2 4 6

1,

4

tomr

11A

vkd 4

1 4,

avk L 1,

,11 , 14-41- ca- 40

1, t

6 kg v

v,h

4 V

i v id tw

o 1

22

S

TE

PH

EN

G. R

AB

E

As such, "the U

nited States chose a policy in the Northeast of coopera•

tion with regional elites and justified the policy in term

s of a comm

unis-tic threat." T

he United S

tates had "contributed to the retention of pow

er by the traditional oligarchy" and "destroyed" a Brazilian pro-

gram to m

odernize the political structure of the Northeast.64

The course of U

nited States reform

policies in Honduras and B

razil pointed to a tension betw

een the Adm

inistration's talk of middle-

class revolution and its search for anti-Com

munist stability. A

s Assis-

tant Secretary M

artin noted to Schlesinger in 1963, the A

lliance for P

rogress contained "major flaw

s." Its "laudable social goals" encour-aged political instability, yet their achievem

ent demanded an 8o per-

cent private investment "w

hich cannot be attracted amid political

instability."65 President K

ennedy recognized the problem, noting,

near the end of his administration, that the U

nited States w

ould have to

learn to

live in

a "dan

gero

us, u

ntid

y w

orld

."66 But little in

the

President's action's or his A

dministration's policies indicated that the

United S

tates was prepared to identify w

ith progressive social revolu-tions. T

he Adm

inistration and the President, B

owles concluded,

never "had the real courage to face up to the implications" of the

principles of the Alliance for P

rogress.67 T

hat the Alliance for P

rogress was a C

old War policy w

as never a subject of dispute. B

ut, in Schlesinger's w

ords, "answering C

astro w

as a byproduct, not the purpose, of the Alliance." W

hat presum-

ably distinguished the Latin A

merican policy of John F

. Kennedy

was th

e belief th

at the k

ey to

stability

and an

ti-com

munism

was

democracy, econom

ic growth and developm

ent, and social change. T

he Alliance for P

rogress, as one observer put it, was "enlightened

anti-comm

unism."68 A

n examination of the course of inter-A

meri-

can relations between 1961 and 1963 points, how

ever, to the need to separate the P

resident's words from

his decisions and his Adm

inistra- tion's deeds. T

hrough its recognition policy, internal security initia- tives, and m

ilitary and economic aid program

s, the Adm

inistration dem

onstrably bolstered regimes and groups that w

ere undemocratic,

conservative, and frequently repressive. The short-term

security that anti-C

omm

unist elites could provide was purchased at the expense

of long-term political and social dem

ocracy. •

Fixation with C

uba: The Bay of Pigs, M

issile Crisis,

and Covert W

ar Against Castro

TH

OM

AS

G. P

AT

ER

SO

N

"My

Go

d," m

uttered

Rich

ard H

elms o

f the C

entral In

telligen

ce A

gency, "these Kennedys keep the pressure on about C

astro."! An-

other CIA

officer heard it straight from the K

ennedy brothers: "Get

off your ass about Cuba." 2 A

bout a y

ear after John F

. Ken

ned

y's

inauguration, a mem

ber of Congress applauded "the w

ay you are gradually strangling C

astro and Com

munism

in Cuba." 3 In 1963 the

President still sought to "dig C

astro out of there." 4 Defense S

ecretary R

obert McN

amara rem

embered that "w

e were hysterical about C

as-tro at the tim

e of the Bay of P

igs and thereafter." 5 As som

eone said,

Cuba w

as one of the four-letter words of the 196os.

President K

ennedy spent as much or m

ore time on C

uba as on any other foreign policy problem

. Cuba stood at the center of his A

dminis-

tration's admitted greatest failure, the B

ay of Pigs, and its alleged

greatest success, the missile crisis. A

multitude of governm

ent agen-cies enlisted in the crusade against revolutionary C

uba: the Com

-m

erce Departm

ent administered trade restrictions; the S

tate Depart-

ment labored to rally the O

rganization of Am

erican States and N

orth A

tlantic Treaty O

rganization allies against Cuba; the F

ederal Bureau

of Investigation spied on pro- and anti-Castro groups; the Im

migra-

tion and Naturalization S

ervice, Coast G

uard, and Departm

ent of H

ealth, Education, and W

elfare handled the steady flow of exiles

from the turbulent island; and the C

IA launched covert operations

desig

ned

to to

pp

le the C

ub

an g

ov

ernm

ent an

d to

assassinate its

leader Fidel C

astro. Contrary to som

e Kennedy inenioitists and schol-

123

14

," tmolhaiii

14c ot, 111414.1

it( A

VirlIA

:01

44

G1/(1

,11 0

4/1

41 -

VF

' 'WV

) AA

4:0 ' r-L4.14,140;)

124

TH

OM

AS G

. PA

TE

RSO

N

ars who have claim

ed that Kennedy w

as often trapped by a bureau-cracy he could not control and distracted by other tim

e-consuming

issues, the President w

as knowledgeable, engaged, and influential on

matters C

uban.6 r W

hy did President K

ennedy and his chief advisers indulge such a k

y; 1

i8:14/,

,1 fixation w

ith Cuba and direct so m

any United S

tates resources to an u

9'41\ 4\''

unrelenting campaign to m

onitor, harass, isolate, and ultimately de-

■4/‘, 41).

stroy Havana's radical regim

e? One answ

er springs from a candid

CILL rem

ark by Robert F

. Kennedy. L

ooking back at the early 196os, he W

1\141 wondered "if w

e did not pay a very great price for being more ener-

pu,

gene than wise about a lot of things, especially C

uba."7 The K

enne-

141' dys' fam

ed eagerness for action became exaggerated in the case of

Cuba. T

hey always w

anted to get moving on C

uba, and Castro dared

Lat, them to try. S

ome E

uropeans thought that "we kept slapping at C

as-

al;

t,

tro because he'd had the effrontery to thumb his nose at us," recalled

one Am

erican diplomat.8 T

he popular, intelligent, but erratic Cuban

leader, whose b

arb

ud

os (bearded ones) cam

e down from

the Sierra

MA) ktiffrt

z,Maestra M

ountains in January 1959 to overthrow the U

nited States

tp-vy0 ally Fulgencio B

atista, hurled harsh words at W

ashington and defi-

pi

antly challenged the Kennedy m

odel of evolutionary, capitalist devel- Jo" opm

ent so evident in the Alliance for P

rogress. As charism

atic figures .1).0( ., A

L charting new

frontiers, the President and Jefe M

aximo often personal-

C

ized the Cuban-A

merican contest. K

ennedy harbored a "deep feeling V

4-

3

against Castro," and the C

uban thought the Am

erican "an intelligent 011

cti)

and able leader of Am

erican imperialism

," and, after the Bay of P

igs X

S

invasion, he branded him a new

Hitler.9 T

o Kennedy's great annoy-

, once, C

astro could not be wheedled or beaten.

111U)

Kennedy's ardent w

ar against Fidelism

o may also have stem

med

0,4_ from

his feeling that Castro had double-crossed him

. As a senator,

Kennedy had initially joined m

any Am

ericans in welcom

ing the Cu-

ban Revolution as a decided advancem

ent over the "oppressive" Ba-

y1^ tista dictatorship. Linking C

astro to the legacy of Bolivar, K

ennedy (014

urged a "patient attitude" toward the new

government, w

hich he did '(\"(i\k

vnot se

e a

s Com

munist.10

Denyinkrepeatedly that he w

as a Com

mu, 'P

A^

ANL

nist, Castro had in fact proclaim

ed his allegiance to democracy and

private property. But in the process of legitim

izing his revolution and ity resisting U

nited States pressure, C

astro turned more and m

ore radi- 111

cal. Am

ericans grew im

patient with the regim

e's highly charged anti- .t'

I Yankeeism

, postponement of elections, jailing of critics, and national-

'.' AP

(Ark/kJ/ft ization of property. T

he Cuba olice state s stem

remindectraaty of

f\X s- r

•TA

,..4", M

k, Wkah

ty-ti) '00 frA,t.

C.,VXj f3`)'\1.

k(i) kkikS.

njs-Of

•

1■

r LA

Cuba

125

Hitler's and S

talin's dreaded totalitarianism. T

he President rejected

the idea that intense United S

tates hostility to the Cuban R

evolution m

ay have contributed to Castro's tightening political grip and flirta-

tion with the S

oviet Union. N

or did Kennedy and other A

mericans

wish to acknow

ledge the measurable benefits of the revolution—

improvem

ents in education, medical care, and housing, and the elim

i-nation of the island's infam

ous corruption that once had been the A

merican M

afia's domain. Instead, K

ennedy officials concluded that C

uba's was a "betrayed revolution.""

ete. itti4; tGs

Richard N

. Goodw

in, the young White H

ouse and State D

epart-m

ent official with responsibilities for L

atin Am

erica, provided another explanation for the K

ennedy fixation with C

uba. He rem

arked that "the entire history of the C

old War, its positions and assum

ptions, converged upon the 'problem

of Cuba.' "" Indeed, the C

old War

dominated international politics, and in the zero-sum

accounting of the tim

e, a loss for "us" meant a gain for "them

." As C

uban-Am

erican relations steadily deteriorated, C

uban-Soviet relations gradually im

-proved. N

ot only did Am

ericans come to believe that a once-loyal ally

had jilted them for the taw

dry embrace of the S

oviets; they also grew

alarmed that C

astro sneered at the Monroe D

octrine by inviting the S

oviet military to the island. W

hen Castro, in late 1961, declared him

-self a M

arxist-Leninist, A

mericans w

ho had long denounced him as a

Com

munist then felt vindicated. A

merican leaders began to speak of

Cuban m

embership in the "Sino-Soviet bloc," thus providing C

omm

u-nists w

ith a "spearhead" to penetrate the Western H

emisphere.' 3

From the m

oment of victory, C

astro had called for Cuban-style revolu-

tions throughout Latin A

merica, and H

avana had sent agents and arms

to other nations to kindle radical fires. Castro's revolutionary m

ission happened to coincide w

ith Nikita K

hrushchev's alarming statem

ent that the Soviet U

nion supported wars of national liberation w

orldwide.

It mattered little to A

mericans that the tw

o appeals appeared indepen- dently or that H

avana and Moscow

differed markedly over the best

method for prom

oting revolutionary change—the S

oviets insisted on utilizing C

omm

unist parties within political system

s, whereas the C

u-bans espoused peoples' rebellions. C

uba came to represent the C

old W

ar in the United S

tates's backyard, and, as such, one senator ex-plained, it becam

e a "target for our national frustration and annoyance w

ith Moscow

and the whole C

omm

unist conspiracy." 14 In addition to the K

ennedy style and the Cold W

ar, Am

erican politics influenced the A

dministration's C

uba policy. In the 196o

du

; (A4/1411-"

illy '

' '19;4 J`q '

" ̀

“t,

i• •

j‘••■ iv

, ,0 „Lk,

"“tr-1

, .G

r4

,11: 44.,

ri„ -0

1

q' vv -

i'. 71

4 t

1.4

.0, ;4

, 4 w

4 G tcN

G4L

4 , f 114 j

tit

126

TH

OM

AS G

. PA

TE

RSO

N 4C

('' 4

t ""1,."' 677

1 't/

kiL

i" fv,,k

r, - qt,)

presidential campaign, K

ennedy had seized the Cuban issue to coun-

ter Richard N

ixon's charge that the inexperienced Dem

ocratic candi-date w

ould abandon Quem

oy and Matsu to C

omm

unism and prove

no match for the hard-nosed K

hrushchev. "In 1952 the Republicans

ran on a program of rolling back the Iron C

urtain in Eastern E

u-rope," K

ennedy jabbed. "Today the Iron C

urtain is 90 miles off the

coast of the United S

tates.".5 Privately he asked, "H

ow w

ould we have saved C

uba if we had [had] the pow

er"? but he nonetheless valued the political payback from

his attack. "What the hell," he

informed his aides, "they never told us how

they would have saved

China [in 1949]."16 H

e did recomm

end a controversial method to

reclaim C

uba for the Am

erican system. A

pparently unaware that

PresidentlD

wi h

t D. E

isenh

ow

er had

initiated

a cland

estine C

IA

program to trai C

uban exiles for an invasion of the island, candidate

--• ,. Kennedy

- just such a project.W411-tlit y4,061,

wilV

) A

fter exploiting the Cuban issue, K

ennedy, upon becoming P

resi- v

, den

t, cou

ld n

ot easily

hav

e retreated. P

artisan p

olitics k

ept h

is gaze

A fixed on the defiant leader in the C

aribbean. Hardly a press confer-

" ence went by w

ithout an insistent question about Cuba. R

epublicans

WO

'

and D

emocracts alike peppered the W

hite House w

ith demands for

IP \ .. ., .( 11` a./ u tee

action against Castroism

. The vocal, burgeoning C

uban exile comm

u- ‘,4

ow\

Wj, t .

