andres serbin race and politlcs: relations between the

Andres Serbin

RACE AND POLITlcs: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING

CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA

Political and academic analysts of the Caribbean have not hesitated to point out that Caribbean societies, in addition to being divided geographically, are separated historically. This statement is based on the development of struggles and confrontation between the colonial powers in the region, initiated in the 16th century and whose aftermath continues to persist even today. Linguistic and cultural divisions, demographic differences of size and of economic development, contrasting frameworks in political cultures, and varied degrees of ties with the metropolises of yesteryear, and with world powers of today, characterise the region, attributing heterogeneousness as a distinctive characteristic.

This heterogeneousness which distinguishes the Caribbean is a feature of the majority of popular beliefs - from the ethnohistoric definition which reduces the Caribbean to insular societies, togeth

'r'~; er with Belize and the three Guyanas on the continent, functioning as a cornmon colonial matrix based on the plantation economy and African slavery, to the diverse geopolitical and socio-economic definitions put forward by different national and regional interests. ·On the other hand, political independence of the British and Dutch colonial territories, initiated at the beginning of the '60s, has

_strengthened this regional heterogeneousness by establishing a new group of state actors to the geopolitical stage. In this context, a clear dividing line has separated the English-speaking Caribbean countries from its Hispanic neighbours. in general, and from the continental Latin American countries, in particular, and this is notably evidenced by the characteristics assumed by their international relations.

1. The Ethnocentrism barrier

The different colonial matrices from which the two groups of states have emerged - with notable differences in the process of historic structure of its socio-racial stratification systems, its ideological-cultural backgrounds, its cultural policies and its respective

Andres Serbin is a ·Professor and Researcher in Cultural Anthropology and President of the lnstitute of Social and Practical Studies in Caracas, Venezuela.

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CARIBBEAN AND LATIN RELATIONS 147

models for economic organisation - have created a sigriificant barrier to interaction and communication. Perceptions and prejudices emerging from this distinctive process, and from the respective ideological-cultural inheritances from the metropolises which colonised them, have contributed to an unfolding of suspicions and mutual mistrusts clearly manifest in the speech of their political elites as weIl as in the attitudes of their populations. The understanding of these perceptions and mutual prejudices constitutes one of the first steps towards the removal of sorne of the obstacles present in the relations between English-speaking Caribbean countries and their Latin American neighbours.' B~cause not only are the speeches of official and political leaders, and the attitudes of the populations, affected by these suspicions and" mistrusts, but they also influence, in a negative manner, ·the formulation of mutual policies at a bilateral as weIl as multilateral level.

What must be pointed out, however, is that while for the Englishspeaking Caribbean the colonial. matrix was formulated by the extermination of the indigenous population and by the imposition of a plantation economy, with the exploitation of a hired or slave labour force coming from other latitudes, in Latin America, the fundamentals of this matrix were organised mainly around institutions such as commandership and land distribution,with the utilisation of the land by the labour force present. As a result, in. each case a social, ethnie and racial stratification system of differing characteristics was constituted. But while in the Caribbean, the work-force, being predominantly of African descent, resulted in the raising of a social stratification system, more notably associated with racism, in Latin America a process of inter-mixing evolved between the aborigine population and the European colonials which progressively emphasised social differences, refuting ethnie and racial elements. In each case, the economic, political, and ideologicalcultural peculiarities of the colonial society imposed distinctive characteristics to social emergence, establishing clear differences between the Spanish and British colonies.

The colonial matrices thus constituted, and the social, racial and ethnie stratification systems thus structured, the countries were historically linked to distinctive processes of political evolution and of economic and cultural ties with their colonial metropolises. While the Latin American societies initiated their independence processes in the 19th century, within the framework of a progressive weakening of Spain as a colonial power and under the ideological guidance of sectors of merchants and estate owners, independence of the English-speaking Caribbean states began one

148 CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS

century later under substantially different worldwide economic and political conditions, within the framework of a graduaI decolonisation under the supervision of Great Britain functioning as a local bureaucratic and political elite influenced by the values of British culture. The different stages of worldwide economic development in which both processes were introduced, contributed at the same time to attributing particular features to its economies and to its ties to colonial and neocolonial dependence within the framework of specific structured links with the highly developed centres of world power.

In this context, the structure of social stratification systems notably distinct in each of the two groups, with a substantially different racial composition, gave way to the development of clearly different cultural models, in which the racial factor had a different meaning. In fact, with the abolition of slavery in Latin America, the "black issue" disappeared in the majority of Latin American countries, while in the English-speaking Caribbean, in spite of emancipation, it still persists up to today, as a distinct characteristic in the social stratification system and in the socio-cultural identification processes.

