an ontology of donald schÖn’s reflection-in-action

7/30/2019 AN ONTOLOGY OF DONALD SCHNS REFLECTION-IN-ACTION

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AN ONTOLOGY OF DONALD SCHNS REFLECTION INDESIGNING

JOHN S GERO AND UDO KANNENGIESSERKey Centre of Design Computing and Cognition

University of Sydney

Abstract. This paper proposes an ontological account of DonaldSchns notion of reflection in the domain of designing. We addresstwo views of this notion: a functional view, describing reflection asthe basis of a model of designing as an interactive process, and amechanistic view, modelling reflection as a precursor of changes inthe design. We use the function-behaviour-structure (FBS) ontology torepresent both these views.

1. The Notion of Reflection in Designing

Donald Schns notion of reflection-in-action (Schn 1983; Schn 1987)

describes how most professional practice is based on the interconnection ofthinking and action. Quoting Schn (1987, p. xi), reflection-in-action ofpractitioners is the thinking what they are doing while they are doing it.Reflection allows practitioners to change the way they go about solvingproblems; or as Schn (1987, p. 26) puts it:

In an action-present a period of time, variable with the context, during which

we can still make a difference to the situation at hand our thinking serves toreshape what we are doing while we are doing it. I shall say, in cases like this,that we reflect-in-action.

Designing is one of the fields to which Schn applies his notion of

reflection-in-action (or in short: reflection). He describes designing as areflective conversation with the materials of a design situation (Schn1992, p. 3), in which designers interact with their intermediate designrepresentations. Specifically, designers change their view of the currentdesign as a result of them generating and interpreting representations of thedesign. Schn and Wiggins (1992) illustrate this concept using the followingexcerpt from the design protocol of a school design task, performed by afirst-year architecture student they refer to as Petra:


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2 J.S. GERO AND U. KANNENGIESSER

I had six of these classroom units but they were too small to do much with. So Ichanged them to this more significant layout (the L-shapes). It relates grade oneto two, three to four, and five to six grades, which is more what I wanted to do

educationally anyway. What I have here is a space which is more of a homebase. Ill have an outside/inside which can be used and an outside/outside whichcan be used then that opens into your resource library/language thing.

The example shows that reflective designing can be schematised asseeing-moving-seeing (Schn 1992, p. 5): The first seeing allows Petrato observe and evaluate her current design, resulting in the recognition thatthe classroom units were too small to do much with. The upper part ofFigure 1, taken from Schn and Wiggins (1992), shows Petras initial

drawing. Her moving, i.e. her act of drawing a modified designrepresentation (lower part of Figure 1), aims to solve this problem. Petrasrepeated seeing of the results of this drawing finally includes a secondjudgment, that the initial problem has now been solved. It also includes therecognition of a set of unintended, desirable consequences of her move,namely the spatial grouping of proximate grades, and the creation of ahome base and of two kinds of spaces (outside/inside andoutside/outside).

Figure 1. Petras drawings of the layout of a classroom (taken from Schn andWiggins (1992))

According to Schns model, design concepts are the consequences,intended or unintended, of the designer moving through the state space of


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AN ONTOLOGY OF SCHNS REFLECTION IN DESIGNING 3

possible designs. Every step of the designer through that space is seen as amove experiment, which is then taken as the basis for both evaluatingprevious design concepts and generating new design concepts. Reflection isa cognitive process that is the driver of this interaction of making andseeing (Schn and Wiggins 1992, p. 135).

Schns choice of the term reflection-in-action fits well with where wesee the focus of his work: on the role that reflection plays in action, i.e. itseffect on subsequent decisions during the design process. We call this a

functional view of reflection, concentrating on the observable phenomena,i.e. the designers interactions, caused by reflective activity within thedesigner.

On the other hand, we define a mechanistic view of reflection, regardingreflection as a cognitive process with a well-defined set of distinctproperties. Little work has been done in identifying these properties andstudying reflection as an underpinning mechanism rather than a descriptorfor the interactive nature of designing.

