GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

ANALYSIS OF THREE PERSPECTIVES:

A LOOK AT THE RE-LAUNCH OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

GEST 590: THE EUROPEAN UNION

DR. ANDERSON

BY

SEAN P. MCBRIDE

WASHINGTON, DC

12 OCTOBER 2009

1 Introduction

The re-launching of the European Community in the mid-1980s was a milestone arguably

as important as the initial creation of the ECSC. The Single European Act prioritized the

creation of a barrier-free internal market, and extended the principle of qualified majority voting

in the Council to matters relating to the single market project. In order to study the varied

theoretical analyses of Project 1992, I will examine the writings of Wayne Sandholtz, John

Zysman, Andrew Moravcsik, and David Cameron. I will address these papers separately in the

order they were published due to the interpretive influence they had on each other, and then

conclude with a comparison of their analyses and explanations. Upon close analysis of these

three papers, Andrew Moravcsik offers the most compelling examination of Project 1992 due to

his historically-grounded and well-articulated theoretical analysis. These elements set him apart

from the other two papers, as Sandholtz and Zysman pay too little attention to the historical

record in arguing their neo-functional analysis, and as Cameron fails to synthesize neofunctional

and intergovernmental thought into a meaningful theoretical construct.

2 “1992: Recasting the European Bargain” by Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman

2.A Explanation

Sandholtz and Zysman depict the events leading up to 1992 as a “dramatic new start”

fully distinct from the original efforts of European integration (Sandholtz and Zysman, 95).

They argue that the end of the Cold War and the economic rise of Japan caused structural

changes that forced the European states to reevaluate their place in the world vis-à-vis the United

States. Similarly, they attribute stagflation and perceived economic disparity with the US and

Japan as leading to an electoral shift towards market-friendly political parties and factions open

to further integration following the failure of own their domestic efforts. Sandholtz and Zysman

argue that these internal and external pressures strengthened the Commission in its role as policy

entrepreneur for an expanded EC. In this role, the Commission ignored the national

governments and appealed directly to transnational business, which clearly saw this reform as in

their interest and formed the “Roundtable of European Industrialists” in 1983 in order to

collaborate with the Commission to pressure national executives (Sandholtz and Zysman, 117).

According to Sandholtz and Zysman, the pressure brought to bear on the national executives by

business from below and the EC from above ensured it was only a matter of time before the SEA

was passed.

2.B Theoretical Analysis

According to Sandholtz and Zysman, the outcome of 1992 had nothing to do with mass

movements, pressure groups, or legislatures (Sandholtz and Zysman, 107). Instead, the SEA

came into existence due to an elite bargain between the European Commission and the European

multinational corporations, under whose combined pressure the national executives had to

acquiesce. Having failed to solve stagflation at the national level, the authors characterize the

national executives as choosing between stagnation and integration (Sandholtz and Zysman, 97).

In final analysis, Sandholtz and Zysman offer a nuanced mixture of supranational

institutionalism and neo-functionalism. Their emphasis on EC officials as integration lobbyists,

business interests as increasingly multinational, and European states as unable to unilaterally

solve economic problems fits well with neofunctionalist thought. Additionally, though the

authors’ temporal division of European integration along the lines of structural forces appears to

deviate from the linear nature of neo-functionalism, their portrayal of prevailing economic forces

suggests that integration will likely continue, though need not necessarily move at a uniform

pace. Due to their increased focus on structural factors and their decreased focus on spillover

effects, their framework is relatively unique, but their focus on technocratic automaticity and

transfers of domestic allegiance requires Sandholtz and Zysman to be classified within the neo-

functionalist camp.