These ideological-cultural differences were to produce in the English-speaking Caribbean and in Latin America two distinctive ethnohistoric identities, especially in the post-colonial period. In each case, the homogenous social sectors were formulated on the basis of integrated elements to popular conceptions, national ideologies (which depended on certain characteristics of metropolitan influence, in terms of language) and of intellectual and cultural traditions, with sorne of their own characteristics of ethnic and ratlai subordinates. And, these identities caused, on the ideologicalcultural level, distinctive perceptions between the English-speaking Caribbean and Latin America.

These perceptions - which frequently present a reciprocal and complementary character - were associated with the formulation of national ideologies based on ethnocentrism which, in many cases, influenced positions assumed at the level of international relations. In the English-speaking Caribbean, the persistence of British cultural influence and the formulation of an Afro-Caribbean identi- . ty caused a constellation of attitudes and contrasting values to its Latin American counterparts.

As an exaggerated historic colonial perception of itself, and in contrast to Latin American societies, the English-speaking Caribbean stressed its British inheritance in terms of its lifestyle and in terms of its political system, especially its Westminster-type parliament, with the cultural patterns associated with this tradition and

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frequently asserted as superior to the Hispanic tradition and to the Republic's values. It also vouchsafed a positive characterisation of the black component in its population, in the context of its growth participation in the economic, political and post-colonial education systems. InevitabIy, with the over-importance it attached to these features, a feeling of superiority towards Latin America was engendered and it was based simply on the stability of its institutions within the framework of constitutional decolonisation.

Because of these perceptions of the English-speaking Caribbean countries, Latin America responded with an emphasis on its own revolutionary and republican traditions which guid~d their course of political independence from Spain, and which prodûced a more dynamic political evolution, with the participation of diverse sectors and social movements, from a conscience of its continental" destiny and of its economic development capabilities, together with the recognition of an indigenous and Hispanic inheritance from whose synthesis emerged distinctive ethnohistoric models, associated with their own models of culturàI policies emerging from the wars of independence and a tradition of presence and participation in the international system. ln turn, this self-perception engendered an opposite attitude of superiority towards the English-speaking Caribbean whose political independence was obtained slowly and without the active participation of its social forces, and because their predominant situation of smaIl insular states was characterised by the absence of natural resources and a reliable economic development process, even though independence had catapulted them as speakers on the international scene.

The differences in size and in potential capabilities for economic development, together with participation in the international system and in the organisations associated with it; tended to encourage these mutual slightings. In short, these prejudices (even though there are numerous exceptions in both groups) created an attitude of mistrust about the ability of Latin Americans to understand the mIes of political and institutional stability in the new English-speaking Caribbean states and to respect their educational levels and the efficiency of their administrative systems, and their ability to gain access to the highest institutional and political hierarchies for their black populations. And, in spite of the setbacks to the system demonstrated by the political occurrences in Guyana from the beginning of the seventies and in Grenada in more recent years, this ideological-cultural superiority continued to nurture a paranoid attitude towards Latin Americans, admittedly worsened by the existence of bordering conflicts between Venezuela and Guyana, between Guatemala and Belize, and between Trinidad an~


Venezuela. For their part, Latin Americans have deve10ped a particular

mistrust towards the distancing achieved by the new English-speaking Caribbean states, under the political and cultural influence of Great Britain .- mistrust reinforced by the crisis in the South Atlantic - and the achievement of political independence. Both perceptions of the "others" are supported byan assortment of .. cultural elements, ideological and socio-political peculiarities in which, very often, the ethnoracial features assume an outstanding role. At the same time, clearly distinct cognitive and communication styles are associated by means of different inteBectual and cultural traditions with which they can identify.

2. Beyond history: the geopolitical obstacles

The influence of these metropolitan actors has been decisive in establishing the appearance and the reinforcement of existing barriers between the states of the region. The colonial baules for control of different territories, insular as weB as continental, have left an indelible impression on the geopolitical configuration of the Caribbean, independent of the conceptualisations which divide them. After Spanish colonisation, the presence of the Dutch, British, French and Danish and the establishment of diverse colonial enclaves by these European powers contributed to the configuration of the political heterogeneousness of the contemporary.Caribbean, through economic and strategic interests, of Europ,ean countries, sorne of which persist up to today. Nowadays, together with the existence of states associated with Great Britain, of Overseas Departments of France, and states associated with the Netherlands co-exist with independent states which have very recently emerged from colonial British..and Dutch rule.

For its part, from the mid-19th century, the United States initiated a defined expansion of its influence on the region. As a consequence, the US presence marked the progress of political independence of Cuba and the Dominican Republic at the end of the 19th century, and significantly influenced the post-colonial political evolution of Haiti in the 20th century. Similarly, during the first few decades of this century, homogenous North American aspirations were crudely manifested in the Central American isthmus. But on the verge of US interventions in the independent Central American and Caribbean states in the 19th century, the presence of this country was confirmed by the states associated with Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. This progress was deve1oped, functioning as the geopolitical importance assigned to the region,

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and of its recent conceptualisation of the Caribbean Basin, in whose eontext the Central American sub-region appears to be characterised as an immediate threat to US strategie interests, while the insular Caribbean sub-region is perceived as a potential threat.

