anthony painter, democratic stress, the populist signal and extremist threat (21 march 2013)

8/13/2019 Anthony Painter, Democratic Stress, The Populist Signal and Extremist Threat (21 March 2013)

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Publications

Democratic Stress, the Populist Signal and

Extremist Threat

Anthony Painter

21 March 2013

Democratic stress, the populist signal and extremist threat: A call for a new mainstream

statecraft and contact democracy

The rise of populism seen across Europe and the US is exposing old and hidden fault-lines in

democratic systems.

Mainstream parties seem powerless to respond to basic popular anxieties. Many appear blind to the

reality that elite political projects have run their course. Democracy is under considerable stress and

fissures are opening up out of which new forms of populism and extremism have emerged.

And yet populists are routinely dismissed as protest parties, clowns and flashes in the pan. In fact,

real demand exists for Europes populists of different kinds and they must be seen as serious

challenger movements that the established parties ignore at their peril.

Today, Policy Network launches a significant new report entitled Democratic stress, the populist

signal and extremist threat. The report is based on a substantial European research project which

has over the past 8 months investigated campaigns, policies and political approaches targeted at

populism and extremism at the national, local and neighbourhood levels. Working with a wide range of

politicians, experts, campaigners, academics and public officials, it has considered how parties of

the left and right have responded to their different manifestations in countries across Europe.

The final report identifies where mainstream politics has failed to date and sets out a strategic

evaluation of how the antagonistic and corrosive aspects of populist impulses and identity politics can

be resisted and defeated. The conclusion sets forward an approach blending statecraft and contact

democracy, with case-study examples.

About the author:

Anthony Painteris associate researcher and project leader for the Policy Network/Barrow Cadbury

Trust project on Populism, extremism and the mainstream. The paper was supported with

contributions from Policy Network research assistant Claudia Chwalisz.

cy Network - Publications http://www.policy-network.net/publications/4357/Democratic-Stress-th...

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, .

contributions from Policy Network research assistant Claudia Chwalisz.

This report received excellent media coverage from: the New Statesman and the Guardian, among

others.

This project is kindly supported by the Barrow Cadbury Trust.

cy Network - Publications http://www.policy-network.net/publications/4357/Democratic-Stress-th...

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Democratic stress,the populist signal

and extremist threatA call for a new mainstreamstatecraft and contact democracy

By Anthony Painterwith additional research and contributions from Claudia Chwalisz


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Published in 2013 by Policy Network

Copyright 2013 Policy Network

Policy Network11 Tufton Street, London, SW1P 3QBTel: +44 20 7 340 2200Email: [email protected]: www.policy-network.net

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticismand review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system ortransmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording orotherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

Design and layout: Alan HuntPrinted by: John Drewe

Policy Network is a leading thinktank and international political network based in London.We seek to promote strategic thinking on progressive solutions to the challenges of the 21stcentury, impacting upon policy debates in the UK, the rest of Europe and the wider world.

Through a distinctly collaborative and cross-national approach to research, events andpublications, Policy Network has acquired a reputation as a highly valued platform forperceptive and challenging political analysis, debate and exchange.

www.policy-network.net


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Contents

Executive Summary 7

Introduction 9

1. Stress and crisis 14

2. The underlying causes of democratic stress 16

3. Populist response to democratic stress 19

4. Extremism and populism 25

5. The demand for populism and extremism 27

6. Mainstream party strategies to cope with democratic stress 31

7. Contact democracy as a strategic response 49

Conclusion - a renewed mainstream statecraft and contact democracy 50

Annex 53

About the Author

Anthony Painter is a political researcher and writer. He led the Policy Network/BarrowCadbury Trust project on Populism, Extremism and the Mainstream. He has publishedresearch with the Center for American Progress, Demos, Searchlight Educational Trust andPolicy Network on political economy, public attitudes, and extremism/populism. Anthonyis the author of two books: Barack Obama: The Movement for Changeand the forthcomingLeft without a future? Social justice after the crash (I.B Tauris).He is a contributing editor

with Progress magazine and has written for the Guardian, New Statesman, Hungton Post,LabourList, Open Democracy, Left Foot Forward,and Labour Uncut.He is Chairman of HackneyUTC and Vice-chairman of Hackney Community College. The project was supported by PolicyNetwork research assistant Claudia Chwalisz.

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Executive Summary

The rise of the populist radical right isone of the most signicant features of

western democracies in the last quarterof a century. As a challenger brand

within democracy but against liberaldemocracy, this suggests that thesystem may be under some stress.

Populism is a democratic argument thatseeks to change the way democracyfunctions. It is a threat withindemocracy to the culture and normsof liberal democracy as it functions. Inother words, right wing populism does

not seek to replace democracy; it seeksto change it.

It is not about being popular as the termis commonly (mis)used in the mediaor politics. Margaret Canovandistinguishes the redemptive andpragmatic sides of democracy.Populism reaches more for theformer a pure and non-bounded

will of the people. Populism isexpressive and emotive; it rejectsthe institutional checks and balancesof liberal democracy. The politicalmainstream is ultimately aboutpragmatism, balance and institutionalinterplay.

The rise of the populist radical rightis a signal of the failure of mainstream

democracy to meet the needs anddesires of citizens perturbed by social,cultural, economic and political change.

Populists have gained a footing indemocratic systems in a number ofdierent forms. They include the

Tea Party in US, the Peoples Party inDenmark, PVV in the Netherlands,the Front National in France, Fidesz in

Hungary, the SVP in Switzerland, theFP in Austria, and UKIP in the UK.

Populism as the representation of abody of democratic needs and desiresis entirely legitimate. If needs andanxieties are not expressed within thedemocratic system then there is a threatof greater extremism. Extremism has acasual and periodic engagement withdemocracy, but that is simply one routeit pursues. It values itself as a movementand as a pure expression of an ideology.It is associated with a politics of hateand tolerance of violence.

However, populism is not necessarilybenign. It creates simplicities wherereal outcomes in public policy need

complexities to be acknowledged. It canfurther corrode trust and hamper theability of mainstream parties to formwinning and governing coalitions. Therhetoric of the populist radical right canimpact upon the welfare of minoritiesand may even, in some circumstances,justify extremist thought and action.This report has an ambivalence aboutpopulism at its heart. As two academic

researchers in this eld express,populism is a threat and corrective to(liberal) democracy.

Real demand exists for a populistradical right but the ability to convertthat demand into political powerdepends on the interplay of populistand mainstream forces.

Strategies at the disposal of mainstreamdemocratic parties are numerousand are analysed in the report asfalling into three main categories:hold, defuse and adopt. The rst

involves seeking to avoid the threat ofpopulism, the second aims to minimisethe impact of populist anxieties,and the third moves towards thepopulist position. However, all these

strategies have limitations. Instead,three sequential and concurring

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strategies are recommended:acknowledge the issues that drivepotential support for the populistradical right; develop a comprehensivenew statecraft involving an expressionof national vision, major public policyinterventions in jobs, welfare andhousing at a local and national level,along with building a new contactdemocracy.

Contact democracy where local needsare met, new voters are mobilisedinto mainstream democracy, hateand extremism is challenged, supportfor community life is extended, and

social capital is developed withincommunities is a crucial componentof the new statecraft. This is notsimply through political parties whichhave to fundamentally changenonetheless - but through communityorganisations, campaigns and localauthorities.

In conclusion, there is a call for a

comprehensive response from thepolitical mainstream: statecraft andcontact democracy. Mainstreamparties have hold of the ball for now.The dierence in this environment is

that if they drop it there are othersto pick it up - populist parties of theright and perhaps, in the future, of theleft too. Democracy is stressed - canthe mainstream relieve that stress and

govern wisely? That is a key questionfor European and US politics in thecoming years.


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Introduction

The most successful new family of parties inEurope over the last quarter of a century hasbeen the populist radical right. In countryafter country, new right wing populist

parties have established themselves assignicant players for oce, power, andpublic voice. This advance should notbe overstated. Only in Switzerlandand arguably Hungary have thesepopulists become leading contendersfor oce. Nonetheless, across Europe

the populist radical right has becomea permanent feature of the politicallandscape. The argument of this report is

that this phenomenon - the populist rightas a challenger brand within and to liberaldemocracy - says something very signicant

about the state of modern democracy andrequires a robust response from the politicalmainstream.

