y ac

cess

ible

as

refle

cted

in th

e hi

gh p

ropo

rtion

of

cor

rupt

ion

com

plai

nts

rece

ived

rela

tive

to p

opul

atio

n an

d pe

rcei

ved

leve

l of c

orru

ptio

n an

d pr

opor

tion

of c

ompl

aina

nts

confi

dent

eno

ugh

to id

entif

y th

emse

lves

ACA

is a

cces

sibl

e as

refle

cted

in

the

mod

erat

e le

vel o

f cor

rupt

ion

com

plai

nts

rela

tive

to p

opul

atio

n an

d pe

rcei

ved

leve

ls

of c

orru

ptio

n, &

th

e pr

opor

tion

of c

ompl

aina

nts

confi

dent

enou

gh to

iden

tify

them

selv

es

ACA

is

inac

cess

ible

as

refle

cted

in lo

w

prop

ortio

n of

co

rrupt

ion

com

plai

nts

rece

ived

, rel

ativ

e to

pop

ulat

ion

and

perc

eive

d le

vels

of

cor

rupt

ion

and

anon

ymou

s co

mpl

aint

s

CIA

BOC

rece

ived

9,3

82 c

ompl

aint

s in

the

thre

e ye

ars

from

201

3-20

15.

This

mak

es fo

r an

aver

age

of 3

,127

.3 c

ompl

aint

s pe

r yea

r, in

a p

opul

atio

n of

20,

966m

n. T

his

acco

unts

for a

ppro

x.

0.01

49%

of t

he p

opul

atio

n, w

hich

is a

rela

tivel

y hi

gh ra

tio.

Acco

rdin

g to

the

GC

B 20

16 d

ata,

43.

9% o

f res

pond

ents

felt

CIA

BOC

was

doi

ng w

ell o

r ver

y w

ell i

n fig

htin

g co

rrupt

ion.

26.

1% re

mai

n di

ssat

isfie

d.12

3 But

a c

omm

unity

per

cept

ions

sur

vey

on

polic

ing

con

duct

ed b

y th

e As

ia F

ound

atio

n, C

olom

bo i

n Ja

n 20

16 s

how

s th

at p

erce

ptio

ns o

f co

rrupt

ion

as a

key

fact

or a

ffect

ing

polic

ing

drop

ped

from

24%

in 2

014

to 6

% in

201

5. P

oliti

cal

inte

rfere

nce

as a

fact

or a

lso

drop

ped

from

56%

to 3

9% (s

ee ta

ble

4). I

n su

ch a

con

text

, the

ab

ove

com

plai

nts

ratio

ass

umes

gre

ater

sig

nific

ance

. It b

ecom

es h

ighe

r rel

ativ

e to

per

ceiv

ed

leve

ls o

f cor

rupt

ion.

Anon

ymou

s co

mpl

aint

s, h

owev

er, r

emai

n a

pers

iste

nt fa

ctor

.124 T

hese

con

cern

com

plai

nts

mad

e by

indi

vidu

als.

How

ever

, a s

igni

fican

t num

ber o

f com

plai

nts

– pe

rhap

s a

third

of a

ll co

mpl

aint

s - a

re b

roug

ht b

y po

litic

al p

artie

s, tr

ade

unio

ns a

nd c

once

rned

CSO

s w

ho re

pres

ent

larg

e co

nstit

uenc

ies.

125

Such

gro

ups

tend

to c

all p

ress

con

fere

nces

bef

ore

or a

fter fi

ling

thei

r co

mpl

aint

s, in

ord

er to

pre

ssur

ise

the

Com

mis

sion

. Thi

s im

plie

s th

eir g

reat

er c

onfid

ence

in

the

new

pol

itica

l clim

ate

whi

ch h

as e

volv

ed o

ver p

ast t

wo

year

s, a

s w

ell a

s th

e in

crea

sed

acce

ssib

ility

of C

IABO

C to

suc

h gr

oups

. Sin

ce s

uch

grou

ps fr

eque

ntly

brin

g in

wel

l-res

earc

hed

com

plai

nts

(con

tain

ing

whi

stle

-blo

wer

info

rmat

ion

in th

e ca

se o

f TU

s) re

leva

nt to

CIA

BOC

’s

man

date

, the

y w

ould

app

ear t

o co

mpr

ise

sig

nific

ant p

ropo

rtion

of r

elev

ant c

ompl

aint

s. .

With

rega

rd to

whi

stle

-blo

win

g, th

e in

itial

pha

se o

f CIA

BOC

’s ‘S

even

ste

ps’ i

nitia

tive

invo

lves

se

lect

ing

a gr

oup

of ‘i

nteg

rity

office

rs’ i

n ea

ch g

ovt i

nstit

utio

n to

act

as

whi

stle

blow

ers.

Thi

s ta

kes

plac

e ag

ains

t the

bac

kgro

und

of a

new

Rig

ht to

Info

rmat

ion

(RTI

) law

whi

ch o

ffers

som

e

relie

f to

whi

stle

blow

ers,

whi

ch w

ill gi

ve g

reat

er v

alid

ity to

the

act o

f whi

stle

-blo

win

g, a

nd m

ay

enco

urag

e m

ore

peop

le to

com

e fo

rwar

d, i

n a

cont

ext w

here

man

y fe

ar th

ey m

ay lo

se th

eir

jobs

if th

ey d

o.

Sour

ces:

CIA

BOC

‘s A

nnua

l Rep

ort (

2015

), p

35; i

nter

view

with

ex-

DG

CIA

BOC

(2/1

1/20

16);

with

Gen

eral

Sec

y. P

ublic

Sec

tor N

urse

s’ U

nion

(14/

19/2

016)

; ED

, Dus

hana

Viri

dhi S

anga

may

a (1

4/9/

2016

) Con

veno

r, D

usha

na V

irodh

i Han

da (1

5/9/

2016

) C

onve

nor,

CaF

FE (1

4/09

/201

6);

Edito

r, R

avay

a (5

/10/

2016

); D

eput

y So

licito

r-Gen

eral

, AG

’s d

ept (

7/09

/201

6);

lega

l co

mm

enta

tors

, aca

dem

ics

& C

SO le

ader

s.

123.

Glo

bal C

orru

ptio

n Ba

rom

eter

201

6 (fo

rthec

omin

g) S

ri La

nkan

dat

a.12

4 It

was

not

pos

sibl

e fo

r the

rese

arch

team

to a

cces

s nu

mbe

rs o

f ind

ivid

ual c

ompl

aint

s, b

ut C

IABO

C a

gree

s th

at o

f the

se, a

nony

mou

s co

mpl

aint

s do

min

ate.

125.

At l

east

one

suc

h gr

oup,

Dus

hana

Viro

dhi S

anvi

dhan

aya

have

bro

ught

ove

r 500

com

plai

nts

to d

ate

and

the

Dus

hana

Viro

dhi H

anda

ove

r 150

cla

ims,

alm

ost e

ntire

ly o

n la

rge-

scal

e co

rrupt

ion.

The

UN

P M

P R

anja

n R

aman

ayak

a al

so s

tate

s th

at h

e ha

s ha

nded

in o

ver 1

50 c

ompl

aint

s. F

inal

ly, th

e D

usha

na V

irodh

i Per

amun

a sa

ys th

ey h

ave

give

n in

225

com

plai

nts.

(Ada

of2

4/10

/201

6)

45

IND

ICAT

OR

VA

LUES

IND

ICAT

OR

HIG

HM

OD

ERAT

ELO

WJU

STIF

ICAT

ION

OF

SCO

RES

18. A

CA’

s re

spon

sive

ness

to

corru

ptio

n c

ompl

aint

s du

ring

the

past

3

year

s

ACA

is h

ighl

y re

spon

sive

as

refle

cted

in th

e hi

gh p

ropo

rtion

of

com

plai

nts

inve

stig

ated

or

case

s co

mpl

eted

du

ring

the

past

3

year

s

ACA

is re

spon

sive

as

refle

cted

in th

e m

oder

ate

prop

ortio

n of

cor

rupt

ion

com

plai

nts

inve

stig

ated

and

ca

ses

com

plet

ed

durin

g th

e pa

st 3

ye

ars

ACA

is n

ot

resp

onsi

ve a

s re

veal

ed in

the

low

num

ber

of c

ompl

aint

s in

vest

igat

ed o

r co

mpl

eted

dur

ing

the

past

3 y

ears

Unt

il en

d-20

14, r

espo

nsiv

enes

s to

com

plai

nts

was

low.

126 T

he a

ppoi

ntm

ent o

f a n

ew D

G

and

late

r, C

omm

issi

on in

201

5 cr

eate

d a

mor

e en

ergi

zed

clim

ate.

Thi

s m

ade

it po

ssib

le fo

r in

vest

igat

ions

to b

e ex

pedi

ted.

In

2015

the

num

ber o

f tot

al c

ompl

aint

s re

ceiv

ed ro

se to

3,9

13,

and

the

num

ber o

f com

plai

nts

clos

ed w

as 3

, 021

. Thi

s is

a p

ositi

ve e

ffici

ency

ratio

.

The

new

Com

mis

sion

face

d an

uph

ill ta

sk o

f inv

estig

atin

g a

back

log

of 9

,752

com

plai

nts

alon

g w

ith th

ose

rece

ived

dur

ing

the

year

(all

toge

ther

, 13,

665

com

plai

nts)

. The

Com

mis

sion

ex

perim

ente

d w

ith d

iffer

ent i

nves

tigat

ion

met

hods

and

evo

lved

a n

ew, h

ybrid

met

hod

in J

anua

ry

2016

. Thi

s gr

eatly

incr

ease

d ou

tput

. 8,2

03 fi

les

wer

e at

tend

ed to

by

the

DG

and

3,0

21 c

lose

d.

How

ever

, it s

houl

d be

men

tione

d th

at m

any

TUs

and

CSO

s en

gage

d in

ant

i-cor

rupt

ion

activ

ity

reite

rate

that

thei

r com

plai

nts

have

stil

l elic

ited

no re

spon

se fr

om C

IABO

C. T

his

is s

igni

fican

t in

that

they

toge

ther

com

pris

e ar

ound

one

-third

of c

ompl

aint

s (s

ee fo

otno

te 5

).

Sour

ces:

CIA

BOC

Ann

ual R

epor

t (20

15) p

34;

Inte

rvie

w w

ith e

x-D

G (2

/11/

2016

); C

onve

nor,

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Nur

ses’

Uni

on (1

4/09

/201

6); C

hairm

an, C

OPE

(20/

10/2

016)

; Con

veno

r, D

usha

na

Viro

dhi H

anda

(15/

9/20

16) a

lso

inte

rvie

ws

with

CSO

lead

ers

and

trade

uni

on le

ader

s.

19. A

CA’

s w

illing

ness

to in

itiat

e co

rrupt

ion

inve

stig

atio

ns d

urin

g th

e pa

st 3

yea

rs

Hig

h nu

mbe

r of

cor

rupt

ion

inve

stig

atio

ns

initi

ated

by

ACA

Mod

erat

e nu

mbe

r of

cor

rupt

ion

inve

stig

atio

ns

initi

ated

by

ACA

Low

num

ber

of c

orru

ptio

n in

vest

igat

ions

in

itiat

ed b

y AC

A

Prio

r to

the

enac

ting

of th

e 19

th A

men

dmen

t in

201

5, C

IABO

C d

id n

ot e

njoy

pow

ers

to in

itiat

e in

vest

igat

ions

on

thei

r ow

n. F

urth

er, t

he C

omm

issi

on a

ppoi

nted

in O

ctob

er 2

015

face

d a

back

log

of 9

,752

file

s, w

hich

did

not

allo

w th

em to

giv

e pr

iorit

y to

initi

atin

g ne

w in

vest

igat

ions

.

Sour

ces:

CIA

BOC

Ann

ual R

epor

t (20

15);

19th

Am

endm

ent (

2015

).

20. A

vera

ge n

umbe

r of c

ases

in

vest

igat

ed b

y th

e AC

A pe

r yea

r du

ring

the

past

3 y

ears

Mor

e th

an a

100

0 co

rrupt

ion

case

s in

vest

igat

ed b

y AC

A pe

r yea

r in

the

past

3 y

ears

Betw

een

300-

999

corru

ptio

n ca

ses

inve

stig

a-te

d by

the

ACA

per y

ear i

n th

e pa

st 3

yea

rs

Less

than

300

co

rrupt

ion

case

s in

vest

iga-

ted

by th

e AC

A pe

r ye

ar in

the

past

3

year

s

Whi

le th

e av

erag

e fo

r the

per

iod

2005

-201

4 is

not

impr

essi

ve, o

ver t

he p

ast t

wo

year

s, 8

,023

fil

es w

ere

atte

nded

to b

y th

e D

G. O

f the

se 3

,021

wer

e cl

osed

afte

r due

con

side

ratio

n, w

hich

le

aves

5,0

02 fi

led

inve

stig

ated

. Thi

s w

orks

out

to a

n av

erag

e ra

te o

f 2,5

01 fi

les

inve

stig

ated

per

ye

ar o

ver t

he p

ast 3

yea

rs, w

hich

falls

into

the

high

cat

egor

y.

Sour

ce: C

IABO

C A

nnua

l Rep

ort (

2015

) p. 2

4; 3

4.

126.

