analysis of complex negotiations in international perspective

Analysis of Complex Negotiations in International Business: The RBC PerspectiveAuthor(s): Stephen E. WeissSource: Organization Science, Vol. 4, No. 2 (May, 1993), pp. 269-300Published by: INFORMSStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2635203Accessed: 29/11/2009 20:39

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ORGANIZATION SCIENCE Vol. 4, No. 2, May 1993

Prinited in U.S.A.

ANALYSIS OF COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: THE RBC PERSPECTIVE*

STEPHEN E. WEISS

Faculty of Administrative Studies, York University, 4700 Keele St. North York, Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3

International negotiations between organizations project a complexity that makes them a challenge to describe, explain and improve. Their many elements and dynamics challenge especially those researchers and practitioners who seek a comprehensive yet essential understanding of these negotiations. Toward that end, this article develops a new analytic perspective that focuses on three key facets of negotiation-parties' Relationships, parties'

Behaviors, and influencing Conditions (RBC)-and their basic B N C interaction. The first section defines international business negotiation, targets the subset of complex,

interorganizational negotiations, presents as an example the 1985-86 CGE-ITT telecommunications merger, and considers the partial views of the merger talks provided by existing frameworks. Several reasons then enumerated underscore the need for and potential value of an inclusive, generally applicable perspective for complex negotiations.

The RBC Framework, coupled with the Basic Model, are presented in detail, with each key facet defined, illustrated, and supported with references from diverse literatures. The Relationship and Behavior facets incorporate multiple levels of analysis (organizational, group and individual). Conditions encompass four types (circumstances, capabilities, cultures and environments). A temporal dimension completes the framework.

The last section of the paper proposes empirical and practical applications of this perspective to international business. The former includes question-asking, model-building and testing, and cumulation of knowledge, and the latter, making sense of myriad details and identifying potential points of influence on counterparts. In these ways, the RBC Perspective integrates existing knowledge and will stimulate future work in the field. (NEGOTIATION; INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS; MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS; IN- TERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS)

Overview

Many organizations engage in international negotiations. In the auto industry, all major US manufacturers have discussed joint ventures with Japanese firms and acquisitions with Europeans. In telecommunications equipment, national suppliers throughout the world have pursued sales with foreign governments. Such negotiations tend to involve "a large number of parts that interact in a nonsimple way" (Simon 1968, p. 86 quoted in Winham 1977, p. 350): many individual actors, several sets of issues within overall agenda, various arenas of activity, and numerous other factors. Carried out over many months, sometimes achieving agreement, sometimes not, these complex, international negotiations are a challenge to manage and to understand.

Existing research on international business negotiation specifically, and on negotiation generally, provides an important base of knowledge (e.g., for the former, Graham 1983; Grieco 1982; Smith and Wells 1976; and for the latter, Bazerman and Lewicki 1983; Lax and Sebenius 1986; Pruitt 1981), yet there is more to learn about complex negotiations. With respect to outcomes, studies of multinational enterprise (MNE)- host government bargaining have explained only a small portion (12-14% in Fagre and Wells 1982; cf. 47% in Lecraw 1984) of the variance in outcomes that are agreements. No-agreement outcomes remain relatively unexplored. For the

*Accepted by Arie Y. Lewin; received July 1990. This paper has been with the author for two revisions.

269

1047-7039/93/0402/0269/$01.25 Copyright C) 1993, The Institute of Management Sciences

270 STEPHEN E. WEISS

process-and structure-of negotiation, existing frameworks and models differ widely in their foci (e.g., Graham 1987, cf. Fayerweather and Kapoor 1976), while relevant empirical studies have concentrated on a few aspects at a time. As a result, it is not clear from existing work how the pieces fit together (or which ones might still be needed) to describe the dynamic whole of a complex, international negotiation or to explain its outcome.

To further broad understanding of complex, international negotiation, this article develops what Blalock (1989, pp. 2-3) has called a "highly inclusive perspective," one that incorporates major features of several existing, simple theories (for supporting views, see Poole and Van de Ven 1989; Runkel and McGrath 1972). Inclusiveness corresponds with the apparent complexity of the phenomenon. Moreover, this kind of perspective enables researchers to go on to see the circumstances under which, on the basis of empirical evidence rather than a priori, certain kinds of variables can "safely" be ignored (Blalock 1989, p. 3).

The article begins with an outline of the generic elements of complex, international negotiation, a substantive example from the mid-1980s, and a review of existing, analytic frameworks for negotiation. The review underscores the desirability of further conceptual development. It also leads to the conclusion that an approach to complex negotiation, even if motivated by international concerns, should be designed for general (including intranational) use. The new perspective then developed focuses on three essential facets of negotiation-parties' Relationships, parties' Behaviors,

and influencing Conditions (RBC)-and their causal interaction in a core, B, c

logic. The RBC Framework for Complex Negotiations and accompanying Basic Model

not only integrate a number of existing perspectives; they carry several distinctive features. They include: (1) a relationship orientation that emphasizes the interactive nature of the negotiation process; (2) multiple levels and units for behavioral analysis (see Rousseau 1985, p. 2); (3) an internationally-applicable representation of influencing conditions; and (4) conjoint consideration of behavior and conditions (see Pervin 1989), and structure and process, for multilateral as well as bilateral negotiations. This perspective can significantly advance empirical and practical endeavors in international business, which are addressed in the final section of the article.

Identifying the Phenomenon

There are very few definitions of international business negotiation in research literature. Stoever (1981, p. 1) confined his definition to negotiations between foreign investors and governments concerning direct investment. A more straightforward, inclusive meaning based on the conduct of business across national borders (e.g., Kennedy 1985; Posses 1978; Robock and Simmonds 1989), combined with Walton and McKersie's (1965, p. 3) widely-cited conceptualization of labor negotiation, leads to a more suitable working definition for this article: the deliberate interaction of two or more social units (at least one of them a business entity), originating from different nations, that are attempting to define or redefine their interdependence in a business matter. This includes company-company, company-government and solely interpersonal interactions over business matters such as sales, licensing, joint ventures, and acquisitions.

The negotiations between organizations can be viewed as a subset of international business negotiations. When organizations are the primary parties to a negotiation, proceedings are often, if not always, complex. This article focuses on these negotiations and uses the terms "complex" and "interorganizational" interchangeably.

COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 271

A Substantive Illustration

The following account of the CGE-ITT telecommunications talks, as an example of an interorganizational, international business negotiation, illustrates the complexity involved. Concentrate on its substance as raw information to be organized later according to existing analytic frameworks.

In mid-1985, the chairmen of ITT and Compagnie Generale d'Electricite (CGE) of France, Rand Araskog and Georges Pebereau, began talking informally about linking their telecommunications (telecom) businesses (Araskog 1989, pp. 159ff). ITT had found itself seriously short of cash and confronted by raiders largely because of its numerous acquisitions during the 1960s and '70s. In its telecom business, sales of telecom equipment had leveled off at $4.6 billion in 1985, and ITT's System 12, an advanced digital switching system whose development cost $1 billion, suffered from technical problems and lower-than-anticipated levels of orders. In the $10 billion-a- year worldwide market for digital central office switches, ITT faced fierce competition from Northern Telecom, Ericsson, CGE, Siemens, and, increasingly, AT&T. CGE, a state-owned holding company with interests in energy, construction and electrical contracting, had seen its telecom business expand rapidly during the 1970s with the growth of the protected French telecom market, but the early 1980s had brought a slowdown. With only a 3% share of the world telecom market, CGE leadership felt their survival in it depended upon reaching "critical size" ("France Allows ITT-CGE Pact" 1986).

