Analysis: The EP 2020 EP Recommendation About The Future Of The EU Eastern Partnership

Raul Mälk, Senior Research Fellow, ECEAPJuly 2020

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYEuropean Parliament (EP) Recommendation of 19 June 2020 on the Eastern Partnership 1(further- Recommendation) stands as EP’s response to the 18 March Commission and HR/VP Joint Communication (further- Communication). Council adopted the Eastern Partnership (EaP) Conclusions on 11 May 2020 (further- Conclusions).

The Recommendation stresses the political, security and democracy issues. The coverage of the economy, environment and especially digital development are shorter, the latter even minimal. The balance of the Recommendation text is very different from Communication, but it is closer to the Conclusions.

The EP document is politically more ambitious than the Communication and the Conclusions. It will push the decisions of the forthcoming March 2021 Eastern Partnership Summit in the direction which would be positive in the eyes of the EaP countries and those EU Member States supporting more dynamic Partnership.

The Recommendation presents explicit formulas about security issues, especially the so-called frozen conflicts. However, it does not go further than previous EP similar documents and Council positions. But the European Parliament’s text is much more detailed than the Communication and the Conclusions. In the Eastern Partnership countries, the EP is seen

1 – European Parliament recommendation of 19 June 2020 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the June 2020 Summit (2019/2209(INI))

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on many occasions paying more attention to Eastern Partnership and their main worries.

The Recommendation supports extensive use of the EU+3 Associated countries format and comprehensive development of sectoral cooperation, so responding to their wishes. At the same time, the Parliament is more strict about conditionality and differentiation. The European Parliament stresses the issues of democracy, the rule of law, and the fight against corruption even more robustly than the Commission and the Council.

The Recommendation is a substantial contribution to the preparations of the next Eastern Partnership Summit. It pushes the meeting towards more ambitious results and the Eastern Partnership to a more prominent position on the broader European Union agenda.

INTRODUCTIONEuropean Parliament (EP) recommendation of 19 June 2020 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the June 2020 Summit2 (further- Recommendation) stands as the EPs response to the 18 March Commission and HR/VP Joint Communication3. The European Parliament adopted the document by 507 votes to 119, with 37 abstentions. Parliament acted slightly later than the Council, which approved the Eastern Partnership (EaP) Conclusions on 11 May4. The Council Conclusions on the Eastern Partnership policy beyond 2020 support the Communication, but the text is more direct and operational than in the Communication. The Recommendation was adopted after 11 June EaP Foreign Ministers and 18 June EaP countries leaders video meetings. The latter announced that the next Eastern Partnership Summit would take place in March 2021.

The EP started its process before the Communication was published, so the Recommendation does not reflect the Commission and HR/VP input so closely as the Council Conclusions. We try in this analysis to follow the structure of the Communication, as it was in the ECEAP analysis of Communication and Conclusions5. The Recommendation pays attention more to

2 – European Parliament recommendation of 19 June 2020 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the June 2020 Summit (2019/2209(INI)) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0167_EN.html It is still provisional edition

3 – Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Eastern Partnership Policy Beyond 2020. Reinforcing Resilience - an Eastern Partnership that delivers for all. Brussels, 18.3.2020. Referred further in this text as: Communication. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/1_en_act_part1_v6.pdf

4 – Council Conclusions on Eastern Partnership policy beyond 2020. Brussels, 11 May 2020 7510/1/20REV 1. Referred further in this text as Conclusions. Subsequent In-Text Citations from: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/43905/st07510-re01-en20.pdf

5 – Analysis of European Commission and High Representative Joint Communication and the 2020 EU Council Conclusions Lay Foundation for the EU Eastern Partnership Future by Raul Mälk and Aap Neljas. 29 May 2020. https://eceap.eu/publication/analysis-the-2020-eu-european-commission-and-high-representative-joint-communication-and-the-2020-eu-council-conclusions-lay-foundation-for-the-eu-eastern-partnership-future/

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the political, security and democracy issues. Its text about the economy, environment and in particular digital development is relatively short. So, the balance of the Recommendation text is very different from Communication. The structure of the EP text is closer to the Conclusions.

Once again, the Parliament’s document is politically more ambitious than Communication and Conclusions. It will push the decisions of the forthcoming Summit in the direction, which would be more positive in the eyes of the EaP countries and those EU Member States supporting more dynamic Partnership. The previous similar document was the EP Recommendation of 15 November 2017 on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the November 2017 Summit.

AMBITION OF THE PARTNERSHIPThe Conclusions support the ambition of the Partnership: "The Council reaffirms the strategic importance it attaches to the Eastern Partnership, as a specific regional dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), supporting sustainable reform processes and offering close political association as well as economic integration with the EU and tangible impact on people's lives". Some Partner countries, in particular, the Associated countries want more. In December 2019 the Foreign Ministers of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine issued a Joint Statement, the first in such a format, about the EaP. They declared that "as the European States respecting the founding values of the European Union, upon implementation of the Association Agreements and taking into consideration the will of our people, we will consider applying for the EU membership in accordance with the article 49 of the Treaty on European Union"6.

The Recommendation makes a clear difference between two groups of the Partnership countries, reflecting them in two different points: „E. whereas certain EaP countries chose to pursue a closer political, human and economic integration with the EU, based on the principle of differentiation and in accordance with performance results and aspirations, and concluded ambitious Association Agreements (AAs) including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs), as well as visa-free regimes and Common Aviation Area Agreements; in addition, they declared the strategic goal of membership of the EU and have already proved their ability to ensure greater stability, security, prosperity and resilience in the Eastern neighbourhood; whereas public support in their societies for European integration remains at a very high level;

F. whereas other EaP countries pursue a more nuanced level of ambition towards the EU; whereas Armenia is part of the Russian-led economic and military regional integration

6 – Joint Statement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine on the Future of Eastern Partnership. Bratislava, 5 December 2019 https://mfa.gov.ua/en/news/76418-ministri-zakordonnih-sprav-ukrajini-gruziji-ta-moldovi-vistupajuty-za-diferencijovanij-pidkhid-u-ramkah-iniciativi-jes-skhidne-partnerstvo

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structures (the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation) and has concluded the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the EU; whereas Azerbaijan as of 2017 is negotiating a new comprehensive agreement with the EU which will replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1999; whereas Belarus does not have any treaty-based contractual relationship with the EU, but recently visa facilitation and readmission agreements have been signed".

The new Communication text misses the issue of European aspirations of the Associated countries. But the Conclusions point out: "… the Council recalls the 2017 Eastern Partnership Summit declaration which acknowledges the European aspirations and European choice of the Eastern partners concerned, as stated in the Association Agreements. The agreements provide for accelerating political association and economic integration with the European Union".

The Recommendation text includes even more clear signals to the EaP countries in general and Associated countries especially. The Recommendation respects "their level of ambition towards the EU". It highlights the Associated countries' striving for an ever closer relationship with the EU. Parliament also confirms the sovereign right of the EaP countries to "freely choose their individual level of cooperation or integration with the EU and to reject any external pressure on such choice".

The issue of EU membership is directly covered in point (b) of the Recommendation, where EP underlines that "(b) …pursuant to Article 49 TEU, any European state may apply to become a member of the EU provided that it respects the values of human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, as referred to in Article 2 TEU; acknowledge that, while accession is not foreseen under the framework of the EaP, the EaP policy can facilitate a process of gradual integration into the EU; consider that for an eventual accession process both the EU and the EaP country concerned must be well prepared, taking into account the EU's future reforms process and the partner country's approximation to the EU acquis, as well as its compliance with the EU membership criteria; ensure that the full implementation of the current agreements between the EU and EaP countries will be the first step in this gradual integration process".

We can see that this text keeps the Eastern Partnership process and enlargement issues both apart and connected. It is clear that in some EU capitals the government is ready to talk about the membership perspective of the Eastern partners only in general terms, as a theoretical possibility, not an element of the current political agenda.

In the 2017 Recommendation the relevant point was longer and more connected to the Associated countries development: "(y) to underline that the Eastern Partnership aims to

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create the necessary conditions for close political association and economic integration, including participation in EU programmes; to reiterate that AAs with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine do not constitute the final goal in their relations with the EU; to acknowledge once again the European aspirations of these countries; to point out that, pursuant to Article 49 of the TEU and in line with the Rome Declaration of 25 March 2017, any European state may apply to become a member of the EU, provided it adheres to the Copenhagen criteria and the principles of democracy, that it respects fundamental freedoms and human rights including those of minority groups and that it upholds the rule of law; to urge the Member States, in this regard, to agree to an ambitious declaration for the 2017 Summit that sets relevant long-term goals"7.

In general, we can conclude that both Council and Parliament have remained close to their previous texts. It is a good result in present political circumstances, as there is a danger of EaP slipping out from the EU radar because of numerous urgent paramount challenges before the European Union.

GENERAL RESULTS OF THE PARTNERSHIPThe text of the Conclusions about the progress in the implementation of the Partnership is encouraging: "The Council welcomes the significant achievements of the Eastern Partnership to date." Regarding the "20 Deliverables for 2020", the Council, in its Conclusions, welcomes "the implementation of deliverables achieved to date and encourages Eastern partner countries to increase efforts for additional progress in all fields".

The Recommendation just recognises that Eastern Partnership is "(e) an attractive framework for cooperation". European Commission Communication and Staff Working paper about the results were issued after the EP draft report was presented in February 2020 by MEP Petras Auštrevičius from Lithuania.