It should be stated at the outset thatpopulism is not intrinsically a radical rightphenomenon though there are denite

anities with cultural concerns of theright. The most striking populist movementin the world today is in fact that of thenow departed Hugo Chavez, whoseleftist nationalist movement, chavismo,swept to power in Venezuela, changing itsdemocracy in the process. Nonetheless, inmore established western democracies, itis the right-wing variant that has been moresignicant. In a sense, this is predicated

upon a series of structural changes inwestern societies that have loosened theclass basis prevalent in the last centuryspolitics. Left-wing populism would tendto t more within this traditional socio-

economic dynamic of party competition.Right-wing populism challenges this socio-economic dynamic of party competitionand the notion of democracy to which itcorresponds. The populist radical right has

reacted to the cultural, social and democraticanxieties of the time in a way that a leftpopulism has not been able to. In turn, thathas opened up space for the populist radical

right family of parties to become furtherestablished.

The rise of the populist radical right is asignal. It comes as mainstream politicsfaces stresses that question its legitimacy- the ability to respond to peoples politicalneeds and desires. This signal sits alongsidethe decline of trust in the politicalmainstream - dened as parties who sit

comfortably within the pragmatic, pluralisticand institutionally bounded traditions ofwestern liberal democracy. Underneaththese stresses sit structural dynamics thathave arisen through economic, social, andcultural change. Where mainstream parties

found themselves sitting comfortably onsettled class, ideology, faith and/or andpatriotic tectonic plates in the post-war eraof universal surage, suddenly they seem

to have slipped onto a fault-line. Now thespace of political conict is not only

contested, the very rules on which it is basedare under question.

Straight away, this discussion runs into

problems of denition and the tendencyfor a variety of terms to be usedinterchangeably. It is important to be clearabout meaning before any substantiveanalysis can proceed. The basis of thisproject has been that there are threedistinct approaches to politics whichare consequential in terms of real worldoutcomes: the mainstream, populism andextremism. The immediate complication

is that the latter two terms here are oftenfused together and hyphenated or evenused interchangeably. This is unhelpful.Populism is a democratic argument thatseeks to change the way democracyfunctions. It is a threat within democracyto the culture and norms of liberaldemocracy as it functions. In otherwords, right wing populism does not seekto replace democracy; it seeks to change

it into a populist, direct, expressive formof democracy instead of an institutionallybounded liberal democracy. This basicinsight is essential in understanding how

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expectations from democracy vary.The content of the populist right winghas to be separated from its basisform. Nationalism, immigrationconcerns, cultural anxiety, andeconomic protection are attachedto populism in dierent ways in dierent

contexts. These ideas, issues andmotivations can also be pursuedthrough the mainstream oreven the extreme. For example,nationalism has been seen in theparamilitary form within Basqueseparatism, in populist form throughthe Flemish Vlaams Blok or mainstreamform through the Scottish National

Partys civic and plural nationalism.While particular anxieties such as thatsurrounding cultural change do havea magnetic attraction to right-wingpopulism, they nonetheless have to bedistinguished from that particular politicalstyle.

In fact, it is the mainstreams inability tocope with a variety of issues, economic

anxieties and cultural attachments thathas created an opening for a populistargument. This fact is circumstantial: it ismainstream failure.

The moral disdain that populists have forthe mainstream is reciprocated. In fact,moral segregation has been one of theprimary responses of the mainstreamto the populist radical right. There is no

better political strategy than assigningyour threat moral illegitimacy - if it works.The problem is that is has not reallyworked. There is demand for parties thatfocus on culture, immigration, economicchange, nationhood, perceived legal andpolitical favouritism towards minoritygroups, the perceived threat of Islam towestern values, EU threats to nationalsovereignty and Eurozone impositions,

and, as has been seen in the case of the TeaParty in the US, a fear of the intrusive state.The problem that mainstream politicalactors now face is that moral isolation has

mainstream parties might respond - and thenature of the threat that the populist radicalright in particular poses.

The analyses of Paul Taggart, Cas Mudde/Cristbal Rovira Kaltwasser, and MargaretCanovan are important in appreciatingthe core characteristics of populism. Muddeand Kaltwasser denes it as follows:

A thin-centred ideology that considers

society to be ultimately separated into two

homogenous and antagonistic groups, the

pure people and the corrupt elite, and

which argues that politics should be

an expression of the volont gnrale

(general will) of the people.

1

Taggart points to the importance of aconception of heartland in populistpolitics.2 Heartland is essentially anidealised notion of a morally purepeople. The elasticity of this conceptis useful as populism itself isextremely elastic. Margaret Canovandistinguishes the redemptive and

pragmatic sides of democracy.The former is expressive and emotive;the latter is about process, balanceand institutional interplay. Westerndemocracies are pragmatic: representativeand liberal as well as democratic.Populists want a more redemptive politicswhere the will of the morally pure majorityis enacted - without much if any obstacle.

While populists seek to make a moralvirtue out of simplicity, the mainstreamacknowledges complexity. The two stylesof politics are connected through theirdemocratic essence. Indeed, Cas Mudderefers to the populist right wing as apathological normalcy.3 However, their

1 Mudde, Cas and Cristbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2012. Populismand (liberal) democracy: a framework for analysis. In Mudde,Cas and Kaltwasser, Cristbal Rovira, eds. Populism in Europeand the Americas: threat or corrective for democracy?

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P. 82 Taggart, P. 2000. Populism. Buckingham: Open University

Press.3 Mudde, Cas. 2008. The Populist Radial Right: A Pathological

Normalcy. In Malmo University, Willy Brandt Series of WorkingPapers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations. March2007. Malmo, SE.


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not been successful and they are in dangerof seeming disdainful of the real concernsto which the populist radical right responds.

To acknowledge that these issues are realconcerns is not to accept the argumentsproered by the populist radical right

- far from it. It is rather that the moralcondemnation form of politics is inadequateand counter-productive. The mainstreamfurther undermines itself. We are beyondthe initial birth stage of the populistradial right. In some cases it has reachedpuberty.

Moreover, populism serves an important

function. Mainstream parties may dislikethe arguments and style of populismbut the alternative is much worse:extremism. If western democracies cannotcope with expressive as well as pragmaticpolitics then there are less democraticavenues available through whichreal anxieties can be expressed. Thedening strategy of extremism is a

casual and periodic engagement with

democracy, but that is simply one routeit pursues. It values itself as a movementand as a pure expression of an ideology.The ideology is transcendent. Therefore,whatever means to protect andadvance the ideology - whether ethnicnationalism, religious radicalism orrevolutionary communism - is legitimatein the eyes of the extremist. Streetmarches, persecution, hatred, inammatory

pamphleteering, violence and terrorism arejust some of the methods of extremists.This is a highly dangerous and toxic formof political action. It poses a major threatto security and well-being.

Populism may be pluralistic democracysugly sibling; extremism is populismsharmful cousin. To a certain extent, thepopulist radical right and the extreme

right are shing in the same pond of angstand anxiety as academic surveys of theirrespective supporters have shown, but theypursue their cause in a dierent fashion.

However, this does not mean that populismis benign. The populist style of dealingwith contentious issues is, in fact, highlyproblematic.

Democracy in complex societies is not asimple aair. There are trade-os, conicts,

interests, protections, challenges, as wellas the unseen, unforeseen andunforeseeable. Expressive democracyglosses over these challenges.Representative democracy, thoughimperfect, attempts to reconcile them,while populism attempts to ignore them.For example, the UK has a commitment toa European single market. Such a market

requires common regulations. To achievethese common regulations it is necessarynot only to pool sovereignty in EUinstitutions, but to accept that too oftennational vetoes will create insurmountableobstacles to agreeing these commonregulations. As a centre-right mainstreamPrime Minister, Margaret Thatcher,notwithstanding her rhetorical ourishes,

understood these trade-os between

the national interest and formal nationalpower. Anti-EU populism rejects suchcomplexity. As in the case of nationalism,euroscepticism is not intrinsically populist- there are substantive arguments thatacknowledge trade-os but come to a

dierent conclusion.

While content and style are notinextricably linked, style does tend to

inuence content, leading to potentiallysignicant and unacknowledged negative

impacts. Populism has consequencesfor economic well-being, the functionsof democracy, foreign and internationalrelationships, and the relationship ofdierent groups, cultures, regions and

nationhood. The concern is substantive aswell as political.

The impact of the populist radical right onthe mainstream centre-left and centre-right varies in accordance with politicalsystems. In majoritarian democracies such


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extremist mode of political action. Whilethe relationship between populismand extremism is a complex one and theevidence base is shallow, it is dicult to

conclude that these elements are conduciveto harmonious community relations andmutual understanding. Indeed, thereare cases, such as in the US with the TeaParty, where a swelling populism has beenaccompanied by rising extremism - suchas the growth of right-wing militia groups.Populist arguments from both politicalactors and the media create a sense ofcrisis and dramatise conict - often in an

untruthful fashion. While bringing this intothe democratic space may be healthier

than leaving it lingering beyond its borders,that does not mean it is without risks andconsequences. The absence of evidencefor a strong intrinsic link between populismand extremism does not mean that it doesnot exist.