Araskog and Pebereau met secretly some 20 times. AraskQg quietly courted Northern Telecom as an alternative partner, but, in June 1986, he and Pebereau reached an agreement to establish a new joint venture company that would hold the telecom businesses of both ITT and CGE-owned Alcatel. For ITT assets and a 70% stake in the new company, CGE would pay ITT $1.8 billion (Sanger 1986).

The deal required approval from the newly established "co-habitation" government in France-from Finance Minister Edouard Balladur, in particular. He added de- mands. The Government also dismissed Pebereau as head of CGE and designated as his successor, Pierre Suard. Suard and Araskog reduced the price to be paid by CGE (to $1.5 billion, with ITT's stake in the new company rising to 37%), and on July 30, the Government announced its approval.

From August to December 1986, intercompany negotiations over details involved intracompany task forces, full negotiating teams comprising financial, legal and operations specialists, and intercompany working groups. The negotiation agenda entailed numerous issues related to acquisition of ITT's telecom businesses in 43 countries and establishment of the new joint venture company in the Netherlands. To reduce its cost, CGE sought out prospective joint venture partners such as Telefonica of Spain, Societe Generale de Belgique, and Credit Lyonnais. At the same time, governments throughout Europe monitored the talks and became so embroiled over France's likely inroads into their telecom markets via ITT's companies that journalists predicted the collapse of the deal (Peterson 1986). Still, because of ITT's tax concerns and CGE's financial closing and privatization program, the companies faced a firm deadline of December 31.

After 21 months, on December 30, 1986, CGE and ITT completed a formal agreement and necessary closings. Additional closings would take place in subsequent months. On January 7, 1987, CGE and ITT launched the new company, Alcatel, n.v.

Views from Existing Frameworks

To analyze and make sense of negotiations like the CGE-ITT talks, a researcher has available a variety of negotiation models and frameworks. Each offers a "lens"


(Allison 1971). There are only a few designed specially for international business negotiations (e.g., Tung 1988). Others originally designated for American arenas such as collective bargaining have also been used internationally (e.g., Walton and McKersie 1965, pp. 382ff), as have models designed to be generic (e.g., Wall 1985). Even some US-oriented frameworks and models not yet used internationally offer some insights for complex, international business negotiations.

The following section reviews examples of each type, collapsing them into two categories: originally for international business, and US-oriented others. Notice what each model or framework elucidates and when compared with others, what it neglects or expressly sets aside. Collectively, they substantiate the complexity attributed to the CGE-ITT talks and others like them.

US-Oriented Models and Frameworks

The most widely used analytic perspective for negotiation is grounded in the strategic bargaining model, which addresses actors' goals or preferences, actions, and outcomes. Both game theorists (Raiffa 1982; Schelling 1960) and social psychologists (Deutsch 1973; Pruitt 1981) have used it to describe concession-making behavior and, assuming preference maximization, to prescribe optimal outcomes. A corresponding account of the CGE-ITT case would highlight facets such as the two companies' (or Pebereau and Araskog's) respective objectives for the valuation of ITT's telecom business, ITT's proposal for a $1.8 billion payment, and tangible outcomes such as ITT's 37% stake in the new company.

In contrast, the "intraorganizational bargaining model" developed by Walton and McKersie (1965, pp. 281ff) draws attention to internal conflict and conflict resolution, particularly as expressed in negotiating representatives' boundary roles. Conflict is caused by differences in motivations, emotions and perceptions (see also Colosi 1983, p. 231; Lax and Sebenius 1986, pp. 339-340). Accordingly, in the CGE-ITT case, a researcher would study Araskog's struggles with corporate raiders, consultations with investment bankers, and limited communications with ITT directors, and Pebereau's minimal contact with French government superiors.

The "structural model" of conflict behavior developed by Thomas (1976, pp. 912-930) offers another view by focusing not on behavior and outcomes, but on the conditions that shape them. The model encompasses behavioral predispositions, social pressures, incentive structure, and rules and procedures. For the CGE-ITT negotiations, it would point, for example, to the interests of ITT subsidiaries and customers, the US Department of Defense, and France's Finance Minister; the CEOs' decision to proceed confidentially with "Project Roxane"; and the intermedi- ary role played by a French banker.

Prescriptive, process-oriented frameworks for public disputes reinforce attention to conditions and distinctively extend the temporal dimension. Carpenter and Kennedy (1988) and Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) both recognize pre-negotiation, negotiation, and implementation or post-negotiation phases. Thus the beginning of the CGE-ITT talks might be found in some early social contact between Pebereau and Araskog, and analysis of the talks would extend beyond the December 30, 1986 contract signings to the parties' behavior in additional closings and in the formation of the new Alcatel, n.v.

One more US-oriented perspective deserves consideration: the collective bargaining model of Kochan and Katz (1988, pp. 1-18). It offers the most encompassing view of interorganizational negotiation of the frameworks sampled (see others in Lewicki, Weiss and Lewin 1992). The model centers on the goals of three parties-labor, management and government-and incorporates elements of the external environment, institutional structures and processes of bargaining (from several vantage


points), and the parties' goal attainment and administration of their relationship. While no one seems to have advocated its use internationally, the model could be adapted to bring out many factors in the CGE-ITT negotiations seen only separately with the perspectives above.

Frameworks for International Business Negotiations

Following the premise in Fayerweather and Kapoor's (1976, p. 26) seminal work that international business negotiation is "unique," researchers in the US and elsewhere have developed dedicated perspectives for it. Basically, they fall into two categories: stage models of negotiation process and behavior motivated by cultural concerns, and broad international frameworks or schemata.

Graham's (1987, p. 168) process (stage) model for all cultures keys on the purpose or nature of negotiators' successive interactions. Its four phases are nontask sound- ing, task-related information exchange, persuasion, and concessions and agreement. Considering the first two phases, in particular, would shed new light on the CGE-ITT illustration. (See other process models for international business in March 1985 and McCall and Warrington 1984 and for diplomacy in Zartman and Berman 1982.)

Among broad frameworks, Fayerweather and Kapoor's (1976, pp. 29-45) contribu- tion highlights the "wide variety of environments" in international business. Their framework comprises: the negotiation situation, functional areas (e.g., finance), "four C's" (common interests, conflicting interests, compromise, and criteria for undertaking negotiation), the environment (political, economic, social and cultural systems), and "perspective" (broad factors such as previous negotiation experiences that influence the negotiation at hand). Though not all clearly defined, these "lenses" would discern still more facets of the CGE-ITT case: for example, the activities of the companies' financial, legal and operations representatives, and common interests such as improved competitiveness and standing in the telecom equipment market.

Most recently, the "conceptual paradigm" of international business negotiation set forth by Tung (1988) clearly describes environmental factors only alluded to in its antecedents (e.g., Weiss and Stripp 1985, p. 5). In addition to this environmental context (political, economic, institutional-legal, cultural), the paradigm consists of the negotiation context, negotiator characteristics, strategic selections and process, and the negotiation outcome. Thus, finally, in the CGE-ITT case, this view would include factors such as the French and US economic contexts, the complexity of issues (e.g., valuation of assets in 43 countries), and the influence of Araskog's and Pebereau's personalities on their selection of negotiation strategies.

Bases for Further Development

As the foregoing review has shown, existing frameworks and models project considerably different views of the same phenomenon. What one perspective makes obvious may remain hidden from another. Granted, some of these models (e.g., the intraorganizational bargaining model) were not originally intended for more than a limited set of aspects. But there is no framework that satisfactorily situates or "synthesizes" them (Blalock 1989, p. 2).