World War II gave new twist to the dynamic Caribbean geopolitics, by initi<üing the progressive displacement of British. influence on the English-speaking region, and by the homogenous North American presence in the English-speaking region, as a result of the transfer of British military bases in the insular Caribbean to the United States. One of the significant milestones in this progress was produced with a coordinated intervention of Great Britain and the United States in the process of de-stabilisation of th,e Cheddi Jagan government in British Guyana, between 1963 and 1964. This interv~ntion marked the so-called "no second Cuba policy" ,.,developed as a result of the consolidation of the revolutionary pr'ocess in Cuba from 1959, and the alienation of this state with the socialist bloc. In such a way that, together with an increase of US military presence in the region, the '60s were marked by the eruption of the "cold war", and by the East-West confrontation in the Caribbean.

However, the decolonisation process of the British territories, initiated in 1962, from the beginning wàs not significantly influenced by this confrontation. The independence of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago in 1962, and of Barbados and Guyana in 1966, followed the course mapped out by the so-called constitutional decolonisation which gradua11y carried these states to political independence, within the framework of the establishment of parliamentary systems inspired by the Westminster model, jointly giving way to the persistence of economic, political and cultural associations with Great Britain. This course was later fo11owed by the smaIl Eastern Caribbean states, and by Belize, after the independence of Grenada ill 1974. Significantly, the Cuban influence in these independence processes was liniited, and only from the beginning of the '70s did it begin to acquire a more outstanding profile, through changes suffered by the Cuban external policies.

In fact, the firstreferences to Cuba as a political and social model to consider for non-Hispanie Caribbean societies came from an inauspicious source of marxist affiliation like the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Dr Eric Williams. However, in spite of the persistence of sanctions imposed on Cuba by the Organisation of American States, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Guyana, diplomatic relations were established with that country in December of 1972, breaking the regional Cuban isolation. On the other hand, since 1975, the turn of Cuban external policies in the light of deepening its relations with the progressive Caribbean


governments and with nationalistic and popular parties of the region, inaugurated a period of greater projeètion and Cuban presence in the Caribbean. In ethnohistoric and political terms, this projection and this presence were reinforced, in the case of nonHispanie states, by the identification of Cuba as an Afro-LatinCaribbean state, and by the "Cuban Card" game, initiated by sorne of the governments of the English-speaking states for the era.

Especially in the case of Jamaica, under the government of Michael Manley, and to a lesser extent, in the case of Guyana, both involved in the political processes of a socialist tendency, its respective governments established ties and agreements of a varying nature with Cuba. Later, the defeat of the New Jewel Movement, which raised Maurice Bishop to power in Grenada, similarly contributed to re-affirming the Cuban influence in the region through different structural ties, and to awakening susceptibilities of the conservative governments of the Eastern Caribbean states towards an eventual Cuban threat to its security and its political stability.

Simultaneously, in the '70s, the presence of a series of Latin American states in the region increased. Mexico began to develop a specifie policy towards the Caribbean from the. beginning of the '70s, while Venezuela increased its Caribbean policies initiated at the end of the previous decade. Within this framework, a particular fluidity in the relations of these Latin American states with sorne of the English-speaking Caribbean states was established, especially with Jamaica, through political and ideological coincidences concerning the need to establish stricter South-South relations in the region, a process in which Socialist International had an outstanding influence. In essence, as a result of these processes, while the '70s was characterised by tension among~English-speakingand Latin American states in the region, in particular as a result of the difficulties of the first countries to join the üAS, the '70s, together. with the acceleration of decolonisation processes and the progressive withdrawal of the European actors, was characterised by the weakening of sorne of the existing differences between the two groups of nations, within the framework of "third world" emphasis, and of a weakening of a homogenous US influence.

This tendency, by itself partial, significantly returned with the budding of the crisis in the South Atlantic in April of 1982, when tensions which characterised the relations between English-speaking and Latin American states once again blossomed, surrounding the alienation of each group with Great Britain and Argentina respectively. In practice, the unity of English-speaking states was reinforced, existent by itself, surrounding territorial conflicts, and

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through coordination of external policies present in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). In such a way that the '80s saw the start of a period with features substantially different in the relations between the two groups of countries. The electoral defeat of Michael Manley and the People's National Party in Jamaica, and, subsequently, the military intervention in Grenada, structured by a more aggressive US policy in the region, initiated during the last few years of the Carter administration and promoted more radically under the new Ronald Reagan government. Together with the launching of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), the mi1itary invasion of Grenada during the internaI political crisis,which broke out in October of 1983 marked the milestone of a ne,w attitude by the conservative governments of English-speaking Caribbean, which, with the exception of Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Belize and The Bahamas, participated in the invasion of the island; The invasion, condemned by sorne Latin American governments because of the principle of non-intervention, the Fa1klands War and its alienation, contributed to reinforcing the divisions which sorne initiatives of the '70s seemed to have tended to weaken. In fact, the North American intervention in Grenada not only emphasised the North American ubiquitousness through its militarypresence and

. by the sharpening of the Central American crises, but it also alienated Jamaica, Barbados, and the Eastern Caribbean states because of their regional security policy. It encouraged too, for a short period, the discussion of the creation of a regional security force to control subversive outbreaks and it put pressures Suriname and Guyana to change their domestic and external policies.