Therefore, the debate about how themainstream contends with populism andthe dark shadow of extremism in the

distance matters not simply for politics, butbecause of the real world consequencesthat could occur should the politicalmainstream - on the left and the right- fail to adapt. The rise of populism asan established part of the landscapeof western democracies is a signalof mainstream failure, evidenced bya decline in trust/engagement withformal politics and an increase in people

versus the elites issues. The mainstreamwill have to think deeply about how itconducts its politics in the future; itsunquestioned position of dominance isunder threat.

This nal report of the six month populism,

extremism and the mainstream PolicyNetwork/Barrow Cadbury Trust analysesthe nature of change, the relationship

between three political styles andoutlooks, possible strategic responses, andcase studies of how the signicant new

challenges facing western democracies

as the UK, it is likely to create a greaterelectoral headache for the centre-rightthan the centre-left - at least while it iscentre-right votes that are drifting toUKIP as is currently the case. However,in consensual political systems on thecontinent, the dilemma is greater for thecentre-left. When support leaks fromthe centre-right to the populist right ina consensus it produces parliamentaryseats. The populist right is a more likelycoalition partner for centre-right liberal orconservative parties than it is for the centre-left. Therefore, losing votes to the populistradical right is worse [for social democraticparties] than losing votes to, say, green

or more radical left parties, because theformer - unlike the latter - tend to helpcentre-right parties into government.4

There is a broader impact point here, also.A central charge of populists is that liberaldemocratic institutions and the elites whooccupy them are morally corrupted andantagonistic towards the interests andvirtue of the people. The centre-

left mainstream relies on state actionto achieve its goals of collectiveprovision to a greater extentthan is the case with the centre-right. It is dicult to call on collective

action if the legitimacy of theinstitutions and those who occupythem are questioned. The success of thepopulist radical right has coincided withsome loss of faith in traditional welfare

institutions, for example. Centre-rightparties also question these institutions - theimpact of the populist radical right shouldnot be overstated.

Populist rhetoric has a wider potentialimpact as well. Its tendency to groupand stereotype particular communities,indulge in conspiracy theory, and refuseto compromise is also found within an

4 Bale, T. C. Green-Pedersen, A. Krouwel, K. R. Luther and N.Sitter. 2010. If You Cant Beat Them, Join Them? ExplainingSocial Democratic Responses to the Challenge from thePopulist Radical Right in Western Europe. Political Studies 58:41026.


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5 Habermas, J. 1975. Legitimation Crisis. Translated by ThomasMcCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press.

6 Dahl, Robert A. 2000. A Preface to Democratic Theory(expanded edition). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Stress is a dierent state for a democracy to

nd itself in. It involves challenges to the

system and the elites who are elected togovern it that go beyond simply alternativegoverning choices within the system.It involves the rise of new populistparties or movements and extreme parties,organisations, or forces of protest thatchallenge the rules of the democratic game.Violence may occur but not to a system oreven government-toppling extent. Stressoccurs when the democratic system canstill function but new political, culturaland economic forces create challengesthat mainstream parties nd dicult to

confront. Either they nd it dicult to react

to these forces without sundering theirexisting coalitions of support or they cannotmove towards them without changingtheir own identity: they are pragmaticallyor ideologically constrained. However,they can still govern. Stress is actually thenormal state for democracies - new forcesand challenges continually arise. Whenstress becomes so severe that democraciesbecome ungovernable as is the case in

Greece and Italy, or the UK in the late 1970s,then a country has entered a state of crisis.

Liberal democracy is constrained. It is akinto what Robert Dahl describes aspolyarchy.6 Therefore, it has free, fair,equal and contested elections at itscore, but the ability of the majority toconstrain the rights of a minority is limited.Constraints are institutional: legally

and constitutionally guaranteed basicfreedoms - of expression, association,etc are underpinned by therule of law. Protection of minorities alsomeans that an interested minority canget their way against a disinterestedmajority. Political elites could be seenas one such minority, though onlyone of many. This ensures a pluralistic quality

1. Stress and crisis

Mainstream parties have been the mainstaysof liberal democracy since universal surage.

In fact, they are intrinsically linked to thesystem - when they struggle to maintain

support, it is one signal that there is conictbetween the system and voters. It isperhaps even a tautology that mainstreamparties are intrinsically bound with theinstitutions of liberal democracy. Theycontest policy and ideological positions butthey are not seeking to shift from a system ofrepresentative, liberal democracy to a moremajoritarian, direct, peoples democracy asan alternative.

The notions of crisis and stress areimportant in understanding the degree ofchallenge there is within the system to therules of the democratic gameas opposed tothe conict of ideas, leaders and policies.

It is important to understand the distinctionbetween crisis and stress. Crisis occurs whena political system is no longer legitimate. In

other words, it can no longer complete thetasks that are set for it. This is one aspect ofwhat the sociologist Jurgen Habermas callslegitimation crisis.5 Even in the context ofsevere austerity, Eurozone-imposed externalrules and debt unsustainability, Europeandemocracies have avoided this crisis point.There are a couple of near exceptions ofcourse. Greece and Italy, certainly on atemporary basis, have faced democratic

crises or at least extreme stresses. Theirdemocracies have shown to be incapableof responding to the complexitiesinstigated by the Eurozone crisis. Whileboth have moved beyond technocraticadministrations, the degree to which this issustainable remains to be seen. However,in the main, European democracies facestresses rather than crises.


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parties have the opportunity to step in- by turning the people against the system.

In a sense, this is turning Schumpetersnotion of democratic elitism in on itself.New entrepreneurs from within andfrom outside the party system spot themarket opportunity for popular desiresthat are not catered for. These newforces challenge the system itself andare not simply new alternatives withinthe mainstream party system. So theTea Party proposes a radical reduction ofthe role of the federal government in theUS political system. The FP challengedthe authority of Austrian courts with

respect to upholding minority rights. UKIPdemands a UK withdrawal from the EU.The Front National drives an anti-Islamicand anti-Gypsy agenda in France. GeertWilders PVV - following in the footsteps ofPim Fortuyn - also confronts fears over thegrowth of Islam and its purportedincompatibility with Dutch values. ViktorOrbns Fidesz re-wrote the Hungarianconstitution to give the executive more

authority over the courts and to safeguardtraditional family values. Underlying thegrowth of all these populist movementsis a series of root causes of stress thatcome to bear on liberal democracy andits mainstream party systems. They aresocio-economic, cultural and political innature.

to liberal democracy. In this sense, it is a caseof minorities rule.7 This is the system towhich the political mainstream is wedded,dened by and denitive of.

Dahl exhibits scepticism of majority rule -though he doesnt discount it as a threat topluralistic democracy. In fact, he very muchfears an authoritarian alternative. JosephSchumpeter has a rather more elite-drivennotion of democracy:

The democratic method is that institutional

arrangement for arriving at political decisions

in which individuals acquire the power to

decide by means of a competitive struggle for

the peoples vote.

8

Democracy becomes a competitive pursuitfor power (prot) by leaders/parties (rms)

elected by voters (consumers). It is notdicult to see a threat to the system

itself in Schumpeters formulation. Ifthere were a strongly held realor perceived general will andthat happened to impinge upon

the rights of a minority view, then anenterprising political leader mightdecide to meet that demand. In moderndemocracies constrained to a varyingdegree by international treaties, judicialreview, coalition formation, separationof powers between branches and levelsof government, super-majorities andprotections from constitutional principlesand human rights, demands for action can

become frustrated. This is precisely whatwe have seen: on immigration; rights forprisoners, migrants and minorities; socialvalues in the case of conservative Americain particular; terrorism; access to welfaresystems; and national sovereignty. In allof these areas the popular will has beenfrustrated not by policy or ideology butby the institutions of liberal democracythemselves. This is where populist

7 Krouse, Richard W. 1982. Polyarchy and Participation: Thechanging democratic theory of Robert A Dahl. Polity (14)3:441-463.