Notwithstanding their original intent, a number of these models have come to be treated as competing alternatives (Putnam 1990). Empirical research on international business negotiations has long been split between two uncommunicative streams (despite their common footing in a strategic perspective): a macro-strategic stream on MNE-host government bargaining that concentrates on the organizations as unitary wholes (e.g., Grosse and Aramburu 1990, Kobrin 1987, Vernon 1968); and a micro- behavioral stream directed at bargaining between individuals in different cultures (e.g., Adler, Graham and Schwarz Gehrke 1987; Harnett and Cummings 1980).


Further, as mentioned earlier, there remains a fair amount of unexplained variance in the proceedings and outcomes of complex, international negotiation.

For researchers interested in a broad understanding of the phenomenon, the views from several existing frameworks can be seen as complementary rather than conflicting parts of the same picture. They can be brought together in an "inclusive" perspective (Blalock 1989, p. 2) in much the way that Kochan and Katz (1988) and Tung (1988) augmented the strategic bargaining model. As Runkel and McGrath have noted (1972, pp. 17-20), "laying out the boundaries and structure of the entire domain of relevance" enhances the planning and interpretation of empirical research, and can be guided by their concept of "facet design."

For such an undertaking, the review above raises one other basic issue: the need for-and validity of-an explicitly international form for a framework for complex, international negotiations. Many writers distinguish international negotiations from domestic ones on the basis of the former's "complexity" (Fayerweather and Kapoor 1976, Newsom 1984). The evidence cited includes cultural differences, legal pluralism, monetary factors, and ideological diversity (Salacuse 1988); and uncertainty (Mascarenhas 1982). Still, with respect to complex, business negotiations, there are two important reasons to develop an analytic approach not rigidly bound to an international context.

First, the traditional criteria for distinguishing international from domestic are difficult to operationalize, even questionable in their validity. As defined earlier, international business negotiation is not always complex: Bargaining between an American tourist and a street vendor in Hong Kong over the price of a T-shirt may (or may not) present some hurdles in language and custom, but rarely entails information overload and other features of complexity (Winham 1977, p. 350). And not all domestic negotiation is contrastingly simple (recall Kochan and Katz 1988). More poignantly, when the focus from the outset is on complex negotiation, "complexity" offers little leverage for distinguishing between domestic and international arenas.

The two arenas have also been analyzed differently on the assumption that the international arena involves greater variation, especially with respect to "[national] cultural differences." It seems more prudent, however, not to make an a priori "assumption of (large) difference" and to allow for similarities and for small as well as large differences. Besides the international negotiations in which a party's behavior differs markedly from the counterpart's (e.g., typically, Americans and Soviets), there are negotiations between parties who have much in common (e.g., Americans (US) and Canadians; see Hofstede 1984, pp. 77, 122, 158). In the same vein, the "assumption of similarity" concerning parties and conditions within a country, which lies implicit in much literature on international negotiation, does not stand up against studies of heterogeneous countries like the US (see Hopkins and Hopkins 1990).

Contemporary international business has blurred many of the traditional lines between national cultural contexts. Some parties and their contexts are easily identified and located, but many others are not. A French-born, US-educated businessper- son working in Paris for a subsidiary of an American firm may negotiate with an American employed by a French company, or with any one of numerous other types of counterparts. Besides, the effects of cultural factors on negotiation outcomes may be overwhelmed by international or global factors such as industrial competition.

Second and most importantly, an internationally-motivated but generally-applicable framework represents a more powerful analytic tool than one limited to international business negotiation (Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey 1988, pp. 33-34; Janosik 1987). The former would broaden understanding of complex, intranational negotiation by pointing to variables often left aside as constants and would militate against simple comparisons of negotiations in different countries. A general perspective allows a


researcher to follow an entire complex negotiation (even when its international and domestic lines shift or blur over time) and to examine, from a consistent viewpoint, a firm's full experience with interorganizational negotiations.

The RBC Perspective

The RBC Perspective introduced below is intended to be an inclusive, analytic perspective that furthers broad understanding of complex negotiations. More specifically, it aims to enhance the meaningfulness and validity of descriptions and explanations of complex negotiation processes and outcomes, and ultimately, to enhance the effectiveness of prescriptions for negotiators. It applies to all complex negotiations, not only the international ones of interest here.

Mnemonically labeled after its three key facets (Relationships, Behaviors, Condi- tions), the RBC Perspective directs attention to parties' relationships as the crux of a negotiation and its analysis. Describing and explaining various aspects of these relationships entails consideration of constituent actors and their behaviors, and relevant influencing conditions. Otherwise put, the core, driving logic of this approach

is a causal, B4

NC linkage. This perspective incorporates the behavioral thrust of the strategic bargaining

model and the contexts attended in Thomas's (1976), Kochan and Katz's (1988), and

aforementioned international business negotiation frameworks. The B' c logic in particular draws support from Snyder and Diesing's (1977, p. 47) threefold conceptualization of intergovernmental crisis bargaining (structure, relations, interactions) and from the "interactional view" (Chatman 1989; Pervin 1989) and other proponents (Runkel and McGrath 1972, p. 32) of the effects of actors and situations, or contexts, on behavior. Each RBC facet will be discussed in detail below.

The RBC Perspective is best represented by a framework and a complementary, basic model, and they guide the detailed development in the next section. The RBC Framework enables one to see the "entire domain" of complex, bilateral (two-organization) and multilateral negotiations: the three RBC facets, including associated analytic levels and sets, and time periods (recall their inclusion in prescriptive frameworks reviewed above). These analytic and temporal views are respectively set forth as vertical and horizontal dimensions in Table 1. While its view of facets and

elements is comprehensive, this framework cannot project the dynamic B C logic of the RBC Perspective. That logic is elaborated in the Basic Model in Figure 1. It depicts a bilateral, complex negotiation and represents only one time period, or segment of one, in Table 1, but should be considered iterative.

Since Table 1 identifies each facet of the RBC Perspective and provides a comprehensive overview, it structures the following discussion of relationships, behav-

iors, conditions and time periods. The underlying B NC logic, and Figure 1 specifically, are referred to as needed. (Figure 1 is also discussed in the section on Applications, under Developing RBC-Based Models.)

Relationships between Primary Parties

As the lead component of the RBC Perspective (see Table 1, Figure 1), Relation- ships between Primary Parties represents a distinctive analytic orientation and focus. Its basis, the nature of the parties involved, and types of relationships deserve separate attention.

Relationships as a Focus. A "relationship" denotes two or more parties' being connected. Writers have explicated "essential elements" (e.g., interdependence in


TABLE 1 The RBC Framework for Complex Negotiations

ANALYTIC FOCUS (FACET) Level/Set

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PRIMARY PARTIES

Interorganizational

Intergroup

Interpersonal

Cross-level

BEHAVIORS OF PRIMARY PARTIES

Organizations'

Groups' (Teams')

Individuals'

CONDITIONS

Circumstances

Capabilities

Cultures

Environments

Pre-negotiation Negotiation Post-negotiation

Time Period

2 -:s: rs ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..........................................--............... .. -.-s

Capabilities X Culturesx c

Environment x

BY M3~~~~~~~~~~~~ Rclatimshps X-Y Coditions y RelatioshipsfX-

Organization's Groupe u (Teams') B

/t Individuale' fi \B

Interorganizational Circumstance Interorganizational _/ Intergroup > Culture XY- Intergroup,,> Interpersonal Environmentxy Interpersonal Cross-levelCrs-el

BeS.SU haviors of Y O rg

. ........

o Organxzation's / DBy

Groups' (Teamspe N T B BX Individuals'Me

Fs oditionsy

|Capabilities y XCY |Cultures y| |Environmenty l

FIGURE 1. Basic RBC Model of Complex Negotiation: The Bilateral (X -Y) Case.


consequences of behavior, in Kelley 1979, p. 3) and have distinguished between "continuing connectedness" and discrete interactions (e.g., Snyder and Diesing 1977, p. 472). But their common thrust is what Saunders (1990) vividly refers to as "the space in between" the parties.

