PoliticalIdentifyandPartyPolarizationintheAmericanElectorate

DavidC.Kimball

BryceSummary

EricC.Vorst

UniversityofMissouri‐St.Louis

PresentedatTheStateoftheParties:2012andBeyondconference,Akron,OH,November7,2013.

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"Iwanteveryonetreatedfairlyinthiscountry.Wehavenevergonewrongwhenwe'veextendedrightsandresponsibilitiestoeverybody."–BarackObama,May14,20121

"Thispresidentismovingusawayfromourfounders'vision.Insteadoflimitedgovernment,heisleadingustowardlimitedfreedomandlimitedopportunity."–MittRomney,April12,20122

EvidenceofideologicalpolarizationamongpartyeliteshasfueledadebateaboutthedegreeofpolarizationamongtheAmericanpublic.Muchofthedebatehasfocusedonanideologicalorpolicy‐baseddefinitionofpolarization.Forexample,thereisclearevidenceof“sorting,”anincreasingcorrespondencebetweenavoter’spartyidentificationandideologicalpositiononaleft‐rightspectrum(Levendusky2009).Inaddition,thereisevidenceshowingthatthepolicypreferencesofaverageDemocratsandRepublicanshavemovedfartherapartonseveralkeyissues,particularlyamongthemostengagedsegmentoftheelectorate(Abramowitz2010;Laymanetal.2010).

However,moreattentionshouldbegiventopsychologicalcomponentsofpolarizationthatemphasizepoliticalidentity.Increasedpartisandisagreementamongpoliticiansandactivistshasfosteredamoreattentivepublicandastrongersenseofpoliticalidentityamongmasspartisans(Hetherington2011).OneconsequenceisincreasedpartyloyaltyonElectionDay(Bartels2000).Butheightenedelitepartisanshipalsoencouragesthepublictoviewpoliticsinzero‐sum“usversusthem”terms.Increasedpartyconflictattheelitelevelinvitesmassfollowerstointernalizethebroadoutlinesofthoseconflictsanddenigratetheirpoliticalopponentsmorethaninthepast.Forexample,AlanAbramowitzwritesthatgrowingpoliticalpolarizationmay“contributetoatendencytodemonizetheopposingpartyanditssupporters”(Abramowitz2013,xv).

WetesttheseargumentswithsurveydatafromtheAmericanNationalElectionStudies.Aspartyeliteshavebecomemoreideologicallypolarized,masspartisanshavebecomemorepolarizedintheirbasicevaluationsofthetwomajorpoliticalparties.Inparticular,followersofbothpartiesexpressincreasinglevelsoffearandcontempttowardtheoppositepartyanditspresidentialcandidates,withthe2012electioncycleproducingrecordlevelsofout‐partydemonization.Polarizedratingsofthetwomajorpartieshavemanyroots,includingpartyidentity,ideology,corevalues,group‐basedattitudes,individualpredispositions,andthegrowthinpartisanmedia.

                                                            1Killough2012.2Metzler2012.

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PartofouranalysisincludespublicattitudestowardtheTeaParty,thelatestfrontinthepartisanwarsandagoodexampleofthepsychologicalbasisofmasspolarization.ThestrongestpredictorofTeaPartysupportisthedegreetowhichvotersliketheRepublicanPartyanddisliketheDemocrats.PartisanshipalsostructureshowvotersdefinetheburgeoningTeaPartymovement.Redmeatrhetoricthatdemonizestheoppositionisastapleofpoliticalcampaignsanditsustainsoppositionpartieswhentheyarenotgoverning.SincePresidentObamahasoccupiedtheWhiteHouse,evaluationsofthenation’sdirectionarecloselyassociatedwithcontemptfortheDemocraticPartyanditspresident.Thereisadeepeningreservoiroffearandloathingoftheopposingpartythatcanbetappedbypoliticalleaderseagertomobilizethebaseforthenextpoliticalbattle,butcontemptforthepoliticaloppositioninhibitsnegotiationandeffortstofindcommongroundinAmericanpolitics.

PartyPolarization

ThereisclearevidenceofpartypolarizationattheelitelevelofAmericanpolitics.Polarizationistypicallydefinedintermsofagrowingideologicalgapbetweenthetwomajorpoliticalpartiesandincreasedideologicalhomogeneitywithinparties.Forexample,studiesofCongressfindthatthecenteroftheDemocraticPartyhasmovedtotheleftwhileRepublicanlegislatorshavemovedmoresharplytotheright,particularlyduringthepasttwodecades(Bonicaetal.2013;Theriault2013).Inaddition,studiesofpartyactivistsfindgrowingdifferencesbetweenDemocratsandRepublicansoneconomic,racialandculturalissues(Laymanetal.2010).Finally,recentexaminationfindsaconsiderabledegreeofpartypolarizationinAmericanstatelegislatures(ShorandMcCarty2011).

Thereissomedebateabouttheextentofideologicalpolarizationamongthemasspublic.Some,suchasFiorinaandcolleagues(2011)arguethatmostvotershavecentristpolicypreferencesthathavenotchangedmuchintheaggregateinresponsetoelitepolarization.However,severalotherstudiesobservegrowingdifferencesbetweenRepublicansandDemocratsonarangeofissues(e.g.,Abramowitz2010;Laymanetal.2010).Increasedelitepolarizationmeansthatelectedofficialsmorefrequentlydividealongpartylinesonimportantissuesoftheday.Theincreasingfrequencyandintensityofthesepolicydisagreementsmakethepublicmoreawareofpolicydifferencesbetweenthemajorpoliticalparties(Hetherington2011).Beingawareofthemajorpolicydifferencesbetweenthepartiesmakesiteasierforcitizenstochoosesidesinthepartisanpoliticalwars.

Furthermore,elitepolarizationheightenspartisanidentityandloyaltyamongthemasspublic.Forexample,Druckmanandcolleagues(2013)findthatexposuretoelitepolarizationincreasestheimpactofpartycuesonpublicopinion,reducestheinfluenceof

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substantiveinformation,andboostsconfidenceinone’sopinions.Regardlessofthesubstanceofthedisputes,masspartisanshavearootinginterestinseeingtheirpartywinpoliticalbattles.Whenelitepartisandisagreementsincreaseinfrequencyandintensity,masspartisanswillfeelastrongersenseofidentitywiththeirownpoliticalpartyandagreaterinclinationtodefinetheoppositepartyinnegativeterms.Thus,someexplainpartypolarizationintermsofgroupidentity,separatefromideologicalpreferences.

Socialidentitytheoryarguesthatpeoplederivetheirownsenseofselffromtheirmembershipingroups.Themotivationtoidentifywithanin‐group(towhichthepersonbelongs)thatisdistinctfromaperceivedout‐groupispowerful(Tajfel1978,1982).Asaresult,peoplenaturallytendtoseetheworldintermsofin‐groupsandout‐groups.Moreimportantly,thetheorypredictsbiasedperceptionsthatexaggerateinter‐groupdifferencesandgeneratepositivefeelingstowardone’sowngroupandnegativefeelingsaboutopposinggroups.PartyidentificationisacentralconceptinthestudyofAmericanvotingbehavior,andwasoriginallyconceivedtoresembleothersocialgroupidentities,likereligion(Campbelletal.1960).Thus,socialidentitytheorymayhelpusunderstandpartisanshipandpartypolarization.

Severalstudiesexaminepartisanshipfromtheperspectiveofsocialidentitytheory.Mostimportantly,aselitepartypolarizationisconveyedtothepublic,citizensbecomemorecertainabouttheirownpartyidentity(Lavine,Johnston,andSteenbergen2012;Druckman,Peterson,andSlothuus2013).Similarly,Greene(1999)findsthatstrongpartisansstandoutfromotherpartisansintermsoftheirrobustsocialidentitywithapoliticalparty.Furthermore,socialidentitypredictsvoterloyalty,activism,andideologicalextremismevenwhencontrollingforstrengthofpartisanship(Greene2004).Morerecently,Iyengar,Sood,andLelkes(2012)applysocialidentitytheorytodocumentincreasingaffectivepolarizationinthemasspublicintheUnitedStatesandBritain.Forinstance,theyobserverisinglevelsofoppositiontointer‐partymarriageandincreasedpartypolarizationintraitratingsofpartysupporters.

