Archive-name: ar-faqLast-modified: 95/Apr/29Version: ar_faq.txt 2.08a

-------------------------- Animal Rights

Frequently Asked Questions (AR FAQ)

--------------------------

------------INTRODUCTION------------

Welcome to the Animal Rights Frequently Asked Questions text (AR FAQ).This FAQ is intended to satisfy two basic goals: a) to provide a sourceof information and encouragement for people exploring the issues involvedin the animal rights movement, and b) to answer the common questions andjustifications offered up by AR opponents. It is unashamedly an advocacyvehicle for animal rights. Opponents of AR are invited to create a FAQthat codifies their views; we do not attempt to do so here. The FAQ restricts itself specifically to AR issues; nutrition andother vegetarian/veganism issues are intentionally avoided because theyare already well covered in the existing vegetarianism and veganism FAQsmaintained by Michael Traub. To obtain these FAQs, contact Michael athis e-mail address given below. The FAQ was created through a collaboration of authors. The answers havebeen attributed via initials, as follows:

TA Ted Altar taltar@beaufort.sfu.ca JE Jonathan Esterhazy

jester@cc.umanitoba.ca DG Donald Graft dgraft@gate.net JEH John Harrington jeh@bisoym.com DVH Dietrich Von Haugwitz vonha001@mc.duke.edu LJ Leor Jacobi leor@mellers1.psych.berkeley.edu LK Larry Kaiser lkaiser@umich.edu JK Jeremy Keens

keens@pitvax.xx.rmit.edu.au BL Brian Luke

luke@checkov.hm.udayton.edu PM Peggy Madison

madison@alpha.acast.nova.edu BRO Brian Owen

brian6@vaxc.middlesex.ac.uk JSD Janine Stanley-Dunham

janine@wlb.hwwilson.com JLS Jennifer Stephens jlstephe@uncc.edu MT Michael Traub traub@btcs.bt.co.uk AECW Allen ECW

aecw001@mayfair.demon.co.uk

The current FAQ maintainer is Donald Graft (see address above). Ideas andcriticisms are actively solicited and will be very gratefully received. Thematerial included here is released to the public domain. We request that itbe distributed without alteration to respect the author attributions. This FAQ contains 96 questions. If they are not all present, then a mailerhas probably truncated it. Contact the FAQ maintainer for a set of split-upfiles.

DG

-------GENERAL-------

-----------------------#1 What is all this Animal Rights (AR) stuff and why should it concern me?-----------------------

The fundamental principle of the AR movement is that nonhuman animalsdeserve to live according to their own natures, free from harm, abuse, andexploitation. This goes further than just saying that we should treatanimals well while we exploit them, or before we kill and eat them. Itsays animals have the RIGHT to be free from human cruelty andexploitation, just as humans possess this right. The withholding of thisright from the nonhuman animals based on their species membership isreferred to as "speciesism". Animal rights activists try to extend the human circle of respect andcompassion beyond our species to include other animals, who are alsocapable of feeling pain, fear, hunger, thirst, loneliness, and kinship.When we try to do this, many of us come to the conclusion that we can nolonger support factory farming, vivisection, and the exploitation ofanimals for entertainment. At the same time, there are still areas ofdebate among animal rights supporters, for example, whether ANY research

that harms animals is ever justified, where the line should be drawn forenfranchising species with rights, on what occasions civil disobediencemay be appropriate, etc. However, these areas of potential disagreement donot negate the abiding principles that join us: compassion and concernfor the pain and suffering of nonhumans. One main goal of this FAQ is to address the common justifications thatarise when we become aware of how systematically our society abuses andexploits animals. Such "justifications" help remove the burden from ourconsciences, but this FAQ attempts to show that they do not excuse theharm we cause other animals. Beyond the scope of this FAQ, more detailedarguments can be found in three classics of the AR literature.

The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan (ISBN 0-520-05460-1) In Defense of Animals, Peter Singer (ISBN 0-06-097044-8) Animal Liberation, Peter Singer (ISBN 0-380-71333-0, 2nd Ed.)

While appreciating the important contributions of Regan and Singer, manyanimal rights activists emphasize the role of empathetic caring as theactual and most appropriate fuel for the animal rights movement incontradistinction to Singer's and Regan's philosophical rationales. To thereader who says "Why should I care?", we can point out the followingreasons:

One cares about minimizing suffering. One cares about promoting compassion in human affairs. One is concerned about improving the health of humanity. One is concerned about human starvation and malnutrition. One wants to prevent the radical disruption of our planet's ecosystem. One wants to preserve animal species. One wants to preserve wilderness.

The connections between these issues and the AR agenda may not be obvious.Please read on as we attempt to clarify this. DG

The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire thoserights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand

of tyranny.Jeremy Bentham (philosopher)

Life is life--whether in a cat, or dog or man. There is no differencethere between a cat or a man. The idea of difference is a humanconception for man's own advantage...

Sri Aurobindo (poet and philosopher)

Non-violence leads to the highest ethics, which is the goal of allevolution. Until we stop harming all other living beings, we are stillsavages.

Thomas Edison (inventor)

The time will come when men such as I will look upon the murder ofanimals as they now look on the murder of men.

Leonardo Da Vinci (artist and scientist)

SEE ALSO #2-#3, #26, #87-#91

-----------------------#2 Is the Animal Rights movement different from the Animal Welfare movement? The Animal Liberation movement?-----------------------

The Animal Welfare movement acknowledges the suffering of nonhumans andattempts to reduce that suffering through "humane" treatment, but it doesnot have as a goal elimination of the use and exploitation of animals. TheAnimal Rights movement goes significantly further by rejecting theexploitation of animals and according them rights in that regard. A personcommitted to animal welfare might be concerned that cows get enough space,proper food, etc., but would not necessarily have any qualms about killingand eating cows, so long as the rearing and slaughter are "humane". The Animal Welfare movement is represented by such organizations as theSociety for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, and the Humane Society. Having said this, it should be realized that some hold a broaderinterpretation of the AR movement. They would argue that the AW groups do,in fact, support rights for animals (e.g., a dog has the right not to bekicked). Under this interpretation, AR is viewed as a broad umbrellacovering the AW and strict AR groups. This interpretation

has the advantageof moving AR closer to the mainstream. Nevertheless, there is a validdistinction between the AW and AR groups, as described in the first paragraph. Animal Liberation (AL) is, for many people, a synonym for Animal Rights(but see below). Some people prefer the term "liberation" because it bringsto mind images of other successful liberation movements, such as the movementfor liberation of slaves and liberation of women, whereas the term "rights"often encounters resistance when an attempt is made to apply it to nonhumans.The phrase "Animal Liberation" became popular with the publication of PeterSinger's classic book of the same name. This use of the term liberation should be distinguished from the literalmeaning discussed in question #88, i.e., an Animal Liberationist is notnecessarily one who engages in forceful civil disobedience or unlawfulactions. Finally, intellectual honesty compels us to acknowledge that the accountgiven here is rendered in broad strokes (but is at least approximatelycorrect), and purposely avoids describing ongoing debate about the meaningof the terms "Animal Rights", "Animal Liberation", and "Animal Welfare",debate about the history of these movements, and debate about the actualpositions of the prominent thinkers. To depict the flavor of such debates,the following text describes one coherent position. Naturally, it will beattacked from all sides! Some might suggest that a subtle distinction can be made between the AnimalLiberation and Animal Rights movements. The Animal Rights movement, at leastas propounded by Regan and his adherents, is said to require total abolitionof such practices as experimentation on animals. The Animal Liberationmovement, as propounded by Singer and his adherents, is said to reject theabsolutist view and assert that in some cases, such experimentation can bemorally defensible. Because such cases could also justify some experimentson humans, however, it is not clear that the distinction described reflectsa difference between the liberation and rights views, so much as it does abroader difference of ethical theory, i.e., absolutism versus utilitarianism.

DG

Historically, animal welfare groups have attempted to improve the lot ofanimals in society. They worked against the popular Western concept ofanimals as lacking souls and not being at all worthy of any ethicalconsideration. The animal rights movement set itself up as an abolitionistalternative to the reform-minded animal welfarists. As the animal rightsmovement has become larger and more influential, the animal exploiters havefinally been forced to respond to it. Perhaps inspired by the efforts of TomRegan to distinguish AR from AW, industry groups intent on maintaining thestatus quo have embraced the term "animal welfare". Pro-vivisection,hunting, trapping, agribusiness, and animal entertainment groups now referto themselves as "animal welfare" supporters. Several umbrella groups whosegoal is to defend these practices have also arisen. This classic case of public-relations doublespeak acknowledges the issueof cruelty to animals in name only, while allowing for the continued use andabuse of animals. The propaganda effect is to stigmatize animal rightssupporters as being extreme while attempting to portray themselves as thereasonable moderates. Nowadays, the cause of "animal welfare" is invoked bythe animal industry at least as often as it is used by animal protectiongroups.

LJ

SEE ALSO: #1, #3, #87-#88

-----------------------#3 What exactly are rights and what rights can we give animals?-----------------------

Despite arguably being the foundation of the Western liberal tradition,the concept of "rights" has been a source of controversy and confusionin the debate over AR. A common objection to the notion that animals haverights involves questioning the origin of those rights. One such argumentmight proceed as follows:

Where do these rights come from? Are you in special communication with God, and he has told you that animals have rights? Have the rights been granted by law? Aren't rights something

that humans must grant?

It is true that the concept of "rights" needs to be carefully explicated.It is also true that the concept of "natural rights" is fraught withphilosophical difficulties. Complicating things further is the confusionbetween legal rights and moral rights. One attempt to avoid this objection is to accept it, but argue thatif it is not an obstacle for thinking of humans as having rights, then itshould not be an obstacle for thinking of animals as having rights. HenrySalt wrote:

Have the lower animals "rights?" Undoubtedly--if men have. That is the point I wish to make evident in this opening chapter... The fitness of this nomenclature is disputed, but the existence of some real principle of the kind can hardly be called in question; so that the controversy concerning "rights" is little else than an academic battle over words, which leads to no practical conclusion. I shall assume, therefore, that men are possessed of "rights," in the sense of Herbert Spencer's definition; and if any of my readers object to this qualified use of the term, I can only say that I shall be perfectly willing to change the word as soon as a more appropriate one is forthcoming. The immediate question that claims our attention is this--if men have rights, have animals their rights also?

Satisfying though this argument may be, it still leaves us unable torespond to the sceptic who disavows the notion of rights even for humans.Fortunately, however, there is a straightforward interpretation of"rights" that is plausible and allows us to avoid the controversialrights rhetoric and underpinnings. It is the notion that a "right" is theflip side of a moral imperative. If, ethically, we mustrefrain from an act performed on a being, then that being can be said tohave a "right" that the act not be performed. For example, if our ethicstells us that we must not kill another, then the other has a right not tobe killed by us. This interpretation of rights is, in

fact, an intuitiveone that people both understand and readily endorse. (Of course, rights sointerpreted can be codified as legal rights through appropriatelegislation.) It is important to realize that, although there is a basis for speakingof animals as having rights, that does not imply or require that theypossess all the rights that humans possess, or even that humans possess allthe rights that animals possess. Consider the human right to vote. (On theview taken here, this would derive from an ethical imperative to give humansinfluence over actions that influence their lives.) Since animals lack thecapacity to rationally consider actions and their implications, and tounderstand the concept of democracy and voting, they lack the capacity tovote. There is, therefore, no ethical imperative to allow them to do so,and thus they do not possess the right to vote. Similarly, some fowls have a strong biological need to extend and flaptheir wings; right-thinking people feel an ethical imperative to makeit possible for them to do so. Thus, it can be said that fowl have the rightto flap their wings. Obviously, such a right need not be extended to humans. The rights that animals and humans possess, then, are determined by theirinterests and capacities. Animals have an interest in living, avoiding pain,and even in pursuing happiness (as do humans). As a result of the ethicalimperatives, they have rights to these things (as do humans). They canexercise these rights by living their lives free of exploitation andabuse at the hands of humans. DG

SEE ALSO: #1-#2

-----------------------#4 Isn't AR hypocritical, e.g., because you don't give rights to insects or plants?-----------------------

The general hypocrisy argument appears in many forms. A typical formis as follows:

"It is hypocritical to assert rights for a cow but not for a plant; therefore, cows cannot have rights."

Arguments of this type are frequently used against AR. Not muchanalysis is required to see that they carry little weight. First, onecan assert an hypothesis A that would carry as a corollary hypothesisB. If one then fails to assert B, one is hypocritical, but this doesnot necessarily make A false. Certainly, to assert A and not B wouldcall into question one's credibility, but it entails nothing about thevalidity of A. Second, the factual assertion of hypocrisy is often unwarranted. Inthe above example, there are grounds for distinguishing between cowsand plants (plants do not have a central nervous system), so the chargeof hypocrisy is unjustified. One may disagree with the criteria, butassertion of such criteria nullifies the charge of hypocrisy. Finally, the charge of hypocrisy can be reduced in most cases tosimple speciesism. For example, the quote above can be recast as:

"It is hypocritical to assert rights for a human but not for a plant; therefore, humans cannot have rights."

To escape from this reductio ad absurdum of the first quote, onemust produce a crucial relevant difference between cows and humans,in other words, one must justify the speciesist assignment of rightsto humans but not to cows. (In question #24, we apply a similar reductionto the charge of hypocrisy related to abortion. For questions dealingspecifically with insects and plants, refer to questions #39 through #46.) Finally, we must ask ourselves who the real hypocrites are. The followingquotation from Michael W. Fox describes the grossly hypocritical treatmentof exploited versus companion animals.

DG

Farm animals can be kept five to a cage two feet square, tied upconstantly by a two-foot-long tether, castrated without anesthesia, orbranded with a hot iron. A pet owner would be no less than prosecuted fortreating a companion animal in such a manner; an American president was, infact, morally censured merely for pulling the ears of his

two beagles.Michael W. Fox (Vice

President of HSUS)

SEE ALSO: #24, #39-#46

-----------------------#5 What right do AR people have to impose their beliefs on others?-----------------------

There is a not-so-subtle distinction between imposition of one's viewsand advertising them. AR supporters are certainly not imposing their viewsin the sense that, say, the Spanish Inquisition imposed its views, or theChurch imposed its views on Galileo. We do, however, feel a moral duty topresent our case to the public, and often to our friends and acquaintances.There is ample precedent for this: protests against slavery, protestsagainst the Vietnam War, condemnation of racism, etc. One might point out that the gravest imposition is that of the exploiterof animals upon his innocent and defenseless victims.

DG

If liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell people whatthey do not want to hear.

George Orwell (author)

I never give them hell. I just tell the truth and they think it's hell.

Harry S. Truman (33rd U.S. President)

SEE ALSO: #11, #87-#91

-----------------------#6 Isn't AR just another facet of political correctness?-----------------------

If only that were true! The term "politically correct" generally refersto a view that is in sync with the societal mainstream but which some mightbe inclined to disagree with. For example, some people might be inclinedto dismiss equal treatment for the races as mere "political correctness".The AR agenda is, currently, far from being a mainstream idea. Also, it is ridiculous to suppose that a view's validity can beoverturned simply by attaching the label "politically correct" or"politically incorrect".

DG

-----------------------#7 Isn't AR just another religion?-----------------------

No. The dictionary defines "religion" as the appeal to a supernaturalpower. (An alternate definition refers to devotion to a cause; that isa virtue that the AR movement would be happy to avow.) People who support Animal Rights come from many different religionsand many different philosophies. What they share is a belief in theimportance of showing compassion for other individuals, whetherhuman or nonhuman.

LK

-----------------------#8 Doesn't it demean humans to give rights to animals?-----------------------

A tongue-in-cheek, though valid, answer to this question is given byDavid Cowles-Hamar: "Humans are animals, so animal rights are human rights!" In a more serious vein, we can observe that giving rights to women andblack people does not demean white males. By analogy, then, giving rights tononhumans does not demean humans. If anything, by being morally consistent,and widening the circle of compassion to deserving nonhumans, we ennoblehumans. (Refer to question #26 for other relevant arguments.)

DG

The greatness of a nation and its moral progress can be judged by the wayits animals are treated.

Mahatma Gandhi (statesman and philosopher)

It is man's sympathy with all creatures that first makes him truly a man.

Albert Schweitzer (statesman, Nobel 1952)

For as long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other. Indeed, hewho sows the seed of murder and pain cannot reap joy and love.

Pythagoras (mathematician)

SEE ALSO: #26

-----------------------#9 Weren't Hitler and Goebbels in favor of animal rights?

-----------------------

This argument is absurd and almost unworthy of serious consideration.The questioner implies that since Hitler and Goebbels allegedly held viewssupportive of animal rights (e.g., Hitler was a vegetarian for some time),the animal rights viewpoint must be wrong or dubious. The problem for this argument is simple: bad people and good people canboth believe things correctly. Or put in another way, just because a personholds one bad belief (e.g., Nazism), that doesn't make all his beliefswrong. A few examples suffice to illustrate this. The Nazis undertook smokingreduction campaigns. Is it therefore dubious to discourage smoking?Early Americans withheld respect and liberty for black people. Does thatmean that they were wrong in giving respect and liberty to others? Technically, this argument is an "ignoratio elenchus fallacy", arguingfrom irrelevance. Finally, many scholars are doubtful that Hitler and Goebbels supportedAR in any meaningful way.

DG

SEE ALSO: #54

-----------------------#10 Do you really believe that "a rat is a pig is a dog is a boy"?-----------------------

Taken alone and literally, this notion is absurd. However, thisquote has been shamelessly removed from its original context andmisrepresented by AR opponents. The original context of the quote isgiven below. Viewed within its context, it is clear that the quoteis neither remarkable nor absurd.

DG

When it comes to having a central nervous system, and the ability tofeel pain, hunger, and thirst, a rat is a pig is a dog is a boy.

Ingrid Newkirk (AR activist)

SEE ALSO: #47

--------------------ANIMALS AND MORALITY--------------------

-----------------------#11 There is no correct or incorrect in morals; you have yours and I have mine, right?-----------------------

This position, known as moral relativism, is quite ancient but becamefashionable at the turn of the century, as reports on the customs ofsocieties alien to those found in Europe became available. It fell out offashion, after the Second World War, although it is occasionally revived.Ethical propositions, we are asked to believe, are no more than statementsof personal opinion and, therefore, cannot carry absolute weight. The main problem with this position is that ethical relativists areunable to denounce execrable ethical practices, such as racism. On whatgrounds can they condemn (if at all) Hitler's ideas on racial purity?Are we to believe that he was uttering an ethical truth when advocatingthe Final Solution? In addition to the inability to denounce practices of other societies,the relativists are unable to counter the arguments of even those whosesociety they share. They cannot berate someone who proposes to raiseand kill infants for industrial pet food consumption, for example,if that person sees it as morally sound. Indeed, they cannot articulatethe concept of societal moral progress, since they lack a basis forjudging progress. There is no point in turning to the relativists foradvice on ethical issues such as euthanasia, infanticide, or the use offetuses in research. Faced with such arguments, ethical relativists sometimes argue thatethical truth is based on the beliefs of a society; ethical truth isseen as nothing more than a reflection of societal customs and habits.Butchering animals is acceptable in the West, they would say, becausethe majority of people think it so. They are on no firmer ground here. Are we to accept that chattelslavery was right before the US Civil War and wrong thereafter? Can allethical decisions be decided by conducting opinion polls? It is true that different societies have different practices that

might be seen as ethical by one and unethical by the other. However,these differences result from differing circumstances. For example, ina society where mere survival is key, the diversion of limited food toan infant could detract significantly from the well-being of theexisting family members that contribute to food gathering. Given that,infanticide may be the ethically correct course. The conclusion is that there is such a thing as ethical truth(otherwise, ethics becomes vacuous and devoid of proscriptive force).The continuity of thought, then, between those who reject the evils ofslavery, racial discrimination, and gender bias, and those who denouncethe evils of speciesism becomes striking.

AECW

Many AR advocates (including myself) believe that morality is relative.We believe that AR is much more cogently argued when it is argued from thestandpoint of your opponent's morality, not some mythical, hard-to-defineuniversal morality. In arguing against moral absolutism, there is a verysimple objection: Where does this absolute morality come from? Moralabsolutism is an argument from authority, a tautology. If there were sucha thing as "ethical truth", then there must be a way of determining it, andobviously there isn't. In the absence of a known proof of "ethical truth",I don't know how AECW can conclude it exists. An example of the method of leveraging a person's morality is to ask theperson why he has compassion for human beings. Almost always he will agreethat his compassion does not stem from the fact that: 1) humans use language,2) humans compose symphonies, 3) humans can plan in the far future, 4) humanshave a written, technological culture, etc. Instead, he will agree that itstems from the fact that humans can suffer, feel pain, be harmed, etc. It isthen quite easy to show that nonhuman animals can also suffer, feel pain, beharmed, etc. The person's arbitrary inconsistency in not according moralstatus to nonhumans then stands out starkly.

JEH

There is a middle ground between the positions of AECW and JEH. One canassert that just as mathematics is necessarily built upon

a set ofunprovable axioms, so is a system of ethics. At the foundation of a systemof ethics are moral axioms, such as "unnecessary pain is wrong". Giventhe set of axioms, methods of reasoning (such as deduction and induction),and empirical facts, it is possible to derive ethical hypotheses. It isin this sense that an ethical statement can be said to be true. Of course,one can disagree about the axioms, and certainly such disagreement rendersethics "relative", but the concept of ethical truth is not meaningless. Fortunately, the most fundamental ethical axioms seem to be nearlyuniversally accepted, usually because they are necessary for societies tofunction. Where differences exist, they can be elucidated and discussed,in a style similar to the "leveraging" described by JEH.

DG

To a man whose mind is free there is something even more intolerablein the sufferings of animals than in the sufferings of man. For with thelatter it is at least admitted that suffering is evil and that the manwho causes it is a criminal. But thousands of animals are uselesslybutchered every day without a shadow of remorse. If any man were torefer to it, he would be thought ridiculous. And that is the unpardonablecrime.

Romain Rolland (author, Nobel 1915)

SEE ALSO: #5

-----------------------#12 The animals are raised to be eaten; so what is wrong with that?-----------------------

This question has always seemed to me to be a fancy version of "Butwe want to do these things, so what is wrong with that?" The idea thatan act, by virtue of an intention of ours, can be exonerated morally istotally illogical. But worse than that, however, is the fact that such a belief is adangerous position to take because it can enable one to justify somepractices that are universally condemned. To see how this is so,consider the following restatement of the basis of the

question:"Suffering can be excused so long as we breed them for the purpose."Now, cannot an analogous argument be used to defend a group ofslave holders who breed and enslave humans and justify it by saying "butthey're bred to be our workers"? Could not the Nazis defend theirmurder of the Jews by saying "but we rounded them up to be killed"?

DG

Shame on such a morality that is worthy of pariahs, and that fails torecognize the eternal essence that exists in every living thing, andshines forth with inscrutable significance from all eyes that seethe sun!

Arthur Schopenhauer (philosopher)

SEE ALSO: #13, #61

-----------------------#13 But isn't it true that the animals wouldn't exist if we didn't raise them for slaughter?-----------------------

There are two ways to interpret this question. First, the questionermay be referring to "the animals" as a species, in which case the argumentmight be more accurately phrased as follows:

"The ecological niche of cows is to be farmed; they get continued survival in this niche in return for our using them."

Second, the questioner may be referring to "the animals" as individuals,in which case the phrasing might be:

"The individual cows that we raise to eat would not have had a life had we not done so."

We deal first with the species interpretation and then with theindividuals interpretation. The questioner's argument appliespresumably to all species of animals; to make things more concrete,we will take cows as an example in the following text. It is incorrect to assert that cows could continue to exist only ifwe farm them for human consumption. First, today in many parts of Indiaand elsewhere, humans and cows are engaged in a reciprocal

and reverentialrelationship. It is only in recent human history that this relationshiphas been corrupted into the one-sided exploitation that we see today.There IS a niche for cows between slaughter/consumption and extinction.(The interested reader may find the book Beyond Beef by Jeremy Rifkinquite enlightening on this subject.) Second, several organizations have programs for saving animalsfrom extinction. There is no reason to suppose that cows would notqualify. The species argument is also flawed because, in fact, our intensivefarming of cattle results in habitat destruction and the loss of otherspecies. For example, clearing of rain forests for pasture has led tothe extinction of countless species. Cattle farming is destroyinghabitats on six continents. Why is the questioner so concerned aboutthe cow species while being unconcerned about these other species?Could it have anything to do with the fact that he wants to continueto eat the cows? Finally, a strong case can be made against the species argument fromethical theory. Arguments similar to the questioner's could bedeveloped that would ask us to accept practices that are universallycondemned. For example, consider a society that breeds a special raceof humans for use as slaves. They argue that the race would not existif they did not breed them for use as slaves. Does the reader acceptthis justification? Now we move on to the individuals interpretation of the question. Oneattempt to refute the argument is to answer as follows:

"It is better not to be born than to be born into a life of misery and early death."