3 “Negotiating the Single European Act” by Andrew Moravcsik

3.A Explanation

Moravcsik’s narrative of the Single European Act differs from that of Sandholtz and

Zysman in several key ways. Most importantly, he relegates the role of the Commission and the

European multinationals to the dustbin, and instead focuses on the domestic affairs and politics

of the three dominant EC members: Britain, France, and Germany. He concludes that the single

market was made possible by the election of the Tories in Britain and the shifting of the French

Socialist party to a pro-market stance, which brought Britain and France more in line with

Germany regarding economic liberalization. Regarding procedural reform, the author concludes

that France and Germany were greatly in favor of increased majority voting in the Council, and

that Britain’s opposition to the issue was countered by the French threat of exclusion from

further negotiation. Thus, these two reforms were carried out and the others were scrapped,

leading to what the author calls the lowest common denominator. Nevertheless, he stipulates

that even this outcome was not assured, as outside issues such Thatcher’s demand for a CAP

rebate could have destroyed the consensus needed for reform. It was therefore preposterous to

speak of national executives as passive or submissive actors.

3.B Theoretical Analysis

Moravcsik challenges Sandholtz and Zysman’s characterization that elite bargains

between the Commission and European multinationals were the primary cause for 1992.

Regarding the Commission, Moravcsik limits the importance of Cockfield and Delors to their

ability to tailor preexisting reform proposals in a way compatible with the interest of the major

member states. Furthermore, he portrays the European multinationals as more reactionary than

proactive, stating that the business ties to the EC were small and that the Roundtable of European

Industrialists did not get involved in the debate until well along in the negotiations, not even

moving to Brussels until 1988 (Moravcsik, 45). Having reduced the role of these actors,

Moravcsik proposes an alternate analysis of 1992 as the product of intergovernmental

negotiations brought about by “the convergence of national interests, the pro-European idealism

of heads of government, and the decisive role of the large member states” (Moravcsik, 48). Most

notable in this proposal is the author’s full dismissal of small member states, assuming that their

small relative weight allows them to be easily influenced or bought off by structural funds

(Moravcsik, 25).

Moravcsik’s analysis is deeply grounded in intergovernmental institutionalism and

neorealism. His willingness to sideline supranational actors in favor of national executives

reflects his belief that national governments ultimately control the process of European

integration. Thus, Moravcsik’s characterization of Margaret Thatcher turning the SEA into a

victory for Britain demonstrats the efficacy of the concept of the lowest common denominator

(Moravcsik, 44). In the realm of procedural reform, Moravcsik even portrays Britain’s failure as

intergovernmental, as it was not a supranational actor but France and Germany that successfully

pressured Britain. France’s threat of a two-tiered Europe reflected the danger that Britain could

lose its place at the intergovernmental bargaining table in determining the organization of

Europe. Most telling of all is Moravcsik’s Clausewitzian charge that “EC politics is the

continuation of domestic policies by other means,” suggesting that intergovernmental power

politics has by no means disappeared, but perhaps moved from the battlefield to the EC.

(Moravcsik, 25).

4 “The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences” by David Cameron

4.A Explanation

Cameron’s narrative of EU reform is in many ways a reconciliation of Moravcsik with

Sandholtz and Zysman. Prompted by his belief that all actors are important, the author focuses

on both Moravcsik’s national executives and Sandholtz and Zysman’s supranational actors.

Thus, he examines France, Germany, and Britain next to the Commission and the Roundtable of

European Industrialists. Most interestingly, this placement of the national next to the

supranational results in a fuller picture of the European Community complete with the

intergovernmental European Council at its apex. In this light, Cameron argues that the European

Council, not the Commission, was the driving force behind economic and monetary union. He

further characterizes the history of the internal market initiative as the history of the European

Council’s meeting through the 1980s (Cameron, 63).

4.B Theoretical Analysis

After rejecting neofunctionalism and neorealism as inadequate for understanding the

1992 initiative, Cameron’s article attempts to use both theories to develop a fuller and better-

rounded analysis (Cameron, 30). This approach allows him to mention spillover in one sentence

and intergovernmentalism in the next, but it does so at the expense of his theoretical coherence.