In this paper, we will present an ontological model of reflection thataccounts for both the functional and the mechanistic view. Section 2 adoptsthe functional view. Here we derive an ontological model of reflectivedesigning from our earlier work on the situated function-behaviour-structure(FBS) framework, which we apply to the above design example. Section 3provides an ontological description of reflection from the mechanistic pointof view. We show how this description allows delineating reflection from

other processes in designing. Section 4 concludes this paper with a summaryof the benefits of our approach.

2. A Functional View of Reflection

2.1. A FRAMEWORK OF SITUATED DESIGNING

Situatedness is a paradigm that can account for the central role of Schnsreflection-in-action and related phenomena reported in empirical studies ofdesigners (Suwa et al. 1999). It provides a framework for understanding howa designers interactions affect both what is designed and the designersexperience (Gero 1999), drawing on models of situated cognition (Dewey1896; Bartlett 1932; Clancey 1997; Ziemke 1999).

Gero and Kannengiesser (2004) have modelled situated designing as therecursive interaction between three different worlds: the external world, theinterpreted world and the expected world, Figure 2(a).

The external world is the world that is composed of representationsoutside the designer. This world is the designers medium forcommunication, either with other designers or with the designer themselves.The latter kind of communication corresponds to Schns concept of


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reflective conversation with the materials of a design situation. Thematerials are represented in the external world and typically include iconicand symbolic representations of the design object, such as the drawingsshown in Figure 1.

Figure 2. Situated designing as the interaction of three worlds: (a) general model,

(b) specialised model for design representations (after Gero and Kannengiesser(2004))

The interpreted world is the world that is built up inside the designer interms of sensory experiences, percepts and concepts. It is the internalrepresentation of that part of the external world that the designer interactswith. The interpreted world corresponds to what Schn (1992, p. 9) denotesas the design world, in which the objects and relationships of a design areconstructed and reconstructed by the designer. This has the implication thatall aspects of the design depend on the unique experience of the individualdesigner. For example, Schn (1992) points out that Petras judgments of her

designs as being too small to do much with or more significant arefundamentally subjective; and other designers might not necessarily agreewith her.

The expected world is the world the imagined actions of the designer isexpected to produce. It is the environment in which the effects of actions arepredicted according to current goals and interpretations of the current stateof the world. The expected world corresponds to the designers currentdesign state space, i.e. the state space of all potential design solutionscurrently considered by the designer. This world is located within the


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interpreted world, as all goals and expectations can be viewed as interpretedrepresentations of potential future designs. In Schns design example,Petras L-shapes are the effects, represented in the external world, of herprojections of a larger layout, in the expected world.

The three worlds are linked together by three classes of connections:interpretation, focussing and action.

Interpretation transforms variables which are sensed in the externalworld into the interpretations of sensory experiences, percepts and conceptsthat compose the interpreted world. This process includes Schns notions ofseeing and worldmaking (Schn quoting Goodman (1978)).

Focussingtakes some aspects of the interpreted world, uses them as goalsin the expected world and suggests actions, which, if executed in the externalworld should produce states that reach the goals. This process uses theresults of qualitative judgments or appreciations (Schn quoting Vickers(1965)) of the design. If the interpretation is judged to be useful or requiredfor the current design task, focussing integrates that interpretation into thedesign state space.

Action is an effect which brings about a change in the external worldaccording to the goals in the expected world. This process corresponds towhat Schn calls moving, including, for instance, the act of drawing.

Figure 2(b) presents a specialised form of this view with the designer (asthe internal world) located within the external world and placing generalclasses of design representations into the resultant nested model. The set of

expected design representations (Xei) corresponds to the notion of a designstate space. This state space can be modified during the process of designingby transferring new interpreted design representations (Xi) into the expectedworld and/or transferring some of the expected design representations (Xe i)out of the expected world. This leads to changes in external designrepresentations (Xe), which may then be used as a basis for re-interpretation,changing the interpreted world.