To many, this is sufficient. However, one could argue that the fact that thelife is miserable before death is not necessary. Suppose that the cows aretreated well before being killed painlessly and eaten. Is it not true thatthe individual cows would not have enjoyed their short life had we notraised them for consumption? Furthermore, what if we compensate the taking

of the life by bringing a new life into being? Peter Singer originally believed that this argument was absurd becausethere are no cow souls waiting around to be born. Many people accept thisview and consider it sufficient, but Singer now rejects it because he acceptsthat to bring a being to a pleasant life does confer a benefit on that being.(There is extensive discussion of this issue in the second edition of AnimalLiberation.) How then are we to proceed? The key is that the AR movement asserts that humans and nonhumans have aright to not be killed by humans. The ethical problem can be seen clearlyby applying the argument to humans. Consider the case of a couple that givesbirth to an infant and eats it at the age of nine months, just when theirnext infant is born. A 9-month old baby has no more rational knowledge ofits situation or future plans than does a cow, so there is no reason todistinguish the two cases. Yet, certainly, we would condemn the couple. Wecondemn them because the infant is an individual to whom we confer the rightnot to be killed. Why is this right not accorded to the cow? I think theanswer is that the questioner wants to eat it.

DG

It were much better that a sentient being should never have existed,than that it should have existed only to endure unmitigated misery.

Percy Bysshe Shelley (poet)

SEE ALSO: #12

-----------------------#14 Don't the animals we use have a happier life since they are fed and protected?-----------------------

The questioner makes two assumptions here. First, that happiness orcontentment accrues from being fed and protected, and second, thatthe animals are, in fact, fed and protected. Both of these premises canbe questioned. Certainly the animals are fed; after all, they must be fattened forconsumption. It is very difficult to see any way that, say,factory-farmed chickens are "protected". They are not protected frommutilation, because they are painfully debeaked. They are

not protectedfrom psychological distress, because they are crowded together inunnatural conditions. And finally, they are not protected from predation,because they are slaughtered and eaten by humans. We can also question the notion that happiness accrues from feedingand protection alone. The Roman galley slaves were fed and protectedfrom the elements; nevertheless, they would presumably trade theircondition for one of greater uncertainty to obtain happiness. The samecan be said of the slaves of earlier America. Finally, an ethical argument is relevant here. Consider again thecouple of question #13. They will feed and protect their infant up tothe point at which they consume it. We would not accept this as ajustification. Why should we accept it for the chicken?

DG

SEE ALSO: #13

-----------------------#15 Is the use of service animals and beasts of burden considered exploitative?-----------------------

A simple approach to this question might be to suggest that we all mustwork for a living and it should be no different for animals. The problem isthat we want to look at the animals as like children, i.e., worthy of thesame protections and rights, and, like them, incapable of being morallyresponsible. But we don't force children into labor! One can make adistinction, however, that goes something like this: The animals arepermanently in their diminished state (i.e., incapable of voluntarilyassenting to work); children are not. We do not impose a choice of work forchildren because they need the time to develop into their full adult andmoral selves. With the animals, we choose for them a role that allows themto contribute; in return, we do not abuse them by eating them, etc. If thisis done with true concern that their work conditions are appropriate and notof a sweat-shop nature, that they get enough rest and leisure time, etc.,this would constitute a form of stewardship that is acceptable and beneficialto both sides, and one that is not at odds with AR

philosophy.DG

-----------------------#16 Doesn't the Bible give Humanity dominion over the animals?-----------------------

It is true that the Bible contains a passage that confers on humanitydominion over the animals. The import of this fact derives from theassumption that the Bible is the word of God, and that God is the ultimatemoral authority. Leaving aside for the moment consideration of the meaningof dominion, we can take issue with the idea of seeking moral authority fromthe Bible. First, there are serious problems with the interpretation ofBiblical passages, with many verses contradicting one another, and withmany scholars differing dramatically over the meaning of given verses. Second, there are many claims to God-hood among the diverse cultures ofthis world; some of these Gods implore us to respect all life and to notkill unnecessarily. Whose God are we to take as the ultimate moralauthority? Finally, as Tom Regan observes, many people do not believe in a God andso appeals to His moral authority are empty for such people. For suchpeople, the validity of judgments of the supposed God must be cross-checkedwith other methods of determining reasonableness. What are the cross-checksfor the Biblical assertions? These remarks apply equally to other assertions of Biblical approval ofhuman practices (such as the consumption of animals). Even if we accept that the God of the Bible is a moral authority, wecan point out that "dominion" is a vague term, meaning "stewardship" or"control over". It is quite easy to argue that appropriate stewardshipor control consists of respecting the life of animals and their rightto live according to their own nature. The jump from dominion to approvalof our brutal exploitation of animals is not contained in the citedBiblical passage, either explicitly or implicitly.

DG

-----------------------#17 Morals are a purely human construction (animals don't understand

morals); doesn't that mean it is not rational to apply our morality to animals?-----------------------

The fallaciousness of this argument can be easily demonstrated by makinga simple substitution: Infants and young children don't understand morals,doesn't that mean it is not rational to apply our morality to them? Of coursenot. We refrain from harming infants and children for the same reasons thatwe do so for adults. That they are incapable of conceptualizing a system ofmorals and its benefits is irrelevant. The relevant distinction is formalized in the concept of "moral agents"versus "moral patients". A moral agent is an individual possessing thesophisticated conceptual ability to bring moral principles to bear indeciding what to do, and having made such a decision, having the free willto choose to act that way. By virtue of these abilities, it is fair to holdmoral agents accountable for their acts. The paradigmatic moral agent is thenormal adult human being. Moral patients, in contrast, lack the capacities of moral agents and thuscannot fairly be held accountable for their acts. They do, however, possessthe capacity to suffer harm and therefore are proper objects of considerationfor moral agents. Human infants, young children, the mentally deficient orderanged, and nonhuman animals are instances of moral patienthood. Given that nonhuman animals are moral patients, they fall within thepurview of moral consideration, and therefore it is quite rational to accordthem the same moral consideration that we accord to ourselves.

DG

SEE ALSO: #19, #23, #36

-----------------------#18 If AR people are so worried about killing, why don't they become fruitarians?-----------------------

Killing, per se, is not the central concern of AR philosophy, which isconcerned with the avoidance of unnecessary pain and suffering. Thus, becauseplants neither feel pain nor suffer, AR philosophy does not mandate

fruitarianism (a diet in which only fruits are eaten because they can beharvested without killing the plant from which they issue).

DG

SEE ALSO: #42-#46

-----------------------#19 Animals don't care about us; why should we care about them?-----------------------

The questioner's position--that, in essence, we should give rights onlyto those able to respect ours--is known as the reciprocity argument. It isunconvincing both as an account of the way our society works and as aprescription for the way it should work. Its descriptive power is undermined by the simple observation that wegive rights to a large number of individuals who cannot respect ours.These include some elderly people, some people suffering from degenerativediseases, some people suffering from irreversible brain damage, theseverely retarded, infants, and young children. An institution that, forexample, routinely sacrificed such individuals to test a new fertilizerwould certainly be considered to be grievously violating their rights. The original statement fares no better as an ethical prescription.Future generations are unable to reciprocate our concern, for example, sothere would be no ethical harm done, under such a view, in dismissingconcerns for environmental damage that adversely impacts futuregenerations. The key failing of the questioner's position lies in the failure toproperly distinguish between the following capacities:

The capacity to understand and respect others' rights (moral agency). The capacity to benefit from rights (moral patienthood).

An individual can be a beneficiary of rights without being a moralagent. Under this view, one justifies a difference of treatments of twoindividuals (human or nonhuman) with an objective difference that isRELEVANT to the difference of treatment. For example, if we wished toexclude a person from an academic course of study, we

could not cite thefact that they have freckles. We could cite the fact that they lackcertain academic prerequisites. The former is irrelevant; the latter isrelevant. Similarly, when considering the right to be free of pain andsuffering, moral agency is irrelevant; moral patienthood IS relevant.

AECW

The assumption that animals don't care about us can also bequestioned. Companion animals have been known to summon aid whentheir owners are in trouble. They have been known to offer comfortwhen their owners are distressed. They show grief when their humancompanions die.

DG

SEE ALSO: #17, #23, #36

-----------------------#20 A house is on fire and a dog and a baby are inside. Which do you save first?-----------------------

The one I choose to save first tells us nothing about the ethicaldecisions we face. I might decide to save my child before I saved yours,but this certainly does not mean that I should be able to experiment onyour child, or exploit your child in some other way. We are not in anemergency situation like a fire anyway. In everyday life, we can choose toact in ways that protect the rights of both dogs and babies.

LK

Like anyone else in this situation, I would probably save the one towhich I am emotionally more attached. Most likely it would be the child.Someone might prefer to save his own beloved dog before saving the babyof a stranger. However, as LK states above, this tells us nothing aboutany ethical principles.

DVH

-----------------------#21 What if I made use of an animal that was already dead?-----------------------

There are two ways to interpret this question. First,

the questionermight really be making the excuse "but I didn't kill the animal", orsecond, he could be asking about the morality of using an animal thathas died naturally (or due to a cause unassociated with the demand foranimal products, such as a road kill). For the first interpretation, wemust reject the excuse. The killing of animals for meat, for example,is done at the request (through market demand), and with the financialsupport (through payment), of the end consumers. Their complicity isinescapable. Society does not excuse the receiver of stolen goods becausehe "didn't do the burglary". For the second interpretation, the use of naturally killed animals,there seems to be no moral difficulty involved. Many would, for estheticreasons, still not use animal products thus obtained. (Would you use thebodies of departed humans?) Certainly, natural kills cannot satisfy thegreat demand for animal products that exists today; non-animal andsynthetic sources are required. Other people may avoid use of naturally killed animal products becausethey feel that it might encourage a demand in others for animal products,a demand that might not be so innocently satisfied.

DG

This can be viewed as a question of respect for the dead. We feelinnate revulsion at the idea of grave desecration for this reason.Naturally killed animals should, at the very least, be left alone ratherthan recycled as part of an industrial process. This was commonlypracticed in the past, e.g., Egyptians used to mummify their cats.

AECW

You have just dined, and however scrupulously the slaughterhouse isconcealed in the graceful distance of miles, there is complicity.

Ralph Waldo Emerson (author)

-----------------------#22 Where should one draw the line: animals, insects, bacteria?-----------------------

AR philosophy asserts that rights are to be accorded to creatures that

have the capacity to experience pain, to suffer, and to be a "subject ofa life". Such a capacity is definitely not found in bacteria. It isdefinitely found in mammals. There is debate about such animals as molluscsand arthropods (including insects). One should decide, based upon availableevidence and one's own conscience, where the line should be drawn to adhereto the principle of AR described in the first sentence. Questions #39 and #43 discuss some of the evidence relevant to drawingthe line.

DG

SEE ALSO: #39, #43

-----------------------#23 If the killing is wrong, shouldn't you stop predators from killing other animals?-----------------------

This is one of the more interesting arguments against animal rights. Weprevent human moral patients from harming others, e.g., we prevent childrenfrom hitting each other, so why shouldn't we do the same for nonhuman moralpatients (refer to question #17 for a definition of moral patienthood)? Ifanything, the duty to do so might be considered more serious becausepredation results in a serious harm--death. A first answer entails pointing out that predators must kill to survive;to stop them from killing is, in effect, to kill them. Of course, we could argue that intervening on a massive scale to preventpredation is totally impractical or impossible, but that is not morallypersuasive. Suppose we accept that we should stop a cat from killing a bird. Then werealize that the bird is the killer of many snakes. Should we now reasonthat, in fact, we shouldn't stop the cat? The point is that humans lack thebroad vision to make all these calculations and determinations. The real answer is that intervening to stop predation would destroy theecosystems upon which the biosphere depends, harming all of life on earth.Over millions of years, the biosphere has evolved complex ecosystems thatdepend upon predation for their continued functioning and stability. Massiveintervention by humans to stop predation would inflict serious and

incalculable harm on these ecosystems, with devastating results for all life. Even if we accept that we should prevent predation (and we don't acceptthat), it does not follow that, because we do not, we are therefore justifiedin exploiting moral patients ourselves. When we fail to stop widespreadslaughter of human beings in foreign countries, it does not follow that we,ourselves, believe it appropriate to participate in such slaughter. Similarly,our failure to prevent predation cannot be taken as justification of ourexploitation of animals.

DG

SEE ALSO: #17, #19, #36, #64

-----------------------#24 Is the AR movement against abortion? If not, isn't that hypocritical?-----------------------

Attempts are frequently made to tie Animal Rights exponents to one sideor the other of the abortion debate. Such attempts are misguided. Claimsthat adherence to the ethics of AR determine one's position on embryorights are plainly counter-intuitive, unless one is also prepared to arguethat being a defender of human rights compels one to a particular positionon abortion. Is it the case that one cannot consistently despise torture,serfdom, and other barbaric practices without coming to a particularconclusion on abortion? AR defenders demand that the rights currently held by humans be extendedto all creatures similar in morally relevant ways. For example, sincesociety does not accept that mature, sentient human moral patients (referto question #17 for a brief description of the distinction between patientsand agents) may be routinely annihilated in the name of science, itlogically follows that comparable nonhuman animals should be given the sameprotection. On the other hand, abortion is still a moot point. It isplainly illogical to expect the AR movement to reflect anything other thanthe full spectrum of opinion found in society at large on the abortion issue. Fundamentally, AR philosophers are content with submitting sufficientconditions for the attribution of rights to individuals, conditions that

explain the noncontroversial protections afforded today to humans. Theyneither encourage nor discourage attempts to widen the circle of protectionto fetuses.

AECW

There is a range of views among AR supporters on the issue of abortionversus animal rights. Many people believe, as does AECW, that the issuesof abortion and AR are unrelated, and that the question is irrelevant to thevalidity of AR. Others, such as myself, feel that abortion certainly isrelevant to AR. After all, the granting of rights to animals (and humans)is based on their capacity to suffer and to be a subject-of-a-life. Itseems clear that late-term fetuses can suffer from the abortion procedure.Certain physiological responses, such as elevated heart rates, and theexistence of a functioning nervous system support this view. It also can be argued that the fetus is on a course to become asubject-of-a-life, and that by aborting the fetus we therefore harm it.Some counter this latter argument by claiming that the "potential" tobecome subject-of-a-life is an invalid grounds for assigning rights, butthis is a fine philosophical point that is itself subject to attack. Forexample, suppose a person is in a coma that, given enough time, willdissipate--the person has the potential to be sentient again. Does theperson lose his rights while in the coma? While the arguments adduced may show that abortion is not irrelevantto AR, they do not show that abortion is necessarily wrong. The reasonis that it is possible to argue that the rights of the fetus are inconflict with the rights of the woman, and that the rights of the womandominate. All may not agree with this trade-off, but it is a consistent,non-hypocritical stance that is not in conflict with AR philosophy. See question #4 for an analysis of hypocrisy arguments in general.

DG

SEE ALSO: #4

-----------------------#25 Doesn't the ethical theory of contractarianism show that animals

have no rights?-----------------------

Contractarianism is an ethical theory that attempts to account for ourmorality by appealing to implicit mutually beneficial agreements, orcontracts. For example, it would explain our refusal to strike each otherby asserting that we have an implied contract: "You don't hit me and Iwon't hit you." The relevance of contractarianism to AR stems from thesupposition that nonhuman animals are incapable of entering into suchcontracts, coupled with the assertion that rights can be attributed onlyto those individuals that can enter into such contracts. Roughly, animalscan't have rights because they lack the rational capacity to assent to acontract requiring them to respect our rights. Contractarianism is perhaps the most impressive attempt to refute the ARposition; therefore, it is important to consider it in some detail. It iseasily possible to write a large volume on the subject. We must limitourselves to considering the basic arguments and problems with them. Thosereaders finding this incomplete or nonrigorous are advised to consult theprimary literature. We begin by observing that contractarianism fails to offer a compellingaccount of our moral behavior and motives. If the average person is asked whythey think it wrong to steal from their neighbor, they do not answer that byrefraining from it they ensure that their neighbor will not steal from them.Nor do they answer that they have an implicit mutual contract with theirneighbor. Instead of invoking contracts, people typically assert some variantof the harm principle; e.g., they don't steal because it would harm theneighbor. Similarly, we do not teach children that the reason why they shouldnot steal is because then people will not steal from them. Another way to point up the mismatch between the theory of contractarianismand our actual moral behavior is to ask if, upon risking your own life tosave my child from drowning, you have done this as a result of a contractualobligation. Certainly, one performs such acts as a response to the distressof another being, not as a result of contractual obligations. Contractarianism can thus be seen as a theory that fails

to account for ourmoral behavior. At best, it is a theory that its proponents would recommendto us as preferable. (Is it seen as preferable because it denies rights toanimals, and because it seems to justify continued exploitation of animals?) Arguably the most serious objection to contractarianism is that it can beused to sanction arrangements that would be almost universally condemned.Consider a group of very rich people that assemble and create a contractamong themselves the effect of which is to ensure that wealth remains intheir control. They agree by contract that even repressive tactics can beused to ensure that the masses remain in poverty. They argue that, by virtueof the existence of their contract, that they do no wrong. Similar contractscould be drawn up to exclude other races, sexes, etc. John Rawls attempts to overcome this problem by supposing that thecontractors must begin from an "initial position" in which they are not yetincarnated as beings and must form the contract in ignorance of their finalincarnation. Thus, it is argued, since a given individual in the startingposition does not know whether, for example, she will be incarnated as a richwoman or a poor woman, that individual will not form contracts that are basedon such criteria. In response, one can begin to wonder at the lengths towhich some will go in creating ad hoc adjustments to a deficient theory. Butmore to the point, one can turn around this ad hoc defense to support the ARposition. For surely, if individuals in the initial position are to be trulyignorant of their destiny, they must assume that they may be incarnated asanimals. Given that, the contract that is reached is likely to include strongprotections for animals! Another problem with Rawls' device is that probabilities can be such that,even given ignorance, contracts can result that most people would see asunjust. If the chance of being incarnated as a slave holder is 90 percent, acontract allowing slavery could well result because most individuals wouldfeel they had a better chance of being incarnated as a slave holder. Thus,Rawls' device fails even to achieve its purpose. It is hard to see how contractarianism can permit movement from the statusquo. How did alleged contracts that denied liberty to

slaves and excludedwomen from voting come to be renegotiated? Contractarianism also is unable to adequately account for the rights wegive to those unable to form contracts, i.e., infants, children, senilepeople, mental deficients, and even animals to some extent. Various meanshave been advanced to try to account for the attribution of rights to suchindividuals. We have no space to deal with all of them. Instead, we brieflyaddress a few. One attempt involves appealing to the interests of true rights holders.For example, I don't eat your baby because you have an interest in it and Iwouldn't want you violating such an interest of mine. But what if no-onecared about a given infant? Would that make it fair game for any use orabuse? Certainly not. Another problem here is that many people express aninterest in the protection of all animals. That would seem to require othersto refrain from using or abusing animals. While this result is attractive tothe AR community, it certainly weakens the argument that contractarianismjustifies our use of animals. Others want to let individuals "ride" until they are capable of respectingthe contract. But what of those that will never be capable of doing so, e.g.,senile people? And why can we not let animals ride? Some argue a "reduced-rights" case. Children get a reduced rights setdesigned to protect them from themselves, etc. The problem here is that withanimals the rights reduction is way out of proportion. We accept that wecannot experiment on infants or kill and eat them due to their reduced rightsset. Why then are such extreme uses acceptable for nonhumans? Some argue that it is irrelevant whether a given individual can enter intoa contract; what is important is their theoretical capacity to do so. But,future generations have the capacity but clearly cannot interact reciprocallywith us, so the basis of contractarianism is gutted (unless we assert that wehave no moral obligations to leave a habitable world for future generations).Peter Singer asks "Why limit morality to those who have the capacity to enterinto agreements, if in fact there is no possibility of their ever doing so?" There are practical problems with contractarianism as well. For example,

what can be our response if an individual renounces participation in anyimplied moral contracts, and states that he is therefore justified inengaging in what others would call immoral acts? Is there any way for us toreproach him? And what are we to do about violations of the contract? If anindividual steals from us, he has broken the contract and we should thereforebe released from it. Are we then morally justified in stealing from him? Orworse? In summary, contractarianism fails because a) it fails to accurately accountfor our actual, real-world moral acts and motives, b) it sanctions contractualarrangements that most people would see as unjust, c) it fails to account forthe considerations we accord to individuals unable to enter into contracts,and d) it has some impractical consequences. Finally, there is a betterfoundation for ethics--the harm principle. It is simple, universalizable,devoid of ad hoc devices, and matches our real moral thinking.

TA/DG

SEE ALSO: #11, #17, #19, #96

----------------PRACTICAL ISSUES----------------

-----------------------#26 Surely there are more pressing practical problems than AR, such as homelessness; haven't you got better things to do?-----------------------

Inherent in this question is an assumption that it is more importantto help humans than to help nonhumans. Some would dismiss this as aspeciesist position (see question #1). It is possible, however, toinvoke the scale-of-life notion and argue that there is greater sufferingand loss associated with cruelty and neglect of humans than with animals.This might appear to constitute a prima-facie case for expending one'senergies for humans rather than nonhumans. However, even if we acceptthe scale-of-life notion, there are sound reasons for expending timeand energy on the issue of rights for nonhuman animals. Many of the consequences of carrying out the AR agenda are highly

beneficial to humans. For example, stopping the production and consumptionof animal products would result in a significant improvement of thegeneral health of the human population, and destruction of the environmentwould be greatly reduced. Fostering compassion for animals is likely to pay dividends in termsof a general increase of compassion in human affairs. Tom Regan puts itthis way:

...the animal rights movement is a part of, not antagonistic to, the human rights movement. The theory that rationally grounds the rights of animals also grounds the rights of humans. Thus those involved in the animal rights movement are partners in the struggle to secure respect for human rights--the rights of women, for example, or minorities, or workers. The animal rights movement is cut from the same moral cloth as these.

Finally, the behavior asked for by the AR agenda involves littleexpenditure of energy. We are asking people to NOT do things: don'teat meat, don't exploit animals for entertainment, don't wear furs.These negative actions don't interfere with our ability to care forhumans. In some cases, they may actually make more time available fordoing so (e.g., time spent hunting or visiting zoos and circuses).

DG

Living cruelty-free is not a full-time job; rather, it's a way of life.When I shop, I check ingredients and I consider if the product is testedon animals. These things only consume a few minutes of the day. There isample time left for helping both humans and nonhumans.

JLS

I am in favor of animal rights as well as human rights. That is theway of a whole human being.

Abraham Lincoln (16th U.S. President)

To my mind, the life of a lamb is no less precious than that of ahuman being.

Mahatma Gandhi (statesman and philosopher)

Our task must be to free ourselves...by widening our circle of compassionto embrace all living creatures and the whole of nature and its beauty.

Albert Einstein (physicist, Nobel 1921)

SEE ALSO: #1, #87, #95

-----------------------#27 If everyone became vegetarian and gave up keeping pets, what would happen to all the animals?-----------------------

As vegetarianism grows, the number of animals bred for food graduallywill decline, since the market will no longer exist for them.Similarly, a gradual decrease would accompany the lessening demand forthe breeding of companion animals. In both cases, those animals thatremain will be better cared for by a more compassionate society.

LK

SEE ALSO: #75

-----------------------#28 Grazing animals on land not suited for agriculture increases the food supply; how can that be considered wrong?-----------------------

There are areas in the world where grazing of livestock is possible butagriculture is not. If conditions are such that people living in theseareas cannot trade for crops and must raise livestock to survive, fewwould question the practice. However, such areas are very small incomparison to the fertile and semi-arid regions currently utilized forintensive grazing, and they do not appreciably contribute to the worldfood supply. (Some would argue that it is morally preferable not to live insuch areas.) The real issue is the intensive grazing in the fertile and semi-aridregions. The use of such areas for livestock raising reduces the worldfood supply. Keith Acker writes as follows in his "A VegetarianSourcebook":

Land, energy, and water resources for livestock agriculture range

anywhere from 10 to 1000 times greater than those necessary to produce an equivalent amount of plant foods. And livestock agriculture does not merely use these resources, it depletes them. This is a matter of historical record. Most of the world's soil, erosion, groundwater depletion, and deforestation--factors now threatening the very basis of our food system--are the result of this particularly destructive form of food production.