Within this framework, the '80s have produced a new alienation between the non-Hispanic Caribbean bloc and the Latin American bloc, surrounding divisions of geopolitical features, but which in reality reiterates the existing ethnohistoric barriers. In parallel, this new regional atmosphere seems to generate a regression in the decolonisation process initiated in the '60s. The territories associated with Great Britain manifest their decision to maintain their ties with it, while Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles are reconsidering aspirations of independence from the Netherlands. At the same time, emphasis on independence from sorne political groups of French and Puerto Rican Overseas Departments are reorganising towards the search for a greater political autonomy which does not include independence.

The historically emerged geopolitical obstacles seem to re-affirm separation of the non-Hispanic Caribbean and Latin America. However, a more detailed analysis of this process must at the same time be considered, and sorne evidence has emerged about the


relations between both groups of states in the refuge of international organisations and, more specifically, surrounding diverse economic cooperation initiatives, particularly functioning as different characteristics of potential and economic development.

3. Politieal Cooperation and Economie Cooperation

Political Diversities

The appearance of the new English-speaking states in the Caribbean and their incorporation into the international system was characterised, from the beginning, by the emergence of the significant diversity with the Latin American states in the political as weIl as in the economic plan. The earlier participation of Latin America in the said system and the development of the same lnter-American system, with its distinctive characteristics, contributed greatly to reinforcing these diversities. One of the best illustrations of this situation emerged with the request of the English-speaking states to join the Organisation of American States upon gaining their independence, among other considerations, sÎnce belonging to this organisation guaranteed access to assistance from the ilnter-American Development Bank (IDB). In the beginning, of the four independent English-speaking Caribbean countries in the '60s, Guyana was automatically disqualified from joining the OAS because of pending territorial disputes with Veneuzela, in a way that the reclamation of the Essequibo by Veneuzela was constituted in an un"salvagable obstacle for its membership and for its request for economic assistance from the IDB. But, added to this fact, the English-speaking Caribbean countries were faced with mistrust manifested on the part of Latin Ame[Ïcan member states of the organisation, concerning the true achievement of its independence with respect to Great Britain, through persistence of parliamentary systems inspired by the Westminstèr model and by its ties to the Commonwealth.

As a compromise, and in spite of the aspiration to join the OAS, these Latin American suspicions were joined with Caribbean mis~

trust concerning the dominant presence of the United States in the O{\S, viewed as a supplement to North American policies towards th,e hemis here. " ~7;:1;;nnt:ex.ts~i'~bts~'S't~'§tmll~\!tl!~

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phenomenon in Latin American practice in spite of the actions of "GRULA" in the refuge of the United Nations and other international forums. .

This uniting of diversities which characterised the incorpû;ation of the first English-speaking Caribbean states into the OAS was repeatedly reinforced within the different frameworks of ethnohistoric indentification utilisedby the two groups of nations, and the persistent anxieties of Caribbean people concerning the "iberoamerican" orientation, predominant within the refuge of the üAS. Finally, the reliance on arguments of an ethnohistoric and political bas~ reached its climax with the alienation produced by the South Atlantic crisis. S~~e:e~ . cUBetio"ID.. ~'.,., ,o' .~~

m~pWt'amm,_,.~tmJ~ti ,·,th r,e lA ..o.tn.s. ~(fm in spite of the initial coincidences e weeen ;;üffi groups surrounding the support to the decolonisation processes, to the declaration of colonisation and racism, and to the rapid incorporation of the English-speaking countries of the Latin American group. In practice, within the framework of the "GRULA," notwithstanding the eventual coincidences surrounding the economic themes, frequent political disagreements were impressively manifested. Together with these disagreements, struggles for positions of respective representatives in the coordination of diverse commissions and organisms within the UN, is manifested up to today, becoming' one of the most distinctive characteristics in the relations between both groups of nations within the refuge of the organisation, tb-~c:m:' , dia~nr,l-idm:~D~~1Sl.t e ~~~~ ""'~~...~..f(i-w~· Th~~~=1S~-"",'·~D,w,!l,,--~.a--_K,!';';"~_b'l~f:_.•,h~L<#''-'5>~rù.:L""A''L'''t~'Lll~f'~e~Iù.c'·''::'r!tOI'@Ul~Q~.w..ti'\!..S~U~,L..-,~~e

W~~Îô'ffS. On the other hand, in other international organisations such as the Non Aligned Movement, where traditionally, participation of Latin American states has been more limited than that of English-speaking Caribbean states, political disagreements have also revitalised the relations between both groups, frequently


reflecting the alienation through existing territorial disputes. In 1. turn, ties between the English-speaking Caribbean states and the Commonwealth have contributed to sharpening the Latin American perceptions concerning its tendency to act in accordance with British interests.