Man

y tra

de u

nion

s an

d an

ti-co

rrupt

ion

orga

niza

tions

cal

led

pres

s co

nfer

ence

s to

pub

liciz

e th

eir c

ompl

aint

s an

d la

ck o

f res

pons

e by

CIA

BOC

bet

wee

n N

ov –

Dec

201

4.

46

IND

ICAT

OR

VA

LUES

IND

ICAT

OR

HIG

HM

OD

ERAT

ELO

WJU

STIF

ICAT

ION

OF

SCO

RES

21. E

ffici

ency

& p

rofe

ssio

nalis

m o

f co

rrupt

ion

inve

stig

ated

by

ACA

durin

g pa

st 3

yea

rs

Hig

hly

effici

ent

and

prof

essi

onal

in

vest

igat

ion

of

corru

ptio

n ca

ses

Effici

ent a

nd

prof

essi

onal

in

vest

igat

ion

of

corru

ptio

n ca

ses

Ineffi

cien

t and

U

npro

fess

iona

l in

vest

igat

ion

of

corru

ptio

n ca

ses

In th

e pa

st m

any

com

men

tato

rs c

ompl

aine

d of

a la

ck o

f effi

cien

cy a

nd p

rofe

ssio

nalis

m a

mon

g C

IABO

C s

taff

in m

any

area

s. B

ut it

can

not b

e de

nied

that

afte

r a n

ew D

G w

as a

ppoi

nted

in F

eb

2015

, a m

assi

ve b

ackl

og w

as c

lear

ed in

a s

hort

spac

e of

tim

e, a

nd c

redi

t mus

t be

give

n fo

r thi

s eff

ort.

413

case

s w

ere

char

ged

in c

ourt

betw

een

2014

-16,

sec

urin

g 54

con

vict

ions

(12.

83%

). Th

is is

a d

ecis

ive

impr

ovem

ent o

n pr

evio

us le

vels

, but

stil

l low

.

In te

rms

of p

rofe

ssio

nalis

m, m

any

plai

ntiff

s st

ill cl

aim

that

CIA

BOC

sta

ff, a

s ex

-pol

ice

office

rs,

seem

to v

iew

com

plai

nant

s as

pot

entia

l sus

pect

s an

d th

is is

see

n as

unp

rofe

ssio

nal.

Thi

s is

so

espe

cial

ly fo

r tho

se w

ho c

ame

in to

com

plai

n ab

out c

orru

ptio

n in

the

educ

atio

nal s

ecto

r, w

here

th

e tro

uble

d is

sue

of s

choo

l adm

issi

ons

rem

ains

a p

eren

nial

site

of r

outin

e co

rrupt

ion.

Als

o,

ther

e is

a p

opul

ar p

erce

ptio

n th

at a

nony

mou

s co

mpl

aint

s, d

espi

te b

eing

cor

robo

rate

d w

ith m

any

supp

ortin

g do

cum

ents

, are

not

add

ress

ed b

y C

IABO

C.

CIA

BOC

is a

lso

perc

eive

d to

mov

e w

ith

extre

me

caut

ion

on c

ompl

aint

s in

volv

ing

sus

pect

s w

ith h

igh

polit

ical

clo

ut. S

till,

com

plai

nant

s in

terv

iew

ed b

y th

e re

sear

ch te

am a

gree

d th

at e

ven

such

sus

pect

s ar

e be

ing

– th

ough

slo

wly

- in

vest

igat

ed.

Sour

ces:

CIA

BOC

’s A

nnua

l Rep

ort (

2015

); in

terv

iew

with

Con

veno

r, C

eylo

n Te

ache

rs’ U

nion

(1

2/09

/201

6); G

en. S

ecy.

Pub

lic S

ecto

r Nur

ses’

Uni

on (1

4/19

/201

6), C

onve

nor,

Voic

e Ag

ains

t C

orru

ptio

n (1

5/09

/201

6) a

nd H

ead,

His

tory

Dep

artm

ent,

Col

ombo

Uni

vers

ity (1

1/10

/201

6).

22.

Aver

age

conv

ictio

n ra

te o

f co

rrupt

ion

case

s in

vest

igat

ed b

y AC

A in

the

past

thre

e ye

ars

Abov

e 75

%Be

twee

n 50

% -

75%

Belo

w 5

0%As

men

tione

d ab

ove,

whi

le 4

13 c

ases

wer

e fil

ed in

the

Hig

h C

ourts

and

the

Mag

istra

te’s

C

ourts

ove

r the

pas

t thr

ee y

ears

, onl

y `5

4 re

sulte

d in

con

vict

ions

(see

tabl

e 4)

.The

rate

of

conv

ictio

ns a

ctua

lly d

ropp

ed b

etw

een

2014

to 2

015

from

46.

15%

To

12.6

%.

This

rate

has

not

pi

cked

up

rem

arka

bly

over

the

first

10

mon

ths

of 2

016.

CIA

BOC

’s e

x-D

G fe

els

that

lega

l offi

cers

ar

e co

mpe

tent

in d

rafti

ng c

harg

es, b

ut a

dmits

that

they

may

lack

adv

ocac

y sk

ills in

term

s of

de

fend

ing

thei

r sui

t in

cour

t. W

hile

non

-lega

l fac

tors

may

of c

ours

e, im

pact

on

the

failu

re to

se

cure

con

vict

ions

, CIA

BOC

can

not h

ide

behi

nd th

ese

and

mus

t ens

ure

that

thei

r leg

al te

ams

– w

hich

now

face

num

eric

ally

mor

e ca

ses

and

mor

e co

mpl

ex c

ases

- ar

e up

to s

tand

ard.

Sour

ce: C

IABO

C’s

web

site

(ww

w.ci

aboc

.gov

.lk)

and

Annu

al R

epor

t (20

15);

inte

rvie

w w

ith

CIA

BOC

sta

ff(10

/11/

2016

).

47

IND

ICAT

OR

VA

LUES

IND

ICAT

OR

HIG

HM

OD

ERAT

ELO

WJU

STIF

ICAT

ION

OF

SCO

RES

23. A

CA’

s w

illing

ness

to in

vest

igat

e in

fluen

tial p

erso

ns fo

r cor

rupt

ion

with

out f

ear o

r fav

our

Con

side

rabl

e

evid

ence

of

inve

stig

atio

n of

influ

entia

l pe

rson

s fo

r co

rrupt

ion

Som

e ev

iden

ce

of in

vest

igat

ion

of

influ

entia

l per

sons

fo

r cor

rupt

ion

No

evid

ence

of

inve

stig

atio

n of

influ

entia

l pe

r-son

s fo

r co

rrupt

ion

This

is a

ver

y co

mpl

ex a

nd n

uanc

ed is

sue.

Unl

ike

in th

e pa

st, u

nder

the

pres

ent C

omm

issi

on

CIA

BOC

has

take

n st

eps

to c

all m

any

influ

entia

l pol

itica

l figu

res

of th

e pr

evio

us g

ovt –

incl

udin

g a

cabi

net m

inis

ter,

defe

nce

secr

etar

y, 3

form

er h

eads

of t

he S

ri La

nka

Nav

y - t

o m

ake

stat

emen

ts b

efor

e it.

It h

as a

lso

inte

rroga

ted

a se

rvin

g m

inis

ter.

But c

ritic

s ou

tsid

e th

e pr

esen

t go

vt a

ccus

e C

IABO

C o

f bei

ng p

art o

f a g

ovt-s

pons

ored

witc

h hu

nt.

The

evid

ence

to s

uppo

rt su

ch a

cla

im, t

houg

h is

wea

k. F

urth

er, C

IABO

C h

as h

ad to

face

sha

rp

chal

leng

es in

per

suad

ing

such

per

sons

to c

ome

befo

re it

, inc

ludi

ng in

som

e ca

ses,

reso

rting

to

lega

l act

ion.

Whi

le c

harg

es h

ave

been

file

d, o

ver t

he p

ast t

wo

year

s, it

sho

uld

be m

entio

ned

that

th

ere

have

bee

n no

con

vict

ions

of i

nflue

ntia

l per

sons

as

yet.

But s

uch

case

s fre

quen

tly in

volv

e la

rge

sum

s of

mon

ey a

nd a

n in

trica

te p

aper

trai

l. Th

e ch

arge

s br

ough

t are

cor

resp

ondi

ngly

ar

duou

s to

pro

ve, n

eces

sita

ting

exte

nded

pro

secu

tion

proc

esse

s.

Sour

ces:

inte

rvie

w w

ith e

x-D

G (1

0/11

/201

6); a

lso

Con

veno

r, C

eylo

n Te

ache

rs’ U

nion

(1

2/9/

2016

) G

en. S

ecy.

Pub

lic S

ecto

r Nur

ses’

Uni

on (1

4/19

/201

6); C

onve

nor,

Voic

e Ag

ains

t C

orru

ptio

n (1

5/09

/201

6) a

nd H

ead,

His

tory

Dep

artm

ent,

Col

ombo

Uni

vers

ity (1

1/10

/201

6). A

lso

inte

rvie

ws

with

lega

l pro

fess

iona

ls a

ttach

ed to

the

AG’s

Dep

t and

BAS

L, o

ppos

ition

pol

itici

ans

and

jour

nalis

ts.

24.A

CA’

s ro

le in

rest

itutio

n, a

sset

re

cove

ry, f

reez

ing

and

confi

scat

ion

in

the

past

3 y

rs

Very

act

ive

role

by

the

ACA

ACA

play

s a

mod

erat

ely

activ

e ro

le

ACA

is in

activ

eC

IABO

C h

as s

ecur

ed a

ppro

x 54

con

vict

ions

ove

r the

pas

t 3 y

ears

and

all

mon

eys

and

asse

ts

seiz

ed in

thes

e in

stan

ce a

re c

hann

elle

d in

to th

e C

onso

lidat

ed F

und,

alo

ng w

ith p

enal

ties

and

fines

cha

rged

by

cour

t. T

he ro

le in

ass

et re

cove

ry, h

owev

er,

is a

ffect

ed b

y its

low

rate

of

conv

ictio

ns

Inte

rvie

w w

ith C

IABO

C s

taff

(10/

11/2

016)

.

25.

Doe

s th

e AC

A id

entif

y ge

nder

in

com

pilin

g co

mpl

aint

s an

d m

onito

ring

corru

ptio

n tre

nds

ACA

has

gend

er s

ensi

tive

dem

ogra

phic

in

form

atio

n th

at a

llow

s it

to m

onito

r how

co

rrupt

ion

and

its s

ervi

ces

affec

t w

omen

diff

eren

tly

ACA

has

gend

er s

ensi

tive

dem

ogra

phic

in

form

atio

n th

at

coul

d al

low

it to

mon

itor h

ow

corru

ptio

n &

its

serv

ices

affe

ct

wom

en d

iffer

ently

, bu

t doe

s no

t mon

itor

thes

e di

ffere

nces

ACA

does

not

co

llect

gen

der

sens

itive

de

mog

raph

icin

form

atio

n

Gen

der-i

dent

ifica

tion

in c

orru

ptio

n co

mpl

aint

s is

not

mai

ntai

ned.

Thi

s co

uld

be d

ue to

the

larg

e pr

opor

tion

of a

nony

mou

s co

mpl

aint

s lo

dged

. St

ill, e

ven

if th

e co

mpl

aint

s th

emse

lves

are

mad

e an

onym

ousl

y, it

sho

uld

be p

ossi

ble

for t

he re

cept

ion

office

r to

com

pile

a re

cord

of t

he p

ropo

rtion

of

com

plai

nant

s w

ho a

re fe

mal

e.

Sour

ce: C

AIBO

C w

ebsi

te:w

ww.

ciab

oc.g

ov.lk

/inve

stig

atio

ns/c

onvi

ctio

ns.

48

4. A

CA’

s pr

even

tion,

edu

catio

n an

d ou

trea

ch fu

nctio

ns (9

indi

cato

rs) IN

DIC

ATO

R V

ALU

ESIN

DIC

ATO

RH

IGH

MO

DER

ATE

LOW

JUST

IFIC

ATIO

N O

F SC

OR

ES26

. Ave

rage

pro

porti

on o

f AC

A’s

oper

atin

g ex

pend

iture

allo

cate

d to

pu

blic

out

reac

h an

d pr

even

tion

durin

g th

e pa

st 3

yea

rs

Abov

e 1%

of

ACA’

s op

erat

ing

ex

pend

iture

Betw

een

0.5%

an

d 1%

of

ACA’

s op

erat

ing

expe

nditu

re

Belo

w 0

.5%

of

ACA’

s op

era-

ting

expe

nditu

re

Acco

rdin

g to

CIA

BOC

’s A

nnua

l Rep

ort (

2015

) its

tota

l rec

urre

nt e

xpen

ditu

re is

Rs

245

milli

on.

Its e

xpen

ditu

re o

n br

iber

y pr

even

tion

(Rs.

1,4

51, 0

00) i

s ho

wev

er, t

aken

from

its

budg

et fo

r ca

pita

l exp

endi

ture

, whi

ch is

som

ethi

ng o

f a b

udge

ting

anom

aly.

The

pro

porti

on o

f C

IABO

C’s

op

erat

ing

expe

nditu

re a

lloca

ted

to p

ublic

out

reac

h in

201

5 is

ther

efor

e 0.

59%

, whi

ch fa

lls in

to

the

mod

erat

e ca

tego

ry.

Sour

ce: C

IABO

C’s

Ann

ual R

epor

t (20

15),

p 36

.