Livestock agriculture is also the single greatest cause of world-widedeforestation both historically and currently (between 1967 and 1975,two-thirds of 70 million acres of lost forest went to grazing). Between1950 and 1975 the area of human-created pasture land in Central Americamore than doubled, almost all of it at the expense of rain forests.Although this trend has slowed down, it still continues at an alarming andinexorable pace. Grazing requires large tracts of land and the consequences ofovergrazing and soil erosion are very serious ecological problems. Byconservative estimates, 60 percent of all U.S. grasslands are overgrazed,resulting in billions of tons of soil lost each year. The amount of U.S.topsoil lost to date is about 75 percent, and 85 percent of that isdirectly associated with livestock grazing. Overgrazing has been thesingle largest cause of human-made deserts. One could argue that grazing is being replaced by the "feedlotparadigm". These systems graze the livestock prior to transport to afeedlot for final "fattening" with grains grown on crop lands. Althoughthis does reduce grazing somewhat, it is not eliminated, and the feedlotpart of the paradigm still constitutes a highly inefficient use of crops(to feed a human with livestock requires 16 times the grain that would benecessary if the grain was consumed directly). It has been estimated thatin the U.S., 80 percent of the corn and 95 percent of the oats grown arefed to livestock.

TA

I grew up in cattle country--that's why I became a vegetarian. Meat stinks,

for the animals, the environment, and your health.k.d. lang (musician)

-----------------------#29 If we try to eliminate all animals products, we'll be moving back to the Stone Age; who wants that?-----------------------

On the contrary! It is a dependency upon animal products that could beseen as returning us to the technologies and mind set of the Stone Age.For example, Stone Age people had to wear furs in Northern climates toavoid freezing. That is no longer the case, thanks to central heatingand the ready availability of plenty of good plant and human-made fabrics.If we are to characterize the modern age, it could be in terms of thegreater freedoms and options made possible by technological advance andsocial progress. The Stone Age people had few options and so were forcedto rely upon animals for food, clothing, and materials for their implements.Today, we have an abundance of choices for better foods, warmer clothing,and more efficient materials, none of which need depend upon the killingof animals.

TA

It seems to me that the only Stone Age we are in any danger of enteringis that constituted by the continuous destruction of animals' habitatsin favor of the Portland-cement concrete jungle! DG

SEE ALSO: #60, #62, #95

-----------------------#30 It's virtually impossible to eliminate all animal products from one's consumption; what's the point if you still cause animal death without knowing it?-----------------------

Yes, it is very difficult to eliminate all animal products from one'sconsumption, just as it is impossible to eliminate all accidental killingand infliction of harm that results from our activities. But this cannotjustify making it "open season" for any kind of abuse of animals. Thereasonable goal, given the realities, is to minimize the harms one causes.

The point, then, is that a great deal of suffering is prevented.

DG

SEE ALSO: #57-#58

-----------------------#31 Wouldn't many customs and traditions, as well as jobs, be lost if we stopped using animals?-----------------------

Consider first the issue of customs and traditions. The plain truth isthat some customs and traditions deserve to die out. Examples aboundthroughout history: slavery, Roman gladiatorial contests, torture, publicexecutions, witch burning, racism. To these the AR supporter adds animalexploitation and enslavement. The human animal is an almost infinitely adaptable organism. The loss ofthe customs listed above has not resulted in any lasting harm tohumankind. The same can be confidently predicted for the elimination ofanimal exploitation. In fact, humankind would likely benefit from aquantum leap of compassion in human affairs. As far as jobs are concerned, the economic aspects are discussed inquestion #32. It remains to point out that for a human, what is at stake isa job, which can be replaced with one less morally dubious. What is atstake for an animal is the elimination of torture and exploitation, andthe possibility for a life of happiness, free from human oppression andbrutality.

DG

People often say that humans have always eaten animals, as if this is ajustification for continuing the practice. According to this logic, weshould not try to prevent people from murdering other people, since thishas also been done since the earliest of times.

Isaac Bashevis Singer (author, Nobel 1978)

SEE ALSO: #32

-----------------------#32 The animal product industries are big business; wouldn't the economy be crippled if they all stopped?-----------------------

One cannot justify an action based on its profitability. Many crimes andpractices that we view as repugnant have been or continue to beprofitable: the slave trade, sale of child brides, drug dealing, scams ofall sorts, prostitution, child pornography. A good example of this, and one that points up another keyconsideration, is the tobacco industry. It is a multibillion-dollarindustry, yet vigorous efforts are proceeding on many fronts to put it outof business. The main problem with it lies in its side-effects, i.e., themassive health consequences and deaths that it produces, which easilyoutweigh the immediate profitability. There are side effects to animalexploitation also. Among the most significant are the pollution anddeforestation associated with large-scale animal farming. As we see inquestion #28, these current practices constitute a nonsustainable use ofthe planet's resources. It is more likely true that the economy will becrippled if the practices continue! Finally, the profits associated with the animal industries stem frommarket demand and affluence. There is no reason to suppose that thisdemand cannot be gradually redirected into other industries. Instead ofprime beef, we can have prime artichokes, or prime pasta, etc. Humanity'sdemand for gourmet food will not vanish with the meat. Similarly, thejobs associated with the animal industries can be gradually redirectedinto the industries that would spring up to replace the animalindustries. (Vice President Gore made a similar point in reference tocomplaints concerning loss of jobs if logging was halted. He commentedthat the environmental movement would open up a huge area for jobs thathad heretofore been unavailable.)

DG

It is my view that the vegetarian manner of living by its purely physicaleffect on the human temperament would most beneficially influence the lot ofmankind.

Albert Einstein (physicist, Nobel 1921)

SEE ALSO: #28, #31

----------------------ARGUMENTS FROM BIOLOGY----------------------

-----------------------#33 Humans are at the pinnacle of evolution; doesn't that give them the right to use animals as they wish?-----------------------

This is one of many arguments that attempt to draw ethical conclusionsfrom scientific observations. In this case, the science is shaky, and theethical conclusion is dubious. Let us first examine the science. The questioner's view is that evolution has created a linear ranking ofgeneral fitness, a ladder if you will, with insects and other "lower"species at the bottom, and humans (of course!) at the top. This ideaoriginated as part of a wider, now discredited evolutionary system calledLamarckism. Charles Darwin's discovery of natural selection overturnedthis system. Darwin's picture, instead, is of a "radiating bush" ofspecies, with each evolving to adapt more closely to its environment,along its own radius. Under this view, the idea of a pinnacle becomesunclear: yes, humans have adapted well to their niche (though many woulddispute this, asserting the nonsustainable nature of our use of theplanet's resources), but so have bacteria adapted well to their niche. Canwe really say that humans are better adapted to their niche than bacteria,and would it mean anything when the niches are so different? Probably, what the questioner has in mind in using the word "pinnacle"is that humans excel in some particular trait, and that a scale can becreated relative to this trait. For example, on a scale of mentalcapability, humans stand well above bacteria. But a different choice oftraits can lead to very different results. Bacteria stand "at thepinnacle" when one looks at reproductive fecundity. Birds stand "atthe pinnacle" when one looks at flight. Now let us examine the ethics. Leaving aside the dubious idea of apinnacle of evolution, let us accept that humans are ranked at the top ona scale of intelligence. Does this give us the right to do

as we pleasewith animals, simply on account of their being less brainy? If we say yes,we open a Pandora's box of problems for ourselves. Does this mean thatmore intelligent humans can also exploit less intelligent humans as theywish (shall we all be slaves to the Einsteins of the world)? Consideringa different trait, can the physically superior abuse the weak? Only amorally callous person would agree with this general principle.

AECW

SEE ALSO: #34, #37

-----------------------#34 Humans are at the top of the food chain; aren't they therefore justified in killing and eating anything?-----------------------

No; otherwise, potential cannibals in our society could claim the samedefense for their practice. That we can do something does not mean that itis right to do so. We have a lot of power over other creatures, but withgreat powers come even greater responsibilities, as any parent willtestify. Humans are at the top of the food chain because they CHOOSE to eatnonhuman animals. There is thus a suggestion of tautology in thequestioner's position. If we chose not to eat animals, we would not beat the top of the food chain. The idea that superiority in a trait confers rights over the inferior isdisposed of in question #33.

AECW

SEE ALSO: #33

-----------------------#35 Animals are just machines; why worry about them?-----------------------

Centuries ago, the philosopher Rene Descartes developed the idea thatall nonhuman animals are automatons that cannot feel pain. Followers ofDescartes believed that if an animal cried out this was just a reflex,the sort of reaction one might get from a mechanical doll. Consequently,they saw no reason not to experiment on animals without anesthetics.Horrified observers were admonished to pay no attention to

the screamsof the animal subjects. This idea is now refuted by modern science. Animals are no more "meremachines" than are human beings. Everything science has learned aboutother species points out the biological similarities between humans andnonhumans. As Charles Darwin wrote, the differences between humans andother animals are differences of degree, not differences of kind. Sinceboth humans and nonhumans evolved over millions of years and sharesimilar nervous systems and other organs, there is no reason to thinkwe do not share a similar mental and emotional life with other animalspecies (especially mammals).

LK

-----------------------#36 In Nature, animals kill and eat each other; so why should it be wrong for humans?-----------------------

Predatory animals must kill to eat. Humans, in contrast, have a choice;they need not eat meat to survive. Humans differ from nonhuman animals in being capable of conceiving of, andacting in accordance with, a system of morals; therefore, we cannot seekmoral guidance or precedent from nonhuman animals. The AR philosophy assertsthat it is just as wrong for a human to kill and eat a sentient nonhuman asit is to kill and eat a sentient human. To demonstrate the absurdity of seeking moral precedents from nonhumananimals, consider the following variants of the question:

"In Nature, animals steal food from each other; so why should it be wrong for humans [to steal]?"

"In Nature, animals kill and eat humans; so why should it be wrong for humans [to kill and eat humans]?"

DG

SEE ALSO: #23, #34, #64

-----------------------#37 Natural selection and Darwinism are at work in the world; doesn't that mean it's unrealistic to try to overcome such forces?-----------------------

Assuming that Animal Rights concepts somehow clash with Darwinian forces,the questioner must stand accused of selective moral fatalism: our sense ofmorality is clearly not modeled on the laws of natural selection. Why,then, feel helpless before some of its effects and not before others? Male-dominance, xenophobia, and war-mongering are present in many humansocieties. Should we venture that some mysterious, universal forces must beat work behind them, and that all attempts at quelling such tendencies shouldbe abandoned? Or, more directly, when people become sick, do we abandon thembecause "survival of the fittest" demands it? We do not abandon them; and wedo not agonize about trying to overcome natural selection. There is no reason to believe that the practical implications of the AnimalRights philosophy are maladaptive for humans. On the contrary, and forreasons explained elsewhere in this FAQ, respecting the rights of animalswould yield beneficial side-effects for humans, such as more-sustainableagricultural practices, and better environmental and health-care policies.

AECW

The advent of Darwinism led to a substitution of the idea of individualorganisms for the old idea of immutable species. The moral individualismimplied by AR philosophy substitutes the idea that organisms should betreated according to their individual capacities for the (old) idea that itis the species of the animal that counts. Thus, moral individualism actuallyfits well with evolutionary theory.

DG

SEE ALSO: #63-62

-----------------------#38 Isn't AR opposed to environmental philosophy (as described, for example, in "Deep Ecology")?-----------------------

No. It should be clear from many of the answers included in this FAQ, andfrom perusal of many of the books referenced in question #92, that thephilosophy and goals of AR are complementary to the goals of the mainstreamenvironmental movement. Michael W. Fox sees AR and environmentalism astwo aspects of a dialectic that reconciles concerns for

the rights ofindividuals (human and nonhuman) with concerns for the integrity of thebiosphere. Some argue that a morality based on individual rights is necessarilyopposed to one based on holistic environmental views, e.g., the sanctityof the biosphere. However, an environmental ethic that attributes someform of rights to all individuals, including inanimate ones, can bedeveloped. Such an ethic, by showing respect for the individuals that makeup the biosphere, would also show respect for the biosphere as a whole, thusachieving the aims of holistic environmentalism. It is clear that a rightsview is not necessarily in conflict with a holistic view. In reference to the concept of deep ecology and the claim that it bearsnegatively on AR, Fox believes such claims to be unfounded. The followingtext is excerpted from "Inhumane Society", by Michael W. Fox.

DG

Deep ecologists support the philosophy of preserving the naturalabundance and diversity of plants and animals in natural ecosystems...The deep ecologists should oppose the industrialized, nonsubsistenceexploitation of wildlife because...it is fundamentally unsound ecologically,because by favoring some species over others, population imbalances andextinctions of undesired species would be inevitable. In their book "Deep Ecology", authors Bill Devall and George Sessions...take to task animal rights philosopher Tom Regan, who with others of likemind "expressed concern that a holistic ecological ethic...results in akind of totalitarianism or ecological fascism"...In an appendix, however,George Sessions does suggest that philosophers need to work towardnontotalitarian solutions...and that "in all likelihood, this will requiresome kind of holistic ecological ethic in which the integrity of allindividuals (human and nonhuman) is respected". Ironically, while the authors are so critical of the animal rightsmovement, they quote Arne Naess (...arguably the founder of the deepecology movement)...For instance, Naess states: "The intuition ofbiocentric equality is that all things in the biosphere have an equal

right to live and blossom and to reach their own forms of unfolding andself-realization..."

Michael W. Fox (Vice President of HSUS)

SEE ALSO: #28, #59

------------------INSECTS AND PLANTS------------------

-----------------------#39 What about insects? Do they have rights too?-----------------------

Before considering the issue of rights, let us first address thequestion "What about insects?". Strictly speaking, insects are smallinvertebrate animals of the class Insecta, having an adult stagecharacterized by three pairs of legs, a segmented body with three majordivisions, and usually two pairs of wings. We'll adopt the looserdefinition, which includes similar invertebrate animals such as spiders,centipedes, and ticks. Insects have a ganglionic nervous system, in contrast to the centralnervous system of vertebrates. Such a system is characterized by localaggregates of neurons, called ganglia, that are associated with, andspecialized for, the body segment with which they are co-located. Thereare interconnections between ganglia but these connections function not somuch as a global integrating pathway, but rather for local segmentalcoordination. For example, the waves of leg motion that propagate alongthe body of a centipede are mediated by the intersegmental connections. In some species the cephalic ganglia are large and complex enough tosupport very complex behavior (e.g., the lobster and octopus). Thecuttlefish (not an insect but another invertebrate with a ganglionicnervous system) is claimed by some to be about as intelligent as a dog. Insects are capable of primitive learning and do exhibit what many wouldcharacterize as intelligence. Spiders are known for their skills andcraftiness; whether this can all be dismissed as instinct is arguable.Certainly, bees can learn in a limited way. When offered a

reward from aperch of a certain color, they return first to perches of that color. Theyalso learn the location of food and transmit that information to theircolleagues. The learning, however, tends to be highly specialized andapplicable to only limited domains. In addition to a primitive mental life as described above, there is someevidence that insects can experience pain and suffering. The earthwormnervous system, for example, secretes an opiate substance when theearthworm is injured. Similar responses are seen in vertebrates and aregenerally accepted to be a mechanism for the attenuation of pain. On theother hand, the opiates are also implicated in functions not associatedwith analgesia, such as thermoregulation and appetite control. Nevertheless,the association of secretion with tissue injury is highly suggestive. Earthworms also wriggle quite vigorously when impaled on a hook. Inpossible opposition to this are other observations. For example, theabdomen of a feeding wasp can be clipped off and the head may go onsucking (presumably in no distress?). Singer quotes three criteria for deciding if an organism has thecapacity to suffer from pain: 1) there are behavioral indications, 2)there is an appropriate nervous system, and 3) there is an evolutionaryusefulness for the experience of pain. These criteria seem to satisfiedfor insects, if only in a primitive way. Now we are equipped to tackle the issue of insect rights. First, onemight argue that the issue is not so compelling as for other animalsbecause industries are not built around the exploitation of insects. Butthis is untrue; large industries are built around honey production, silkproduction, and cochineal/carmine production, and, of course, mass insectdeath results from our use of insecticides. Even if the argument weretrue, it should not prevent us from attempting to be consistent in theapplication of our principles to all animals. Insects are a part of theAnimal Kingdom and some special arguments would be required to excludethem from the general AR argument. Some would draw a line at some level of complexity of the nervous

system, e.g., only animals capable of operant conditioning need beenfranchised. Others may quarrel with this line and place it elsewhere.Some may postulate a scale of life with an ascending capacity to feel painand suffer. They might also mark a cut-off on the scale, below whichrights are not actively asserted. Is the cut-off above insects and thelower invertebrates? Or should there be no cut-off? This is one of theissues still being actively debated in the AR community. People who strive to live without cruelty will attempt to push the lineback as far as possible, giving the benefit of the doubt where there isdoubt. Certainly, one can avoid unnecessary cruelty to insects. The practical issues involved in enfranchising insects are dealt with inthe following two questions.

DG

I want to realize brotherhood or identity not merely with the beingscalled human, but I want to realize identity with all life, even withsuch things as crawl upon earth.

Mahatma Gandhi (statesman and philosopher)

What is it that should trace the insuperable line? ...The questionis not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?

Jeremy Bentham (philosopher)

SEE ALSO: #22, #40-#41, #47

-----------------------#40 Do I have to be careful not to walk on ants?-----------------------

The Jains of India would say yes! Some of their more devout memberswear gauze masks to avoid inhaling and killing small insects andmicrobes. Regardless of how careful we are, we will cause some suffering as aside-effect of living. The goal is to avoid unnecessary suffering andto minimize the suffering we cause. This is a far cry from wanton,intentional infliction of cruelty. I refer here to the habit of some ofpulling off insects' wings for fun, or of torching a congregation ofants for pleasure. This question is an issue for the individual conscience

to decide. Perhapsone need not walk around looking out for ants on the ground, but should onebe seen and it is easy to alter one's stride to avoid it, where is the harmin doing so?

DG

SEE ALSO: #39, #41

-----------------------#41 There is some evidence of consciousness in insects; aren't you descending to absurdity to tell people not to kill insects?-----------------------

Enfranchising insects does not mean it is never justifiable to killthem. As with all threats to a being, the rule of self-defense applies.If insects are threatening one's well-being in a nontrivial way, ARphilosophy would not assert that it is wrong to eliminate them. Pesticides and herbicides are often used for mass destruction of insectpopulations. While this might be defended on the self-defense principle,one should be aware of the significant adverse impact on the environment,on other non-threatening animals, and indeed on our own health. (Refer toquestion #59 for more on the use of insecticides.) It is not absurd to attempt to minimize the amount of sufferingthat we inflict or cause.

DG

We should begin to feel for the flies and other insects struggling tobe free from sticky fly paper. There are humane alternatives.

Michael W. Fox (Vice President of HSUS)

SEE ALSO: #39-#40, #59

-----------------------#42 Isn't it hypocritical to kill and eat plants?-----------------------

It would be hypocritical IF the same criteria or morally relevantattributes that are used to justify animal rights also applied toplants. The criteria cited by the AR movement are "pain and suffering"and being "subjects-of-a-life". An assessment of how plants measure upto these criteria leads to the following conclusions.

First, our best science to date shows that plants lack any semblanceof a central nervous system or any other system design for such complexcapacities as that of conscious suffering from felt pain. Second, plants simply have no evolutionary need to feel pain. Animalsbeing mobile would benefit from the ability to sense pain; plants wouldnot. Nature does not gratuitously create such complex capacities as thatof feeling pain unless there is some benefit for the organism'ssurvival. The first point is dealt with in more detail in questions #43 and #44.The general hypocrisy argument is discussed in question #4.

TA

SEE ALSO: #4, #39-#44

-----------------------#43 But how can you prove that plants don't feel pain?-----------------------

Lest we forget the ultimate point of what follows, let us not forget thecentral thesis of AR. Simply stated: to the extent other animals sharewith us certain morally relevant attributes, then to that extent we conferupon them due regard and concern. The two attributes that are arguablyrelevant are: a) our capacity for pain and suffering, and b) the capacityfor being the "subject-of-a-life", i.e., being such that it matters to onewhether one's life fares well or ill. Both of these qualities require the existence of mental states. Alsonote that in order to speak of "mental states" proper, we would denote, ascommon usage would dictate, that such states are marked by consciousness.It is insufficient to mark off mental states by only the apparent presenceof purposefulness or intentionality since, as we shall see below, manymaterial objects possess purposeful-looking behaviors. So then, how do we properly attribute the existence of mental states toother animals, or even to ourselves for that matter? We cannot infer thepresence of felt pain simply by the presence of a class of behaviors thatare functional for an organism's amelioration or avoidance of noxiousstimuli. Thermostats obviously react to thermal changes in the environmentand respond in a functionally appropriate manner to

restore an initial"preferred" state. We would be foolish, however, to attribute tothermostats a capability to "sense" or "feel" some kind of thermal "pain".Even placing quotes around our terms doesn't protect us from absurdity. Clearly, the behavioral criterion of even functional avoidance/defensereactions is simply not sufficient nor even necessary for the properattribution of pain as a felt mental state. Science, including the biological sciences, are committed to the workingassumption of scientific materialism or physicalism (see "The MetaphysicalFoundations of Modern Science", E. A. Burtt, 1924). We must then startwith the generally accepted scientific assumption that matter is the onlyexistent or real primordial constituent of the universe. Let it be said at the outset that scientific materialism as such doesnot preclude the existence of emergent or functional qualities like thatof mind, consciousness, and feeling (or even, dare I say it, free will),but all such qualities are dependent upon the existence of organizedmatter. If there is no hardware, there is nothing for the software to runon. If there is no intact, living brain, there is no mind. It should alsobe said that even contemporary versions of dualism or mind-stuff theorieswill also make embodiment of mental states dependent on the presence ofsufficiently organized matter. To briefly state the case, cognitive functions like consciousness andmind are seen as emergent properties of sufficiently organized matter.Just as breathing is a function of a complex system of organs referred toas the respiratory system, so too is consciousness a function of theimmensely complex information-processing capabilities of a central nervoussystem. It is possible, in theory, that future computers, given asufficiently complex and orderly organization of hardware and cleversoftware, could exhibit the requisite emergent qualities. While suchcomputers do not exist, we DO know that certain living organisms on thisplanet possess the requisite complexity of specialized and highlyorganized structure for the emergence of mental states. In theory, plants could possess a mental state like pain, but if, and

only if, there were a requisite complexity of organized plant tissue thatcould serve to instantiate the higher order mental states of consciousnessand felt pain. There is no morphological evidence that such a complexity of tissueexists in plants. Plants lack the specialized structures required foremergence of mental states. This is not to say that they cannot exhibitcomplex reactions, but we are simply over-interpreting such reactions ifwe designate them as "felt pain". With respect to all mammals, birds, and reptiles, we know that theypossess a sufficiently complex neural structure to enable felt pain plusan evolutionary need for such consciously felt states. They possesscomplex and specialized sense organs, they possess complex and specializedstructures for processing information and for centrally orchestratingappropriate behaviors in accordance with mental representations,integrations, and reorganizations of that information. The properattribution of felt pain in these animals is well justified. It is not forplants, by any stretch of the imagination.

TA

The absurdity (and often disingenuity) of the plant-pain promoters can beeasily exposed by asking them the following two questions:

1) Do you agree that animals like dogs and cats should receive pain-killing drugs prior to surgery? 2) Do you believe that plants should receive pain-killing drugs prior to pruning?

DG

SEE ALSO: #42, #44

-----------------------#44 Aren't there studies that show that plants can scream, etc.?-----------------------

How can something without vocal apparatus scream? Perhaps the questionerintends to suggest that plants somehow express feelings or emotions. Thisnotion is popularized in the book "The Secret Life of Plants", by Tompkinsand Bird, 1972. The book describes "experiments" in which plants areclaimed to respond to injury and even to the thoughts and

emotions ofnearby humans. The responses consist of changes in the electricalconductivity of their leaves. The truth is, however, that nothing but adismal failure has resulted from attempts to replicate these experiments.For some definitive reviews, see Science, 1975, 189:478 and The SkepticalInquirer, 1978, 2(2):57. But what about plant responses to insect invasion? Does this suggestthat plants "feel" pain? No published book or paper in a scientificjournal has been cited as indeed making this claim that "plants feelpain". There is interesting data suggesting that plants react to localtissue damage and even emit signaling molecules serving to stimulatechemical defenses of nearby plants. But how is this relevant to the claimthat plants feel and suffer from pain? Where are the replicatedexperiments and peer-reviewed citations for this putative fact? There arenone. Let us, for the sake of argument, consider the form of logic employed bythe plant-pain promoters:

premise 1: Plants are responsive to "sense" impressions. premise 2: As defined in the dictionary, anything responsive to sense impressions is sentient. conclusion 1: Plants are sentient. premise 3: Sentient beings are conscious of sense impressions. conclusion 2: Plants are conscious of sense impressions. premise 4: To be conscious of a noxious stimuli is unpleasant. conclusion 3: Noxious stimuli to plants are unpleasant, i.e., painful.