GOVERNANCE AND GENERAL ISSUESBoth the Communication and the Conclusions are positive about the general state of the Partnership governance and do not offer any substantial changes. The Recommendation also does not propose to change the management of the Partnership.

Maybe the most visible change in the new Communication is strengthening resilience as an overriding policy framework. It is as a cross-cutting issue reflected in all areas – economy, governance, environment and climate, digital development and societal development. Council Conclusions welcome this approach. The Recommendation mentions the word "resilience" on eleven occasions, but it is not such a cross-cutting theme of the document

7 – European Parliament recommendation of 15 November 2017 to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the November 2017 Summit (2017/2130(INI)). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017-0440_EN.html

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as it is in the Communication.

The Communication proposes that the basic principles of increased differentiation, greater ownership, enhanced focus and greater flexibility remain relevant for the Partnership beyond 2020. The Recommendation also states: "C. whereas the Eastern Partnership (EaP) is inclusive by nature, is based on mutual interests and understanding, shared ownership and responsibility, differentiation and conditionality…". So, there is a broad consensus between the institutions about the principles.

The Recommendation points out a strong message about conditionality: "D. whereas increased cooperation between the EU and the EaP countries is not a linear process and a fully-fledged cooperation can be achieved and maintained only insofar as the core European values and principles are respected during the constitutional and legislative process and if the fight against corruption, organised crime, money laundering, oligarchic structures and nepotism is guaranteed; stresses, however, that in serious cases of backsliding cooperation can be reversed".

The Communication and the Conclusions have a clear message about differentiation.

Foreign Ministers of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in their December 2019 Joint Statement invited the EU "to consider establishing the Three Associated partners+ EU dialogue in the areas including, but not limited to, transport, energy, justice and digital economy"8. The Communication stops short before explicitly accepting the three Ministers’ proposal, but leaves the door in principle open.

In its 2017 Recommendation the European Parliament proposed for the Associated countries EaP+ model: "(u) to consider, within the EaP policy, an attractive longer-term 'EaP+' model for associated countries that have made substantial progress in implementing AA/DCFTA-related reforms, that could eventually lead to joining the customs union, energy union, digital union and Schengen area, further EU internal market access, integration into EU transport networks, industrial partnerships, increased participation in other EU programmes and agencies, further cooperation in the field of the CSDP, and more immediate measures such as additional unilateral tariff preferences, a concrete timeframe for the abolition of roaming tariffs between the partners and the EU, and the development of high-capacity broadband; to open the 'EaP+’ model to other Eastern Partnership countries once they are ready for such enhanced commitments and have made significant progress towards implementing mutually agreed reforms”9.

The resolution of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly of 9 December 2019 on “The future of the Trio Plus Strategy 2030: building a future of Eastern Partnership” proposes similar

8 – Joint Statement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine on the Future of Eastern Partnership. Bratislava, 5 December 2019 https://mfa.gov.ua/en/news/76418-ministri-zakordonnih-sprav-ukrajini-gruziji-ta-moldovi-vistupajuty-za-diferencijovanij-pidkhid-u-ramkah-iniciativi-jes-skhidne-partnerstvo

9 – European Parliament recommendation of 15 November 2017 to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the November 2017 Summit (2017/2130(INI)) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017-0440_EN.html

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to EaP+ proposal a Trio Plus Strategy: “5. It suggests that the Trio Plus Strategy 2030 would establish the European Trio Process with deeper integration instruments for the EU and its associated countries, as it was done by the Berlin Process initiated in 2014, which aimed to strengthen the EU leadership and a coalition of like-minded EU member States for the integration of Western Balkan countries into the EU; furthermore suggests an active EU open door policy for those EaP countries that achieve a significant and valuable progress”10.

The Recommendation includes this time idea of enhanced cooperation strategy for Associated countries. The EP does it with a text where inclusiveness (point g) and differentiation (point h) are next to each other: “(g) maintain a balanced approach between tailor-made differentiation within the EaP and the inclusiveness, coherence and consistency of the multilateral framework, which remains a reference point for all EaP countries; avoid splitting the EaP along the lines of the different countries’ ambitions towards the EU; consider that the scope and depth of cooperation between the EU and the EaP countries is to be determined by the ambitions of the parties, as well as by their implementation of reforms; acknowledge that the AAs/DCFTAs that have been signed with Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine are the evidence of a differentiated approach and should lead to further enhanced bilateral relationship formats and roadmaps based on the principle of ‘more for more’;

(h) in light of a tailor-made approach, consider creating for the three associated countries an enhanced cooperation strategy, which could establish a reform and investment support programme in areas such as capacity building, transport, infrastructure, connectivity, energy, justice and the digital economy, which could later foresee an extension to the remaining EaP countries on the basis of individual assessments of EU reform commitments and progress achieved, bearing in mind the need to sustain the coherence of the EaP and in line with the inclusiveness principle; this dialogue could include meetings on the margins of the European Council with leaders of the associated countries on a structured basis, and regular participation of their representatives in the meetings of the European Council working groups and committees”.

There is a balance between inclusiveness and differentiation here. Despite all the problems with three non-associated countries, it is crucial to keep the whole area involved. It is also vital to find flexible ways for Armenia with whom EU has concluded CEPA. 3 Associated Countries+ EU format is in practice used in the Trade area already11, so it is about its use in other sectors. The Recommendation also supports designated financial resources to the Associated countries in point (l).

The EP also pays attention to the regional cooperation of the three Associated countries and all six countries: “(x) acknowledge the initiatives by the governments of associated countries

10 – Resolution by the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly on the future of the Trio Plus Strategy 2030: building a future of Eastern Partnership. 9 December 2019 http://www.epgencms.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/upload/439b3edc-e523-4a0e-a9bc-e6c8db51ed75/NEST_8th_urgency_resolution_EN.pdf

11 – For example Commissioner level meetings https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1910&title=EU-Trade-Commissioner-and-Members-of-the-Governments-of-Georgia-Moldova-and-Ukraine-met-in-Brussels and https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/may/tradoc_157890.pdf

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to boost their mutual cooperation and joint position within the EaP, and encourage their expansion to the multi-sectoral level, in particular in the areas of energy, transport, digital matters, cybersecurity, environmental protection, the maritime economy, border controls, customs cooperation, trade facilitation and justice and home affairs; a similar approach should be applied to cooperation among all EaP countries on various issues;”.

There are problems between the three Associated countries, and it was the only first joint statement of the three foreign ministers in December 2019. They have some cooperation experience from GUAM cooperation, but it has not achieved very much. Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development-GUAM is a regional cooperation format, which includes the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. In current form, as an organisation, it works from 2006, after the Charter was adopted. The Secretariat of the GUAM, headed by the Secretary General, works in Kyiv. The Parliamentary Assembly of the GUAM was established in 2004, and it includes three committees: political; trade and economic; science, culture and education12.

One of the main alleys forward of the Eastern Partnership is the development of sectoral cooperation. Sectoral cooperation text is in part about bilateral relations of the Communication: “The implementation of bilateral agreements will be sped up and complemented with deeper sectoral cooperation and exchange between interested partner countries.” The need to advance sectoral cooperation was also one of the points of the Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers in December 201913. The Council Conclusions mention the issue only once: “deeper sectoral cooperation and gradual economic integration in accordance with the level of commitment as enshrined in the bilateral agreements“.

The Recommendation pays serious attention to sectoral cooperation, and it is mentioned in the text six times. The general support of the EP is clear: „(j)launch additional measures for a deeper integration and further sectoral cooperation of the EaP countries with the EU and their participation in selected EU agencies, investment framework platforms and intra-EU programmes and initiatives, in full compliance with existing conditionalities and pursuant to the EU’s incentive-based approach, in order to achieve further convergence in the spirit of the ‘more for more’ principle and taking into account the best reform support practices”. The Recommendation also supports sectoral cooperation of the three Associated countries: “(x) acknowledge the initiatives by the governments of associated countries to boost their mutual cooperation and joint position within the EaP, and encourage their expansion to the multi-sectoral level, in particular in the areas of energy, transport, digital matters, cybersecurity, environmental protection, the maritime economy, border controls, customs cooperation, trade facilitation and justice and home affairs; a similar approach should be applied to cooperation among all EaP countries on various issues”.

12 – Organization for Democracy and Economic Development - GUAM https://guam-organization.org/en/about-the-organization-for-democracy-and-economic-development-guam/

13 – Joint Statement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine on the Future of Eastern Partnership. Bratislava, 5 December 2019 https://mfa.gov.ua/en/news/76418-ministri-zakordonnih-sprav-ukrajini-gruziji-ta-moldovi-vistupajuty-za-diferencijovanij-pidkhid-u-ramkah-iniciativi-jes-skhidne-partnerstvo

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FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE PARTNER COUNTRIESThe Communication remains very general in the issues of financial support to the Partnership countries. It reflects the current situation with the preparations of the new MFF. The European Commission’s 2018 MFF package includes “Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument”14.

The Recommendation includes a rather detailed and long text about the finances. It supports the designation of more resources to Partner countries: “(aq) ensure that the MFF confirms the EU’s financial support for the infrastructure and investment projects of EaP countries, increasing their resilience to cyber threats and improving and modernising their education systems; take active measures to improve the absorption capacity of the EaP countries; apply the experience of the Western Balkans Investment Framework to attract and coordinate financial and technical assistance and to increase efficiency of infrastructure projects”.

