another futile exercise

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Another Futile Exercise P OLITICS in Kashmir is taking a new turn with some recent developments. Five top leaders of the opposition in the valley have been released after years of detention. The pro-independence militant outfit, JKLF, appears to be moving away from Islamabad, after the latter's crackdown on the organisation in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. In the midst of alt this, speculation is afloat about the centre evolving a 'package plan' for Kashmir to pave the way for elections there. The decision to release the Jamaat-i-lslami leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani, the People's Conference leader Abdul Ghani Lone, and three others representing different opposition groups is being linked with the 'package plan' which in order to restore the political process seeks to involve opposition politicians in a future election, so that by all appearances it looks 'fair'. The prime minister is believed to have urged his partymen in the Jammu and Kashmir state Congress unit—a squabbling lot, as in so many other states—to patch up their differences in preparation for the polls. It seems that the centre is planning to enact another farce, in the name of elections, a la Punjab, in Kashmir, without any sincere effort at coming to grips with the basic problem of popular grievances there—which, elections or not, will continue to feed the centre's bugbear of 'secessionism' or 'terrorism'. The ritual of elections, by hook or by crook—whether at the gunpoint by security forces (as in Punjab recently), or by rigging and capturing of booths by musclemen of locally powerful politi- cians (as in Bihar, and other parts of the country)—is being put forward as a 'democratic' symbol of legitimisation of what in practical terms is sheer authoritarianism. Elections and their results—both manipulated—are seen by the centre as a source of authority which it can use to contain popular grievances in different parts of India. In Kashmir, the centre's game is already falling apart. If by releasing the five opposition politicians the policy-makers in New Delhi hoped that they would fall in line with the centre's plan of reviving the so-called political process, the prime minister was in for a disappointment. Soon after their release, all the five leaders demanded, in a joint press statement, that the people of Kashmir be granted the right of self-determination, and reiterated the call for the implementation of the United Nations resolution on plebiscite. Although the call for the UN supported plebiscite (which allows the Kashmiris to opt for accession to either India or Pakistan, without any third alternative) contradicts their demand for self-determination (which would allow the Kashmiris to opt for independence from the two neighbouring states), the mood of these leaders suggests that they are unwilling for any settlement with New Delhi unless the latter stops the repression unleashed on their people and releases the thousands of their young men held in jails and interrogation centres—the basic conditions necessary for any dialogue for the solution of the Kashmir imbroglio. The five opposition Kashmiri leaders, in their press statement, appealed to all democratic minded people to pressurise the Indian government to abstain from the use of brute force, and persuade it to grant Kashmiris their basic rights. Till now there are no indications that the centre is wilting to heed these demands. It appears to be working on the speculation that the militants can be divided, now that the JKLF is disenchanted with Pakistan. Us decision to release the opposition leaders, significantly enough, came in the wake of the Jamaat-i-lslami leader Geelani's appeal from jail to the militants early in March to stop abducting innocent people as such abductions were un-lslamic and harmful to the cause of Kashmiri independence. But is it not too late? Do people like Geelani have any control over Hizbul Mujahideen or the other Islamic fundamentalist militant outfits (which are supposed to be under the hegemony of Geelani Jamaat-i-lslami), from whose operations he had been segregated during all this period, thanks to the centre's decision to detain him? Curiously enough, the centre till now has not come out with any justifiable grounds for his detention. Why did it decide to release him, for that matter? The entire exercise harks back to what New Delhi did with Sheikh Abdullah—arresting him without any trial to prove the charges brought against him and then releasing him when it suited New Delhi's political interests. As for the JKLF, Islamabad's clamping down on its leader Amanullah's march to cross the Line of Control (LOC) in Pakistan—as well as its gradual withdrawal of military support from the organisation—may have helped it to reinforce its pro-independence image in the valley vis-a-vis the pro-Pakistan groups like the Hizbul Mujahideen, who favour the valley's accession to Pakistan, But this should be of little comfort for policy-makers in New Delhi, who perhaps hope to harness the disgruntled JKLF to its package programme or restoring the so-called political process. Although many from among the National Conference have joined the JKLF and may return to the political process once it is initiated, the bulk of the younger elements in the militant outfit have become anti-Indian, thanks to the gory record set by the security forces during the last few years. Even if Pakistan cuts off aid to them, they are likely to remain a sullen lot waiting for a chance of reprisal, unless the centre puts an end to arbitrary arrests and killings by its forces, A package plan with a few economic concessions, without any direction towards greater autonomy in political decision-making, will hardly help restoration of normalcy in Kashmir or create a favourable environment for fair elections. The failure of the electoral experiment in Punjab does not seem to have had any salutary effect on New Delhi. Economic and Political Weekly April 4, 1992 671 April 4, 1992