There is a major logical sleight-of-hand here. The meaning of the term"sentient" changes between premise 2 ("responsive to sense impressions")and premise 3 ("conscious of sense impressions"). Thus, equivocation onthe usage of "sentient" is used to bootleg the false conclusion 3. Thereis also an equivocation on the meaning of "painful" ("unpleasant" versusthe commonly understood meaning).

TA

If we can bring ourselves to momentarily assume (falsely) that plants

feel pain, then we can easily argue that by eliminating animal farming,we reduce the total pain inflicted on plants, leading to the ironicconclusion that plant pain supports the AR position. This is discussedin more detail in question #46.

DG

SEE ALSO: #42-#43, #46

-----------------------#45 But even if plants don't feel pain, aren't you depriving them of their life? Why isn't that enough to accord moral status to plants?-----------------------

The philosophy of Animal Rights is generally regarded as encompassingonly sentient creatures. Plants are just one of many non-sentient, livingcreatures. To remain consistent, granting moral status to plants wouldlead one to grant it to all life. It may be thought that a philosophyencompassing all life would be best, but granting moral status to allliving creatures leads to rather implausible views. For example, concern for life would lead one to oppose the distributionof spermicides, even to overpopulated Third world countries. The moralityof any sexual intercourse could be questioned as well, since thousands ofsperm cells die in each act. Also, the sheer variety of life forms createsdifficulties; for example, arguments have been made to show that somecomputer programs--such as computer viruses--may well be called alive.Should one grant them moral status? There are questions even in the case of plants. The use of weed-killersin a garden would need defending. And if killing plants is wrong, whyisn't merely damaging them in some other way also wrong? Is trimminghedgerows wrong? The problems raised above are not attempts to discourage efforts todevelop an ethics of the environment. They simply point out that accordingmoral status to all living creatures is fraught with difficulties. Nevertheless, some people do, indeed, argue that the taking of lifeshould be minimized where possible; this constitutes a kind of moralstatus for life. Interestingly, such a view, far from undermining the AR

view, actually supports it. To see why, refer to question #46.

AECW

SEE ALSO: #46, #59

-----------------------#46 Isn't it better to eat animals, because that way you kill the least number of living beings.-----------------------

There are at least two problems with this question. First, there is theassumption that killing is the factor sought to be minimized, but asexplained in question #18, killing is not the central concern of AR; rather,it is pain and suffering, neither of which can be attributed to plants. Second, the questioner overlooks that livestock must be raised on a dietof plant foods, so consumption of animals is actually a once-removedconsumption of plants. The twist, of course, is that passing plants throughanimals is a very inefficient process; losses of up to 80-90 percent aretypical. Thus, it could be argued that, if one's concern is for killing,per se, then the vegetarian diet is preferable (at least for today'spredominant feedlot paradigm).

DG

SEE ALSO: #18, #28, #45

-----------------------#47 Nature is a continuum; doesn't that mean you cannot draw a line, and where you draw yours is no better than where I draw mine?-----------------------

Most people will accept that the diversity of Nature is such that one iseffectively faced with a continuum. Charles Darwin was right to state thatdifferences are of degree, not of kind. One should take issue, however, with the belief that this means that aline cannot be drawn for the purpose of granting rights. For example,while there is a continuum in the use of force, from the gentle nudge ofthe adoring mother to the hellish treatment visited upon concentrationcamp prisoners, clearly, human rights are violated in one case and not theother. People accept that the ethical buck stops somewhere between the two

extremes. Similarly, while it is true that the qualities relevant to theattribution of rights are found to varying extents in members of theanimal kingdom, one is entitled to draw the line somewhere. After all,society does it as well; today, it draws the line just below humans. Now, such a line (below humans) cannot be logically defensible, sincesome creatures are excluded that possess the relevant qualities to agreater degree than current rights-holders (for example, a normal adultchimpanzee has a "higher" mental life than a human in a coma, yet we stillprotect only the human from medical experimentation). Therefore, any linethat is drawn must allow some nonhuman animals to qualify asrights-holders. Moreover, the difficulty of drawing a line does not by itself justifydrawing one at the wrong place. On the contrary, this difficulty meansthat from an ethical point of view, the line should be drawn a) carefully,and b) conservatively. Because the speciesist line held by AR opponentsviolates moral precepts held as critical for the viability of any ethicalsystem, and because some mature nonhumans possess morally relevantcharacteristics comparable to some human rights-bearers, one must come tothe conclusion that the status quo fails on both counts, and that thearrow of progress points toward a moral outlook that encompasses nonhumanas well as human creatures. In addition, it should be noted that when a new line is drawn that ismore in step with ethical truth (something quite easy to do), in no wayshould one feel that the wanton destruction of non rights-holders isthereby encouraged. It is desirable that a moral climate be created thatgives due consideration to the interests and welfare of all creatures,whether they are rights-holders or not.

AECW

The idea that a continuum makes drawing a line impossible or that oneline is therefore no better than another is easily refuted. For example,the alcohol concentration in the blood is a continuum, but society drawsa line at 0.10 percent for drunk driving, and clearly that

is a betterline than one drawn at, say, 0.00000001 percent.

DG

SEE ALSO: #22, #39-#41

-------FARMING-------

-----------------------#48 The animals are killed so fast that they don't feel any pain or even know they're being killed; what's wrong with that?-----------------------

This view can only be maintained by those unfamiliar with modern meatproduction methods. Great stress occurs during transport in whichmillions die miserably each year. And the conveyor-belt approach to theslaughtering process causes the animals to struggle for their lives asthey experience the agony of the fear of death. Only people who have neverwatched the process can believe that they don't feel any pain or aren'taware that they're being killed. One point that many people are unaware of is that poultry is exempted fromthe requirements of the Humane Slaughter Act. Egg-laying hens are typicallynot stunned before slaughter. Also exempt from the act are animals killedunder Kosher conditions (see question #49). But even if no suffering were involved, the killing of sensitive,intelligent animals on a vast scale (over six billion each year in theU.S. alone) cannot be regarded as morally correct, especially since todayit is demonstrably clear that eating animal flesh is not only unnecessarybut even harmful for people. Fellow-mammals are not like corn or carrots.To treat them as if they were is to perpetuate an impoverished moralitywhich is based not on rationality but merely tradition.

DVH

Even the climactic killing process itself is not so clean as one is ledto believe. Every method carries strong doubts about its "humaneness".For example, consider electrocution. We routinely give anesthetics topeople receiving electro-shock therapy due to its painful effects.

Consider the pole-axe. It requires great skill to deliver a perfect,instantly fatal blow. Few possess the skill, and many animals suffer fromthe ineptness with which the process is administered. Consider Kosherslaughter, where an animal is hoisted and bled to death without priorstunning. Often joints are ruptured during the hoisting, and the death isa slow, conscious one. The idea of a clean, painless kill is a fantasypromulgated by those with a vested interest in the continuance of thepractices.

DG

-----------------------#49 What is factory farming, and what is wrong with it?-----------------------

Factory farming is an industrial process that applies the philosophy andpractices of mass production to animal farming. Animals are considered not asindividual sentient beings, but rather as a means to an end--eggs, meat,leather, etc. The objective is to maximize output and profit. The animalsare manipulated through breeding, feeding, confinement, and chemicals tolay eggs faster, fatten more quickly, or make leaner meat. Costs areminimized by recycling carcasses through feed, minimizing unit space, notproviding bedding (which gets soiled and needs cleaning), and otherpractices. Battery-hen egg production is perhaps the most publicized form. Hens are"maintained" in cages of minimal size, allowing for little or no movementand no expression of natural behavior patterns. Hens are painfully debeakedand sometimes declawed to protect others in the cramped cage. There are nofloors to the cages, so that excrement can fall through onto a tray--the henstherefore are standing on wire. Cages are stacked on top of each other inlong rows, and are kept inside a climate-controlled barn. The hens are thenused as a mechanism for turning feed into eggs. After a short, miserable lifethey are processed as boiler chickens or recycled. Other typical factory farming techniques are used in pig production, whereanimals are kept in concrete pens with no straw or earth, unable to move morethan a few inches, to ensure the "best" pork. When sows litter, piglets are

kept so the only contact between the sow and piglets is access to the teats.The production of veal calves is a similar restraining process. The calves arekept in narrow crates which prevent them from turning; they can only stand orlie down. They are kept in the dark with no contact with other animals. Factory farming distresses people because of the treatment of the animals;they are kept in unnatural conditions in terms of space, possible behaviors,and interactions with other animals. Keeping animals in these circumstancesis not only cruel to the animals, but diminishes the humanity of thoseinvolved, from production to consumption. In addition, the use of chemicals and hormones to maximize yields, reducehealth problems in the animals, and speed production may also be harmful tohuman consumers.

JK

SEE ALSO: #12, #14, #32, #48, #50

-----------------------#50 But cattle can't be factory-farmed, so I can eat them, right?-----------------------

At this time, cattle farming has not progressed to the extremes inflictedon some other animals--cows still have to graze. However, the proponents offactory farming are always considering the possibilities of extending theirtechniques, as the old-style small farm becomes a faded memory and farmingbecomes a larger and more complex industry, competing for finance fromconsumers and lenders. Cattle farming practices such as increasing cattledensities on feedlots, diet supplementation, and controlled breeding arealready being implemented. Other developments will be introduced. However, as discussed in question #49, it is not only the method offarming that is of concern. Transport to the slaughterhouse, often a longjourney in crowded conditions without access to food and water, and the waitat the slaughterhouse followed by the slaughtering process are themselvesbrutal and harmful. And the actual killing process is itself not necessarilyclean or painless (see question #48).

JK

We can challenge the claim that cattle cannot be

factory-farmed; it justisn't true. We can also challenge the claim that if it were true, it wouldjustify killing and eating cattle. A broad view of factory farming includes practices that force adaptations(often through breeding) that increase the "productivity" of animal farming.Such increases in productivity are invariably achieved at the expense ofincreased suffering of the animals concerned. This broader view definitelyincludes cattle, both that raised for meat and for dairy production. Veal production is paradigmatic factory farming. David Cowles-Hamardescribes it as follows: "Veal calves are kept in isolation in 5'x2' cratesin which they are unable even to turn around. They are kept in darkness muchof the time. They are given no bedding (in case they try to eat it) and arefed only a liquid diet devoid of iron and fiber to keep their flesh anemicand pale. After 3-5 months they are slaughtered." Dairy farming also qualifies as factory-farming. Here are some salientfacts:

* Calves are taken away at 1-3 days causing terrible distress to both the cows and the calves; many calves go for veal production.

* Over 170,000 calves die each year due to poor husbandry and appalling treatment at markets.

* Cows are milked for 10 months and produce 10 times the milk a calf would take naturally. Mastitis (udder inflammation) frequently results.

* Cows are fed a high-protein diet to increase yield; often even this is not enough and the cow is forced to break down body tissues, leading to acidosis and consequent lameness. About 25 percent of cows are afflicted.

* At about 5 years of age, the cow is spent and exhausted and is slaughtered. The normal life span is about 20 years.

Finally, we cannot accept that even if it were not possible to factory-farmcattle, that therefore it is morally acceptable to kill and eat them. DavidCowles-Hamar puts it this way: "The suggestion that animals should pay for

their freedom with their lives is moral nonsense."DG

SEE ALSO: #14, #48-#49

-----------------------#51 But isn't it true that cows won't produce milk (or chickens lay eggs) if they are not content?-----------------------

This is simply untrue. Lactation is a physiological response thatfollows giving birth. The cow cannot avoid giving milk any more thanshe can avoid producing urine. The same is true of chickens and egg-laying;the egg output is manipulated to a high level by selective breeding,carefully regulated conditions that simulate a continuous summer season,and a carefully controlled diet. To drive this point home further, consider that over the last fivedecades, the conditions for egg-laying chickens have become increasinglyunnatural and confining (see question #49), yet the egg output has increasedmany times over. Chickens will even continue to lay when severely injured;they simply cannot help it.

DG

SEE ALSO: #49, #52, #55

-----------------------#52 Don't hens lay unfertilized eggs that would otherwise be wasted?-----------------------

Yes, but that is no justification for imposing barbaric and cruel regimeson them designed to artificially boost their egg production. If thequestioner is wondering if it is OK to use eggs left by free-range chickens"to go cold", then the answer from the AR side is that free-range eggproduction is not so idyllic as one might like to think (see question #55).Also, such a source of eggs can satisfy only a tiny fraction of the demand.

DG

SEE ALSO: #49, #51, #55

-----------------------#53 But isn't it true that the animals have never known anything better?-----------------------

If someone bred a race of humans for slavery, would you accept theirexcuse that the slaves have never known anything better? The point is thatthere IS something better, and they are being deprived of it.

DG

Not having known anything better does not alleviate the suffering of theanimal. Its fundamental desires remain and it is the frustration of thosedesires that is a great part of its suffering. There are so many examples:the dairy cow who is never allowed to raise her young, the battery hen whocan never walk or stretch her wings, the sow who can never build a nest orroot for food in the forest litter, etc. Eventually we frustrate the animal'smost fundamental desire of all--to live.

David Cowles-Hamar

-----------------------#54 Don't farmers know better than city-dwelling people about how to treat animals?-----------------------

This view is often put forward by farmers (and their family members).Typically they claim that, by virtue of proximity to their farmed animals,they possess some special knowledge. When pressed to present thisknowledge, and to show how it can justify their exploitation of animalsor discount the animals' pain and suffering, only the tired argumentsaddressed in this FAQ come forth. In short, there is no "special knowledge". One should also remember that those farmers who exploit animals have astrong vested interest in the continuance of their practices. Would oneassert that a logger knows best about how the forests should be treated? Technically, this argument is an instance of the "genetic fallacy". Ideasshould be evaluated on their own terms, not by reference to the originators.

DG

-----------------------#55 Can't we just eat free-range products?-----------------------

The term "free-range" is used to indicate a production method in which theanimals are (allegedly) not factory-farmed but, instead, are provided with

conditions that allow them to fully express their natural behavior. Somepeople feel that free-range products are thus ethically acceptable. Thereare two cases to be considered: first, the case where the free-range animalitself is slaughtered for use, and second, the case where the free-rangeanimal provides a product (typically, hens providing eggs, or cows providingmilk). Common to both cases is a problem with misrepresentation of conditions as"free-range". Much of what passes for free-range is hardly any better thanstandard factory-farming; a visit to a large "free-range egg farm" makesthat obvious (and see MT's comments below). Nutritionally, free-range products are no better than their factory-farmedequivalents, which are wholly or partly responsible for a list of diseases aslong as your arm. For the case of free-range animals slaughtered for use, we must ask whyshould a free-range animal be any more deserving of an unnecessary death thanany other animal? Throughout this FAQ, we have argued that animals have aright to live free from human brutality. Our brutality cannot be excused byour provision of a short happy life. David Cowles-Hamar puts it this way:"The suggestion that animals should pay for their freedom with their livesis moral nonsense." Another thing to think about is the couple describedat the end of question #13. Their babies are free-range, so it's OK toeat them, right? For the case of products from free-range animals, we can identify at leastfour problems: 1) it remains an inefficient use of food resources, 2) it isstill environmentally damaging, 3) animals are killed off as soon as theybecome "unproductive", and 4) the animals must be replaced; the nonproductivemales are killed or go to factory farms (the worst instance of this is thefate of male calves born to dairy cows; many go for veal production).

BRO

What's wrong with free-range eggs? To get laying hens you must havefertile eggs and half of the eggs will hatch into male chicks. These arekilled at once (by gassing, crushing, suffocation, decompression, ordrowning), or raised as "table birds" (usually in broiler

houses) andslaughtered as soon as they reach an economic weight. So, for everyfree-range hen scratching around the garden or farm (who, if she were able tobargain, might pay rent with her daily infertile egg), a corresponding malefrom her batch is enduring life in a broiler house or has already beensubjected to slaughter or thrown away to die. Every year in Britain alone,more than 35 million day-old male chicks are killed. They are mainly used forfertilizer or dumped in landfill sites. The hens are slaughtered as soon as their production drops (usually aftertwo years; their natural life span is 5-7 years). Also, be aware that manysites classified as free-range aren't really free-range; they are justmassive barns with access to the outside. Since the food and light areinside, the hens rarely venture outside.

MT

SEE ALSO: #13, #49-#50, #52

-----------------------#56 Anything wrong with honey?-----------------------

Bees are often killed in the production of honey, in the worst case thewhole hive may be destroyed if the keeper doesn't wish to protect them overthe winter. Not all beekeepers do this, but the general practice is one thatembodies the attitude that living things are mere material and have nointrinsic value of their own other than what commercial value we can wrenchfrom them. Artificial insemination involving death of the male is now alsothe norm for generation of new queen bees. The favored method of obtainingbee sperm is by pulling off the insect's head (decapitation sends anelectrical impulse to the nervous system which causes sexual arousal). Thelower half of the headless bee is then squeezed to make it ejaculate. Theresulting liquid is collected in a hypodermic syringe.

MT

SEE ALSO: #22, #39-#41

-----------------------#57 Don't crop harvest techniques and transportation, etc., lead to the death of animals?-----------------------

The questioner's probable follow-up is to assert that since we performactions that result in the death of animals for producing crops, a form offood, we should therefore not condemn actions (i.e., raising and slaughter)that result in the death of animals for producing meat, another form offood. How do we confront this argument? It is clear that incidental (or accidental, unintended) deaths of animalsresult from crop agriculture. It is equally clear that intentional deaths ofanimals result from animal agriculture. Our acceptance of acts that lead toincidental deaths does not require the acceptance of acts that lead tointentional deaths. (A possible measure of intentionality is to ask if thesuccess of the enterprise is measured by the extent of the result. In ourcase, the success of crop agriculture is not measured by the number ofaccidental deaths; in animal agriculture, conversely, the success of theenterprise is directly measured by the number of animals produced forslaughter and consumption.) Having shown that the movement from incidental to intentional is notjustified, we can still ask what justifies even incidental deaths. We mustrealize that the question does not bear on Animal Rights specifically, butapplies to morality generally. The answer, stripped to its essentials, isthat the rights of innocents can be overridden in certain circumstances.If rights are genuinely in conflict, a reasonable principle is to violatethe rights of the fewest. Nevertheless, when such an overriding of the rights of innocents isdone, there is a responsibility to ensure that the harm is minimized.Certainly, crop agriculture is preferable to animal agriculture in thisregard. In the latter case, we have the added incidental harm due tothe much greater amount of crops needed to produce animals (versus feedingthe crops directly to people), AND the intentional deaths of the producedanimals themselves. Finally, many argue for organic and more labor-intensive methods of cropagriculture that reduce incidental deaths. As one wag puts it, we have aresponsibility to survive, but we can also survive responsibly!

DG

SEE ALSO: #58-#59

-----------------------#58 Modern agriculture requires us to push animals off land to convert it to crops; isn't this a violation of the animals' rights?-----------------------

Pushing animals off their habitats to pursue agriculture is a lessserious instance of the actions discussed in question #57, which deals withanimal death as a result of agriculture. Refer to that question forrelevant discussion. An abiding theme is that vegetarianism versus meat eating, and cropagriculture versus animal agriculture, tend to minimize the amount ofsuffering. For example, more acreage is required to support animalproduction than to support crop production (for the same nutritionalcapability). Thus, animal production encroaches more on wildlife than doescrop agriculture. We cannot eliminate our adverse effects, but we cantry to minimize them.

DG

SEE ALSO: #57, #59

-----------------------#59 Don't farmers have to kill pests?-----------------------

We could simply say that less pests are killed on a vegetarian diet andthat killing is not even necessary for pest management, but because theissue is interesting, we answer more fully! This question is similar to question #57 in that the questioner's likelyfollow-up is to ask why it is acceptable to kill pests for food but not tokill animals for food. It differs from question #57 in that the defensethat the killing is incidental is not available because pests are killedintentionally. We can respond to this argument in two ways. First, we canargue that the killing is justifiable, and second, we can argue that itis not necessary and should be avoided. Let's look at these in turn. Our moral systems typically allow for exceptions to the requirement thatwe not harm others. One major exception is for self-

defense. If we arethreatened, we have the right to use force to resist the threat. To theextent that pests are a threat to our food supplies, our habitats, orour health, we are justified in defending ourselves. We have theresponsibility to use appropriate force, but sometimes this requiresaction fatal to the threatening creatures. Even if the killing of pests is seen as wrong despite the self-defenseargument, we can argue that crop agriculture should be preferred overanimal agriculture because it involves the minimization of the requiredkilling of pests (for reasons described in question #57). Possibly overshadowing these moral arguments, however, is the argument thatthe use of pesticides, synthetic fertilizers, and herbicides is not onlynot necessary but extremely damaging to the planet, and should thereforebe avoided. Let us first look at the issue of necessity, followed by theissue of environmental damage. David Cowles-Hamar writes: "For thousands of years, peoples all over theworld have used farming methods based on natural ecosystems where potentialpest populations are self-regulating. These ideas are now being exploredin organic farming and permaculture." Michael W. Fox writes: "Integratedpest management and better conservation of wilderness areas around crop landsin order to provide natural predators for crop pests are more ecologicallysensible alternatives to the continuous use of pesticides." The point isthat there are effective alternatives to the agrichemical treadmill. In addition to the agricultural methods described above, many pestproblems can be prevented, certainly the most effective approach. Forexample, some major pest threats are the result of accidental or intentionalhuman introduction of animals into a habitat. We need to be more carefulin this regard. Another example is the use of rodenticides. More effectiveand less harmful to the environment would be an approach that relies onmaintenance of clean conditions, plugging of entry holes, and nonlethaltrapping followed by release into the wild. The effects of the intensive use of agrichemicals on the environment arevery serious. It results in nation-wide ground water pollution. It results

in the deaths of beneficial non-target species. The development ofresistant strains requires the use of stronger chemicals with resultingmore serious effects on the environment. Agrichemicals are generally morehighly concentrated in animal products than in vegetables. It is thusenlightened self-interest to eschew animal consumption! Organic farming and related methods eschew agrichemicals in favor ofnatural, sustainable methods.

DG

SEE ALSO: #57-#58

-------------------------LEATHER, FUR, AND FASHION-------------------------

-----------------------#60 What is wrong with leather and how can we do without it?-----------------------

Most leather goods are made from the byproducts of the slaughterhouse, andsome is purpose-made, i.e., the animal is grown and slaughtered purely forits skin. So, by buying leather products, you will be contributing to theprofits of these establishments and augmenting the economic demand forslaughter. The Nov/Dec 1991 issue of the Vegetarian Journal has this to say aboutleather: "Environmentally turning animal hides into leather is an energyintensive and polluting practice. Production of leather basically involvessoaking (beamhouse), tanning, dyeing, drying, and finishing. Over 95 percentof all leather produced in the U.S. is chrome-tanned. The effluent that mustbe treated is primarily related to the beamhouse and tanning operations. Themost difficult to treat is effluent from the tanning process. All wastescontaining chromium are considered hazardous by the U.S. EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA). Many other pollutants involved in the processingof leather are associated with environmental and health risks. In terms ofdisposal, one would think that leather products would be biodegradable, butthe primary function for a tanning agent is to stabilize the collagen orprotein fibers so that they are no longer biodegradable."

MT

For alternatives to leather, consult the excellent Leather Alternatives FAQmaintained by Tom Swiss (tms@tis.com).