27. A

CA’

s co

rrupt

ion

prev

entio

n in

itiat

ives

dur

ing

the

past

3 y

ears

Man

y c

orru

ptio

n pr

even

tion

initi

ativ

es

Som

e co

rrupt

ion

prev

entio

n in

itiat

ives

(a

vera

ge o

f 1-2

per

ye

ar

Few

or n

o co

rrupt

ion

prev

entio

n in

itiat

ives

CIA

BOC

con

duct

ed a

n ex

tend

ed a

war

enes

s pr

ogra

mm

e at

14

diffe

rent

loca

tions

for s

tate

se

ctor

em

ploy

ees,

incl

udin

g re

gion

al p

olic

e ac

adem

ies,

traffi

c po

lice

head

quar

ters

, Dep

artm

ent

of P

rison

s an

d D

istri

ct S

ecre

taria

ts.

In D

ecem

ber 2

015

CIA

BOC

laun

ched

an

Actio

n Pl

an ti

tled

‘Sev

en S

teps

to Z

ero

Tole

ranc

e’ it

emiz

ing

seve

n pr

even

tive

mea

sure

s. O

ver t

he p

ast t

wo

year

s,

CIA

BOC

beg

an w

orki

ng w

ith s

taff

in 8

sec

tors

(Im

mig

ratio

n de

partm

ent,

the

pass

port

office

, th

e ex

cise

dep

artm

ent,

polic

e de

partm

ent,

Iden

tity

card

uni

t and

loca

l gov

t ins

titut

ions

and

the

educ

atio

n se

ctor

) pen

ding

cab

inet

app

rova

l of i

ts P

reve

ntio

n U

nits

. CIA

BOC

als

o ce

lebr

ated

‘A

nti-C

orru

ptio

n D

ay’ i

n D

ec 2

015

by o

rgan

izin

g an

aw

aren

ess

cam

paig

n. C

IABO

C’s

ex-

DG

la

unch

ed th

e an

ti-co

rrupt

ion

web

site

I-Pa

id-A

-Brib

e (IP

AB) (

whi

ch h

owev

er, h

as n

ot b

een

very

su

cces

sful

). It

is p

rese

ntly

pla

nnin

g to

com

mem

orat

e An

ti-C

orru

ptio

n da

y w

ith a

sem

inar

for

publ

ic s

ecto

r em

ploy

ees

on th

e pa

ram

eter

s of

ele

ctor

al c

orru

ptio

n, a

head

of p

lann

ed lo

cal

elec

tions

in 2

017.

Aro

und

800

invi

tees

at l

ocal

, pro

vinc

ial a

nd n

atio

nal l

evel

s ar

e ex

pect

ed to

at

tend

.

Sour

ce: I

nter

view

with

ex-

DG

, CIA

BOC

on

02.1

1.20

16;

ED, T

rans

pare

ncy

Inte

rnat

iona

l Sri

Lank

a (2

3/11

/201

6), C

IABO

C A

nnua

l Rep

ort (

2015

). Al

so in

terv

iew

with

pre

sent

DG

, 28/

11/1

6)

28. N

umbe

r of r

evie

ws

of

orga

niza

tiona

l pro

cedu

res,

sys

tem

s &

capa

bilit

ies

cond

ucte

d by

AC

A to

pr

even

t cor

rupt

ion

durin

g th

e pa

st 3

ye

ars

Man

y re

view

s w

ere

con

duct

ed

(rela

tive

to

num

ber o

f or

gani

zatio

ns in

ju

risdi

ctio

n

A su

bsta

ntia

l nu

mbe

r of r

evie

ws

wer

e co

nduc

ted

(rela

tive

to n

umbe

r of

org

aniz

atio

ns in

ju

risdi

ctio

n

Few

or n

o re

view

s w

ere

cond

ucte

d (re

lativ

e to

nu

mbe

r of

orga

niza

tions

in

juris

dict

ion

CIA

BOC

‘ pro

pose

d Pr

even

tion

Uni

t to

over

see

the

abov

e-m

entio

ned

‘Sev

en s

teps

to Z

ero

Tole

ranc

e’ A

ctio

n Pl

an’ i

n se

ven

sect

ors

(Imm

igra

tion

depa

rtmen

t, th

e pa

sspo

rt offi

ce, t

he e

xcis

e de

partm

ent,

polic

e de

partm

ent,

Iden

tity

card

uni

t and

loca

l gov

t ins

titut

ions

and

the

educ

atio

n se

ctor

) are

task

ed w

ith id

entif

ying

pos

sibl

e lo

opho

les

whe

re c

orru

ptio

n co

uld

take

pla

ce. T

hey

then

reco

mm

end

how

thes

e lo

opho

les

shou

ld b

e tig

hten

ed. T

his

wor

k, h

owev

er, i

s on

-goi

ng.

Sour

ce: I

nter

view

with

CIA

BOC

sta

ff on

10.

11.2

016;

CIA

BOC

Ann

ual R

epor

t (20

15),

p 34

.

29. F

requ

ency

of i

nclu

ding

cor

rupt

ion

prev

entio

n re

com

men

datio

ns in

AC

A’s

inve

stig

atio

n re

ports

dur

ing

the

past

3 y

rs

frequ

ently

som

etim

esN

ot a

t all.

CIA

BOC

sta

tes

that

reco

mm

enda

tions

are

stru

ctur

ed in

to th

e in

vest

igat

ion

repo

rts.

This

in

form

atio

n is

not

acc

essi

ble

due

to C

IABO

C’s

con

fiden

tialit

y cl

ause

. It

was

not

pos

sibl

e fo

r the

le

ad re

sear

cher

to e

ven

acce

ss a

repo

rt fo

rmat

.

Sour

ce: I

nter

view

with

ex-

DG

(2/1

1/20

16) a

nd C

IABO

C s

taff

(10/

11/2

016)

.

49

IND

ICAT

OR

VA

LUES

IND

ICAT

OR

HIG

HM

OD

ERAT

ELO

WJU

STIF

ICAT

ION

OF

SCO

RES

30. A

CA’

s pl

an fo

r pre

vent

ion,

ed

ucat

ion

and

outre

ach

and

its

impl

emen

tatio

n

Com

preh

ensi

ve

and

clea

r pl

an w

hich

is

impl

emen

ted

and

acce

ssib

le

A pl

an d

oes

exis

t, bu

t is

not

impl

emen

ted

fully

Ther

e is

no

plan

or o

nly

a w

eak

one

for

prev

entio

n,

educ

atio

n an

d ou

treac

h .

CIA

BOC

’s A

ctio

n Pl

an ‘S

even

Ste

ps to

Zer

o To

lera

nce’

incl

udes

cam

paig

ns in

sec

onda

ry

scho

ols

aim

ed a

t cha

ngin

g at

titud

es to

cor

rupt

ion,

incl

udin

g in

trodu

cing

cor

rupt

ion

awar

enes

s co

ncep

ts in

to p

rimar

y sc

hool

syl

labi

.

Muc

h w

ork

has

alre

ady

been

don

e in

sch

ools

acr

oss

the

isla

nd. T

he P

lan

in fa

ct e

nvis

ages

w

orki

ng w

ith th

ree

dem

ogra

phic

gro

ups:

sch

ool-g

oing

chi

ldre

n, s

choo

l-lea

vers

and

adu

lts

(prim

arily

pub

lic s

ecto

r em

ploy

ees)

. Whi

le w

orki

ng w

ith s

choo

l chi

ldre

n in

volv

es th

e ab

ove-

men

tione

d in

puts

into

prim

ary

sylla

bi, Y

MAC

or ‘

Yout

h M

obiliz

ing

Agai

nst C

orru

ptio

n” G

roup

s w

ill be

sta

rted

for s

choo

l lea

vers

, usi

ng a

lect

ure

and

disc

ussi

on fo

rmat

.

Wor

k w

ith a

dults

will

invo

lve

a p

ublic

dia

logu

e on

cor

rupt

ion

thro

ugh

the

prin

t, el

ectro

nic

and

soci

al m

edia

. Mos

t im

porta

ntly,

the

Actio

n Pl

an a

ims

to w

ork

tow

ards

revi

sing

the

law

in k

eepi

ng

with

the

prov

isio

ns o

f the

19t

h Am

endm

ent.

How

ever

, it i

s to

o so

on to

gau

ge th

e eff

ects

of i

ts

impl

emen

tatio

n

Sour

ce: I

nter

view

with

ex-

DG

, CIA

BOC

; CIA

BOC

Ann

ual R

epor

t (20

15)

31. A

CA’

s co

llabo

ratio

n w

ith o

ther

st

akeh

olde

rs in

pre

vent

ion,

edu

catio

n an

d ou

treac

h ac

tiviti

es

Hig

h de

gree

of

colla

bora

tion

with

th

ree

or m

ore

join

t pro

ject

s

Som

e de

gree

of

colla

bora

tion

with

on

e or

two

join

t pr

ojec

ts

Littl

e or

no

colla

bora

tion

with

oth

er

stak

ehol

ders

CIA

BOC

col

labo

rate

s w

ith U

NC

AC/U

NO

DC

and

is w

orki

ng o

n a

self-

asse

ssm

ent w

ith U

NO

DC

. It

also

par

ticip

ated

in th

e op

enin

g of

the

Col

ombo

offi

ce o

f the

ipai

dabr

ibe.

lk w

ebsi

te a

nd

wor

ked

with

UN

DP

volu

ntee

rs a

nd m

embe

rs o

f CSO

s in

clud

ing

TISL

dur

ing

2015

-16,

incl

udin

g ce

lebr

atin

g An

ti-C

orru

ptio

n D

ay in

Dec

embe

r 201

5. C

IABO

C is

wor

king

with

the

Dep

artm

ent o

f Ed

ucat

ion

to in

corp

orat

e an

ti-co

rrupt

ion

awar

enes

s in

to s

choo

l syl

labu

ses

from

the

first

gra

de

upw

ards

.

CIA

BOC

is p

rese

ntly

wor

king

with

the

Pres

iden

tial s

ecre

taria

t and

Prim

e M

inis

ter’s

offi

ce

to o

rgan

ize

a se

min

ar fo

r pub

lic s

ecto

r em

ploy

ees

all l

evel

s (w

ho b

e in

volv

ed in

con

duct

ing

el

ectio

ns) o

n id

entif

ying

ele

ctor

al c

orru

ptio

n ah

ead

of k

ey lo

cal e

lect

ions

in 2

017,

to c

oinc

ide

with

Ant

i-Cor

rupt

ion

Day

on

9th

Dec

embe

r 201

6.

CIA

BOC

Ann

ual R

epor

t (20

15) P

34.

32. A

CA’

s re

sear

ch a

nd e

xplo

ratio

n of

cor

rupt

ion

risks

, con

text

and

co

nditi

ons

Exte

nsiv

e us

e of

rese

arch

to

deve

lop

risk

asse

ssm

ents

an

d se

ctor

al

corru

ptio

n pr

ofile

s

Som

e de

gree

of

rese

arch

to d

evel

op

risk

asse

ssm

ents

an

d se

ctor

al

corru

ptio

n pr

ofile

s

Littl

e or

no

disc

erni

ble

inde

pend

ent

rese

arch

car

ried

out b

y th

e AC

A

No

inde

pend

ent r

esea

rch

has

been

con

duct

ed b

y C

IABO

C. I

ts w

ebsi

te d

ispl

ays

rese

arch

don

e by

oth

er o

rgan

izat

ions

in

the

field

of a

nti-c

orru

ptio

n. B

ut C

IABO

C d

oes

not h

ave

a bu

dget

for

rese

arch

and

exp

lora

tion

of c

orru

ptio

n ris

ks, c

onte

xts

and

cond

ition

s.

Sour

ce: C

IABO

C w

ebsi

te (w

ww.

ciab

oc.g

ov.lk

) and

Ann

ual R

epor

t (20

15).

50

IND

ICAT

OR

VA

LUES

IND

ICAT

OR

HIG

HM

OD

ERAT

ELO

WJU

STIF

ICAT

ION

OF

SCO

RES

33. A

CA’

s di

ssem

inat

ion

of c

orru

ptio

n pr

even

tion

info

rmat

ion

and

use

of

cam

paig

ns

Exte

nsiv

e di

ssem

inat

ion

of c

orru

ptio

n pr

even

tion

and

relia

nce

on

cam

paig

ns

Lim

ited

diss

emin

atio

n of

cor

rupt

ion

prev

entio

n in

-form

atio

n an

d re

lianc

e on

ca

mpa

igns

Doe

s no

t di

ssem

inat

eco

rrupt

ion

Prev

entio

nin

form

atio

n or

rely

on

cam

paig

ns

CIA

BOC

laun

ched

an

anti-

corru

ptio

n w

alk

on A

nti-C

orru

ptio

n D

ay o

n 9

Dec

201

5 in

whi

ch

arou

nd 2

,000

chi

ldre

n fro

m s

choo

ls in

Col

ombo

par

ticip

ated

, as

part

of a

n aw

aren

ess-

rais

ing

cam

paig

n. C

IABO

C c

ontin

ues

to w

ork

in s

choo

ls, d

isse

min

atin

g co

rrupt

ion

prev

entio

n in

form

atio

n. I

t als

o co

llabo

rate

s w

ith o

ther

gro

ups

wor

king

on

corru

ptio

n su

ch a

s th

e C

oalit

ion

Agai

nst C

orru

ptio

n, c

onve

ned

by T

ISL

on th

eir a

war

enes

s in

itiat

ives

suc

h as

wal

ks a

nd

exhi

bitio

ns.