Generally speaking, ethnohistoric, political, and territorial disagreements have made attempts at political coordination of both groups of nations in internationa~ forums, ~ignific~nt.ly d~fficult.. And in the movements for economlC cooperatIon, thls SItuatIon has also been repeatedly reproduced in spite of the eventual coincidences surrounding the South-South cooperation and the creation of a New International Economic Order of the '70s.

Multilateral Attempts

ln principle, the creation of several regional and sub-regional integration schemes in Latin America was preceded several years before by the emergence of similar schemes in the Caribbean and in general excluded the participation of Caribbean states. One of the main obstacles in this participation was associated wiih the differences in size, population, economic potential and degrees of development, achieved by the other Caribbean states in general, closely associated with the difficulties of coriceiving the region in relatively homogenous economic terms. In this final light, if a limited definition of the insular Caribbean, Belize, and the Guyanas, in an ethnohistoric perspective, is possible, to a certain unitary perspective of the region, the existing differences between Cuba, ffàiti, and St Lucia, to take only threeexamples, are particularly exciting in. the same regional context. If both claims to extend conceptualisation of the region to the continental Latin American states, difficulties will worsen if we bectr in mind the existence of countries which present a degree of economic development more advanced than Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia (both defined by a "Caribbean orientation"), and a sub-region characterised by economic and social problems similar to Central America which, however, also presents substantial differences among its members.

Functioning as these internaI difficulties among the Latin American states and the existing differences with the Caribbean countries, from the wider regional integration scheme of "ALALC" and "ALAD1", to sub-regional initiatives such as the Central American Common Market "(MCCA)" and the Andean Pact, the space gr~nted to Caribbean participation was traditionally significantly reduced. The creation of CARIFTA (Caribbean Free Trade Area) in 1968 and CARICOM (Caribbean Community and Cornmon

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CARIBBEAN AND LATIN RELATIüNS 165

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trfi"~~~~:~'iitf'tfi''8"&ro;~~~~:~~~~i~:~:::=:~~~~:~t: ~~1JtYl"~. The cornrnon ideologic goal of its principal prornoters -, P-~(Ïëfi:f}.'1E0li'è'VéPfi1Fô~Më~oo,Er.è:stden.f2filia:tl1i$1i~$.J}l!r.~~~~~j'~V" ,,:€t':;YI,"a'~;:;;iYe'''''lI'' and ~"'f'7ffi';fi:>','M'''l'n15't"" '-""M'-',b'~;oh,'M- W""'l~v~;-o,,·t:"'?H""m-- ~l'C~k~~..."'M"g!',L;J,a .EiJ;··~.bY.;j~';''''~ik~ ..",·Jf!~g •.>•.,!~!!~J;,n2 __ ;Al11'''i.%' .E"'J....~,"''tê.~'''''with their ernphasis on the need to create a New International

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Economie Order and their aspiration to intensify the South-South relations, seemed to initiate a phase of doser cooperation between Latin America and the Caribbean. In turn, the exclusion of the United States and the inclusion of Cuba in the new organism, and its differentiation of the OAS and the organisms of the UN, with. participation of the European countries, gave it a manifested regional "third world" slant. Its fundamental objectives were. presented in less ambitious terms, focusing mainly on promoting regional cooperation arnong the member states, with the aim of adopting similar' econornic and strategie policies surr~nding economic and social thernes.