[Figure1abouthere]

Thereisadditionalevidenceofincreasingdenigrationoftheoppositeparty,particularlyinthelastdecade.Figure1showsthepercentageofpartisanswhoreportfeelingangryorafraidabouttheoppositeparty’spresidentialcandidate.ThedataarefromsurveysconductedbytheAmericanNationalElectionStudies,andquestionsthataskifthepresidentialcandidateofaparticularpartyevermadetherespondentfeelangry,orafraid.3                                                            3The2012waveoftheANESsurveysisunusualinthatitincludedtwointerviewmodes.Onesampleofrespondentswasinterviewedface‐to‐face,thetraditionalmodeforANESsurveys,andtheothersamplecompletedthesurveyontheInternet.SeveralindicatorsshowtheInternetsampletobemorepolarizedthantheface‐to‐facesample.Foranydepictionofchronologicaltrends,asinFigure1,weonlyusetheface‐to‐facesampleofthe2012survey.

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Whileoppositepartypresidentialcandidatestendtoinspiremoreangerthanfear,bothindicatorsincreaseovertime.Comparedtopreviousdecades,bothindicatorsalsoreachnewhighsin2012,withalmosthalfofpartisansprofessingfearandalmosttwo‐thirdsofpartisansexpressingangerinreactiontothepresidentialcandidatefromtheoppositeparty.

[Figure2abouthere]

ThemostcompellingevidencefromIyengar,Sood,andLelkes(2012)depictsgrowingmasspolarizationinthefeelingthermometerratingsofthetwomajorpartiesoverthepastthirtyyears.Thethermometerquestionsaskrespondentstorategroupsorpoliticalfiguresonascalefrom0to100,withhighervaluesindicatingwarmerfeelingsandlowerscoresindicatingmoreanimositytowardtheobject.Weupdatetheirevidencetoincludethe2012waveoftheANESsurveys(seeFigures2and3).Asthefiguresindicate,duringthepastthirtyyearsRepublicansandDemocratshaveconsistentlyratedtheirownpartypositively,atapproximately70degrees.Onaverage,DemocratstendtoratetheirownpartyacouplepointshigherthanRepublicansratetheGOP.

[Figure3abouthere]

However,thefiguresshowthatratingsoftheoppositepartyhavedeclinedovertime,witharelativelysteepdropoccurringduringthelasttenyears.Meanratingsoftheoppositepartywerecloseto50degreesin1980buthavedroppedalmostto30degreesin2012.Onaverage,DemocratstendtoratetheGOPapointortwolowerthanRepublicansratetheDemocraticParty.Onceagain,the2012cycleproducedrecordlowthermometerratingsoftheoppositeparty,forbothRepublicansandDemocrats.Tosummarizethetwotrends,thegapinaffectionforone’sownpartyandtheoppositeparty,termedaffectivepartisanshipor“netpartisanaffect”(Iyengar,Sood,andLelkes2012),hasincreasedfromroughly25degreesin1980toalmost37degreesin2012.

Whyisthispolarizationinaffectiveratingsofthetwomajorpartieshappening?Thereissomedebateaboutthisquestionaswell.Abramowitz(2013)arguesthatideologyisattherootofmasspolarization.Ideologicaldisagreementsbetweenthetwopartieshavecomedefineagrowingportionofthepolicyagenda,andDemocratsandRepublicanshavemovedfartherapartontheideologicalspectrum.Thus,affectivepolarizationmaybeaby‐productofideologicalpolarization.Asithappens,theratherdramaticincreaseinnetpartisanaffectamongthemasspublicoverthepastdecadecoincideswithsharperideologicalpolarizationinCongressduringthesameperiod.

Iyengarandcolleagues(2012)arguethatexposuretopoliticalcampaigns,andnegativeadsinparticular,explainsmasspolarization.Politicalcampaignstendtofocusheavilyoninter‐partydifferences,which,accordingtosocialidentitytheory,should

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strengthenpartisanidentityamongvoters.Inaddition,negativecampaignadvertisingisdevotedtodemonizingtheopposingpartyanditscandidates,whichshouldencouragepartisanstoviewtheiropponentsinaharsherlight.Furthermore,negativecampaigninginpresidentialelectionshasincreasedovertime(West2013),whichalsocorrespondswiththegrowingpolarizationinratingsofthetwoparties.

Webelievethatneitheroftheseperspectivesfullyexplainspolarizedattitudestowardthepoliticalparties.Inadditiontoideology,thereareotherpoliticalattitudesassociatedwithpartypolarizationintheUnitedStates.Inadditiontonegativecampaigns,thereareothersourcesofpartisanrhetoricthatcontributetoaffectivepolarizationinAmericanpolitics.TherearepluralisticrootsofpoliticalattitudesintheUnitedStates(Kinder1983;ClawsonandOxley2013),andpartypolarizationisnodifferent.Corevaluesthatarecommonreferencepointsinpoliticaldebates,group‐relatedsymbolsandattitudes,thegrowthofpartisanmedia,andindividualpredispositionshelpexplainpolarizedratingsofthetwopoliticalparties.Inthenextsectionweexplainthesehowtheseconceptsrelatetopartypolarizationandtheninthefollowingsectionweprovidesomeevidencefromthe2012ANESsurveytosupportourhypotheses.

SourceofMassPolarization

AsshownbyAbramowitz(2010,2013),thestrengthenedlinkbetweenpartisanandideologicalidentificationisanimportantsourceofpolarizationintheUnitedStates.However,eventhoughmanypoliticaldebatesinAmericanpoliticscanbeboileddowntoideology,elitediscoursedoesnotframepoliticsentirelyintermsofliberal‐conservativeconflicts.Infact,politicalpartiesandcandidatesfrequentlyavoidusingtermssuchas“liberal”or“conservative”intheircampaignrhetoric.ThismakessensebecausefewAmericansuseideologicaltermstodiscusspolitics,andmanydonotunderstandpoliticsintermsofleft‐rightideologicalconcepts(Converse1964;Lewis‐Becketal.2008;Goren2013).AsignificantportionofAmericansareunabletoplacethemselves,orthemajorparties,ontheideologicalspectrum.Thosethatdotendtoassume,sometimesincorrectly,thattheirfavoredcandidateshavethesamepolicyandideologicalpositionsasthemselves.Thetendencytoprojectone’sownattitudesontofavoredpoliticalfiguresismostpronouncedamongpeoplewithstrongpartyattachments(Lavine,Johnston,andSteenbergen2012).Thus,therearesomelimitsontheabilityofideologytoexplainpartisanconflictandpolarization.Corevalues,group‐basedattitudes,individualpredispositions,andtheriseofpartisanmediaalsoaccountforthestateofpartypolarizationintheUnitedStatestoday.

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CoreValues

Toappealtoasmanyvotersaspossible,politicalcampaignsfrequentlyframepolicydisputesintermsofcorevaluesorprinciplesthatcanbeappliedtoissuesinaparticularpolicydomain.Corevaluesaregeneralbeliefsabouthowtheworldshouldwork,andvaluesguideaperson’sunderstandingofrightandwrong.Totheextentthatpartisanpoliticaldebatesareframedintermsofclashingvalues,thenpartisansareencouragedtoviewthoseconflictsintermsofrightversuswrongandgoodversusevil.Ifdifferentpartiesrepresentcompetingvalues,ordifferentpolesonthesamevaluedimension,thencorevaluesmaystructureaffectivepolarizationintheUnitedStates.

Corevaluesarewidelyheldandusedbyvoters.Virtuallyallcitizens,regardlessoftheirlevelofeducationorinvolvementinpolitics,adheretoalimitednumberofcorevaluesandareabletobasetheirownvotingdecisionsandpolicypreferencesonthosevalues(Feldman1988;Goren2013).Sincefirmlyheldvaluesmayconflictwithoneanotheronsignificantpublicpolicydebates,valuesarelikelytostructurepartisanconflict.Asaresult,valueconflictmaybeanimportantsourceofattitudepolarizationinAmericanpolitics.WeexaminethreecorevaluesthathavebecomecommonsourcesofpartisanconflictinAmericanpolitics:egalitarianism,limitedgovernment,andmoraltraditionalism.4

Egalitarianismemphasizesequalopportunityandfairtreatmentforeveryone,regardlessoftheirindividualattributes.Highadherencetoegalitarianismisassociatedwithmoreliberalviewsinseveralpolicydomains,particularlysocialwelfareissues.Lowadherencetoegalitarianismisassociatedwithmoreconservativepolicypositions(Feldman1988).Thus,egalitarianismcorrelateswithDemocraticpartisanship.Limitedgovernmentdealswiththedegreetowhichthenationalgovernmentshouldintervenetoprovideaneconomicsafetynetforitscitizens.Thosewhobelievethatpeoplearelargelyresponsiblefortheirownwell‐beingfavorlimitedgovernment.HighadherencetolimitedgovernmentisassociatedwithmoreconservativeviewsoneconomicpoliciesandcorrelateswithRepublicanpartisanshipandvotingbehavior(Goren2013).Overall,egalitarianismandlimitedgovernmenthelpstructureapersistentpartycleavageintheUnitedStatessincetheNewDeal.