(ow

jj 14 ,64: 11.40

PO

/RA

I* ti 4.,11:41,i7114:101

8.1:;,4) fV,6

:4t-tcrui p

,1

0),

1 y :pi a) /- 11' 60 0

0'1,

g..-uva ;127

ments the im

perial nations had used to maintain control and order. In

the 195os France w

as driven from Indochina, and G

reat Britain's

position in the Middle E

ast receded dramatically after the S

uez crisis, to cite tw

o prominent exam

ples. T

he Cuban R

evolution exemplified this process of breaking upland

breaking away. A

merican leaders reacted so hostilely to this revolu-

tion not simply because C

astro and his 26th of July Movem

ent taunted them

or because domestic politics and the C

old War sw

ayed them, ' but

because Cuba, as sym

bol and reality, challenged United S

tates hege-

(1 , ror mony in L

atin Am

erica. The specter of "another C

uba" haunted Presi-dent K

ennedy, not just because it would hurt him

politically, but be-

,7 ) cause "the game w

ould be up through good deal of Lati m

e rica."" A

mericans refused to accept a eyoL

uti that not only argete4Batista

and

their islan

d assets b

ut also

tot

IC

the U

nite

d,

States's claim

to political, economic, and m

ilitary leadership in the,

Un

ited` I lA

hemsiphere. "T

he revolution became anti-im

perialism and freedom

, the overthrow

of the monoculture-m

ilitarist-dictatorship-dependence LI.4

structure," remem

bered Carlos F

ranqui, a Fidelista who later w

ent

into exile." Given this fundam

ental conflict, a breakdown in C

uban-A

merican relations w

as inevitable: Cuba sought independence and

radical social change which w

ould necessarily come at the expense of

the United S

tates, and the latter, not unexpectedly, defended its inter-ests against revolutionary nationalism

. As C

astro put it, "the United

States had to fight his revolution."" K

hrushchev, in pondering the A

merican cam

paign against Cuba, once asked: "W

hy should an ele-phant be afraid of a m

ouse?"" The S

oviet leader, who certainly knew

his ow

n nation's imperial record in suppressing its neighbors w

hen they becam

e too independent-minded, surely knew

that the answer to his

question could be found in the Am

erican fear that the Cuban R

evolu-tion w

ould become contagious and further dim

inish United States hege-

mony in the W

estern Hem

isphere. A

fter the United S

tates helped expel Spain from

Cuba in 1898 and

imposed the P

latt Am

endment on the island in 1903, A

mericans

gained influence through military interventions, occupations, threats,

economic penetration, and political m

anipulation:BY

1959 Am

eri-cans dom

inated Cuba's oil, telephone, m

ining, and electric industries an

d p

rod

uced

mo

re than

a third

of its su

gar. T

hat y

ear, too

, the

United S

tates bought 74 percent of Cuba's exports and supplied 65

percent of the island's imports. 24 B

ecause the United S

tates had such trem

endous economic favors to dispense (especially a quota system

nity in Florida never let the issue rest. B

usinessmen protested that the

Cuban governm

ent nationalized Am

erican-owned property w

orth a billion dollars; and they grew

apprehensive that the practice would

become attractive in the hem

isphere. The outgoing T

reasury Secre-

tary told Kennedy that "large am

ounts of capital now planned for

investment in L

atin Am

erica" were being held back, because inves-

tors were "w

aiting to see whether the U

nited States can cope" w

ith C

astro's Cuba." G

eorge Meany, the cantankerous head of the A

FL

-C

IO, decried the com

munization of the C

uban labor federation), T

he Jo

int C

hiefs o

f Staff ad

vised

the P

residen

t to in

vad

e Cuba."

veryone seemed eager to know

when K

ennedy would knock C

astro off his perch, and m

any expected the President to act before the next

election. O

verarching all explanations for Kennedy's obsession w

ith Cuba is

a major phenom

enon of twentieth-century w

orld history: the steady erosion of the authority of im

perial powers, w

hich had built systems

of dependent, client, and colonial governments. T

he strong currents of decolonization, anti-im

perialism, revolutionary nationalism

, and social revolution, som

etimes in com

bination, undermined the instru-

12

8

TH

OM

AS G

. PA

TE

RSO

N

that guaranteed Cuba sugar sales in the A

merican m

arket), Washing-

ton wielded political influence in H

avana. The U

nited States also

stationed a military m

ission in Cuba and sent arm

s to Batista's forces.

The C

IA infiltrated political groups and helped B

atista organize an anti-C

omm

unist police unit. A

fter having underestimated C

astro's 26th of Ad

min

istratio

n

Movem

ent and the depth of the nation's unrest, the E

isenhower A

dministration tried

to manipulate C

uba once again on the very eve of Castro's victory.

With

the P

residen

t's blessin

g an

d C

IA in

structio

ns, W

illiam D

. P

awley, ow

ner of Cuban lands and form

er Am

bassador to Brazil,

traveled to Havana to press B

atista to resign in favor of a military

jun

ta in o

rder to

prev

ent th

e 26

th o

f July

Mo

vem

ent's im

min

ent

triumph. T

he Cuban P

resident balked at this exercise of "Plattism

," and P

awley's m

ission aborted.25 Even after this setback, the U

nited S

tates's continued sense of its strength in Cuba appeared in a C

IA

report that concluded that "no sane man undertaking to govern and

reform C

uba would have chosen to pick a fight w

ith the US

." Because

Castro did not honor traditional U

nited States pow

er in his nation, he m

ust have possessed a "psychotic personality."26 Am

ericans, unable or unw

illing to acknowledge that the C

uban Revolution tapped deep

nationalistic feelings and that their own interventionism

and island interests m

ade the United S

tates a primary target, preferred to depict

Fidel C

astro as a crazed guerrillero whose tem

porarily frenzied peo-ple w

ould toss him out w

hen their rationality returned. T

he Eisenhow

er Adm

inistration bequeathed to its successor an un-productive tit-for-tat process of confrontation w

ith Cuba and a legacy

of failure.27 In 1959-196o, with A

mbassador P

hilip Bonsai thinking

that Castro suffered "m

ental unbalance at times" and E

isenhower

concluding that the Cuban leader "begins to look like a m

adman,"

Havana and W

ashington traded punch for punch.28 In Novem

ber 1959 the P

resident decided to encourage anti-Castro groups w

ithin Cuba to

"check" or "replace" the revolutionary regime, and thus end an anti-

Am

ericanism that w

as "having serious adverse effects on the United

States position in L

atin Am

erica and corresponding advantages for international C

omm

unism."29 In M

arch of the next year Eisenhow

er o

rdered

the C

IA to

train C

ub

an ex

iles for an

inv

asion

of th

eir hom

eland—this shortly after C

uba signed a trade treaty with the Soviet

Union. T

he CIA

, as well, hatched assassination plots against C

astro and staged hit-and-run attacks along the C

uban coast. As C

uba under-took land reform

that struck at Am

erican interests and nationalized

‘r,,_

" 1,

44,&14■1, 4 t•-1-•

,etri ,

I IC

.4164,

. ./.411AV ) 1

4441 -0

1.,: wt.,

r

i46i4111 ?i ,, VOri C

uba 1

29

GV

- A

merican-ow

ned industries, the United S

tates suspended Cuba's

sugar quota and forbade Am

erican exports to the island, drastically cutting a once-flourishing com

merce. O

n January 3, 1961, fearing an invasion and certain that the A

merican em

bassy was a "nest of spies"

aligned with counter-revolutionaries w

ho were burning cane fields and

sabotaging buildings, Castro heatedly dem

anded that the embassy

staff be reduced to the small size of the C

uban delegation in Washing-

ton.3° The U

nited States prom

ptly broke diplomatic relations w

ith C

uba. E

isenhower failed to topple C

astro, but Am

erican pressure acceler- ated the radicalization of the revolution and helped open the door to 1, vl L' the S

oviets. Moscow

bought sugar, supplied technicians, armed the i/,,;\

militia, and offered generous trade term

s. Although the revolution's

radicalization was probably inevitable,11 w

as not inexoTable —

that C

uba would end up in the S

oviet camp. H

ostile United S

tates policies ensured that outcom

e. Revolutionary C

uba needed outside assistance to survive. "R

ussia came to C

astro's rescue," Bonsai has concluded,

"only after the United S

tates had taken steps designed to overthrow

him."3'

Kennedy's foreign policy troubles have som

etimes been explained

as inheritances from E

isenhower that shackled the new

President

with problem

s not of his own m

aking. To be sure, K

ennedy inherited the C

uban problem from

Eisenhow

er. But he did not sim

ply continue his predecessor's anti-C

astro policies. Kennedy greatly exaggerated

the Cuban threat, attributing to C

astro a capability to export revolu- tion that the C

uban leader never had and lavishing on him an atten-

tion he did not deserve. Castro w

as "an affront to our pride" and a "m

ischief maker," W

alter Lippm

ann wisely w

rote, but he was not a

"mortal threat" to the U

nited States. 32 A

nd because of his obsession w

ith Cuba, K

ennedy significantly increased the pressures against the upstart island. H

e thus helped generate major crises, including the

October 1962 m

issile crisis. Kennedy inherited the C

uban problem—

and he made it w

orse. T

he new P

resident actually made his first im

portant policy choice on C

uba before he entered the White H

ouse. On the day C

uban-A

merican relations w

ere severed, Secretary of S

tate Chi . '

telephoned Secretary-designate D

ean Rusk and a.

reaction. Rusk talked w

ith Kennedy and reported

elect "would not associate him

self with the M

in i.e., he w

ould not take a position for or against .idos

130

TH

OM

AS G

. PA

TE

RSO

N

time. . . ."33 B

y saying nothing, Kennedy accepted a decision that

reduced his own options for dealing w

ith Cuba. T

he United 'S

tates lost an em

bassy which had served as a first-hand listening post; now

W

ashington would have to rely upon a fast dim

inishing number of

CIA

informants and deep-cover agents or upon often exaggerated

information from

exiles. Most im

portant, with econom

ic coercion having failed to bring dow

n Castro and diplom

acy now im

peded, the rupture in relations elevated covert action—

especially an invasion by C

uban exiles—as one of the few

means left to resolve the contest w

ith C

uba. T

he questions of whether and under w

hat conditions to approve an exile expedition dom

inated the President's discussion of C

uba in his first few

months in office.34 A

lthough Kennedy alw

ays reserved the authority to cancel the operation right up to the m

oment of depar-

ture, his choices, made after m

uch deliberation, pointed in one direc-tion: G

o. National security adviser M

cGeorge B

undy later said that the P

resident "really was looking for w

ays to make it w

ork . . . and allow

ed himself to be persuaded it w

ould work and the risks w

ere acceptable."35 N

ot simply a prisoner of events or of the E

isenhower

legacy, Kennedy associated so closely w

ith the covert operation that it becam

e identified as his. H

e listened to but rejected the counsel of doubting advisers, and he never revealed m

oral or legal qualms about

violently overthrowing a sovereign governm

ent. He never requested

a contingency plan to disband the exile brigade. In questioning aides, the P

resident worried m

ost about which m

ethods would deliver suc-

cess and whether the guiding hand of the U

nited States could be

concealed. Kennedy sought deniability of an A

merican role, but

never the demise of the project.

NI 2 •"r‘, I

On M

arch , Kennedy's chief advisers gathered in a critical N

a- A

-101,P` i/s.

tional Security C

ouncil (NS

C) m

eeting. CIA

Director A

llen Dulles

10.; la

. and Deputy D

irector for Plans R

ichard Bissell explained plans for an

■k-

invasion at the tow

n of Trinidad, on C

uba's southern coast near the E

scambray M

ountains, where C

IA-backed rebels w

ere already oper-RA,), ‘)k

'iv ating. The P

resident criticized the plan as too much like a spectacular

rY A

l' W

orld War II am

phibious landing. He asked for som

ething quieter, vIV

A/0. / (and he instructed planners that no A

merican forces w

ere to be used. D

ulles advised that the mission had to go forw

ard, because "we have

a disposal problem." G

reat embarrassm

ent would beset W

ashington if the exile brigade, training in G

uatemala, w

ere to disband and its m

embers return to the U

nited States to bellow

their anger. Kennedy

Cu

ba

13

1

requested "new proposals"; he ordered the C

IA to force bickering

exile groups to unite behind one leader; he directed Arthur M

. Schle-

singer, Jr., the Harvard historian-turned-W

hite House assistant, to

draft a White P

aper to justify an invasion; and he asked the State

Departm

ent to gain OA

S backing for strong anti-C

astro measures.3 6

Officials m

oved fast. The C

IA devised a plan for daw

n landings in the area of B

ahia de Cochinos (B

ay of Pigs). T

he existence of an air strip at the tow

n of Playa G

iron, the surrounding Zapata sw

amps w

ith few

access roads, and the region's sparse population made this an

appealing entry site. In a Miam

i motel, a C

IA operative bluntly

A

forced

exiles to

form

the C

ub

an R

evo

lutio

nary

Co

un

cil un

der Jo

sece .

Miro C

ardona, a former foe of B

atista and a onetime m

ember of

Castro's governm

ent. Schlesinger quickly produced a W

hite Paper.

Issued on April 3, this propagandistic justification for anti-C

astroism „ _

condemned the C

uban radical for betraying his revolutionary prom-

ises, delivering his island to the "Sino-S

oviet bloc," and attempting to c r,., C

'

subvert Latin A

merican governm

ents. 37 After several high-level m

eet- ,,,V4 -

ings and Dulles's assurance that the prospects for O

peration Zapata

v.tl w

ere even greater than they had been for the successful CIA

plot in („I'l is/

1954 against Guatem

ala, Kennedy set A

pril 17 as D-D

ay. 4„._

T

he B

ay o

f Pig

s plan

beg

an to

unrav

el from

the start,/ A

s the

brigade's old, slow freighters, obtained from

the United F

ruit Com

- : 4',‘ t .

\1

pany, plowed their w

ay to Cuba, B

-26 airplanes took to the skies " \isi„.■ from

Nicaragua. O

n April 15, D

-Day m

inus 2, the brigade pilots destroyed several parked planes of C

astro's meager air force. T

hat ̀4 ° y;\

same day, as part of a pre-invasion ploy, a lone, artificially dam

aged B

-26 flew directly to M

iami, w

here its pilot claimed that he had \, ,4"'N, ' \)\'"-

defected from the C

uban military and had just bom

bed his country's airfields. B

ut the cover story soon cracked. Snooping journalists no- \

v„vr. ticed that the nose cone of the B

-26 was m

etal; Cuban planes had

plastic noses. They observed too that the aircraft's guns had not been

, fired. T

he Am

erican hand was being exposed. T

he President, still

insistent upon hiding Am

erican complicity, decided to cancel a sec-

ond D-D

ay air strike against the remnants of the C

uban air force. C

IA officials protested, because they believed the invasion force ;)'\i)

could not succeed unless Castro's few

planes were knocked out. A

fter ,

conferring with S

ecretary Rusk, K

ennedy stuck with his decision.