That is the general sense of the term "relationships" for the RBC Perspective. The term refers to all aspects of the parties' connectedness to each other as negotiators: the overall pattern as well as discrete interactions (Saunders 1990); the dynamic and the structural (Fombrun 1986); the task- and process-oriented (Collins and Guetzkow 1964, p. 81). The term is used analytically, "neutrally," not to connote any one kind of relationship (e.g., a positive one).

Focusing on "the space in between" is central to meaningful analysis of negotiation, as a growing number of writers have asserted (e.g., Fisher and Brown 1988; Greenhalgh 1987; Greenhalgh and Kramer 1990; Saunders 1987, 1990), for three major reasons. First, negotiation, by definition (see above), concerns a relationship between two or more parties. Its vicissitudes and potentialities generate the issues to be negotiated and the targets sought.

Second, from a methodological viewpoint, describing and explaining the ensuing negotiation process as an essentially interactive, jointly determined phenomenon requires an analytically complementary approach (see Zartman 1976, p. 8 on "mutual movement"). Like conflict, communication and agreement, negotiation compels ana- lysts to treat parties' actions as interrelated. To proceed otherwise, to use individually-oriented analyses, risks "ecological fallacy" (Waltz 1971).

Third, the outcome of a negotiation usually has multiple attributes, many of which go unattended in the absence of an overarching, relationship-based perspective. Existing frameworks (e.g., Tung 1988) set the outcome apart from the negotiation process and the parties' relationship, define it in terms of each party's payoff or tangible gain, and treat those gains as the parties' only purpose for negotiating. Researchers' growing use of joint and individual measures of gain represents an improvement. Still, in many non-Western cultures and arguably in many Western ones, negotiators' paramount concern is the nature of the interaction or the broader relationship (see Graham 1987 on client satisfaction and interpersonal attraction). Some negotiations are simply not aimed at explicit or tangible outcomes (see Weiss and Stripp 1985, p. 41; Ikle 1976, pp. 43ff).

As part of the RBC Perspective, the Relationships facet designates a number of variables for investigation. It encompasses conceivable independent variables such as the commonality of parties' interests, balance of power and levels of trust as well as dependent variables such as the intensity of expressed conflict, occurrence of turning points and the extent of agreement achieved. The outcome of a negotiation lies within this facet, not within Behaviors, because of the argument above and its joint determination by parties. Even impasses and unilateral withdrawals can be fully characterized only with reference to the parties' relationship.

Parties to Complex Negotiation. The RBC Framework addresses parties to negotiation (the "actors") indirectly, under Relationships and Behaviors, since the three facets seem relatively more important and parsimonious as a set. Not all of a social actor's constitutive characteristics and behaviors pertain to a negotiation analysis. Still, to use the framework, a researcher must identify parties. That calls for two considerations: the type of party, and level of behavior or activity.

Primary Parties and Others. Following Wehr (1979), there are three types of parties to negotiation: primary, secondary and third. Primary parties have interrelated goals and have become or plan to become engaged in direct talks. Secondary parties have an indirect stake in the outcome but do not consider themselves directly involved. In


the CGE-ITT case, the primary parties were CGE, ITT and the French Finance ministry, and the secondary parties included competitors such as AT&T and customers such as the Mexican government. Third-party neutrals (those who work between primary parties toward an agreement satisfactory to all) did not play a regular role, although Michel David-Weill of Lazard Freres facilitated several interactions. (In order to maintain the RBC Framework's focus on primary parties' negotiations, secondary and third parties are considered among Conditions (see Table 1: Circumstances, Environment).)

The identification and classification of parties should take parties' perceptions into account (Greenhalgh and Kramer 1990) but not depend entirely on them. Most primary parties would probably identify each other. On occasion, however, primary parties ignore or unintentionally exclude other parties who may have a primary or secondary role. For research purposes, the key qualification should be that the actor qua party can affect the negotiation process and the development of an outcome.

Levels and Units. The most obvious primary parties to complex negotiation, as it is defined above, are organizations. The "CGE-ITT negotiation" label is a case in point. Indeed, most studies of such negotiations treat organizations abstractly as parties (e.g., Wall 1985) or as unitary wholes (e.g., Fagre and Wells 1982) in line with the strategic bargaining model. But as Rousseau (1985, p. 2) concluded about management research in general, they neglect "...the multi-level and cross-level character of organizational phenomena."

Work in various fields suggests that, in complex social phenomena, actors exist on more than one level, act differently as units and influence each other across levels. This work includes in conflict literature, Boulding (1962) and Herman and Brady (1972); in international relations, Crane (1984) and Ikle (1976); in organization theory, Roberts (1970) and Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton (1981); and in political science, Allison (1971) and Waltz (1954). Accordingly, the RBC Perspective incorporates the three levels of analysis commonly acknowledged in the social sciences: organizational (for definitions, see Daft 1983, p. 8; Scott 1987, pp. 20-23), group (Condor and Brown 1989, p. 12; Gersick 1988, pp. 12-13; Hare 1982, p. 20), and the individual human being.

That allows a researcher to study parties to complex negotiation either by separately examining the three types of corresponding "focal units" (Rousseau 1985) as Allison (1971) did, or by decomposing organizations into constitutive groups and individuals (cf. Mayer's 1988 concept of "nested negotiations"). Groups may be especially important to attend to since they "form a link between the individual and the organization" (Gladstein, 1984, p. 499), play a prominent role in negotiations involving Asian and other non-US cultures (see Stewart and Keown 1989, p. 71), and have not been widely studied in the context of negotiation (see Brett and Rognes 1986, Carlisle and Leary 1981).

Relationships in Complex Negotiations. The foregoing distinctions among primary parties suggest three corresponding relationship types: interorganizational, intergroup and interpersonal (see Table 1 (top of the vertical, analytical dimension)). Relation- ships between like units of analysis can be labeled "symmetric." Asymmetric or cross-level relationships between unlike units also occur as a fourth type. For example, a chief executive of one organization may meet with a second firm's negotiating team.

Including four relationship types at the outset of an analysis complicates the task considerably. Yet, as Morley, Webb and Stephenson (1988, p. 120) have observed with respect to groups and intergroup relationships, to do otherwise is to "distort" the social context of negotiation.


Specific Elements of Relationships and Other Facets. The rest of the RBC Frame- work and the Basic Model may be more clearly understood and substantiated with examples for each of the cells in Table 1. Replicating that structure, Table 2 furnishes examples from international, company-company negotiations. (Company-government or multilateral negotiations would require few modifications.) Illustrative rather than exhaustive, the cell entries draw upon a number of sources-the frameworks reviewed earlier, other internationally-oriented and generic works on negotiation, and negotiation lore.

Each entry represents an examinable area of variation. Some entries are generally stated, but many others are well enough specified to be treated as variables. For instance at the top of Table 2, in the middle, the "Relationships-Interpersonal/ Negotiation Period" cell includes number of issues and character of interaction. To relate the variables to each other and designate them as dependent, intervening or independent, a researcher may refer to Figure 1.