The Western Balkans experience is mentioned in the text twice (also in point (i)), differently from the 2017 EP Recommendation. The Communication and the Conclusions do not mention the Western Balkans. Many supporters of the EaP have proposed to tie Eastern Partnership mechanisms to Union policies at the Western Balkans region. The European Union and its Member States have consistently, since the Feira and Thessaloniki Summits in 2000 and 2003, expressed their unequivocal support for the European perspective of the Western Balkans.

The Recommendation connects conditionality and differentiation with strict monitoring: “(k) provide EaP countries with greater financial assistance, and make it subject to conditions, including in the context of ongoing legislative negotiations on the external financial instruments for the period 2021-2027; ensure that such assistance should be tailored to the specific needs of the individual EaP countries under the guidance of the European Parliament via delegated acts, and used to implement activities under the EaP programme…

(l) recognise the need for an additional political, administrative and financial support framework for the three associated countries within the overall EaP, based on individual approaches, that would address their specific structural reforms, modernisation and institution-building needs; note that this access to EU funding should be linked to reform commitments and should include a set of ambitious benchmarks;

(m) prioritise the imperative of the ‘more for more’ democracy and rule of law principle in the light of recent developments in both the EU and EaP countries, and ensure that functioning and resilient democratic institutions, the rule of law, good governance, the fight against corruption and nepotism, media freedom and respect for human rights remain the

14 – Proposal for a regulation. Multiannual Financial Framework: Proposal for the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument EU Commission 2018 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/1821-Multiannual-Financial-Framework-Proposal-for-the-Neighbourhood-Development-and-International-Cooperation-Instrument

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key criteria and conditions for closer political Partnership and financial assistance;

(n) carry out regular impact assessments of the EU support programmes in order to increase their efficiency and apply timely adjustments; react faster to the deterioration of the rule of law and democratic accountability in the EaP countries and apply smart conditionality, including by linking the provision of macrofinancial assistance to democratisation and reforms, so as to prevent the partner governments from further backsliding; create conditions to be in a position to divert assistance in a given EaP country from the central authorities, if they do not adhere to commitments, to local authorities or civil society actors”.

The EP remark about “recent developments in both the EU and EaP countries” would most probably not appear in Council Conclusions as it touches the intensive intra-EU discussion about the rule of law. Text about the EP role in the budgetary affairs would most probably not find support from the Council: “(o) enhance the role of the European Parliament in the scrutiny and oversight of programmes via delegated acts in the application of the EU external financial instruments”. Delegated acts would lead to the increased role of the European Parliament, and often Council tries to avoid them.

FUTURETalking about the future of the Partnership, the Conclusions state: “The Council stresses the importance that the Eastern Partnership remains ambitious, flexible and inclusive framework for cooperation”.

The last Eastern Partnership Summit in 2017 during the Estonian EU Presidency approved the document “20 deliverables for 2020 “. This document has added more focus to the Partnership. Continuing the current long-term priorities of the “20 deliverables for 2020“, the Communication proposes long-term Eastern Partnership policy objectives beyond 2020:

- together for resilient, sustainable and integrated economies;

- together for accountable institutions, the rule of law and security;

- together towards environmental and climate resilience;

- together for a resilient digital transformation; and

- together for resilient, fair and inclusive societies.

The Council supports the Communication approach of building of the work beyond 2020 on the “20 Deliverables for 2020“ framework.

The Recommendation states “(e)… the EaP should continue to be an attractive framework for cooperation”. It does not analyse the proposed five objectives, but we may say that EP vision for the next period covers priorities proposed in the Communication but has other internal balance. The list of subparts headlines of the Recommendation:

- Structural dialogue, state building and democratic accountability

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- Sectoral cooperation towards common economic space

- Boosting human capital

- Security, stability, territorial integrity and conflict resolution

- Local and regional authorities and civil society

- Better media, communication and policy management.

Digital and environmental issues do not have separate parts with their headline in the Recommendation. At the same time, there is a lengthy text under the headline „Security, stability, territorial integrity and conflict resolution“.

EASTERN PARTNERSHIP POLICY OBJECTIVES BEYOND 2020

A. ECONOMY

In the area of the economy, the Communication text refers to “full implementation of the current Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) “, and “selective and gradual economic integration into the EU’s internal market“.

The text of the Conclusions supports this approach:” Increased trade, where possible, continued regulatory approximation, establishing conditions for associated countries’ continued alignment with the EU internal market and gradual economic integration as provided for in the association agreements, improved access to finance and where applicable further integration of the economies of Eastern partner countries and the EU are of key importance. These steps will be accompanied by the removal of identified trade barriers, and the improvement of food safety and SPS measures, together with cooperation on transitioning to climate neutral, clean and circular economies, as well as embracing opportunities from digital transformation.”

The Recommendation goes much further, bringing in terms “common economic space” and “four freedoms”. Communication and Conclusions do not talk about “common economic space” and “four freedoms”. EP states an aim to “(i) embark on a process to create a common economic space, leading towards integration with the four freedoms, that would facilitate deeper economic integration and convergence of EaP countries with EU policies and a deeper economic cooperation among the EaP countries themselves, using the path trodden with the Western Balkan countries”.

Later in the text this pledge is more detailed about the implementation of the Association Agreement countries: “(ae) encourage continuous and effective implementation of the DCFTAs in order to gradually create the conditions for the opening up of the EU single market; consider the creation of a special legal approximation facility aimed at helping associated partners in harmonising their legislation with the EU acquis and assisting them in their efforts to implement it; acknowledge that the implementation of the DCFTAs

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has delivered numerous positive results, but there are still some issues that need to be adequately addressed;

(af) note the importance of deepening economic cooperation and market integration with the EaP countries through a gradual opening of the EU single market, including the full implementation of DCFTAs and compliance with legal, economic and technical regulations and standards, as well as by establishing a common economic space”.

The Recommendation includes focused statements about sectorial cooperation in the economy and proposes sectoral roadmaps. Nevertheless, it does not offer in the text such steps as upgrading existing DCFTAs or adding to them special sectoral agreements. The Recommendation provides a broad range of additional cooperation steps and activities: “(j) launch additional measures for a deeper integration and further sectoral cooperation of the EaP countries with the EU and their participation in selected EU agencies, investment framework platforms and intra-EU programmes and initiatives, in full compliance with existing conditionalities and pursuant to the EU’s incentive-based approach…

(ag) aim to explore and secure the cooperation and gradually differentiated sectoral integration of eligible and willing EaP countries in the Energy Union, the Transport Community and the Digital Single Market, among other areas; focus on telecommunications and prioritise the creation of a roaming fees-free regime between the EU and EaP countries and an intra-EaP one as soon as possible; build trust services, including cyber capacities to protect critical infrastructure and personal data, and achieve greater cooperation on customs, banking and financial services, which would help the EaP countries’ fight against money laundering and bolster financial surveillance, while leading to the possible expansion of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) to the EaP countries;

(ah) introduce instruments such as legal screening and sectoral roadmaps to determine the EaP countries’ readiness to comply with the EU acquis and to confirm their readiness for differentiated sectoral integration”. Sectoral roadmaps are a good idea to move forwards with sectoral cooperation.

The Recommendation also offers the expansion of the SEPA area, proposed in the Communication, but not in the Conclusions. It may become one of the visible goals for the coming period, but it means hard work to implement specific criteria and requirements by the banks and governments. This goal is even more challenging when looking to the current situation in the area of fight against money laundering, and this issue is mentioned in the Recommendation four times.

In the area of trade, the Communication states that sectoral trade facilitation arrangements are possible with all partner countries. The EP Recommendation points out about the

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Associated countries, that “selective and gradual economic integration of these countries into the EU’s internal market is envisaged in the DCFTAs. It demands regulatory convergence with, and effective implementation by these countries of, the EU acquis in specified areas (public procurement, technical barriers to trade, market surveillance, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, customs services, and tax good governance standards).” There are worries in EU about some trade policies of the Partnership countries, including their rules of public procurement and trade protection measures.

The Recommendation has a more comprehensive approach to the trade issues, aiming increase of resilience of the Partner countries through more diversified trade. EP also mentions participation in EU Macro-regional strategies, which Communication and Conclusions do not cover. Ukraine and Moldova participate in EU Strategy for Danube Region, and Belarus cooperates with EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region.

Part of the Communication about investment and access to finance repeats well-known postulates about the importance of the structural reforms for attracting investments. The Conclusions are relatively modest in the investments matters: “Investment activity is also an important contribution to the economic prosperity. Its more efficient promotion and support should be further reflected.”

The Recommendation states about the investment climate: „ U. … strong and resilient institutions, the prevalence of the rule of law, the implementation of judicial reforms and the fight against corruption and money laundering are pivotal in building a fair, stable and trustworthy environment, which can then in turn attract and sustain long-term investment and growth in the EaP countries”.

In most Partner countries the level of EU countries FDI stock has been stagnant for years, as an exception, recently there is was some growth in Ukraine. The Parliament recommends to “(ar) prioritise the need for sustainable and credible investments in EaP countries by devising a strategy for long-term engagement, focusing not only on stabilisation alone but also on democratisation”. EP sends a message that large-scale investment policy has political aspects. The reality may be somehow different, as there was a steady rise of EU-28 FDI to Azerbaijan energy sector for many years despite its democratic deficits.

The Recommendation mentions the need to improve “(as)… the environment for foreign direct investment (FDI), taking into account social, labour and environmental rights; make the promotion of FDI from the EU a key aspect of the EaP policy and develop an action plan for this purpose, with the aim of further improving the business environment and guaranteeing legal certainty”.

The Communication continues the EU line to support the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), also adding start-ups in EaP countries. The Conclusions also have

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passages about easier access to finance and support to SMEs.