As m

entio

ned

abov

e, it

has

set

up

YMAC

or y

outh

gro

ups

to s

pear

head

act

iviti

es a

mon

g sc

hool

leav

ers.

It is

als

o w

orki

ng w

ith th

e el

ectro

nic

med

ia a

s w

ell a

s th

e ta

bloi

d m

edia

to

conv

ey p

reve

ntio

n in

form

atio

n to

pub

lic s

ecto

r em

ploy

ees.

Thi

s in

clud

es a

sem

inar

/wor

ksho

p pr

ogra

mm

e fo

r pub

lic e

mpl

oyee

s.

Sour

ce: I

nter

view

with

CIA

BOC

sta

ff on

10.

11.2

016.

34. A

CA’

s us

e of

its

web

site

and

so

cial

med

ia fo

r dis

sem

inat

ing

info

rmat

ion

on c

orru

ptio

n pr

even

tion

Exte

nsiv

e us

e of

its

web

site

and

so

cial

med

ia to

sp

read

cor

rupt

ion

prev

entio

n in

form

atio

n

Lim

ited

use

of

its w

ebsi

te a

nd

soci

al m

edia

to

spre

ad c

orru

ptio

n pr

even

tion

info

rmat

ion

ACA

does

not

ha

ve w

ebsi

te

and

does

not

re

ly o

n so

cial

m

edia

to s

prea

d pr

even

tion

info

rmat

ion

CIA

BOC

’s w

ebsi

te h

as a

hot

line.

Its

2015

Ann

ual R

epor

t als

o ha

s an

attr

activ

e pr

efac

e w

hich

us

es im

ages

and

nar

rativ

e st

rate

gies

to ra

ise

awar

enes

s. T

he w

ebsi

te o

ffers

link

s to

som

e re

leva

nt re

ports

on

corru

ptio

n co

nduc

ted

by a

ssoc

iate

d in

stitu

tions

, but

CIA

BOC

has

not

in

itiat

ed re

sear

ch o

r pub

lic p

erce

ptio

n su

rvey

s on

its

own

on is

sues

of c

orru

ptio

n an

d im

puni

ty.

They

do

not u

se s

ocia

l med

ia a

t pre

sent

.

Sour

ce: C

IABO

C w

ebsi

te (w

ww

:cia

boc.

gov.

lk);

Annu

al R

epor

t 201

5.

51

5. A

CA’

s co

oper

atio

n w

ith o

ther

org

aniz

atio

ns (5

indi

cato

rs)

IND

ICAT

OR

VA

LUES

IND

ICAT

OR

HIG

HM

OD

ERAT

ELO

WJU

STIF

ICAT

ION

OF

SCO

RES

35. G

over

nmen

t sup

port

(eg.

AG

’s

Dep

t, D

irect

or o

f Pub

lic P

rose

cutio

ns)

to A

CA

in p

rose

cutio

n of

cor

rupt

ion

case

s

Hig

h le

vel o

f su

ppor

t as

refle

cted

in

abse

nce

of

inte

rfere

nce

and

aver

age

pros

ecut

ion

rate

of

abo

ve 7

5%

mod

erat

e le

vel

of s

uppo

rt as

re

flect

ed in

so

me

inte

rfere

nce

and

aver

age

pros

ecut

ion

rate

of 5

0% -

75%

Low

leve

l of

supp

ort a

s re

flect

ed in

su

bsta

ntia

l in

terfe

renc

e an

d av

erag

e pr

osec

utio

n ra

te

of b

elow

50%

CIA

BOC

rece

ives

sup

port

from

the

AG’s

Dep

t bot

h fo

rmal

ly a

nd in

form

ally.

The

y re

tain

s ar

ound

te

n la

wye

rs a

ttach

ed to

the

AG’s

Dep

t on

a co

nsul

tanc

y-ba

sis,

whe

n th

eir o

wn

lega

l per

sonn

el

cann

ot c

ope

with

the

wor

kloa

d. A

t pre

sent

CIA

BOC

has

26

lega

l offi

cers

.

Aver

age

pros

ecut

ion

rate

s ho

wev

er, a

re n

ot im

pres

sive

: 137

.3 p

er y

ear b

etw

een

2014

-201

6 w

hich

is a

sm

all p

ropo

rtion

of t

he in

vest

igat

ions

com

plet

ed.

Thou

gh a

t pre

sent

CIA

BOC

sta

tes

that

ther

e ha

s b

een

no in

terfe

renc

e fro

m th

e pr

esen

t gov

t, pr

osec

utio

ns o

f infl

uent

ial p

erso

ns re

mai

n lo

w -

due

in s

ome

mea

sure

- to

the

com

plex

ity

of a

rraig

nmen

ts s

ough

t. Fu

rther

, in

som

e in

stan

ces,

pol

itici

ans

out o

f pow

er m

ay s

till w

ield

si

gnifi

cant

pol

itica

l clo

ut in

a s

ituat

ion

in w

hich

the

coal

ition

-in-p

ower

rem

ains

a fr

agile

col

lect

ion

of d

iver

se g

roup

s. T

hus

even

if th

e go

vt d

oes

not i

nter

fere

, the

re m

ay b

e pr

essu

re fr

om o

ther

, illi

cit s

ourc

es, w

hich

impa

ct o

n pr

osec

utio

n ra

tes.

Sour

ce: C

IABO

C A

nnua

l Rep

ort;

inte

rvie

w w

ith E

dito

r, R

avay

a (0

5/10

/201

6); w

ith e

x-D

G

CIA

BOC

(2/1

1/20

16);

Dep

uty

Solic

itor-G

ener

al, A

G’s

Dep

t (7/

9/20

16);

Audi

tor G

ener

al

(21/

09/2

016)

and

Cha

irman

, Pol

ice

Com

mis

sion

(28/

10/2

016)

.

36. C

oope

ratio

n be

twee

n AC

A an

d ot

her i

nteg

rity

agen

cies

(inc

ludi

ng

ACAs

if th

ere

are

mul

tiple

inst

itutio

ns)

Hig

h de

gree

of

coo

pera

tion

betw

een

ACAs

or

betw

een

ACA

and

othe

r int

egrit

y ag

enci

es

Lim

ited

coop

erat

ion

betw

een

ACA

and

othe

r int

egrit

y ag

enci

es

Con

flict

&/o

r lac

k of

coo

pera

tion

betw

een

ACA

and

othe

r int

egrit

y ag

enci

es

Ther

e ar

e tw

o ot

her i

nteg

rity

agen

cies

, i.e

. the

Fin

anci

al C

rimes

Inve

stig

atio

n D

epar

tmen

t (F

CID

) whi

ch is

a u

nit w

ithin

the

Polic

e D

ept,

and

the

Pres

iden

tial C

omm

issi

on t

o In

vest

igat

e an

d In

quire

into

Ser

ious

Act

s of

Fra

ud, C

orru

ptio

n an

d Ab

use

of P

ower

, Sta

te R

esou

rces

and

Pr

ivile

ges

(PR

ECIF

AC).

CIA

BOC

poi

nts

out t

hat t

hey

shar

e le

gal s

taff

with

PR

ECIF

AC, w

hich

in

pra

ctic

e en

sure

s th

at c

ases

han

dled

by

one

agen

cy a

re n

ot d

uplic

ated

in o

ther

s. F

urth

er

PREC

IFAC

con

stan

tly c

heck

s if

CIA

BOC

is fo

llow

ing

up o

n ca

ses

whi

ch P

REC

IFAC

is w

orki

ng

on. T

his

is d

ue to

the

fact

that

com

plai

nant

s te

nd to

see

k re

lief b

y ap

plyi

ng to

mul

tiple

age

ncie

s at

the

sam

e tim

e. T

he A

udito

r Gen

eral

als

o m

akes

inpu

ts w

hen

aske

d. W

hile

all

such

age

ncie

s ar

e ve

ry w

illing

, the

y al

so h

ave

thei

r ow

n st

aff s

horta

ge is

sues

.

How

ever

, the

re d

oes

not s

eem

to b

e an

y re

al c

olla

bora

tion

in in

vest

igat

ions

or a

ny a

ttem

pt to

fo

rge

a un

ified

stra

tegy

for d

ealin

g w

ith ‘d

ifficu

lt’ c

ases

– i.

e. h

igh

profi

le p

erso

ns o

r com

plic

ated

ca

ses,

in o

rder

to s

ecur

e a

high

er le

vel o

f con

vict

ions

. Som

e of

the

blam

e fo

r thi

s un

satis

fact

ory

situ

atio

n pe

rhap

s lie

s at

the

feet

of C

IABO

C’s

con

fiden

tialit

y cl

ause

.

Sour

ce: I

nter

view

with

form

er S

ecre

tary

to P

REC

IFAC

(10/

09/ 2

016)

; Cha

irman

, Pol

ice

Com

mis

sion

(2/1

1/20

16) a

nd fo

rmer

DG

, CIA

BOC

(10/

11/2

016)

.

52

IND

ICAT

OR

VA

LUES

IND

ICAT

OR

HIG

HM

OD

ERAT

ELO

WJU

STIF

ICAT

ION

OF

SCO

RES

37. C

oope

ratio

n be

twee

n AC

A an

d no

n-go

vern

men

tal o

rgan

izat

ions

in

clud

ing

CSO

s an

d pr

ivat

e co

mpa

nies

Hig

h de

gree

of

coo

pera

tion

betw

een

ACA

and

othe

r or

gani

zatio

ns

incl

udin

g C

SOs

and

priv

ate

com

pani

es

Lim

ited

coop

erat

ion

betw

een

AC

A an

d ot

her o

rgan

izat

ions

Con

flict

and

/ or

lack

coo

pera

tion

betw

een

ACA

and

othe

r or

gani

zatio

ns

Som

e tra

de u

nion

s an

d C

SOs,

esp

ecia

lly th

ose

linke

d to

leftw

ing

polit

ical

par

ties,

com

plai

n th

at

CIA

BOC

’s a

ttitu

de to

war

ds th

e pu

blic

is a

dver

saria

l rat

her t

han

supp

ortiv

e. T

hey

stat

e th

at th

eir

com

plai

nts

are

not a

ddre

ssed

. C

IABO

C d

oes

not s

eem

to h

ave

a po

licy

of c

onta

ctin

g co

mpl

ain-

ants

and

ask

ing

them

to p

rovi

de th

e ba

ckgr

ound

/con

text

to th

eir c

ompl

aint

s. H

owev

er, a

few

C

SOs

say

they

wer

e tre

ated

with

civ

ility,

and

kep

t inf

orm

ed a

bout

the

stat

us o

f the

inve

stig

atio

n of

thei

r com

plai

nts.

Sour

ce: i

nter

view

with

CSO

lead

ers

& tra

de u

nion

lead

ers.

38. A

CA’

s pa

rtici

patio

n in

inte

rnat

iona

l ne

twor

ks

Very

act

ive

with

AC

A pa

rtici

patin

g in

3 o

r mor

e ne

twor

ks

Activ

e w

ith A

CA

parti

cipa

ting

in 1

or

2 ne

twor

ks

ACA

does

not

pa

rtici

pate

in a

ny

netw

ork

The

Com

mis

sion

ers,

DG

and

sen

ior m

embe

rs o

f sta

ff pa

rtici

pate

ofte

n in

UN

, IN

GO

-rela

ted

an

d Tr

ansp

aren

cy In

tern

atio

nal-l

inke

d ev

ents

.

Sour

ce: T

rans

pare

ncy

Secr

etar

iat;

inte

rvie

w w

ith fo

rmer

DG

, CIA

BOC

.

39. A

CA’

s co

oper

atio

n w

ith A

CAs

in

othe

r cou

ntrie

s H

igh

degr

ee o

f co

oper

atio

n w

ith

join

t pro

ject

s an

d te

chni

cal

assi

stan

ce w

ith

seve

ral A

CAs

in

othe

r cou

ntrie

s

Lim

ited

coop

erat

ion

in s

ome

area

s w

ith

one

or tw

o AC

As in

ot

her c

ount

ries

ACA

does

not

pa

rtici

pate

in a

ny

netw

ork

CIA

BOC

has

mad

e co

ntac

t with

AC

As in

a w

ide

rang

e of

cou

ntrie

s, in

clud

ing

Asia

n co

untri

es

such

as

Chi

na, M

alay

sia,

Indi

a, P

akis

tan

and

Mon

golia

.

How

ever

, the

re d

oes

not s

eem

to b

e jo

int p

roje

cts.

Sour

ce: I

nter

view

with

form

er D

G, C

IABO

C (2

/11/

2016

).

53

6. A

CA’

s ac

coun

tabi

lity

and

over

sigh

t (4

indi

cato

rs)

Som

e tra

de u

nion

s an

d C

SOs,

esp

ecia

lly th

ose

linke

d to

leftw

ing

polit

ical

par

ties,

com

plai

n th

at C

IABO

C’s

atti

tude

tow

ards

the

publ

ic is

adv

ersa

rial r

athe

r tha

n su

ppor

tive.

The

y st

ate

that

thei

r com

-pl

aint

s ar

e no

t add

ress

ed.