Shortly after m

idnight on April 17, m

ore than 1400 comm

andos m

otored in small boats to the beaches at B

ahia de Cochinos. T

he invaders im

mediately tangled w

ith Castro's m

ilitia. Som

e comm

andos 0.i 'v

i\, 6

,‘J" \,)

\\,‘ \

, K\ -"\ I

)9-, • \\,

132 T

HO

MA

S G

. PA

TE

RS

ON

C

uba 133

never made it, because their boats broke apart on razor-sharp coral

reefs. In the air, Castro's m

arauding airplanes shot down tw

o brigade B

-26s and, in the water, sank ships carrying essential com

munications

equipment and am

munition. F

ighting ferociously, the brigade none-theless failed to establish a beachhead. W

ould.-Washington try to

salvage the mission? K

ennedy turned down C

IA appeals to dispatch

planes from the nearby U

SS

Essex, but he did perm

it some jets to

provide air cover for a new B

-26 attack from N

icaragua. Manned this

time by A

merican C

IA pilots, the B

-26s arrived an hour after the jets had com

e and gone. Cuban aircraft dow

ned the B-26s, killing four

Am

ericans. With C

astro's boasting that the mercenarios had been

foiled, the final toll was grim

: 114 of the exile brigade dead and 1,189 captured. A

pall settled over the While H

ouse. • "H

ow could I have been so stupid, to let them

go ahead?" Kennedy

asked an assistant.38 Stupid or not, K

ennedy knew the answ

ers to his ow

n q

uestio

n. F

irst, he d

early so

ught to

oust C

astro an

d sco

re a victory in the C

old War. S

econd, his personality and style encouraged action. A

lways driven to w

in, Kennedy believed "that his disapproval

of the plan would be a show

of weakness inconsistent w

ith his general stance."39 O

ne foreign policy observer explained "how the P

resident got such bad advice from

such good advisers":

The decision on w

hich they were asked to advise w

as presented as a choice betw

een action and inaction. . . . None of the P

resident's advisers wants it

said o

f him

by h

is colleag

ues . . . th

at he . . . lo

ses his n

erve w

hen

the

going gets hot. The H

arvard intellectuals are especially vulnerable, the m

ore so from being new

on the scene. They are conscious of the fact that

the tough-minded m

ilitary suspect them of being soft-headed. T

hey have to show

that they are he-men too, that they can act as w

ell as lecture.0

Th

ird, fear of nasty political repercussions influenced the P

resident. T

old to disband, brigade mem

bers might have refused to give up their

arms or even have m

utineed. In any case, Republicans w

ould have scorned a w

eak-kneed Adm

inistration.4' Kennedy approved the op-

eration, finally, because he felt a sense of urgency. CIA

analysts advised that tim

e was on C

astro's side. Delay w

ould permit the S

ovi-ets to strengthen the C

uban military, perhaps w

ith MIG

fighters, and the rainy season w

as about to begin, making m

ilitary maneuver diffi-

cult. The G

uatemalan president, facing aw

kward questions about

Cuban trainees in his country, w

as also beseeching Washington to

move the exiles out by late A

priI.42

( Failures in intelligence, operations, decision-m

aking, and judg-46' m

ent doomed the B

ay. of Pigs undertaking. A

rrogant CIA

architects

0 , knew too little and assum

ed too much about C

uba, particularly about

,34-. 1" . the landing site. Although B

issell and Dulles have staunchly denied

u that they ever told the President that the invasion w

ould ignite an

1a j island-w

ide rebellion against the Castro regim

e and thus ensure the '

fJ \J-

, ascendency of M

iro's provisional government, K

ennedy decision- m

akers nonetheless believed that the invasion would stim

ulate a popu-lar revolt against an unpopular governm

ent. But the C

IA did not

'pe coordinate the invasion with the anti-C

astro underground in Cuba,

because the agency feared leaks and the likely infiltration of o

pposi-

tion groups by Castro's security forces. N

o rebellion erupted.4 3 Ken-

nedy and his advisers also assumed that, should the brigade prove

\ incapable of taking territory, it could m

elt into the mountains and

become a guerrilla arm

y. But, because the invasion site had been

shifted, the mountains now

lay some 8o m

iles away, w

ith impassable

swam

ps between. N

either Kennedy nor C

IA advisers had explored

this problem. T

he guerrilla option, which, like the belief in a rebel-

lion, probably led Kennedy to suppress doubts about the operation,

was actually im

possible. C

IA planners failed in other w

ays. If they overestimated C

uban

C- discontent w

ith Castro, they underestim

ated the effectiveness of his m

ilitary. They anticipated that he w

ould crack; in fact, he expertly led his forces at the B

ay of Pigs, w

here he had vacationed. CIA

analysts had failed to detect the coral reefs. C

IA-issued equipm

ent malfunc-

tioned; crucial comm

unications gear was concentrated in one ship

that sunk; paratroopers did not drop far enough inland to cut off causew

ays.4 4 Another operational failure rem

ained a tightly held se-cret. T

he CIA

had been attempting since 196o to kill F

idel Castro,

even employing M

afia thugs for the task. The C

IA activated assassina-

tion plots in March and A

pril. It seems likely that assassination w

as part of the general B

ay of Pigs plan. B

issell has admitted that he w

as hopeful "that C

astro would be dead before the landing." 43

t,

\ The m

ost controversigl operational question remains the cancelled

,V) second D

-Day air strike. P

ost-crisis critics have complained that the

\ j„.1 \ P

resident lost his nerve and made a decision that condem

ned the ;A,

v ' expedition to disaster.4 6 C

astro and Bissell have agreed that C

uban F s`

,

air supremacy w

as important to C

uba's triumph.47 B

ut was it deci-

. sive?

0, sv

e. A p

re-emptiv

e strike o

n D

-Day

again

st the C

uban

air force

v

would not have delivered victory to the invaders. A

fter the first air

134

TH

OM

AS G

. PA

TE

RSO

N

attack, Castro had dispersed his planes; the brigade's B

-26s would

have encountered considerable difficulty in locating and destroying th

em. A

nd, ev

en if a D

-Day

assault h

ad d

isabled

all of C

astro's

planes, then what? L

a brigada's 1400 men w

ould have had to face v

O1castro's

army of 25,00o and the nation's 200,000 m

ilitia. The com

man-

, d

dos most likely w

ould not have survived the overwhelm

ing power of

t/ the C

uban military.

. A

flawed decision-m

aking system also contributed to failure. B

issell ' IV

" ,, and D

ulles were too em

otionally comm

itted to the project to see the shortcom

ings in their handiwork. C

IA planners w

ere less than candid k' l l )vith the P

resident, for fear that he would term

inate the project. Opera-

1 lion Z

apata was even kept a secret from

many other C

IA professionals

'1 responsible for intelligence analysis. Had they been asked to assess the

chances for national rebellion, for example, they probably w

ould have T ,'-''reported negatively, pointing out C

astro's continued popular appea1.45 A

'1,-" CIA

officials also contributed to the President' thinking that A

meri-

v,t,NA

t can participation could be hidden and plausibly denied. But how

could ,

Ken

nesly

ey

er have th

ou

gh

t that secrecy

was p

ossib

le? Wish

ful th

ink

-

\? N;\ ing provides the best ainsw

er.45 "Trying to m

ount an operation of this ‘„\ii,d'L 1m

agnitude from the U

nited States," a C

IA official w

rote later, "is \i-i about as covert as w

alking nude across Tim

es Square w

ithout attract-i5ct ing attention."5° N

onetheless, until his decision to cancel the second strike, K

ennedy clung to the fiction o T

he Joint Chiefs of S

taff and Secretary of S

tate also failed as advis-ers. A

lthough the generals and admirals had serious reservations,

they always evaluated the operation favorably. S

worn to secrecy,

they did not seek close staff analysis of the CIA

plan. Not "cut in"

until the later stages of planning, they hesitated to "pound the desk," because the operation w

as "not our show."5' N

or did Dean R

usk provide rigorous scrutiny or press his case against the invasion. A

"g

oo

d so

ldier" w

ho

wen

t alon

g w

ith th

e app

arent co

nsen

sus, h

e seem

ed to believe that he sould preside over debate rather than influ-ence it. R

usk later regretted his restraint:

As a co

lon

el of in

fantry

[in th

e Seco

nd

Wo

rld W

ar], I kn

ew th

at this

brig

ade d

idn't h

ave th

e chan

ce of a "sn

ow

ball in

hell." B

ut I w

asn't a

colonel of infantry; I was sitting there in a very special cubicle. I failed

President K

ennedy by not insisting that he ask a question that he did not ask. H

e should have turned to our Joints Chiefs of S

taff and said to them:

"Now

gentlemen, I m

ay want to do this w

ith U.S

. forces, so you tell me

what you w

ould need. . . ." By the tim

e the Joint Chiefs had com

e in with

Cu

ba 1135

their sustained and prolonged bombing, their several divisions, a m

assive fleet, and their big air force, it w

ould have become obvious to the P

resi-dent that that little brigade didn't have a chance at al1.5 2

One w

onders, of course, why K

ennedy himself did not think to 'ask

the question. Rusk also kept departm

ental intelligence and Cuban

specialists in the dark.53 K

ennedy encountered a good deal of dissenting opinion and he rejected it. S

chlesinger, for example, w

rote several mem

oranda to the P

resident, arguing that time w

as actually not on Castro's side and

that the Cuban leader, at least for the m

oment, rem

ained popular.5 4 T

he skeptics included Richard G

oodwin, John K

enneth Galbraith,

Charles E

. Bohlen, C

hester Bow

les, and Adlai S

tevenson. In making

his decision, Kennedy also bypassed C

ongress, further ensuring that he received lim

ited advice. Only S

enator J. William

Fulbright, F

or-eign R

elations Com

mittee chairm

an, was let into the inner circle,

and, at that, only once. Picking up rum

ors of a forthcoming invasion

of Cuba, F

ulbright sent the President a m

emorandum

that strongly disapproved invasion—

it was "of a piece w

ith the hypocrisy and cyni-cism

for which the U

nited States is constantly denouncing the S

oviet U

nion . . . ," he wrote. K

ennedy thereupon invited the Arkansas

senator to attend an April 4

meeting. F

ulbright spoke forthrightly to the assem

bled top-level advisers, chiding them for exaggerating the

Cuban threat. A

s he had told the President earlier, the C

astro regime

"is a thorn in the flesh; but it is not a dagger in the heart."55 No one in

the room agreed w

ith Fulbright.

"Mr. P

resident, it could have been worse," rem

arked a Stevenson

assistant. How

? "It might have succeeded." 56 H

ad all gone well w

ith the chain reaction of beachhead, rebellion, and C

astro's death or departure, the victory w

ould only have "exchanged a Castro pest-

house for a post-Castro asylum

." 57 Tainted as an A

merican stooge,

the head of the new governm

ent would have struggled to w

in public favor. W

ell-armed C

astroites, including Fidel's brother R

aul and Che

Guevara, w

ould probably have initiated a protracted guerrilla war

against the Am

erican-created regime. T

he Soviets m

ight have helped these rebel forces, and volunteers from

around the world m

ight have sw

elled the resistance—like the Spanish C

ivil War of the 193os, Schle-

singer had warned. T

he United S

tates would have had to save its

puppet government through m

ilitary aid, advisers, and maybe even

troops'. To have sustained a successful B

ay of Pigs invasion, then, the

r.

13

6

TH

OM

AS G

. PA

TE

RSO

N

Kennedy A

dministration probably w

ould have had to undertake a prolonged and expensive occupation of the island.58

As it w

as, defeat d

id n

ot ch

asten th

e Adm

inistratio

n. W

hile a

secret presidential panel investigated the disaster, Kennedy and his

advisers huddled. At the A

pril 20 C

abinet meeting, B

owles found his

colleagues "almost savage." R

obert Kennedy becam

e especially agi-tated, and "there w

as an almost frantic reaction for an action program

w

hich people would grab onto."59 W

ith Republicans belittling the

President—

Eisenhow

er said the story ought to be titled "Profile in

Tim

idity and Indecision" and Nixon allow

ed that Kennedy should

have known that "w

hen you comm

it maxim

um U

.S. prestige you

have to comm

it maxim

um U

.S. pow

er to back it up," Kennedy w

as not sym

pathetic to Bow

les's call for patience and caution.6° The U

n-der S

ecretary was "yellow

-bellied," press secretary Pierre S

alinger sn

orted

, and "w

e're goin

g to

get h

im." W

hite H

ouse aid

e Harris

Wofford shot back: "W

hy don't you get those who got us into this

mess?"61 K

ennedy pushed Bow

les out of the State D

epartment later

in the year. O

n April 2

0 the beleaguered P

resident spoke out. "Let the record

show," he boom

ed, "that our restraint is not inexhaustible." Indeed, the U

nited States intended to defend the M

onroe Doctrine and carry

on a "relentless" struggle with C

omm

unism in "every corner of the

globe." In familiar w

ords, Kennedy declared that "the com

placent, the self-indulgent, the soft societies are about to be sw

ept away w

ith the debris of history. O

nly the strong . . . can possibly survive."62 T

hat day, too, Kennedy ordered A

merican m

ilitary advisers in Laos

to put on their uniforms to show

United S

tates resolution in the face of defeat. "A

new urgency" w

as injected into "Kennedy's concern for

counterin

surg

ency

. . . ," recalled G

eneral M

axw

ell Tay

lor, w

ho

headed the post-crisis inquiry.63 Although K

ennedy privately claimed

that the Cuban failure deterred him

from m

ilitary intervention in L

aos, the record of the April 2

2 N

SC

meeting dem

onstrates that the P

resident chose an activist policy of confrontation with the "C

omm

u-nist w

orld."64 S

uch

a postu

re was m

ore in

line w

ith th

e advice a

Bundy aide offered R

obert Kennedy during the B

ay of Pigs crisis.

When the A

ttorney General grow

led that Moscow

would now

judge A

merica w

eak, Walt W

. Rostow

comm

ented that "we w

ould have am

ple opportunity to prove we w

ere not paper tigers in Berlin, S

outh-east A

sia, and elsewhere."65 T

his thinking also resembled the recom

-m

endations of the Taylor S

tudy Group, w

hich on June 13 reported

Cu

ba 137

secretly to the President that "w

e are in a life and death struggle w

hich we m

ay be losing," so henceforth all of the nation's Cold W

ar

resources had to be mobilized. 66

Robert K

ennedy told counterinsurgency specialist Colonel E

dward

Lansdale that the B

ay of Pigs "insult needed to be redressed rather

quickly." 67 But that redressing faced som

e heady obstacles. The anti-

Castro underground lay shattered. C

uban security forces, before and after the landing, rounded up, jailed, killed, or converted thousands of anti-regim

e subversives, most of w

hom w

ere surprised because the C

IA had not forew

arned them about D

-Day. In the U

nited States the

Cuban R

evolutionary Council splintered, as the dem

oralized and an-gry C

uban comm

unity descended once again into fierce factionalism.

Castro trium

phantly exploited patriotic nationalism to strengthen his

regime. 68 Instead of driving the S

oviets out of Cuba, the botched B

ay of P

igs operation drew H

avana and Moscow

closer together. Under-

standably fearing another invasion, perhaps with A

merican troops,

Castro sought S

oviet military assistance. T

he Soviets shipped sm

all arm

s, machine guns, how

itzers, armored personnel carriers, patrol

boats, tanks, surface-to-air missiles, and, ultim

ately, nuclear missiles

that could reach into the United S

tates itself. 69 P

ersuaded that "there can be no long-term living w

ith Castro as a

neighbor," Kennedy officials launched a m

ulti-track program of co-

vert, economic, diplom

atic, and propagandistic elements.r E

ncour-aged by the W

hite House, the C

IA created a huge operations station

in Miam

i called JMW

AV

E to recruit and organize C

uban exiles. In W

ashin

gto

n, R

obert K

enned

y b

ecame a ram

rod fo

r action. A

t a N

ovember 4 W

hite House m

eeting, the Attorney G

eneral made his

pitch: "stir things up on the island with espionage, sabotage, general

disorder . . . ."71 The P

resident himself asked C

olonel Lansdale to

direct Operation M

ongoose—"to use our available assets . . . to help

Cuba overthrow

the Com

munist regim

e." 7' O

peration Mongoose and JM

WA

VE

, although failing to unseat C

astro, punished Cubans. C

IA-handled saboteurs burned cane fields

and blew up factories and oil storage tanks. In a D

ecember 1961 raid,

for example, a seven-m

an team blasted a railroad bridge, derailed an

approaching train, and torched a sugar warehouse. M

yriad exile groups, from

Alpha 66 to the R

evolutionary Student D

irectorate, left the F

lorida Keys to stage hit-and-run attacks along C

uba's coast. CIA

agents contam

inated goods leaving European ports for C

uba, and they bribed E

uropean manufacturers to produce faulty equipm

ent for

Cuba—

as when a G

erman industrialist shipped off-center ball bear-

ings. British-m

ade Leland buses w

ere sabotaged too.73 These spoiling

operations compelled the C

astro government to divert scarce re-

sources from econom

ic and social programs to coastal defense and

internal surveillance. They also pushed C

uba toward greater depen-

dence upon the Soviet U

nion. T

he CIA

devised new plots to kill C

astro. Poisonous cigars, pills,

,\,MaN,)''' and needles w

ere directed Castro's w

ay, but to no avail. Did the K

enne-

e dys know

about these death schemes? R

obert Kennedy learned about

f

\ \i them

them

in mid-1962, and his biographer claim

s that the Attorney G

eneral p V

ord

ered an

end to

assassinatio

n p

rojects. Jo

hn K

enned

y said

at the

time that in general he disapproved of the killing of foreign leaders.14

VA-1/

The P

resident apparently never directly ordered the assassination of ).;`-' ,A.