The Recommendation text is also supportive: „(at) support greater diversification and competitiveness of the economies of EaP countries, through reinforced support for SMEs as well as demonopolisation, deoligarchisation and privatisation, by strengthening and widening the scope, geographical coverage and relevance to the recipients’ needs of programmes such as EU4Business; in particular, lend to SMEs in local currencies, develop new initiatives designed to attract venture capital into the EaP countries, and provide continuous support for the development of export-oriented industries”. This text does not include new specific practical proposals, with the exception, maybe, venture capital issues, which is crucial to the development of the start-ups.

EP pays attention to the development of rural areas in the Partner countries: “(au) address the rural-urban divide in the EaP countries through effective financial and technical incentives for micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), small-scale farmers and family enterprises in rural and suburban areas, and through the improvement of human connectivity and infrastructure between cities and countryside with a view to fostering social cohesion”. Development of the countryside also has political influence. People there often have more conservative positions, and the older generation also Soviet-era propaganda influenced views. They may easier fall victims of the disinformation efforts.

The Communication pays attention to a need to work towards broader use of the euro in Partnership countries foreign economic relations. This issue is not present in the Recommendation, neither in the Conclusions.

Strengthening interconnectivity is one of the crucial areas of the Eastern Partnership. Infrastructure network of the Partnership countries needs an extensive overhaul to serve modern needs, including interconnectivity with the EU. The Recommendation calls to have Investment Action Plans in all main connectivity areas, not only in transport as now: “(an) adopt a comprehensive infrastructure building plan, including border crossings, and support the implementation of the priority projects as identified in the Indicative TEN-T and other Investment Action Plans with the aim of improving transport, energy and digital connectivity between the EU and the EaP countries, and among the EaP countries themselves, while ensuring environmental sustainability during the implementation process; encourage regulatory convergence in the transport sector”.

Concerning transport, the EU focus will be on the long-term priority investments outlined in the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) Indicative Investment Action Plan15, which envisages total investments from different sources 12,8 billion euros until 2030. The Recommendation supports the Communication approach. It adds geopolitical perspective

15 – Indicative TEN-T Investment Action Plan. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/ten-t_iap_web-dec13.pdf

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with remarks about Central Asia and Asia: „(ao) urge the EaP countries, in cooperation with the Commission, to fully use the opportunities provided by the trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) Investment Action Plan; underline the need to better exploit the connectivity potential of the Black Sea and support infrastructure projects, which are crucial for increasing connectivity with the region and with Central Asia; in this regard, acknowledge the strategic geographical location of EaP countries as a link between the European Union, Asia and the wider neighbourhood, which could bring increased value for EU foreign policy engagements”.

Concerning energy connectivity, the EU will continue to work with the partner countries to reinforce cross-border and inter-regional interconnections. The energy part of the Recommendation points out: „(ak) make sure that adequate actions and funding are dedicated … for the improvement of energy security and interconnectivity, particularly reverse flow of gas, energy efficiency and use of renewables in the EaP countries; recognise the important role of Azerbaijan in the diversification of energy supply towards the EU, as well as the success of Ukraine in the unbundling of the gas transmission system, and support energy independence and supply diversification efforts in other EaP countries; encourage the EaP countries to complete their reforms in the energy sector in compliance with EU law, including on environmental and safety policy”.

Following the internal debates in the EU (for example EP discussions over Just Transition Fund16) it is possible to see that there would be debates about the EU support to the fossil fuels projects, in particular gas projects, in the Partner countries. It would be rational to support selected projects if they increase energy security or lead to a significant reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. EaP countries face big challenges in this field, and there must be a clear strategic vision. Unrealistic calls may reduce the public support to the EU and green policies in the societies of partner countries.

Investing in people has been one of the priorities, and the cooperation in this area is thriving. The Recommendation devotes several points to education, and it is one of the best-presented areas:

“(bb) support educational reforms in those EaP countries that are willing, since this is key for their future, with the aim of addressing shortfalls between the reform of education systems and labour market demand, and promote vocational training, among other measures; acknowledge the importance of cross-border mobility in strengthening people-to-people contacts, expand funding for and the participation of the EaP countries in educational and professional skills-boosting and exchange programmes such as Erasmus+ and Creative Europe, and strengthen the capacity of EaP countries to participate in Horizon Europe;

(bc) strengthen academic and educational cooperation among the EU and EaP countries,

16 – Florence Schulz. EU lawmakers divided over inclusion of natural gas in Just Transition Fund. – EURACTIV.de, 8 July 2020 https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/eu-lawmakers-divided-over-inclusion-of-natural-gas-in-just-transition-fund/

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including intra-EaP cooperation, by: (i) launching a regional programme supporting centres of academic and research excellence in the region; (bd) launch a pilot project aimed at establishing the Eastern Partnership Open Science and Innovation Centre, a network of thematic centres of competence located in each EaP country to provide R&I support and services; (ii) establishing the Eastern Partnership University in Ukraine; (iii) creating targeted EaP programmes in specialised universities and an electronic educational platform for online training courses focused on European values and the rule of law, good governance, public administration and eradication of corruption in the EaP countries; and (iv) providing a venue for joint training for EaP countries’ public officials, including at the level of local and regional authorities”.

It is difficult to predict the future of some ideas in the area of education, as the financing issues are not solved, but this part of the EP document is well focused. Education is one of the popular priorities of the Eastern Partnership, and it has a significant influence on the public perception of the EU and Eastern Partnership.

B. GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY

The Communication states that good governance and democratic institutions, the rule of law, successful anti-corruption policies, fight against organised crime, respect of human rights and security, including support to populations affected by conflict, are the backbone of strong and resilient states and societies. The Communication notes that ’20 Deliverables for 2020’ has made a difference in 3 out of 4 priority areas, the exception being the governance.

The Conclusions point out the Council’s opinion that the progress on the rule of law “continues to lag behind”. The Council, therefore, invites the EEAS and the Commission, in close coordination with the Member States to better monitor reforms in strengthening the rule of law and expand its support for crucial fundamentals. The Conclusions emphasise: “The EU will help in building strong democratic institutions and functioning public administrations implementing structural reforms, also through Twinning and TAIEX instruments.“

The Recommendation continues the strong message line:”(t) acknowledge that strong, independent and efficient institutions at central and local level are key to democratic accountability, deoligarchisation, and the fight against corruption and state capture; therefore seek a renewed commitment by the EaP countries to enact comprehensive reforms of the judicial and public administration aimed at ensuring the independence, competence and merit-based recruitment of judges and civil servants, as well as the prioritisation of the fight against corruption, among other means by reducing the space for corruption through increased transparency, accountability and promotion of clean behaviour among the population at large, strengthening the rule of law and promoting good governance; acknowledge that without achieving the above-mentioned goals it will be virtually impossible

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to achieve sustainable growth, boost economic activity and development, cut back poverty, increase Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and improve societal trust and political stability”. It is difficult to find more persuasive words than “virtually impossible” in such political documents.

The Recommendation mentions some efficient ways to support EaP countries: “(u) advance on a broader spectrum legal and economic reforms with an experience transfer from the EU Member States through twinning projects, particularly by extending the twinning programme to local and regional governments;

(v) develop a European quality public administration in the associated EaP countries by opening job-shadowing schemes, offering civil servants from EaP countries temporary placements in the relevant services of the EU institutions and Member States in specific areas”. Twinning and job-shadowing schemes must involve more extended periods of stay to be effective.

The Recommendation sees several alleys of EU practical support in the area of the rule of law and governance: “(r) … making instruments similar to the Support Group for Ukraine available to all EaP countries, with the associated partners having priority; develop existing and new EU tools in the area of rule of law and good governance to monitor and assess progress by the associated partners, in particular the EU Justice Scoreboard and the Rule of Law Mechanism; provide effective guidance and benchmarks for reforms, including by adopting roadmaps to specify association commitments; develop detailed working documents with a clear methodology and a comparative perspective drawing on the practice of the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan and accession process and in order to supplement the current Progress Reports and Association Agendas“.

The President of the European Commission decided the establishment of the Support Group for Ukraine (SGUA), mentioned at the beginning of the point (r), in 2014 and is administratively part of DG NEAR. The EU supports Ukraine’s reforms, based on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement / Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. SGUA has around 30 staff in Brussels and five officials based in the EU Delegation in Kyiv. It plays a coordinating role in the European Commission support to Ukraine. This group works in close cooperation with relevant Commission DGs, EEAS, the EU Delegation in Kyiv, Member States, international and bilateral donors, as well as European and International Financial Institutions17.

17 – European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/ukraine/sgua_en

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The Recommendation stresses the role of local governments: “(ck) scale up the EU’s support and initiatives to strengthen and enable the local authorities and their associations to implement national reforms at a local level; promote the role of local authorities as policymakers and decision-makers, and encourage regular exchanges between central and local governments on reform agendas with the active and inclusive participation of civil society and other relevant stakeholders;(cl) develop country roadmaps and indicators for engagement with local and regional governments, following the examples of similar engagement with civil society”. EU cooperation with local governments and also lower levels of the central governments and more technical parts of the central governments may be a way forward in relations with countries, where are problems with democracy and human rights. Eastern Partnership is also about stabilisation, finding ways to work with the complicated administrations. It is inclusive, and it is challenging to imagine some country just thrown entirely out of the EaP.

Communication and Conclusions pay a lot of attention to the judicial reforms, the fight against corruption, organised crime and cybercrime.