Moraltraditionalismfocuseson“thedegreetowhichconservativeororthodoxmoralstandardsshouldguidethepublicandprivatelifeofthenation”(Goren2013,5).Moraltraditionalistsopposechangingnormsregardingfamilystructureandbelievethatgovernmentshouldpromotetraditionalfamilyvalues.Incontrast,moralprogressivesare

                                                            4ThesearenotmeanttobeanexhaustivelistofcorevaluesinAmericanpolitics.AdditionalvaluesarecoveredbyGoren(2013)andClawsonandOxley(2013).Rather,egalitarianism,limitedgovernment,andmoraltraditionalismhavestructuredpartyconflictintheUnitedStatesforanextendedperiod.

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moretolerantofdifferentlifestylesandresistgovernmenteffortstoenforcetraditionalnotionsofmorality(Hunter1991).MoraltraditionalismundergirdsseveralpolicydebatesintheUnitedStates,includingabortionandgayrights,andmoraltraditionalismhasbeenasourceofpartisanconflictsincethe1960s(Goren2013;ClawsonandOxley2013).

Corevaluesaredistinctfromleft‐rightideologyassourcesofpartisanconflict.Whileeachofthevaluesdescribedabovecanbemappedontotheliberal‐conservativespectrum,noneofthemareperfectlycorrelatedwithideology.Moreimportantly,peoplewhomaynotcomprehendtheliberal‐conservativeframeworkofideologicalconflictcanapplycorevaluestovotingandpolicydecisions.Andsincecorevaluesformthebasisforbeliefsaboutrightandwrong,valuesarecrucialfornurturingnegativeviewsofthepoliticalopposition.Itisnosurprisethatpartisanrhetoricfrequentlytapsintocorevalues.ThequotationsfromPresidentObamaandGovernorRomneyatthebeginningofthispaperoffertwoexamplesofvaluereferencesduringthe2012presidentialcampaign.Obama’sstatement,madeinconnectionwithhisannouncedsupportforlegalizinggaymarriage,containsegalitarianthemes.Romney’sstatement,madeattheannualconventionfortheNationalRifleAssociation,emphasizeslimitedgovernment.Insum,valueconflictshouldhelpexplainpolarizedratingsofthetwoparties.Thosewithmoreextremebeliefsoneachvaluedimensionshouldproducemorepolarizedratingsofthetwomajorparties.

Groupattitudes

Wealsobelievethatattitudestowardsocialgroupscontributetopolarizedratingsofthetwopoliticalparties.AttitudestowardgroupsareanimportantsourceofpolicypreferencesintheUnitedStates.Partisanrhetoricisfrequentlyframedintermsdesignedtoappealtopublicstereotypesofprominentgroupsinsociety.Inaddition,sometheoriesofpartisanshiparerootedinpublicperceptionsofsocialgroupscommonlyassociatedwitheachpoliticalparty(Jacoby1988;Green,Palmquist,andSchickler2002).Asisthecasewithcorevalues,peoplewhodonotfollowpoliticsverycloselycanstillformbeliefsaboutgroupsinsocietyandrelyonthosebeliefstoevaluatethepoliticalparties.Wefocusonattitudestowardtwogroupsthatreflectimportantpartisandifferencesinmodernpolitics:AfricanAmericansandwomen.

WhilemanyscholarshaveobservedadeclineinovertracismintheUnitedStates,DonaldKinderandLynnSanders(1996)arguethatanewtypeofracialprejudice,termed“racialresentment”,hasemergedinthewakeofthecivilrightsmovement.RacialresentmentcentersonabeliefthatalackofworkethicaccountsforinequalitybetweenblackandwhiteAmericans.SinceAfricanAmericansidentifyheavilywiththeDemocraticParty,racialattitudeshavelikelypartisanconsequences.Racialresentmenthasnotdiminishedoverthelasttwodecadesanditisassociatedwithpolicypreferencesonissues

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suchasaffirmativeactionandthedeathpenalty(KinderandSanders1996;ClawsonandOxley2013).Inaddition,racialresentmentisassociatedwithRepublicanpartisanshipandvotingbehavior(ValentinoandSears2005).Finally,thepartisanimpactofracialresentmentmaybestrongernowthatthefirstAfricanAmericanpresidentinthenation’shistoryoccupiestheWhiteHouse(TeslerandSears2010;KinderandDale‐Riddle2012).Elitepoliticalrhetoricandmediacoverageofpoliticscanarouseracialresentmentinsubtleways.Forexample,whenNewtGingrichreferredtoBarackObamaas“thefoodstamppresident”duringthe2012presidentialcampaign(Weiner2012),theremarkmayhavetappedintoracialresentment.Sincetherearesubstantialdifferencesbetweenblackandwhitevotersintheirsupportforthetwomajorparties,weexpectracialresentmenttobeassociatedwithpolarizedratingsoftheparties.

WealsoexamineattitudesinvolvingthestatusofwomeninAmericansociety.Modernsexismrevolvesaroundreactionstochanginggenderrolesandbeliefsaboutthedegreethatdiscriminationagainstwomenstillpersists(GlickandFiske2011).Thereisaconsistentgendergapinvotingandpartyidentification,withwomenmoresupportiveoftheDemocraticPartyandmenfavoringtheRepublicanParty(ClawsonandOxley2013).Furthermore,thereispersistentpartisanconflictoverissuesspecifictowomen,suchasabortion,contraception,equalpay,andworkplacerights.Forexample,theDemocraticPartyrecentlycampaignedonanallegedGOP“waronwomen,”highlightingsomeoftheseissues.The“waronwomen”rhetoriclikelystirsbeliefsaboutmodernsexismwhenvotersevaluatethetwoparties.Thus,attitudesabouttheroleofwomenarelikelytobeasourceofpolarizedratingsofthetwomajorparties.

PartisanMedia

Thusfarwehavediscussedattitudesthatareexpectedtobeprimedbypartisanrhetoric.Itisalsoimportanttoconsiderthesourcesofpartisanrhetoricinelitediscourse.Inadditiontonegativecampaigns,therecentgrowthofpartisanmediaoncabletelevision,talkradio,andtheInternetisanotherlikelysourceofpolarizationinAmericanpolitics.Partisanmediaprogramsandwebsitestendtofeaturehyperboliclanguageandfearmongeringthathighlightsthelatestoutrageperpetratedbythepoliticalopposition(BerryandSobieraj2013).Thus,partisanmediaseemstobeaneffectivemechanismfornurturingnegativeattitudestowardtheoppositeparty.

Thereisevidencethatconsumersofpartisanmediabecomemorepolarizedbytheexperience.Inaseriesofcontrolledexperiments,Levendusky(2013a)findsthatexposuretolike‐mindedmediaproducesmovescitizenstoadoptmoreextremepolicypositions.Inaddition,exposuretopartisanmediaisassociatedwithmorenegativeratingsoftheoppositepartyandreducedsupportforbipartisanship(Levendusky2013b).Mutz(2007)

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arguesthattwofeaturesoftelevisedpoliticaldiscourse,incivilityandclose‐upcamerashotsofspeakers,causeviewerstotreatopposingpointsofviewaslesslegitimate.Intwoexperiments,shefindsthatexposuretoteleviseddebatescausedviewerstorateopposingcandidateslessfavorably,producingmorepolarizedratingsoftheirpreferredandopposingcandidates.Incivilityandclose‐upcameraanglesaremorecommonfeaturesofpartisantelevisionmediathanmainstreamtelevisionnetworks.Thus,weexpectthatconsumersofpartisanmediawillexhibitmorepolarizedratingsofthetwomajorpoliticalparties.

Predispositions

Finally,wehypothesizethatsomeindividualshavepredispositionsthatfostermorenegativeviewsofthepoliticalopposition.Onesuchtraitisthe“needtoevaluate,”whichreflectsaperson’scapacityforbeingjudgmental.Inotherwords,theneedtoevaluateindicatesthedegreeandfrequencywithwhichsomeoneratesobjectsasgoodorbad.Thosewhoarehighintheneedtoevaluatetendtoholdmoreintenseopinions(JarvisandPetty1996).Whenitcomestopartisanpolitics,weexpectthattheneedtoevaluateisassociatedwithmorenegativeopinionsoftheoppositionandmorepolarizedratingsofthetwomajorparties.