DG

-----------------------#61 I can accept that trapping is inhumane, but what about fur ranches?-----------------------

Leaving aside the raw fact that the animals must sacrifice theirlives for human vanity, we are left with many objections to fur ranching. A common misconception about fur "ranches" is that the animals do notsuffer. This is entirely untrue. These animals suffer a life of miseryand frustration, deprived of their most basic needs. They are kept inwire-mesh cages that are tiny, overcrowded, and filthy. Here they aremalnourished, suffer contagious diseases, and endure severe stress. On these farms, the animals are forced to forfeit their naturalinstincts. Beavers, who live in water in the wild, must exist on cementfloors. Minks in the wild, too, spend much of their time in water,which keeps their salivation, respiration, and body temperaturestable. They are also, by nature, solitary animals. However, on thesefarms, they are forced to live in close contact with other animals.This often leads to self-destructive behavior, such as pelt and tailbiting. They often resort to cannibalism. The methods used on these farms reflect not the interests and welfareof the animals but the furriers' primary interest--profit. The end ofthe suffering of these animals comes only with death, which, in orderto preserve the quality of the fur, is inflicted with extreme crueltyand brutality. Engine exhaust is often pumped into a box of animals.This exhaust is not always lethal, and the animals sometimes writhe inpain as they are skinned alive. Another common execution practice,often used on larger animals, is anal electrocution. The farmers attachclamps to an animal's lips and insert metal rods into its anus. Theanimal is then electrocuted. Decompression chambers, neck snapping,and poison are also used.

The raising of animals by humans to serve a specific purpose cannotdiscount or excuse the lifetime of pain and suffering that theseanimals endure.

JLS

Cruelty is one fashion statement we can all do without.Rue McClanahan (actress)

The recklessness with which we sacrifice our sense of decency tomaximize profit in the factory farming process sets a pattern for crueltyto our own kind.

Jonathan Kozol (author)

SEE ALSO: #12, #14, #48-#49

-----------------------#62 Anything wrong with wool, silk, down?-----------------------

What's wrong with wool? Scientists over the years have bred a Merino sheepwhich is exaggeratedly wrinkled. The more wrinkles, the more wool.Unfortunately, greater profits are rarely in the sheep's best interests. InAustralia, more wrinkles mean more perspiration and greater susceptibility tofly-strike, a ghastly condition resulting from maggot infestation in thesweaty folds of the sheep's over-wrinkled skin. To counteract this, farmersperform an operation without anesthetic called "mulesing", in which sectionsof flesh around the anus are sliced away, leaving a painful, bloody wound. Without human interference, sheep would grow just enough wool to protectthem from the weather, but scientific breeding techniques have ensured thatthese animals have become wool-producing monstrosities. Their unnatural overload of wool (often half their body weight) bringsadded misery during summer months when they often die from heat exhaustion.Also, one million sheep die in Australia alone each year from exposure tocold after shearing. Every year, in Australia alone, about ten million lambs die before theyare more than a few days old. This is due largely to unmanageable numbers ofsheep and inadequate stockpersons. Of UK wool, 27 percent is "skin wool", pulled from the skins of slaughteredsheep and lambs. What's wrong with silk? It is the practice to boil the cocoons that still

contain the living moth larvae in order to obtain the silk. This produceslonger silk threads than if the moth was allowed to emerge. The silkworm cancertainly feel pain and will recoil and writhe when injured. What's wrong with down? The process of live-plucking is widespread. Theterrified birds are lifted by their necks, with their legs tied, and thenhave all their body feathers ripped out. The struggling geese sustaininjuries and after their ordeal are thrown back to join their fellow victimsuntil their turn comes round again. This torture, which has been described as"extremely cruel" by veterinary surgeons, and even geese breeders, beginswhen the geese are only eight weeks old. It is then repeated at eight-weekintervals for two or three more sessions. The birds are then slaughtered. The "lucky" birds are plucked dead, i.e., they are killed first and thenplucked.

MT

-------------------HUNTING AND FISHING-------------------

-----------------------#63 Humans are natural hunter/gatherers; aren't you trying to repress natural human behavior?-----------------------

Yes. Failing to repress certain "natural behaviors" would create anuncivilized society. Consider this: It would be an expression of naturalbehavior to hunt anything that moves (e.g., my neighbor's dogs or horses)and to gather anything I desire (e.g., my employer's money or furniture).It would even be natural behavior to indulge in unrestrained sexualappetites or to injure a person in a fit of rage or jealousy. In a civilized society, we restrain our natural impulses by two codes:the written law of the land, and the unwritten law of morality. And thisalso applies to hunting. It is unlawful in many places and at many times,and the majority of Americans regard sport hunting as immoral.

DVH

Many would question the supposition that humans are

natural hunters.In many societies, the people live quite happily without hunting. Inour own society, the majority do not hunt, not because they are repressingtheir nature--they simply have no desire to do so. Those that do hunt oftenshow internal conflicts about it, as evidenced by the myths and ritualsthat serve to legitimize hunting, cleanse the hunter, etc. This suggeststhat hunting is not natural, but actually goes against a deeper part ofour nature, a desire not to do harm.

BL

The squirrel that you kill in jest, dies in earnest.Henry David Thoreau

(essayist and poet)

SEE ALSO: #37, #64-#67

-----------------------#64 The world is made up of predators and prey; aren't we just another predator?-----------------------

No. Our behavior is far worse than that of "just another predator". Wekill others not just for nourishment but also for sport (recreation!), forthe satisfaction of our curiosity, for fashion, for entertainment, forcomfort, and for convenience. We also kill each other by the millions forterritory, wealth, and power. We often torture and torment others beforekilling them. We conduct wholesale slaughter of vast proportions, on landand in the oceans. No other species behaves in a comparable manner, andonly humans are destroying the balance of nature. At the same time, our killing of nonhuman animals is unnecessary, whereasnonhuman predators kill and consume only what is necessary for theirsurvival. They have no choice: kill or starve. The one thing that really separates us from the other animals is ourmoral capacity, and that has the potential to elevate us above the statusof "just another predator". Nonhumans lack this capacity, so we shouldn'tlook to them for moral inspiration and guidance.

DVH

SEE ALSO: #37, #63, #67

-----------------------#65 Doesn't hunting control wildlife populations that

would otherwise get out of hand?-----------------------

Hunters often assert that their practices benefit their victims. Avariation on the theme is their common assertion that their actions keeppopulations in check so that animals do not die of starvation ("a cleanbullet in the brain is preferable to a slow death by starvation"). Followingare some facts and questions about hunting and "wildlife management" thatreveal what is really happening. Game animals, such as deer, are physiologically adapted to cope withseasonal food shortages. It is the young that bear the brunt of starvation.Among adults, elderly and sick animals also starve. But the hunters do notseek out and kill only these animals at risk of starvation; rather, they seekthe strongest and most beautiful animals (for maximum meat or trophypotential). The hunters thus recruit the forces of natural selection againstthe species that they claim to be defending. The hunters restrict their activities to only those species that areattractive for their meat or trophy potential. If the hunters were trulyconcerned with protecting species from starvation, why do they not performtheir "service" for the skunk, or the field mouse? And why is hunting notlimited to times when starvation occurs, if hunting has as a goal theprevention of starvation? (The reason that deer aren't hunted in early springor late winter--when starvation occurs--is that the carcasses would containless fat, and hence, be far less desirable to meat consumers. Also, huntingthen would be unpopular to hunters due to the snow, mud, and insects.) So-called "game management" policies are actually programs designedto eliminate predators of the game species and to artificially provideadditional habitat and resources for the game species. Why are these predatorspecies eliminated when they would provide a natural and ecologically soundmechanism for controlling the population of game species? Why are suchactivities as burning, clear-cutting, chemical defoliation, flooding, andbulldozing employed to increase the populations of game animals, if huntinghas as its goal the reduction of populations to prevent

starvation? The truthis that the management agencies actually try to attain a maximum sustainableyield, or harvest, of game animals. The wildlife managers and hunters preferentially kill male animals, apolicy designed to keep populations high. If overpopulation were really aconcern, they would preferentially kill females. Another common practice that belies the claim that wildlife management hasas a goal the reduction of populations to prevent starvation is the practiceof game stocking. For example, in the state of New York the Department ofEnvironmental Conservation obtains pheasants raised in captivity and thenreleases them in areas frequented by hunters. For every animal killed by a hunter, two are seriously injured and leftto die a slow death. Given these statistics, it is clear that hunting failseven in its proclaimed goal--the reduction of suffering. The species targeted by hunters, both the game animals and their predators,have survived in balance for millions of years, yet now wildlife managersand hunters insist they need to be "managed". The legitimate task of wildlifemanagement should be to preserve viable, natural wildlife populations andecosystems. In addition to the animal toll, hunters kill hundreds of human beingsevery year. Finally, there is an ethical argument to consider. Thousands of humanbeings die from starvation each and every day. Should we assume that thereader will one day be one of them, and dispatch him straight away?Definitely not. AR ethics asserts that this same consideration should beaccorded to the deer.

DG

Unless hunting is part of a controlled culling process, it is unlikely tobe of benefit in any population maintenance. The number and distribution ofanimals slaughtered is unrelated to any perceived maldistribution of species,but is more closely related to the predilections of the hunters. Indeed, hunting, whether for "pleasure" or profit, has a history moreclosely associated with bringing animals close to, or into, extinction, ratherthan protecting from overpopulation. Examples include the buffalo and thepassenger pigeon. With the advent of modern "wildlife

management", we seea transition to systems designed to artificially increase the populationsof certain species to sustain a yield or harvest for hunters. The need for population control of animals generally arises either from theintroduction of species that have become pests or from indigenous animalsthat are competing for resources (such as the kangaroo, which competes withsheep and cattle). These imbalances usually have a human base. It is moreappropriate to examine our resource uses and requirements, and to act moreresponsibly in our relationship with the environment, than to seek a"solution" to self-created problems through the morally dubious practice ofhunting.

JK

...the American public is footing the bill for predator-control programsthat cause the systematic slaughter of refuge animals. Raccoons and red fox,squirrel and skunks are but a few of the many egg-eating predators trappedand destroyed in the name of "wildlife management programs". Sea gulls areshot, fox pups poisoned, and coyotes killed by aerial gunners in low-flyingaircraft. This wholesale destruction is taking place on the only Federallands set aside to protect America's wildlife!

Humane Society of the United States

The creed of maximum sustainable yield unmasks the rhetoric about "humaneservice" to animals. It must be a perverse distortion of the ideal of humaneservice to accept or engage in practices the explicit goal of which is toinsure that there will be a larger, rather than a smaller, number of animalsto kill! With "humane friends" like that, wild animals certainly do not needany enemies.

Tom Regan (philosopher and AR activist)

The real cure for our environmental problems is to understand that our jobis to salvage Mother Nature...We are facing a formidable enemy in thisfield. It is the hunters...and to convince them to leave their guns on thewall is going to be very difficult.

Jacques Cousteau (oceanographer)

SEE ALSO: #66

------------------------------#66 Aren't hunting fees the major source of revenue for wildlife management and habitat restoration?------------------------------

We have seen in question #65 that practices described as "wildlifemanagement" are actually designed to increase the populations of game speciesdesirable to hunters. Viewed in this light, the connection between huntingfees and the wildlife agencies looks more like an incestuous relationshipthan a constructive one designed to protect the general public's interests.Following are some more facts of interest in this regard. Only 7 percent of the population hunt, yet all pay via taxation for huntingprograms and services. Licenses account for only a fraction of the cost ofhunting programs at the national level. For example, the US Fish and WildlifeService programs get up to 90 percent of their revenues from general taxrevenues. At the state level, hunting fees make up the largest part, and asignificant part is obtained from Federal funds obtained from excise taxes onguns and ammunition. These funds are distributed to the states based on thenumber of hunters in the state! It is easy to see, then, how the programs aredesigned to appease and satisfy hunters. It is important to remember that state game officials are appointed, notelected, and their salaries are paid through the purchase of hunting fees.This ensures that these officials regard the hunters as their constituents.David Favre, Professor of Wildlife Law at the Detroit College of Law,describes the situation as follows:

The primary question asked by many within these special [state] agencies would be something like, "How do we provide the best hunting experience for the hunters of our state?" The literature is replete with surveys of hunter desires and preferences in an attempt to serve these constituents. ...Three factors support the status quo within the agency. First, as with most bureaucracies, individuals are hesitant to question their own on-going programs...Second, besides the normal bureaucratics, most state

game agencies have a substantial group of individuals who are strong advocates for the hunters of the state. They are not neutral but very supportive of the hunting ethic and would not be expected to raise broader questions. Finally, and in many ways most importantly, is the funding mechanism...Since a large proportion of the funds which run the department and pay the salaries are from hunters and fishermen, there is a strong tendency for the agency to consider itself not as representing and working for the general public but that they need only serve their financial sponsors, the hunters and fishermen of the state. If your financial support is dependent on the activity of hunting, obviously very few are going to question the ecological or ethical problems therewith.

Many would argue that these funding arrangements constitute a prostitutionof the public lands for the benefit of the few. We can envision possiblealternatives to these arrangements. Other users of parks and naturalresources, such as hikers, bird watchers, wildlife enthusiasts, eco-tourists,etc., can provide access to funds necessary for real habitat restoration andwildlife management, not the perverted brand that caters to the desires ofhunters. As far as acquisition and protection of land is concerned,organizations such as the Nature Conservancy play an important role. Theycan do much more with even a fraction of the funding currently earmarked tosubsidize hunting ($500 million per year).

DG/JK

SEE ALSO: #65

-----------------------#67 Isn't hunting OK as long as we eat what we kill?-----------------------

Some vegetarians accept that where farmers or small landholders breed,maintain, and then kill their own livestock there is an argument for theireating that meat. There would need, at all stages, to be a humane life anddeath involved. Hunting seems not to fit within this argument because thekill is often not "clean", and the hunter has not had any involvement in thebirth and growth of the animal.

As the arguments in the FAQ demonstrate, however, there is a wider contextin which these actions have to be considered. Animals are sentient creatureswho share many of our characteristics. The question is not only whether it isacceptable to eat an animal (which we perhaps hunted and killed), but if itis an appropriate action to take--stalking and murdering another animal,or eating the product of someone else's killing. Is it a proper action fora supposedly rational and ethical man or woman?

JK

This question reminds one of question #12, where it is suggested thatkilling and eating an animal is justified because the animal is raised forthat purpose. The process leading up to the eating is used to justify theeating. In this question, the eating is used to justify the process leadingup to it. Both attempts are totally illogical. Imagine telling the police notto worry that you have just stalked and killed a person because you ate theperson!

DG

SEE ALSO: #12, #21, #63-#64

-----------------------#68 Fish are dumb like insects; what's wrong with fishing?-----------------------

Fish are not "dumb" except in the sense that they are unable to speak.They have a complex nervous system based around a brain and spinal cordsimilar to other vertebrates. They are not as intelligent as humans interms of functioning in our social and physical environment, but they arevery successful and effective in their own environment. Behavioral studiesindicate that they exhibit complex forms of learning, such as operantconditioning, serial reversal learning, probability learning, and avoidancelearning. Many authorities doubt that there is a significant qualitativedifference between learning in fishes and that in rats. Many people who fish talk about the challenge of fishing, and the contestbetween themselves and the fish (on a one-to-one basis, not in relation totrawling or other net fishing). This implies an awareness and intelligencein the hunted of a level at least sufficient to challenge

the hunter. The death inflicted by fishing--a slow asphyxiation either in a net orafter an extended period fighting against a barbed hook wedged somewherein their head--is painful and distressing to a sentient animal. Those thatdoubt that fish feel pain must explain why it is that their brains containendogenous opiates and receptors for them; these are accepted as mechanismsfor the attenuation of pain in other vertebrates.

JK

Some people believe that it is OK to catch fish as long as they arereturned to the water. But, when you think about it, it's as if one isplaying with the fish. Also, handling the fish wipes off an importantdisease-fighting coating on their scales. The hook can be swallowed, leadingto serious complications, and even if it isn't, pulling it out of their mouthleaves a lesion that is open to infection.

JSD

SEE ALSO: #22, #39

-------------------------ANIMALS FOR ENTERTAINMENT-------------------------

-----------------------#69 Don't zoos contribute to the saving of species from extinction?-----------------------

Zoos often claim that they are "arks", which can preserve species whosehabitat has been destroyed, or which were wiped out in the wild for otherreasons (such as hunting). They suggest that they can maintain the speciesin captivity until the cause of the creature's extirpation is remedied, andthen successfully reintroduce the animals to the wild, resulting in a healthy,self-sustaining population. Zoos often defend their existence againstchallenges from the AR movement on these grounds. There are several problems with this argument, however. First, the numberof animals required to maintain a viable gene pool can be quite high, and isnever known for certain. If the captive gene pool is too small, theninbreeding can result in increased susceptibility to disease, birth defects,and mutations; the species can be so weakened that it

would never be viablein the wild. Some species are extremely difficult to breed in captivity: marine mammals,many bird species, and so on. Pandas, which have been the sustained focus ofcaptive breeding efforts for several decades in zoos around the world, arenotoriously difficult to breed in captivity. With such species, the zoos,by taking animals from the wild to supply their breeding programs, constitutea net drain on wild populations. The whole concept of habitat restoration is mired in serious difficulties.Animals threatened by poaching (elephants, rhinos, pandas, bears and more)will never be safe in the wild as long as firearms, material needs, and awillingness to consume animal parts coincide. Species threatened by chemicalcontamination (such as bird species vulnerable to pesticides and lead shot)will not be candidates for release until we stop using the offendingsubstances, and enough time has passed for the toxins to be processed out ofthe environment. Since heavy metals and some pesticides are both persistentand bioaccumulative, this could mean decades or centuries before it is safeto reintroduce the animals. Even if these problems can be overcome, there are still difficulties withthe process of reintroduction. Problems such as human imprinting, the need toteach animals to fly, hunt, build dens, and raise their young are seriousobstacles, and must be solved individually for each species. There is a small limit to the number of species the global network of zooscan preserve under even the most optimistic assumptions. Profound constraintsare imposed by the lack of space in zoos, their limited financial resources,and the requirement that viable gene pools of each species be preserved. Fewzoos, for instance, ever keep more than two individuals of large mammalspecies. The need to preserve scores or hundreds of a particular specieswould be beyond the resources of even the largest zoos, and even the wholeworld zoo community would be hard-pressed to preserve even a few dozenspecies in this manner. Contrast this with the efficiency of large habitat preserves, which canmaintain viable populations of whole complexes of species with minimal human

intervention. Large preserves maintain every species in the ecosystem in apredominantly self-sufficient manner, while keeping the creatures in thenatural habitat unmolested. If the financial resources (both government andcharitable), and the biological expertise currently consumed by zoos, wereredirected to habitat preservation and management, we would have far fewerworries about habitat restoration or preserving species whose habitat is gone. Choosing zoos as a means for species preservation, in addition to beingexpensive and of dubious effectiveness, has serious ethical problems. Keepinganimals in zoos harms them, by denying them freedom of movement andassociation, which is important to social animals, and frustrates many oftheir natural behavioral patterns, leaving them at least bored, and at worstseriously neurotic. While humans may feel there is some justifying benefitto their captivity (that the species is being preserved, and may somedaybe reintroduced into the wild), this is no compensating benefit to theindividual animals. Attempts to preserve species by means of captivity havebeen described as sacrificing the individual gorilla to the abstract Gorilla(i.e., to the abstract conception of the gorilla).

JE

-----------------------#70 Don't animals live longer in zoos than they would in the wild?-----------------------

In some cases, this is true. But it is irrelevant. Suppose a zoo decidesto exhibit human beings. They snatch a peasant from a less-developed countryand put her on display. Due to the regular feedings and health care that thezoo provides, the peasant will live longer in captivity. Is this practiceacceptable? A tradeoff of quantity of life versus quality of life is not always decidedin favor of quantity.

DG

-----------------------#71 How will people see wild animals and learn about them without zoos?-----------------------

To gain true and complete knowledge of wild animals, one must observe

them in their natural habitats. The conditions under which animals arekept in zoos typically distorts their behavior significantly. There are several practical alternatives to zoos for educationalpurposes. There are many nature documentaries shown regularly ontelevision as well as available on video cassettes. Specials on publictelevision networks, as well as several cable channels, such as TheDiscovery Channel, provide accurate information on animals in theirnatural habitats. Magazines such as National Geographic providesuperb illustrated articles, as well. And, of course, public librariesare a gold-mine of information. Zoos often mistreat animals, keeping them in small pens or cages.This is unfair and cruel. The natural instincts and behavior of theseanimals are suppressed by force. How can anyone observe wild animalsunder such circumstances and believe that one has been educated?

JLS

All good things are wild, and free.Henry David Thoreau

(essayist and poet)

SEE ALSO: #69-#70

-----------------------#72 What is wrong with circuses and rodeos?-----------------------

To treat animals as objects for our amusement is to treat them withoutthe respect they deserve. When we degrade the most intelligent fellowmammals in this way, we act as our ancestors acted in former centuries.They knew nothing about the animals' intelligence, sensitivities,emotions, and social needs; they saw only brute beasts. To continue suchancient traditions, even if no cruelty were involved, means that we insiston remaining ignorant and insensitive. But the cruelty does exist and is inherent in these spectacles. Inrodeos, there is no show unless the animal is frightened or in pain. Incircuses, animals suffer most before and after the show. They endurepunishment during training and are subjected to physical and emotionalhardships during transportation. They are forced to travel

tens ofthousands of miles each year, often in extreme heat or cold, with tigersliving in cramped cages and elephants chained in filthy railroad cars. Tothe entrepreneurs, animals are merely stock in trade, to be replaced whenthey are used up.

DVH

David Cowles-Hamar writes about circuses as follows in his "The Manualof Animal Rights":

Not surprisingly, a considerable amount of "persuasion" is required to achieve these performances, and to this end, circuses employ various techniques. These include deprivation of food, deprivation of company, intimidation, muzzling, drugs, punishment and reward systems, shackling, whips, electronic goads, sticks, and the noise of guns...Circus animals suffer similar mental and physical problems to zoo animals, displaying stereotypical behavior...Physical symptoms include shackle sores, herpes, liver failure, kidney disease, and sometimes death...Many of the animals become both physically and mentally ill.

DG

The American rodeo consists of roping, bucking, and steer wrestlingevents. While the public witnesses only the 8 seconds or so that theanimals perform, there are hundreds of hours of unsupervised practicesessions. Also, the stress of constant travel, often in improperlyventilated vehicles, and poor enforcement of proper unloading, feeding,and watering of animals during travel contribute to a life of misery forthese animals. As half a rider's score is based on the performance of the bucking horseor bull, riders encourage a wild ride by tugging on a bucking strap thatis squeezed tightly around the animal's loins. Electric prods and rakingspurs are also used to stimulate wild behavior. Injuries range frombruises and broken bones to paralysis, severed tracheas, and death. Spinalcords of calves can be severed when forced to an abrupt stop whiletraveling at 30 mph. The practice of slamming these

animals to the groundduring these events has caused the rupture of internal organs, leading to aslow, agonizing death. Dr. C. G. Haber, a veterinarian with thirty years experience as a meatinspector for the USDA, says: "The rodeo folks send their animals to thepacking houses where...I have seen cattle so extensively bruised that theonly areas in which the skin was attached was the head, neck, legs, andbelly. I have seen animals with six to eight ribs broken from the spineand at times puncturing the lungs. I have seen as much as two and threegallons of free blood accumulated under the detached skin."

JSD

-----------------------#73 But isn't it true that animals are well cared for and wouldn't perform if they weren't happy?-----------------------

Refer to questions #72 and #74 to see that entertainment animals aregenerally not well cared for. For centuries people have known that punishment can induce animals toperform. The criminal justice system is based on the human rationality inconnecting the act of a crime or wrongdoing with a punishment. Manyreligions are also based, among other aspects, on a fear of punishment.Fear leads most of us to act correctly, on the whole. The same is true for other animals. Many years of unnecessary andrepetitive psychology experiments with Skinner boxes (among other gadgets)have demonstrated that animals will learn to do things, or act in certainways (that is, be conditioned) to avoid electric shocks or other punishment. Animals do need to have their basic food requirements met, otherwise theysicken and die, but they don't need to be "happy" to perform certain acts;fear or desire for a reward (such as food) will make them do it.