8 Schumpeter, Joseph, A. 2010. Capitalism, socialism anddemocracy. Oxford: Routledge.


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2. The underlying causesof democratic stress

1. Socio-economic change and stress

The way in which social class nds communal

and political expression has changed over

recent decades. The degree to whichcommunities are settled around signicantindustrial or agricultural forms has changed;media and technology have loosenedcommunal ties and facilitated greaterliberalism and tribalism in equal measure;and a more educated society has led to thequestioning of traditional social norms. Thesolidarity of class action has been dicult

to sustain and the attachment to parties of

particular classes - though still notable - hasweakened considerably. People thereforepursue other objectives through their politicalaction - whether searching for leadership/competence or an expression of identity andvalues. Space has opened up for new partiesand movements to step in where workingclass, faith-grounded or bourgeois partiesonce stood. Environmental, parochial,nationalist, lifestyle, and personality driven

parties have been some of the forms thathave emerged. Most successful, however,have been the populist radical right - onlygreen or nationalist parties are even close.

Economic change has been driven by shifts inglobal comparative advantage and stressesin international credit and productionsystems. Countries are faced with a choicebetween costly withdrawal from the system

or a diminished capability of managingeconomic change. People care more abouttheir job, their employer, their community,theirnation than general economic welfare.When democracy is incapable of meetingthese needs then there is a reaction.Moreover, one aspect of the globalisationof economic life is increasing migrationows one that presents a visible aspect of

change, consequently creating a great deal

of anxiety.

It is important to note that the emergenceof populism and the presence of extremism

occur in a number of dierent economic

contexts. Indeed, some of the mostsuccessful populist parties such as the FPin Austria, the PVV in the Netherlands andthe Front National in France enjoyed theirgreatest successes in advance of the currentfraught economic context. While the Greekextreme right party, Golden Dawn, hasachieved some limited political success,there has been no such movement anddemocratic breakthrough for the Spanishextreme right despite, for example, bothnations facing extremely negative economicconditions. It is dicult to conclude that

economic circumstance is a primary driverof populism and extremism. It is rather more

about the way in which it interacts withalready present tensions and anxieties. Inthis regard, the force of cultural identity iscrucial.

2. Cultural identity

In his memoir,Joseph Anton,Salman Rushdiewrites on the battle over the publication ofThe Satanic Versesas follows:

In this new world, in the dialectics of theworld beyond the communism-capitalism

confrontation, it would be clear that

culture could be primary too. The culture of

central Europe was asserting itself against

Russianness to unmake the Soviet Union.

And ideology, as Ayatollah Khomeini and

his cohorts were insisting, could certainly be

primary. The wars of ideology and culture

were moving to the centre of the stage.9

The Rushdie aair was a signal of the strength

of feelings of cultural attachment. There isno logical reason why someones economicposition should denitively be their primary

motivation for political expression. Theirperception of values, nation and identity canbe equally as strong. As the forces of classpolitics - trade unions, mass industry andagriculture, the mass party, and the clubs,

churches, societies and communities thatunderpinned them all - weakened, other

9 Rushdie, Salman. 2012. Joseph Anton. London: Jonathan Cape.P. 110.


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dynamic and interactive nature of onlineand social media can make fears and hatredmore toxic - in a political sense in the caseof certain modes of populism or in a securitysense in the case of extremism.

3. Political change

If the functioning of liberal democracyas a set of constraints on the popular willcontains the seeds of a populist reaction,then further constraints are likely tocreate further opportunities. The majorconstitutional development over the lastfew decades has been the expansion ofthe EUs acquis communautaire and thegrowth of supranational decision-making.

A European level demos and popularlyaccessible democratic system has not andperhaps could not hope to keep up withthese major constitutional changes. Perhapsthe most consequential aspect of this hasbeen the freedom of movement of labourwhich has meant that signicant anxieties

are dicult to respond to in a clear fashion.

It is not simply through the actions of the EUthat national sovereignty has been brought

into question, but through the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights, which has alsosometimes been seen to be against popularnational notions of human rights andjustice. These constraints are often viewedas disempowering and provoke questionsabout national and popular sovereignty.

Changes in the forms and structure of partycompetition also create new openings. The

emergence of the catch all party whichsought to move beyond its traditional basewas an early evolutionary change.11Over timeand in interaction with social and culturalchange, the traditional base can begin to bedetached from the party and either cease tovote or become attracted to other parties.Strategic necessity becomes a weaknessover time. Parties can become cartels, deeplyembedded in the system collusively. This was

the case in Austria, for example, as the SP

forms of political and democratic expressionbecame more signicant. While these

expressions of cultural identity would notnecessarily become attached to the populiststyle of politics or even extremism, given theconstraints inherent in liberal democracy,there was certainly a good chance theywould.

One particularly ugly aspect of thisphenomenon has been the reaction to theUSAs rst African American President,

Barack Obama. The Birther movement,which seeks to deny the Presidentscitizenship and consequent eligibility forpresidential oce, has been one reaction.

This movement ows through right-wingmedia discourse, online blogs and chat-rooms, Tea Party conspiracy theory, butalso into Republican mainstream discourse,most notably through the presidentialnomination candidacy of Donald Trump.Alongside this, research by the SouthernPoverty Law Center has found that thenumber of anti-government Patriot groupshas shot up from 149 in 2008 to 1,274 in

2012.10

Cultural identity anxieties - and theconspiracy theories which can accompanythem - ow through mainstream media and

political discourse into the populist radicalright and into the extremes. In certain formsand discourses they can become a populistchallenge and even a security threat.

Technology interacts with cultural changein a way that can reinforce fear, hatred

and prejudice. The formation of on-linebubbles and tribes reecting and amplifying

anxieties without challenge is becoming afeature across the political spectrum. Thisis a more interactive and extreme versionof what happens when people consumetheir own prejudices (whether left or right)in the particular news media to which theyexpose themselves. Echo chambers can below-level, dip in and out, interest focused or

they can be dangerous and corrosive. The

10 Potok, Mark. 2012. For the Radical Right, ObamaVictory Brings Fury and Fear. Extremis Project. http://extremisproject.org/2012/11/for-the-radical-right-obama-victory-brings-fury-and-fear/.

11 Kirchheimer, O. 1966. The transformation of the WesternEuropean party systems. In LaPalombara, J. and Weiner, M,eds. Political parties and Political Development. Princeton:Princeton University Press.


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tend to challenge, merge and adapt to oneof the two main parties. In majoritariansystems, new parties can form but nd it

dicult to secure a parliamentary footing.

However, in the case of UKIP in the UK forexample, European parliamentary electionshave ironically provided an alternativeroute where the blockages of the domesticpolitical system are considerable for smallerparties.

While populism is not the only plausibleresponse to socio-economic, culturaland political change, it does have certainresources that are to its advantage. Withineach of these stresses on liberal democracy

lies opportunities for a populist political,ideological and rhetorical attack: thegeneral will thwarted; elites mendacity;the people and their heartland jeopardised;the other posing a threat, and arrogant andaloof liberal democracy either incapableor unwilling to respond adequately. Thesearguments can become highly charged, hate-lled and irtatious with threatening and

violent action - extremism feeds o similar

anxieties. The nature of both the populistand extremist responses to democraticstress will now be explored further.

and VP held power continuously, ruling incoalition together for almost two-thirds ofthe post-1945 period. Media-focused parties- so-called electoral professional parties12 -with centralised control and micro-targetedmessages can become hollowed out anddistant from the communities they serve.New organisational forms, strategies, andtechniques can pit the short against the longterm and leave a trail of distrust, disinterestand thin commitment in their wake. Trustin liberal democratic institutions has beeneroded as a consequence. For example, theEdelman Trust Barometer nds seven out

of nine European countries featured havetrust in government levels below 40 percent

and seven have no trust in governmentleaders at all levels of 50 percent or more.13

As we will see, this elite politics combineswith cultural and socio-economic change tocreate new opportunities for populist andextremist actors. The former - in its radicalright form - has been the most successfulnew party of families in Western Europe.Extremists, on the other hand, have the

potential to create a real threat to physicaland emotional well-being.

All of this plays out dierently in varying

systems of liberal democracy - consensual ormajoritarian.14 Consensual systems denedby greater institutional checks and balancesand/or proportional voting systems providemore opportunities for new parties toform and become challengers for oce. In

Austria, the Netherlands and Switzerland,populist parties have not only won seatsin legislative assemblies, but have takenpart in government too. An exceptionamongst consensual democracies is the USwhere the two party system, as a result ofa majoritarian electoral system, has foughto or consumed contenders; new forces

12 Panebianco, A. 1988. Political parties: organisation and

power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.13 2012 Edelman Trust Barometer: Global Deck. Edelman

Insights. http://www.slideshare.net/EdelmanInsights/2012-edelman-trust-barometer-global-deck

14 Lijphart, A. 1984. Democracies: patterns of majoritarian andconsensus government in twenty-one countries. Yale: YaleUniversity Press.