Asecondpredispositionrelevanttopartisanpolarizationisauthoritarianism,aworldview“concernedwiththeappropriatebalancebetweengroupauthorityanduniformity,onetheonehand,andindividualautonomyanddiversity,ontheother”(Stenner2005,14).Authoritariansvalueconformityandorderandtendtoviewwithworldinblackandwhiteterms.Attheotherextreme,libertariansvaluediversityandappreciatenuance.Authoritarianismisassociatedwithpublicpreferencesonissuessuchasgayrights,militaryinterventionabroad,andthebalancebetweencivillibertiesandtheneedtopreventterroristattacks(HetheringtonandWeiler2009).

Giventheassociationbetweenpoliticalattitudesandauthoritarianism,itwouldappearthatauthoritarianismisrelatedtopartyidentification.Wehaveasomewhatdifferentpointofview.HetheringtonandWeiler(2009)arguethatauthoritarianismstructurespartisanship,withthosehighontheauthoritarianismspectrumgravitatingtowardtheRepublicanPartyandvoterslowinauthoritarianismfavoringtheDemocraticParty.Whiletheyfindevidencetosupportthelinkbetweenauthoritarianismandpartisanship,thatisnottheentirestory.HetheringtonandWeiler(2009)alsofindanasymmetrywhenexaminingauthoritarianismandfeelingthermometerratingsofthetwoparties.Inaddition,theyfindaconsiderablevariationontheauthoritarianismdimensionwithinbothparties.Inexaminingpartisanpolarization,itisimportanttokeepinmindthatauthoritariansmakestrongerdistinctionsbetweenin‐groupsandout‐groups(Stenner

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2005).Thus,wehypothesizethatauthoritarians,regardlessofthepartywithwhichtheyidentify,holdmorenegativeopinionsoftheirpoliticalopponentsandmorepolarizedratingsofthetwomajorparties.Tosummarize,webelievethatthereareseveralrootsofpartisanpolarizationinthemasspublic.Inthenextsectionwetestourhypotheseswithpublicopiniondatafromthe2012election.

PredictorsofNetPartisanAffect

WeexaminethepredictorsofpolarizedpartyevaluationsusingdatafromtheAmericanNationalElectionStudies2012TimeSeriessurvey(ANES201).Thesampleincludes2,054face‐to‐faceintervieweesand3,860whocompletedthesurveyontheInternet.Ourmeasureofpolarizedpartisanattitudesisthethermometerratingforone’sownpartyminusthethermometerratingfortheoppositionparty,dubbed“netpartisanaffect”byIyengar,Sood,andLelkes(2012).

Beforegettingtomeasuresofourconceptsdescribedabove,weincludeseveralcontrolvariablestoaccountforalternativeexplanationsofpolarization.First,wecontrolforstrengthofpartyidentification.AsFigure4indicates,strongpartisansproducesignificantlymorepolarizedratingsofthetwopartiesthanothers,andthedifferencebetweenstrongpartisansversusweakandleaningpartisanshasgrownbyaboutfivedegreesoverthepast30years.5Thedifferencesbetweenweakandleaningpartisansarenotnearlyaspronounced.Forstrongpartisans,thedifferenceinpartythermometerratingsincreasedfromroughly39degreesin1978toover56degreesin2012.Netpartisanaffecthasrisenforotherpartisansaswell,butnotquiteassteeplyasforstrongpartisans.Inanycase,wecontrolforstrengthofpartisanshipbyincludingseparatedummyvariablesforstrongandweakpartisansintheanalysesbelow.

[Figure4abouthere]

Ideologyisanothercommonpredictorofpartypolarization,asmoreextremeideologicalpositionsareassociatedwithmorepolarizedratingsoftheparties.Wecontrolforideologybyusingtheitemthatasksrespondentstoplacethemselvesonaseven‐pointscalefromextremelyliberalatoneendtoextremelyconservativeattheotherend.Afollow‐upquestionaskedmoderatesandthosewhocouldnotplacethemselvesonthescaletochooseonesideoftheideologicalspectrumortheother.Weusedthefollow‐upitemtoplacemanyofthoseuncertainideologuesasslightlyliberalorslightlyconservative,

                                                            5ForallanalysesinthispaperwetreatIndependentswholeantowardapartyaspartisans.

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minimizingtheamountofmissingdata.Highervaluesonthescaleindicatemoreconservativerespondents.

ItisnotclearwhytheInternetsampleismorepolarizedthantheface‐to‐facesampleinthe2012ANESdata.PerhapsthelowerresponseratefortheInternetmodeproducesamorepoliticallyextremesampleofrespondents.PerhapstheInternetmodeofthesurveyfosterstheexpressionofmoreextremeattitudes.WeincludeadummyvariablefortheInternetmodeofsurveyresponseasanothercontrolvariable.Netpartisanaffectisapproximatelysixdegreeslarger,onaverage,fortheInternetrespondentsthanfortheface‐to‐facerespondents.Wealsocontrolforresidentsofbattlegroundstates,totestthehypothesisthatexposuretothepresidentialcampaignproducesmorepolarization.Onaverage,netpartisanaffectwasjustonetotwodegreeshigherinbattlegroundstatesin2012.

Finally,wetreatthetwopredispositions,needtoevaluateandauthoritarianism,ascontrolvariablesbeforeestimatingtheimpactofcorevalues,group‐basedattitudesandexposuretopartisanmedia.Wemeasureneedtoevaluatebyaveragingresponsestotwoquestionsabouthowfrequentlytheyformopinionsaboutthings.6Highervaluesindicateastrongerneedtoevaluate.Wemeasureauthoritarianismbasedonfourforced‐choicequestionsthataskaboutpreferredtraitsinchildren(independencevs.respectforelders;curiosityvs.goodmanners;obediencevs.self‐reliance;andbeingconsideratevs.well‐behaved).Responsestothefourquestionsareaveragedtogethertocreatetheauthoritarianismscale.7Highervaluesindicateamoreauthoritarianworldview.

TheassociationsbetweenthecontrolvariablesandnetpartisanaffectarepresentedinTable1separatelyforDemocratsandRepublicans.Weuseordinaryleastsquaresregressiontoestimatetheimpactofeachvariableonnetpartisanaffect.Foreachvariableweusethemodelestimatestocalculatehowmuchthegapinpartythermometerratingschanges,onaverage,whenmovingfromthe10thpercentiletothe90thpercentileoneachindependentvariable.Weusethisapproachbecausesomeindependentvariableshavehighlyskeweddistributions.Notsurprisingly,strengthofpartisanshipisapotentpredictorofnetpartisanaffect.Holdingtheothercontrolvariablesconstant,strongpartisansratethetwopartiesroughly25degreesfartherapartthandoleaningpartisans.Weakpartisansproducepartythermometerratingsonlyafewdegreesmorepolarizedthanleaningpartisans.Ideologyalsoinfluencesnetpartisanaffectintheexpecteddirection.MovingfromlowtohighconservatismamongRepublicansincreasesthegapbetweenpartyfeelingthermometerratingsbyalmost12degrees.MovinginamoreconservativedirectionamongDemocratsreducesthegapinpartyratingsbyasimilaramount.

                                                            6Thequestionsaskedwhethertherespondenthasopinionsaboutmanythingsandiftherespondenthasmoreopinionsthantheaverageperson.Thereliabilitycoefficient(Cronbach’sα)fortheseitemsis.66.7Thereliabilitycoefficient(Cronbach’sα)fortheitemsintheauthoritarianismscaleis.60.

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[Table1abouthere]

Wealsofindfairlyconsistentassociationsbetweenthetwopredispositionsandnetpartisanaffect.Movingfromlowtohighvaluesontheneedtoevaluatescaleincreasesthegapbetweenpartyratingsbyroughly5degrees,formembersofbothparties.Similarly,movingfromlowtohighvaluesonauthoritarianismpolarizespartythermometerratingsbyroughly8degrees.SincebothmeasuresyieldsimilarestimatedeffectsforRepublicansandDemocrats,thissuggeststhatthepredispositionscontributetopartypolarizationinfairlyuniformways.