Fl~v,,(;,~~Në"kjiiif>~'h.''ffifilim'ifLcmrtB1roamIe-trS .N;~=='~"!h."""'t-;::'~·~~A~--~--~··-- ..n ..wr1:..-k=""'.=....:>.:,....os~T.ew.lv .""'U1UL~S:s<:l1'11y"'_11diU;:M:~y?!15l;,ue,~~u.lA..1JUIIg~!~JoG.ed.M.J,J.o·

~~~-en-oi& Jewel Movement g?v~rnment in 1979.) :ra~~~s ~~1f11I._,;JI;{f.dp.â1t{)~~l'l~didllj!fts _~m.wi~Q..B~~l!ll<!aen~~A superficial revision of this participation reveals that Barbados does not participate in any, Guyana only in one, Trinidad and Tobago and Grenada in two, while J amaica has been induded in four. More recently, Grenada has remained only because of Venezue1ah pressures, having expressed on repeated occasions its disposition to withdraw.

In turn, attempts to outline a programme of specifie cooperation bet~eén non-Hispanie Caribbean countries and the Latin American Cafibbean States, in spite of special recommendations by the Third Biennial Programme of 1986, was not successful, mainly because of the lack of response from the respective governments of both groups of nations. A~ '_!&~~il~!t~'i!J ét'j'ôlfe't411imr~udlmS'kflW . . .:-'.tm.~~

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~1iJmi~ati~o!-~~~"?iff't!t~'o . 'fi . -]~ ~J!~ea., and which will eventually constitute the basis for an integration scheme similar to that of Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay in the Southern Zone.

Bilateral Relations

In the~~plan, however, t~@për.-âÈî:'ij~'tïmài'

trv~~~œ...gJ;mt'f1_~~~n~~l)~êiTm1iëa~Î'te:'"êœt;,IIiainly functioning as "Caribbean" policies outlined by the so-calledLatin American "average powers" involved in the region. .'. ..

With respect to Cuba which, as we have already indicated, a. specifie policy unfolded towards the region in the '70s, reinforced by its identification as an Afro-Latin and Caribbean state and by its "third world" projections, the other Latin American countries which have developed an active policy in the Caribbean have been M:"l~itm, ~j]l~Z~. and ~wlIif and, more recently, ~

. ~s, Mexico, with the framework of an external third world policy encouraged by President Echeverria, formulated a specifie policy towards the Caribbean, on occasion coordinated with the Government of Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela. In spite of the Mexican involvement in the Caribbean being later than that of Venezuela, an action directed at the region was jointly established, especially in relation with the Western Caribbean. As Vaughan Lewis points out, in characterising this poliey as "reactive or protective," strongly conditioned by the priorities of U .S. relations, its restrictions moreover obeyed a limited identification of its interesn- in the region, fundamentally conditioned by its policy towards Cuba and its difficult relations with the United States. In fact, the initial impulse achieved by th.is .~l~, gradeg ually disa.ppeared with the latter government and~jlt!it~glf$J:»-~m9 ë.Gn!t~jsi~lfil;'~@{jltèlin a way that tt)1Jîl:• .JilJ~Ait~OOfëtr afi~{j.·.~.Wtt~,... '. 'Olt.·o~ :·fi1e-m., •.. ·.m.~ '~~...)w ..ne..o. '.~ .. ·'" -.m, '.<:;-wiI.~.·, ... """'<o'...a~b.'ea~~t3.t.e .. ,e'Jf'~ .F tj ...-- . --.g~~~~~~,...

p~O'~~~1îffiîfëœ-*:will1i!l~~i~m~~!l~~~!i-§j,Q1jlJ~m~üomtMJ ~I

~piitJriff~---arét&mî~:B'âc;ifi(if

o .~9!1etheless, in ~~g,. t~~.!lli~t:~wjtlli1i'Mêit'tfm~~~~1M'&~j§;m'~~§!ilr liS~tl~~'rOrè{f'iffitàtSiStm1c~s{;hemA'.tŒ(tlre1:@â'îibb~a:rr4..hI:QugJ....~the.. ~'~p. -"""·~'·"''''''''':''-.fr•.Js':~k!'~~~~~.!li~~';'''''~·:'-'-'-'- •.....-~~' -"".o<.~«'"~U~ - :!..~--::-...M=,".

s.~~1):S~~-Wêf}t~, on. the basis of an ~~~~u1~~9~3j0 li(ffi.'~d.e,:tta~....•.~Ce.!tl.,.,m:.~nëtn.oleum=r! i.. ttEI.'''''~o':'''~"":',s-:et.les=-,m11.'.. ...- .. EOdu,~. s,' to."·g:eth~€p~.::;""1.m. .,.....f

--t'-"- , ' , ;tt-=-'V'i6~>~~~- ~&~A-~ ,.~,. ~"":'~~~~tr.Q;s:';'~~~