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agendas. In another sense, the elites canbe seen as not taking enough initiative toprotect the pure people from others, adominant theme of the populist anti-Islamicdiscourse. The process is seen as a corruptingone: culturally, ideologically and politically.

Indeed, Cas Mudde and Cristbal RoviraKaltwasser question the degree to whichpopulism is a threat or corrective fordemocracy.20Paul Taggarts analysis of thehistorical development of populism showsthat it can often be corrective as anxiousvoices are brought into the democraticprocess. This applies as much to pooragricultural workers who were attracted

to the Peoples Party in the 1890s and theculturally and economically alienated whoare attracted to the Tea Party in modern dayAmerica. The Peoples Party was subsumedwithin the Democratic Party over time, justas the Tea Party has interacted with theRepublican Party. Both parties changed inaccordance with absorption and interaction.The Democratic Party of the New Dealresponded quite clearly to the concerns of the

Peoples Party demographic. At one point, itis worth remembering, Franklin D Roosevelteven threatened the independence of theSupreme Court. Without absorbing the TeaParty, the Republicans have shifted towardsits agenda - and away from the mainstream- as primaries have become a battle betweenmainstream Republicanism and Tea Partyradicalism.

Whatever one may think of the particulararguments, ideas, values and conicts that

are being expressed, there is a strong casethat it is better that they are expressedwithin, rather than outside, the democraticsystem. Some viewpoints may well beantagonistic, stereotyping, immersed inconspiracy theory, but there are alternativespaces where they could reside other thanthe democratic space. If these ideas and

Mudde sees the populist radical right asa radicalisation of mainstream values:nativism, authoritarianism and populism.Nativism is:

an ideology which holds that states should

be inhabited exclusively by members of the

native group (the nation) and that non-

native elements (persons and ideas) are

fundamentally threatening to the nation-

states homogeneity. 18

Both on the mainstream left and right thereare expressions of milder versions of thisoutlook. Social democracy is dependenton some notion of citizenship no matter

how porous, which requires a people tobe citizens. The centre-right espousescondent themes of patriotism and national

virtue which have an implicitly nativisttinge to them. Anxiety about immigration,integration, nationhood, sovereignty andglobalisation appear across the mainstreamalso. As Margaret Canovan puts it in herwork on nationhood:

The discourses of democracy, social justiceand liberalism all in their dierent ways

presuppose the existence not just of a state,

but of a political community.19

Mudde denes populism as:

A thin-centred ideology that considers

society to separated into two homogenous

and antagonistic groups, the pure people

and the corrupt elite, an which argues thatpolitics should be an expression of the volont

gnrale of the people.

There is some overlap with Taggart here.The notion of the (morally) pure peopleversus the corrupt elite is an important one.In the case of the populist radical right, thecorrupt elite is seen as taking advantageof the people to perpetuate their own

18 Mudde, Cas. 2008. The Populist Radial Right: A PathologicalNormalcy. In Malmo University, Willy Brandt Series ofWorking Papers in International Migration and EthnicRelations. March 2007. Malmo, SE.

19 Canovan, M. 1996. Nationhood and political theory.Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

20 Mudde, C. and C. R. Kaltwasser. 2012. Populism and (liberal)democracy: a framework for analysis. In Mudde, Cas andKaltwasser, Cristbal Rovira, eds. Populism in Europe and theAmericas: threat or corrective for democracy? Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.


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process, it also has a number of potentialweaknesses. As a redemptive as opposed topragmatic ideology or style, it may lack theability to spot trade-os and contradictions

in its political positions. The modern policy-making environment is multi-tiered andhighly complex: slogan-led policy-making hasdeciencies in this context. Secondly, it adopts

an overtly moral outlook on the world seekingto de-legitimise mainstream democracy. Inreturn, it is often a mainstream tactic to toxifypopulist forces. Forging consensus aroundpolicy solutions in this environment becomesfraught. Finally, populism - in its radical rightform - has a disregard for minority rights. Thepotential to do harm by espousing a certain

rhetoric, changing a legal framework, orcreating adverse economic conditions forspecic groups is considerable. For all those

who value the protection of minority rights,this will be a cause for concern.

The argument of this report is that Muddesnotion of the populist radical right as apathological normalcy is a useful one.Mudde, Taggart and Canovan have all

provided valuable insight into populism as aphenomenon. Populism is one response todemocratic stress - and a signicant one.

It is not going away anytime soon and, infact, we are seeing new populist forces- such as UKIP in the UK - emerge all thetime. Before looking at some of the aspectsof demand for populism, it is important toconsider its harmful cousin - extremism -and how they may be distinguished as

well as the nature and strength of theirrelationship. It will then be important toconsider the demand for these politicalstandpoints as well as the strategies thatmainstream parties may adopt in confrontingpopulist and/or extreme arguments.

thoughts, many of them more popular thanmany centrists might like to concede, nd

their way into the territory of the extremewith its hatred and even violent potentialthen the harm could be greater. Given someof the ideas of the populist radical right,it may be that engaging with a populist ispreferable to engaging with an extremist:the far lesser of two evils.On the threat side, Mudde and RoviraKaltwasser distinguish between consolidatedand unconsolidated democracies.Consolidated democracies have thus farlargely ridden out any populist threat todemocracy with checks and balances. The

exceptions are perhaps Hungary underFidesz and, arguably, Italy under SilvioBerlusconi where legal systems were broughtunder tighter control of the executive.Unconsolidated democracies experiencingchange through populist forces could includethe Egyptian constitution as it is shifted in thedirection of a Muslim Brotherhood world-viewbacked by plebiscite.

The impacts on democratic politics havebeen in the eld of party competition asmainstream parties, to a greater or lesserextent, have shifted to respond to anypopulist threat to their electoral base. TjitskeAkkerman has systematically analysedthe impact of the populist far right on thegovernance agendas of centre-right parties.She found that centre-right parties in agroup of eight European countries have

shifted towards the populist radical righton issues to do with immigration andasylum (they have kept their distance onanti-Islamic positions which suggests thatthere is a toxic zone into which mainstreamparties are reluctant to travel). Occasionally,populist radical right parties were able toexert inuence in coalition - the Danish

Peoples Party and the FP have both beenable to pressure their centre-right partners

at various times.21

-While populism can appeal to a silentmajority and bring them into the political

21 Akkerman, T. 2012. Populist radical right parties in WesternEurope: how do mainstream parties react and to whateect? Paper submitted to Policy Network Amsterdam

conference, November 2012. Also see Akkerman, T. & S.L.de Lange. 2012. Radical right parties in oce. Incumbencyrecords and the electoral cost of governing. Governmentand Opposition 47(4): 574-596 and Akkerman, T. 2012. Theimpact of radical right parties in government. A comparativeanalysis of immigration and integration policies in ninecountries(1996-2010). West European Politics 35(3):,511-529.


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CASE STUDY

THE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT IN THE UK:THE CASE OF THE UKS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EU

The conventional political reaction to UKIP has been to interpret its recent successin building greater support through the prism of the UKs European Union (EU)membership. A second place nish for UKIP in the 2009 European elections with 13

seats won only served to emphasise this point. David Camerons decision to committo an in-out referendum on the UKs EU membership in 2017 following renegotiatedTreaty terms is widely, and correctly, seen as a response to euroscepticism both withinhis own party and as a result of recent increases in UKIP support. Intra-party challengeshave made his command of his parliamentary party fraught, while the extra-partychallenge of UKIP threatens a number of Conservative marginal seats without thecorresponding coalition opportunities available in PR systems.

Looking at the nature of populist parties over the last ten years or so, it is dicult

to conclude that David Camerons current position on granting a referendum whilecampaigning positively for continued membership is one that resolves both theintra- and extra-party dilemmas he is facing. Cameron is facing a challenge to shiftto a more eurosceptic position in four main directions: (i) Conservative parliamentaryand wider party eurosceptics; (ii) UKIP; (iii) eurosceptic media; and (iv) voterswho switch allegiance between the Conservatives, UKIP and no voting in responseto a bundle of issues including the EU. Before looking at each of these actors in turn,it is necessary to consider UKIP in the context of the denitions of populism

presented above.