Turningtoourotherhypothesizedpredictorsofpartypolarization,theANESdataalsoprovidebatteriesofquestionsthatweusetomeasureadherencetocorevalues.Wemeasureegalitarianismusingsixitemsthataskrespondentsthedegreetowhichtheyagreeordisagreewithstatementsaboutequalrights,equalopportunity,fairtreatment,andrelatedtopics.Weaveragedresponsestothesixquestionstocreatetheegalitarianismscale.8Highervaluesindicateastrongerbeliefinequality.TheANESsurveycontainsfourquestionstomeasurebeliefsaboutlimitedgovernment.Theitemsaskaboutpreferencesforfreemarkets,preferencesformoreorlessgovernment,whygovernmenthasgottenbigger,andtheamountofpreferredregulationofbusiness.Weaveragedresponsestothefourquestionstocreatethelimitedgovernmentscale.9Highervaluesindicateastrongerpreferenceforlimitedgovernment.Finally,wemeasuremoraltraditionalismusingfourquestionsthataskrespondentsthedegreetowhichtheyagreeordisagreewithstatementsaboutnewerlifestyles,changingmoralbehavior,traditionalfamilyvalues,andtolerancefordifferentmoralstandards.Responseswereaveragedtogethertocreateamoraltraditionalismscale.10Highervaluesindicateastrongerpreferencefortraditionalmoralvalues.

Wemeasuregroup‐basedattitudesinasimilarmanner.Racialresentmentismeasuredbasedonfourquestionsthataskrespondentsthedegreetowhichtheyagreeordisagreewithstatementsaboutthestatusofblacksinsociety(ClawsonandOxley2013,196).Responsestothesefouritemsareaveragedtogethertocreatethescale(Cronbach’sα=.80).Highervaluesindicatehigherlevelsofracialresentment.TheANESsurveycontainssixquestionstomeasurebeliefsaboutmodernsexism.Theitemsaskabouthowserioussexdiscriminationis,mediacoverageofsexdiscrimination,whetherwomendemandingequalityseekspecialfavors,discriminationinhiringandpromotion,whethercomplainingaboutsexdiscriminationcreatesmoreproblems,andwhetherwomenhaveasmany

                                                            8Theegalitarianitemsformareliablescale(Cronbach’sα=.78).9Thelimitedgovernmentitemsformareliablescale(Cronbach’sα=.77).10Thereliabilitycoefficient(Cronbach’sα)fortheitemsinthemoraltraditionalismscaleis.77.

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opportunitiesasmen.Weaveragedresponsestothesixquestionstocreateamodernsexismscale.11Highervaluesindicategreaterconcernaboutthepersistenceofmodernsexism.

Finally,wemeasureexposuretobothflavorsofpartisanmediaaswellasageneralmeasureofmainstreamnewsmediaexposure.TheANESsurveyincludedalongseriesofquestionsaskingwhichTVandradioprogramstheyregularlyconsumeandwhichwebsitestheyregularlyvisit.Weselectednineteensources,fromRushLimbaughtoHannitytotheDrudgeReport,asexamplesofconservativemedia.Weaveragedtogetherresponsesindicatingthenumberofthosemediasourcesthatpeoplefrequentedregularly.12Highervaluesindicategreaterexposuretoconservativemedia.Weapplythesamemeasurementmethodtonineteenliberalmediasources,includingHuffingtonPost,MSNBC,NationalPublicRadio,andtheNewYorkTimes.13Highervaluesindicategreaterexposuretoliberalmedia.PartisanmediaexposureisconfinedtoafairlysmallsliceoftheAmericanelectorate.Basedonthesemeasures,themedianrespondentisnotaregularconsumerofanyliberalmediaoranyconservativemedia.WealsoconstructedascaleofgeneralattentiontomainstreamnewsbasedonhowmanydaysaweekrespondentsfollowthenewsonTV,radio,theInternet,andinnewspapers.14Highervaluesindicatemorefrequentgeneralnewsexposure.Themedianrespondentfollowsthenewsthreedaysaweekthroughthosesources.

[Table2abouthere]

InTable2wereportthebivariateassociationsbetweennetpartisanaffectandtheremainingpredictors,whilecontrollingforthevariablesdepictedinTable1.WeusethesamemethodusedinTable1andreportassociationsseparatelyforDemocratsandRepublicans.Allthreecorevaluespolarizeevaluationsofthepoliticalpartiesintheexpecteddirection.MovingfromlowtohighvaluesonegalitarianismamongDemocratsincreasestheexpectedgapinpartyratingsbyalmost16degrees.AmongRepublicans,strongbeliefinlimitedgovernmentandmoraltraditionalism(toalesserdegree)generatemorepolarizedevaluationsofthetwomajorparties.Corevaluescanalsohelpusexplainthegrowthinpartypolarizationduringthelastfewdecades.Thecorrelationbetweenmoraltraditionalismandtheseven‐pointpartyidentificationscalehasgrownfrom.09in1986to.37in2012.Similarly,thecorrelationbetweenegalitarianismandpartisanshiphasgrownstronger(from‐.33in1984to‐.45in2012).Theresultsalsorevealthemoderatingimpactofcross‐pressuredpartyidentifiers.Partymemberswhoadheretovaluesthatconflictwiththebasepositionoftheirparty(egalitarianismforRepublicans,limited

                                                            11Thereliabilitycoefficient(Cronbach’sα)fortheitemsinthemodernsexismscaleis.66.12Theconservativemediaitemsformareliablescale(Cronbach’sα=.86).13 Theliberalmediaitemsformareliablescale(Cronbach’sα=.77).14Thereliabilitycoefficient(Cronbach’sα)fortheitemsinthegeneralnewsexposurescaleis.43.

14  

governmentandmoraltraditionalisminthecaseofDemocrats)arelesspolarizedintheirratingsofthetwoparties.

Wealsofindevidenceofourhypothesizedeffectsofgroup‐basedattitudesonpartypolarization.MovingfromlowtohighvaluesinracialresentmentamongRepublicansincreasesthegapinpartythermometerratingsby10degrees.ForDemocrats,higherlevelsofracialresentmentmutesaffectivepartypolarization.Racialresentmentalsohelpsaccountforthegrowthinaffectivepolarizationsincethe1980s,asthecorrelationbetweenpartyidentificationandracialresentmenthasincreasedfrom.15in1986to.38in2012.Turningtogenderattitudes,increasingconcernaboutmodernsexismamongDemocratsproducesmorepolarizedratingsofthetwomajorparties,buthasamoremutedimpactonRepublicans.

Comparedtotheattitudesandpredispositionsexaminedhere,theoverallimpactofmediaexposureonpartypolarizationisratherweak.Thisisdueinparttothefactthatexposuretopartisanmedia,aswehavedefinedit,isverynarrow.Forexample,themedianRepublicanisnotaregularconsumerofanyofthe19conservativenewssourcesweexamined.Similarly,themedianDemocratdoesnotfrequentanyliberalsourceseither.Nevertheless,wedofindthatRepublicanexposuretoconservativemediaisassociatedwithan8degreeincreaseinthegapbetweenpartythermometerratings.Exposuretoliberalmediahasaweakerimpactonpartypolarization.ThereismorewidespreadpublicexposuretogeneralsourcesofnewsintheUnitedStates,butattentiontogeneralnewssourcesdoesnotappeartodomuchinthewayofaffectivepolarization.Overall,whilethepartisanmediahavegrownsubstantiallyoverthepastseveralyears,theymaynotcontributemuchtomasspolarizationbecauseoftheelectorate’slimitedexposuretopartisanmedia.

Thusfar,wehaveprovidedsomeevidenceofthepluralisticrootsofpartypolarizationintheUnitedStates.Partyidentity,ideology,corevalues,groupattitudes,predispositions,and,toalesserdegree,mediaexposure,allappeartocontributetopolarizedevaluationsofthemajorparties.ThisbegsthequestionofwhetherpolarizedviewsofthepartiesmattersinAmericanpolitics.Wethinkincreaseddenigrationoftheoppositepartyhasseveralimportantconsequences.Inthenextsections,weexaminetwoareaswherenetpartisanaffectcontributestoourunderstandingofpublicopinion:attitudestowardtheTeaParty,andevaluationsofthecountry’sdirection.

TheTeaPartyandOut‐PartyDenigration

InarelativelyshortperiodoftimetheTeaPartyhasbecomeanimportantforceinAmericanpolitics,puttingitsstampondebatesaboutgovernmentspendingandthe

15  

nationaldebtandinfluencingRepublicanprimaryelectionsaroundthecountry.TheTeaPartyhasalsoemergedasamajorsourceofoppositiontoPresidentObamaandtheDemocraticPartyagendainnationalgovernment(SkocpolandWilliamson2013).WeexaminepublicsupportfortheTeaPartyusingdatafromthefirstwaveoftheANESEvaluationsofGovernmentandSocietySurvey(EGSS1),conductedviaInternetinOctoberof2010.ThiswasoneoftheearliestnationalsurveystoincludequestionsabouttheTeaParty.