Novel interpreted design representations (Xi) may also be the result ofconstructive memory, which can be viewed as a process of interactionamong design representations within the interpreted world rather than acrossthe interpreted and the external world. Constructive memory is best

exemplified by a paraphrase of Dewey by Clancey (1997): Sequences ofacts are composed such that subsequent experiences categorize and hencegive meaning to what was experienced before. The implication of this isthat memory is not laid down and fixed at the time of the original sensateexperience but is a function of what comes later as well. Memories cantherefore be viewed as being constructed in response to a specific demand,based on the original experience as well as the situation pertaining at thetime of the demand for this memory. Therefore, everything that hashappened since the original experience determines the result of memory


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construction. Each memory, after it has been constructed, is added to theexisting knowledge (and becomes part of a new situation) and is nowavailable to be used later, when new demands require the construction offurther memories. These new memories can be viewed as newinterpretations of the augmented knowledge.

In Figure 2, both interpretation and constructive memory are representedas push-pull processes. This emphasises the role of the designersindividual experience that constructs or pulls new design concepts tomatch first-person knowledge rather than just replicates or pushes whatcan be seen as third-person knowledge (Gero and Fujii 2000).

2.2. THE FBS ONTOLOGY IN REFLECTIVE DESIGNING

Design representations can be viewed as describing any of three aspects ofthe design: function (F), behaviour (B) and structure (S). These notions arethe basic constituents of the function-behaviour-structure (FBS) ontology(Gero 1990). They are defined as follows:

Function (F) of an object is defined as its teleology, i.e. what theobject is for. For example, some of the functions of a windowinclude to provide view, to provide daylight and to provide rainprotection.

Behaviour(B) of an object is defined as the attributes that are derivedor expected to be derived from its structure (S), i.e. what the objectdoes. Using the window example, some behaviours include thermalconduction and light transmission.

Structure (S) of an object is defined as its components and theirrelationships, i.e. what the object consists of. Examples of structureproperties of a window include glazing length, glazing height andtype of glass.

Using the FBS ontology, we can specialise the model of situateddesigning shown in Figure 2(b) by replacing the variable X, which stands fordesign representations in general, with the more specific representations F, Band S. This results in a simplified version of Gero and Kannengiessers(2004) situated FBS framework, Figure 3. This framework serves as a modelof designing as a reflective conversation at three levels:

reflective conversation with design function reflective conversation with design behaviour reflective conversation with design structureThe three levels of reflective conversation are connected to one another

by a set of processes that transform interpreted structure (Si) into interpretedbehaviour (Bi) (process 13, labelled in Figure 3), interpreted behaviour (B i)into interpreted function (Fi) (process 14), expected function (Fei) into


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expected behaviour (Bei

) (process 10), and expected behaviour (Bei

) intoexpected structure (Sei) (process 11). These interconnections allow forreflective conversation at any level to drive further reflective conversation atany other level.

Figure 3. Reflective designing as the interconnection of three levels of reflectiveconversation (adapted from Gero and Kannengiesser (2004))

2.3. AN ONTOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF SCHNS EXAMPLE

We can use the processes described in Figure 3 to model the design activitiesin Schn and Wiggins (1992) example presented in Section 1. Table 1shows that what Petra describes as a simple change in her design (from thesix classroom units to the three L-shapes) can be modelled as a sequence offour design steps:

1.

Constructive memory: Petra, after finding her initial school layout astoo small, uses her design knowledge to generate a new designcandidate based on three L-shapes. Figure 4 highlights process 6 torepresent this design step.

2. Focussing: Petra decides to take the new design candidate as a basisfor her future design moves, which includes this candidate in thecurrent design state space. Figure 5 represents this design step asprocess 9.


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3. Action: Petras act of drawing, resulting in the three L-shapes, givesan externally visible account of her new design decision. Figure 6shows this design step as process 12.

4. Interpretation: Petra visually apprehends (Schn 1992) what she hasproduced. This activity is subsumed in Schns notion of seeing,which is represented as process 3 in Figure 7.