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  • Another Futile Exercise PO L I T I C S in Kashmir is taking a new turn with some recent developments. Five top leaders of the opposition in the valley have been released after years of detention. The pro-independence mili tant outf i t , JKLF, appears to be moving away from Islamabad, after the latter's crackdown on the organisation in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. In the midst of alt this, speculation is afloat about the centre evolving a 'package plan' for Kashmir to pave the way for elections there. The decision to release the Jamaat-i-lslami leader Syed A l i Shah Geelani, the People's Conference leader Abdul Ghani Lone, and three others representing different opposition groups is being linked wi th the 'package plan' which in order to restore the political process seeks to involve opposition politicians in a future election, so that by a l l appearances it looks 'fair'. The prime minister is believed to have urged his partymen in the Jammu and Kashmir state Congress unita squabbling lot , as in so many other statesto patch up their differences in preparation for the polls. It seems that the centre is planning to enact another farce, in the name of elections, a la Punjab, in Kashmir, without any sincere effort at coming to grips w i t h the basic problem of popular grievances therewhich, elections or not, wi l l continue to feed the centre's bugbear of 'secessionism' or 'terrorism'. The ritual of elections, by hook or by crookwhether at the gunpoint by security forces (as in Punjab recently), or by rigging and capturing of booths by musclemen of locally powerful poli t i -cians (as in Bihar, and other parts of the country)is being put forward as a 'democratic' symbol of legitimisation of what in practical terms is sheer authoritarianism. Elections and their resultsboth manipulatedare seen by the centre as a source of authority which it can use to contain popular grievances in different parts of India.

    In Kashmir, the centre's game is already falling apart. If by releasing the five opposition politicians the policy-makers in New Delhi hoped that they would fall in line with the centre's plan of reviving the so-called political process, the prime minister was in for a disappointment. Soon after their release, a l l the five leaders demanded, in a jo in t press statement, that the people of Kashmir be granted the right of self-determination, and reiterated the call for the implementation of the United Nations resolution on plebiscite. Although the call for the UN supported plebiscite (which allows the Kashmiris to opt for accession to either India or Pakistan, without any third alternative) contradicts their demand for self-determination (which would allow the Kashmiris to op t for independence from the two neighbouring states), the mood of these leaders suggests that they are unwil l ing for any settlement w i t h New Delhi unless the latter stops the repression unleashed on their people and releases the thousands of their young men held in jails and interrogation centresthe basic conditions necessary for any dialogue for the

    solution of the Kashmir imbroglio. The five opposition Kashmiri leaders, in their press statement, appealed to all democratic minded people to pressurise the Indian government to abstain from the use of brute force, and persuade it to grant Kashmiris their basic rights. T i l l now there are no indications that the centre is wilting to heed these demands. It appears to be working on the speculation that the militants can be divided, now that the JKLF is disenchanted wi th Pakistan. Us decision to release the opposition leaders, significantly enough, came in the wake of the Jamaat-i-lslami leader Geelani's appeal from ja i l to the militants early in March to stop abducting innocent people as such abductions were un-lslamic and harmful to the cause of Kashmiri independence.

    But is it not too late? Do people like Geelani have any control over Hizbul Mujahideen or the other Islamic fundamentalist militant outfits (which are supposed to be under the hegemony of Geelani Jamaat-i-lslami), from whose operations he had been segregated during all this period, thanks to the centre's decision to detain him? Curiously enough, the centre t i l l now has not come out with any justifiable grounds for his detention. Why did it decide to release h im, for that matter? The entire exercise harks back to what New Delhi did with Sheikh Abdullaharresting him without any tr ial to prove the charges brought against him and then releasing him when it suited New Delhi's political interests.

    As for the JKLF, Islamabad's clamping down on its leader Amanullah's march to cross the Line of Control (LOC) in Pakistanas well as its gradual withdrawal of military support from the organisationmay have helped it to reinforce its pro-independence image in the valley vis-a-vis the pro-Pakistan groups like the Hizbul Mujahideen, who favour the valley's accession to Pakistan, But this should be of little comfort for policy-makers in New Delhi, who perhaps hope to harness the disgruntled J K L F to its package programme or restoring the so-called political process. Although many from among the National Conference have joined the J K L F and may return to the political process once it is initiated, the bulk of the younger elements in the militant outfit have become anti-Indian, thanks to the gory record set by the security forces during the last few years. Even if Pakistan cuts of f aid to them, they are likely to remain a sullen lot waiting for a chance of reprisal, unless the centre puts an end to arbitrary arrests and killings by its forces, A package plan with a few economic concessions, without any direction towards greater autonomy in political decision-making, wi l l hardly help restoration of normalcy in Kashmir or create a favourable environment for fair elections. The failure of the electoral experiment in Punjab does not seem to have had any salutary effect on New Delhi.

    Economic and Political Weekly April 4, 1992 671

    April 4, 1992