.. ;.··..... ~Sfi;;w.liîl."".G.h!fèXi,.;'c .... .n"I''''e~., ....m'TLt&."'" "".s,.li', 'stant-l.a llk-,t;eduoo.~!(~USf..QTT1~i.,rlutie.~ 000~. ~~.. ~,,--7~~~:~~ "':>~${~~~~~~~ë'~~MM:~"--,",,,~~~sffme:-<Ï\1.ti~rtfp(jô~ftf)~ (§an"B~a1l"~"~\!&entFa.k>A"~e.nlGan?;;t:·ountH<Js.s~~~~~r-:!:"-.o~'-- ..._. ',._ _'. _'._ ,_ ',_, :;:=::>~~~,-;t,L~$;ç~~~-':"""-'~~~"2r~'-:?~;~M&-~~~<&~5<f~~-{.0_'~~~

00 '1ih''''''~tréiùe:.itlJ'fs'i~:tmfiê"fit€td.f~., .,hado ' 0" .a:icOh·an . <~ • ·o'lillomin· €a .."...!JSi! J1li;" _····"'·_··.."--'''''':i'i~"à?'i:r~f~~~,;'&Vf,'''~l''é&"'*'''" ~lt§j~,,"",,'z""-bJi-

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R~lilî\ic, though it extended later to other countries. The basis of the scheme was fundamentally in the· '~lm;i1hYifJ

inmmm~"()~xn~:tl~~, ~~~

~~d~~~:~~~'tfff~~~;;u~~a~~~a~t~~~ bilateral leve1 with the Caribbean, principally associated with commercial agreements. And, in J uly of 1974, it proceeded to' formulate an inter-governmental commission together with CARICOM countries, which initiated its activities in October of 1980 with the participation of the Mexican Institute for External Trade and the Mexican Management Council on International Affairs (CEMAl). At the same time, . r. <6 ". ,..JÏlf~.1W::lsi

iI~.i~J:1iTfff~ . : ~all~i.<i~~~ 'tigbillJ>, in addition to a series of programmes implemented with Cuba and the Dominican Republic. '

ln turn, ~dJt, which initiated a specifie policy towards the region at the end of the '70s, established in the following decade and up to today, a Caribbean policy with increasingly accentuated features within the framework of its own priorities in external policies. During the first government of Carlos Andres Perez, this orientation deepened, functioning as the favourable joint opening by the worldwide energycrisis of 1973-1971. In this process, the

. ,~< • .,.,.~. ,;. -eztml~ played a protagonist role, orienting the bulk of economic assistance to the region, within the framework of the PROCA plan. _ '.' . Asl flmYJjf~11l)bY~mlJim.'si~tiD=JIl~ëp.~ ~~~s ~~- fina~ce deve10prnent pr~gr~mmes and energy cooperating plans, and which also could be used to buy Venezuelan assets or for the financing of pre-investment studies. On the other_ hand, it must be pointed out that, in terms of IÎmltilateral agreements, Venezuela was one of the first Latin American countries to be incorporated as an active member into the Caribbean Development Bank in 1975.

However, Venezuela has been particularly active in the implementation of bilateral agreements. It has established, for example, fi'fu'"'ijJlY~~e~Wien~i'[lî~inl·dad~nd~"Ubago and..~<lnd·mrrr:~n~me·;f;...... -.:o!"'#6~-O~i:~-.:t.:>~~~-:_"""';..,-_·~1'! ...:.:J:_~---··"'~ii!l+:S1h .......\f~.u"""",..~~~~......-...~~~~~: _.;;:~~~~'(_~~·GJIii!IIIil ,

has implemented agreements associated with the exploitation of bauxite with the latter country, with Jarnaica and, recently, with Guyana. At the same time, it has deve10ped p1if~»tJll,~$liIIff

~IVôffi~i;Sci~n!ifrQ'illffdift'è"Clffiiê~~llm!iP~jtlx~~~~~Jz'i.~ t1j't~asf~1f&faa"h'bn~al1. The pniv~~~Qt has been active m"ihe region from the '70s, with the msmtImîM:PfOÏ~~a:P'!f~"f~~~k~ OOêiâ1 and the e~Imttil.liY!I~1Q~~~fP~' construction materials, textiles and supplying petrochemicals. S'orne of these initiatives have

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been channelled through the~Të'1Q~_mM~~<t~~'@J)and the ~_~...m~~~),and they have been reinforced by the à~~~;Jin}tl'VaY.During the last presidential period, the policy towards the region acquired a more defined outl~ne in terms of development of cooperation programmes which have emphasised the "shared responsibility" and the implementation of a more active cultural policy, oriented to promote an awareness of the country among the populations of the non"'Hispanie Caribbean states.

For its part, -mi'ü:b.1g initiated, in the '70s an economic cooperation policy towards the Caribbean, with §PSfl.:mlÙ!iL~!If ~~!~h~t._~o'penin~ line~ of credit for thë-'~importôt-cOiomblanproducts. s.. ..; , .~