Castro—

at least no trail of documents leads to the K

ennedy White \

House. B

ut, of course, the word "assassination." w

as never uttered in \ \'''At'

''',/'

the presence of the President or com

mitted to paper, so that he could

be protected by the principle of plausible deniability. What w

as always

mentioned w

as the need to remove C

astro. "And if killing him

was one

of the things that was to be done in this connection," assassination w

as attem

pted because "we felt w

e were acting w

ithin the guidelines." So

( bespoke Bissell's replacem

ent, Richard H

elms.75 P

resident Kennedy

may or m

ay not have known about the assassination plots, but he did

set the general guidelines. Intensified econom

ic coercion joined assassination and sabotage as m

ethods to undermine the C

astro government. A

merican officials did

not expect the economic denial program

alone to force Castro's fall.

But th

ey d

id seek

to in

hib

it the islan

d's eco

nom

ic dev

elopm

ent,

thereby decelerating socialization, spurring Cuban discontent, and

diminishing C

uba's appeal as a model for L

atin Am

erica. In February

1962 Kennedy further tightened the econom

ic screws by banning

most im

ports of Cuban products (especially tobacco). E

l bloqueo, as the C

ubans called the embargo, hurt. C

uba was forced to pay higher

freight costs, enlarge its foreign debt, and suffer innumberable fac-

tory shut-downs due to the lack of spare parts once bought in the

United S

tates. Cuba's econom

ic woes also stem

med from

the flight of technicians and m

anagers, a decline in tourism, high w

orker absentee-ism

, the drying up of foreign capital investment, hastily conceived

policies to diversify the economy, and suffocating governm

ent con-trols. T

he overall effect on Cuba of A

merican econom

ic measures

was not w

hat Washington intended: greater political centralization,

more state m

anagement, closer ties to the S

oviet Union. B

y 1962, 82 percent of C

uba's exports flowed to C

omm

unist countries, and 85 percent of its im

ports came from

them. A

s with m

ilitary defense4 so w

ith the economy: the S

oviet Union becam

e Cuba's lifeline. 6

T

he Kennedy A

dministration also lobbied the O

AS

to isolate C

uba. Eisenhow

er had grown frustrated w

ith the regional organiza-tion's refusal to "do som

ething about Castro."22 S

ecretary Herter

explained in March 196o w

hy the OA

S hesitated: "O

ur own latest

National Intelligence E

stimate does not find C

uba to be under Com

-m

unist control or domination, and w

e lack all of the hard evidence it w

hich would be required to convince skeptical L

atin Am

erican Gov-

ernments and the public opinion behind them

."7 8 But after C

astro declared him

self a Marxist-L

eninist in late 1961, the United S

tates \ m

anag

ed to

ob

tain th

e vo

tes to o

ust C

ub

a from

the O

AS

, even

though M

exico voted "nay" and Argentina, B

olivia, Brazil, C

hile, and E

cuador abstained.2 0 The expulsion registered loudly in H

avana, w

hich interpreted it as "political preparation for an invasion." 80 By

the spring of 1962, moreover, fifteen L

atin Am

erican states had an- sw

ered Washington's call to break relations w

ith Cuba.

Diplom

atic contact between C

ubans and Am

ericans also virtually ceased, w

ith two exceptions. W

hen in May 1961 C

astro offered to trade the B

ay of Pigs prisoners for A

merican farm

tractors, the White

House encouraged a private com

mittee of distinguished A

mericans

to negotiate with C

uba. But the T

ractors-for-Freedom

Com

mittee

could not reach terms and disbanded. T

hen New

York law

yer James

B. D

onovan, working closely w

ith Washington officials, gained C

as-tro's trust and bargained directly w

ith him in H

avana. In Decem

ber 1962, in exchange for food and m

edicine, Castro released the brigade

mem

bers. In a celebration at Miam

i's Orange B

owl, K

ennedy re-ceived their flag. "I can assure you," an em

otional President told the

huge crowd, "that this flag w

ill be returned to this brigade in a free H

avan

a.", A

nother encounter took place during the August 1961 P

unta del E

ste conference that drafted the Alliance for P

rogress charter. Che

Guevara initiated contact w

ith Richard G

oodwin by sending a box of

Cuba's finest cigars to the W

hite House assistant. "S

ince to write to

an enemy is difficult, I lim

it myself to extending m

y hand," read an attached note. 8 2 A

t a farewell party, the tw

o men held an intense

conversation. Che first thanked G

oodwin for the B

ay of Pigs—

it had helped the regim

e solidify its power. G

oodwin rem

arked that the

iI

13

8

TH

OM

AS G

. PA

TE

RSO

N

Cuba

139

i?":01414,

140

TH

OM

AS G

. PA

TE

RSO

N

Cubans could repay the favor by attacking the A

merican naval base

at Guantanam

o. In a frank yet reasonable manner C

he asked for a

modus viven

di w

ith Washington and urged talks on trade, com

pensa-

tion for nationalized property, and Guantanam

o. Cuba w

ould even

be willing to discuss its ties w

ith the Soviets ada C

uban activities in

the hemisphere. G

oodwin carried the prom

ising August 17 overture

to Kennedy, w

ho, smoking one of C

he's cigars, listened to his aide's

appeal for further exploration of the "below ground dialogue" w

ith

the Cubans. T

he President rejected the suggestion: it cam

e too soon

after the humiliating B

ay of Pigs, w

ould likely disturb some L

atin

Am

erican governments, and w

ould legitimize a M

arxist govern-

ment.83 C

he's important initiative died that abruptly—

at JFK

's desk.

By the spring of 1962 C

uba was losing on several fronts in its

contest with the U

nited States: diplom

atic isolation in the hemi-

sphere, ouster from the O

AS

, economic em

bargo, CIA

assistance to

anti-Castro rebels in C

uba, exile raids and sabotage, assassination

plots, Operation M

ongoose, and the successful launching of the anti-

Cuban A

lliance for Progress. A

fter the Am

erican failure at the Bay

of Pigs and in the face of the studied A

merican effort to cripple the

Cuban R

evolution, "were w

e right or wrong to fear direct invasion"

nex

t? Fid

el Castro

later asked

.84 Although K

ennedy had actually

ruled out invasion as a method to overthrow

Castro, in large part

because Latin A

merican opinion w

ould have been so negative and

Am

erican casualties would have been so staggering, C

astro could

only think the worst in 1962. A

fter all, some W

ashington politicians

were shouting for invasion and K

ennedy officials spoke frankly about

getting rid of Castro.

It may be plausibly argued that, had there been no exile expedi-

tion, no destructive covert activities, and no economic and diplom

atic

boycott—had there been no concerted U

nited States vendetta to

quash the Cuban R

evolution—there w

ould not have been an October

missile crisis. T

he principal source for that frightening crisis lay in

Kennedy's unvarnished hostility tow

ard Cuba and in C

astro's under-

standable apprehension that United S

tates invasion was inevitable.

The origins of the m

issile crisis, then, derived largely from U

nited

States-C

uban tensions. To stress only the global dim

ension of Soviet-

Am

erican competition, as is com

monly done, is like saying that a

basketball game can be played w

ithout a court. Cuba w

as the court.

To slight the local or regional sources of the conflict is to m

iss a

central point: Nikita K

hrushchev would never have had the opportu-

Cu

ba

14

1

pity to begin his dangerous missile gam

e if Kennedy had not been

attempting to (expunge C

astro and his revolution from the hem

i-

sphere. This interpretation does not dism

iss but incorporates the

view, predom

inant in the scholarly literature, that the emplacem

ent

of nuclear missiles in C

uba served the Soviet strategic goal of catching

up in the nuclear arms race. 8 5 T

his interpretation emphasizes that

both Cuba and the S

oviet Union calculated that their interests w

ould

be served by putting medium

and intermediate-range rockets on the

island. Havana hoped to gain deterrent pow

er to thwart an expected

Am

erican invasion, and Moscow

hoped to enhance its deterrent

power in the C

old War and save a new

ally."' From

Castro's perspec-

tive, the United S

tates would not start a local, conventional w

ar out

of fear that it would then have to risk a nuclear w

ar. 8 7 "We'd carried

out the Bay of P

igs operation, never intending to use Am

erican mili-

tary force—but the K

remlin didn't know

that," Defense S

ecretary

Robert M

cNam

ara recalled. "We w

ere running covert operations

against Castro" and "people in the P

entagon were even talking about

a first strike [nuclear policy]. . . . So the S

oviets may w

ell have be-

lieved we w

ere seeking Castro's overthrow

plus a first strike capabil-

ity. This m

ay have led them to do w

hat they did in Cuba." 88

Cuba's eagerness for S

oviet military assistance is w

ell documented

in the contemporary record. C

astro and other Cuban officials m

ade

repeated, consistent, and compelling statem

ents that their nation

faced an Am

erican onslaught. "Cuba took m

easures to defend its

security against a systematic policy of hostility and aggression," C

as-

tro privately explained to United N

ations Secretary G

eneral U T

hant

during the October crisis. 89

Contem

porary, secret, now declassified U

nited States docum

ents

reveal that Am

erican decisionmakers knew

that the Cuban-S

oviet

military linkage, w

hich included the June 1962 agreement on nuclear

missiles, grew

from C

uba's fear of invasion. They did not say so I

publicly, of course, for such would have acknow

ledged their own

responsibility for generating the fear. In Septem

ber 1962, CIA

ana-

lysts concluded that "the main purpose of the present m

ilitary build-

up in Cuba is to strengthen the C

omm

unist regime there against w

hat

the Cubans and S

oviets conceive to be a danger that the US

may

attempt by one m

eans or another to overthrow it."90 In early O

ctober

the D

epartm

ent o

f State cab

led its d

iplo

matic p

osts th

at Castro

feared an Am

erican invasion and that "the available evidence sug-

gests strongly that this crash build-up of military and econom

ic assis-

„1:11U, 4:

142

TH

OM

AS G

. PA

TE

RSO

N

tance did not represent a Soviet initiative but rather a response to

insistent demands from

Castro for help."9' E

arly in the crisis, a CIA

office issued a secret report that noted C

uba's numerous "invasion

scares" in the summ

er of 1962. But the C

ubans "felt progressively m

ore secure as the work [S

oviet installation of military equipm

ent) advanced."92 F

inally, to cite yet another example, a post-crisis S

tate D

epartment study indicated that w

hen Soviet "m

ilitary equipment

began arriving in volume in late sum

mer 1962 the U

S governm

ent realized that these chronic [invasion] fears played a part in C

astro's m

otives. "93 W

hy did the Cubans and S

oviets decide upon medium

(MR

BM

) and interm

ediate (IRB

M) m

issiles, with ranges of 1

,020 and 2,20o

nautical miles respectively, instead of upon a m

ilitary pact, non-nuclear, conventional forces, or w

eapons that could satisfy Am

erican tolerance for "defensive” assistance? P

erhaps the Cubans w

ere con-fused about the types of m

issiles they would receive.94 D

uring the 1958 M

iddle East crisis, w

hen Am

erican troops landed in Lebanon,

Khrushchev and G

amal A

bdul Nasser discussed "rockets" and "m

is-siles" for E

gypt. Nasser betrayed considerable ignorance about the

details of these weapons—

as perhaps Castro did later.95 T

he Cubans

may not have paid m

uch attention to missile type, because to them

m

ore powerful w

eapons simply m

eant more deterrence. O

r they may

have assumed that im

pressive surface-to-surface missiles (42 M

RB

Ms

arrived; the IRB

Ms never arrived) w

ere necessary for true deterrence against an aggressive U

nited States. O

ne thinks here of a similar

Am

erican assumption at the end of the S

econd World W

ar that the fanatical Japanese w

ould surrender only under threat of annihilation from

the atomic bom

b. O

n October 14 an A

merican U

-2 plane photographed missile sites

in Cuba, thus providing the first "hard" evidence, as distinct from

the "soft" reports of exiles, that the island w

as becoming a nuclear base.

"He can't do that to m

e!" snapped Kennedy w

hen he saw the pictures

on the 16th.96 He h

ad w

arned

the S

oviets th

at the U

nited

States

would not suffer "offensive" w

eapons in Cuba, although the w

arnings had com

e after the Cuban-S

oviet decision of early summ

er.92 The

President convened his top advisers shortly before noon on O

ctober 16. H

is first questions focused on the firing readiness of the missiles

and the probability that they carried nuclear warheads. T

he tentative answ

ers were negative, although he w

as advised that the missiles

could become operational in a brief tim

e. Discussion of m

ilitary op-

Cuba 1

43

tions (invasion? air strike?) dominated this first m

eeting. Kennedy's

imm

ediate preference became clear: "W

e're certainly going . . . to take out these . . . m

issiles." McG

eorge Bundy urged consideration

not.only of military plans but of a "political track" or diplom

acy. But

Kennedy show

ed little interest in negotiations. When M

cNam

ara m

entioned that diplomacy m

ight precede military action, the P

resi-dent im

mediately sw

itched the discussion to another question: How

long w

ould it take to get air strikes organized? Conspicuously absent

from this first m

eeting was a serious probing of S

oviet and Cuban

motivation. 95 A

t a second meeting on the 16th, R

usk argued against the surprise air strike that G

eneral Maxw

ell Taylor had bluntly advocated. T

he S

ecretary of State recom

mended instead "a direct m

essage to Cas-

tro." At the close of R

usk's remarks, K

ennedy imm

ediately asked: "C

an we get a little idea about w

hat the military thing is?" B

undy then posed a question now

central to the history of the missile crisis:

"How

gravely does this change the strategic balance?" McN

amara,

for o

ne, th

ought "n

ot at all," b

ut T

aylo

r disp

uted

him

. Ken

ned

y

himself w

as uncertain, but he did complain that the m

issile emplace-

ment in C

uba "makes them

look like they're co-equal with us." A

nd, added T

reasury Secretary C

. Douglas D

illon, who obviously knew

the P

resident's competitive personality, the presence of the m

issiles m

ade it appear that "we're scared of the C

ubans." T

hen the rambling discussion turned to K

hrushchev's motivation.