EP also stresses the importance of these issues. The Recommendation mentions corruption altogether ten times, in particular talking about the resilience: “(bl)…strengthen cooperation and support in respect of the EaP countries’ resilience against corruption, money laundering, terrorism and organised crime in general, and underline the need to strengthen the resilience of individuals, communities and state institutions”. European Parliament pays attention also to the influence of judicial reforms and fight against crime to the economy: “U. whereas strong and resilient institutions, the prevalence of the rule of law, the implementation of judicial reforms and the fight against corruption and money laundering are pivotal in building a fair, stable and trustworthy environment, which can then in turn attract and sustain long-term investment and growth in the EaP countries”.

Regarding the civil protection, the Conclusions text shares the approach of the Communication in the civil protection and security issues: “The Council also duly notes the proposal to consider, where appropriate, reinforcing capacity and Resilience of Eastern partner countries as regards enhancing civil protection, fighting against organised crime and other illicit activities, countering terrorist threats and preventing radicalisation, hybrid threats, malicious cyber activities, promoting the application of the existing international law in cyberspace and the development of robust legal and policy cybersecurity frameworks based on EU legislation and best practices.”

The Recommendation supports this line, among other positions, it calls to: “(bz) promote integrated border management and cooperation between the EU and associated countries, and advance law enforcement cooperation”.

European Parliament, in its document, wholly shares the approach of the Communication

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and Conclusions, that strengthening of Partner countries overall internal resilience also improves their ability to counter foreign interference.

Regarding external security, the most critical issue for the Partnership countries is so-called frozen conflicts. The Communication expresses the EU commitment to pursue efforts to support conflict prevention, confidence building and the facilitation of negotiated peaceful conflict settlements. The text is short and very general, far from Partner countries’ expectations.

The Conclusions move further than the Communication: “The Council remains deeply concerned about the continued violations of international law in certain countries of the Region. The Council calls for renewed efforts and fully supports conflict prevention, confidence building and the facilitation of negotiated peaceful conflict settlement under the agreed negotiating formats and processes and recall the EU’s role in these.” This text does not reflect any possible change of mechanisms pointing to the “agreed negotiating formats and processes”.

The Recommendation makes a clear statement about the role of Russia in the EaP region: “M. whereas the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the EaP countries are still infringed by unresolved regional conflicts, external aggression and the ongoing occupation of the territories of some of those countries, which undermine the human rights situation, represent a barrier to enhancing the prosperity, stability and growth of the EaP and compromise EU action, thus endangering the whole EaP project; whereas in the majority of these conflicts Russia is playing an active role as an aggressor, through its hybrid warfare, illegal occupation and annexation policy, cyberattacks, propaganda and disinformation, which threaten European security as a whole”.

The Recommendation expresses European Parliament’s general political stand in the relation of these frozen conflicts: “O. whereas the European Parliament condemns the violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the EaP countries, does not recognise forcible changes in their borders and attempted annexation of their territories, and rejects the use of force or the threat of force, sharing the EU’s commitment to supporting a peaceful conflict resolution via diplomatic means and in accordance with the norms and principles of international law, the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, namely in the conflicts to which Russia is a party”.

European Parliament calls to: “(bn) strongly condemn the continued violations of fundamental principles and norms of international law in the EaP region, notably destabilisation, invasion, the occupation and annexation of territories of several EaP countries by the Russian Federation and its refusal to comply with the decisions of international tribunals and courts; establish a more coordinated policy towards the Russian Federation among the EU Member States, in particular in terms of engagement on issues concerning the EaP countries”. European Parliament repeats here earlier EU positions. There remains a question of why Commission, HR/VP and Council were not doing that in

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the Communication and Conclusions. Parliament knows about the differences between the policies of governments of the Member States towards Russia and sends its strong message to them.

The Recommendation turns to all frozen conflicts (so including here also Armenia-Azerbaijan one): “(bo) call for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from all occupied territories and for an end to military hostilities, which unnecessarily claim the lives of civilians and soldiers while hampering socio-economic development, thus enabling hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people (IDPs) to return to their homelands”.

The Recommendation supports existing conflict resolution formats and mechanisms: “(bp) develop a more active role for the EU, represented by the Vice-President of the European Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in the peaceful resolution of the ongoing conflicts and in the prevention of any future conflicts in its Eastern neighbourhood, while acknowledging the agreed negotiating formats and processes, such as the Geneva International Discussions, the OSCE Minsk Group, the Normandy Format and the 5 + 2 Talks; appoint an EU Special Envoy for Crimea and the Donbas region”. The only addition is at the end the idea about the EU Special Envoy for Crimea and the Donbas region. There are ideas about EU deeper engagement in the conflict resolution18, but the EP document does not include them.

There is a particular point of the Recommendation about the Armenian–Azerbaijan conflict: “(br) reaffirm its support for the efforts of the co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and for their 2009 Basic Principles, with a view to achieving a solution based on the norms and principles of international law, the UN Charter and the OSCE 1975 Helsinki Final Act; encourage all sides to intensify dialogue and to refrain from inflammatory rhetoric that would further jeopardise any prospects for settlement”. It is also in line with previous positions, no new elements.

The Recommendation points out the need to create general conditions for the conflict resolution: “(bq) continue promoting an environment conducive to the settlement of conflicts and supporting activities that promote confidence and people-to-people contacts across conflict-divided communities; prioritise efforts and expand funding for preemptive peace-building, including preventive diplomacy, as well as early warning and action mechanisms”. Developing relations with people over the battlelines of the frozen conflicts is an issue that causes heated debates in related countries. EP supports such steps of governments in

18 – Thomas de Waal ,Nikolaus von Twickel. Beyond Frozen Conflict. Scenarios for the Separatist Disputes of Eastern Europe. Brussels: CEPS; London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2020. https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/beyond-frozen-conflict

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Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, which are often criticised by more radical elements of the political scale in these countries.

EP supports the activities of the EU missions in the region: “(bs) take action to ensure effective activities and the execution of a full mandate for the following existing EU missions in the EaP region, including coordination of their activities: the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, the EU Advisory Mission in Ukraine, the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, and the mission of the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia”. Member States need to be encouraged to provide more human and other resources to the missions in the region.

The EP supports Ukraine against Russian aggression: “(bt) take into consideration the calls made by the Ukrainian Government for an extended international peacekeeping force to be stationed along the Ukraine-Russia border and in the Luhansk and Donetsk districts; once the situation permits and as part of the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements, an EU-led CSDP mission should be offered for deployment to the parties to the conflict, to assist in tasks such as demining, preparations for local elections and securing free access for humanitarian aid organisations”. Here EP follows logics of the Ukrainian proposals: at first, international control on the Ukrainian-Russian border, and then implementation of the Minsk agreements, including local elections. The Recommendation does not define what kind of international peacekeeping force has to be stationed – UN, OSCE or some other.

The Recommendation also notes maritime security issues: “(bu) support freedom of navigation and strongly oppose the blockade of the Azov Sea and the continued creeping annexation of the Black Sea by the Russian Federation”. The European Parliament does not propose here any specific practical measures for the Azov and Black Seas.

Communication and Conclusions also talk about security cooperation with EaP countries. EU should continue to uphold security dialogues with Eastern Partnership countries. Practical Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) cooperation will also be strengthened, including contributions by partner countries to the European civil and military missions and operations. The documents are general and short about this issue, and they do not add significant new elements.

The Recommendation points out EU general contribution in the Eastern Partnership region: “(bk) recognise that through its political, cultural and economic investment in the EaP countries the EU invests in the security and stability of the region”. This text indicates that Union activities include primarily soft security elements. Parliament does not exclude at the

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same time defence cooperation, but it is not in the sense of military security guarantees.

In the next point, the European Parliament acknowledges “(bl)…the increased security interdependence between the EU and EaP countries”. This sentence is a diplomatic expression that the EU acts in the Region and is ready to stand against other outside countries activities if they go against “(bl)…security, stability and peace for the future development of the EaP countries”. The Recommendation mentions some other countries activities in the EaP region: “(bl)… in recent years they have been subject to the interest and ambition of third countries, such as China, Turkey or some Gulf states, which do not necessary share the values and interests of the EU”.

This list does not mention Russia, which is included in other parts of the text several times. The document also does not reflect the activities of EU’s transatlantic partner the United States, with whom EaP countries cooperate in many areas. The EP includes a strong strategic statement about other forces active in the region: “(cc) acknowledge that any lack of EU presence or inaction vis-a-vis its EaP partners will create space for other global players to step in; increase cooperation or create a forum with like-minded democratic allies and international actors to mitigate and counteract the negative influence of third-country powers in the EaP region”. The complicated situation in the EaP region demands cooperation and division of labour between the like-minded partners of the EaP countries. There are meetings of donors in some capitals, but more efforts are needed.

The Recommendation lists several avenues of cooperation in broader security and defence: “(bl)… boost EU-EaP cooperation in security and defence by devoting particular attention to the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts and the prevention and resolution of the new types of challenges, such as hybrid threats, cyberattacks, including election cyber-meddling, disinformation and propaganda campaigns, and third-party interference in the political, electoral, and other democratic processes; strengthen cooperation and support in respect of the EaP countries’ resilience against corruption, money laundering, terrorism and organised crime in general, and underline the need to strengthen the resilience of individuals, communities and state institutions”.

The document aims towards more extensive collaboration in particular defence matters: “(ca) welcome further cooperation between the EU and EaP countries with the aim of promoting international stability and security, in line with the EU's Global Strategy, and propose new forms of voluntary cooperation in the field of security and defence, considering it an area of ambition in the coming future as the EU will aim gradually to create the European Defence Union”. The document includes practical recommendations about the defence industry: “(cb) promote R&D and industrial cooperation in the development of armaments and

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military technologies and capabilities among the EU Member States and the EaP countries”.