Looking at key elements of populism - the people versus the elite, a sense of crisis,thin ideology, the competition of the general will with the institutional checks andbalances of liberal democracy, and the notion of a heartland - it is easy to see thateuroscepticism could quite easily become a populist cause. Indeed, that is preciselythe mode of discourse adopted by the UK Independence Party. European andnational political elites are seen as conspiring against the will of the people to managetheir own aairs. The sense of crisis in the context of the Eurozone challenges is

palpable. UK membership of the EEC is seen as a historic betrayal of a heartland of

traders, shermen and entrepreneurs with ways of life that were trampled upon byEU regulation and common policies in areas such as sheries and the free movement

of people. Occasionally neo-liberal (on regulation) but other times nationalistic (onimmigration), UKIPs is a thin ideology. Institutional barriers such as qualied majority

voting are seen as impediments to UKIPs view of democracy. This is clearly a populistradical right party.

David Camerons European policy as a mainstream centre-right response - in part tothe populist radical right - is likely to have a particular trajectory over the coming yearsand may end up fortifying UKIP. Here is the potential impact on the dierent groups

identied above:


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1. The Tory eurosceptic right and eurosceptics in the wider Conservative party. Thesimple fact is that this group sees an in-out referendum not as a means of gaugingthe general will, but a means by which the UK can terminate its current relationshipwith the EU. David Camerons commitment to hold an in-out referendum should hewin the 2015 election and re-open EU treaty negotiations would mean that he will

face a shopping list of demands for renegotiation, which he will in all likelihoodfail to deliver. His intra-party eurosceptics will then demand that he campaigns forout. Should he refuse to do so, it is likely that some of them will leave the party andeither campaign as independents or join UKIP. This will strengthen UKIP as theonly reliable political home for eurosceptics.

2. UKIP. Likewise UKIP will focus quite clearly on campaigning for out. The binarynature of the referendum will place them at an advantage in gathering evenmore out supporters. They will receive a very high prole, likely to enhance their

cause and hurt both Labour and the Conservatives. However, if there is an

in-out referendum it means (in all likelihood) that a Conservative governmenthas been elected in 2015. If the leader is in favour of in, then the party will be split andUKIP will be able to project a clear and uncompromising voice. A defeat for thereferendum would be expected to mean that much of this new support pretty quicklyevaporates, but will it all? In other words, we could expect a UKIPbounce, but when it falls, it may not fall all the way to ground. Moreover,the notion that the issue is resolved once a referendum has occurreddoes not follow history. The 1975 referendum did not resolve the issue ofEEC membership for the Labour party. Indeed, the partys hostility to EEC membershipin the early 1980s was one of the motivating issues behind the split away of the

Social Democratic Party in 1981.

3. The eurosceptic media. Faced with a Conservative party that is divided, theeurosceptic elements of the media will begin to make ever warmer noises about UKIP.They may withhold full endorsement but they will improve the partys brand amongsttheir readerships. This will mean that in common with many populist radical right partiesacross Europe, UKIPs incentive will be to maintain the clarity/purity of its position ratherthan compromise with the mainstream.

4. UKIP supporters and considerers. Following a recent large-scale survey of UKIP

supporters by the Conservative peer, Lord Ashcroft, he concluded:

Many of those who are drawn to voting UKIP recognise the willful simplicity of the partys

rhetoric: that we could cut taxes, increase defence spending and balance the budget all at

once, and cut crime and improve access to the NHS, if only we left EU and clamped down

on immigration. For some of them, this simplicity does not matter. They have eectively

disengaged from the hard choices inherent in the democratic process, though they still

want formally to take part in it. 22

These are voters who are attracted to a populist radical right cause, of which the EU

is just one element - an element linked to deeper issues of cultural anxiety, political

22 Aschcroft, Michael. 2012. The UKIP threat is not about Europe. Lord Ashcroft Polls. http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2012/12/the-UKIP-threat-is-not-about-europe/.


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4. Extremism and populism

Right-wing extremists are conict theorists

par excellence. For them, where ethnicgroups come into contact with one another,hate and violence is not only inevitable, but

also desirable.

Conict theory holds that conict will

result from ethnic mobility and whiteintolerance is greatest where the size of thenonwhite population presents a challengeto the economic interests and dominantsocial and political position of whites.23Green, Stolovitch and Wong have foundthat the ethnic elements of conict are

more signicant than the socio-economicimpacts in their study of ethnic mobilityin New York City.24 However, conicttheory seems very weak as a generalrule as it is time and place contingent.Any initial conict can weaken considerably

as the notion of the group itself changesand ethnic boundaries blur and disintegrate.

This is the essence of contact theory.

Sturgis, Jackson and Brunton-Smith havefound a very dierent result looking at

communities in London.25 They nd that,once socio-economic deprivation is takeninto account, more ethnically diverseneighbourhoods have moresocial cohesion.The more contact there is, in terms ofsocial interaction, then not only is conict

reduced, but cohesion increases. Thisnding was further reinforced by Saggar

and Sommerville who conclude that lowersocial cohesion and trust is correlated withdeprivation rather than diversity.26 Thiswill have implications for strategies forcombating extremism. For this reason,cohesion through contact is disregarded in

the right-wing extremist universe. Contactis instead seen as rst a recipe for conict

and violence, then dilution and, at the veryextreme end of the spectrum, almost asa form of cultural genocide. The extremeright universe is one where group conict is

natural, desirable and necessary. Evidenceto the contrary is treated as an irrelevance.

Both the populist and extreme radical rightsubscribe to some notion of conict as

inevitable. This explains a similar intensityof concern for supporters of both populistand extremist parties when it comes toattitudes towards political elites and anti-immigration hostility (many of these

attitudes are seen within the politicalmainstream too, but with a lower degree ofintensity). Robert Ford, Matthew Goodwinand David Cutts argue on the basis ofempirical analysis that the UKs right wingpopulist party, UKIP, and its extreme rightparty, the British National Party (BNP) are:

not simply mobilizing a diverse array of voters

disconnected from mainstream politics but

are recruiting electorates that share severalkey attitudinal features, in particular populism

and anti-immigrant hostility. 27

There are two dierences between the

populist and extremist strategies. Firstly,populists operate within the sphere ofdemocratic politics. They see changing thenature of democracy as their main target;their goal is to purify and re-moralise

what they perceive as a corrupt system.Extremists, on the other hand, take a moreinstrumental view of democracy: it eitherserves their purpose or it does not.

Therefore, they enter democratic spaceand depart from it at intervals dependingon the degree to which it serves theirpurpose. Some former extreme partiessuch as the Swedish Democrats see their

23 Blalock, Hubert M. 1967. Toward a Theory of Minority GroupRelations. City?: Wiley.

24 Green, D., D.Z. Strolovitch and J.S. Wong. 1998. DefendedNeighborhoods, Integration and Racially Motivated Crime.American Journal of Sociology, 104(2): 372-403.

25 Sturgis, P., J. Jackson, and I. Brunton-Smith. 2011. Ethnicdiversity and the social cohesion of neighbourhoods: The caseof London. 6th ECPR General Conference. Reykjavik.

26 Saggar, S. and W. Somerville. 2012. Building a Britishmodel of integration in an era of immigration: policy lessonsfor Government. Transatlantic Council on Migration andMigration Policy Institute.

27 Ford, R., M. Goodwin, and D. Cutts. 2011. StrategicEurosceptics and Polite Xenophobes: Support for theUnited Kingdom Independence Party in the 2009 EuropeanParliament Elections. European Journal of Political Science51(2): 204-234.


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Dutch PVV is one of the more successfulpopulist radical right parties in Europe, but itsrelative success has not been accompaniedby a growth in extremism. Conversely, theemergence of the Tea Party in the US hasbeen correlated with the growth of militiagroups, and even some horric cases of

extremist violence, such as the massacreof six people by Wade Michael Page in OakCreek, Wisconsin.

It is clear that the relationship between thepopulist radical right and the extreme rightis a contextual and contingent one. Froma security as well as a political perspective,there is a need for a much better

understanding of political discourses in themainstream media, politics, its populistcorollaries and how that impacts any rise inextremist politics and potential for violence.This is further compounded by the interplayof extremisms as, for example, far-right andIslamic extremist groups fuel one anotherin a process Roger Eatwell has described ascumulative extremism.28

Having seen dierent approaches ofpopulism and extremism to advancing theirpolitical case in a context of democracy understress - the supply side - it is worth takinga look at things from the other end. Thedemand side - attitudes, demographics,and anxieties - are the context in which allpolitical movements and parties operate.The report will then analyse the variousstrategic responses that mainstream

political actors can adopt to weaken thedemand and opportunity for populists andextremists.

interests as served by democracy and oftenchange in the process and start to leavetheir extremism behind. The French FrontNational has also trodden this path. Othersattempt to enter the democratic spacebut ultimately fail, such as the UKs BNP.Some parties, such as Hungarys Jobbik,exist both within and beyond democracy.Street protests, persecution of minoritiesand competition for oce co-exist in a one

foot in, one foot out model of extremism.The English Defence League (EDL), with itsassociation with the British Freedom Party,has also unsuccessfully experimented withdemocracy, reverting to a sectarian streetprotest model. A key distinction between

the populist and extreme right is not pro-versus anti-democracy, but something morenuanced: change within the system overconditional engagement with the system asa tool of mobilisation.