The R

ussian leader had been cautious on Berlin, K

ennedy said. "It's just as if w

e suddenly began to put a major num

ber of MR

BM

s in T

urkey," the President w

ent on. "Now

that'd be goddam danger-

ous. . . ." Bundy jum

ped in: "Well, w

e did, Mr. P

resident." Not liking

the sound of a double standard, Kennedy lam

ely answered, "Y

eah, but that w

as five years ago."99 Actually, the A

merican Jupiter m

issiles in T

urkey, under a 1959 agreement w

ith Ankara, w

ere put into launch position in m

id-1961—during the K

ennedy Adm

inistration—and not

turned over to Turkish forces until O

ctober 22, 1962, the very day

Kennedy inform

ed Moscow

that it must w

ithdraw its S

S-4 m

issiles from

Cuba.10 0

For the next several days, K

ennedy's group of advisers, named the

Executive C

omm

ittee or Ex C

omm

, met frequently in tight secrecy.

Taylor later sum

marized policy options: "talk them

.out," "squeeze them

out," or "shoot them out."'°' In exhausting sessions m

arked by frank disagreem

ent and changing minds, E

x Com

m m

embers w

eighed

14

4

TH

OM

AS G

. PA

TE

RSO

N

the advantages and disadvantages of invasion, bombing, quarantine,

and diplomacy.102 T

he President gradually m

oved with a m

ajority of E

x Com

m advisers tow

ard a quarantine or blockade of Cuba: incom

ing ships w

ould be stopped and inspected for military cargo. M

cNam

ara persistently argued this alternative against the generals, D

illon, CIA

D

irector John McC

one, and Dean A

cheson, all of whom

urged an air strike. W

hen queried if an air strike would knock out all of the know

n m

issiles, Taylor replied: "T

he best we can offer you is to destroy

9o%. . . ." In other w

ords, some m

issiles in Cuba w

ould remain in

place fo

r firing

again

st the U

nited

States. R

ob

ert Ken

ned

y also

w

orrried that the Soviets might react unpredictably w

ith military force,

"which could be so serious as to lead to general nuclear w

ar." In any case, the A

ttorney General insisted, there w

ould be no "Pearl H

arbor type of attack" on his brother's record.1 03

By O

ctober 22 the P

resident had made tw

o decisions. The chief

decision was to quarantine C

uba to prevent further military ship-

ments and to im

press the Soviets w

ith Am

erican resolve to force the m

issiles out. If the Soviets balked, other, m

ore drastic, measures

would be undertaken. T

he second decision was to inform

the Soviets

of U

nited

States p

olicy

thro

ug

h a telev

ision ad

dress rath

er than

through diplom

atic channels. Ex C

omm

advisers have dubiously ar-gued that a surprise public speech w

as necessary to rally world opin-

ion behind United S

tates policy and to prevent Khrushchev him

self from

issuing a "blustering ultimatum

." 104 At least tw

o E

x C

om

m

participants recomm

ended that negotiations be tried first. Form

er A

mbassador to the S

oviet Union C

harles Bohlen advised that M

os-cow

would have to retaliate against the U

nited States after its techni-

cians were killed by A

merican bom

bs. A stern letter to K

hrushchev should be "tested" as a m

ethod to gain withdraw

al of the missiles. "I

do

n't see th

e urg

ency

of m

ilitary actio

n," B

oh

len to

ld th

e Presi-

dent.105 And a grim

Am

bassador to the United N

ations Adlai S

teven-son appealed to an unreceptive K

ennedy: "the existence of nuclear m

issile bases anywhere is negotiable before w

e start anything." 1°6 G

oing into the crisis, Kennedy refused to negotiate w

ith either Khru-

shchev or Castro.

Kennedy's evening television speech on O

ctober 22 sounded famil-

iar themes in A

merican diplom

atic history. He recalled the special

United S

tates relationship with the W

estern Hem

isphere, and he rem

inded Am

ericans that 193os lessons taught them to resist aggres-

sion and surrender. The P

resident lectured the Soviets to reverse

Cuba

145

their "deliberately provocative" decision by dismantling their "strate-

gic" missiles in C

uba, and he announced the Caribbean quarantine as

an "initial" step. The U

nited States Inform

ation Agency beam

ed his w

ords around the world in thirty-seven languages, including S

panish for C

uba itself. For the C

ubans Kennedy had an oft-heard m

essage: C

astro and his clique had become "puppets" of an "international

conspiracy."107 T

he missile crisis becam

e an international war of nerves. M

ore than sixty A

merican ships w

ent on patrol to enforce the blockade. The

Strategic A

ir Com

mand w

ent on nuclear alert, moving upw

ard to D

efense Condition (D

EF

CO

N) 2 for the first tim

e ever (the next level is deploym

ent for combat). B

-52 bombers, loaded w

ith nuclear w

eapons, stood ready, while m

en and equipment m

oved to the south-eastern U

nited States to prepare for an invasion (thousands of road

maps of C

uba were distributed).iol A

merican diplom

ats hastened to inform

NA

TO

allies; two A

frican nations agreed to deny landing rights for Soviet aircraft, so that the Soviets w

ould have trouble resup-plying their m

ilitary on the island; the OA

S voted to endorse U

nited S

tates policy; and the United N

ations Security C

ouncil debated. S

trangely, the Soviets did not m

obilize or redeploy their huge mili-

tary, nor did they take measures to m

ake their strategic forces less vulnerable.'°9 T

he Soviets also refrained from

testing the quarantine: their ships turned around and w

ent home. B

ut what next? O

n the 26th, K

ennedy and some E

x Com

m m

embers, thinking that the S

ovi-ets w

ere stalling, soured on the quarantine. Sentim

ent for military

action

streng

then

ed..

Kennedy also approved a S

tate Departm

ent message to B

razil that invited its am

bassador in Havana to talk w

ith Castro about the "great

jeopardy" in which the S

oviet missiles had placed his governm

ent. Indeed, the C

ubans could expect to suffer "desperate hand-to-mouth

existence" under an expanded Am

erican quarantine. But, if the m

is-siles and S

oviet military personnel departed, "m

any changes in the relations betw

een Cuba and the O

AS

countries, including the US

, could flow

." For the first tim

e in the Kennedy presidency, as nuclear

war threatened, W

ashington was suggesting an accom

modation of

Cuban-A

merican differences. T

his overture, however, m

ay have rep-resented no m

ore than a ploy to divide Moscow

and Havana, for the

President him

self "doubted that it would do any good . .

The "first real blink" in the crisis cam

e in the afternoon of the 26th. A

Soviet em

bassy officer, Aleksander F

omin, called A

BC

correspon-

I

\

14

6

TH

OM

AS G

. PA

TE

RSO

N

dent John Scali and asked for a m

eeting. They talked in a W

ashington restaurant, w

here Scali w

as surprised to hear Fom

in urge him to carry

a message to the television journalist's high-level friends in the S

tate D

epartment: the S

oviet Union w

ould withdraw

the missiles if the

United S

tates would prom

ise not to invade Cuba. S

cali scurried to R

usk, who sent the unusual em

issary back to Fom

in with the reply

that Am

erican leaders were interested in discussing the proposal.m

In the m

eantime, a private K

hrushchev letter arrived with the sam

e offer, as w

ell as with a pointed rem

inder for Kennedy: the m

issiles w

ere in Cuba only because the U

nited States had been threatening

the island.113 B

ut the next morning another letter cam

e. Khrushchev now

upped i the stakes: he w

ould trade the missiles in C

uba for the Am

erican .'„,,),,)‘1" m

issiles in Turkey. A

n angry Kennedy felt boxed, because "w

e are rJ11-

now in the position of risking w

ar in Cuba ancL

in Berlin over m

issiles in T

urkey which are of little m

ilitary value."" Indeed, the President

, in early 1961 had expressed doubts about the military efficacy of the

Jupiters in Turkey and had later directed the D

efense Departinent to

` )).? prepare a study for phasing them

out. But he had not ordered their

removal. "5 N

ow

they

seemed

to stan

d in

the w

ay o

f settling

the

October crisis, for K

ennedy hesitated to accept a swap—

first, be-cause he did not w

ant to appear to be giving up anything in the face of S

oviet provocation; second, because he knew the proud T

urks would

be upset with the appearance of being "traded off in order to appease

an enemy";"6 and third, because acceptance of a m

issile trade would

)c,,̀0---1 lend credence to charges that the United S

tates all along had been applying a double standard. K

ennedy told his Ex C

omm

advisers that K

hrushchev's offer caused "embarrassm

ent," for most people w

ould think it "a very fair trade." Indeed, M

oscow had played "a very good

card."117 Som

e of Kennedy's advisers had explored the issue days

before Khrushchev's second letter. S

tevenson had recomm

ended a horse trade, and A

mbassador W

. Averell H

arriman counseled that

Am

erica's "ring o

f bases" aro

und th

e Soviet U

nio

n h

ad p

roven

"counter-productive." T

he way out of the crisis, H

arriman said, w

as to let K

hrushchev save face through an agreement to w

ithdraw the

Jupiters. Such a bargain w

ould also permit K

hrushchev to gain politi-cally on his tough-m

inded military and "sw

ing" toward im

proved relations w

ith the United S

tates." T

his discussion raises another question: What if the S

oviets and C

ubans had announced in the summ

er of 1962 that they were deploy-

Cuba 1

47

ing a limited num

ber of missiles—

the same num

ber as Am

ericans had stationed in T

urkey (and Italy)? Would the U

nited States have been

Af ,

able to compel reversal of a publicly announced decision and prevent

emplacem

ent without having to abandon the Jupiters in T

urkey'in a ,k1 negotiated deal? S

ome E

x Com

m advisers later suggested that, in

such a case, Washington m

ight not even have sought to force with- 1J'

' draw

al of th

e SS

-4s fro

m C

uba." M

any p

eople ab

road

, inclu

din

g y

l, t som

e European allies, w

ould have asked if the US

SR

had any less right than the U

nited States to practice deterrence. M

oscow no doubt

calculated differently—that W

ashington would attem

pt to halt ship- m

ents of missiles—

and thus tried to sneak them in.

In th

e afterno

on

of th

e 27

th m

ore b

ad n

ews ro

cked

the W

hite

House. A

n Am

erican U-2 plane overflew

the eastern part of the S

oviet Union, probably because equipm

ent malfunctioned. S

oviet fighters scram

bled to intercept it, and Am

erican jets from A

laska took flight to rescue the errant aircraft. A

lthough the spy plane flew

home w

ithout having sparked a dog fight, Moscow

might have read

the incident as provocative. Worse still, a U

-2 was shot dow

n over C

uba by a surface-to-air missile (S

AM

). Cubans, after having fought

Soviet soldiers for control of the S

AM

sites, may have brought dow

n the U

-2.129 Am

erican decisionmakers assum

ed at the time that the

Soviets m

anned the SA

M batteries; thus the shoot-dow

n constituted a dangerous escalation. A

distressed McN

amara now

thought "inva- „„ ■,)_,

sion had become alm

ost inevitable. "01 B

ut K

enned

y h

esitated to

'IN ,

retaliate, surely scared about taking a step in the direction of nuclear ,9\''n',,,<\-

war. U

pon brother Robert's advice, the P

resident decided to ignore ,''' ,;p,;\

Khrushchev's second letter and answ

er the first. And he dispatched

')

the Attorney G

eneral to deliver an ultimatum

to Soviet A

mbassador

Anatoly D

obrynin: start pulling out the missiles w

ithin forty-eight hours or "w

e would rem

ove them.""=

After D

obrynin asked about th

e Jup

iters in T

urk

ey, R

ob

ert Ken

ned

y p

resented

an im

po

rtant

Am

erican concession: they would be dism

antled if the problem in

Cuba w

ere resolved. As the P

resident had said in an Ex C

omm

meet-

ing, "we can't very w

ell invade Cuba w

ith all its toil . . . when w

e could have gotten them

out by making a deal. on the sam

e missiles in

Turkey.""3 B

ut, should the Soviets leak w

ord of a "deal,” Robert

Kennedy told the S

oviet ambassador, the U

nited States w

ould dis-avow

the offer.124 Just in case this unusual style of diplomacy failed,

the President ordered the calling up of A

ir Force reservists. In the last

Ex C

omm

meeting on the 27th, M

cNam

ara reminded his colleagues

74

8

TH

OM

AS G

. PA

TE

RSO

N

that the United S

tates had to have two contingencies ready if a diplo-

matic settlem

ent could not be reached: a response to expected Soviet

action in Europe and a governm

ent to take power in C

uba after an A

merican invasion. S

omeone rem

arked: "Suppose w

e make B

obby m

ayor of Havana."125

On O

ctober 28, faced with an ultim

atum, a concession, and the

1 (-

possibility that the Cubans w

ould shoot down another U

-2 and pre-

cipitate a Soviet-A

merican conflagration, K

hrushchevcretreated: An

4

agreem

ent, alth

ou

gh

no

t written

, was stru

ck: th

e So

viet U

nio

n

‘, A cr1

agreed to dismantle the M

RB

Ms under U

nited Nations supervision

• ,s wq

and the United S

tates pledged not to invade Cuba. "E

veryone knew

AAA

w

ho were haw

ks and who w

ere doves," Bundy told E

x Com

m that

A -v

m

orning, but "today was the doves' day."'26 A

wary P

resident cau- iv\

; ,c ;`

tioned his gleeful advisers that "this is not a time for gloating," for

v problem

s remained: im

plementing supervision, pressing the S

oviets

to remove their IL

-28 bombers from

the island too, and watching for

Soviet mischief elsew

here.127 But the crisis had passed—

just when the

nuclear giants seemed at the brink. A

lthough an embittered C

astro

thwarted a U

nited Nations inspection system

, Am

erican reconnais-

ance planes monitored the departure of the S

S-4s. T

he IL-28 bom

bers w

ere also crated and shipped back to the Soviet U

nion.128 In April

1963 the Jupiter missiles cam

e down in T

urkey. Castro rem

ained

skeptical of the no-invasion pledge. As he once rem

arked to U T

hant, it w

as difficult for Cubans to believe a sim

ple Am

erican "promise not

„ to comm

it a crime."129

John F. K

ennedy's handling of the Cuban m

issile crisis has received 14

high grades as a success story and m

odel for crisis managem

ent. But it

v .c f ;11

l,- was a n

ear miss. "W

e were in

luck

," Am

bassad

or Jo

hn K

enneth

\\

; G

albraith ruminated, "but success in a lottery is no argum

ent for , iotteries.",3. M

any close calls threatened to send the crisis to greater "

levels of danger. Besides the tw

o U-2 incidents, there w

as the serious possibility that a "crackpot" exile group w

ould attempt to assassinate

Castro or raid the island.';' A

s well, O

peration Mongoose sabotage

\, c \ team

s were inside C

uba during the crisis and could not be reached by j.ti

ii+;'‘‘ their C

IA handlers. W

hat if this "half-assed operation," Robert K

en-

nedy worried, ignited trouble?132 O

ne of these teams actually did

blow up a C

uban factory on Novem

ber 8.133 To cite another m

ishap:

not until October 27 did A

dministration officials think to inform

the

Soviets that the quarantine line w

as an arc measured at goo nautical

miles from

Cape M

aisi, Cuba.'34 W

hat if a Soviet captain inadver-

;1■•

Cuba 1

49

tently piloted his ship into the blockade zone? And, w

hen the com-

mander of the S

trategic Air C

omm

and issued DE

FC

ON

2 alert in-

structio

ns, h

e did

so in

the clear, in

stead o

f in co

de, b

ecause h

e w

anted to impress the S

oviets.'35 Alerts serve to prepare A

merican

forces for war, but they also carry the danger of escalation, because

movem

ent to a high category might be read by an adversary as A

meri-

can planning for a first strike. Under such circum

stances, the adver-sary

mig

ht b

e tempted

to strik

e first. Fin

ally, th

e Nav

y's an

ti-

submarine w

arfare activities carried the potential of escalating the crisis. S

oviet submarines prow

led near the quarantine line, and, fol-

lowing standing orders, N

avy ships forced several of them to surface.