WeestimateasimplestatisticalmodelofsupportfortheTeaParty,whichismeasuredonascalefrom1(opposeagreatdeal)to7(supportagreatdeal).PreviousresearchfindsthatsupportfortheTeaPartyislargelyconfinedtowhites(SkocpolandWilliamson2013),sowelimitoranalysistonon‐Hispanicwhiterespondentstothesurvey.SomearguethatTeaPartysupportismotivatedbyideologicaloppositiontothepoliciesoftheDemocraticPartyunderPresidentObama(Abramowitz2013;Summary2013).WetrytomimicthesestudiesincreatingapolicyconservatismscalebasedonseveralbinarychoicequestionsthataskaboutoppositiontoprominentlegislativeitemsearlyintheObamapresidency.Wecreatedascalefromsevenoftheselegislativeitems,includingthestimulusbill,thechildren’shealthinsuranceprogram(SCHIP),capandtradelegislation,theAffordableCareAct,regulationofthefinancialindustry,endingthemilitary’s“don’task,don’ttell”policy,andfederalfundingofstemcellresearch.Ourmeasureindicatestheproportionofthoselegislativeitemsthattherespondentopposed.15Highervaluesindicatemoreconservativepolicypreferences,sothepolicymeasureshouldbepositivelyassociatedwithsupportfortheTeaParty.

SomestudiesfindthatsupportfortheTeaPartyismotivatedbyracialresentmentandareactiontotheelectionofthefirstAfricanAmericanpresidentinthenation’shistory(ParkerandBarreto2013;Abramowitz2013;Summary2013).Wecreatearacialresentmentscaleusingthesamefoursurveyquestionsdescribedabove(Cronbach’sα=.83).Highervaluesindicatehigherlevelsofracialresentment,soracialresentmentshouldbepositivecorrelatedwithsupportfortheTeaParty.

WehypothesizethatsupportfortheTeaPartyin2010alsorepresentsastrongpartisanreactiontothefirstinstanceofunifiedDemocraticPartycontrolofCongressandtheWhiteHousesince1994.TheTeaPartyisanoutletforGOPangerandunhappinessatfindingthemselvesintheloyalopposition.Thus,netpartisanaffect(thedegreetowhichonelikestheGOPanddislikestheDemocrats)shouldbeagoodpredictorofsupportfortheTeaParty.TheEGSS1surveydidnotincludepartyfeelingthermometerquestionstoallowustomeasurenetpartisanaffectinthesamewayaswiththe2012ANESdata.However,thereisanacceptablesubstitute:fourquestionsthataskhowmuchrespondentslikedor

                                                            15Thepolicyconservatismitemsformareliablescale(Cronbach’sα=.80).

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dislikedtheDemocraticParty,BarackObama,theRepublicanParty,andSarahPalinonascalefrom1(likeagreatdeal)to7(dislikeagreatdeal).WereversethescalefortheRepublicanandPalinitemsandaveragethefourresponsestocreateanetpartisanaffectscale.16HighervaluesindicategreaterpositiveaffectfortheGOP,sothescaleshouldbepositivelyassociatedwithTeaPartysupport.

[Table3abouthere]

Wefindthatwhencontrollingforpolicypreferencesandracialresentment,supportfortheTeaPartyisstillstronglyassociatedwiththedegreetowhichonedislikesDemocratsandlikesRepublicans(seeTable3).Movingfromthe10thpercentiletothe90thpercentileonnetpartyaffectincreasesexpectedsupportfortheTeaPartyby2.7points,almosthalfoftherangeonthesupportscale.Bycomparison,policyconservatismandracialresentmenthavesmallereffectsonTeaPartysupport(.9pointsand.6points,respectively).Overall,theseresultssuggestthattheTeaPartycanbeunderstoodasavehicleforthosewhodisliketheDemocraticPartythemost.ItislikelythatincreasingpartypolarizationhelpedmaketheTeaPartypossible.AdeepeningreservoirofhostilitytotheDemocraticPartyamongRepublicansprovidesfertilegroundforTeaPartyappeals.WithgrowingcontemptfortheGOPevidentamongDemocrats,perhapsasimilarmovementontheLeftisnotfarbehind.

TofurtherexamineattitudestowardtheTeaPartywecodedresponsestoanopen‐endedquestionaskingwhattheTeaPartystandsfor,alsofromthefirstwaveoftheEGSSsurvey.17Thedatafileincludedthefulltextoftheresponseprovidedbyeachperson.Wecodedresponsesintoeightdifferentcategories,basedonconceptsdevelopedbyBrewer(2009)andtheAmericanNationalElectionStudiescodingforquestionsaboutwhatpeoplelikeanddislikeaboutthetwomajorpoliticalparties.ThesecategoriesincludedEconomicPolicy,Non‐economicPolicy,Philosophy,GovernmentManagement,GeneralImage,People,ForeignPolicy,andNone(orDon’tKnow).Eachrespondentwascodedintoatleastoneoftheseeightcategories.WiththeexceptionoftheNonecategory,thecategoriesarenotmutuallyexclusive.Thus,asubstantiveresponsecouldbecodedintomultiplecategories.18Thecriterionfortheplacementoftheresponsesintoeachcategoryisasfollows.

TheEconomicPolicycategoryincludedresponsesthatreferencedtheeconomy.Forinstance,referencestotaxes,spending,aswellasfiscalandmonetarypolicy.19Non‐EconomicPolicyresponsesconsistedofthosethatwerenon‐economicinnature,orthat

                                                            16Thereliabilitycoefficient(Cronbach’sα)forthenetpartisanaffectscaleis.86.17Thequestionasks“WhatdoestheTeaPartystandfor?”18Forinstance,considerthefollowingresponse:“ReductionofTaxes.SocialConservatives.”ThisresponsewascodedasbothPhilosophyforitsreferencetosocialconservatismandasEconomicforthereferencetotaxes.19Forinstance,theopen‐endedresponse“lowertaxes”wascodedasanEconomicPolicyresponse.

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referenceddomesticpoliciesspecifically,suchaswelfare,education,andguncontrol.20ThePhilosophycategoryincludedideologicalphrases,suchas“conservative,”aswellasassociatedvaluesincludinglessgovernment,traditionalvalues,andstates’rights.21TheGovernmentManagementcategoryincludedresponsesthatreferencedhowthegovernmentwasrunorhowitoperated.Thisincludedresponsespertainingtowastefulgovernmentspending,governmentincompetence,andcorruption.22TheGeneralImagecategoryincludednegativeorpositiveresponseswithoutideologicalorissuecontent,suchaswhetherrespondentslikedordislikedtheTeaPartyaswellasspecificreferencestopartylabels.Forinstance,affectiveresponsessuchastheTeaPartystandsfor“craziness”or“Theystandforthepeople”werecodedasGeneralImage.ThePeoplecategoryincludedresponsesthatreferencedaparticularindividual.Forexample,theseincluderesponsesmentioningSarahPalinorotherpoliticiansassociatedwiththeTeaParty.23TheForeignPolicycategorycoveredspecificresponsesrelatedtoforeignaffairssuchasthewarsinIraqandAfghanistanormoregeneralresponsessuchasthosereferringtoisolationism.24TheNone(orDon’tKnow)categorypertainedtoresponsesthatwereleftblankorwhereresponsesstatedthattheydidnotknowtheanswertothequestion.

ThefirstsetofresultsaggregatesallresponsesbycategoryandillustratesthefrequencywithwhichrespondentsidentifiedtheTeaPartyasbeingassociatedwitheachoftheeightcategoriesdescribedabove.Thehighestpercentageofrespondents(44%)identifiedtheTeaPartyusingageneralimage,while29%describedtheTeaPartyintermsofgeneralphilosophy,and23%mentionedaneconomicpolicy.FarfewerrespondentsidentifiedtheTeaPartywithanon‐economicpolicy(3%),governmentmanagement(2%),apersonorpeople(1%),orforeignpolicy(0.2%).Morethanone‐in‐threerespondents(35%)eitherdidnotknowwhattheTeaPartystandsforordidnotanswerthequestion.Theseresultsareinterestinginthat,roughlyoneyearintotheTeaParty’sexistence,respondentsusedageneralimagetodefinetheTeaPartymorefrequentlythantheyreferredtophilosophyasadefiningfeature.Further,respondentsusedageneralimagetodefinetheTeaPartyroughlytwiceasoftenastheyusedaneconomicpolicytodothesame.