Table 2 contains distinctly objective and subjective elements as well as elements that can be examined both ways (see Kelley and Thibaut 1978, p. 13; cf. North 1977, p. 577). Staying with "Relationships/Negotiation Period" in Table 2, a researcher could objectively measure the extent of use of working groups but subjectively measure, via parties' self-perceptions and perceptions of the others' perceptions, trust level and degree of rapport (see Greenhalgh and Kramer 1990, Hopmann and King 1976). The common interests involved, on the other hand, could be viewed both ways. The viewpoint the researcher chooses should be based on the investigative purpose (e.g., description, explanation, prescription), specific research questions, and knowledge of the subjects' cultures (e.g., emic, etic). Similar observations hold for Behav- iors and Conditions.

Behaviors of Primary Parties

The second major facet of complex negotiation highlighted by the RBC Framework (the middle tier of the vertical dimension in Table 1) is primary parties' behaviors, that is, the behaviors of a primary party directed toward or affecting the other party as a party to the negotiation. The term covers behavior with unintended effects upon the negotiating counterpart as well as intentional negotiating actions. Specifically, it includes cognitive domains such as perception, information-processing and judgment (Bazerman 1983); verbal styles; making substantive concessions; and general approaches such as integrative or "tough."

Focusing on parties' behaviors as part of a comprehensive, analytic perspective is supported by the models reviewed earlier and by other research (e.g., Runkel and McGrath 1972). Negotiation calls for action by parties. Their respective behaviors influence the nature, course and results of their negotiations and relationships (Goffman 1969, Hayley 1963). In other words, this focus shifts attention to each side of "the space in between" (see Figure 1).

Table 1 and Figure 1 show three levels of behavior in complex negotiation: organizations', groups' and individuals'. Some types of behavior (e.g., formulating a proposal) are conceivable at every level; other behavior appears peculiar to or characteristic of only one (e.g., perceptions, on the individual level).

The behavior of each focal unit can be investigated according to the "arena" in which it occurs, or the targets to which it is directed. Colosi (1983) has suggested three such arenas (cf. Kelley and Thibaut 1978, pp. 31ff, 283). The RBC Perspective adds another three for a total of six postulated arenas for primary party behavior: independent (undertaken by a party itself and relevant to the negotiation, but not communicated to the other primary party, e.g., planning); horizontal (action directed at the counterpart, typically at the negotiating table); internal (activity within a party


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such as a negotiating team); vertical (a party's communications with its superior or subordinate); lateral (nonvertical, negotiation-relevant actions directed at a party's peers or colleagues); and external (directed beyond the negotiation setting and the primary parties, e.g., to mass media). (See Figure 2.)

With the exception of the internal arena, each arena is open to each of the three focal units and its corresponding analytic level. An organization may behave vertically if it is a subsidiary (e.g., ITT's West German subsidiary, SEL) or laterally, as a member of an intercompany business group (e.g., the Japanese kigyoshudan). In every one of these arenas, the focal unit-organization, group, or individual-is treated as an indivisible whole.

The sixth arena-the internal workings of a party (recall the models of Walton and McKersie 1965 and Kochan and Katz 1988)-requires special treatment because internal behaviors cannot be studied on a single level of analysis or more accurately, with only one focal unit. Organizations' Behaviors-Internal must be examined at the group and/or individual levels, and Groups' Behaviors-Internal, at the individual level. (Internal activity for individuals is not considered here.) Table 2 thus locates internal arenas between levels of behavior.

These arenas underscore the relevance and potential value of multilevel behavioral analysis for complex negotiations. Action apparent in the horizontal arena may actually be intended for internal or external targets. Behavior on one level can affect behavior on another. And behavior on one level can affect relationships on that level or on a different one. In the CGE-ITT case, ITT's activities, the Araskog-Pebereau (chairmen's) relationship and the CGE-ITT relationship were influenced by Araskog's behavior, which included standing firm on the price of ITT's telecom business, communicating regularly with Michel David-Weill and other ITT directors, and contacting other possible suitors. (See Table 2: Behaviors/Negotiation Period for general examples.)

Conditions

The third of the three major facets in the RBC Framework (the bottom tier of the vertical dimension in Table 1) is Conditions: factors that stimulate, restrict or otherwise modify the primary parties' behaviors and relationships in a complex


negotiation. These factors may be events, contexts, states of being or nonprimary parties' actions (primary parties' previous behaviors or relationships will be placed elsewhere in the framework).

Several of the frameworks reviewed above (e.g., Fayerweather and Kapoor 1976, Kochan and Katz 1988, Thomas 1976, Tung 1988), various other works on negotiation (Druckman 1971; Evans and Beltramini 1987; Jonsson 1978; Rubin and Brown 1975, p. 36; Sawyer and Guetzkow 1965), and other behavioral research (Barker and Wright 1955, Oliver 1990, Pervin 1989) have underscored the analytic importance of address- ing such factors. Certainly the interpretation of a CGE negotiator's reading aloud a 10-page proposal to an ITT counterpart depends in part on whether he does so in a formal, intercompany negotiation session or in a public concert hall during a sym- phony attended by the two companies' negotiating teams. At the same time, the assortment of terms used in these studies ("conditions," "background factors," " context," " environment," " orientation," "situation" and "structural context") suggests that this area of inquiry has not been systematically or sufficiently developed, especially for international negotiations.

The RBC Perspective uses the word "conditions" to reflect the active, motivating and influencing role of these factors and in order to augment existing work, distin- guishes four sets of them: circumstances, capabilities, cultures, and environments (see Table 1). Each set represents resources and constraints, and incentives and deterrents for primary parties. The sets differ in the loci of their main impacts.

Circumstances refers to physical and social features of the negotiation "site(s)" (in a broad sense) that apply to both primary parties. It parallels Rubin and Brown's (1975, pp. 36-37) "structural context" of bargaining and includes the neutrality of the site, the availability of diverse communication channels (e.g., face-to-face, telephone, facsimile (see Carnevale, Pruitt and Seilheimer 1981; Rutter 1987)), commonality of industry customs, coverage by mass media, and the presence of interpreters and third party neutrals (see Table 2: Conditions-Circumstances/Negotiation Period). Al- though the mere presence or absence of a prior primary party relationship is relevant here, particular qualities of the relationship such as trust levels are assigned to the Relationships (pre-negotiation) facet. Circumstances of the CGE-ITT negotiation included the time pressure on both parties to reach an agreement before the end of 1986.

Such circumstances can affect the behavior and relationships of primary parties at any level-organizational, group or individual (see Figure 1). Counterparts may respond differently to a given set of circumstances, and the framework admits that possibility. The approaching end of the Gregorian calendar year, for instance, generally does not pressure Latins and Arabs as much as it does urban Americans (Weiss and Stripp 1985).

Beyond Circumstances lie three sets of conditions that apply to each primary party separately, for the most part, and reflect distinguishable emphases, if not clear-cut boundaries. Their inclusion originated with each set's usual association with one type of focal unit (individual, group and organization), but all three sets are seen as potential influences on each unit's behavior. These conditions can be construed as concentric rings around a primary party, with wider rings representing conditions spatially and temporally more distant from the party (see Figure 3). This configura- tion suggests that parties are more conscious of smaller ring conditions, but that has yet to be empirically explored and validated.