The second distinguishing feature of right-wing extremism is a tolerance and evenacceptance of violence. Alongside this,extremists mobilise hatred for particular

groups dened by their race, ethnicity,religion, migration status or nationality.Attitudes towards violence is a cleardistinguishing element between populist andextremist actors. However, the deploymentof the politics of hate can be fuzzy. Thereare populist voices such as Geert Wilders ofthe PVV who has be seen to espouse thepolitics of hate - notwithstanding failure toconvict him under Dutch anti-hate laws -

with anti-Islam rhetoric that has not spiltover into advocating a politics of violence.While it is denitive of extremism that there

is acceptance and even advocacy of violence,the politics of hate is less respectful of theextremist/populist boundary.

While the populist radical right and theextreme right appeal to many of the sameattitudes with the exception of tolerance of

violence, the degree to which they interactand support one another is much less clear.Indeed, they may even be inversely relatedin many circumstances. For example, the

28 Eatwell, R. 2006. Community cohesion and cumulativeextremism in contemporary Britain. The Political Quarterly77(2):204-216.

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5. The demand for populismand extremism

Populist radical right and extreme rightparties have been able to tap into apublic appetite for the politics of identity,

concern with the performance and processof representative democracy, and, inmore recent times, anxiety induced byeconomic stress. In explaining the successof the populist radical right in particular, it isnecessary to understand the dimensions ofthis context. None of this is deterministic:it is opportunity rather than destiny.Mainstream parties, for example, mayhave found a way of meeting this demand.

However, when looking at modern Europeanattitudes, it becomes quite clear how it isthat the populist radical right has been ableto become the most successful new partyfamily in the last two decades or so.

A combination of anxiety over change,economic strife, cultural angst, mistrust inthe ability and competence of governments(including in their management of borders),

concerns over free-riding upon generousEuropean welfare states, and, amongst aminority group of voters, a basic displeasureof growing diversity are all evident. As theanalysis of a variety of data will show, thereis perhaps a hardcore minority of votersfor whom there is little that can be doneto persuade them that there is a robustmainstream response to their concerns. Thisproportion varies from country to country.

Beyond this minority, there is a softer

reluctant radical or latent hostile groupthat is open to some persuasion.

However, there are attractions towardsthe populist radical right for this group.Finally, there is a much wider groupwho have a lesser degree of anxietybut who could drift toward the populistright if a successful mainstream responseis lacking - these can be termed identityambivalents. When we analyse mainstreamstrategic responses to these demands for apopulist radical right, the measure of theirsuccess is the degree to which: (1) theymarginalise the outwardly hostile groups; (2)they limit the pool of potential demand for

the populist radical right; and (3) they meetthe anxieties of the mainstream majority -many of which are shared with the soft orhard right.

Zick, Kupper, and Hovermann of theFriedrich Ebert Stiftung looked at crossborder comparisons of attitudes towardsrace, immigration, values and culture.29Onquestions of immigration and culture, deep

concerns are evident (see table 1 below).

It should be noted that the same data alsoshows some positive attitudes towardsimmigration and Muslims. For example, wellover half of respondents in all the countriesmentioned above agree that immigrantsenrich our culture. In none of the countriesdo more than 30 percent believe thatthe majority of Muslims nd terrorism

justiable. Nonetheless, the data above

TABLE 1

D GB F NL I PT PL HU

There are too many immigrants in [country] 50 62.2 40.3 46 62.5 59.6 27.1 58.7

Immigrants are a strain on our welfare system 40.8 60.2 54.7 20.3 31.7 42.5 45.8 77.2

There are too many Muslims in [country] 46.1 44.7 36.2 41.5 49.7 27.1 47.1 60.7

The Muslim culture ts well into [country/Europe] 16.6 39 48.8 38.7 27.4 50.1 19 30.2

D= Germany; GB=UK; F=France; NL=Netherlands; I=Italy; PT=Portugal; PL=Poland; HU=Hungary.Source: http://library.fes.de/pdf-les/do/07908-20110311.pdf

29 Zick, A. et al. 2011. Intolerance, Prejudice andDiscrimination: A European Report. Berlin: Friedrich EbertStiftung.

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into economic anxiety, nation, attitudes toimmigration, Muslims and other minorities,and optimism, nostalgia and pessimism.Using cluster analysis, Populus grouped theEnglish population into six identity tribesranging from very liberal attitudes on theleft to a group in active enmity on the right.Chart 1 (on the following page) shows howthe resulting Fear and Hopereport recordedthe breakdown of the tribes.

UKIP support has, up until recently, beenconcentrated amongst the latent hostiles.However, there is little doubt that ithas the potential to sway some thecultural integrationists who are more likely

to support the Conservatives. They mayeven be able to pick o more of thosein active enmity as the British far-right fragments and turns in on itself.All these elements are contingent.The point is that the populist radicalright does have a potential constituency.This is further underlined by the work ofCounterpoint on reluctant and potentialradicals.31 Table 3 (on the following page)

shows the breakdown between themainstream, reluctant and potentialradicals, based upon elections surveys andstrengths of attachment to populist parties.

Where there are established populist orextreme right parties, the mainstreamis smaller in these countries. This is in alllikelihood due to an interaction betweenthe demand side and the success of the

supply side. Unsurprisingly, Hungary isat one end of the spectrum andGermany, with its cultural aversion toextremism, is at the other end of thespectrum. Both the Fear and HopeReport and the Reluctant radical analysesshow that there is space on the right inWestern European societies in whichpopulists can operate.

One important caveat on the demand side isthe apparently more widespread acceptance

show that populist and/or extremist partiesof the right have an opportunity to tap intoanxiety around immigration, welfare, Islam,as well as the concerns about the body politicthat were identied earlier.

Pter Krek of Political Capital in Budapesthas developed an index of demand for right-wing extremism - DEREX. It accumulatesattitudes that are likely to providean opportunity for the extreme rightacross four dimensions: prejudice/welfarechauvinism; right-wing value orientation;anti-establishment attitudes; and fear,distrust and pessimism (The DEREXstructure is shown in the Annex). Table 2 (on

the following page) shows the breakdownbetween Central/ Eastern Europe andWestern Europe.

If we take the DEREX value as a usefulproxy for demand for right-wing extremismand the separate right-wing value/anxietydimensions as a potential demand forpopulism then interesting relationships startto emerge between these demands and

the growth of populist and extreme right-wing parties. The most successful extremeshave been in Central/Eastern Europe inthe shape of Jobbik provoking anti-Romasentiment30 and Golden Dawn in Greece.This is consistent with the DEREX data. Innorthern and western Europe, it has beenpopulist parties that have been more adeptat tapping into drivers of demand for farright representation, driven by prejudice,

anti-establishment attitudes, traditionalright-wing values or economic/physical fear.Attitudes to conict and violence would also

be a useful addition to this data set.

Consistently, when voters attitudes andbehaviours are researched, the potentialfor populist and extremist right support isclear. In 2011, the organisation behind theHope not Hate campaign commissioned

the polling company, Populus, to undertakea large-scale survey of English attitudes

30 Karacsony, Gergely and Daniel Rona. 2012. Reasons behindthe rise of the Hungarian radical right. Journal of EastEuropean and Asian Studies 2(1): 61-92

31 Fieschi, C. et al. 2012. Recapturing the Reluctant Radical:how to win back Europes populist vote. Counterpoint.


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TABLE 2

DEREX Prejudices Anti-

establishment

attitudes

Right-wing

Orientation

Fear

Central/Eastern Europe 8% 26% 25% 28% 16%

Western Europe 4% 20% 16% 14% 9%

Source: Strategies Against Right-Wing Extremism in Western and Eastern Europe - presentation to Policy Network seminar

November 2012.