Thesecondsetofresultsdividesthehighest‐frequencyresponsecategoriesofgeneralimage,philosophy,andeconomicpolicybypartyidentificationandorientationtowardtheTeaParty.TheheightofeachbarinFigure5indicateswhatpercentmentioned

                                                            20Forinstance,theopen‐endedresponse“anti‐publiceducation”wascodedasNon‐economicPolicyresponse.21Forinstance,theopen‐endedresponse“reducinggovernmentpower”wascodedintothePhilosophycategory.22Forinstance,theopen‐endedresponse“theyareagainstwastefulspending”wascodedintotheGovernmentManagementcategory.23Forinstance,theopen‐endedresponse“ItstandsforSarahPalin”wascodedintothePeoplecategory.24Forinstance,theopen‐endedresponse“Strongmilitary”wascodedintotheForeignPolicycategory.

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phrasesfromthatcategoryindescribingtheTeaParty.ThecolorofthebarindicateswhatshareofthoseresponsescamefromTeaPartysupportersversusnon‐supporters.Forexample,thebarattheleftedgeofthefigureindicatesthat43%ofDemocratsdescribedtheTeaPartyingeneralimageterms,butonly7%ofthoseDemocraticrespondentsprofessedsupportfortheTeaParty.Thus,thevastmajorityofgeneralimageresponsesfromDemocratsdescribedtheTeaPartyinnegativeterms.ThemostimmediateconclusionthatcanbedrawnfromtheseresultsisthatfewDemocratsandIndependentsidentifiedthemselvesasTeaPartysupporters.WhenDemocratsandIndependentsofferedadescriptionoftheTeaParty,mostoftentheyreferredtothegeneralimageoftheTeaPartyandusuallyinnegativeterms.Bycomparison,roughlyhalfofGOPidentifierssupporttheTeaParty,andRepublicanstendtodescribetheTeaPartyinmoresubstantiveterms.

[Figure5abouthere]

ItisalsonoteworthythatIndependentswereleastlikelytoofferanydescriptionoftheTeaPartywhileRepublicansweremostlikelytoofferasubstantiveresponse.PerhapsthemostintriguingfindingcomesfromthedifferentwaysinwhichRepublicans,Democrats,andIndependentsdefinetheTeaParty,regardlessofwhethertheysupportoropposeit.RepublicansaremorelikelythanDemocratsandIndependentstorefertoeconomicpoliciesorgovernmentphilosophythemesindescribingtheTeaParty.WhilepartyidentificationisonlyamoderatepredictorofwhetherornotarespondentwilluseageneralimagetodefinetheTeaParty,partyidentificationismuchmorehighlycorrelatedwithresponsesinvokingeconomicorphilosophicalconceptsasperceiveddefiningfeatures.Specifically,approximately50%ofRepublicansusedageneralimagetodefinetheTeaParty,whileapproximately43%ofDemocratsand30%ofIndependentsdidthesame.However,RepublicansweremorelikelytodefinetheTeaPartyineconomicterms(32%)thanwereDemocrats(20%)orIndependents(14%).RepublicanswereevenmorelikelytodefinetheTeaPartyinphilosophicalterms(41%)thanwereDemocrats(24%)orIndependents(14%).Inaddition,mostoftheeconomicorphilosophymentionsontheRepublicansidecamefromTeaPartysupporters.Overall,justayearintotheTeaParty’sexistencewefindopinionsoftheTeaPartyareheavilybifurcatedbypartisanship.

NetPartyAffectandthePoliticsofNegativeEmotions

Finally,webelievethatpartypolarizationalsosharpenstheemotionalnatureofpoliticalconflict.Heightenedcontemptfortheoppositepartycreatesgreaterfearandloathingwhenreckoningwithoccasionswhentheoppositepartycontrolsthelegislativeandexecutivebranchesofthegovernment.Weexplorethisideabyexaminingsomequestionsfromthe2010EGSS1surveythataskedaboutthedirectionofthecountry.For

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example,oneiterationofthequestionasked“Generallyspeaking,howdoyoufeelaboutthewaythingsaregoinginthecountrythesedays?Howangry?”Respondentsansweredonascalefrom1(extremely)to5(notatall).Thesamerootwasusedtoqueryfournegativeemotions:angry,afraid,worried,andoutraged.Thereisalotofvariationonallfouritems,withslightlymorerespondentsplacingthemselvesonthenegativesideofthescaleratherthanthepositiveside.Wereversedthedirectionofthescalesothathigherscoresindicatemorenegativeemotions,andweaveragedresponsestoallfouritemstocreateanegativeemotionsindex(α=.89).Wethenestimatearegressionmodeltoexplainvariationinemotionsaboutthenation’sdirection.

Withthenationstillemergingfromarecessionin2010,weexpectthateconomicneedsandconcernshelpstructurefeelingsaboutthewaythingsaregoinginthecountry.ThenationalunemploymentrateinOctober2010wasstillhigh(9.5percent).Thus,ourregressionmodelincludesoneindependentvariableindicatingwhethertherespondentisunemployed.Weexpectthatnegativeemotionsshouldbemorepronouncedforthosewhoareunemployed.Thesurveyalsoincludestwoquestionsaboutongoingeconomicanxieties.Theitemsaskhowworriedtherespondentisabout(1)one’sfinancialsituationand(2)payingforhealthcareduringthenext12months.Respondentsansweredonascalefrom1(extremelyworried)to5(notatallworried).Wereversedthedirectionofthescalesothathigherscoresindicatehigheranxietylevels,andweaveragedresponsestobothitemstocreateaneconomicperilindex(α=.75).Thereisalotvariationineconomicperil,withmorereportedanxietyaboutone’soverallfinancialsituationthanaboutpayingforhealthcare.Weexpectmoreeconomicanxietytobeassociatedwithmorenegativeemotionsaboutthedirectionofthecountry.

Wealsoexpectthatnegativeemotionsaboutthecountryreflectpoliticalattitudes.Thosewithmoreconservativepolicypreferencesmayhavebeenupsetin2010aboutthecontentofthemainlegislativeinitiativespursuedinthefirsttwoyearsoftheObamaadministration.Thus,weexpectapositiverelationshipbetweenthepolicyconservatismindexdescribedaboveandnegativeemotions.WealsoexaminewhetherpassionsamongAmericanvotersreflectracialdivisionsinsocietyinresponsetotheelectionofPresidentObamaandongoingchangesinthenation’sdemographicsembodiedbythatelection.Thus,whitesmayexpressmorenegativeemotionsthannon‐whiterespondents,andpeoplewithhigherlevelsofracialresentmentmayexpressmorenegativeemotions.

Finally,partypolarizationmaycontributetonegativefeelingsaboutthedirectionofthecountry.GiventhatDemocratsheldtheWhiteHouseandmajoritiesintheHouseandSenatein2010,Democraticpartisanslikelyhadmorepositivefeelingsaboutthenation’sdirectionthanRepublicans.Morespecifically,weexpectthatthosewhodislikedtheDemocratsthemosttestifiedtothemostnegativeemotionsaboutthedirectionofthe

20  

country.WemeasurecontemptforDemocratsbyaveragingresponsestothetwoquestionsthatassesshowmuchrespondentsdisliketheDemocraticPartyandPresidentObama.

ThemodelestimatesarereportedinTable4.Wefindthatwhencontrollingforpolicypreferences,financialpressures,andracialdivisions,negativeemotionsaboutthenation’sdirectionarestronglyassociatedwiththedegreetowhichonedislikestheDemocraticParty.Movingfromthe10thpercentiletothe90thpercentileincontemptforDemocratsisassociatedwithaonepointincreaseinnegativefeelingsaboutthedirectionofthecountry(thefullrangeoftheemotionsindexisfourpoints).Angerandconcernaboutwhatisgoingoninthecountryisshapedbyhowmuchonedislikesthegoverningparty.Growingdisdainforone’spoliticalopponentsmeansthatpoliticiansandactivistsnowhaveadeeperwelloffearandloathingamongfellowpartysupporterstotapwhentheyfindthemselvesintheloyalopposition.

[Table4abouthere]

Otherpoliticalattitudesareassociatedwithfeelingsaboutthecourseofthenation.Increasedoppositiontothemainlegislativeagendaof2009‐2010tendstoproducemorenegativeemotions.Furthermore,wefindsomeevidenceofracialdivisionsinfeelingsaboutthedirectionofthecountry.Whiterespondentsandthosewithhigherlevelsofracialresentmentreportmorenegativefeelings,althoughthoseeffectsaremoremodest.Finally,whileunemploymentdoesnotseemtoproducemorenegativefeelings,thereisastrongassociationbetweenconcernsabouteconomicperilsandnegativeemotions.Fearandloathingaboutthewaythingsaregoinginthenationreflectseconomic,partisan,policyandracialattitudes.However,partypolarizationandcontemptfortheoppositepartyareanimportantsourceofthosenegativefeelings.