In one case, a Navy com

mander exercised the high-risk option of

dropping a depth charge on a Soviet subm

arine.'3 6 As in so m

any of

these examples, decisionm

akers in Washington actually lost som

e

control of the crisis to personnel at the operational level. E

x Com

m m

embers represented considerable intellectual talent

and experience, and the policy they urged upon the President ulti-

mately forced the S

oviets to back down. B

ut a mythology of gran-

deur, illusion of control, and embellishm

ent of performance have

obscured the history of the comm

ittee. The group never functioned

independently of the President. In an exam

ple of "promotional lead-

ership," Kennedy picked his advisers, directed them

to drive the

missiles out, and used his brother as a "policem

an" at meetings.'37 E

x C

omm

debated alternatives under "intense strain," often in a "state

of anxiety and emotional exhaustion." 138 A

pparently two advisers

suffered such stress that they became passive and unable to perform

their responsibilities. 139 An assistant to A

dlai Stevenson recalled that

he had had to become an E

x Com

m "back-up" for the am

bassador

because, "while he could speak clearly, his m

emory w

asn't very

clear. . . ." Asked if failing health produced this condition, V

ice Ad-

miral C

harles Wellborn answ

ered that the "emotional state and ner-

vous tension that was involved in it [m

issile crisis] had this effect."

Stevenson w

as feeling "pretty frightened.".4° So apparently w

as Dean

Rusk. R

obert Kennedy rem

embered that the S

ecretary of State "fre-

quently could not attend our meetings," because "he had a virtually

complete breakdow

n mentally and physically." 1 4 1 W

e cannot deter-

mine how

stress affected the advice Ex C

omm

gave Kennedy, but at

least we know

that the crisis managers struggled against tim

e, sleep,

exhaustion, and themselves, and they did not alw

ays think clear-

headedly at a time w

hen the stakes were very high. H

ad Stevenson

11)1

' , c1.14 4.)

oh.-4

1 0,,,. 7 -1,.,“,),,t

,/t:v- ,2,

L . .../11:(e .

150

T

HO

MA

S G.

and Rusk, both of w

hom recom

mended diplom

acy and comprom

ise,

been steadier, the option of negotiations at the start might have re-

ceived a better hearing and the world m

ight have been spared the

grueling confrontation. C

ontemporaries and scholars have debated K

ennedy's shunning of

formal, private negotiations and traditional, diplom

atic channels and

his opting instead for a public showdow

n through a surprise television

speech. It does not appear that he acted this way because he thought

the Soviets w

ould protract talks until the missiles had becom

e fully

, operational—even before his television address he knew

that many of

the missiles w

ere ready to fire, and Ex C

omm

worked under the as-

■kc \

,,,/.sum

ption that the SS-4s were arm

ed with nuclear w

arheads.142 Nor did

vi km. K

ennedy initially stiff-arm negotiations in order to score a foreign

policy victory just before the Novem

ber congressional elections.

tics does not explain his decisions; indeed, the*nost popular political

position most likely w

ould have been an air strike and invasion to rid

the island of both the missiles and C

astro.143 Did K

ennedy initially

reject diplomacy because the S

oviet missiles intolerably altered the

strategic balance? Kennedy seem

s to have leaned toward M

cNam

ara's

argument that the m

issiles in Cuba did not m

ake a difference, given the

fact that the Soviets already possessed enough capability to inflict

unacceptable damage on som

e Am

erican cities. P

resident Kennedy eschew

ed diplomatic talks before O

ctober 22

because his strong Cold W

ar views, draw

ing of lessons from the past,

and personal hostility toward C

astro's Cuba recom

mended confronta-

tion. His conspicuous style of boldness, toughness, and craving for

victory also influenced him, and he resented that K

hrushchev had

tried to trick him by stating that no offensive w

eapons would be

placed in Cuba and then clandestinely sending them

. Kennedy had

warned M

oscow not to station such w

eapons on the island; if he did

r not force the Soviets to back dow

n, he worried, his personal credibil-

c,

tw

ity would have been underm

ined. And, even if the m

issiles did not A

"— A ,

L V

markedly change the strategic balance, the new

missiles in C

uba gave , 41' \p

'l to

. Av. the appearance of doing so. O

ne Ex C

omm

mem

ber remarked that

\, the question is "psychological," and K

ennedy agreed that the matter

c' w

as as much "political" as "m

ilitary."I44 Kennedy acted so boldly,

too, because the Soviet m

issile deployment challenged the M

onroe

\',VC

Doctrine and U

nited States hegem

ony in Latin A

merica. F

inally,

with other tests in B

erlin and Southeast A

sia looming, the U

nited

\,"" S

tates believed it had to make em

phatic its determination to stand

rN'cN

Q,\■ ‘,)

‘ ,

—

Cuba .1

51

firm in the C

old War. R

emem

ber, Rusk has said, "aggression feeds

upon success."145 P

resident Kennedy helped precipitate the m

issile crisis by harasing

Cuba through his m

ulti-track program. T

hen he reacted to the crisis

by suspending diplomacy in favor of public confrontation. In the end,

he frightened himself. In order to postpone doom

sday, or at least to

prevent a high-casualty invasion of Cuba, he m

oderated the Am

eri-

can response and comprom

ised. Khrushchev w

ithdrew his m

istake,

while gaining w

hat Am

bassador Llew

ellyn Thom

pson thought was

the "important thing" for the S

oviet leader: being able to say, "I

saved Cuba. I stopped an invasion,".4 6

Kennedy m

ay have missed an opportunity to negotiate a m

ore com-

prehensive settlement. H

e and Ex C

omm

gave little attention to a

proposal that Brazil had offered in the U

nited Nations to denuclearize /

Latin A

merica. T

his proposal also sought to guarantee the territorial

integrity of each nation in the region. Harrim

an recomm

ended that the

United S

tates accept the Brazilian plan, but enlarge it: the U

nited

States and the S

oviet Union w

ould agree not to place nuclear weapons

in any nation in the world other than in nuclear pow

ers. Thus G

reat

Britain could hold A

merican m

issiles, but Turkey and Italy could not.

Nor could S

oviet missiles be deployed in C

uba or Eastern E

urope.

Looking beyond the crisis, H

arriman presented his schem

e `tas a first

and important step tow

ards disarmam

ent," but Kennedy officials only

briefly discussed the question of denuclearization. [47 Perhaps there

could have been another aspect of a far-reaching agreement: the

United S

tates would turn G

uantanamo over to C

uba in exchange for a

Cuban pledge to end the S

oviets' military presence on the island. In

short, under this provisions, both Am

erican and Soviet m

ilitaries

would leave C

uba, Latin A

merica w

ould become off-lim

its to nuclear

weapons, C

uba's territorial integrity would be guaranteed, and M

os-

cow and W

ashington would m

ake a modest nod tow

ard arms con-

tro1.148 Would the C

ubans have accepted such a deal? Given his ex-

treme anger w

ith Moscow

after the Soviets disengaged the m

issiles,

Castro m

ay well have grasped an opportunity to begin a process tow

ard

improved relations w

ith Washington.'49 S

uch a bargain, of course,

il,,, A?,

would have required C

uban-Am

erican discussions. Yet K

ennedy

oy t;t,l, P

' never seem

ed open to such talks. Why? B

ecause they would have

(1. All" ,4,2 , legitim

ized the Castro-C

omm

unist government and signified a C

old

V„,-- is'"‘aiii..1 W

ar defeat. ,,w

; PA' (N

.. ti In the end, Castro rem

ained in power, the S

oviets continued to As) ‘,,..!..." 1: ,?1,

0.1. 61'1 , 110 1\1

, , frIA ■,■:' '",k--1v-

\''

152

TH

OM

AS G

. PA

TE

RSO

N

garrison troops on the island and subsidize the Cuban econom

y, the

United

States p

ersisted in

its campaig

n o

f harassm

ent, an

d n

ew

Soviet-A

merican contests over C

uba erupted (197o and 1979). The

Soviets, exposed as nuclear inferiors, vow

ed to catch up in the arms

race. At the sam

e time, perhaps the "jaggedjdges" of K

ennedy's

Cold W

arriorism w

ere smoothed.■50 In the afterm

ath of the missile

crisis, Moscow

and Washington installed a teletype "hot line" to facili-

tate comm

unication. The nuclear w

ar scare during the missile crisis

also nudged the superpowers to conclude the longstanding talks on a

test ban treaty. Negotiated by H

arriman in M

oscow, the L

imited T

est

Ban T

reaty, signed on July 25, 1963, was lim

ited, not comprehensive

(it banned only tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and beneath the

surface of the oceans). Although som

e analysts have trumpeted the

treaty as a major accom

plishment because it started the superpow

ers

on a p

ath to

ward

arms co

ntro

l, the ag

reemen

t did

not p

reven

t a

plethora of underground nuclear detonations or slow the cascading

arms race. It nonetheless stands as one of just a few

successes in the V

diplom

atic record of the Kennedy A

dministration.'s'

After the m

issile crisis, Cubans com

plained, Kennedy played a

EE

double game." T

he President show

ed some interest in accom

moda-

1 u

■, 4" ' 1 tion at the sam

e time that he reinvigorated anti-C

uban programs.152

The A

dministration created a new

State D

epartment office, the C

oor-

dinator of Cuban A

ffairs, and put more econom

ic pressure on the

island, including an unsuccessful attempt to block a U

nited Nations-

' funded crop diversification project.'53 Washington intended by early

1963 to "tighten the noose" around Cuba. '54

Operation M

ongoose had been put on hold during the October

crisis, but raids by exiles, some of them

no doubt perpetrated with

CIA

collaboration, and most of them

monitored but not stopped by

1 Am

erican authorities, remained a m

enace.I55 In March 1963, after an

exile "action group" attacked a Soviet ship in C

uban waters, K

ennedy

speculated that such freelance raids no longer served a "useful pur-

pose." They seem

ed to strengthen the "Russian position in C

uba and

the C

om

munist co

ntro

l of C

uba an

d ju

stify rep

ressive m

easures

within C

uba. . . ."158 He knew

too that some C

uban exiles had devel-

oped links with right-w

ing political groups in the United S

tates—in

essence the exiles had also become a threat to his A

dministration.157

The P

resident ordered restrictions on unauthorized exile activities,

because they had failed to deliver "any real blow at C

astro."158 Repub-

licans and Cuban exile leaders denounced the decision.159 R

aiding

Cu

ba 553

parties still managed to slip out of the F

lorida Keys to sabotage and

kill in Cuba, and the A

dministration itself, to m

ollify the more than

50o anti-Castro groups, m

ay have "backed away" from

enforcing its

own restrictions. 1 6° A

fter the missile crisis, C

astro had sought better relations with

Washington, and he m

ade gestures toward détente. H

e sent home

thousands of Soviet m

ilitary personnel and released some political

prisoners, including a few A

mericans. H

e remarked in an A

pril 1963

interview w

ith AB

C T

elevision's Lisa H

oward that the prisoner re-

lease could mark a beginning tow

ard rapprochement.. 81 B

ut then the

mercurial Jefe M

ciximo departed for a four-w

eek trip to the Soviet

Union, w

here he patched up relations with K

hrushchev and won

promises of m

ore foreign aid.1 8 2 Washington stirred against M

oscow's

"grandiose" reception of Castro, the latter's "vehem

ence" in denounc-

ing the United S

tates, his "tone of defiance rather than conciliation,"

and the refurbished Soviet-C

uban alliance.' 8 3 Soon R

obert Kennedy

asked the CIA

to "develop a list of possible actions which m

ight be

undertaken against Cuba."1 8 4 In m

id-June the NS

C approved a new

sabotage program. T

he CIA

quickly cranked up new dirty tricks and

revitalized its assassination option by making contact w

ith a traitor-

ous Cuban official, R

olando Cubela S

ecades. Code-nam

ed AM

/

LA

SH

, he p

lotted

with

the C

IA to

kill F

idel C

astro. In

Flo

rida,

Am

erican officials intercepted and arrested saboteurs heading for

Cuba, but they seldom

prosecuted and usually released them. A

lpha

66 and Com

mando L

raiders hit oil facilities, sugar mills, and indus-

trial plants.185 In the fall of 1963 C

uba continued to seek an accomm

odation.

Through contact w

ith a mem

ber of Stevenson's U

nited Nations staff,

William

Attw

ood, the Cuban governm

ent signaled once again its

interest in improving relations. T

he President authorized an eager

Attw

ood to work up an agenda w

ith the Cubans. X

66 In late October,

when K

ennedy met w

ith the French journalist Jean D

aniel, the Presi-

dent spoke in both hard-line and conciliatory tones about Cuba.

Aw

are that Daniel w

as journeying to Havana to interview

Castro,

Kennedy asked the reporter to return for another W

hite House discus-

sion. Castro later claim

ed that Daniel carried a "private m

essage"

from K

ennedy, who asked about the prospects for a C

uban-Am

erican

dialogue.1 8 7 Yet, on N

ovember 18, K

ennedy sounded less the concilia-

tor and more the w

arrior. In a tough-minded speech, he reiterated

the familiar charges against C

astro's "small band of conspirators."08

tion of the economic em

bargo and Am

erican respect for Cuban sover-

eignty. As for K

ennedy, could he have quieted the Cuban exile com

mu-

nity, disciplined the CIA

, and persuaded hard-line State D

epartinent officials? W

ould he have been willing to w

ithstand the political back-lash from

his dealing with "C

omm

unist Cuba"? M

ore important, did

he want to im

prove relations with C

uba? Would he have shelved his

intense, sometim

es personal, three-year war against C

uba and dis-banded the m

yriad spoiling operations? Would he ever have accepted

the legitimacy of a radical revolution in the U

nited States sphere of

influence? It does not seem likely that either K

ennedy, had he lived, or C

astro could have overcome the roadblocks that they and their na-

tional interests had erected. T

he Cuban-A

merican confrontation w

as and is a question of the C

old War, dom

estic Am

erican politics, and personalities. But it has

been primarily a question of faltering U

nited States hegem

ony in the hem

isphere. Kennedy struggled to preserve that hegem

ony. In the end, he failed—

he did not achieve his well-defined and ardently pur-

sued goals for Cuba. H

is Adm

inistration bequeathed to successors an im

pressive fixation both resistant to diplomatic opportunity and at-

tractive to political demagoguery.