~~~:~~~m~~~s~""~j~~~ with the ~ljff§li'fi'f~ '0 .•.. .

.)

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: ..., . . .:E1: ,"i .-00 .s ~~. ~R:elTsaTjjZ'iJ!tJt~~~ .._.n.4;.

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..... ' ..'" ·IS. ~t;,u~..$R~

~~~P~~.h~~~~~œr-.. F~~~~~g:~·osa new continental actor has appeared in

~ the region, especially from the signing of this last treaty. In recent years, ~li;,tlJ has begun to increase its bilateral cooperation agreements with sorne of the countries of the region, ~~

-wi;2. '. ~~rss~wllt~f!ll'l;~Jl"

~~!!!!!~~~~.~.,~~ The ~~~.bf-~5Pft.f@fPüî'f6W'ffiTO~lmflréftiliÉJlrhas characterised in this process of graduaI increase of the Brazilian presence in the Caribbean, especially with these three countries, and with sorne private initiatives in the tourism sector of the Eastern Caribbean. Particularly significant have been, however, the governmental agreements of scientific and technical cooperation with Guyana and Suriname, assistance in the widening of an infra-structural road in the first of these countries, and of the telephone communications in the second, on par with agreements between state petroleum companies of Brazil and Trinidad and Tobago. At this point the gli""gn'~r~~J&of~;~a:ffi;'~:êTri"i+""\'l~f!Q.r",,,,nTI·litra~'a;"slstaff"'''eil';'lfi~8ur4naIi1ë;@:""staho..

QOk~~~·«t)~~~~M~~~~"'~-'='<"'''''~1:''"'-&~··''''~·~~~'n.;..:.~~..=-,---~.-''·' '~~8"W"

;}1S''''··I;'~.Pt~l~~HS;-g;~~~lI~''''~tîn..JSf~~()''fi\''irc:m'm'ttÎ':ê-:rs-._._.U~~~4!J_ .....~.;.._ .. -'Y 'r~~~~~._..U .._U;Y_Y~;z.;. ~!?"'

Caribbean policies of the regional Latin American powers are


frquently seen to be influenced by strategie considerations and regional geopolitics, beyond those eventually dictated by the EastWest confrontation. In this light, it is necessary to bear in mind at the same time, the rivalry which is established between them in relation to the persistence of geopolitical concepüons, particularly those developed in Brazil and Colombia. In fact, the hypotheses of conflict caused in terms of its relations on a regional level often had an influence on the structuring of policies towards the zones considered to be strategically important, to the point where its projected national interests for the region respond II1.0re to· considerations of safety and national influence rather than economic reasons.

As a compromise, the reactions of the non-Hispanie Cari!>bean states, particularly since the North American invasion of Grenada, have been channelled in the same direction, on giving priority to security and political stability in the zone of its external poliey agenda. However, historically these considerations have be.en displaced by the importance granted in the first place to economie relations and to the prompting of national economic development. Within this framework, Latin America has occupied a secondary position in its interests, while its preoccupations have been directed mainly towards the old European colonial metropolises, towards the. United States and Canada, as potential sources of economic assistance, and towards the African states, as enviroments eulturally associated to its population.

Notwithstanding, it is possible to point out the existence of sorne "Latin Arrierican doctrines" in the English-speaking Caribbean, from the outline by Williams in terms of questioning an involvement of the Latin American states, and especially of Venezuela, in the region, to the arguments by Manley, emphasising the "third world" coincidences of Latin American and Caribbean interests. At the same time, on the verge of a significant turn in the attitude of the governments of sorne of the non-Hispanie Caribbean states, in the light of considering the relations with Latin America and a "third route" within the framework of the dictated conditions by the confrontation between the super-powers. However, this change in attitude, of the indifference and the suspicion of a pragmatism in the relations with Latin America, is hardly outlined, manifesting itself particularly in the increase of commercial exchange between both regions.

Conclusion

The .analysis which 1 have attempted allows for a few tentative conclusIOns on the diversities which have characterised the old

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relations between the English-speaking Caribbean states and the Latin American states and the new relations to be established. In the first place, it is self-evident that these diversities respond in a high degree to the ethnohistoric perceptions that the populations of both groups of nations retained with respect to the "others"

Existing diversities are, therefore, fundamentally ethnopolitical, while ideological conceptions, which still question the presence of homogenous foreign actors in the region and which reinforce a political "third world" solidarity, were replaced in the '70s by a significant convergence of mutual interests. However, the most obvious differences are in the field of eeonomie relations between the eountries. These differences have undermined attempts at integration and economic cooperation, in spite of the clear n'êed for improvedrelations between Latin American countries'and those belonging to the Caribbean Community, and signeâ economic agreements between Latin America and the English-speaking Caribbean. And, in practice, even the limited attempts at coordination policies which emerged in the UN and in other international organisations, especially duting the '70s, have been weakened. by the frustrations in the eeonomie cooperation plan.

As a result, these economic differences and the interests which emanate from them are frequently supported by the relations which are established between both groups of nations, in the different existing ethnopolicies. Consequently, the recommendations of sorne ailalysts to promote ~ultural exchange policies and informative policies which modify existing perceptions and which may overcome the cultural and linguistic barriers may indeed help to weaken the hostilities facing both groups of countries. In the meantime, the bilateral initiatives appear to produce, in the medium term, more concrele results, in the sense of modifying the existing ethnopoliti cal perceptions,· although they may be dictated by the respective national intere~ts and contribute little to changing the general picture of basic diversities between both groups of nations.

However,in the long term, the actions coordinated ata regional level, in the political and cultural and economic plan, emerge as the only viable alternative to gradually reduce the existing di\'ersities. The eventual political convergence which begins to emerge in Latin America as a resuIt of the Contadora experiment, of the Support Group and the Esquipulas Plan for Central Americà, and the receptiveness which they have received by sorne Caribbean governments may contribute to an eventual modelof limited politieal coordination and an overcoming of the existing diverse ethnopoli cies. In time, initiatives like SELA would be able to be forffiulated. But this belongs to the future.

andres serbin race and politlcs: relations between the

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