JK

SEE ALSO: #14, #51, #72, #74

-----------------------#74 What about horse or greyhound racing?-----------------------

Racing is an example of human abuse of animals merely

for entertainmentand pleasure, regardless of the needs or condition of the animals. Thepleasure derives primarily from gambling on the outcome of the race. Whilesome punters express an interest in the animal side of the equation, mostpeople interested in racing are not interested in the animals but in betting;attendance at race meetings has fallen dramatically as off-course bettingoptions became available. While some of the top dogs and horses may be kept in good conditions, forthe majority of animals, this is not the case. While minimum living standardshave to be met, other factors are introduced to gain the best performances(or in some cases to fix a race by ensuring a loss): drugs, electricalstimuli, whips, etc. While many of these practices are outlawed (includingdog blooding), there are regular reports of various illegal techniques beingused. Logic would suggest that where the volume of money being moved aroundis as large as it is in racing, there are huge temptations to massage theoutcomes. For horses, especially, the track itself poses dangers; falls and fracturesare common in both flat and jump races. Often, lame horses are doped toallow them to continue to race, with the risk of serious injury. And at the end of it all, if the animal is not a success, or does notperform as brilliantly as hoped, it is disposed of. Horses are lucky in thatthey occasionally go to a home where they are well treated and respected, butthe knackery is a common option (a knackery is a purveyor of products derivedfrom worn-out and old livestock). (Recently, a new practice has come to light:owners of race horses sometimes murder horses that do not reach their"potential", or which are past their "prime", and then file fraudulentinsurance claims.) The likely homes for a greyhound are few and far between.

JK

Race horses are prone to a disease called exercise-induced pulmonaryhemorrhage (EIPH). It is characterized by the presence of blood in the lungsand windpipe of the horse following intense exercise. An Australian studyfound 42 percent of 1,180 horses to be suffering from EIPH.

A large percentage of race horses suffer from lameness. Fractures of theknee are common, as are ligament sprain, joint sprain, and shin soreness. Steeple chasing is designed to make the horses fall which sometimes resultsin the death of the horse either though a broken neck or an "incurable"injury for which the horse is killed by a veterinarian.

David Cowles-Hamar

SEE ALSO: #72-#73

-----------------COMPANION ANIMALS-----------------

-----------------------#75 What about keeping pets?-----------------------

In a perfect world, all of our efforts would go toward protecting thehabitats of other species on the planet and we would be able to maintain a"hands off" approach in which we did not take other species into ourfamily units, but allowed them to develop on their own in the wild. However,we are far from such a Utopia and as responsible humans must deal with theresults of the domestication of animals. Since many animals domesticatedto be pets have been bred but have no homes, most AR supporters seenothing wrong with having them as companion animals. As a matter of fact,the AR supporter may well provide homes for more unwanted companionanimals than does the average person! Similarly, animals domesticated foragricultural purposes should be cared for. However, animals in the wild should be left there and not brought intohomes as companions. A cage in someone's house is an unnaturalenvironment for an exotic bird, fish, or mammal. When the novelty wearsoff, wild pets usually end up at shelters, zoos, or research labs. Wildanimals have the right to be treated with respect, and that includesleaving them in their natural surroundings.

LK

A loving relationship with a proper companion animal, a relationshipthat adequately provides for the animal's physical and psychological needs,is not at all inconsistent with the principles and

advocacy of animal rights. Indeed, animal rights advocates have been leaders in drawing attention tosome of the abuses and neglects of our "beloved" pets. Many of the taken forgranted practices do need to be reexamined and changed. The questions thatanimal rights raises about companion animals are important questions:

* Can we maintain animals as companions and still properly address their needs? Obviously, we can't do this for all animals. For example, keeping birds in cages denies those creatures their capacity and inherent need to fly.

* Is manipulating companion animals for our needs in the the best interests of the nonhuman animal as well? Tail docking would thus be a practice to condemn in this regard.

* Might some of our taken-for-granted practices of pet keeping be really a form of exploitation? Animals in circuses or panhandlers using animals on the street to get money from passersby would arguably be cases of exploitation.

* Which attitudes of human caretakers are truly expressions of our respect and love towards these animals, and which might not be? Exotic breeding is one example of this kind of abuse, especially when the breeding results in animals that are at a greater risk for certain diseases or biological defects.

All that animal rights is really asking is that we consider more deeplyand authentically the practice at hand and whether or not it truly meetsthe benchmark that BOTH the needs of human AND nonhuman animals beconsidered.

TA

The following points should be considered when selecting a companionanimal. Get a companion animal appropriate to your situation--don't keep a big dogin a flat or small garden. Don't get an animal that will be keptunnecessarily confined--birds, fish, etc. However, it is a good policy totry to keep cats inside as much as possible, especially at

night, to protectboth the cat and local wildlife. Get your dog or cat from a local pound oranimal group; thousands of animals are destroyed each year by groups such asthe RSPCA. The majority are animals who are lost or dumped. Vicious animalsare not adopted out. By getting an animal from such a source you will besaving its life and reducing the reliance on breeders. Finally, get your companion neutered. There is no behavioral or biologicalbenefit from being fertile or from having a litter. And every pup or kittenthat is produced will need to find a home.

JK

SEE ALSO: #76

-----------------------#76 What about spaying and neutering?-----------------------

Ingrid Newkirk writes:

"What's happening to our best friends should never happen even to our worst enemies. With an estimated 80 to 100 million cats and dogs in this country already, 3,000 to 5,000 more puppies and kittens are born every hour in the United States--far more than can ever find good homes. Unwanted animals are dumped at the local pound or abandoned in woods and on city streets, where they suffer from starvation, lack of shelter and veterinary care, and abuse. Most die from disease, starvation, and mistreatment, or, if they're lucky are 'put to sleep' forever at an animal shelter."

The point is that the practice of neutering and spaying prevents far moresuffering and harm than it imposes on the neutered or spayed animals. Thenet harm is minimized.

DG

SEE ALSO: #75

------------------LABORATORY ANIMALS------------------

-----------------------#77 What is wrong with experimentation on animals?-----------------------

The claimed large gains from using animals in research makes the practicethe most significant challenge to AR philosophy. While it is easy to dismissmeat production as a trivial indulgence of the taste buds, such a dismissalis not so easily accomplished for animal research. First, a definition. We refer to as "vivisection" any use of animals inscience or research that exploits and harms them. This definition acknowledgesthat there is some research using animals that is morally acceptable under ARphilosophy (see question #80). The case against vivisection is built upon three planks. They are:

PLANK A. Vivisection is immoral and should be abolished.

PLANK B. Abolition of vivisection is not antiscience or antiresearch.

PLANK C. The consequences of abolition are acceptable.

It is easy to misunderstand the AR philosophy regarding vivisection. Often,scientists will debate endlessly about the scientific validity of research,and sometimes AR people engage in those debates. Such issues are part ofPLANK C, which asserts that much research is misleading, wrong, or misguided.However, the key to the AR position is PLANK A, which asserts an objection tovivisection on ethical grounds. We seek to reassure people about the effectsabolition will have on future medical progress via PLANKS B and C. In the material that follows, each piece of text is identified with apreceding tag such as [PLANK A]. The idea is to show how the text fragmentsfit into the overall case. There is some overlap between PLANKs B and C, sothe assignment may look arbitrary in a few cases.

DG

[PLANK A] Over 100 million animals are used in experiments worldwide every year.A few of the more egregious examples of vivisection may be enlightening forthe uninformed (taken from R. Ryder's "Victims of Science"):

* Psychologists gave electric shocks to the feet of 1042 mice. They then caused convulsions by giving more intense shocks through cup-shaped electrodes applied to the animals' eyes or

through spring clips attached to their ears.

* In Japan, starved rats with electrodes in their necks and electrodes in their eyeballs were forced to run in treadmills for four hours at a time.

* A group of 64 monkeys was addicted to drugs by automatic injection in their jugular veins. When the supply of drugs was abruptly withdrawn, some of the monkeys were observed to die in convulsions. Before dying, some monkeys plucked out all their hair or bit off their own fingers and toes.

Basic ethical objections to this type of "science" are presented hereand in questions #79 and #85. Some technical objections are found inquestions #78 and #80. Question #92 contains a list of books on vivisection;refer to them for further examples of the excesses of vivisection, as wellas more detailed discussion of its technical merits. VIVISECTION TREATS ANIMALS AS TOOLS. Vivisection effectively reducessentient beings to the status of disposable tools, to be used and discardedfor the benefit of others. This forgets that each animal has an inherentvalue, a value that does not rise and fall depending on the interests ofothers. Those doubting this should ponder the implications of their viewsfor humans: would they support the breeding of human slaves for the exclusiveuse of experimenters? VIVISECTION IS SPECIESIST. Most animal experimenters would not usenonconsenting humans in invasive research. In making this concession, theyreveal the importance they attach to species membership, a biological linethat is as morally relevant as that of race or gender, that is, not relevantat all. VIVISECTION DEMEANS SCIENCE. Its barbaric practices are an insult to thosewho feel that science should provide humans with the opportunity to riseabove the harsher laws of nature. The words of Tom Regan summarize the feelings of many AR activists: "Thelaudatory achievements of science, including the many genuine benefitsobtained for both humans and animals, do not justify the unjust means used

to secure them. As in other cases, so in the present one, the rights viewdoes not call for the cessation of scientific research. Such researchshould go on--but not at the expense of laboratory animals."

AECW

Atrocities are not less atrocities when they occur in laboratories andare called medical research.

George Bernard Shaw (playwright, Nobel 1925)

Vivisection is the blackest of all the black crimes that a man is atpresent committing against God and his fair creation.

Mahatma Gandhi (statesman and philosopher)

What I think about vivisection is that if people admit that they have theright to take or endanger the life of living beings for the benefit of many,there will be no limit for their cruelty.

Leo Tolstoy (author)

I am not interested to know whether vivisection produces results thatare profitable to the human race or doesn't...The pain which it inflictsupon unconsenting animals is the basis of my enmity toward it, andit is to me sufficient justification of the enmity without lookingfurther.

Mark Twain (author)

SEE ALSO: #78-#82, #85-#86

-----------------------#78 Do AR people accept that vivisection has led to valuable medical advances?-----------------------

[PLANK A] AR advocates generally believe that vivisection has played a contributing,if not necessarily essential, role in some valuable medical advances.However, AR philosophy asserts that the end does not justify the means, andthat therefore the answer cannot decide the legitimacy of the stance againstvivisection.

[PLANK C] That said, many people, including former vivisectors and medical historians,will readily state that there is ample scientific and

historical evidenceshowing that most vivisection is futile, and often harmful to those itpretends to serve. On statistical grounds, vivisection does not deliver: despite the use of144,000,000 animals in Britain since 1950, life-expectancy in Britain for themiddle-aged has not changed since this date. Some 85 percent of the labanimals killed between the 1890s and the 1990s died after 1950, but the fallin death rate during these 100 years was 92 percent complete by 1950. Consider, for a specific example, these figures for cancer:

--------------------------------------------------------- CANCER DEATH RATE PER MILLION MEN IN BRITAIN [FOR THOSE > 100 PER MILLION]---------------------------------------------------------Cancer type 1971-1975 1976-1980 % change---------------------------------------------------------Bladder 118 123 + 4.2Pancreas 118 125 + 5.9Prostate 177 199 + 12.4Stomach 298 278 - 6.7Colorectal 311 320 + 2.9Lung, Trachea, 1091 1125 + 3.1Bronchus...[data for women excised for space reasons]

Gains in the war against cancer are sadly lacking, despite the vast numbers ofanimals sacrificed for cancer research. When such analyses are performed across the spectrum of health issues, itbecomes clear that, at best, the contribution of vivisection to our healthmust be considered quite modest. The dramatic declines in death rates for oldkiller diseases, such as, tuberculosis, pneumonia, typhoid, whooping cough,and cholera, came from improvements in housing, in working conditions, in thequantity and quality of food and water supplies, and in hygiene. Chemotherapyand immunization cannot logically be given much credit here, since they onlybecame available, chronologically, after most of the declines were achieved. Consider the particular example of penicillin: it was discoveredaccidentally by Fleming in 1928. He tested on rabbits, and when they failedto react (we now know that they excrete penicillin rapidly), he lost interestin his substance. Still, two scientists followed up on his work, successfullytried on mice and stated:

"...mice were tried in the initial toxicity tests because of their small size, but what a lucky chance it was, for in this respect man is like the mouse and not the guinea pig. If we had used guinea pigs exclusively we should have said that the penicillin was toxic, and we probably should not have proceeded to try to overcome the difficulties of producing the substance for trial in man."

Vivisection generally fails because:

* Human medicine cannot be based on veterinary medicine. This is because animals are different histologically, anatomically, genetically, immunologically, and physiologically.

* Animals and humans react differently to substances. For example, some drugs are carcinogenic in humans but not in animals, or vice-versa.

* Naturally occurring diseases (e.g., in patients) and artificially induced diseases (e.g., in lab animals) often differ substantially.

All this manifests itself in examples such as the one below:

--------------------------------------------------- SPECIES DIFFERENCE IN TESTS FOR BIRTH DEFECTS---------------------------------------------------Chemical Teratogen (i.e., causes birth defects) ----------------------------------- yes no---------------------------------------------------

aspirin rats, mice, monkeys, humans guinea pigs, cats, dogs

aminopterin humans monkeys

azathioprine rabbits rats

caffeine rats, mice rabbits

cortisone mice, rabbits rats

thalidomide humans rats, mice, hamsterstriamcilanone mice humans

---------------------------------------------------

There are countless examples, old and recent, of the misleading effects

of vivisection, and there are countless statements from reputable scientistswho see vivisection for what it is: bad science. Following are just a few ofthem.

AECW

The uselessness of most of the animal models is less well-known. Forexample, the discovery of chemotherapeutic agents for the treatment of humancancer is widely heralded as a triumph due to use of animal model systems.However, here again, these exaggerated claims are coming from or are endorsedby the same people who get the federal dollars for animal research. There islittle, if any, factual evidence that would support these claims. Indeed whileconflicting animal results have often delayed and hampered advances in the waron cancer, they have never produced a single substantial advance in theprevention or treatment of human cancer. For instance, practically all of thechemotherapeutic agents which are of value in the treatment of human cancerwere found in a clinical context rather than in animal studies.

Dr. Irwin Bross1981 Congressional testimony

Indeed even while these [clinical] studies were starting, warning voiceswere suggesting that data from research on animals could not be used todevelop a treatment for human tumors.

British Medical Journal, 1982

Vivisection is barbaric, useless, and a hindrance to scientific progress.

Dr. Werner HartingerChief Surgeon, West Germany,

1988

...many vivisectors still claim that what they do helps save human lives.They are lying. The truth is that animal experiments kill people, and animalresearchers are responsible for the deaths of thousands of men, women andchildren every year.

Dr. Vernon ColemanFellow of the Royal Society

of Medicine, UK

-----------------------#79 How can you justify losing medical advances that would save human lives by stopping vivisection?

-----------------------

[PLANK A] The same way we justify not performing forcible research on unwillinghumans! A lot of even more relevant information is currently foregoneowing to our strictures against human experimentation. If life-savingmedical advances are to be sought at all cost, why should nonhuman animalsbe singled out for ill-treatment? We must accept that there is such athing as "ill-gotten gains", and that the potential fruits of vivisectionqualify as such. This question might be regarded as a veiled insult to the creativityand resourcefulness of scientists. Although humans have never set foot onPluto, scientists have still garnered a lot of valuable scientificinformation concerning it. Why couldn't such feats of ingenuity be repeatedin other fields?

AECW

[PLANK B] Forcible experimentation on humans is not the only alternative. Manyhumans would be glad to participate in experiments that offer the hope ofa cure for their afflictions, or for the afflictions of others. Ifindividual choice were allowed, there might be no need for animalexperimentation. The stumbling block is government regulations that forbidthese choices. Similarly, government regulations are the reason manyanimals are sacrificed for product testing, often unnecessarily.

PM

SEE ALSO: #77-#78, #80-#82, #85-#86

-----------------------#80 Aren't there instances where there are no alternatives to the use of animals?-----------------------

[PLANK A] The reply to the question here is succinct: "If so, so what?". Let us recallthat we are happy enough (today) to forego knowledge that would be acquiredat the expense of commandeering humans into service, and that we includechildren, the mentally diminished and even people suffering from types of

disease for which animal models are unsatisfactory (such as AIDS). That is,a prior ethical decision was made that rules them out from experimentation,and that foregoes any potential knowledge so derived. Now the Animal Rights argument is consistent: since no morally relevantdifference can be produced that separates humans spared experimentation fromtest animals (those that are subjects-of-a-life), vivisection is exposed asimmoral, and the practice must be abandoned. Just as the insights offered by the Nazis' experiments on concentrationcamp prisoners were morally illicit, so are any and all benefits traceable tovivisection. As Tom Regan put it:

"Since, whatever our gains, they are ill-gotten, we must bring an end to [such] research, whatever our losses."

[PLANK B]The argument above makes the search for alternatives morally imperative, andif it is objected that this "just isn't possible", one should reply thatbelittling the ingenuity of scientists will not do. There have been caseswhere alternatives to vivisection had to be sought, and--of course--they werefound. For example, Sharpe writes in The Human Cost of Animal Experimentation:"Historically, a classic example is the conquest of yellow fever. In 1900, noanimal was known to be susceptible, prompting studies with human volunteerswhich proved that mosquitoes did indeed transmit the disease. Theseobservations led to improved sanitation and quarantine measures in Havanawhere yellow fever, once rife, was eradicated."

[PLANK C] We now cite a few alternatives to animal models of human diseases. Twotraditional types are: a) Clinical studies: these are essential for athorough understanding of any disease. Anesthetics, artificial respiration,the stethoscope, electrocardiographs, blood pressure measurements, etc.,resulted from careful clinical studies. b) Epidemiology studies: i.e., thestudy of diseases of whole populations. They, and not animal tests, haveidentified most of the substances known to cause cancer in humans. Typicalexample: Why is cancer of the colon so frequent in Europe and North America,infrequent in Japan, but common in Japanese immigrants to

North America? More recent technological advances now allow a host of other investigativemethods to be applied, including:

* Tissue cultures: Human cells and tissues can be kept alive in cultures and used for biomedical research. Since human material is used, extrapolation problems are short-circuited. Such cultures have been used in cancer research by FDA scientists, for example, and according to them: "[they] offer the possibility of studying not only the biology of cancer cell growth and invasion into normal human tissue, but also provide a method for evaluating the effects of a variety of potentially important antitumor agents."

* Physico-chemical methods: For example, liquid chromatographs and mass spectrophotometers allow researchers to identify substances in biological substances. For example, a bioassay for vitamin D used to involve inducing rickets in rats and feeding them vitamin-D-rich substances. Now, liquid chromatography allows such bioassays to be conducted quicker and at reduced cost.

* Computer simulations: According to Dr. Walker at the University of Texas: "... computer simulations offer a wide range of advantages over live animal experiments in the physiology and pharmacology laboratory. These include: savings in animal procurement and housing costs; nearly unlimited availability to meet student schedules; the opportunity to correct errors and repeat parts of the experiment performed incorrectly or misinterpreted; speed of operation and efficient use of students' time and consistency with knowledge learned elsewhere."

* Computer-aided drug design: Such methods have been used in cancer and sickle-cell anemia drug research, for example. Here, 3D computer graphics and the theoretical field of quantum pharmacology are combined to help in designing drugs according to required specifications.

* Mechanical models: For example, an artificial neck has been developed

by General Motors for use in car-crash simulations. Indeed, the well-known "crash dummies" are much more accurate and effective than the primates previously employed.

This list is by no means exhaustive.

[PLANK B] There are instances where the benefits of experimentation accrue directlyto the individual concerned; for example, the trial of a new plastic heartmay be proposed to someone suffering from heart disease, or a new surgicaltechnique may be attempted to save a nonhuman animal. This may qualify, inthe mind of the questioner, as an instance of use of animals. The positionhere is simple: The Animal Rights position does not condemn experimentationwhere it is conducted for the benefit of the individual patient. Clinicaltrials of new drugs, for example, often fall in this category, and so doessome veterinary research, such as the clinical study of already sick animals.Another example of acceptable animal research is ethology, i.e. the studyof animals in their natural habitat.

AECW

[PLANK B] Following is a list of alternatives to much, if not all, vivisection:

* Cell, tissue, and organ cultures * Clinical observation * Human volunteers (sick and well) * Autopsies * Material from natural deaths * Noninvasive imaging in clinical settings * Post-market surveillance * Statistical inference * Computer models * Substitution with plants

These alternatives, and others not yet conceived, will ensure thatscientific research will not come to a halt upon abolition of vivisection.

DG

-----------------------#81 But what if animals also benefit, e.g., through advance of veterinary science?-----------------------

[PLANK A] The Animal Rights philosophy is species-neutral, so the

arguments developedelsewhere in this section apply with equal force. The immorality ofrights-violative practices is not attenuated by claiming that the victimsand beneficiaries are of the same species.

AECW

-----------------------#82 Should people refuse medical treatments obtained through vivisection?-----------------------

[PLANK A] This is a favorite question for the defenders of vivisection. Theimplication is that the AR position is inconsistent or irrational becauseAR people partake of some fruits of vivisection. As a first answer, we can point out that for existing treatments derivedfrom vivisection, the damage has already been done. Nothing is gained byrefusing the treatment. Vivisectors counter that the situation is analogousto our refusal to eat meat sold at the grocery; the damage has been done,so why not eat the meat? But there is a crucial difference. Knowledge isa permanent commodity; unlike meat, it is abstract, it doesn't rot. Considera piece of knowledge obtained through vivisection. If vivisection wereabolished, the knowledge could be used repeatedly without endorsing orfurther supporting vivisection. With meat consumption, the practice ofslaughter must continue if the fruits are to continue to be enjoyed. Another point is that, had the vivisection not occurred, the knowledgemight well have been obtained through alternative, moral methods. Are weto permanently foreclose the use of an abstract piece of knowledge due to thepast folly of a vivisector? The same cannot be said of meat; it cannot beobtained without slaughter. If the reader finds this unpersuasive, she should consider that the ARmovement sincerely wants to abolish vivisection, eliminating ill-gottenfruits. If this is achieved, the original question becomes moot, becausethere will be no such fruits.

DG

[PLANK A] This is another "where should I draw the line" question, with the addedtwist that one's personal health may be on the line. As

such, the rightanswer is likely to depend a good deal on personal circumstances and judgment.It is certainly beyond the call of duty to make an absolute pledge, since theprinciple of self-defense may ultimately apply (particularly in life-or deathcases). Still, many people will be prepared to make statements against animaloppression, even at considerable cost to their well-being. For these, thefollowing issues might be worth considering.

[PLANK C] WHAT IS THE TRUE CONTRIBUTION OF ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION TO THE DEVELOPMENTOF THE TREATMENT? Most treatments owe nothing to animal experimentation atall, or were developed in spite of animal experimentation rather than thanksto it. Insulin is one good example. The really important discoveries did notproceed from the celebrated experiments of Banting and Best on dogs but fromclinical discoveries: According to Dr. Sharpe: "The link between diabetes andthe pancreas was first demonstrated by Thomas Cawley in 1788 when he examineda patient who had died from the disease. Further autopsies confirmed thatdiabetes is indeed linked with degeneration of the pancreas but, partlybecause physiologists, including the notorious Claude Bernard, had failed toproduce a diabetic state in animals...the idea was not accepted for manyyears." One had to wait until 1889 for the link to be accepted, the date atwhich two researchers, Mering and Minkowski, managed to induce a form ofdiabetes in dogs by removing their entire pancreas. Autopsies furtherrevealed that some parts of the pancreas of diabetics were damaged, givingbirth to the idea that administering pancreatic extracts to patients mighthelp. Other examples of treatments owing nothing to vivisection include the heartdrug digitalis, quinine (used against malaria), morphine (a pain killer),ether (an anesthetic), sulfanilimide (a diuretic), cortisone (used to relievearthritic pains, for example), aspirin, fluoride (in toothpastes), etc. Incidentally, some of these indisputably useful drugs would find it hardto pass these so-called animal safety tests. Insulin causes birth defects inchickens, rabbits, and mice but not in man; morphine

sedates man butstimulates cats; doses of aspirin used in human therapeutics poison cats (anddo nothing for fever in horses); the widespread use of digitalis was sloweddown by confounding results from animal studies (and legitimized by clinicalstudies, as ever), and so on. IS THE TREATMENT REALLY SAFE? The nefarious effects of many newly-developed,"safe" compounds often take some time to be acknowledged. For example, evenserious side-effects can sometimes go under-reported. In the UK, only a dozenof the 3500 deaths eventually linked to the use of isoprenaline aerosolinhalers were reported by doctors. Similarly, it took 4 years forthe side-effects of the heart drug Eraldine (which included eye damage) to beacknowledged. The use of these drugs were, evidently, approved followingextensive animal testing. WILL THE TREATMENT REALLY HELP? This question is not as incongruous as itmay appear. A 1967 official enquiry suggested that one third of the mostprescribed drugs in the UK were "undesirable preparations". Many new drugsprovide no advantage over existing compounds: in 1977, the US FDA released astudy of 1,935 drugs introduced up to April 1977 which suggested that 79.4percent of them provided "little or no [therapeutic] gain". About 80 percentof new introductions in the UK are reformulations, or duplications ofexisting drugs. A 1980 survey by the Medicines Division of UK Department forHealth and Social Security states : "[new drugs] have largely been introducedinto therapeutic areas already heavily oversubscribed and...for conditionswhich are common, largely chronic and occur principally in the affluentWestern society. Innovation is therefore largely directed toward commercialreturns rather than therapeutic needs."