The Parliament also recognises: ”(bv) … the contribution of the EaP countries to the EU common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions, battlegroups and operations; continue supporting the Security Sector Reform (SSR); deepen cooperation in EU-related defence policies, including participation in PESCO once the issue of participation of third countries is resolved”. There are possibilities to widen EaP countries participation in EU CSDP operations and missions, both military and civilian, including the difficult ones in Africa. Now there are 6 EU military missions/operations on the way, 11 ongoing civilian missions (including 3 in the EaP countries), with around five thousand people deployed19. Ukraine has been contributing to CSDP missions since 2003, whereas Georgia and Moldova since 2014.

Regarding cyber resilience, the Communication states the EU further support and assistance to the partner countries. The Conclusions point out: “The Council also duly notes the proposal to consider, where appropriate, reinforcing capacity and resilience of Eastern partner countries as regards … hybrid threats, malicious cyber activities, promoting the application of the existing international law in cyberspace and the development of robust legal and policy cybersecurity frameworks based on EU legislation and best practices”.

The Recommendation mentions cybersecurity issues eleven times, so it is one of the cross-cutting themes. There is a particular point about the cooperation in this area: “(bw) acknowledge that cybersecurity is one of the areas where the EU and the EaP countries can work together more effectively and the EU can take advantage of the experience of EaP countries in combating hybrid or cybersecurity threats; establish a formal cyber dialogue with the interested EaP countries and promote cooperation platforms between the countries in the EaP region in order to address hybrid threats more effectively with a view to strengthening the resilience of those countries, especially following the large-scale cyberattack of the Russian Federation against Georgia in October 2019”. This position is well in line with Communication and Conclusions.

C. ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE

The climate and environment issues part of the Communication is long and detailed. EU promises to “help partner countries fulfil their nationally determined contributions to the Paris Agreement and modernise their economies, reducing their carbon footprint and moving towards climate neutrality, while acknowledging the investment challenges “. A very similar text is in the Conclusions.

The Recommendation calls to: “(aj) ensure the EaP countries’ strong involvement in and

19 – Military and civilian missions and operations. – EEAS. 5 March 2019 https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en

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contribution to the fight against climate change, including through participation in the new European Green Deal and by ensuring that the DCFTAs do not contradict the climate objectives and initiatives set out therein; such engagement should take place through EU investment support, including from the EBRD and EIB, and should be conditional on a sound assessment of the environmental impact and of the effects on local communities, with a special focus on the sectors that might be affected and would be in need of extra support”.

The call “do not contradict the climate objectives” indicates some conflicts of interests. Eastern Partnership countries still envisage developing energy, industrial and transport projects related to fossil fuels, like gas pipelines, motorways, airports etc. as their infrastructure is still mostly outdated and creates security challenges. There are debates about the EU internal projects during the next MFF period related to the gas. Some compromises are hopefully possible concerning the projects in EaP countries. Russia, China and other countries may use such situations also for political purposes to offer support without environmental conditions.

People’s health and wellbeing include many issues which concern the citizens of the partner countries. The Communication reflects the existing fruitful cooperation in many matters as environment-related quality of life, including the environmental services (such as water supply and sanitation, waste management, green areas and urban mobility), preventing and reducing pollution, increasing the energy efficiency of buildings.

In the Conclusions, the text reads that “The Council welcomes the proposed new emphasis on wellbeing and public health in Eastern partner countries, notably as regards COVID-19“. The draft EP text was prepared before the COVID-19 crisis. This crisis and health cooperation are not at the prominent position in the Recommendation, but „health“ is mentioned in the text three times.

Both Communication and Conclusions cover the circular economy as a new cooperation issue. This issue also gets detailed attention in the Recommendation: „(al) provide continuous support to the upgrading of the EaP countries’ solid waste management system to EU standards, by establishing recycling targets and recycling systems to meet the targets; address the negative impact on the environment and public health of outdated and unauthorised solid waste facilities; identify financial instruments to support the financing of waste management projects by the EU and national/local funds”.

To strengthen energy security, the Communication pays attention to the diversification of the energy mix, notably via renewable energy sources, and new energy connections.

Communication promises that the EU will continue to contribute to strengthening international nuclear safety. Conclusions also stress that „adherence to the highest international standards of nuclear safety and environmental protection must be duly respected“. The Recommendation text includes explicit text about the issue: „(am) ensure that existing and new nuclear installations in the EaP countries comply with the highest environmental and nuclear safety standards, according to the international conventions; ensure that unsafe energy projects such as the Ostrovets nuclear plant will not be part

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of the European electricity network”. As the Ostrovets plant will send its energy into the vast Russian controlled electricity network, the implementation of such a recommendation would mean that the three Baltic States must close all their connections to that network. The synchronisation of the Baltic States with the Central European grid is on the way, and the Roadmap sets the target date of 202520.

D. DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT

The digital area has a prominent place in Communication, and it is a constructive text. The Conclusions does not offer new elements. The Council states: “Building on achievements so far, work in this area should aim to extend the benefits of the Digital Single Market and support the full implementation of current and future commitments. Strengthening eGovernance, supporting innovative digital start-ups, addressing the digital skills gap and in general increasing efficiency, transparency and accountability are key to facilitate the digital transition of economies and societies.“

The Recommendation mentions digital area several times, but similarly to the Council Conclusions, the particular text is rather short and general: “(ai) promote the development of e-services, both commercial and public, and of the economy as well as of a wide range of telework capabilities, in order to strengthen resilience and resistance in case of crisis, as experienced with pandemics”.

The Communication states that “the EU will support the implementation of roaming and spectrum agreements among the partner countries and, where appropriate, with the EU”. Conclusions do not pay attention to the roaming issue. The Recommendation mentions in its point (ag) the need to prioritise the creation of a roaming fees-free regime between the EU and EaP countries and an intra-EaP one as soon as possible.

E. SOCIETIES

The presentations of the issues of societal development in Communication and Conclusions repeat well-known main principles and norms. The Council highlights „the importance of free, fair and credible elections, preserving civil society space and for support of an engaged civil society, including think-tanks, protection of human rights defenders, as well as free, plural and independent media, journalists and media literacy.“ This text reflects the well-publicised problems with democratic development in Partnership countries.

Eastern Partnership countries have seen numerous electoral system changes, contested election results, and international missions have been not satisfied with their electoral practices. It is clear why the Recommendation pays so much attention to the issue of elections: “(z) foster electoral reforms in order to ensure free, fair, competitive and

20 – Energy security: The synchronisation of the Baltic States' electricity networks - European solidarity in action. 20 June 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_3337

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transparent elections and encourage full compliance of election processes, notably in the adoption of legislative amendments to electoral laws and party financing, with international standards, the recommendations of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the opinions of the Venice Commission; urge EaP countries to ensure the non-harassment, whether judicial, physical, or institutional, of political actors not aligned with the incumbent government, and to safeguard freedom of expression, of association and of assembly, including the right to peaceful demonstration; commend EaP states that have agreed on the implementation of democratising political reforms and support the strengthening of the electoral legislative framework through inclusive political dialogues”.

The last sub-point seems to cover recent developments in Georgia, where amendments to the Constitution were adopted by the Parliament on 29 June 2020 to make the elections more proportional. The bill followed the 8 March election agreement between the Georgian Dream ruling party and the united opposition, in talks mediated by the diplomatic corps21. In some other EaP countries, we can also see debates around the use of proportional and majoritarian elements in their election system. In some other EaP countries, we can also view discussions around the use of proportional and majoritarian features in their election systems. 19 December 2019 the Verkhovna Rada adopted a new election code. It harmonises procedures for all Ukrainian electoral events – presidential, parliamentary, local elections22. With the new Code, Ukraine strengthened the proportional approach. On 16 July 2020, the Parliament amended the election legislation of Ukraine, which also increased proportional features23. It seems that a proportional system with multi-mandate election districts leads to a better representation of minorities. The EP recommends: “(aa) ensure that during the amending process of their electoral legislation the EaP countries create equal possibilities for the representation of all ethnic and national minorities”. It is a complicated issue and decisions to support the representation of the minorities may lead to the conflict with such principles as the election of the representatives by universal, free, equal, direct and secret ballot.

The Recommendation calls to stand against outside interference into political processes in EaP countries: “(ac) contribute to preventing third-party interference in the political, electoral, and other democratic processes of the EaP states, whether designed to sway an election towards a favoured candidate or party, or to undermine trust in the democratic system, notably through disinformation, illicit political financing, cyberattacks on political and media actors, or any other illegal means”. Much of such activities in Partner countries are related to Russia. Increasing the resilience against such interference of the EaP countries is one of the leading ideas of the Communication, the Conclusions and the Recommendation. Even

21 – US Secretary of State Pompeo welcomes adoption of Georgian constitutional amendments. – Agenda.ge, 2 July 2020 https://agenda.ge/en/news/2020/2093

22 – https://112.international/ukraine-top-news/ukraines-parliament-adopts-new-elections-code-with-zelenskys-amendment-46712.html

23 – Ukraine’s parliament amends Election Code. – 112 Ukraine, 16 July 2020 https://112.international/ukraine-top-news/ukraines-parliament-amended-election-code-53110.html

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modest finances, campaign support from abroad or spreading fake news on the internet may change the election situation in these volatile societies. Financing of the EaP countries political parties remain very problematic. On many occasions, there are too close relations between some political forces and oligarchs, most of which in the Partnership countries have some Russian connections.