Capabilities denotes the skills, resources and traits of a primary party that enable it to influence and be influenced by a counterpart, either directly, or indirectly via Behaviors (see Figure 1). Skills and resources have appeared in aforementioned frameworks (e.g., Fayerweather and Kapoor 1976, Thomas 1976, Tung 1988) and in


Notes X: Company X, Y: Firm Y Ci: Circumstances, Ca: Capabilities, Cu: Cultures, E: Environments

FIGURE 3. The FOUr Sets of Conditions in the RBC Perspective.

empirical studies in international relations (e.g., Bennett and Sharpe 1979, p. 60; Bueno de Mesquita 1990, p. 331; Maoz 1989; North 1977, p. 575; North and Choucri 1983). Traits are included in the RBC Perspective to further its cross-cultural applicability, since, in many cultures, a negotiator's ability to influence others appears to rest more on status than on skills (Graham 1983, Weiss and Stripp 1985). Table 2 lists specific elements such as a party's negotiating experience (Evans and Beltramini 1987, p. 61), disposition and motivations (Rubin and Brown 1975, pp. 158ff), personality (Herman and Kogan 1977), and authority (Pruitt 1981, pp. 41-43). More concretely, in the CGE-ITT talks, one such capability was the financial expertise of CGE staff needed to valuate ITT's worldwide telecom business.

Cultures refers to both the acquired knowledge used by a people to interpret their world and to act purposefully (Spradley and McCurdy 1971, p. 2) and to the set of learned behaviors they share (Gregory 1983, p. 364). The internationally-oriented negotiation frameworks above that include a cultural component tend to refer solely to national groupings of people, but primary parties to a negotiation also belong to ethnic and organizational cultures (see Frost et al. 1985, Schneider 1988). For the CGE-ITT talks, the RBC Cultures' view would encompass the extent of information- sharing between finance and legal departments at ITT and the nature of French negotiating practices. All such cultures can shape a party's basic concept of the negotiation process, expectations concerning aspects of interaction with a counterpart, and their actual behavior (Eldridge 1979, pp. 49ff; Weiss and Stripp 1985).

In complex negotiations, some cultural conditions of the parties may intersect or apply jointly (see Figure 3). In a negotiation between a US-based Company X and a French Firm Y, a French person employed by Company X faces a team of compatri- ots. Less obviously, both primary parties may come from the cultural value cluster of "Anglo countries" (Hofstede 1984, p. 191) or more broadly, from "modern" (e.g., industrial, high-tech), "western" or "traditional" cultures. They would fall under Cu1tureXy in Figure 1.

Two other ostensibly cultural factors are specially classified. First, both parties may come from or form a "negotiator subculture" or international business (or government) elite (see Everett, Stening and Longton 1982; Zartman and Berman 1982, pp. 226-227). A CGE negotiator interviewed by the author spoke of the "M&A" [merger and acquisition] nature of the talks, and how it brought into play certain M&A procedures and behavior. Since these subcultures rest on the parties' roles as negotiators, not their membership in broad collectivities, and extend beyond the dimensions of a relationship, they fit within Circumstances. Second, the RBC view of general characteristics of a particular kind of cross- or multicultural exchange (e.g.,


Franco-American) depends on the parties' awareness of them. Unattended, the characteristics represent a possible output of analysis. In other cases, they show up in planning (Pre-negotiation Behaviors), in parties' previous joint experiences (Relation- ships/ Post-negotiation of a previous negotiation), or in the particular character of the parties' interaction (Relationship).

In concept, capabilities and cultures apply to any type of primary party. Organiza- tions as well as individuals can have negotiating experience and be influenced by national or ethnic culture. There are organizations (pers. comm.) that compile their negotiation experiences for use by their representatives in future negotiations.

Finally, Environments refers, as Aldrich (1979, p. xii) has written, not simply to [non-cultural] "elements 'out there' beyond a set of focal organizations, but rather to concentrations of resources, power, political domination, and most concretely, other organizations." These environmental factors affect parties' behavior and relationships (recall Fayerweather and Kapoor 1976, Kochan and Katz 1988 and Tung 1988). Table 2 (Conditions-Environments/Negotiation Period) thus includes commonly recognized elements such as host and home governments' policies, respective economic and legal systems, and elements that are not strictly country- or location-specific (e.g., multilateral, regional and global conditions under Environment xy in Figure 1). The CGE-ITT case again offers concrete examples: the competitiveness of the worldwide telecom market, the protectionist telecom policies of European governments, the EC92 movement, uncertain foreign exchange markets, the French government's pending privatization of CGE, and concurrent negotiations with AT&T.

The discussion thus far has concentrated on the influence of conditions on parties' behaviors and relationships, but parties can also act, individually or in concert, to modify some conditions (see Figure 1). Consider, for instance, circumstances and capabilities such as conference location, provision of a portable computer for joint use, and excessive staff in the negotiating room. Similarly, cultures not only influence parties' behavior, but adapt and change because of it. And while many environmental conditions seem beyond the reach of primary parties to a negotiation, others can be altered (cf. the immutability of the environment asserted by Rugman, Lecraw and Booth 1985 and the incremental nature of change in Kochan and Katz 1988, p. 11). Araskog (1989, p. 168) and other ITT executives persuaded the US Department of Defense not to execute plans to cut off ITT's German subsidiary's access to classified information (see also Murray 1983). Because complex negotiations often last months or years, such changes may represent critical pieces of the picture.

Time Periods

The last dimension of the RBC Framework (depicted horizontally in Table 1) represents the kind of temporal view espoused by the prescriptive frameworks above (Carpenter and Kennedy 1988, Susskind and Cruikshank 1987) and other practi- tioner-oriented work (e.g., Gray 1989, p. 5-7; McDonald 1986, pp. 311-315; Reck and Long 1985). It is also important to incorporate given the emphasis on history, tradition, and long-term futures in many nations and cultures (Weiss and Stripp 1985), and empirical evidence from American negotiators that parties' previous experiences and concerns about the future affect their behavior and relationships (Pruitt 1983, Thompson 1989). This temporal dimension applies to each of the three RBC facets and consists of three time periods centering on the course of the primary parties' relationship (as opposed to the parties' individual and potentially staggered activities): pre-negotiation, negotiation and post-negotiation.

Pre-negotiation begins as soon as one party decides to negotiate with another primary party, goes on to involve separate and joint planning (Morley 1982), and ends when the parties begin responding to their counterparts' initial proposals for resolu-


tion of outstanding issues (cf. Saunders 1985; Zartman 1989, p. 4). The negotiation period commences when parties set forth an agenda with intentions to engage in mutual give-and-take or when they both move from their initial positions; covers their formal and informal negotiating behavior, explicit and "tacit" communications (Schelling 1960); and continues through the attainment of a negotiation outcome, whether it is an agreement, nonagreement or something in between. Post-negotiation begins thereafter, when parties attempt to follow through or otherwise live with their accomplishment. This period carries no fixed endpoint. (See specific elements in Table 2.)

For the CGE-ITT negotiations, the pre-negotiation period reportedly ran from April 11, 1985, when CGE's Pebereau informed ITT's Araskog that he had been approached about a takeover of ITT, to November 1985, when Araskog proposed a joint venture with CGE-majority ownership (Araskog 1989). The negotiation period extended from that meeting to the December 30, 1986 signings of formal agreements. And the post-negotiation period since then has included ITT's sale of 7% of Alcatel, n.v. to CGE in June 1990.