TABLE 1. Schn and Wiggins (1992) example of reflective designing mapped ontothe processes labelled in Figure 3

Example from Schn and Wiggins (1992) Processes labelled in Figure 2

I had six of these classroom units but they were too

small to do much with. So I changed them to thismore significant layout (the L-shapes).

It relates grade one to two, three to four, and five tosix grades, which is more what I wanted to doeducationally anyway. What I have here is a space

which is more of a home base. Ill have anoutside/inside which can be used and an

outside/outside which can be used then that opensinto your resource library/language thing.

Constructive memory: 6

Focussing: 9Action: 12Interpretation: 3

Transformation: 13

These four design steps compose what can be thought of as one cycle ofPetras reflective conversation at the structure (S) level. The result of thiscycle, namely the new design structure created, is then taken as a basis fordiscovering additional, unintended consequences of the new structure. In theexample, these consequences represent (interpreted) behaviours (Bi) derivedfrom the new structure. Figure 8 shows this as process 13. One of the newbehaviours that Petra discovers may be termed person permeability. WhilePetra does not explicitly refer to this behaviour, she does talk about her goalof relating grade one to two, three to four, and five to six grades,something she wanted to do educationally anyway. We can view this goalas the expected function (Fei) to allow interaction between proximategrades, which can be viewed as being previously transformed into ourpostulated expected behaviour (Bei) person permeability via process 10.Other interpreted behaviours (Bi) that Petra derives from her new L-shapeddesign deal with features that she refers to as a home base and asoutside/inside and outside/outside. The complete design protocol


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Figure 4. Step 1 of reflective conversation with design structure: Constructivememory (process 6)

Figure 5. Step 2 of reflective conversation with design structure: Focussing(process 9)


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Figure 6. Step 3 of reflective conversation with design structure: Action (process12)

Figure 7. Step 4 of reflective conversation with design structure: Interpretation(process 3)


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Figure 8. Consequences of reflective conversation with design structure: Derivingnew behaviour from structure (process 13)

presented by Schn (1983) shows that these features are used, later in thedesign process, as a basis for further, reflective moves through the designstate space.

3. A Mechanistic View of Reflection

The ontological framework we have presented so far assumes a functionalview of reflection. It provides a level of description that captures thedesigners interaction with the design situation but is too coarse-grained torepresent reflection as an underlying process. This Section switches from thefunctional to a mechanistic stance, which aims to provide a more detailedontological representation of reflection as a precursor for the designers

reflective conversation.Schns descriptions of reflection, from a mechanistic perspective, implythe use of memory: We think critically about the thinking that got us intothis fix or this opportunity; and we may, in the process, restructure strategiesof action, understandings of phenomena, or ways of framing problems(Schn 1987, p. 28). Two characteristics of reflection can be inferred fromSchns descriptions: first, self-reference, as previous thoughts andthinking are re-produced, and, second, change, as these thoughts andthinking are modified and adapted in the light of the current situation. The


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characteristics of self-reference and change fit well with two of thedefinitions provided by the Merriam-Webster dictionary, summarising thephysical meaning of reflection: the production of an image by or as if by amirror (which maps onto self-reference) and the action of bending orfolding back (which maps onto change).

Constructive memory, introduced in Section 2.1, can be seen assubsuming reflection, as it references itself through recalling previousexperiences and modifies them to match the current situation. The primarykinds of experiences reflected on in designing are experiences with designobjects. Design objects can be described by their function, behaviour andstructure. Therefore, we can represent reflection as being captured byprocesses 4, 5 and 6 shown in Figure 3. Accordingly, we can define threelevels of reflection:

reflection on design function reflection on design behaviour reflection on design structureThis representation can be further elaborated, using an approach to

reflection that is more process-centred. Specifically, we use Gero andKannengiessers (2006) idea of applying the FBS ontology to processes asthe object of designing. To introduce this idea, let us first look at theexample of a thermal stress analysis process. A possible function (F) of sucha process may be to operate time-efficiently. This function can be ascribed

to the behaviour (B) speed of the process. The structure (S) of the thermalstress analysis process, like any other process (Gero and Kannengiesser2006), consists of three components: an input (i), a transformation (t) and anoutput (o). Figure 9 describes the structure (S) of an instance of a thermalstress analysis process. It includes a given geometry and temperature (as aproperty external to the design) as the input (i), the sequence of steps of afinite element analysis (FEA) as the transformation (t), and a set of stressesas the output (o). These three components are connected to one another bytwo unidirectional relationships, i t and t o.