European Parliament has a very high profile in standing against violation of human rights. This document continues EP policy and recommends to: “(ad) adopt an EU human rights violations sanctions mechanism or EU ‘Magnitsky Act’, to be applicable to individuals or entities found in breach of human rights or essential freedoms, particularly by engaging in arrests, kidnappings and beatings of civil society or opposition activists and journalists and in violent repression of peaceful protests, as well as those involved in high-level corruption cases in the EaP countries”. In March 2019, the European Parliament had passed a resolution, calling for an EU-wide ‘Magnitsky Act’ to include state and non-state actors who have contributed, physically, financially or through acts of systemic corruption, to such abuse and crimes worldwide. Last December EU Foreign Affairs Council cleared the way to start the preparatory work on a European Act, targeting individuals involved in human rights abuses worldwide who could face EU asset freezes and travel bans. There are still different positions in the Council, where member states need consensus for the new sanctions framework to take effect24.

The Recommendation points out worries about the COVID-19 crisis time measures: „(cz) denounce the misuse of pandemic-related measures by the authorities as a means to silence the political opposition, civil society and the media by restricting their legitimate rights”. The extraordinary situation has led to radical measures both in the EU and partner countries. In democratic societies, the executive is under parliamentary control, special measures proportional and temporary.

The Recommendation aims countering the polarisation of the Partner Countries societies: „(db) promote inclusive and participatory platforms for dialogue and cooperation bringing together stakeholders across different sectors and levels, including policymakers, economic actors, academics and civil society, as well as churches, religious communities and citizens with fewer opportunities, with the goal of countering polarising and extremist tendencies in politics and society, as well as the impact of disinformation and propaganda campaigns”. The polarisation has connections to the high level of social inequality, deficits of the democratic systems and other factors. It creates a fertile ground for foreign interference.

The Recommendation aims EU support to the EaP countries to reduce sources for polarisation: “(be) ensure that all EU support programmes include a consistent gender

24 – EU ministers break ground on European ‘Magnitsky Act’. – EURACTIV.com, 10 December 2019 https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/eu-ministers-break-ground-on-european-magnitsky-act/

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equality and human rights dimension, address and target the most disadvantaged and vulnerable groups in society, including ethnic and other minorities, such as Roma, refugees and internally displaced persons from areas experiencing violent conflicts; reinforce initiatives for those groups’ political and socio-economic empowerment and improving their access to education, healthcare and decent housing;

(bf) ensure that the EU assistance and programmes reach the local level, including in the remote parts of the EaP countries, in particular rural areas, so as to enable the inhabitants to push for positive changes in their communities, in particular those more vulnerable to post-Soviet sentiments and Russian manipulation”. Polarisation is part of the political life in many parts of the world, and it is complicated to overcome it. EP list of efforts does not touch some ideological and ethical divides of modern societies, which also lead to confrontation between different parts of the nations. There is a deep divide between the older parts of the population with Soviet experience and the young generation, which aims to be a part of the open modern world.

Communication and Conclusions do not cover issues of religion and freedom of religion. This issue is present in the Recommendation: “(bi) ensure the fundamental right of freedom of religion or belief by protecting and promoting the rights of all religious components present in the region, on the basis of the concept of full and equal citizenship;

(bj) strengthen dialogue and cooperation with churches and religious communities and organisations in areas such as peace-building and reconciliation, thus reinforcing trust in a just and free society, as well as in education, healthcare and basic social services”. Issues of religion in EaP countries are very complex, for example, in Ukraine.

The Communication and the Conclusions pay a lot of attention to the development of civil society and youth participation. The Conclusions even state: “The Council reiterates the crucial role of cross-border cooperation and people-to-people contacts especially between the younger generation for the development of Eastern partner countries’ societies and underlines the need to put support for youth at the centre of the Eastern Partnership beyond 2020 “.

The Recommendation has a substantial part of the text devoted to the civil society and youth, mostly it repeats earlier positions. So the document mentions: „(cd) acknowledge the contribution of EaP civil society actors and organisations to democratisation and reform processes in their countries and the whole EaP region, and call for greater openness and engagement towards them from the governments of the EaP countries, and particularly a more meaningful and effective involvement in the policymaking processes“.

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The civil society is today more diverse than earlier. It also includes such organisations and initiatives, which work against democracy and reforms. This diversity is visible in the point of the Recommendation about the EU support to the civil society: „(ce) continue a wide-ranging dialogue with the EaP civil society actors and enhance the EU’s support for the activities of democratically oriented civil society organisations by promoting their activities and safety and by safeguarding their working environment“. The definition of which Partner Countries actors are „democratically oriented“ and which not will be a contentious issue for the EU. EP political groups may have very diverging views about such selection criteria. Another challenge is a growing tendency to create government-organised NGOs.

The Recommendation includes several points about the practical support and cooperation with the civil society in the EaP countries: “(cf) increase the EU’s efforts to strengthen its engagement and support for grassroots initiatives in regions and rural areas in order to develop civil society’s organisational and monitoring capacities and local democratic practices;

(cg) strengthen EaP civil society's ability to act as a watchdog for reform and to hold the respective state institutions to account, by cutting red tape and securing its presence in trilateral meetings, including in all Human Rights Dialogues and Association and Cooperation Council meetings;

(ch) foster cooperation among the EaP countries’ civil societies by establishing a regional centre to increase competences and exchange best practices and working approaches, as part of the new project of the Eastern Partnership University in Ukraine;

(ci) continue providing structural, financial and capacity development support to organisations that assist independent pro-democracy civil society actors; insist that EU, Member State, and independent programmes in support of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, including the European Endowment for Democracy, must continue to operate freely and without harassment or judicial limitations; take all possible measures to prevent independent NGOs from being crowded out through the imposition of judicial limitations and financial barriers, the selective application of legal provisions, or the enhanced presence of government-organised NGOs (GONGOs);

(cj) raise awareness about attacks on civil activists in EaP countries by extremist forces and also by state authorities, which undermine EU values, international human rights standards and joint obligations to the ECHR”. Extremism is a serious challenge, in particular,

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extreme nationalist or religious groups. This issue needs agreed Union policy also in the EaP framework.

This long and substantial text reflects the activity of the civil society, including in relations with the EU. It also shows that there is a big problem in relations or even missing relations with political parties in the Partnership countries. Most of the political forces are in EaP countries weak as organisations and especially as policymakers. Broad EU cooperation with civil society cannot compensate for the problems with political parties. There is only one remark in the Recommendation about the Partner countries parliaments: “(p) enhance parliamentary diplomacy and review the functioning of Euronest in order to enable it to reach its full potential”. Parliaments and political parties have a low level of public support in Partnership countries. The conclusion has to be, that EU has to be more active in its cooperation with legislators, their involvement in EaP activities, not leaving them aside. This issue needs a new view and additional efforts from EP, national Parliaments, European political parties and political parties in the EU Member States. More contacts mean that information moves in both directions, and parliamentarians in the EU Member States also will know EaP better, especially in the countries not so close geographically. The Euronest Parliamentary Assembly was constituted on 3 May 2011 in Brussels. It has 120 members including 60 from European Parliament and 10 from each six Partner countries national parliaments. In December 2019, Euronest Parliamentary Assembly adopted a resolution about the role of parliamentary oversight in Eastern partnership countries25, and its recommendations are worth to implement.

The EU will support independent and free media outlets that produce high quality and diverse content promises Communication. The Council, in its Conclusions, stresses the importance of „free, plural and independent media, journalists and media literacy“. To counter threats inside and outside the EU adopted in December 2018 the Action Plan against disinformation26.

The Recommendation also pays attention to serious problems with free media in all EaP countries. Support and protection of the free media is an urgent challenge as in the COVID-19 crisis-related economic downturn media outlets lost a big part of their income and are vulnerable to political and other interference. The Recommendation calls to: “(cv)

25 – RESOLUTION on Parliamentary oversight as a tool to strengthen democracy, accountability and effectiveness of state institutions in the Eastern Partner countries, http://www.epgencms.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/upload/bc023780-624a-4f8e-b523-cd54bc3855c0/NEST_8th_resolution_POL_EN.pdf

26 – European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Action Plan against Disinformation. Brussels, 5.12.2018 JOIN(2018) 36 final https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/action_plan_against_disinformation.pdf

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promote free media and freedom of expression as a fundamental principle, and therefore support a democratic, independent, pluralistic and balanced media landscape in the EaP countries which ensures protection of local journalists, opinion makers and dissident voices from harassment and intimidation, allows non-discriminatory access to online and offline information and meaningful civic participation, and safeguards and guarantees human and civil rights”. This text reflects the situation with the numerous cases of pressure against journalists in Partnership countries, including from the oligarch owners of many media groups. But it is not enough to express support to the free media. Many printed media outlets are on the way to close down. The EU needs to find ways to assist media organisations to stay economically viable. It is a challenge in the many Union Member States also.

The Communication notes that citizens of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine enjoy visa-free movement with EU. With three other countries, there are agreements about visa facilitation, the one with Belarus not yet in force27. Conclusions state: “The possibility to launch new visa liberalisation dialogues with the remaining countries, whose citizens require visas to travel to the EU, will be considered, in due course, if conditions allow, provided that well-managed and secure mobility conditions are in place, including through the satisfactory implementation of the visa facilitation and readmission agreements“. Some EU Member States have problems with numerous asylum seekers from Associated countries. In Conclusions, there is a clear indication of the worries. The Recommendation does not mention this issue.