CIA

BOC

doe

s no

t see

m to

hav

e a

polic

y of

con

tact

ing

com

plai

n-an

ts a

nd a

skin

g th

em to

pro

vide

the

back

grou

nd/c

onte

xt to

thei

r com

plai

nts.

How

ever

, a fe

w C

SOs

say

they

wer

e tre

ated

with

civ

ility,

and

kep

t inf

orm

ed a

bout

the

stat

us o

f the

inve

stig

atio

n of

thei

r com

plai

nts.

Sour

ce: i

nter

view

with

CSO

lead

ers

& tra

de u

nion

lead

ers.

The

Com

mis

sion

ers,

DG

and

sen

ior m

embe

rs o

f sta

ff pa

rtici

pate

ofte

n in

UN

, IN

GO

-rela

ted

and

Tra

nspa

renc

y In

tern

atio

nal-l

inke

d ev

ents

.

Sour

ce: T

rans

pare

ncy

Secr

etar

iat;

inte

rvie

w w

ith e

x-D

G, C

IABO

C.

CIA

BOC

has

mad

e co

ntac

t with

AC

As in

a w

ide

rang

e of

cou

ntrie

s, in

clud

ing

Asia

n co

untri

es s

uch

as C

hina

, Mal

aysi

a, In

dia,

Pak

ista

n an

d M

ongo

lia.

How

ever

, the

re d

oes

not s

eem

to b

e jo

int p

roje

cts.

Sour

ce: I

nter

view

with

ex-

DG

, CIA

BOC

(2/1

1/20

16).

IND

ICAT

OR

VA

LUES

IND

ICAT

OR

HIG

HM

OD

ERAT

ELO

WJU

STIF

ICAT

ION

OF

SCO

RES

40. I

nfor

mat

ion

prov

ided

in a

nd

acce

ssib

ility

of A

CA’

s an

nual

repo

rt an

d w

ebsi

te

Com

preh

ensi

ve

info

rmat

ion

on

ACA

is p

rovi

ded

in a

nnua

l rep

ort

and

web

site

, su

bmitt

ed to

pa

rliam

ent a

nd

easi

ly a

cces

sibl

e to

the

publ

ic

Lim

ited

info

rmat

ion

on A

CA

is p

rovi

ded

in a

nnua

l rep

ort a

nd

web

site

; sub

mitt

ed

to p

arlia

men

t but

not

ea

sily

acc

essi

ble

to

the

publ

ic

Subm

its a

nnua

l re

port

to

gove

rnm

ent b

ut

is n

ot a

vaila

ble

to th

e pu

blic

Acco

rdin

g to

its

enab

ling

legi

slat

ion

(199

4) C

IABO

C is

requ

ired

to p

rodu

ce a

n An

nual

Rep

ort

deta

iling

its a

ctiv

ities

, whi

ch is

to b

e se

nt to

the

Pres

iden

t, w

ho th

en m

akes

it a

vaila

ble

to

Parli

amen

t. C

IABO

C d

ownl

oade

d its

Ann

ual R

epor

t for

the

first

tim

e on

to it

s w

ebsi

te in

201

5.

The

Annu

al R

epor

t spe

lt ou

t its

mis

sion

and

pro

vide

d so

me

basi

c in

form

atio

n on

its

budg

et,

num

ber o

f inv

estig

atio

ns c

arrie

d ou

t ove

r the

pas

t five

yea

rs a

nd s

taff

vaca

ncie

s. H

ard

copi

es

are

not e

asily

ava

ilabl

e. It

s w

ebsi

te is

free

ly a

cces

sibl

e, b

ut th

e in

form

atio

n pr

ovid

ed h

owev

er, i

s lim

ited

to a

hot

line

and

emai

l acc

ess

to th

e D

G, c

ompl

eted

inve

stig

atio

ns a

nd c

onvi

ctio

ns.

Des

pite

man

y eff

orts

, the

rese

arch

team

was

not

abl

e to

acc

ess

a ha

rd c

opy

of p

revi

ous

Annu

al

Rep

orts

.

Sour

ce: C

IABO

C A

nnua

l Rep

ort 2

015;

web

site

(w

ww.

ciab

oc.g

ov.lk

)

41.A

CA’

s ov

ersi

ght m

echa

nism

sO

vers

ight

co

mm

ittee

s w

ith a

ctiv

e pa

rtici

patio

n by

MPs

sen

ior

civi

l ser

vant

s &

prom

inen

t ci

tizen

s

Ove

rsig

ht

com

mitt

ees

with

m

embe

rs o

f pa

rliam

ent a

nd /o

r se

nior

civ

il se

rvan

ts

as m

embe

rs

Acco

unta

ble

to E

xecu

tive

with

out a

ny

over

sigh

t co

mm

ittee

CIA

BOC

is a

nsw

erab

le to

Par

liam

ent.

The

y ar

e ex

pect

ed to

pro

vide

a P

arlia

men

tary

Com

mit-

tee

with

pro

gres

s re

ports

eve

ry tw

o m

onth

s. In

pra

ctic

e, th

ese

proc

edur

es h

ave

only

just

beg

un

to fa

ll in

to p

lace

, sin

ce th

e 19

th A

men

dmen

t to

the

Con

stitu

tion

whi

ch c

onta

ins

thes

e ov

ersi

ght

prov

isio

ns w

as o

nly

pass

ed in

May

201

5. T

he C

omm

ittee

has

jus

t rec

ently

com

e in

to p

lace

an

d ha

ve s

o fa

r req

uest

ed tw

o re

ports

from

CIA

BOC

. C

IABO

C is

beh

indh

and

on

the

first

but

ha

s co

mpi

led

the

seco

nd. T

hey

are

wor

king

on

this

.

Sour

ce: I

nter

view

with

ex-

DG

CIA

BOC

(10/

11/2

016)

; Edi

tor,

Rav

aya

(5/1

0/20

16)s

ee a

lso

Chr

is

Kam

ales

an, S

unda

y Ti

mes

, (15

/5/2

016)

, Haf

sa S

abry

, Sun

day

Lead

er (6

.9.2

015

& 31

/07/

2016

).

54

IND

ICAT

OR

VA

LUES

IND

ICAT

OR

HIG

HM

OD

ERAT

ELO

WJU

STIF

ICAT

ION

OF

SCO

RES

42. A

CA’

s pr

oced

ure

for d

ealin

g w

ith

com

plai

nts

agai

nst A

CA

pers

onne

lC

ompl

aint

s ag

ains

t AC

A pe

rson

nel a

nd

inve

stig

ated

by

an-o

ther

pub

lic

agen

cy to

avo

id

confl

ict o

f int

eres

t an

d re

sults

of

inve

stig

atio

n an

d pu

nish

men

t im

pose

d ar

e pu

blic

ised

Com

plai

nts

agai

nst

ACA

pers

onne

l are

in

vest

igat

ed b

y its

inte

rnal

con

trol

unit

but r

esul

ts o

f in

vest

igat

ion

and

puni

shm

ent a

re n

ot

publ

icis

ed

Com

plai

nts

agai

nst A

CA

pers

onne

l ar

e ig

nore

d or

not

in

vest

igat

ed

with

out a

ny

expl

anat

ion

Her

e th

e re

cord

is v

ery

prob

lem

atic

. Th

ere

is n

o pr

oced

ure

for i

nves

tigat

ion

by a

noth

er p

ublic

ag

ency

. In

fact

, a c

ompl

aint

of b

riber

y ag

ains

t the

pre

viou

s C

IABO

C C

hairm

an (2

010-

15) w

as

inve

stig

ated

by

the

accu

sed

him

self

and

dism

isse

d. A

s ev

iden

ced

by th

e nu

mbe

r of c

ompl

aint

s of

his

con

duct

car

ried

by th

e m

edia

, thi

s is

sue

gene

rate

d m

uch

publ

ic o

utra

ge. T

his

situ

atio

n ha

s ch

ange

d w

ith th

e im

plem

entin

g of

the

19th

Am

endm

ent,

whi

ch s

tipul

ates

a p

arlia

men

tary

co

mm

ittee

to o

vers

ee th

e fu

nctio

n of

inte

grity

bod

ies.

Sinc

e C

IABO

C’s

inve

stig

ator

s ar

e dr

awn

from

the

Polic

e D

epar

tmen

t, th

ey fa

ll un

der t

he

Polic

e O

rdin

ance

. Th

eref

ore

disc

iplin

ary

hear

ings

aga

inst

them

hav

e to

be

cond

ucte

d by

the

Polic

e H

uman

Res

ourc

es D

epar

tmen

t. T

his

is a

ver

y cu

mbe

rsom

e m

echa

nism

. In

any

cas

e,

the

puni

tive

stra

tegy

use

d in

the

Polic

e D

epar

tmen

t see

ms

to in

volv

e tra

nsfe

rring

offi

cers

out

ra

ther

than

inst

itutin

g ju

dici

al a

ctio

n ag

ains

t the

m, w

hate

ver t

he d

epth

of t

he o

ffens

e.

Thus

CIA

BOC

can

not i

nitia

te a

ctio

n ag

ains

t its

inve

stig

ator

s, o

nly

reco

mm

end

the

need

for i

t. Th

e in

tern

al w

ill an

d m

easu

res

for i

nves

tigat

ing

com

plai

nts

agai

nst i

ts o

wn

pers

onne

l are

wea

k.

In M

ay 2

016

the

Sund

ay T

imes

sta

ted

that

CIA

BOC

was

pro

bing

the

cond

uct o

f an

insp

ecto

r in

the

Inve

stig

atio

ns D

epar

tmen

t. A

CIA

BOC

spo

kesm

an w

as q

uote

d as

say

ing

that

an

inte

rnal

in

vest

igat

ion

was

taki

ng p

lace

. How

ever

, the

resu

lts o

f thi

s pr

oces

s w

as n

ot p

ublic

ised

, whi

ch is

un

satis

fact

ory

in a

n in

tegr

ity u

nit s

uch

as C

IABO

C.

Sour

ce: A

.C.V

isva

linga

m, I

slan

d, 3

0.07

.201

5;. N

irmal

a Ka

nnag

ara;

Sun

day

Lead

er 0

8.12

.201

3,

Chr

is K

amal

esan

, Sun

day

Tim

es, 1

5.05

.201

6, H

afsa

Sab

ry, S

unda

y Le

ader

, 06.

09.2

015

& 31

.08.

2016

.

43. O

utco

me

of c

ompl

aint

s ag

ains

t AC

A or

its

pers

onne

l in

past

3 y

ears

All v

alid

com

-pl

aint

s ag

ains

t AC

A pe

rson

nel

resu

lt in

pu

nish

men

t or

othe

r rem

edie

s,

and

outc

ome

is

publ

icis

ed

Som

e va

lid

com

plai

nts

agai

nst

ACA

pers

onne

l re

sult

in p

unis

hmen

t or

oth

er re

med

ies,

an

d ou

tcom

e is

pu

blic

ised

.

Com

plai

nts

invo

lvin

g AC

A pe

rson

nel a

re

igno

red

and

not

inve

stig

ated

.

Des

pite

a p

ublic

out

cry,

no

puni

tive

actio

n w

as a

ttem

pted

aga

inst

the

prev

ious

Cha

irman

(2

010-

15) a

ccus

ed o

f acc

eptin

g a

brib

e. T

he p

rese

nt C

omm

issi

oner

s, h

owev

er, e

njoy

a h

igh

repu

tatio

n fo

r int

egrit

y in

lega

l circ

les

and

this

con

tribu

tes

tow

ards

the

proc

ess

of c

onso

lida-

ting

the

pres

tige

of th

e in

stitu

tion.

As m

entio

ned

in th

e pr

evio

us in

dica

tor,

on 1

5th

May

201

6, a

new

spap

er s

tate

d th

at C

IABO

C

was

pro

bing

the

cond

uct o

f an

inve

stig

ator

(Ins

pect

or A

.H.M

. Gam

ini A

beys

ingh

e) a

ccus

ed o

f le

akin

g co

nfide

ntia

l inf

orm

atio

n. T

he o

utco

me

of th

is p

robe

rem

ains

shr

oude

d in

mys

tery

, and

in

gen

eral

, CIA

BOC

’s in

tern

al p

roce

dure

s la

ck tr

ansp

aren

cy. I

n O

ctob

er 2

016,

CIA

BOC

‘s e

x-D

G w

as a

ccus

ed o

f mis

usin

g he

r pow

ers

of d

iscr

etio

n, a

nd b

eing

sel

ectiv

e in

filin

g ch

arge

s. S

he

tend

ed h

er re

sign

atio

n on

17

Oct

201

6.

Sour

ce: C

hris

Kam

alen

dran

in S

unda

y Ti

mes

(15/

05/2

016)

, Col

ombo

Tel

egra

ph (2

7/9/

2016

); K

Tenn

akoo

n in

Cey

lon

Toda

y (1

4/10

/201

6); a

lso

disc

ussi

on w

ith k

ey in

form

ants

incl

udin

g ac

adem

ics

and

lega

l pro

fess

iona

ls.