[PLANK B] ARE THERE ALTERNATIVES TO THE TREATMENT? A better appreciation of thebenefits of "alternative" practices has developed in recent years. Often,dietary or lifestyle changes can be effective treatments on their own.Adult-onset diabetes has been linked to obesity, for instance, and can oftenbe cured simply by weight-loss and sensible dieting. Other types ofalternative medicine, such as acupuncture, have proven

useful in stressrelief, and against insomnia and back pains.

AECW

[PLANK A] In modern society, I think it would be almost impossible NOT to use medicalinformation gained through animal research at some stage--drug testing beingthe most obvious consideration--without opting out of health care altogether.It is important, therefore, that we emphasize the need to stop now. The pastis irretrievable.

JK

-----------------------#83 Farmers have to kill pests to protect our food supply. Given that, what's wrong with killing a few more rats for medical research?-----------------------

[PLANK A] First, we object to the casual attitude of the questioner to the killingof rights holders. A nonspeciesist philosophy, such as that of Animal Rights,sees that as no different from suggesting:

Humans are killed legitimately every day. Given that, what's wrong with killing a few more humans for medical research?

Hopefully, the reply is now obvious: in the original question, the fateof pests is an irrelevant consideration (here), and the case for theliberation of laboratory animals must be evaluated on its own. Seeking todilute a number of immoral killings into a greater number of arguablydefensible ones is a creative but illogical attempt at ethical reasoning.

AECW

SEE ALSO: #59

-----------------------#84 What about dissection; isn't it necessary for a complete education?-----------------------

[PLANK A] Dissection refers to the practice of performing exploratory surgery onanimals (both killed and live) in an educational context. The averageperson's experience of this practice consists of dissecting a frog ina high-school biology class, but fetal chipmunks, mice,

rabbits, dogs,cats, pigs, and other animals are also used. Dissection accounts for the death of about 7 million animals per year.Many of these animals are bred in factory-farm conditions. Others aretaken from their natural habitats. Often, strayed companion animals endup in the hands of dissectors. These animals suffer from inhumaneconfinement and transport, and are finally killed by means of gassing,neck-snapping, and other "inexpensive" methods. The practice of dissection is repulsive to many students andhigh-schoolers have begun to speak out against it. Some have even engagedin litigation (and won!) to assert a right to not participate in suchunnecessary cruelty. California has a law giving students (through highschool) the right to refuse dissection. The law requires an alternative tobe offered and that the student suffer no sanctions for exercising thisright. Having dealt with the sub-question "What is dissection?", let'sconsider whether it is necessary for a complete education.

[PLANK B] There are several very effective alternatives to dissection. In somecases, these alternatives are more effective than dissection itself.Larger-than-life models, films and videos, and computer simulations areall viable methods of teaching biological principles. The latter option,computer simulation, has the advantage of offering an additionalinteractive facility that has shown great value in other educationalcontexts. These alternative methods are often cheaper than the traditionalpractice of dissection. A computer program can be used indefinitely fora one-time purchase cost; the practice of dissection presents an ongoingexpense. In view of these effective alternatives, and the economic gains associatedtherewith, the practice of dissection begins to look more and more likea rite of passage into the world of animal abuse, almost a fraternityinitiation for future vivisectors. This practice desensitizesstudents to animal suffering and teaches them that animals can beused and discarded without respect for their lives. Is

this the kind oflesson we want to teach our children?

JLS/DG

[PLANK C] Dissecting animals is often described as necessary for the completeeducation of surgeons. This is nonsense. Numerous surgeons have statedthat practicing on animals does not provide adequate skills for humansurgery. For example, dogs are the favorite test animal of surgerystudents, yet their body shape is different, the internal arrangement oftheir organs is different, the elasticity of their tissues under the scalpelis different, and postoperative effects are different (they are less proneto infection, for one thing). Also, many surgeons have suggested thatpracticing on animals may induce in the mind of the student a casualattitude to suffering. Following are the thoughts of several prestigious surgeons on this issue.

AECW

...wounds of animals are so different from those of [humans] that theconclusions of vivisection are absolutely worthless. They have done farmore harm than good in surgery.

Lawson Tait

Any person who had to endure certain experiments carried out on animalswhich perish slowly in the laboratories would regard death by burning at thestake as a happy deliverance. Like every one else in my profession, I usedto be of the opinion that we owe nearly all our knowledge of medical andsurgical science to animal experiments. Today I know that precisely theopposite is the case. In surgery especially, they are of no help to thepractitioner, indeed he is often led astray by them.

Professor Bigelow

...the aim should be to train the surgeon using human patients by movinggradually from stage to stage of difficulty and explicitly rejecting theacquisition of skills by practicing on animals...which is useless anddangerous in the training of a thoracic surgeon.

Professor R. J. Belcher

Practice on dogs probably makes a good veterinarian, if that is the kind

of practitioner you want for your family.William Held

[End surgeon quotes]

Animal life, somber mystery. All nature protests against thebarbarity of man, who misapprehends, who humiliates, who tortureshis inferior brethren.

Jules Michelet (historian)

Mutilating animals and calling it 'science' condemns the human speciesto moral and intellectual hell...this hideous Dark Age of the mindlesstorture of animals must be overcome.

Grace Slick (musician)

SEE ALSO: #77-#81, #92

-----------------------#85 What is wrong with product testing on animals?-----------------------

[PLANK A] The practice of product testing on animals treats animals as discardableand renewable resources, as replaceable clones with no individual lives,no interests, and no aspirations of their own. It callously enlistshapless creatures into the service of humans. It assumes that the risksincurred by one class of individuals can be forcibly transferred ontoanother. Product testing is also unbelievably cruel. One notorious method oftesting is the Draize irritancy test, in which potentially harmfulproducts are dripped into the eyes of test animals (usually rabbits). Theharmfulness of the product is then (subjectively) assessed depending onthe size of the area injured, the opacity of the cornea, and the degreeof redness, swelling and discharge of the conjunctivae, and in moresevere cases, on the blistering or gross destruction of the cornea.

[PLANK C] The use of animals in medicine is often challenged on scientificgrounds, and product tests are no exception. For example, one widely usedtest is the so-called LD50 (Lethal Dose 50 percent) test. The toxicity levelof a product is assessed by force-feeding it to a number of animals until 50

percent of them die. Death may come after a few days or weeks, and is oftenpreceded by convulsions, vomiting, breathing difficulties, and more. Often,this test reveals nothing at all; animals die simply because of the volumeof product administered, through the rupture of internal organs. How such savage practices could provide any useful data is a mystery, andnot just to AR activists. It is seen as dubious by many toxicologists, andeven by some Government advisers. Animal models often produce misleadingresults, or produce no useful results at all, and product testing is noexception. One toxicologist writes: "It is surely time, therefore, that weceased to use as an index of the toxic action of food additives the LD50value, which is imprecise (varying considerably with different species, withdifferent strains of the same species, with sex, with nutritional status,environmental status, and even with the concentration at which the substanceis administered) and which is valueless in the planning of further studies."

[PLANK B] The truth is that animal lives could be spared in many ways. For example,duplication of experiments could be avoided by setting up databases ofresults. Also, a host of humane alternatives to such tests are alreadyavailable, and the considerable sums spent on breeding or keeping testanimals could be usefully redirected into researching new ones.

AECW

The animal rights view calls for the abolition of all animal toxicitytests. Animals are not our tasters. We are not their kings.

Tom Regan (philosopher and AR activist)

SEE ALSO: #86

-----------------------#86 How do I know if a product has been tested on animals?-----------------------

There are two easy ways to determine whether a product uses animal productsor is tested on animals. First, most companies provide a toll-free telephonenumber for inquiring about their products. This is the

most reliable methodfor obtaining up-to-date information. Second, several excellent guides areavailable that provide listings of companies and products. The sectionentitled "Guides, Handbooks, and Reference" in question #92 lists severalexcellent guides to cruelty-free shopping. For maximum convenience, you canobtain a wallet-sized listing from PETA. Send a stamped, self-addressedenvelope with your request for the "PETA Cruelty-Free Shopping Guide" toPETA, P.O. Box 42516, Washington, DC 20015. Another thing to think about is the possibility of avoiding products bymaking safe, ecologically sound alternative products yourself! Several ofthe guides described in question #92 explain how to do this.

DG

SEE ALSO: #85, #92

-----------AR ACTIVISM-----------

-----------------------#87 What are the forms of animal rights activism?-----------------------

Let us first adopt a broad definition of activism as the processof acting in support of a cause, as opposed to privately lamentingand bemoaning the current state of affairs. Given that, AR activismspans a broad spectrum, with relatively simple and innocuous actionsat one end, and difficult and politico-legally charged actions at theother. Each individual must make a personal decision about whereto reside on the spectrum. For some, forceful or unlawful action isa moral imperative; others may condemn it, or it may be impractical(for example, a lawyer may serve animals better through the legislativeprocess than by going on raids and possibly getting disbarred).Following is a brief sampling of AR activism, beginning atthe low end of the spectrum. The spectrum of action can be divided conveniently into four zones:personal actions, proselytizing, organizing, and civil disobedience.Consider first personal actions. Here are some of the personal actions

you can take in support of AR:

Learning -- Educate yourself about the issues involved. Vegetarianism and Veganism -- Become one. Cruelty-Free Shopping -- Avoid products involve testing on animals. Cruelty-Free Fashion -- Avoid leather and fur. Investing with Conscience -- Avoid companies that exploit animals. Animal-Friendly Habits -- Avoid pesticides, detergents, etc. The Golden Rule -- Apply it to all creatures and live by it.

Proselytizing is the process of "spreading the word". Here are some ofthe ways that it can be done:

Tell your family and friends about your beliefs. Write letters to lawmakers, newspapers, magazines, etc. Write books and articles. Create documentary films and videos. Perform leafletting and "tabling". Give lectures at schools and other organizations. Speak at stockholders' meetings. Join Animal Review Committees that oversee research on animals. Picket, boycott, demonstrate, and protest.

Organizing is a form of meta-proselytizing--helping others to spreadthe word. Here are some of the ways to do it:

Join an AR-related organization. Contribute time and money to an AR-related organization. Found an AR organization. Get involved in politics or law and act directly for AR.

The last category of action, civil disobedience, is the mostcontentious and the remaining questions in this section deal furtherwith it. Some draw the line here; others do not. It is a personaldecision. Here are some of the methods used to more forcefully assertthe rights of animals:

Sit-ins and occupations. Obstruction and harassment of people in their animal-exploitation activities (e.g., foxhunt sabotage). The idea is to make it more difficult and/or embarrassing for people to continue these activities. Spying and infiltration of animal-exploitation industries and organizations. The information and evidence gathered

can be a powerful weapon for AR activists. Destruction of property related to exploitation and abuse of animals (laboratory equipment, meat and clothes in stores, etc.). The idea is to make it more costly and less profitable for these animal industries. Sabotage of the animal-exploitation industries (e.g., destruction of vehicles and buildings). The idea is to make the activities impossible. Raids on premises associated with animal exploitation (to gather evidence, to sabotage, to liberate animals).

It can be seen from the foregoing material that AR activism spans awide range of activities that includes both actions that would beconventionally regarded as law-abiding and non-threatening, and actionsthat are unlawful and threatening to the animal-exploitation industries.Most AR activism falls into the former category and, indeed, one cansupport these actions while condemning the latter category of actions.People who are thinking, with some trepidation, of going for the firsttime to a meeting of an AR group need have no fear of finding themselvesinvolved with extremists, or of being coerced into extreme activism.They would find a group of exceedingly law-abiding computer programmers,teachers, artists, etc. (The extreme activists are essentially unorganizedand cannot afford to meet in public groups due to the unwelcome attentionof law-enforcement agencies.)

DG

One person can make all the difference in the world...For the first time inrecorded human history, we have the fate of the whole planet in our hands.

Chrissie Hynde (musician)

This is the true joy in life; being used for a purpose recognized byyourself as a mighty one, and being a force of nature instead of afeverish, selfish little clod.

George Bernard Shaw (playwright, Nobel 1925)

Nothing is more powerful than an individual acting out of his

conscience, thus helping to bring the collective conscience to life.

Norman Cousins (author)

SEE ALSO: #5, #88-#93, #95

-----------------------#88 Isn't liberation just a token action because there is no way to give homes to all the animals?-----------------------

If one thinks of a liberation action solely in terms of liberation goals,there is some validity in viewing it as a token, or symbolic, action. Itis true that liberation actions could not succeed applied en masse,because there aren't enough homes for all the animals, and even ifthere were, distribution channels do not exist for relocating them.Having said this, however, one needs to remember that for the fewanimals that are liberated, the action is far from a token one. Thereis a world of difference between spending one's life in a loving homeor a sanctuary and spending it imprisoned in a cage waiting for abrutal end. Liberation actions need to be viewed with a less literal mind set. AsPeter Singer points out, raids are effective in obtaining evidence ofanimal abuse that could not otherwise have come to light. For example,a raid on Thomas Gennarelli's laboratory at the University of Pennsylvaniaobtained videotapes that convinced the Secretary for Health and HumanServices to stop his experiments. One might also bear in mind that symbolic actions have been some ofthe most powerful ones seen throughout history.

DG

All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is for good mento do nothing.

Edmund Burke (statesman and author)

SEE ALSO: #89-#91

-----------------------#89 Isn't AR activism terrorism because it harasses people, destroys property, and threatens humans with injury or death?-----------------------

The answer to question #87 should make it clear that most AR activismcannot be described as extreme and, furthermore, that not even allacts described as extreme could be thought of as "terrorism". Forexample, a peaceful sit-in is highly unlikely to put others in astate of intense fear. Thus, it is not correct to characterize ARactivism generally as terrorism. One of the fundamental guidelines of the extreme activists is thatgreat care must be taken not to inflict harm in carrying out the acts.This has been borne out in practice. On the very rare occasions whenharm has occurred, the mainstream AR groups have condemned the acts.In some cases, the authors of the acts have been suspected to be thoseallied against the AR movement; their motives would not require deepthought to decipher. The dictionary defines "terrorism" as the systematic use of violenceor acts that instill intense fear to achieve an end. Certainly,harassment of fur wearers, or shouting "meat is murder" outside abutcher shop, could not be considered to be terrorism. Even destructionof property would not qualify under the definition if it isdone without harming others. Certainly, the Boston Tea Party raidersdid not consider themselves terrorists. The real terrorists are the people and industries that inflict painand suffering on millions of innocent animals for trivial purposes eachand every day.

DG

If I repent of anything it is likely to be my good behavior.

Henry David Thoreau (essayist and poet)

I am in earnest--I will not equivocate--I will not excuse--I will notretreat a single inch and I will be heard.

William Lloyd Garrison (author)

SEE ALSO: #87-#88, #90-#91

-----------------------#90 Isn't extreme activism involving breaking the law (e.g., destruction of property) wrong?

-----------------------

Great men and women have demonstrated throughout history that lawscan be immoral, and that we can be justified in breaking them. Thosewho object to law-breaking under all circumstances would have tocondemn:

The Tiananmen Square demonstrators. The Boston Tea Party participants. Mahatma Gandhi and his followers. World War II resistance fighters. The Polish Solidarity Movement. Vietnam War draft card burners.

The list could be continued almost indefinitely. Conversely, laws sometimes don't reflect our moral beliefs. AfterWorld War II, the allies had to hastily write new laws to fully prosecutethe Nazi war criminals at Nuremburg. Dave Foreman points out that thereis a distinction to be made between morality and the statutes of agovernment in power. It could be argued that the principle we are talking about does not apply.Specifically, the law against destruction of property is not immoral,and we therefore should not break it. However, a related principle canbe asserted. If a law is invoked to defend immoral practices, or toattempt to limit or interfere with our ability to fight an immoralsituation, then justification might be claimed for breaking that law. In the final analysis, this is a personal decision for each personto make in consultation with their own conscience.

DG

Certainly one of the highest duties of the citizen is a scrupulousobedience to the laws of the nation. But it is not the highest duty.

Thomas Jefferson (3rd U.S. President)

I say, break the law.Henry David Thoreau

(essayist and poet)

SEE ALSO: #89, #91

-----------------------#91 Doesn't extreme activism give the AR movement a bad name?-----------------------

This is a significant argument that must be thoughtfully considered.In essence, the argument says that if your actions can be characterizedas extremist, then you are besmirching the actions of those who aremoderate, and you are creating a backlash that can negate the advancesmade by more moderate voices. The appeal to the "backlash" has historical precedent. Martin LutherKing heard such warnings when he organized civil-disobedience protestsagainst segregation. Had Dr. King yielded to this appeal, would theCivil Rights and Voting Rights Acts have been passed? Dave Foreman, writing in "Confessions of an Eco-Warrior", points outthat radicals in the anti-Vietnam War movement were blamed for prolongingthe war and for damaging the "respectable" opposition. Yet the fear ofincreasingly militant demonstrations kept President Nixon from escalatingthe war effort, and the stridency eventually wore down the pro-warestablishment. The backlash argument is a standard one that will always be trotted outby the opponents of a movement. Backlash can be expected whenever thestatus quo is challenged, regardless of whether extreme actions areemployed. The real question to ask is: Does the added backlash outweighthe gains achieved through extreme action? The answer here is not clearand we'll leave it to the informed reader to make a judgement. Twobooks that might help in assessing this are "Free the Animals" byIngrid Newkirk, and "In Defense of Animals" by Peter Singer. The following argument is paraphrased from Dave Foreman: Extreme actionis a sophisticated political tactic that dramatizes issues and places thembefore the public when they otherwise would be ignored in the media,applies pressure to corporations and government agencies that otherwiseare able to resist "legitimate" pressure from law-abiding organizations,and broadens the spectrum of activism so that lobbying by mainstreamgroups is not considered "extremist".

DG

My doctrine is this, that if we see cruelty or wrong that we have

the power to stop, and do nothing, we make ourselves sharers inthe guilt.

Anna Sewell (author)

If there is no struggle, there is no progress. Those who profess tofavour freedom, and yet deprecate agitation, are people who want rainwithout thunder and lightning. They want the ocean without the roar ofits many waters. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never didand it never will.

Frederick Douglass (abolitionist)

SEE ALSO: #87-#90

--------------------------------AR INFORMATION AND ORGANIZATIONS--------------------------------

-----------------------#92 What are appropriate books and periodicals to read for more information on AR issues?-----------------------

There are hundreds of books that could be recommended. We provide onlya sampling of books and periodicals below. Please refer to question #94for further book references and reviews. Space limitations forced us toavoid children's books. Refer to the guide books listed for fullbibliographies.

TA/DG/JLS/AECW

Animal Production and Factory Farming-------------------------------------

"Animal Factories", Jim Mason and Peter Singer, AAVS, 801 Old York Rd, Suite 204, Jenkintown, PA 19046-1685, $12.95. Facts and photos on farms that mass produce animals for meat, milk, and eggs. [1980, 1990]

"Factory Farming: The Experiment That Failed", Animal Welfare Institute, P.O. Box 3650, Washington, DC 20007. Fact-packed indictment of factory-farming on welfare and economic grounds. [1988]

"Waste of the West: Public Lands Ranching", Lynn Jacobs, P.O. Box 5784, Tucson, AZ 85703.

"Do Hens Suffer in Battery Cages?", Michael Appleby, The Athene Trust, 5a Charles St, Petersfield, Hants GU32 3EH. Scientific evidence of hen suffering. [1991]

"Alternative to Factory Farming", Paul Carnell, Earth Resources Research Publishers, London. Factory farming challenged on economic grounds. [1983]

"Chicken and Egg: Who pays the price?", Clare Druce, Green Print Publishers, London. A criticism of the poultry industry. [1989]

"Taking Stock: Animal Farming and The Environment", Alan Durning and Holly Brough, Worldwatch Paper 103, WorldWatch Institute, 1776 Mass. Avenue N.W., Washington, DC 20036-1904. The environmental cost of animal farming. [1991]

"Assault and Battery", Mark Gold, Pluton Publishers, London. Effects of farming on animals, humans and the environment. [1983]

"Animal Machines", Ruth Harrison, Vincent Stuart Publishers, London. The first book on factory farming. [1964]

"Facts about Furs", G. Nilsson, et. al., Animal Welfare Institute, (op. cit.). On fur-farming and trapping. [1980]

"Pulling the Wool", Christine Townend, Hale and Ironmonger Publishers, Sydney, Australia. The Australian wool and sheep industry. [1985]

Animal Rights History---------------------

"All Heaven in a Rage", E. S. Turner. Provides a history of the animal protection movement up to the 1960's. [1964]

"Animal Warfare", David Henshaw, Fontana Publishers, London. The rise of direct action for Animal Rights. [1984]

"History of the Humane Movement", Charles D. Niven, Johnson Publishers, London. From antiquity to today. [1967]

"Animal Revolution", Richard Ryder, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford. Overview of the history of AW and AR movements. [1985]

"The Animal Liberation Movement: Its Philosophy, Its Achievements and Its Future", Peter Singer, Old Hammond Press Publishers, Nottingham, [1986]

"Man and the Natural World", Keith Thomas, Penguin, London. History from 1500 AD to 1800 AD. [1991]

Animal Rights Legislation-------------------------

"Animals and their Legal Rights", The Animal Welfare Institute, Washington D.C. [1990]

"Animal Rights, Human Wrongs", S. Jenkins, Lennard Publishings, Harpenden, UK. An RSPCA officer's experiences demonstrate the lack of adequate animal legislation. [1992]

"Up against the Law", J. J. Roberts, Arc Print, London. 1986 Public Order Act and its implications for Animal Rights protests. [1987]

"Animals and Cruelty and Law", Noel Sweeney, Alibi, Bristol UK. A practicing barrister argues for Animal Rights from the legal standpoint. [1990]

Animal Rights Philosophy------------------------

"The Case for Animal Rights", Tom Regan, University of California Press. [1983]

"The Struggle for Animal Rights", Tom Regan, International Society for Animal Rights, Inc., Clarks Summit, PA. [1987]

"Animal Liberation", Peter Singer, PETA Merchandise, P.O. Box 42400, Washington, D.C. 20015, $3.00 post-paid. The book that popularized Animal Rights. [1975, 1990]

"In Defense of Animals", Peter Singer.

"Animals' Rights", Henry Salt, AAVS (op. cit.), $6.95. Written a century ago, a true classic, anticipates many of today's arguments.

"No Room, Save in the Heart: Poetry and Prose on Reverence for

Life--Animals, Nature and Humankind", Ann Cottrell Free, AAVS (op. cit.), $8.95.

"The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain and Science", Bernard Rollin. [1989]

"Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism", James Rachels. [1990]

"Morals, Reason and Animals, Steve Sapontzis. [1987]

"Political Theory and Animal Rights", Clarke and Lindzey (Eds.). This book provides interesting excepts from thinkers since Plato to Regan on the issue of our relations and duties towards animals. [1990]

"The Nature of the Beast: Are Animals Moral?", Stephen Clark.

"Animals, Men and Morals", Godlovitch et. al. [1971]

"Fettered Kingdoms", John Bryant, Fox Press Publishers, Winchester. Includes a well-known indictment of pet keeping. [1990]

"The Moral Status of Animals", Stephen Clark, Oxford University Press Publishers, Oxford. The roots of humans' treatment of animals in sentimental fantasy. [1977]

"The Savour of Salt--A Henry Salt Anthology", G. and W. Hendrick, Centaur Press Publishers, Fontwell. [1989]

"Animals and Why They Matter: A Journey Around the Species Barrier", Mary Midgley, Penguin Publishers, London. [1983]

"Beast and Man", Mary Midgley, Harvester Press Publishers, Brighton. [1979]

"Animal Rights--A Symposium", David Paterson and Richard Ryder, Centaur Press Publishers, Fontwell. [1979]

"Inhumane Society: The American Way of Exploiting Animals", Michael W. Fox, St. Martins Press, New York. [1990]

"The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory", Carol J. Adams. [1990]

"Rape of the Wild: Man's Violence against Animals and the

Earth", Andree Collard with Joyce Contrucci. [1989]

"The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery", Marjorie Spiegel, Mirror Books, NY. [1988]

Animal Rights Theology----------------------

"Christianity and the Rights of Animals", Andrew Linzey, Crossroad, New York. [1987]

"Animal Sacrifices -- Religious Perspectives on the Use of Animals in Science", Tom Regan (Ed.), Temple University Press, PA. [1986]

Circuses, Rodeos, and Zoos--------------------------

"The Rose-Tinted Menagerie", William Johnson, PETA (op. cit.), $16.50. Describes behind-the-scenes action in circuses, aquariums, and zoos.