Figure 9. The structure (S) of an instance of a thermal stress analysis process

Let us now use the FBS ontology to model the process of reflection ondesign objects. To better distinguish between the FBS view of the reflectionprocess and the FBS view of the design object, we will add the abbreviationsF, B and S in brackets only to the function (F), behaviour (B) and


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structure (S) of the reflection process, not to the function, behaviour andstructure of the design object being reflected upon.

Table 2 shows the results of applying the FBS ontology to the three levelsof reflection defined earlier in this Section. We can see that they differ intheir function (F) and partially in their structure (S), but exhibit the samebehaviour (B). The different functions (F) are specific to the subset of thedesign state space (i.e. function state space, behaviour state space andstructure state space) that each level of reflection aims at modifying. Thesame behaviours (B) are used for all three levels of reflection to evaluate theachievement of these functions (F). As shown in Table 2, we propose thattwo behaviours (B) play a major role in reflection: the accuracy with whichthe result of the reflection solves a given design issue (e.g. the ability ofPetras L-shapes to solve her too small to do much with problem), and thenovelty1 of the result with respect to the previous design solution. Thestructures (S) of the three levels of reflection differ in the respective types ofinput (i) and output (o). The fundamental similarity in the structure (S) of allthree levels of reflection is their homogeneity, as their inputs (i) and outputs(o) are always of the same type. The notion of homogeneity is equivalent tothe idea of self-reference.

The representation shown in Table 2 can be used to separate reflectionprocesses from other processes in designing. The homogeneity of theirstructure (S) is unique. For example, all processes of design synthesis areheterogenous, as they take design behaviours, as input (i), and produce

design structures, as output (o). All design analysis processes are alsoheterogenous. They transform design structure (and, eventually, givenexternal effects), as input (i), into design behaviour, as output (o),irrespective of their instantiation as, for instance, thermal stress analysis,kinetic analysis or cost analysis.

Our ontology can also be used to highlight similarities between reflectionand other processes. For example, the function (F) of reflection is the sameas the function (F) of (re-)interpretation (captured by processes 1, 2 and 3 inFigure 3). For example, the function to modify the (design) structure statespace is the same for reflection on design structure as for re-interpretationof design structure (via process 1 in Figure 3). Furthermore, the

transformation (t) of both process structures (S) is of the push-pull type.The design object being reflected on does not have to be physical. Wemay equally apply reflection to objects in virtual environments. The verynotion of an object may even be generalised to include processes. Businessprocess reengineering (Davenport 1993) is a common example for a

1 See Saunders and Geros (2004) notion of novelty as a measurefor the interestingness of designs


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discipline concerned with (re-)designing processes. In our ontology,reflecting on a process can be described as taking a property of the processas input (i) and subjecting it to a push-pull transformation (t), whichproduces an alteration of that property as output (o). Depending on theclassification of the property as function, behaviour or structure of theprocess, the reflection can be put into one of the three categories presented inTable 2. Figure 10 shows the example of the structure (S) of reflection onthe behaviour of a design process, here on the speed of the processproducing a preliminary design concept.