J iytt,f , (

15

4

TH

OM

AS G

. PA

TE

RSO

N

•

Cuba

155

The P

resident, reported Bundy, sought to "encourage anti-C

astro elem

ents within C

uba to revolt" and to "indicate that we w

ould not perm

it another Cuba in the hem

isphere."■69 In H

avana, meanw

hile, Daniel and C

astro met. O

n Novem

ber 22, w

hile discussing chances for Cuban-A

merican détente, the new

s of the assassination in D

allas arrived. "Es una m

ala noticia" ("This is

bad news"), the stunned C

uban mum

bled repeatedly.'i° What w

ould becom

e of his overture? he wondered. In W

ashington, the new L

yn-don B

. Johnson Adm

inistration decided in fact to put the "tenuous" and "m

arginal" contacts "on ice."171 Castro also w

orried that he w

ould be held personally responsible for Kennedy's death, because

is- the alleged assassin Lee H

arvey Osw

ald had professed to be pro- tc- ,? I C

astro (he may actually have been leading a covert life as an anti-

'

1 Castro agitator). S

ome A

mericans did blam

e the Cuban regim

e. Sev-

eral official investigations have concluded that--quban officials played no part in the assassination, but conspiracy theories persist. O

ne theory actually points an accusing finger at disgruntled antitC

astro .,C

uban exiles in the United States.172

,104 A

t the time of his death, K

ennedy's Cuba policy w

as moving in

VJ

' "

opposite directions—probing for talks but sustaining m

ulti-track pres- ,

sures. "How

can you figure him out?" C

astro had asked in late Octo-

J' y

) ber 1963)73 O

n the very day that Kennedy died, A

M/L

AS

H rendez-

voused with C

IA agents in P

aris, where he received a ball-point pen

rigged with a poisonous hyperderm

ic needle intended to produce C

astro's instant death.'74 But A

M/L

AS

H w

as but one obstacle to im

proved Cuban-A

merican relations. F

or Kennedy and C

astro to have reached détente, each w

ould have had to suppress his strong ideological biases. W

ould Castro have risked a cooling of his close

relationship with the S

oviet Union and C

uban Com

munists at a tim

e w

hen Washington still w

orked for his ouster, some A

mericans yelped

constantly for a United S

tates invasion, and the next presidential election m

ight send a conservative Republican to the W

hite House?

Would C

astro have been willing to sever his lifeline? W

ould Castro

have abandoned his bonds with L

atin Am

erican revolutionaries in order to w

in a lifting of Am

erican economic sanctions?

From

the Kennedy 196os to the R

eagan io8os United S

tates policy has consistently dem

anded two C

uban concessions: an end to support for revolutions in the hem

isphere and an end to the Soviet m

ilitary presence on the island. H

avana has just as consistently refused to budge on either point before seeing U

nited States concessions: aboli-

+t o

1 144,14,0 ic O

st

34

2 N

otes to Pages 118-121

1962, NS

F: M

emoranda and M

eetings Series, N

SA

M #177 F

older, Box 338,

JFK

L.

51. "Sum

mary of T

raining for Latin A

mericans in U

.S. M

ilitary Schools

and Institutions," October 16, 1961, and C

hester Bow

les to Kennedy, "R

e-port on P

olice Training in L

atin Am

erica," Septem

ber 30, 1961, both in NS

F:

Mem

oran

da an

d M

eeting

s Series, N

SA

M #

88

Fo

lder, B

ox

33

1, JF

KL

; S

choultz, Hum

an Rights, 179-83, 211-47.

52. MacN

amara testim

ony in Senate, F

oreign Assistance A

ct of 1962, pp. 6

0, 7

6; testim

on

y o

f Gen

eral En

emark

, Sen

ate, Executive Sessions, 1962,

XIV

, 433. 53. B

owles to K

ennedy, Septem

ber 30, 1961; NS

F: M

emoranda and M

eet-ings S

eries, NS

AM

#88 Folder, B

ox 331, JFK

L.

. 54. O

ffice of A

ssistant S

ecretary o

f Defen

se, Intern

ational S

ecurity

Af-

fairs, "U.S

. Policies T

oward L

atin Am

erican Military F

orces," February 25,

1965, Vol. III (1-6/65), and m

emorandum

, Robert S

ayre to Bundy, O

ctober 8, 1964, V

ol. II (9-12/64), both in Box 2, N

SC

(Latin A

merica-C

ountry) F

iles, LB

JL.

55. Lieuw

en, Generals vs. P

residents, 127; U

.S. C

ongress, Senate, C

om-

mittee on F

oreign Relations, F

oreign Assistance A

ct of 1963, 88th Cong., 1st

sess. (Washington, D

C, 1963), 206-8. T

he Kennedy A

dministration actually

discouraged Bosch from

purging his security forces of Trujillist elem

ents. See

Briefing M

emorandum

for the President, "P

rincipal Problem

s Confronting

Dr. B

osch," January 2, 1963, Box 115A

, PO

F, JF

KL

. 56. B

urrows O

H; W

illiams O

H.

57. Mem

orandum of conversation, K

ennedy and Brazilian F

oreign Minis-

ter Clem

ente Mariani, M

ay 16, 1961; CIA

, Office of C

urrent Intelligence, m

emorandum

, "Com

munist Inroads in B

razil," Septem

ber 27, 1961; mem

o-randum

of conversation, Gordon and P

resident Goulart, January 13, 1962,

all in NS

F: C

O: B

razil, Box 12, JF

KL

. 58. S

tanding Group on B

razil, "Proposed S

hort-Term

Policy for M

eeting of S

tanding Group on B

razil," Septem

ber 30, 1963; NS

F: C

O: B

razil, Folder

(10/1-1/15/63), Box 14A

, JFK

L; Jan K

nippers Black, U

nited States Penetra-

tion of Brazil (P

hiladelphia, PA

, 1977), 138-78. 59. F

or th

e United

States ro

le in th

e overth

row

of G

oulart, see B

lack,

United States P

enetration of Brazil, 37-

56; Phyllis R

. Parker, B

razil and the Q

uiet Intervention, 1964 (Austin, T

X, 1979).

68

. Martin

OH

; mem

oran

du

m o

f con

versatio

n, K

enn

edy

and

Celso

F

urtado, Director of B

razilian Developm

ent Agency, S

UD

EN

E, July 14,

1961, NS

F: C

O: B

razil, Box 12, JF

KL

. 61. D

SB X

LV

II (July 23, 1962), 137-38. 62. B

urrows O

H; L

evinson and de Onis, T

he Alliance, 224-54. S

ee also "A

n Evaluation of the A

lliance for Progress in C

osta Rica—

A C

ountry Team

R

eport," in Am

bassador Raym

ond Telles to S

D, A

ugust 21, 1963, NS

F: C

O:

Costa R

ica, Box 35, JF

KL

. 63. M

emorandum

of conversation, Kennedy and F

urtado, July 14, 1961, and m

emorandum

of conversation, Goulart and G

ordon, October 22, 1961,

both

in N

SF

: CO

: Brazil, B

ox 1

2, JF

KL

; Rio

rdan

Ro

ett, The P

olitics of F

oreign Aid in the B

razilian Northeast (N

ashville, 1972), 70, 92-93.

otes to Pages 122-125

343

64. Roett, P

olitics of Foreign A

id, 112 -38, 170. S

ee also Ruth L

eacock,

"JFK

, Business, and B

razil," Hispanic A

merican H

istorical Review

LIX

(No-

vember 1979), 636-73.

65. Draft m

emorandum

by Martin on "P

roblems of A

lliance," 1963, Alli-

ance for Progress F

older, Box 1, S

chlesinger Papers.

66. PP

P, JF

K, 1963, p. 458.

67. Chester B

owles O

H, JF

KL

. 68. S

chlesinger, "The A

lliance for Progress," 59; Jerom

e Slater, "D

emoc-

racy V

ersus S

tability

: The R

ecent L

atin A

merican

Policy

of th

e United

States," Y

ale Review

LV

(Decem

ber 1965), 175. See also A

braham F

. Low

en-thal, "U

nited States P

olicy Tow

ard Latin A

merica: `L

iberal,' Radical,' and

'Bureaucratic' P

erspectives," Latin A

merican R

esearch Review

VIII (S

pring

19

e i2 ,2

44x.

vittiL, m

, ivt _p

t i g tv

al' w, t, 1

,044

1

,(144,,,, c,:i.

i., C

hap

ter 5. C

ub

a

ork, i. Q 19u8o I), I7

Q

uoted in Thom

as Pow

ers, T

he M

an

Wh

o K

ept th

e Secrets (N

ew

2. R

ichard Bissell in P

eter Collier and D

avid Horow

itz, The K

ennedys

(New

York, 1984), 278.

3. C

laude Pepper to K

ennedy, April 27, 1962, B

ox 23-G-4-2F

, Senatorial

Files, H

ubert H. H

umphrey P

apers, Minnesota H

istorical Society, S

t. Paul,

MN

. 4. P

aul Miller, "C

onfidential Mem

orandum—

Conversation w

ith Presi-

dent Kennedy," M

arch 13, 1963, Box 48, G

ridiron Club R

ecords, LC

.

5. Q

uoted in U.S

. Senate, S

elect Com

mittee to S

tudy Governm

ental O

perations with R

espect to Intelligence Activities,

Alleged A

ssassination

Plots Involving Foreign L

eaders: An Interim

Report (W

ashington, DC

, 1975),

142n. .‘. S

ee, for example, E

rnest R. M

ay, "Writing C

ontemporary Interna-

tional History," D

iplomatic H

istory VIII (S

pring 1984), 105.

7. A

1968 comm

ent in Harris W

offord, Of K

ennedys and Kings (N

ew

York, 1980), 426.

8. W

illiam A

ttwood, T

he Tw

ilight Struggle: Tales of the C

old War (N

ew

York, 1987), 257.

9. T

heo

dore C

. Soren

sen,

Kennedy

(New

York, 1965), 306; F

rank

Mankiew

icz and Kirby Jones, W

ith Fidel (N

ew Y

ork, 1975), 145. to. K

ennedy to Elizabeth S

wank, January 29, 1959, B

ox 717, Senate F

iles. P

rePP

, JFK

L; K

ennedy to C.A

. Nolan, A

pril 25, 1959, ibid.; John F. Ken-

nedy, The Strategy of P

eace, A

llan Nevins, ed. (N

ew Y

ork, 1960), 132.

11

. U.S

. Departm

ent of State, C

uba (Washington, D

C, 1961); PPP, JFK,

1961, p. 369; Mem

orandum for the P

resident, "Latin A

merican P

rogram."

1961, Box 1

21

, PO

F, JF

KL

. Theodore D

raper popularized the "betray al"

theme in his C

astro's Revolution (N

ew Y

ork, 1962) and Castroism

(New

York, 1965). 1

2. R

ichard N. G

oodwin, T

he Am

erican Condition (G

arden City. N

Y.

1974), 256.

344 N

otes to Pages 125-130

13

. Adolf A

. Berle, L

atin Am

erica—D

iplomacy and R

eality (New

York,

1962), 77. 14. C

R C

IX (M

ay 20, 1963), 8986. 1

5. Q

uoted in Kent M

. Beck, "N

ecessary Lies, H

idden Truths: C

uba in the 196o C

ampaign," D

iplomatic H

istory VIII (W

inter 1984), 45. 1

6. Q

uo

ted in

Arth

ur M

. Sch

lesing

er, Jr., A T

ho

usa

nd

Da

ys (Boston,

1965), 224. 1

7. R

obert Anderson in M

emorandum

, January 19, 1961, Box 11, P

ost-presidential, A

ugusta, Georgia . . . P

apers, DD

EP

, DD

EL

. 1

8. F

or Am

erican interest groups and Cuba, see R

ichard E. W

elch, Jr., R

esponse to Revolution: T

he United States and the C

uban Revolution, 1959-

1961 (C

hapel Hill, N

C, 1985).

19

. "Notes on N

ational Security C

ouncil Meeting, 15 N

ovember 1961,"

Box 4, V

PS

F, L

BJL

. 2o. A

rthur M. S

chlesinger, Jr., Mem

orandum for the P

resident, March 3,

1961, Box 65, S

chlesinger Staff M

emoranda, P

OF

, JFK

L.

21. Carlos F

ranqui, Fam

ily Portrait w

ith Fidet-(N

ew Y

ork, 1984), 73. 22. Q

uoted in Cole B

lasier, The H

overing Giant: U

.S. Responses to R

evo-lutionary C

hange in Latin A

merica (P

ittsburgh, PA

, 1975), 185. 23. Q

uoted in Drew

Pearson to L

yndon B. Johnson, M

ay 24;1964, Box

G265, D

rew P

earson Papers, L

BJL

. 24. Jorge I. D

ominguez, C

uba: Order and R

evolution (Cam

bridge, MA

, 1978), 68, 149.

25. William

D. P

awley, "M

emoirs" (unpublished m

anuscript, Coral G

a-bles, F

L, n.d.), ch. 19; U

.S. S

enate, Com

mittee on the Judiciary, C

omm

unist T

hreat to the United States through the C

aribbean, P

art ro: T

estimony of

William

D. P

awley (W

ashington, DC

, 196o), 739; Justo Carrillo, "V

ision and R

evision: U.S

.-Cuban R

elations, 1902 to 1959," in Jaime S

uchlicki et al., eds., C

uba: Continuity and C

hange (Miam

i, FL

, 1985), 166. 26. "W

hy the Cuban R

evolution of 1958 Led to C

uba's Alignm

ent with

the US

SR

," February 21, 1961, C

IA R

ecords (FO

IA).

27. For 1959-1961, see S

tephen G. R

abe, Eisenhow

er and Latin A

merica

(Chapel H

ill, NC

, 1988); Stephen E

. Am

brose with R

ichard H. Im

merm

an, Ike's Spies (G

arden City, N

Y, 1981), 303-316; W

elch, Response; B

lasier, H

overing Giant; L

ouis A. P

erez, Jr., Cuba (N

ew Y

ork, 1988). 28. B

onsai to Secretary of S

tate, Novem

ber 6, 1959, 611.37/11-659, Box

2473, DS

R, N

A; E

isenhower quoted in T

rumbull H

iggins, The P

erfect Fail-

ure: Kennedy, E

isenhower, and the C

IA at the B

ay of Pigs (N

ew Y

ork, 1987), 48. 29. M

emorandum

for the President, "C

urrent Basic U

nited States P

olicy T

oward C

uba," Novem

ber 5, 1959, 611.37/11-559, Box 2474, D

SR

. 3o. Q

uoted in Wayne S

. Sm

ith, The C

losest of Enem

ies (New

York, 1987),

64. 31. Philip W

. Bonsai, C

uba, Castro, and the U

nited States (Pittsburgh, P

A,

1971), 192. 32. W

ashington Post, A

pril 23, 1963. 33. M

emorandum

of meeting w

ith the President, January 3, 1961, B

ox 22, O

SA

NS

A, W

HO

F, D

DE

L; M

emorandum

of conversation with D

ean Rusk,

Notes to P

ages 130 -133

345

January 3, 1961, Box 10, C

hristian Herter P

apers, DD

EL

; Mem

orandum by

A. J. G

oodpaster, January 5, 1961, Box 4, International S

eries, Office of the

Staff S

ecretary, WH

OF

, DD

EL

.