TABLE 3

D DK FN F HU NL NO SW

Mainstream 91.2 86.3 81.4 84.2 66.3 80.7 82.9 85.5

Potential radical 8.2 3.6 14 12.3 25.7 8.1 3.4 1.2

Reluctant radical 0.1 5 2.1 0.8 5.4 5.6 6.2 1.4

D=Germany; DK=Denmark; FN=Finland; F=France; HU=Hungary; NL=Netherlands; NO-Norway SW=Sweden

Source: Counterpoint data https://www.smashwords.com/books/download/238093/1/latest/0/0/recapturing-the-reluctant-

radical-how-to-win-back-europes-populist-vote-by-catherine-eschi-marley-morris-and-lila-caballero.pdf

CHART 1

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Activeenmity

Latenthostiles

Culturalintegrationists

Identityambivalents

Mainstreamliberals

Confident

multiculturals

8% 16% 28% 24% 10% 13%

Percent

Source: The New Tribes of British Identity Politics. 2012. Fear and Hope. http://www.fearandhope.org.uk/

CHART 2

Would you be more or less likely to vote for a party that promised to stop all immigration intothe UK?

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

60+

Less likely

60+

More likely

40-59

Less likely

40-59

More likely

25-39

Less likely

25-39

More likely

18-24

Less likely

18-24

More likely

Percent

Source: Extremis Project/YouGov extremism poll 19th-20th August 2012.

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of and adherence to notions of liberalismand pragmatism amongst younger voters.A recent poll by Extremis Project/YouGovshows the age impact on attitudes towardspopulist radical right themes very clearly(see chart 2).

It is clear from this data that attitudes toimmigration shift quite markedly betweenthe cohorts under 40 years old and thoseover. It remains to be seen whether this isan age or cohort eect. Contact theory

would suggest the latter: these age groupswere raised, educated and work in amore uid and diverse Britain. However,

populism will be able to shift its focus

from immigration to other issues, i.e.welfare dependency or cultural friction,in response to any generational shiftthat occurs; neither demand nor supplyis static.

Party competition will heavily inuence

the degree to which dierent voter tribes

are attracted to the mainstream, populismor, in the event of catastrophic failure, the

extreme. Party strategy - in organisational,electoral and governance terms - is critical,but the strategic choices are neithersimple nor clear. It is important to look ata variety of strategies - both in terms ofwhat has worked and what might work.The populist signal and the extremistthreat emerge from liberal democraciesunder stress. How can mainstream partiesrespond?


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6. Mainstream party strategiesto cope with democratic stress

There are two broad approaches formainstream parties and political movementsto cope with the populist radical right:

outcompeting them or reducing demand forpopulism. A strong strategy would combineboth: address the anxieties that createthe opportunity for populist and extremistparties to emerge and gain support, whileoutcompeting the parties themselves.

In the short term at least, it is easier toresist the threat from populist partiesin majoritarian political systems. It is

dicult for such parties to gain a foothold.However, once they reach a critical mass,they can severely dent the support ofmainstream parties of both the right andleft. For example, UKIP took more votesaway from Labour in the 2009 Europeanelections but has taken many more potentialvotes away from the Conservatives since2010 by a factor of 37%-3%.32 Incumbencymatters, but what is most striking is that the

majority of UKIP voters have backed neitherof the two main parties in the previouselection.

The other risk in majoritarian systems isthat a populist force attaches itself to amainstream party, dragging it away froma majoritarian position - on the left and theright. The most obvious example is the TeaParty and its impact on the Republican Party

in the US. It contributed to the Republicansfailure to win a majority in the Senate in 2010and made it more dicult for Mitt Romney

to pass through the presidential primary asa moderate. Whether populist parties andforces meet a support threshold or functionwith a mainstream party, they pose a threatto the mainstream - even if they do notbecome strong forces from a parliamentaryor governmental perspective.

In consensual systems, the risk to themainstream is one of representation andcoalition formation. Support, even withaggregate thresholds in place, is fairlyquickly converted into parliamentaryrepresentation. As soon as this occurs,coalition formation is impacted and themainstream party may become weakened.Tjitske Akkerman has systematicallyanalysed the party positions of a number ofliberal, Conservative/Christian democratic,social democratic and populist radical rightparties in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany,the Netherlands, UK and Switzerland. Liberalparties such as the Dutch VVD have co-optedthe positions of populist radical right parties

on immigration, social rights and asylum,while avoiding their anti-Islamic stances.However, some populist parties have movedevenfurtherto the right including the SwissSVP, Austrian FP, while the Dutch PVVand Flemish Vlaams Blok (VB) have remainedat a far-right pole.33

What follows are eight potential strategicresponses that mainstream parties can deploy

in response to the populist radical right. Theyare not exhaustive, but are illustrative. Baleet al. break down strategic responses intothree categories: hold; adopt, and defuse.A holdstrategy involves staying the courseand avoiding a substantive strategicresponse to the populist radical right:cordon sanitaire, tentative engagementand return to the roots broadly fall intothis category. Defuse involves attempts to

decrease the salience of populist radicalright issues. Triangulation, re-framing andleft populism fall into this category. The thirdcategory is adopt:absorption is an exampleof this strategic response. Statecraft andcontact democracy are the substantiveapproaches that have yet to be tried. Theydo not seem to fall easily within the hold-defuse-adopt typology. Nor have they beencomprehensively attempted. Table 4 details

strategic responses of centre-left and centre-

32 Ford, R. 2013. UKIPs rise is not just a problem for theconservatives they are emerging as the party of choice fordisaected and angry voters from all parties. LSE Politicsand Policy blog.

33 Akkerman, T. 2012. Immigration policy and electoralcompetition in Western Europe. A ne-grained analysis ofparty positions over the past two decades. Party Politics19(1):1-23.


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In the case of the populist nationalist anti-immigrant, francophone and elite VB, thisstrategy worked. A competitor, but moremoderate nationalist party, the N-VA (NewFlemish Alliance), has overtaken the party inpopularity. In the recent Antwerp elections,VB fell from 33.5 percent to 10.2 percent

of the vote; its stronghold was breeched.Cordon sanitaire clearly has its uses whenit comes to marginalising parties andbears some resemblance to the no sharedplatform approach adopted by mainstreamparties towards the BNP in the UK.

Therefore, this strategy in one ofcontainment and does have its uses -particularly where extremist parties are the

target. It has several drawbacks, however:

1. Despite its successful deployment inBelgium, it often does not work. A similarapproach has been attempted towardsthe Front National in France, yet they stillremain a signicant minority party.

2. While a cordon sanitaire mayquarantine parties, it does not quarantine

issues. Flemish nationalism is, if anything,stronger than ever. The Front Nationalsagenda on immigration, minority

right parties in Denmark, the Netherlands,Norway and Austria within the Bale et al.typology.

This typology gives good means to describeresponses. What follows is an analysis of themerits of eight (or so) mainstream strategic

responses to the rise of the populist radicalright in Western European democracies andthe US.

A. Cordon Sanitaire

The cordon sanitaire strategy is describedby Sarah de Lange and Tjitske Akkermanin the context of the Flemish party systemas follows:

[Established parties] have agreed not tocooperate with the [Vlaams Blok(VB)] in the

electoral arena (no electoral cartels, no joint

press conferences or declarations towards the

press), in the parliamentary arena (no joint

legislative activities or voting agreements,

no support for resolutions introduced by the

VB), or the executive arena (no governmental

coalitions).34

34 de Lange, Sarah L. and T. Akkerman. 2012. Populist partiesin Belgium: a case of hegemonic liberal democracy? InMudde, Cas and Kaltwasser, Cristbal Rovira, eds. Populism inEurope and the Americas: threat or corrective for democracy?Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

TABLE 4

Conservative/

liberal strategy

Social democrat

internal debate

Other left/

green parties'

response

Outcome:

social democratic

party strategy

DK 1980s Defuse United Hold Hold

DK 1990s Adopt Divided Hold Defuse

DK 2000s Adopt Divided Hold Adopt

NL 2000 Adopt Divided Hold Defuse/hold/adopt

NL mid-2000s Defuse Divided Hold/Adopt Defuse

N 1970s Defuse United Defuse Defuse

N 2000s Defuse United Defuse Defuse

AT mid-1980s-mid 1990s Defuse United Hold Hold/defuse

AT mid-1990s-2000s Adopt Divided Hold Hold/adopt

Note: DK=Denmark, NL=Netherlands, N=Norway, AT=Austria

Source: Bale, Green-Pedersen, Krouwel, Luther, and Sitter, If you cant beat them join them? Explaining social democraticresponses to the challenge from the populist radical right in Western Europe. Political Studies: 2010 Vol 58, p.421

8/13/2019 Anthony Painter, Democratic Stress, The Popul

anthony painter, democratic stress, the populist signal and extremist threat (21 march 2013)

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