"Animals in Circuses and Zoos--Chiron's World?", Marthe Kiley-Worthington, Little Eco Farms Publishing, Basildon, UK. Investigation into the treatment of animals by zoos and circuses. [1990]

"The Last Great Wild Beast Show", Bill Jordan and Stefan Ormrod, Constable Publishers, London. How animals are snatched from the wild to be shipped to zoos worldwide. [1978]

"Beyond the Bars", Virginia McKenna, William Travers, Jonathan Wray (eds.), Thorsons Publishers, Wellingborough, UK. The immorality of animal captivity. [1987]

Diet Ethics-----------

"Diet for a New America", John Robbins, PETA (op. cit.), $12.50 post-paid. Examines problems with animal-based food systems with solutions, info on the link between diet and disease.

"Compassion: The Ultimate Ethic", V. Moran, American Vegan Society, NJ, USA. Exploration of veganism: its roots in eastern and western

philosophy. [1991]

"Food: Need, Greed and Myopia", G. Yates, Earthright, Ryton UK. World food problem seen from a vegetarian/vegan standpoint. [1986]

"Radical Vegetarianism", Mark Braunstein, Panjandrum Books, Los Angeles. [1983]

Guides, Handbooks, and Reference--------------------------------

"Save the Animals! 101 Easy Things You Can Do", Ingrid Newkirk, PETA (op. cit.), $4.95.

"67 Ways to Save the Animals", Anna Sequoia, Harper Perennial, $4.95. [1990]

"The Animal Rights Handbook -- Everyday Ways to Save Animal Lives", Berkley Books, New York, $4.50. [1993]

"PETA's Shopping Guide for Caring Consumers", PETA (op. cit.), $4.95. A must have! Lists names and addresses of cruelty-free companies.

"Keyguide to Information Sources in Animal Rights", Charles R.Magel, AAVS (op. cit.), $24.95.

"A Shopper's Guide to Cruelty-Free Products", Lori Cook, Bantam Books, New York, $4.99. [1991]

"Animal Rights: A Beginner's Guide", Amy Achor, Writeware Inc., Yellow Springs, OH, $14.95. [1992]

"The PETA Guide to Action for Animals", PETA (op. cit.), $4.00.

"The Extended Circle: A Commonplace Book of Animal Rights", Wynne-Tyson (Ed.). Provides hundreds of quotes and short excepts from thinkers throughout history. [1989]

"The Animal-Free Shopper", R. Farhall, R. Lucas, and A. Rofe A. (Eds.), The Vegan Society, 7 Battle Road, St. Leonards on Sea, East Sussex, TN37 7AA, UK. [1991]

"The Animal Welfare Handbook", C. Clough and B. Kew, 4th Estate,

London, UK [1993]

Laboratory Animals and Product Testing--------------------------------------

"Vivisection and Dissection in the Classroom: A Guide to Conscientious Objection", Gary L. Francione and Anna E. Charlton, AAVS (op. cit.), $7.95. Legal citings, sample pleadings, and letters.

"Animals in Education: The Facts, Issues and Implications", Lisa Ann Hepner, Richmond Publishers, Albuquerque NM. [1994]

"Entering the Gates of Hell: Laboratory Cruelty You Were Not Meant to See", Brian Gunn, AAVS (op. cit.), $10.00.

"Animal Experimentation: The Consensus Changes", Gill Langley (Ed.), MacMillan Publishers, London. Collection of essays outlining the change in morality. [1991]

"Slaughter of the Innocent", Hans Ruesch, Civitas Publications, Swaine, NY. [1983]

"Naked Empress: The Great Medical Fraud", Hans Ruesch, CIVIS, Klosters, Switzerland. Why vivisection is a major cause of human disease. [1982]

"Victims of Science: The Use of Animals in Research", Richard Ryder, National Anti-Vivisection Society, Centaur Press Publishers, Fontwell. Classic denunciation of vivisection. [1983]

"The Cruel Deception: The Use of Animals in Medical Research", Robert Sharpe, Thorsons Publishers, Wellingborough, UK. Detailed study of the barbarity and uselessness of vivisection. [1989]

"Free the Animals!", Ingrid Newkirk, PETA (op. cit.), $14.00. Story of the Animal Liberation Front in America.

Periodicals-----------

"Animals Magazine", 350 Huntington Ave., Boston, MA 02130.

"The Animals' Agenda", P.O. Box 6809, Syracuse, NY 13217-9953.

"Animal People", P.O. Box 205, Shushan, NY 12873.

"The Animals' Voice", P.O. Box 341-347, Los Angeles, CA 90034.

"Between the Species", P.O. Box 254, Berkeley, CA 94701.

"Bunny Hugger's Gazette", P.O. Box 601, Temple, TX 76503-0601.

Wildife-------

"The Politics of Extinction", L. Regenstein, Collier-Macmillan, London. Classic denunciation of the wildlife carnage. [1975]

"Wildlife and the Atom", L. Veal, London Greenpeace, 5 Caledonian Road, London N1 9DX, UK. The use of animals by the nuclear industry. [1983]

SEE ALSO: #1, #94

-----------------------#93 What organizations can I join to support AR?-----------------------

There are hundreds of AR-related organizations scattered around theglobe. In addition, there are many vegetarian and vegan groups. ThisFAQ is already too long to list all of these groups. This FAQ gives onlyAR-related groups in the United States and the United Kingdom. Latereditions of the FAQ may cover other countries. For a full listing ofvegetarian and vegan groups worldwide, refer to the excellent FAQsmaintained by Michael Traub (Internet address traub@btcs.bt.co.uk). The following data on US organizations comes from the book "The AnimalRights Handbook", Berkley Books, New York, 1993, ISBN 0-425-13762-7.

DG/AECW

-------------UNITED STATES-------------

Multi-Issue-----------

Alliance for Animals, P.O. Box 909, Boston, MA 02103

American Humane Association, 63 Inverness Drive East, Englewood, CO 80112-5117

American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), 424 E. 92nd St., New York, NY 10128

Animal Allies, P.O. Box 35063, Los Angeles, CA 90035

Animal Liberation Network, P.O. Box 983, Hunt Valley, MD 21030

Animal Protection Institute of America, P.O. Box 22505, Sacramento, CA 95822

Animal Rights Mobilization, P.O. Box 1553, Williamsport, PA 17703

Animal Welfare Institute, P.O. Box 3650, Washington, DC 20007

Citizens to End Animal Suffering and Exploitation (CEASE), P.O. Box 27, Cambridge, MA 02238

Defenders of Animals, P. O. Box 5634, Weybosset Hill Station, Providence, RI 02903, (401) 738-3710

Doris Day Animal League (DDAL), 227 Massachusetts Ave. NE, Suite 100, Washington, DC 20002

Focus on Animals, P.O. Box 150, Trumbull, CT 06611

Friends of Animals, P.O. Box 1244, Norwalk, CT 06856

The Fund for Animals, 200 West 57th St., New York, NY 10019

Humane Society of the United States, 2100 L St., NW, Washington, DC 20037

People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), 501 Front Street, Norfolk, VA 23510

World Society for the Protection of Animals, 29 Perkins St., P.O. Box 190, Boston, MA 02130

Companion Animals-----------------

The Anti-Cruelty Society, 157 W. Grand Ave., Chicago, IL 60616

Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (MSPCA), 350 S. Huntington Ave., Boston, MA 02130

Progressive Animal Welfare Society (PAWS), 15305 44th Ave.

W, P.O. Box 1037, Lynnwood, WA 98046

San Francisco Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SFSPCA), 2500 16th St., San Francisco, CA 94103

Sports and Entertainment------------------------

Committee to Abolish Sport Hunting, P.O. Box 44, Tomkins Cove, NY 10986

Performing Animal Welfare Society, 11435 Simmerhorn Rd., Galt, CA 95632

Farm Animals------------

Food Animal Concerns Trust (FACT), P.O. Box 14599, Chicago, IL 60614

Farm Animals Reform Movement (FARM), 10101 Ashburton Lane, Bethesda, MD 20817

Farm Sanctuary, PO Box 150, Watkins Glen, NY 14891

Humane Farming Association, 1550 California Street, Suite 6, San Francisco, CA 94109

United Animal Defenders, Inc., P.O. Box 33086, Cleveland, OH 44133

United Poultry Concerns, PO Box 59367, Potomac, MD 20889

Laboratory Animals------------------

Alternatives to Animals, P.O. Box 7177, San Jose, CA 95150

American Anti-Vivisection Society, 801 Old York Rd., Suite 204, Jenkintown, PA 19046

In Defense of Animals, 21 Tamal Vista Blvd., No. 140, Corte Madera, CA 94925

Last Chance for Animals, 18653 Venture Blvd., No. 356, Tarzana, CA 91356

National Anti-Vivisection Society, 53 W.Jackson Blvd., Suite 1550, Chicago, IL 60604

New England Anti-Vivisection Society, 333 Washinton St.,

Boston, MA 02135

Professional Organizations--------------------------

Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF), 1363 Lincoln Ave., San Raphael, CA 94901

Association of Veterinarians for Animal Rights, 15 Dutch St., Suite 500-A, New York, NY 10038

National Association of Nurses Against Vivisection, P.O. Box 42110, Washington, DC 20015

Physician's Committee for Responsible Medicine, P.O. Box 6322, Washington, DC 20015

Psychologists for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, P.O. Box 1297, Washington Grove, MD 20880-1297

Scientists Center for Animal Welfare, 4805 St. Elmo Ave., Bethesda, MD 20814

Scientists Group for Reform of Animal Experimentation, 147-01 3rd Ave., Whitestone, NY 11357

Legislative Organizations-------------------------

Committee for Humane Legislation, 30 Haviland, South Norwalk, CT 06856

The National Alliance for Animal Legislation, P.O. Box 75116, Washington, DC 20013-5116

United Action for Animals, 205 E. 42nd St., New York, NY 10017

Marine Life Preservation------------------------

American Cetacean Society, P.O. Box 2639, San Pedro, CA 90731

Center for Marine Conservation, 1725 DeSales St., NW, Washington, DC 20036

Greenpeace, P.O. Box 3720, 1436 U St., NW, Washinton, DC 20007

Marine Mammal Fund, Fort Mason Center, Bldg. E, San Francisco, CA 94123

Wildlife--------

Defenders of Wildlife, 1244 19th St., NW, Washington, DC 20036

Earth Island Institute, 300 Broadway, Suite 28, San Francisco, CA 94133

International Fund for Animal Welfare, P.O. Box 193, Yarmouth Port, MA 02675

Rainforest Action Network, 301 Broadway, Suite A, San Francisco, CA 94133

Wildlife Information Center, Inc., 629 Green St., Allentown, PA 18102

Specific Animals----------------

American Horse Protection Association, 1000 29th St., NW, Suite T100, Washington DC 20007

Bat Conservation International, P.O., Box 162603, Austin, TX 78716

The Beaver Defenders, Unexpected Wildlife Refuge, Inc., Newfield, NJ 08344

Friends of the Sea Otter, P.O. Box 221220, Carmel, CA 93922

Greyhound Friends, 167 Saddle Hill Rd., Hopkinton, MA 01748

International Primate Protection League, P.O. Box 766, Summerville, SC 29484

Mountain Lion Preservation Foundation, P.O. Box 1896, Sacramento, CA 95809

Primarily Primates, P.O. Box 15306, San Antonio, TX 78212

Save the Manatee Club, 500 N. Maitland Ave., Suite 210, Maitland, FL 32751

Special Interest----------------

Feminists for Animal Rights. P.O. Box 16425, Chapel Hill,

NC 27516

International Network for Religion and Animals, P.O. Box 1335, North Wales, PA 19454

Jews for Animal Rights, 255 Humphrey St., Marblehead, MA 01945

Student Action Corps for Animals (SACA), P.O. Box 15588, Washington, DC 20003-0588

--------------UNITED KINGDOM--------------

Animal Aid, 7 Castle Street, Tonbridge, Kent TN9 1BH, UK

Animal Concern, 62 Old Dumbarton road, Glasgow G3 8RE, UK

Animal Liberation Front Supporters Group, BM 1160, London WC1N 3XX, UK

Animal Research Kills, P.O. Box 82, Kingswood, Bristol BS15 1YF, UK

Athene Trust, 5a Charles Street, Petersfield, Hants GU32 3EH, UK

Beauty Without Cruelty, 57 King Henry's Walk, London N1 4NH, UK

Blue Cross Field Centre, Home Close Farm, Shilton Road, Burford, Oxfordshire OX18 4PF, UK

Born Free Foundation, Cherry Tree Cottage, Coldharbour, Dorking, Surrey RH5 6HA, UK

British Hedgehog Preservation Society, Knowbury House, Knowbury, Ludlow, Shropshire SY8 3LQ, UK

British Trust For Ornithology, The Nunnery, Nunnery Place, Thetford, Norfolk IP24 2PU, UK

British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection, 16a Crane Grove, Islington, London N7 8LB, UK

Campaign for the Abolition of Angling, P.O. Box 130, Sevenoaks, Kent TN14 5NR, UK

Campaign for the Advancement of Ruesch's Expose, 23 Dunster Gardens, London NW6 7NG, UK

Campaign to End Fraudulent Medical Research, P.O. Box 302, London N8 9HD, UK

Cat's Protection League, 17 King's Road, Horsham, West Sussex RH13 5PN, UK

CIVIS, P.O. Box 338, London E8 2AL, UK

Disabled Against Animal Research and Exploitation, P.O. Box 8, Daventry, Northamptonshire NN11 4QR, UK

Donkey Sanctuary, Slade House Farm, Salcombe Regis, Sidmouth, Devon EX10 0NU

Dr. Hadwen Trust for Humane Research, 6c Brand Street, Hitchin, Hertfortshire SG5 1HX, UK

Earthkind, Humane Education Centre, Bounds Green Road, London N22 4EU, UK

Elefriends, Cherry Tree Cottage, Coldharbour, NR Dorking, Surrey RH5 6HA, UK

Environmental Investigation Agency, 2 Pear Tree Court, London EC1R 0DS, UK

Fund for the Replacement of Animals in Medical Experiments, Eastgate House, 34 Stoney Street, Nottingham NG1 1NB, UK

Green Party Animal Rights Working Party, 23 Highfield South, Rock Ferry, Wirral L42 4NA, UK

Horses and Ponies Protection Association, Happa House, 64 Station Road, Padiham, N. Burnley, Lancashire BB12 8EF, UK

Humane Research Trust, Brook House, 29 Bramhall Lane South, Bramhall, Stockport, Cheshire SK7 2DN, UK

Hunt Saboteurs Association, P.O. Box 1, Carlton, Nottingham NG4 2JY, UK

International Association Against Painful Experiments on Animals, P.O. Box 215, St Albans, Herts AL3 4PU, UK

International Primate Protection League, 116 Judd Street, London WC1H 9NS, UK

League Against Cruel Sports, 83-87 Union Street, London SE1 1SG, UK

International League of Doctors for the Abolition of Vivisection,

UK Office, Lynmouth, Devon EX35 6EE, UK

National Anti-Vivisection Society, Ravenside, 261 Goldhawk Road, London W12 9PE, UK

National Canine Defence League, 1 Pratt Mews, London NW1 0AD, UK

People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, P.O. Box 3169, London NW6 2QF, UK

Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, The Lodge, Sandy, Bedfordshire SG19 2DL, UK

Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Causeway, Horsham, West Sussex RH12 1HG, UK

Student Campaign For Animal Rights, P.O. Box 155, Manchester M60 1FT, UK

Teachers For Animal Rights, 29 Lynwood Road. London SW17 8SB, UK

Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society, 19A James Street, Bath, Avon BA1 2BT, UK

Zoocheck, Cherry Tree Cottage, Coldharbour, Dorking, Surrey CR0 2TF, UK

-----------------------#94 Can you give a brief Who's Who of the AR movement?-----------------------

TOM REGAN -- Professor of Philosophy at North Carolina State University.His book "The Case For Animal Rights" is arguably the single best recentwork on animal rights. It is a demanding text but one that is well worththe effort to read and study carefully. Everybody that is seriouslyinterested in the issues should read this rigorously argued case for AR.It starts with some core concepts of inherent value theory, the sameconcepts that played an important and significant role in the progress ofhuman civil liberties since the 17th century and which began to beextended to nonhumans during the 19th century. The notion of inherentvalue continues to be vital and important for progress in both human andanimal rights. A less demanding but still informative book by Regan is"The Struggle for Animal Rights". One might wish to first

read this bookbefore tackling Regan's more difficult text.

PETER SINGER -- Professor of Philosophy at Monash University, Melbourne.Singer is best known for his book "Animal Liberation", probably the mostwidely read book on AR philosophy. Singer, unlike Regan, is not anabolitionist as many people incorrectly surmise. His utilitarian positionallows for the possibility or necessity of killing animals under certaincircumstances. What is often lost sight of is that the obvious and patentabuses of animals covers so much ground that both Regan and Singer sharecommon views on far more issues than those on which they differ. Otherimportant books by Singer include "In Defense of Animals" and "AnimalFactories".

MARY MIDGLEY -- Senior Lecturer of Philosophy at the University of Newcastle.Midgley's book "Beast and Man" has not been given the attention that itdeserves. She deals with the contemporary facts of biology and ethologyhead-on to provide an ethical argument for the respectful treatment ofanimals that takes seriously scientific discoveries and thoughts aboutanimals. The "Humean fork" (or so-called logical divide) between facts andvalues is here carefully crossed by observing that we are foremost"animals" ourselves and that the similarities between ourselves and otheranimals is more important and relevant for our ethics andself-understanding than are the often over-inflated differences.

CAROL ADAMS -- Author.Adams' book "The Sexual Politics of Meat" has made a valuable contributionin combining cultural and ethical analysis by pointing out the politicalimplications of the metaphors we unthinkingly employ. The primarymetaphors she analyses in her book relate to meat. Such metaphors havebeen applied to women, but the most insidious aspect of the metaphors isthe way that they hide the life that is killed to produce meat. Instead of"cow", we have "beef" on our plates. Adams argues that the system thatkills animals is the same system that oppresses women; hence, there is an

important and striking connection between vegetarianism and feminism.

RICHARD RYDER -- Senior Clinical Psychologist at Warneford Hospital, Oxford.Ryder is the originator of the key term "speciesism". Ryder's book"Animal Revolution" provides both an historical perspective and acritical analysis of animal welfare and attitudes towards animals.

HENRY SALT -- 1851-1939.Salt was a remarkable social reformer who championed the humane reform ofschools, prisons, society, and our treatment of animals. He also exerted acritical and important influence upon Gandhi. His book "Animals' Rights"was the first to use that title and therein he gives voice to almost allof the essential arguments for AR that we see being advanced and refinedtoday. The book provides an excellent biography of earlier Europeanwriters on animal issues during the 18th and 19th centuries.

VICTORIA MORAN -- Author.Moran's book "Compassion the Ultimate Ethic" makes a fine contributionregarding the less discursive but perhaps more fundamental intuitive basisfor animal rights.

MARJORIE SPIEGEL -- Author.Spiegel's book "The Dreaded Comparison" is a slim but courageous volumecomparing the treatment of African-American slaves and the treatment ofnonhuman animals. In text and pictures, Spiegel discloses remarkablesimilarities between the two systems. A picture of slaves packed intoa slave ship is matched with a photograph of battery hens. A pictureof a woman in a muzzle is paired with a picture of a dog in a muzzle.The parallels are striking and revealing. Few other writers have beenas open or as unequivocal as Spiegel in likening cruelty to animals totraffic in human beings.

TA

It is hard to keep a Who's-Who list at a reasonable length. Here area few other prominent people:

STEPHEN R. L. CLARK -- Professor of Philosophy at

Liverpool University.MICHAEL W. FOX -- Vice President of Humane Society of the US, nationally known veterinarian, and AR activist.RONNIE LEE -- Founder of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF).JIM MASON -- Attorney and journalist.INGRID NEWKIRK -- Co-founder of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA); prominent activist.ALEX PACHECO -- Co-founder of PETA; exposer of the Silver Spring monkeys abuses."VALERIE" -- Founder of ALF in the United States.

DG

-----------------------#95 What can I do in my daily life to help animals?-----------------------

Indeed, the buck must first stop here in our own daily lives with theelimination or reduction of actions that contribute to the abuse andexploitation of animals. Probably the single most important thing you can do to save animals,help the ecology of the planet, and even improve your own health, is toBECOME A VEGETARIAN. It is said that "we are what we eat". Moreaccurately, "we are what we do" and what we do in order to eat has aprofound consequence on our self-definition as a compassionate person. Aslong as we eat meat, we share complicity in the intentional slaughter ofcountless animals and destruction of the environment for clearly trivialpurposes. Why trivial? No human has died from want of satisfying a so-called "MacAttack", but countless cows have died in order to satisfy our palates.On a more positive note, vegetarians report that one's taste and enjoymentof food is actually enhanced by eliminating animal products. Indeed, avegetarian diet is not a diet of deprivation; far from it. Vegetariansactually eat a GREATER variety of foods than do meat-eaters. Maybe thebest kept culinary secret is that the really "boring" diet actually turnsout to be the traditional meat-centered diet. Next, STOP BUYING ANIMAL PRODUCTS LIKE FUR OR LEATHER. There are plentyof good plant and synthetic materials that serve as excellent materialsfor fabrics and shoes. Indeed, all the major brands of

high-qualityrunning shoes are now turning to the use of human-made materials. (Why?Because they are lighter than leather and don't warp or get stiff aftergetting wet.) There are many less obvious animal products that are being used in manyof our everyday household and personal products. After first attending tothose obvious and most visible products like leather and fur, thenconsider what you can do to reduce or eliminate your dependency onproducts that may contain needless animal ingredients or were brought tomarket using animal testing. Two very good product guides are:

Shopping Guide for the Caring Consumer, PETA, 1994. A Shopper's Guide to Cruelty-Free Products, Lori Cook, 1991.

Then GET INFORMED AND READ AS MUCH AS YOU CAN ON THE ISSUE OF ANIMALRIGHTS. Besides reading about animal rights from the major theorists,also read practical guides and periodicals. Question #92 lists manyappropriate books and periodicals. Finally, you can GET INVOLVED IN A LOCAL ANIMAL RIGHTS OR ANIMAL WELFAREORGANIZATION. Alternatively, if you lack the time, consider givingdonations to those organizations whose good work on behalf ofanimals is something you appreciate and wish to materially support.

TA

SEE ALSO: #87, #92-#93

----------FINALLY...----------

-----------------------#96 I have read this FAQ and I am not convinced. Humans are humans, animals are animals; is it so difficult to see that?-----------------------

This FAQ cannot reflect the full variety of paths which have led peopleto support the concept of Animal Rights. A more complete compilation wouldinclude, for instance, religious arguments. For example, some Easternreligions stress the importance of the duties of humans toward animals. A

Christian case for Animal Rights has been presented. Also, legal argumentshave been put forward, by some barristers in the UK, for instance. Still, some people may remain skeptical about the viability of all of theseother approaches as well. For those people, here is a short quiz:

What is wrong with cannibalism? What is wrong with slavery? What is wrong with racial prejudice? What is wrong with sexual discrimination? What is wrong with killing children or the mentally ill? What is wrong with the Nazi experiments on humans?

Animal Rights proponents can reply instantly and consistently. Can you?Do your answers involve qualities that, if you are objective about it, canbe seen to apply to animals? For example, were the Nazi experiments wrongbecause the subjects were human, or because the subjects were harmed???

AECW

It is not difficult to see that humans are humans and animals are animals.What is difficult to see is how this amounts to anything more than an emptytautology! If there are relevant differences that justify differences intreatment, then let's hear them. AR opponents have consistently failed tosupport the differences in treatment of humans versus animals with relevantdifferences in capacities. Yes, an animal is an animal, but it can still suffer terribly from ourbrutality and lack of compassion.

DG

I am in favor of animal rights as well as human rights. That is theway of a whole human being.

Abraham Lincoln (16th U.S. President)

[The day should come when] all of the forms of life...will stand before thecourt--the pileated woodpecker as well as the coyote and bear, the lemmingsas well as the trout in the streams.

William O. Douglas (late U.S. Supreme Court

Justice)Brought to you by: animal-rights.com