55

7. P

ublic

per

cept

ions

of t

he A

CA’

s pe

rfor

man

ce (7

indi

cato

rs)

IND

ICAT

OR

VA

LUES

IND

ICAT

OR

HIG

HM

OD

ERAT

ELO

WJU

STIF

ICAT

ION

OF

SCO

RES

44. P

ublic

con

fiden

ce th

at

gove

rnm

ent h

as g

iven

the

ACA

the

requ

ired

pow

ers

and

reso

urce

s fo

r cu

rbin

g co

rrupt

ion

Hig

h le

vel o

f co

nfide

nce

as

refle

cted

in

surv

ey fi

ndin

gs

(abo

ve 7

5%) a

nd

view

s of

sen

ior

ACA

pers

onne

l, C

SO le

ader

s an

d an

ti-co

rrupt

ion

expe

rts a

nd

jour

nalis

ts

Mod

erat

e le

vel

of c

onfid

ence

as

refle

cted

in s

urve

y fin

ding

s (5

0%-7

5%)

&vie

ws

of s

enio

r AC

A pe

rson

nel,

CSO

lead

ers,

an

ti-co

rrupt

ion

expe

rts a

nd

jour

nalis

ts

Low

leve

l of

confi

denc

e as

re

flect

ed in

su

rvey

find

ing

(bel

ow 5

0%)

and

view

s of

se

nior

AC

A pe

rson

nel,

CSO

le

ader

s,

anti-

corru

ptio

n ex

perts

and

jo

urna

lists

The

2015

CPI

rank

s Sr

i Lan

ka 8

3 ou

t of 1

54 s

tate

s, n

otch

ing

only

37

poin

ts. T

his

scor

e ha

s re

mai

ned

stab

le o

ver t

he p

ast 3

yea

rs. T

rans

pare

ncy

Inte

rnat

iona

l’s G

loba

l Cor

rupt

ion

Baro

met

er’s

(GC

B) 2

016

data

on

Sri L

anka

, 43

.9%

of r

espo

nden

ts th

ough

t tha

t CIA

BOC

was

do

ing

wel

l or e

ven

very

wel

l. 26

.1%

wer

e di

ssat

isfie

d. 3

0% w

ould

not

ven

ture

an

opin

ion.

Agai

nst t

his,

a c

omm

unity

per

cept

ions

sur

vey

on p

olic

ing

by

the

Asia

Fou

ndat

ion

in J

an 2

016

(see

tabl

e 6)

sho

ws

a sh

arp

shift

ove

r the

pas

t yea

r: p

ublic

vie

ws

on c

orru

ptio

n as

a k

ey fa

ctor

aff

ectin

g po

licin

g dr

oppe

d fro

m 2

4% in

201

4 to

6%

in 2

015.

Pol

itica

l int

erfe

renc

e as

a fa

ctor

al

so d

ropp

ed fr

om 5

6% to

39%

.Thi

s im

plie

s th

at p

erce

ptio

ns o

f cor

rupt

ion

as w

ell a

s po

litic

al

inte

rfere

nce

with

in p

ublic

inst

itutio

ns s

uch

as th

e po

lice

has

decl

ined

radi

cally

ove

r 201

5 (i.

e.

100%

-[6%

+39%

] = 5

5% o

f res

pond

ents

hav

e co

nfide

nce

in th

e po

litic

al c

limat

e) T

his

rate

s a

‘m

oder

ate’

sco

re.

Sour

ce: C

IABO

C’s

Ann

ual R

epor

t (20

15);

Cor

rupt

ion

Perc

eptio

n In

dex

(201

5), T

rans

pare

ncy

Inte

rnat

iona

l, Be

rlin.

inte

rvie

w w

ith C

onve

nor,

Citi

zens

Mov

emen

t for

Goo

d G

over

nanc

e (7

/9/2

016)

; al

so A

udito

r Gen

eral

(21/

9/20

16),

Cha

irman

, CO

PE (2

8/10

/201

6); C

onve

nor,

Cey

lon

Teac

hers

’ Uni

on (2

2/9/

2016

); G

ener

al S

ecy.

Pub

lic S

ecto

r Nur

ses’

Uni

on (1

4/19

/201

6),

Con

veno

r, Vo

ice

Agai

nst C

orru

ptio

n (1

5/9/

2016

); al

so i

nter

view

s w

ith c

rimin

al ju

stic

e pr

ofes

sion

als

atta

ched

to th

e AG

’s D

ept a

nd C

SO le

ader

s.

45. P

ublic

con

fiden

ce in

AC

A’s

adhe

renc

e to

due

pro

cess

, im

parti

ality

and

fairn

ess

in u

sing

its

pow

ers

Hig

h le

vel o

f co

nfide

nce

as

refle

cted

in

surv

ey fi

ndin

g (a

bove

75%

) and

vi

ews

of s

enio

r AC

A pe

rson

nel,

CSO

lead

ers,

an

ti-co

rrupt

ion

expe

rts a

nd

jour

nalis

ts

Mod

erat

e le

vel

of c

onfid

ence

as

refle

cted

in

surv

ey fi

ndin

gs

(50%

- 7

5%) a

nd

view

s of

sen

ior

ACA

pers

onne

l, C

SO le

ader

s, a

nti-

corru

ptio

n ex

perts

an

d jo

urna

lists

Low

leve

l of

confi

denc

e as

re

flect

ed in

su

rvey

find

ings

(b

elow

50%

) and

vi

ews

of s

enio

r AC

A pe

rson

nel,

CSO

lead

ers,

an

ti-co

rrupt

ion

expe

rts a

nd

jour

nalis

ts

The

issu

e of

CIA

BOC

’s im

parti

ality

and

adh

eren

ce to

due

pro

cess

and

fairn

ess

rem

ains

pr

oble

mat

ic.

On

the

one

hand

, the

re is

clo

se m

edia

inte

rest

in C

IABO

C’s

act

iviti

es. O

n th

e ot

her,

a su

cces

sion

of s

enio

r pol

itica

l figu

res

have

exp

ress

ed m

uch

cons

tern

atio

n ab

out

CIA

BOC

’s fa

ilure

to

adhe

re to

due

pro

cess

. In

resp

onse

to s

uch

a cr

itica

l com

men

t, in

Oct

20

16, t

he th

en-D

G fe

lt ob

liged

to te

nder

her

resi

gnat

ion.

The

fact

that

she

did

, iro

nica

lly, i

s te

stim

ony

to th

e fa

ct th

at s

he fe

lt th

at s

he d

id a

dher

e to

due

pro

cess

and

atte

mpt

ed to

be

impa

rtial

.

How

ever

, the

se in

cess

ant c

harg

es a

nd c

ount

er-c

harg

es s

houl

d be

see

n ag

ains

t a fr

augh

t po

litic

al c

ultu

re w

hich

has

em

erge

d in

the

post

-con

flict

situ

atio

n. A

nea

r bre

akdo

wn

of la

w a

nd

orde

r and

the

abje

ct p

oliti

ciza

tion

of p

ublic

inst

itutio

ns p

reva

ils. T

his

has

crea

ted

enor

mou

s pu

blic

ang

er a

gain

st p

oliti

cian

s a

nd p

ublic

ser

vant

s w

ho a

re p

erce

ived

to b

e cu

lpab

le. I

n su

ch

a co

ntex

t, th

e pu

blic

con

tinue

s to

mak

e de

man

ds th

at c

orru

pt p

oliti

cian

s sh

ould

be

brou

ght t

o ju

stic

e w

hich

may

be

unre

alis

tic i

n th

e sh

ort t

erm

.

Sour

ces:

Int

ervi

ews

with

lega

l pro

fess

iona

ls, N

irmal

a Ka

nnan

gara

in S

unda

y le

ader

(22/

02/2

014)

; Sun

day

Tim

es (1

6/04

/201

5); S

unda

y Le

ader

(31/

8/20

16),

Isla

nd

(31/

8/20

16);

Dai

ly M

irror

(23/

9/20

16);

Col

ombo

Tel

egra

ph (2

7/9/

2016

); Su

nday

Lea

der (

3/10

/201

6); E

cono

my

Nex

t (1

8/10

/201

6).

56

IND

ICAT

OR

VA

LUES

IND

ICAT

OR

HIG

HM

OD

ERAT

ELO

WJU

STIF

ICAT

ION

OF

SCO

RES

46. C

onfid

ence

in A

CA’

s ad

here

nce

to

due

proc

ess,

impa

rtial

ity a

nd fa

irnes

s in

usi

ng it

s po

wer

s, a

mon

g pe

rson

s w

ho h

ad d

irect

con

tact

with

th

e AC

A

Hig

h le

vel o

f co

nfide

nce

as

refle

cted

in

surv

ey fi

ndin

gs

(abo

ve 7

5%) a

nd

view

s of

sen

ior

ACA

pers

onne

l, C

SO le

ader

s,

jour

nalis

ts a

nd, i

f po

ssib

le p

erso

ns

with

dire

ct c

onta

ct

with

the

ACA

Mod

erat

e le

vel

of c

onfid

ence

as

refle

cted

in s

urve

y fin

-din

gs (5

0%-7

5%)

and

view

s of

sen

ior

ACA

pers

onne

l, C

SO le

ader

s,

jour

nalis

ts a

nd ,

if po

ssib

le, p

erso

ns

with

dire

ct c

onta

ct

with

the

ACA

Low

leve

l of

confi

denc

e as

re

flect

ed in

su

rvey

find

ings

(b

elow

50%

) and

vi

ews

of s

enio

r AC

A p

erso

nnel

, C

SO le

ader

s,

jour

nalis

ts a

nd, i

f po

ssib

le p

erso

ns

with

dire

ct

cont

act w

ith th

e AC

A

Pers

ons

who

hav

e ha

d di

rect

con

tact

with

CIA

BOC

fall

into

two

mai

n ca

tego

ries:

(a) o

rdin

ary

citiz

ens

and

(b) m

embe

rs o

f CSO

s, T

Us

and

polit

ical

act

ivis

ts w

ho re

pres

ent o

rgan

izat

ions

. Th

e se

cond

cat

egor

y in

par

ticul

ar, h

ave

filed

com

plai

nts

on m

assi

ve fr

aud

of g

igan

tic d

imen

sion

s w

hich

the

CIA

BOC

, und

erst

anda

bly

enou

gh in

the

pres

ent p

oliti

cal c

limat

e, h

as b

een

som

ewha

t he

sita

nt in

inve

stig

atin

g. T

his

has

lead

to p

olar

ized

resp

onse

s, a

nd t

hose

who

had

hig

h ex

pect

atio

ns o

f inv

estig

atio

ns in

to m

assi

ve fr

aud

bein

g fa

st-tr

acke

d ar

e cr

itica

l abo

ut C

IABO

C’s

pe

rform

ance

.

Ord

inar

y ci

tizen

s on

thei

r par

t ten

d to

be

intim

idat

ed b

y th

e so

mew

hat a

dver

saria

l app

roac

h as

sum

ed b

y C

IABO

C’s

Rec

eivi

ng O

ffice

rs. T

hey

com

plai

n th

at th

ese

office

rs in

terro

gate

them

as

if

they

wer

e th

e off

ende

rs.

It sh

ould

be

note

d th

at C

IABO

C’s

inve

stig

ator

s ar

e dr

awn

from

the

Polic

e D

ept,

whi

ch d

oes

not h

ave

reco

rd o

f bei

ng p

eopl

e-fri

endl

y. F

or m

any

com

plai

nant

s,

such

an

adve

rsar

ial r

espo

nse

is s

een

as a

lack

of i

mpa

rtial

ity in

that

CIA

BOC

’s s

taff

seem

to

resp

ond

bette

r to

high

er s

tatu

s co

mpl

aina

nts

or th

ose

with

an

orga

niza

tion

back

ing

them

, whi

ch

enha

nces

thei

r sta

tus.

Both

cat

egor

ies

of c

ompl

aina

nts

agre

e th

at m

any

anon

ymou

s co

mpl

aint

s m

ay b

e m

otiv

ated

by

petty

reve

nge.

How

ever

, the

y po

int o

ut th

at C

IABO

C’s

rece

ivin

g offi

cers

can

not a

lway

s as

sum

e th

is, a

nd n

eed

to tr

eat e

very

com

plai

nant

with

gre

ater

resp

ect a

nd a

ssum

e a

mor

e pr

ofes

sion

al

stan

ce.

Sour

ce: i

nter

view

with

Cha

irman

, CO

PE, (

20/1

0/20

16);

Con

veno

r, C

eylo

n Te

ache

rs’ U

nion

(2

2/09

/201

6); G

en. S

ecy.

Pub

lic S

ecto

r Nur

ses’

Uni

on (1

4./9

/201

6), C

onve

nor,

Voic

e Ag

ains

t C

orru

ptio

n (1

5/9/

2016

); C

onve

nor,

CaF

FE (1

3/9/

2016

) and

Hea

d, H

isto

ry D

ept,

Col

ombo

U

nive

rsity

(11/

10/2

016)

; int

ervi

ews

with

crim

inal

just

ice

prof

essi

onal

s a

ttach

ed to

the

AG

’s

office

and

BAS

L, o

ppos

ition

pol

itici

ans

and

jour

nalis

ts. S

ee a

lso

A.C

. Vis

valin

gam

in Is

land

(2

0/6/

2015

); K

Tenn

akoo

n in

Cey

lon

Toda

y (1

4/10

/201

6).