TABLE 2. Three levels of reflection described using the FBS ontology

Process Process function (F) Process behaviour (B) Process structure (S)

Reflection

on designfunction

to modify the

(design) functionstate space

accuracy, novelty

i = interpreted designfunctiont = push-pull

transformation

o = interpreteddesign function

Reflectionon design

behaviour

to modify the(design) behaviour

state space

accuracy, novelty

i = interpreted designbehaviourt = push-pull

transformation

o = interpreteddesign behaviour

Reflectionon designstructure

to modify the(design) structurestate space

accuracy, novelty

i = interpreted designstructuret = push-pull

transformationo = interpreted

design structure

Figure 10. The structure (S) of reflection on the speed of the process producing apreliminary design concept

In some cases, reflection is applied to processes that are referred to asstrategies. One distinguishing feature of strategies is that the transformation(t) components of their structure (S) are viewed as actions or sequences of


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actions. Reflecting on design strategies is most clearly an instance ofdesigners thinking what they are doing (Schn 1987, p. xi). Most researchin reflection on strategies comes from work in management science and ismainly understood from a functional perspective. Here, the termstrategizing has been established to denote the interactive construction ofnew strategies through reflective conversation (Cummings and Wilson2003). Strategizing combines the traditional idea of top-downimplementation of pre-formed strategies with more recent models of bottom-up recognition of new strategies as patterns in a stream of actions(Mintzberg and Waters 1985).

An episode of Schns (1983) protocol of Petras design session can beused to illustrate reflection on a design strategy. Take Schns (1983, p. 93)analysis of the protocol:

At the beginning of the review, Petra is stuck:

[Petra:] Ive tried to butt the shape of the building into the contours of theland there but the shape doesnt fit into the slope.

Quist [Petras studio master] criticizes her framing of the problem, pointing outthat she has tried to fit the shapes of the buildings into the contours of a screwyslope that offers no basis for coherence. Instead, he resets her problem:

[Quist:] You should begin with a discipline, even if it is arbitrary... you

can always break it open later.

Schn (1983, p. 85) explains that what Quist means by discipline is abuilding geometry that is imposed upon the screwy site to providecoherence. This geometry may be broken open later, i.e. partiallydissolved and replaced against another one.

We can interpret Quists re-framing of the problem as a reflection onPetras initial design strategy. The desired function of the strategy remainsunchanged to generate a coherent composition of the building shape andthe site. What is primarily changed by Quists reflection process is thestructure of the strategy, Figure 11. The structure of Petras initial strategy iscomposed of the given site (as input), the adaptation of the building shape tothat site (as transformation), and a coherent buildingsite compound (as

output). Quists reflection uses this structure as input (i) and transforms (t) itinto an altered structure as output (o). The altered structure consists of abuilding geometry (as input), the configuration of the site using that buildinggeometry (as transformation), and a coherent buildingsite compound (asoutput).


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4. ConclusionOur ontology of Schns model of reflection has the potential to advancedesign research in three ways:

Figure 11. The structure (S) of reflection on the structure of a design strategy inSchn (1983)

1. Increased understanding of the notion of reflection: Our ontologicalframework provides a semi-formal representation for both thefunctional and the mechanistic view of Schns notion of reflection.We claim that this is an essential condition for enhancing the veryunderstanding of this line of work. In particular, the mechanistic

view clearly distinguishes reflection from other design generators.We have extended Schns model by proposing three levels ofanalysis: the function level, the behaviour level and the structurelevel. Most research on reflection, including Schns work, can belocated at the structure level. Further understanding is needed at theother two levels.

2. Multidisciplinary integration: We have shown that our ontology canbe applied to reflection irrespective of the specific instantiation ofthe design object being reflected upon. This provides a uniformframework for comparing and integrating the research from differentdesign disciplines. In particular, research findings related to

reflection on strategies and processes can now be viewed in a formthat allows easier access from traditionally object-centred disciplinessuch as design research.

3. Framework for further research: Our ontological approach toreflection can be used as a point of reference for further studies.Most research has delivered a functional view of reflection,focussing on its role in the course of designing rather than on itsmechanisms. The largest gap in our knowledge of reflectionconcerns the transformation (t) component of its structure (S).


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Current research efforts at our Key Centre are directed towardsdescribing the push-pull mechanism of constructive memory inmore detail.

Acknowledgements

This research is supported by a grant from the Australian Research Council, grantno. DP0559885 Situated Design Computing.

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an ontology of donald schÖn’s reflection-in-action

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