The Communication mentions: “Labour migration initiatives amongst the partner countries as well as between EaP and EU countries will be considered which aim to establish partnerships to foster legal migration and mobility…“ Legal workers and seasonal employees from Ukraine, Moldova and other EaP countries, have been during last years part of functioning several of the EU economies. Conclusions do not reflect on this issue.

The Recommendation is positive about labour mobility („support“) and pays a lot of attention to other issues of Labour sector. The document states EP „(av) support increased labour mobility between the EU and EaP countries, as well as among the EaP countries, with a strong focus on the legality and sustainability of the process, allowing for exchange of skills and experience and avoiding brain drain and local labour shortages; in this regard, take full stock of the successful implementation of visa-free regimes with the three associated countries”.

The Recommendation includes strong points about labour policy reforms, avoiding brain drain: “(ay) support and launch country-based action plans to combat unemployment and tackle social and regional inequalities; invest in youth, foster entrepreneurship and create new programmes and incentives for young professionals to return to the labour markets of the EaP countries;

(az) encourage EaP countries to pursue comprehensive labour policy reforms in order

27 – It is in force from July,1 2020

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to improve working conditions and workers’ rights; develop an action plan to fight undeclared work, support the creation of fully-fledged trade unions, and call for ILO conventions to be transposed into national law and implemented”.

Some of these issues are controversial in EaP countries, for example, it is difficult to talk about “fully-fledged trade unions” in some countries and “support” their establishment needs initiatives from the ground and appropriate legislative framework. In EU27 countries the situation with trade unions varies, and in the several Member States, their role is in today modest.

Country Union Density

Austria 26,3

Czechia 11,5

Denmark 66,5

Estonia 4,3

France 8,8

Germany 16,5

Hungary 7,9

Italy 34,4

Latvia 11,9

Lithuania 7,1

Netherlands 16,4

Spain 13,6

Sweden 64,9

Moldova (2016) 23,9

Armenia (2015) 32,2

Ukraine (2015) 43,8

Table 1 – Union density in selected EU member states, 2018, per cent of the total labour force, data OECD28, and EaP countries data from the International Labour Organisation (ILO)29

28 – www.stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TUD#

29 – www.ilostat.ilo.org/topics/union-membership/

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There are both unreformed old-style trade unions in EaP countries and only a limited number of really independent Unions, the ILO statistics reflect both categories together. There are different examples from the EU Member States to study for EaP countries employees. When we look at the Eastern EU Member States, then we see, as a rule, rather low membership level (see Table 1). It seems that this lower level and the limited role of the Unions is most probably the outcome of the reforms in Eastern Partnership Countries, not the Nordic model of broad membership.

The Recommendation pays attention to the social Level Playing Field: “(ba) address the shortcomings in the implementation of the commitments with regard to social policies and labour rights and protect the EU labour market from social dumping; control not only the transposition of relevant EU directives and norms into national law, but also their actual implementation; together with the EaP countries, create a monitoring scheme for fundamental labour rights involving trade unions and civil society organisations; use the disbursement of macrofinancial assistance as a leverage or conditionality to force EaP countries to improve labour conditions”. The role of the Labour issues in trade competition is a global issue, and the EaP countries do not stand out in that regard among the EU trade partners. When we talk about Associated countries becoming a part of the EU internal market, the debate about social Level Playing Field is unavoidable at some stage.

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION, GOVERNANCE AND IMPLEMENTATIONA need for an energetic and more strategic approach to communication is emphasised both in the Communication and Conclusions.

The Recommendation calls to more human contacts: “(da) reinforce and, where possible, increase the EU’s and EaP countries’ common efforts in the field of people-to-people contacts and exchanges in order to build mutually positive images among the population and make good use of the pro-European sentiment among the EaP citizenry”.

European Parliament states the need to enhance the communication activities: “(co) acknowledge that the lack of a proper communication and information campaign in the midst of the disinformation wave to which the EaP countries are exposed might result in a loss of the EaP’s decade-long effort, investment and achievements; therefore step up strategic communication efforts and, in an open dialogue with citizens, increase the visibility of the support provided by the EU in the EaP countries, at both national and local level; to this end, reach out to people in small communities and rural areas, business and community leaders, diasporas and national minorities, beyond already EU-minded cohorts”. Focusing on these parts of the Partner countries’ population, which are not yet positive about the EU, is the right way to proceed. Looking at the list of groups who need special attention, it would be good to add older people. Among the national minorities, special efforts are required towards Russians, as they are under the intensive influence of the state-controlled media from Russia.

On numerous occasions, politicians in EaP countries try to present EU supported practical projects, especially infrastructure objects, as just their (own) achievements. EU has to be more decisive when communicating cooperation achievements, including direct comparisons of the aid programmes scale and amount with those from other actors like Russia or China. At the present moment, the Union is too shy to do that.

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A most effective strategy against hybrid actions and disinformation is the creation of general resilience. The Recommendation includes a list on cooperation proposals in communication area: “(by) enhance cooperation in building the societal and institutional resilience of the EaP countries with a stronger focus on countering disinformation, propaganda, manipulation and hostile influencing carried out by external forces aiming at dividing and destabilising the EaP countries, as well as undermining the integrity of their political processes and their relations with the EU; assist interested EaP countries in the activities carried out at the EU level to tackle the above-mentioned hostilities, including the implementation of good practices and solutions, such as the Action Plan against Disinformation and the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation, and by using the expertise of the Helsinki European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, the Riga NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence and the EU East StratCom Task Force”. There is also another recommendation about the resilience: “(cx) support programmes and reforms concerning media and information literacy to reflect the current digital age”.

The Media landscape is now in transition. Many methods of the traditional press are not effective in the digital media, in particular in the fight against disinformation. New media demands very prompt actions from the political level, for which Partner countries officials are often not ready. Being slow, they lose the initiative in the competition for the attention and trust of the audience.

The Recommendation supports the work of the EEAS East StratCom task force: “(cq) … to identify and respond to disinformation and propaganda campaigns undermining the EU-EaP countries' relationship and its goals”. The EEAS unit is rather small, and its success depends on good cooperation with the EU Member States and also with Partner countries’ relevant structures, where such exist.

The Recommendation proposes a multi-direction strategy for support to the Partner countries in this area: “ (cw) step up the support in the local fight against fake news, hybrid warfare in communication and degradation of media programmes, which can undermine the fight against corruption, and against the dissemination of false information in order to obtain economic or political advantages; sustain the development of actions to ensure full transparency of media ownership; constantly help and monitor the local official regulatory agency in every EaP country”.

To implement these recommendations, the support to the independent media is crucial, especially in the current situation, when many media outlets have severe economic troubles. It opens the door for the acquisition of media outlets by oligarchic capital or capital connected with Russia in Partner countries. Lack of resources also limits the possibilities of public media channels to produce high-quality journalistic material and entertainment. Transparency of the media ownership must allow knowing the real owners, not only some shadow structures. There are deficits with that issue also in the several EU Member States.

And finally, the Recommendation points to the exchange of media content: “(cy) promote the broadcasting of European media productions in the EaP countries as well as EaP countries’ productions in the EU, in order to bridge the differences provoked by history and by the fake information delivered in the last decades; support local media outlets in obtaining access to European media programmes and initiatives for close collaboration between media outlets from the EU and EaP”. On many occasions, it is about financial resources at the disposal of private and public media. Because of financial difficulties to expect producers providing media content free of charge is not very realistic. There is intense competition in the commercial media

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market of EaP countries, especially in the area of visual entertainment. Besides EU productions, there are Russian, British, US, Turkish and other.

NEXT ACTIONSThe EaP Summit was scheduled initially in June 2020. Because of the COVID-19 crisis, it is now planned in March 2021. Conclusions point out about the Summit practical results: “… to endorse long-term policy objectives on the basis of the Joint Communication on the EaP beyond 2020, the present Council Conclusions and input of Member States and Eastern partner countries…“.

The Recommendation sends next Eastern Partnership Summit a strong message, calling it to: „(c) promptly enact a strategic and future-oriented vision for the next decade of the EaP policy beyond 2020 with the aim of providing benefits first and foremost for citizens, strengthening resilience, fostering sustainable development, ensuring irreversible achievements, and deepening the EU-EaP cooperation and integration process, which is in the EU’s own security and economic interests;

(d) ensure that the conclusions of the June 2020 Summit include a clear strategy and a long-term common vision for further engagement and development of the EaP beyond 2020, reinforced EU commitments and political incentives, as well as a pledge from the EaP countries to deliver on their own; encourage future Presidencies of the Council of the EU, in line with the European Parliament’s resolutions and recommendations, to prepare detailed and ambitious agendas for cooperation with EaP countries…“. Point (d) reflects the challenge of different levels of interest in EaP by the EU Council Presidencies. Southern Member States tend to pay more attention to the ENP Southern dimension, as it is related to their strong national interests.

The Recommendation also looks forward towards the strengthening of the parliamentary cooperation body Euronest: “(p) enhance parliamentary diplomacy and review the functioning of Euronest in order to enable it to reach its full potential”.

The Recommendation fixes future timetable of return to the EaP issues: “ W. whereas the European Parliament is committed to adopting annual resolutions on the implementation of AAs/DCFTAs by the associated countries and at least biannual recommendations on the relations with the remaining EaP countries and the EaP policy as a whole”.

July 2020

The Estonian Center for Eastern Partnership (ECEAP) does not take collective positions. This analytic paper, like all publications of the ECEAP, represents only the views of its author.