47. C

onfid

ence

in th

e AC

A’s

dign

ified

and

resp

ectfu

l tre

atm

ent o

f per

sons

und

er

inve

stig

atio

n

Hig

h le

vel o

f eff

ectiv

enes

s as

re

flect

ed in

the

view

s of

sen

ior

ACA

pers

onne

l, C

SO le

ader

s,

jour

nalis

ts a

nd

pers

ons

subj

ect

to in

vest

igat

ion,

if

poss

ible

Mod

erat

e le

vel

of c

onfid

ence

as

refle

cted

in th

e vi

ews

of s

enio

r AC

A pe

rson

nel,

CSO

lead

ers,

jo

urna

lists

and

pe

rson

s s

ubje

ct

to in

vest

igat

ion,

if

poss

ible

Low

leve

l of

confi

denc

e as

re

flect

ed in

vi

ews

of s

enio

r AC

A pe

rson

nel,

CSO

lead

ers,

jo

urna

lists

and

pe

rson

s s

ubje

ct

to in

vest

igat

ion,

if

poss

ible

The

rese

arch

team

wer

e un

able

to a

cces

s su

ch p

erso

ns. A

t the

sam

e tim

e, if

com

plai

nant

s to

C

IABO

C a

re in

timid

ated

by

the

treat

men

t the

y re

ceiv

ed, i

t is

hard

to im

agin

e th

at s

uspe

cts

– at

le

ast t

hose

from

low

er s

ocio

econ

omic

bac

kgro

unds

– w

ould

fare

muc

h be

tter.

Som

e po

litic

al

figur

es in

vest

igat

ed h

ave

com

plai

ned

of th

eir t

reat

men

t to

the

med

ia.

But t

hese

are

influ

entia

l pe

rson

ages

who

may

ver

y qu

ick

to ta

ke o

ffens

e at

the

way

they

’re tr

eate

d w

hen

out o

f pow

er.

It w

as in

fact

the

alle

gedl

y di

sres

pect

ful c

ondu

ct o

f the

inte

rroga

tion

of a

sen

ior c

abin

et

min

iste

r (fo

r a re

lativ

ely

min

or c

harg

e) w

hich

set

into

mot

ion

the

train

of e

vent

s w

hich

led

to th

e re

sign

atio

n of

the

prev

ious

DG

on

17th

Oct

ober

201

6.

Whi

le C

IABO

C s

taff

agre

e th

at th

e Sr

i Lan

kan

Polic

e d

o no

t hav

e a

reco

rd o

f tre

atin

g su

spec

ts (w

ithou

t pol

itica

l con

tact

s) w

ith a

ny d

egre

e of

dig

nity

, the

y ve

hem

ently

den

y th

at

they

them

selv

es tr

eat s

uspe

cts

in a

ny w

ay th

at is

inap

prop

riate

. Thi

s an

xiet

y to

con

vinc

e th

e re

sear

ch te

am a

nd th

e p

ublic

at l

arge

, im

plie

s th

at th

e cr

itici

sm re

ceiv

ed o

ver t

he p

ast t

wo

year

s on

this

rega

rd h

as h

ad a

n im

pact

on

CIA

BOC

sta

ff ac

ross

the

boar

d.

Sour

ce: S

unda

y Ti

mes

(26/

4/20

15);

Isla

nd, e

dito

rial (

15/0

9/20

16);

Cey

lon

Toda

y (1

4/10

/201

6);

Keer

thiT

enne

koon

in C

olom

bo T

eleg

raph

(19/

10/2

016)

. Als

o in

terv

iew

s C

SO le

ader

s, jo

urna

lists

an

d ac

adem

ics.

57

IND

ICAT

OR

VA

LUES

IND

ICAT

OR

HIG

HM

OD

ERAT

ELO

WJU

STIF

ICAT

ION

OF

SCO

RES

48. P

ublic

per

cept

ion

of A

CA’

s eff

ectiv

enes

s in

cor

rupt

ion-

cont

rol

Hig

h le

vel o

f eff

ectiv

enes

s as

refle

cted

in

surv

ey fi

ndin

gs

(abo

ve 7

5%) a

nd

view

s of

sen

ior

ACA

pers

onne

l C

SO le

ader

s,

anti-

corru

ptio

n ex

perts

and

jo

urna

lists

Mod

erat

e le

vel o

f eff

ectiv

enes

s as

re

flect

ed in

sur

vey

findi

ngs

(50%

-75%

) an

d vi

ews

of C

SO

lead

ers,

ant

i-co

rrupt

ion

expe

rts

and

jour

nalis

ts

Low

leve

l of

effec

tiven

ess

as re

flect

ed in

su

rvey

find

ings

(b

elow

50%

) an

d vi

ews

of

CSO

lead

ers,

an

ti-co

rrupt

ion

expe

rts a

nd

jour

nalis

ts

As m

entio

ned

abov

e, in

the

GC

B (2

016)

dat

a, 4

3.9%

of r

espo

nden

ts th

ough

t tha

t CIA

BOC

w

as d

oing

wel

l or e

ven

very

wel

l. Th

e As

ia F

ound

atio

n, C

olom

bo’s

Com

mun

ity P

erce

ptio

ns

Surv

ey o

n po

licin

g c

ondu

cted

in J

anua

ry 2

016

was

eve

n m

ore

posi

tive.

It in

dica

ted

that

55%

of

resp

onde

nts

had

confi

denc

e in

the

new

pol

itica

l clim

ate

(see

tabl

e 6)

. Fur

ther

, all

key

info

rman

ts

inte

rvie

wed

for t

his

asse

ssm

ent –

with

out e

xcep

tion

– ag

reed

that

the

leve

l of a

ctiv

ity h

ad

defin

itely

rise

n w

ith th

e ne

w C

omm

issi

on a

nd s

peci

ally

ex-

DG

Ms

Wic

kram

asin

ghe.

Thi

s w

as

thou

ght t

o be

par

ticul

arly

so

in th

e re

alm

s of

pre

vent

ion

and

outre

ach

activ

ities

, with

the

‘Sev

en

step

s to

zer

o To

lera

nce’

stra

tegy

.

Sour

ce: S

ourc

e: in

terv

iew

s w

ith tr

ade

unio

nist

s, C

SO le

ader

s an

d jo

urna

lists

; A.C

. Vis

valin

gam

in

Isla

nd (2

0/6/

2015

); K

Tenn

akoo

n in

Cey

lon

Toda

y (1

4/10

/201

6); C

eylo

n To

day,

(22/

02/2

016)

.

49. P

erce

ptio

ns o

f AC

A’s

effec

tiven

ess

in c

orru

ptio

n –c

ontro

l am

ong

pers

ons

with

dire

ct c

onta

ct

with

AC

A

Hig

h le

vel o

f eff

ectiv

enes

s as

refle

cted

in

surv

ey fi

ndin

gs

(abo

ve 7

5%) a

nd

view

s of

sen

ior

ACA

pers

onne

l C

SO le

ader

s,

anti-

corru

ptio

n ex

perts

and

jo

urna

lists

Mod

erat

e le

vel o

f eff

ectiv

enes

s as

re

flect

ed in

sur

vey

findi

ngs

(50%

-75%

) an

d vi

ews

of C

SO

lead

ers,

ant

i-co

rrupt

ion

expe

rts

and

jour

nalis

ts

Low

leve

l of

effec

tiven

ess

as re

flect

ed in

su

rvey

find

ings

(b

elow

50%

) an

d vi

ews

of

CSO

lead

ers,

an

ti-co

rrupt

ion

expe

rts a

nd

jour

nalis

ts

Amon

g th

ose

who

had

dire

ct c

onta

ct w

ith C

IABO

C, a

s m

entio

ned

abov

e, m

embe

rs o

f gr

oups

w

ho h

ad a

ctiv

ely

enga

ged

in o

vertu

rnin

g th

e pr

evio

us g

ovt e

xpre

ssed

dis

satis

fact

ion.

127 T

his

was

exp

ress

ed in

thei

r int

ervi

ews

with

the

rese

arch

team

, and

in th

e nu

mer

ous

lette

rs to

ne

wsp

aper

s an

d so

cial

med

ia. T

his

is p

erha

ps d

ue to

thei

r hi

gh –

and

per

haps

unr

ealis

tic -

expe

ctat

ions

of C

IABO

C.

How

ever

, eve

n am

ong

this

cat

egor

y of

per

sons

, the

re is

gen

eral

agr

eem

ent t

hat t

he le

vel o

f ac

tivity

has

rise

n en

orm

ousl

y in

com

paris

on to

pre

viou

s co

mm

issi

ons.

Sour

ce: S

ourc

e: in

terv

iew

s w

ith tr

ade

unio

nist

s, C

SO le

ader

s an

d jo

urna

lists

; A.C

. Vis

valin

gam

in

Isla

nd (2

0/06

/201

5); K

Ten

nako

on in

Cey

lon

Toda

y (1

4/10

/201

6).

50. P

erce

ptio

ns o

f AC

A’s

effec

tiven

ess

in d

ealin

g w

ith

com

plai

nts

amon

g fe

mal

e ci

tizen

s w

ho h

ad d

irect

con

tact

with

AC

A

Hig

h le

vel o

f eff

ectiv

enes

s as

refle

cted

in

surv

ey fi

ndin

gs

(abo

ve 7

5%)

and

view

s of

C

SO le

ader

s,

anti-

corru

ptio

n ex

perts

, jo

urna

lists

and

, if

poss

ible

, wom

en

who

had

dire

ct

cont

act w

ith A

CA.

mod

erat

e le

vel o

f eff

ectiv

enes

s as

re

flect

ed in

sur

vey

findi

ngs

(50%

- 75

%) a

nd v

iew

s of

C

SO le

ader

s, a

nti-

corru

ptio

n ex

perts

, jo

urna

lists

and

, if

poss

ible

, wom

en

who

had

dire

ct

cont

act w

ith A

CA.

Low

leve

l of

effec

tiven

ess

as re

flect

ed in

su

rvey

find

ings

(b

elow

50%

) &

view

s of

C

SO le

ader

s,

antic

orru

ptio

n ex

perts

, jo

urna

lists

and

, if

poss

ible

, wom

en

who

had

dire

ct

cont

act w

ith

ACA.

The

rese

arch

team

was

not

abl

e to

acc

ess

any

fem

ale

com

plai

nant

s. H

owev

er, t

he S

ri La

nkan

da

ta o

n th

e 20

16 G

CB

(forth

com

ing)

rev

eals

that

42.

8% o

f fem

ale

resp

onde

nts

thou

ght t

hat

CIA

BOC

was

doi

ng w

ell o

r ver

y w

ell i

n fig

htin

g co

rrupt

ion,

whi

le 2

4.1%

wer

e di

ssat

isfie

d.

Furth

er, a

s m

entio

ned

abov

e, a

mon

g ra

ids

into

com

plai

nts

of b

riber

y an

d co

rrupt

ion

cite

d on

CIA

BOC

’s w

ebsi

te b

etw

een

2012

-16,

the

re a

re fi

ve in

stan

ces

of f

emal

e pl

aint

iffs

who

ci

te d

eman

ds fo

r sex

ual g

ratifi

catio

n in

lieu

of m

oney

, for

pol

itica

l or a

dmin

istra

tive

favo

urs.

O

f the

se, t

wo

such

cha

rges

, hav

e re

sulte

d in

con

vict

ions

, with

sen

tenc

es in

clud

ing

2 yr

s rig

orou

s im

pris

onm

ent s

uspe

nded

for 1

0 ye

ars.

The

firs

t was

initi

ated

in A

ugus

t 201

2, b

ut th

e in

dict

men

t onl

y to

ok p

lace

in M

arch

201

6. T

he o

ther

was

mad

e in

Sep

tem

ber 2

013,

and

the

perp

etra

tor w

as s

ente

nced

in J

anua

ry 2

016.

Thi

s am

ount

s to

a 4

0% c

onvi

ctio

n ra

te, w

hich

is

sign

ifica

ntly

hig

her t

hat t

hat f

or o

ther

con

vict

ions

.

Cle

arly

then

, whi

le fe

mal

e co

mpl

aina

nts

have

bro

ught

cha

rges

aga

inst

dem

ands

for s

exua

l gr

atifi

catio

n, it

is o

nly

in th

e pa

st tw

o ye

ars

that

thes

e ha

ve b

orne

frui

t in

the

cour

ts. T

his

indi

cate

s th

at th

e pr

esen

t CIA

BOC

sta

ff ta

kes

com

plai

nts

of d

eman

ds fo

r sex

ual g

ratifi

catio

n se

rious

ly e

noug

h to

see

wom

en w

ho c

ome

forw

ards

with

com

plai

nts

all t

he w

ay th

roug

h to

co

urt.

This

is a

n im

pres

sive

ach

ieve

men

t in

a co

nser

vativ

e As

ian

soci

ety.

Sour

ce: C

IABO

C w

ebsi

te (w

ww.

ciab

oc.g

ov.lk

); G

loba

l Cor

rupt

ion

Baro

met

er 2

016

(forth

com

ing)

.

127.

90%

of k

ey in

form

ants

had

dire

ct e

xper

ienc

e of

dea

ling

with

CIA

BOC

.

58

93%

72.22%

50.00%

66.66%

40.00%

25.00%

50.00%

56.67%

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

100%

ACA's Legal Independence &Status

ACA's Financial and HumanResources

ACA's Detection &Investigation Functions

ACA's Prevention, Education& Outreach Functions

ACA's Cooperation withOther Organizations

ACA's Accountability &Oversight Functions

Public Perceptions of theACA's Performance

Overall Score

CIABOC strives to function in a post-conflict society in which public institutions are frail. Public administration has been subjected to intense politicization. A culture of irregular payments has evolved, in which the public remains ambiguous about what in fact constitutes the parameters of corruption. While large-scale corruption spawns much public outrage, paying bribes for minor public services does not bring moral censure upon the giver. Thus the offense is always committed by one’s opponents, and never by one’s self. The self remains in denial about its complicity in corruption. This creates a situation where the boundary between public service and administrative favour is blurred and unclear to both the public as well as the public servant. In the post-2015 political climate, public institutions are struggling to recover a measure of autonomy.