Conclusion

TherearegrowingdifferencesinfeelingstowardthetwomajorpoliticalpartiesintheUnitedStates.Contemptfortheoppositepartyhasincreasedsubstantially,particularlyduringthepasttenyears.Theincreaseinnegativefeelingsfortheoppositionpartyispartlyaresponsetoelitepolarization.Elitepolarizationstrengthenspartyidentityamongthepublic,fuelsbiasedpoliticalreasoninganddistrustofthepoliticalopposition.Polarizedratingsofthepartieshavemanyothersources,includingideology,corevalues,group‐basedattitudes,individualpredispositions,andexposuretopartisanmedia.Thus,incraftingrhetoricthatencouragesrevulsionfortheoppositepartybothpoliticalpartiescanappealtoadiversepaletteofpublicattitudes.

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Partypolarizationandincreasinglynegativeassessmentsofone’spoliticalopponentshaveimportantconsequencesforAmericanpolitics.PartypolarizationhashelpedcreatedemotionalspacefortheTeaPartytoemerge.SupportfortheTeaPartyisstronglyrelatedtohowmuchonelikestheRepublicanPartyanddislikestheDemocraticParty.Twentyyearsago,whentherewasconsiderablylesscontemptforDemocratsamongGOPsupporters,theremaynothavebeenmuchofamarketfortheTeaParty.Ifthatcontemptcontinuestogrow,thentheTeaPartyshouldcontinuetothrive.SinceweobservesimilarlevelsofcontemptfortheGOPamongDemocrats,thereseemstobeanopportunityforamorecoordinatedmovementliketheTeaPartytoformontheLeft.

Increasednegativitytowardpoliticalopponentsamongthemasspublicisapromisingdevelopmentforthoseeagertomobilizethebaseofeitherparty.Appealsthatemphasizethreatsandfeararemoreeffectiveatmotivatingmasspoliticalactivitythanapositiveagenda(Miller2013).Politicianscanappealtofeelingsofcontempt,angerandfeartodrawmorecitizensintothepoliticalarena.However,havingrepeatedlystokedthosenegativefeelingsamongpartysupporters,itcanbedifficultforpoliticianstoridethattigerwhengoverningrequiresnegotiationandcompromise.Ifpartisansdonotviewtheothersideaslegitimate,thentheyarelesslikelytosupportcompromisewiththeopposition.ThisdynamicseemstohavecontributedtothegovernmentshutdowninOctoberof2013.Amajorityofeachparty’ssupportersfounditunacceptablefortheirpartyleaderstomakeconcessionstotheotherside(Motel2013).OntheRepublicanside,TeaPartysupporters(thosewhotendtodislikeDemocratsthemost)weremorelikelytowanttheirpoliticalleaderstostandfirmandnotcompromise(Summary2013).Itappearsthatmanynationalpoliticiansrespondedtothosedesires,prolongingtheshutdowncrisis.Giventheincreasingdisdainforpoliticalopponents,anothersimilarcrisismayoccuragainsoon.

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Figure1EmotionstowardOtherParty’sPresidentialCandidatesbyDecade

Source:ANES2010,2013

Angry

Afraid

30

40

50

60

70P

erc

ent

1980s 1990s 2000s 2012Decade

27  

Figure2MeanPartyRatingsbyDemocrats,1978‐2012

Figure3MeanPartyRatingsbyRepublicans,1978‐2012

Source:ANES2010,2013

Democratic Party

Republican Party

30

40

50

60

70

80

Me

an T

herm

omet

er

Rat

ing

1980 1990 2000 2010Year

Republican Party

Democratic Party

30

40

50

60

70

80

Me

an T

herm

omet

er

Rat

ing

1980 1990 2000 2010Year

28  

Figure4NetPartisanAffectbyStrengthofPartisanship,1978‐2012

Source:ANES2010;ANES2013

Strong Partisans

Weak Partisans

Leaning Partisans

10

20

30

40

50

60N

et

Pa

rtis

an

Aff

ect

1980 1990 2000 2010Year

29  

Figure5WhattheTeaPartyStandsfor,byPartyIdentificationandTeaPartySupport

Source:ANESEGSS1

0

20

40

60

Pe

rce

nt

Image Economic Philosophy None

D I R D I R D I R D I R

Non-supporters Tea Supporters

30  

Table1AssociationsbetweenControlVariablesandNetPartisanAffect,2012

IndependentVariable Republicans DemocratsStrongpartisan 24.6

[21.7,27.5]26.6

[24.0,29.3]Weakpartisan 2.2

[‐0.7,5.1]3.7

[0.9,6.4]Ideology 11.7

[9.3,14.1]‐11.7

[‐14.2,‐9.2]Needtoevaluate 4.5

[1.4,7.7]5.9

[3.1,8.8]Authoritarianism 8.3

[5.2,11.4]7.5

[4.1,10.9]N 1840 2813

Estimatesarecreatedusingordinaryleastsquaresregression.Cellentriesindicatetheexpectedchangeinnetpartisanaffectwhenmovingfromthe10thpercentiletothe90thpercentileontheindependentvariable.95%confidenceintervalsareinparentheses.Additionalcontrolvariables,surveymodeandbattlegroundstates,arenotshown.Dataareweightedbythepost‐stratifiedweightforthefullsample.

Source:ANES2013

31  

Table2AssociationsbetweenPredictorsandNetPartisanAffect,2012

IndependentVariable Republicans DemocratsEgalitarianism ‐7.4

[‐10.5,‐4.3]15.7

[12.9,18.4]Limitedgovernment 10.2

[7.1,13.2]‐11.8

[‐14.1,‐9.5]Moraltraditionalism 4.7

[1.6,7.7]‐11.7

[‐14.4,‐9.0]Racialresentment 10.0

[7.1,12.9]‐7.9

[‐11.0,‐4.9]Modernsexism ‐3.0

[‐6.0,‐0.2]9.4

[6.7,12.1]Conservativemedia 8.1

[5.4,10.9]‐2.4

[‐3.6,‐1.2]Liberalmedia ‐4.4

[‐6.4,‐2.3]1.6

[‐0.6,3.8]Generalnews 2.4

[‐0.6,5.4]‐3.5

[‐6.4,‐0.6]N(min) 1840 2813

Estimatesarecreatedusingordinaryleastsquaresregression.Cellentriesindicatetheexpectedchangeinnetpartisanaffectwhenmovingfromthe10thpercentiletothe90thpercentileontheindependentvariable.95%confidenceintervalsareinparentheses.Additionalcontrolvariables,strengthofpartisanship,ideology,needtoevaluate,authoritarianism,surveymodeandbattlegroundstates,arenotshown.Dataareweightedbythepost‐stratifiedweightforthefullsample.

Source:ANES2013

32  

Table3PredictingSupportfortheTeaPartyamongNon‐HispanicWhites,2010

IndependentVariable

Impact[95%CI]

NetPartisanAffect 2.7[2.4,3.0]

PolicyConservatism 0.9[0.6,1.2]

RacialResentment 0.6[0.3,0.8]

NR2

904.55

ThedependentvariableissupportfortheTeaPartyonascalefrom1(opposeagreatdeal)to7(supportagreatdeal).Estimatesarecreatedusingordinaryleastsquaresregression.CellentriesindicatetheexpectedchangeinsupportfortheTeaPartywhenmovingfromthe10thpercentiletothe90thpercentileontheindependentvariable.95%confidenceintervalsareinbrackets.Dataareweightedbythepost‐stratificationweight.

Source:ANES2010‐2012EvaluationsofGovernmentandSocietyStudy,October2010Survey

33  

Table4PredictingFearandLoathingabouttheDirectionoftheCountry,2010

IndependentVariable

Impact[95%CI]

DislikeforDemocrats 1.0[0.8,1.2]

EconomicPeril 0.9[0.7,1.0]

Unemployed 0.02[‐0.1,0.1]

PolicyConservatism 0.2[0.03,0.4]

RacialResentment 0.2[0.05,0.35]

Non‐HispanicWhite 0.2[0.04,0.3]

NR2

1161.32

Thedependentvariableisascalemeasuringnegativeemotionsaboutthewaythingsaregoinginthecountryfrom1(notatall)to5(extremely).Estimatesarecreatedusingordinaryleastsquaresregression.Cellentriesindicatetheexpectedchangeinnegativeemotionswhenmovingfromthe10thpercentiletothe90thpercentileontheindependentvariable.95%confidenceintervalsareinbrackets.Dataareweightedbythepost‐stratificationweight.

Source:ANES2010‐2012EvaluationsofGovernmentandSocietyStudy,October2010Survey