Furthermore, his concluding statement that “it will be the states… rather than the supranational

organizations of the Community that will… define shape, and control policy” exposes him as an

intergovernmentalist at heart, causing one to wonder why he feels so uncomfortable admitting as

such (Cameron, 74). Cameron’s primary theoretical thrust is that the EC is simultaneously

integrationist and intergovernmental (Cameron, 65), meaning that though the EC continues to be

defined by intergovernmental negotiation, supranational institution building is indeed taking

place. However, he stipulates that the ongoing dominance of the member states will tend to

make this supranational institutional building all for naught. In this light, Cameron’s definition

of “integrationist” is exactly in line with Moravcsik, meaning the product of intergovernmental

negotiations brought about by “the convergence of national interests, the pro-European idealism

of heads of government, and the decisive role of the large member states” (Moravcsik, 48).

Nevertheless, Cameron does take a very different tone by attributing to the European Council the

“policy leadership… necessary for the development of the internal market” (Cameron, 63). His

illustration of a council of national executives “prodding the Commission and the Council of

Ministers to work more expeditiously” towards the single market draws a stark contrast to

Moravcsik’s emphasis on Margaret Thatcher’s efforts to limit the SEA or Sandholtz and

Zysman’s characterization of an elite bargain that fully cuts over the heads of the national

executives. In final analysis, Cameron is deeply intergovernmentalist. Though he is more

willing than Moravcsik to admit progress in supranational institution building, he concludes that

institutionalized intergovernmentalism will continue to dominate the European Community.

5 Conclusion

As Cameron’s paper illustrates, the 1992 Project clearly possessed both elements of

supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Nevertheless, Cameron’s refusal to coherently

ground himself to a theory robs him of his ability to form meaningful analysis. While his

narrative is certainly the most complete among the papers, it also does the poorest job at filtering

out meaningful content for the reader. If he indeed believes that intergovernmentalism was the

dominant force behind integration, he does himself a disservice by failing to show that through

his narrative. His suggestion that supranational institutions will never be able to displace

intergovernmentalism begs the question of why he featured supranational institutions so

prominently. Furthermore, Cameron’s characterization of the European Council as the political

executive of the Community offers little theory beyond Moravcsik’s elevation of national

executives. Though the term “institutionalized intergovernmentalism” sits better alongside

descriptions of supranational institutions, Cameron’s admission that the European Council “is

not, strictly speaking, a Community institution, since it was not created by the treaties” shows

that his characterization of the European Council as the political executive is merely a rhetorical

construct theoretically differing little from Moravcsik (Cameron, 63). In contrast to Cameron,

the other authors offer clear analysis of the 1992 process through coherent use of a single

theoretical construct. These two other papers focus on the actors they consider most relevant,

and explain away those that do not. This approach makes the analyses in the piece by Moravcsik

and the piece by Sandholtz and Zysman far more useful to the reader. Between these two pieces,

the one by Moravcsik is superior because it has a more detailed narrative that (perhaps because it

was published later) very effectively counters Sandholtz and Zysman’s analysis. Sandholtz and

Zysman attempt to counter what they perceived as the two alternative theoretical approaches to

1992, but because they could not possibly know what Moravcsik would later write, their

categorization does not fit Moravcsik’s approach, which fell somewhere between “domestic

politics” and “elite bargains.” Indeed, Moravcsik’s approach is characterized by elite bargains

just as readily as that of Sandholtz and Zysman, with the bargains taking place between national

executives as opposed to supranational authorities and multinational corporations. In contrast,

because Moravcsik likely wrote his article in response to the piece by Sandholtz and Zysman, his

argument directly challenges numerous points of their analysis by crafting a detailed narrative

that definitively demonstrates the superior role of national executives in shaping Project 1992

vis-à-vis the supranational bodies and multinational corporations. Due to his superior narrative

and his defensible and clear theoretical framework, Andrew Moravcsik’s “Negotiating the Single

European Act” offers the best analysis of the re-launching of the European Community.