Three clarifications ought to be made, however. First, some time boundaries of actual negotiations (e.g., the very beginning of pre-negotiation (see Stein 1989); the end of post-negotiation and the beginning of pre-negotiation in repeated or serial negotiations) may be difficult for researchers and practitioners to pinpoint. Re- searchers can handle that problem to some extent by investigating more than one set of temporal specifications (Chan 1978, Hopmann and King 1976). Second, befitting the definition of negotiation at the outset, the three time periods are defined with respect to the parties' relationship, but that does not imply simultaneous or constant activity by both parties. This conceptualization allows for times during a period when only one party is active. And third, the three-period sequence does not constrain an analyst to a linear view of the finer-grain activity within periods. Graham (1987) and others have proposed stages primarily for the negotiation period, but evidence for them is still sketchy, and other researchers (e.g., Gulliver 1979, p. 84) have propounded cyclical or uneven development of relationships. American negotiators have reported no discernible pattern in their talks with Saudis (Weiss and Stripp 1985). At this point in research, the three broad time periods of the RBC Framework appear generally applicable and sufficiently useful for analysis.

Empirical and Practical Applications for International Business

Fully elaborated, the RBC Perspective presents a picture of complex, international business negotiation considerably richer than existing analytic views and more useful for a broad understanding. That would emerge in a complete RBC view of the CGE-ITT talks, and although it cannot be laid out in this space, many components have been identified and could be used in that effort. One can review the initial illustration of the talks for all of the elements that this view does include.

More generally, the RBC Perspective can contribute in several ways to future research and practice in complex, international business negotiation. The following section addresses three basic research endeavors: asking questions, building and testing RBC-based models, and cumulating knowledge. At this stage of research, each endeavor plays a valuable role. Their benefits for practitioners, along with direct, practical uses of this perspective, are taken up in the last part of the section.

Question-Asking

The RBC Framework in Tables 1 and 2 and Basic Model in Figure 1 elicit a wide range of descriptive, explanatory, and prescriptive questions about complex, interna-


tional negotiation. They concern the nature of individual facets and cells as well as the relationships between them, single as well as multiple analytic levels, and hitherto neglected areas as well as new angles on previously-raised questions. This variety is shown below in five questions.

Descriptions of Process

Q1. What kinds of communicative behavior used by negotiators to "fine-tune" relationships in their own cultures are unreliable in cross-cultural and cross-linguistic relationships?

Q2. How do teams in international negotiations tend to respond to the three, simultaneous sets of pressures emanating from their own, their counterparts', and common environments?

Answering Q2 could entail study of perception and the tension between environmental constraints and incentives ("threats" and "opportunities" in Dutton and Jackson 1987); variation, by national culture, in teams' responsiveness to environments (e.g., manipulation, resignation); the relative attention a team gives to each set of pressures when the sets conflict; and the determinants of coordinated versus independent responses by the teams.

Concentrating on Q1, one finds that research on negotiators' communicative behavior has traditionally been limited in scope to "offers" and "threats," with relatively few studies of the subtle ways American and other negotiators shape relationships (see van der Wijst, forthcoming; Weiss 1985). Yet, popular treatments of the Japanese language (e.g., Imai 1975) have underscored differences between pub- licly expressed meanings (e.g., "We'll study it") and intended meanings ("No way"). And cross-cultural communication research proffers nonverbal variables such as claiming space, touch, eye contact, and amount of silence (Gudykunst and Ting- Toomey 1988, pp. 99-133) and the concept of communicative context, that is, whether the information in a verbal message is primarily conveyed explicitly in the speaker's code (low context culture) or in the circumstances (high context) (Hall 1976, p. 79). That suggests the proposition:

P1.1. Statements typically used by high-context culture negotiators to convey rejec- tion of a proposal are misinterpreted in cross-cultural negotiations with counterparts from low-context cultures.

There is preliminary confirmatory evidence of P1.1 (see Chua and Gudykunst 1987). Going further, however, the RBC Perspective suggests mediating factors:

P1.2. The nature and magnitude of the effects of a negotiator's communicative behaviors on his relationship with a counterpart from another culture depend on the circumstances and on the counterpart's capabilities.

These propositions and others related to Q1 could be explored experimentally or in situ, via direct observation, content analysis of transcripts, or questionnaires. Additional confirmation of the first proposition would serve as a caution to practicing, international negotiators. The second proposition could lead negotiators to be more skeptical about popular maxims and to develop contingency guidelines for uses of different communicative styles.

Explanation of Outcomes

Q3. During complex, international negotiations, how does incongruity in qualities of relationships across the three main RBC levels affect development of an agree-


ment? Do the perception of incongruity and its effect differ by organizational or national culture?

Q4. How much variation in the outcomes of complex, international negotiations can be explained by variables representing the following RBC facets from pre-negotiation and negotiation periods: (a) the pre-negotiation, interorganizational relationship, (b) organizations' environments during pre-negotiation, (c) circumstances during negotiation, (d) organizations' capabilities during negotiation, (e) organizations' cultures during negotiation, (f) groups' negotiating behaviors, and (g) individuals' negotiating behaviors?

Question Q4 envinces the breadth and richness of the RBC Perspective and will be considered in the section on models.

The first part of Q3 relates to Araskog's admission (1989, p. 195) that Suard's succeeding Pebereau at CGE caused him to worry about achieving a final, CGE-ITT agreement-notwithstanding the commonality of interests within the interorganizational relationship. Still, granting the desirability of congruity in relationship qualities across all levels, especially in the long run, one could more intriguingly postulate that it is not a necessary condition during the negotiation period for achievement of an agreement. In one complex, US-Japanese negotiation that reached an agreement, both sets of negotiators interviewed by the author (pers. comm.) characterized their interpersonal relationships negatively. Hence:

P3.1. When incongruity occurs in a complex, international negotiation, an interorganizational agreement will still develop if there is an influential, agreement-promoting relationship on at least one level.

P3.2. The salience and impact of relationships on different levels (e.g., intergroup, interpersonal) vary with time in a negotiation.

P3.3. Incongruity in relationship qualities on different levels affect Asian and Arab parties' behavior more negatively than it does American and French parties' behavior.

For empirical studies, a researcher could operationally define relationship quality on a positive-negative scale (Loewenstein, Thompson and Bazerman 1989) or according to types such as "symbiosis" and "enmity" (see Greenhalgh and Kramer 1990). Data on the number, membership and quality of interpersonal and intergroup relationships in a negotiation could be drawn from individual negotiators and their counterparts in interviews or questionnaires. Interorganizational relationship quality could be seen as an aggregate of the qualities of top executives' relationships, or perhaps as the nature and number of current linkages between the organizations outside the negotiation at hand. If validated, these propositions would encourage practicing negotiators to pay greater attention to alternative relationship foci and to the timing of their relationship-building efforts.

Prescriptions

Q5. In order to sustain movement toward a satisfactory outcome in complex negotiations, how should executives manage the intraparty behaviors that occur in diverse arenas and the interparty relationships in development on different levels?

Prompted by Figures 1 and 2, this question assumes that complexity threatens rather than facilitates the creation of an agreement. That has yet to be established empirically.

In the CGE-ITT talks, the dispersion of horizontal arenas in 43 countries led CGE executives to set up an ad hoc management committee as an internal, coordinating


body. A CGE negotiator interviewed by the author (pers. comm.) also propounded the importance of speed and limited participation in the first phase of negotiations. Thus:

P5.1. Top executives who personally represent their organizations, restrict the number of participants, and rapidly develop a "heads of agreement" as a prelude to detailed negotiations by others, realize a final, interorganizational agreement more often than those who assign complete responsibility for a detailed agreement, from start to finish, to negotiation teams.

Investigating this and other management responses (e.g., advisory committees for the external arena) would require intensive negotiation simulation or field research, but the results would have direct, practical implications.