Figure 1 - CIABOC’S SCORE BY DIMENSION

The new government initially came to power on an anti-graft platform. But they now face rebellion by their own MPs and ministers, who wish to recompense their electoral supporters by gifting them with positions in the public sector. Here again, the culture intervenes. There is no real consensus that politicians giving jobs to their supporters is wrong; only that politicians you have no access to are somehow wrong to provide their supporters with employment in the state sector. This revives the politicization process. Further, politicians of all parties and at all levels national, provincial and local have been accused of receiving commissions from entrepreneurs and businessmen who obtain contracts for public infrastructure building projects.128 The cycle seems endemic.

In this climate, CIABOC’s efforts may seem like a drop in the ocean. Yet CIABOC’s staff are themselves encouraged by the extent to which their collective performance has improved over the past two years. Morale is up and a high level of staff commitment seems to prevail. This should be appreciated by critics rather than dismissed. At the same time this level of performance – while undoubtedly improved – still does not match the expectations of these same critics who invested so much effort in order to bring

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

128. This is due to many reasons.Though presently, a UNP-UPFA coalition governs at the national level, at the provincial and local levels, UPFA politicians linked to the previous regime remain in power, pending provincial and local elections delayed by delimitation issues. A number of such local politicians as well as national-level figures in the previous UPFA govt and leaders of minor parties within the UPFA have been accused of gross

59

about regime change. While they are firmly against ‘witch hunts’ taking place, they did expect that legal measures would be adopted against wrongdoers. CIABOC, on their part, appear to feel that such critiques do not appreciate the complexities of producing evidence against some kinds of white collar crime which could stand in court.

Against this, CIABOC themselves, the media and even some government ministers claim that files of completed investigations sent to the Attorney General are still stockpiled on his desk. The AG’s Department cites lack of court time. Either way, it cannot be denied that the rate of convictions is low. But CIABOC’s senior executives accept that its legal officers - used to dealing with routine misuse of bureaucratic privileges by low-level public employees such as grama sevakas, school teachers/principals and forestry officers - lack advocacy skills to defend more nuanced and intricate cases in court.

Thus though there is an indicator addressing the rate of convictions, the assessment tool itself lacks a dimension dedicated to the Anti-Corruption Agency’s legal competence. Since this is a key aspect of its ability to play its role in society successfully this is an important hiatus in the scheme.

While CIABOC’s code of confidentiality does protect the interests of suspects who are subsequently found to be innocent, it also contributes towards creating a culture of secrecy. A system of gate-keeping appears to have evolved where lower-level staff guard access to senior officials such as the Commissioners and Director-General, who - despite the avowals on CIABOC’s website - are not really accessible to the public. This could be for their own protection, in a situation where politically sensitive investigations are taking place. However, it also creates a situation where the Commissioners themselves seem reluctant to engage with potential critics, including other stakeholders on the anti-corruption front. Since their institutional position is tenured, this lack of openness in dealing with the public is indefensible.

This tendency extends to issues of institutional accountability. While it is valid that the position of the Commissioners should be tenured, this cannot extend to the rest of the staff, in the face of complaints of inappropriate conduct or misuse of funds. The drafting of internal inquiry procedures is required.

Finally, the failure to engage in qualitative research about and understand the context of corruption loopholes is a significant omission. Research into the context of corruption will equip CIABOC staff to grasp the context in which loophole for corruption tend to surface. It will help investigators to understand how a culture of impunity emerges in certain situation, which would help them deal with specific actors who are granted this kind of impunity.

RECOMMENDATIONSLegal independence and status 1. The procedure assumed by the Constitutional Council for the appointment of Commissioners – i.e. calling for nominations from the public and subjecting nominees to an interview process – should be mandated in order to retain transparency.

Human and financial resources2. CIABOC should proceed to recruit a special unit of approx 8 – 10 staff who are equipped to deal with white collar crime – including accounting and criminal justice professionals and qualitative social science researchers – and provide recurrent training which would help them stay abreast of best practices in investigation.129

3. CIABOC, as a public sector organization of extraordinary functions, should be freed from ties to the Police department and the Public Services Commission, and be allowed to recruit its own personnel and formulate its own salary structures.

129. A cabinet draft has already been submitted for this cadre, but its composition should include higher quality staff.

60

Detection and Investigation Function 4. Initially recruit a 3 – 4 member experienced legal team led by selected prosecutors with a proven record in the Attorney General’s Department, to prosecute charges in court relating to complicated cases or cases relating to grand corruption, until such time as CIABOC’s own team of legal officers are of such standard as to function independently of the AG’ Dept. CIABOC should also be able to and set in place a system of bonuses if convictions are secured.

5. Establish another high court complex preferably cited in Colombo, where bribery and corruption cases can be heard under a trial-at-bar.

6. Create an official forum for the exchange of ideas with FCID and PRECIFAC, the Financial Intelligence Unit of the Central Bank, the Auditor General and if relevant, the CID for a coordinated and productive approach to complex and large-scale corruption and money laundering cases.

7. Should retain a separate register to identify the gender of complainants

Prevention, education and outreach functions8. Should seek donor assistance to engage in qualitative research into corruption risks, contexts and conditions in Sri Lankan society.

Accountability and oversight functions9. Produce a high-quality Annual Report according to standard report-writing criteria

10. Provide the CC with progress reports very two months.

11. A preliminary inquiry procedure should be devised by the Commissioners/DG to be deployed In the event of complaints against CIABOC staff. The procedure should ascertain the accuracy of the sequence of events cited in the complaint, and then expeditiously arrange a disciplinary hearing with the Police HR Department, at which either a Commissioner or DG also participates.

12. In the event of evidence of wrong-doing by CIABOC staff, disciplinary action must be taken and publicized on CIABOC’s website.

13. CIABOC’s confidentiality clause should be re-defined to cover only information pertaining to on-going investigations and court cases. There should be provision for senior CIABOC investigative staff to profitably share ideas on how to approach politically-sensitive or complicated cases strategically through a forum with the auditor general and other integrity bodies.

61

Transparency international believes that Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) as public institutions tasked with combating corruption, must be transparent, accessible and accountable to citizens. They must operate with the utmost integrity, maintain a reputation of objectivity and professionalism and demonstrate effectiveness in their duties. Transparency International has identified ACAs as key partners in the fight against corruption and plans to work in constructive collaboration with governments who are ready to invest in improving their anti-corruption effectiveness by building strong oversight and enforcement mechanisms.

Transparency International’s initiative aimed at strengthening anti-corruption agencies combines biennial assessments of ACAs with sustained engagement, dialogue and advocacy at both national and regional levels. A robust assessment tool was developed over a period of two years in consultation with numerous experts and practitioners around the world. In mid-2013, Transparency International convened an experts meeting in Kuala Lumpur to explore the possibility of developing an ACA assessment tool. After receiving encouraging feedback and useful input, Transparency International commissioned a background review and draft framework by anti-corruption specialist, Alan Doig. The concept received further interest and backing from ACAs in the Asia and Pacific region during the 18th and 19th Steering Group Meeting of the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific in 2013 and 2014.

In 2014, Transparency International commissioned anti-corruption expert, Dr Jon Quah to further refine the framework, producing a set of indicators incorporating elements of TI’s National Integrity Systems assessment methodology and other relevant tools and principles. In April 2015, Transparency International organized a Focus Group Discussion in Bangkok, bringing together practitioners, researchers and ACAs to scrutinize the indicator framework and approach. Participants subsequently formed an Advisory Group to guide the finalization of the tool.

The tool was piloted in Bhutan in 2015 and lessons learnt around the research framework, process and approach were captured and used to finalize the methodology in consultation with the Advisory Group. At present the initiative is being implemented in a number of countries in the Asia Pacific region.

ANNEX 1: BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT

62

Persons interviewed during assessment of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC), 15 August – 30 November 2016.

ORGANIZATION/DEPARTMENT/PARTY POSITION/DESIGNATION1. Anti-Corruption Front (Dushana Virodhi Peramuna

Executive Director

2. Attorney General’s Department Deputy Solicitor General3. Auditor General’s Department Auditor General4. Bar Association of Sri Lanka Member5. Bar Association of Sri Lanka Member6. Campaign for Free and Fair Elections Convener, (CAFFE) 7. Ceylon Teacher’s Union (Lanka Guru Sangamaya) General Secretary8. Citizen’s Movement for Good Governance(CIMOGG) President9. Committee on Parliamentary Enterprise (COPE) Chairman10. Police Commission Chairman11. PRECIFAC Ex-Secretary to Commission12. Presidential Secretariat Media Coordinator13. Public Sector Nurse’s Union (Rajaye Heda Sangamaya) General Secretary14. Ravaya Editor15. Voice Against Corruption (Dushana Virodhi Handa) Convener16. Voice Against Corruption (Dushana Virodhi Handa) Member17. United National Party Deputy Minister/Ministry of

Immigration & Emigration18. University of Colombo Head/Department of History19. United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) Resident Coordinator20. United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) Economic Adviser

ANNEX 2: INTERVIEWEES

63

Persons involved in consultations on assessment findings – Colombo, 10.11.2016

POSITION ORGANIZATIONDirector-General (15.2.2015 - 17.11.2016) CIABOCDirector-General (appointed 1.12.2016) CIABOCAssistant Director/Investigations CIABOCLegal Officer CIABOCLead Researcher Independent consultantResearch Assistant TISLProject Coordinator TISL

ANNEX 3: STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTED

64

Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs/USA (2016) Investment Climate Statements Report July5/2016

Central Bank (2015) Recent Economic Development. Central Bank of Sri Lanka: Colombo.

Centre for Policy Alternatives (2004) Sri Lanka 2003. Transparency International National Integrity systems Country Study Report. Transparency International Secretariat: Berlin.

Colombo Telegraph (2016) “Corruption Commission’s Director-General Dilrukshi Wickramasinghe Charged with Abuse of Office’ in Colombo Telegraph 27 September 2016.

Economy Next (2016) “Sri Lanka’s ex-Defence Secretary indicted over Rs. 11.4 billion arms scandal” (by police correspondent) in Econoomy next 31 August 2016 (www.economynext.lk)

Fernando, Anton and R.M.B. Senanayeke (2007) Synopsis of Anti-Corruption and Related Laws: laws In force and proposed new laws. USAID: Colombo

Fernando, Mark (2007) Defeating the Dragon (White Paper). USAID: Colombo. GAN Business Anti-corruption Portal (2016) Sri Lanka Corruption Report (2016)(www.business-anti-corrupton.com/country-profiles/sri-lanka - visited 2 November 2016)

Gomez, Mario, Neshan Gunasekera and Dinesha Samararatne(2007) Bribery and Corruption in Sri Lanka: Strengthening the Institutional Framework (White Paper) USAID: Colombo.

Jayasinghe, Amal (2015) “Sri Lanka’s Graft Busters question Rajapaksha brothers” in AFP News, 24April 2015.

Kamalendran, Chris (2016) “CIABOC investigator under investigation” in Sunday Times 15 May 2016.

Kannangara, Nirmala (2014) “Sri Lanka’s Bribery Cimmission in question!” In Sunday Leader, 22February 2014.

Ministry of Finance (2015) Annual Report. Minstry of Finance: Colombo.

Rodrigo, Prasanna (2010) “Sri Lanka’s Bribery Commission needs more fire-power” in Sunday Times, 28 February 2010.

Sabry, Hafsa (2016) “CIABOC to be revamped!” in Sunday Leader, 31 August 2016.

Sooriyagoda, Lakmal (2016) MR’s Ex-CO in Bribery Net! In Ceylon Daily News 19 August 2016.

Sugathapala, D.G. (2016) “Avant Garde: Court tells CID to submit final report on October 5th” in Daily Mirror, 16 August 2016.

Tranaparency International Secretariat (2014) National Integrity System Assessment – Sri Lanka 2014. Transparency International Sri Lanka: Colombo.

UN (2004) United Nations Convention Against Corruption. United Nation’s Office Against Drugs and Crime: Vienna & New York.

UNODC (2016) Country Review Report of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. Review by China and Papua New Guinea of the implementation by Sri Lanka of articles 15 – 42 of Chapter III.“Criminalization and law enforcement” and articles 44 – 50 of Chapter IV. “International cooperation” of the United Nations Convention against Corruption for the review cycle2012 – 2013

Visvalingam, A.C (2011) Good Governance and the Rule of Law. Colombo: Citizens’ Movement forGood Governance.

(2015) “The Chairman of the Bribery Commission must go!” in Island, 20 June 2015.

World Justice Project (2016) Rule of Law index 2016 (www.worldjusticeproject.org)

Wriggins, Howard, (1960), Ceylon: the dilemmas of a new nation. Princeton University Press, Princeton

ANNEX 4: REFERENCES

65

66

Transparency International Sri Lanka5/1Elibank RoadColombo 05Sri Lanka

Phone: +94 0114369781 Fax: +94 011 2 501 707

tisl@tisrilanka.orgwww.tisrilanka.org

facebook.com/tisrilankatwitter.com/tisrilanka