34. For the B

ay of Pigs, see P

eter Wyden, B

ay of Pigs (N

ew Y

ork, 1979);

Higgins,

Perfect F

ailure; Gabriel M

olina, D

iario de Gir6n (L

a Hab

ana,

1983); Haynes Johnson, T

he Bay of P

igs (New

York, 1964); K

arl Meyer and

Tad

Szu

lc, T

he C

uban In

vasio

n

(New

Yo

rk, 1

96

2); L

ucie'n

S.

Vandenbroucke, "A

natomy of a F

ailure: The D

ecision to Land at the B

ay of

Pigs," P

olitical Science Quarterly X

CIX

(Fall 1984), 471- 49 1 .

35. Quoted in H

erbert Parm

et, JFK

(New

York, 1983), 159.

36. Discussion on C

uba, March II, 1961, N

ational Security A

ction Mem

o-randum

No. 31, B

ox 329, NS

F, JF

KL

; Dulles in S

chlesinger, A T

housand

Days, 242. 37. D

epartment of S

tate, Cuba.

38. Quoted in S

orensen, Kennedy, 309.

3490 / Lb 0i d u i. s, 2 H 9 Zile to W

alter Lippm

ann, May 3, 1961, B

ox 75, Walter L

ipp-

mann P

apers, Yale U

niversity Library.

41. U.S

. Senate, C

omm

ittee on Foreign R

elations, Executive Sessions,

1961: Historical Series, X

III, Part I (W

ashington, DC

, 1984), 445; Roger

Hilsm

an, To M

ove a Nation (N

ew Y

ork, 1967), 32; Welch, R

esponse, R

oge r

Sorensen, K

ennedy, 306. 42. A

llen Dulles in M

eet the Press N

o. 61, V (D

ecember 31, 1961); S

her-

man K

ent, "Is Tim

e on Our S

ide," mem

orandum for the D

irector, March to,

1961, CIA

Records (F

OIA

); Senate, E

xecutive Sessions, 1961, XIII, P

art 1,

p. 401; Allen D

ulles, The Craft of Intelligence (N

ew Y

ork, 1963), 169.

43. Richard M

. Bissell, Jr., O

H Interview

, OH

Project, C

olumbia U

niver-

sity, New

York; B

issell, "Response to L

ucien S. V

andenbroucke, 'Confes-

sions of Allen D

ulles,' " Diplom

atic History V

III (Fall 1984), 379-380; S

en-

ate, Executive Sessions, 1961, X

III, Part I, p. 392.

44. For these and other operational failures, see S

enate, Executive Ses-

sions, 1961, XIII, P

art 1, p

p. 3

42 , 412; B

issell OH

Interview; L

yman B

.

Kirkpatrick, "P

aramilitary C

ase Study: T

he Bay of P

igs," Naval W

ar College

Review

II (Decem

ber 1972), 39; Tad S

zulc, Fidel (N

ew Y

ork, 1986), 550-

55 1 ; Barton J. B

ernstein, "Kennedy and the B

ay of Pigs R

evisited—T

wenty

Four Y

ears Later," F

oreign Service Journal LX

II (March 1985), 32; H

ilsman,

To M

ove, 78; "Com

ments by F

idel Castro, 14 and 15 June, on the Invasion of

17 April 1961," M

axwell T

aylor Papers, N

ational Defense U

niversity, Wash-

ington, DC

; Welch, R

esponse, 8o-81; CIA

, Report N

o. oo-K-3/187,928, "E

x-

perien

ces Just B

efore, D

urin

g, an

d A

fter the 1

7 A

pr 1

96

1 In

vasio

n A

t-

tempt," June 5, 1961, N

o. 1977 (12D), D

DR

S.

45. Interview w

ith Richard B

issell by Lucien V

andenbroucke, May 18,

1984. See also S

enate, Alleged A

ssassination Plots; T

homas P

owers, "Inside

the Departm

ent of Dirty T

ricks," Atlantic M

onthly CC

XL

IV (A

ugust 1979),

40. 46

: Ch

arles J. V. M

urp

hy

, "Cu

ba: T

he R

ecord

Set S

traigh

t," Fortune

LX

IV (S

eptember 1961), 92ff; H

anson Baldw

in OH

Interview, U

.S. N

aval

Institute, Annapolis, M

D; A

llen W. D

ulles to L. P

aul Brem

er III, April 28,

346 N

otes to Pages 1

33

-13

7

1965, Box 138, A

llen Dulles P

apers, Princeton U

niversity Library, P

rince-to

n, N

J; "Interv

iew B

etween

Pau

l D. B

ethel . . an

d O

rlando C

uerv

o o

f C

uban Brigade 2506," January 30, 1963, K

enneth Keating P

apers, University

of Rochester L

ibrary, Rochester, N

Y; B

issell OH

Interview; T

ime C

XX

IX

(June 1, 1987), 29. 47. "C

omm

ents by Fidel C

astro;" Bissell O

H Interview

. 48. V

andenbroucke, "Anatom

y," 475; Joseph B. S

mith, P

ortrait of a Cold

Warrior (N

ew Y

ork, 1976), 324- 49- R

obert Jervis, Perception and M

isperception in International Relations

(Princeton, N

J, 1976), 356-406; Vandenbroucke, "A

natomy," 488-489-

5o. Kirkpatrick, "P

aramilitary," 41.

51. Adm

iral Arleigh B

urke OH

Interview #4, U

.S. N

aval Institute. See

also Maxw

ell Taylor, Sw

ords and Plow

shares (New

York, 1972), 188-189;

Robert D

ennison OH

Interview#8, U

.S. N

aval Institute; Vandenbroucke,

"Anatom

y," 477; Jeffrey G. B

arlow, "P

resident John F. K

ennedy and His

Join

t Ch

iefs of S

taff" (Ph

.D. d

issertation

, Un

iversity

of S

ou

th C

arolin

a, 1981),177-200.

52. Dean R

usk, "Reflections on F

oreign Policy," in K

enneth W. T

homp-

son, ed

., The K

ennedy Presidency (L

anham, M

D, 1985), 195. S

ee also War-

ren I. Cohen, D

ean Rusk (T

otowa, N

J, 1980), 96-115. 53. B

onsai, Cuba, C

astro, 179; Sm

ith, Closest, 69.

54. Arthur M

. Schlesinger, Jr., M

emorandum

for the President, "Joseph

New

man on C

uba," March 31, 1961, C

ountries, PO

F, JF

KL

; Schlesinnger,

"How

ard Handlem

an on Cuba," ibid.; S

chlesinger, A T

housand Days, 252-

256. 55. J. W

illiam F

ulbright, "Cuba P

olicy," March 29, 1961, B

ox 38, File 1,

Series 48:14, J. W

illiam F

ulbright Papers, U

niversity of Arkansas L

ibrary, F

ayetteville; Schlesinger, A

Thousand D

ays, 252. 56. C

layton Fritchey in W

yden, Bay of P

igs, 183n. 57. E

llis 0. Briggs, F

arewell to F

oggy Bottom

(New

York, 1964), 192.

58. Schlesinger, A

Thousand. D

ays, 254; Bonsai, C

uba, Castro, 184-186.

59• Chester B

owles, "N

otes on Cuban C

risis," May 1961, B

ox 392, Diary,

Bow

les Papers. A

lso, Bow

les to the President, A

pril 20, 1961, Box 297, ibid.

6o. M

emoran

dum

, June 5

, 1961,. B

ox to

, Post-p

residen

tial Pap

ers, D

DE

P, D

DE

L; "O

ff-the-R

ecord

Break

fast with

Nix

on . . . A

pril

21, [1961]," B

ox 65, Schlesinger S

taff Mem

oranda, PO

F, JF

KL

. 6t. W

offo

rd, O

f Kennedys, 341.

62. PP

P, JF

K, 1961, pp. 304-

306. 63. T

aylor, Swords, 200.

64. On L

aos, see "Background D

inner with A

rthur Schlesinger, Jr.," M

ay to, 1961, B

ox 1, Robert H

. Estabrook P

apers, JFK

L; H

erbert L. M

atthews,

"Talk w

ith Ken

ned

y," July 2, 1962, Box 27, H

erbert L. M

atthews P

apers, C

olumbia U

niversity Library. Q

uotation in Draft R

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NS

C M

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ox 4, VP

SF

, LB

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65. Walt W

. Rostow

, The D

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66. Operation Z

AP

AT

A: T

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52• 67. Q

uoted in Taylor B

ranch and George C

rile III, "The K

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Notes to P

ages 137 -140

347

detta: How

the CIA

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CC

LI (A

ugust 1975), 50. 68. C

IA, R

eport No. C

S-3/474,882, "R

eaction Within C

uba to Attem

pt to O

verthrow C

astro Regim

e," May 19, 1961, N

o. 1977 (12C), D

DR

S; C

IA,

"Experiences"; C

IA, S

taff Mem

oranda No. 23-61, A

pril 28, 1961, CIA

Rec-

ords, (FO

IA); Justo C

arrillo to Jose Miro C

ardona, Septem

ber 30, 1961, Box

23, Theodore D

raper Papers, H

oover Institution Archives, S

tanford, CA

; N

SC

Action M

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No. 2413-C

, May 4

, 1961, Box 4, V

PS

F, LB

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IA, "T

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IE 85-62, M

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SF

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70. O

pera

tion

ZA

PA

TA

, 52

. For propaganda, see E

dward R

. Murrow

(U

SIA

) to the President, "O

ur Latin A

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ay 15, 1961, B

ox 121, PO

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. 71. Q

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72. Quoted in S

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73. Branch and C

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orris Morley, Im

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he United States and

Cuba, 1952-

1987 (New

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203, 367-374; D

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uba, 148; M

argaret P. D

oxey, Econom

ic Sanctions and International Enforcem

ent (N

ew Y

ork, 1980), 39; PP

P, JF

K, 1962, p

. 10

6; G

ary C

. Hu

fbau

er and

Jeffrey

J. Sch

ott,

Econom

ic Sanctions Reconsidered

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C,

1985), 315-323; Donald L

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he Em

bargo of Cuba: A

n Econom

ic A

ppraisal," Caribbean Studies X

IV (O

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.S. D

epart-m

ent of State, "S

uccess of the Econom

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raft Update to W

hite P

aper on Cuba, n.d. (but probably 1964), D

SR

(FO

IA); C

IA, "S

ituation and P

rospects in Cuba"; A

nna P. S

chreiber, "Econom

ic Coercion as an Instru-

ment of F

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XV

(April 1973), 387 -

405; Robin

Renw

ick, Econom

ic Sanctions (Cam

bridge, MA

, 1981), 64-66; Interview

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rimm

ins by Thom

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aterson, Washington, D

C, F

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77. Bryce N

. Harlow

, Mem

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taff Notes, D

DE

Diary S

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an File, D

DE

P.

78. Christian A

. Herter, M

emorandum

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tatus of Possi-

ble OA

S A

ction on Cuba," M

arch 17, 1960, Box to, D

ulles-Herter S

eries, ibid.

79. Delesseps S

. Morrison, L

atin Am

erican Mission (N

ew Y

ork, 1965), 152-197; M

orley, Imperial State, 155-162.

80. Szulc, F

idel, 574- 81. P

PP

, JFK

, 1962, p. 911; Milton S

. Eisenhow

er, The W

ine Is Bitter

(Garden C

ity, NY

, 1963), 274-295; D

iary, James B

. Donovan P

apers, Hoo-

ver Institution Archives; R

udolf A. C

lemens, "P

risoners Exchange" (unpub-

lished manuscript by R

ed Cross officer, W

ashington, DC

, n.d.). 82. R

ichard

N. G

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348 N

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389; John L. G

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86. Herbert S

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87. Lee L

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88. Quoted in J. A

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CA

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LB

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92. "Evidence of a S

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95. Moham

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96. Quoted in A

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97. PP

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98. "Off-the-R

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99. "Off-the-R

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Barto

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105. Charles E

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107. PP

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108. U.S

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113. DSB

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114. Brom

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350 N

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118. Harrim

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National S

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119. Garthoff, R

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ou

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121. Brom

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129. U T

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131. "Call from

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141. Quoted in S

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IA, "R

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351

143. Thom

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Journal of Am

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XX

III (June 1986), 87-119; Thom

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67-70. 144. "O

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1962. See also W

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145. "The C

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146. "Cuban M

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147. Harrim

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DD

RS

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sion, Annexes, vo

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mith, "S

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150. Rusk quoted in P

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151. Glenn T

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enjamin S

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the Test B

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A, 1981); M

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152. Herbert L

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s to John Oakes, N

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VI (F

all 1963), tog. 153. P

residen

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oran

du

m fo

r Directo

r McC

on

e, Decem

ber 1

3,

1962, Box 68, D

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to Senator H

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Mem

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G-1/5.2.2.6.1-2, U

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r-

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154. "Review

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ee FB

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156. PP

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157. Departm

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L; S

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352 N

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161. "Lisa H

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162. Ernest H

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163. Departm

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DS

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164. John A. M

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165. Reports by G

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166. William

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171. "Meeting w

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Chapter 6. M

iddle East

1. S

peech to Zionists of A

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men

ts of S

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ned

y, August z th

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, 196o

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C, 1961), 46-50. (H

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196o.) 2. Jo

hn F

. Ken

ned

y,

The Strategy of P

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ew

York, 1960), 118.

3. S

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47, q

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in M

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Notes to P

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• 4. S

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ebru

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Ken

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5. S

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en-

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6. W

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1955-1981 (Albany, N

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7. K

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8. C

R, C

III (July 2, 1957), 10780-10793. For reaction to the speech, see

Richard M

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9. B

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. L. S

ulzberger, The L

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Macom

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Interview,

JFK

L.

to. S

peech

to B

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ion, F

ebru

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, 1959, in

Ken

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19 -

23.

. Speech of N

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12. S

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K 1960, 49.

13. L

awrence F

uchs, "JFK

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27; Steven S

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On G

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PO

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1983), 226; Spiegel, O

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O; P

hilip Klutznick O

H

Interview, JF

KL

. 15. E

dward T

ivnan, The L

obby: Jewish P

olitical Pow

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Foreign P

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16. R

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OF

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n Kom

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19. M

emco

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