These questions represent a small sample of the diverse possibilities raised by the RBC Perspective. It poses a large research agenda. Nevertheless, for each query, the framework provides the researcher with an overarching picture-the overall domain of relevance.

Developing and Testing RBC-Based Models

In addition to distinguishing individual facets and elements of complex negotiation (see Tables 1 and 2), the RBC Perspective suggests relationships between them that

have been discussed, up to this point, primarily in terms of the core B logic. Elaborating on that, Figure 1 presented the Basic RBC Model, which sets forth major -albeit not all conceivable-relationships between facets of a two-organization (X, Y) negotiation. (The temporal dimension runs left to right in the figure.) Corresponding equations include: (El) Rt = f(Bxt, Byt, Cxyt); (E2) Bxt =

f(Cxt_1, Cxyt-1, Byt_1, Rt-1); and (E3) Byt = f(Cyt-1, Cxyt-1, Bxt-1, Rt-1). Several variables in these equations can be specified at different or at multiple

times, within or across the three basic time periods. Within periods, values of t to examine can range from minutes to months, and may best be set according to the sample of negotiations to be studied (e.g., single-lot toy sales versus multiyear purchases of airplanes). Further, Figure 1 postulates the effect of Rt_1 on Rt as mediated by Bx, By and Cxy but a direct Rt -1 effect could easily be incorporated in (El) and examined empirically as (E1*). Notice also some secondary facet relationships in Figure 1 that were mentioned in the section on Conditions: (E4) Cxt =

f(Cxt1, Bxt-1), and the direct effects of Cx on By, and of Bx, By and Rxy on Cxy (specifically, Circumstances).

Testing the central part of the Basic RBC Model, as represented by Question Q4 and Equation (E1*), could proceed qualitatively or quantitatively. Case studies would test the inclusiveness of the model, since they do not abstract from target phenomena as drastically as other methods do (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 1984). Observations of the CGE-ITT negotiations throughout this article offer the rudiments of a case study. The development of a series of RBC-based studies would further not only evaluation and elaboration of the model, but also knowledge about and comparisons between the cases (see Weiss 1987, 1990; cf. Dupont 1990).

Quantitatively rigorous tests could be designed for data from negotiation simulations (e.g., Winham and Bovis 1979) and from topically wide-ranging surveys (Stewart and Keown 1989; Tung 1982) used in combination with existing data bases on organizational capabilities and environmental conditions (Grosse and Aramburu, 1990). Such investigations could begin with specifications and statistical techniques well established in research on international business negotiation (e.g., Fagre and Wells' 1982 use of percentage foreign ownership of subsidiaries as a proxy for


Three-Facet Relationships (159 possible models)

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Multilevel Configurations Related to Questions Q1-Q5

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causation between facets

FIGURE 4. Partial, RBC-Based Models of Complex Negotiation: Selected Examples.

outcomes of MNE-host government negotiations). Multi-method analysis (e.g., Druckman 1986) also promises to be useful for the RBC Model.

Beyond study of the Basic Model as a whole, a researcher can use the Framework to build and to compare various partial models and secondary relationships, all while remaining within the domain of the framework. Consider the partial models in Figure 4. The six in the top half are a sample of the complete set of 159 possible 3-cell relationships identified by systematically varying the RBC facets and three time


periods (for a precedent, see Rapoport and Guyer 1966). Model (a) roughly reflects Equation (El). (b)-(d) depict other explanations for parties' relationships during negotiation: namely, pre-negotiation and negotiation behaviors (b); pre-negotiation conditions and negotiation behaviors (c); and pre-negotiation relationships and expectations concerning the post-negotiation relationship (d). Further examination may effectively rule out a number of the 159 configurations as implausible (e.g., (e)) or uninteresting ((f)), but their value lies in pushing out the territory initially considered.

The bottom half of Figure 4 consists of multilevel configurations, based on Figure 1, that parallel Questions Q1-Q5. Models (g) and (h) both concern Qi, with (g) reflecting Proposition P1.1 and (h) P1.2. Thus the framework facilitates quick, visually dramatic comparisons of the models.

Cumulating Knowledge

This discussion has referred to existing views and numerous studies, but they do not come out of a well-formulated, widely-recognized "base" of knowledge about international business negotiations. Research studies explicitly concerned with the subject have emerged from different paradigms, with different foci, and their findings have generally remained apart. The RBC Perspective encourages assimilation and provides a coherent structure-cement-for them.

Laying out the entire domain of relevance for complex, international negotiations enables a researcher to consider segmented views and empirical results as pieces of a larger puzzle and to see how and where they fit. One can bring together, for example, the traditionally separate macro-strategic and micro-behavioral research on international business negotiation. Further, RBC's inclusiveness reaches to negotiation-relevant knowledge in different disciplines and fields (see Toyne 1989). References for this article have come from psychology, sociology and political science; social psychology, labor relations and international relations; diverse business areas (e.g., marketing); and fields within management (e.g., organization theory, organizational behavior).

The same perspective can contribute to the development of future knowledge. In Relationships, it provides a clear focus. When it places current knowledge among its cells (Table 1, Figure 1), it also points, by the emptier cells, to facets of complex negotiation that are still relatively unexplored.

Enhancing Practitioners' Effectiveness

Practitioners stand to gain from these research applications. Question-asking, model-building and testing, and knowledge cumulation will lead to better descriptions of the negotiation process and more powerful explanations of variation in outcomes. From that, practitioners can better understand what conducting complex negotiation entails. They may also learn which facets and elements of facets most strongly affect outcomes, which ones to target to influence their counterpart's behavior, which influences on themselves can be modified, and how, generally, individuals, groups and organizations can achieve better outcomes. If these orders appear to be tall in light of the frustrations of negotiation researchers in the 1970s (Bartos 1967), we ought to bear in mind the innovations (e.g., win-win negotiation) that have benefitted practitioners in the 1980s.

In the meantime, practitioners can put the RBC Perspective to use directly. Easily remembered and plausible, it organizes detailed information according to key facets and dynamics. Practitioners can thereby cope with the information overload that characterizes many complex negotiations (Winham 1977) without holding overly simplistic views. RBC reminds negotiators to attend not just to bargaining tactics but also to relationships and conditions. That in itself will help them at the outset, to plan


more thoroughly and to anticipate more eventualities, and afterwards, to gather the information to learn from their own and others' experiences.

Conclusion

The original impetus for this work came from several directions: a desire to understand CGE-ITT-like negotiations more thoroughly, the exhaustiveness of research on interpersonal negotiations, the paucity of research on interteam negotiation, and the schism created by "forest-or-trees" perspectives in international business literature. That dichotomy, in particular, seemed unsatisfactory and unnecessary. In short, there was a call for an inclusive yet parsimonious and meaningful approach to complex, international business negotiations.

In the RBC Perspective, this article has presented such an approach. Based on an extensive literature, its focus on three key facets of negotiation and their dynamic, multilevel interaction clearly furnishes analytic and organizing power for various applications. While complex negotiations in international business are indeed a challenge to understand, the RBC Perspective offers much to advance that understanding, in research and in practice.

Acknowledgements

Most of this work was completed while the author served on the faculties of New York University's Stern School of Business and Dartmouth College's Tuck School. Portions of the material herein were presented at annual meetings of the International Studies Association (1987) and the Academy of Management (1988) and at various research seminars. For comments on earlier drafts, special thanks go to Ellen Auster; thanks also go to Art Brief, Susan Douglas, Len Greenhalgh, Stephen Kobrin, Naveen Seth, Jim Tiessen and anonymous reviewers.

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