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www.emeraldinsight.com/loi/dpm

Volume 28 Number 1 2019ISSN 0965-3562

Volume 28 Number 1 2019

Disaster Prevention and Management

An International Journal

Disaster Prevention and ManagementAn International Journal

Number 1

Disaster prevention – doing it differently by rethinking the nature of knowledge and learningGuest Editors: John Norton and Terry David Gibson

1 Editorial advisory board 2 Guest editorial 6 Views from the Frontline and Frontline methodology: critical reflection on theory and practice

Terry David Gibson and Nigel Scott

20 Developing the CSO case studiesJohn Norton and Terry David Gibson

25 Traditional Kiribati beliefs about environmental issues and its impacts on rural and urban communitiesRuiti Aretaake

33 Advancing small island resilience and inclusive development through a convergence strategy in Carles, PhilippinesJesusa Grace Molina

42 Waiting for politics at the mercy of river: case study of an enduring communitySarwar Bari

50 Social and economic inequality limits disaster prevention amongst the most vulnerable in VietnamGuillaume Chantry and John Norton

60 Tackling everyday risks through climate adaptive organic farmingHepi Rahmawati and Anastasia Maylinda Titi Lestari

69 Citizens of Delhi lead resilience actionManu Gupta, Parag Talankar and Shivangi Chavda

76 Enhancing resilience against floods in the Lower Motowoh community, Limbe, Southwest CameroonGaston Buh Wung and Festus Tongwa Aka

84 Enhancing earthquake resilience of communities: an action by women’s groups in NepalNisha Shrestha, Surya Narayan Shrestha, Bhubaneswari Parajuli, Amod Mani Dixit, Bijay Krishna Upadhyay, Om Kala Khanal and Khadga Sen Oli

93 Drawing the case studies together: synthesis of case studies and group discussionsTerry David Gibson, Aka Festus Tongwa, Sarwar Bari, Guillaume Chantry, Manu Gupta, Jesusa Grace Molina, Nisha Shresha, John Norton, Bhubaneswari Parajuli, Hepi Rahmawati and Ruiti Aretaake

106 Making communities disaster resilient: challenges and prospects for community engagement in NepalChandra Lal Pandey

119 Local responses to disasters: recent lessons from zero-order respondersFernando Briones, Ryan Vachon and Michael Glantz

126 Local voices and action: concluding discussionTerry David Gibson, Festus Tongwa Aka, Ruiti Aretaake, Sarwar Bari, Guillaume Chantry, Manu Gupta, Jesusa Grace Molina, John Norton, Bhubaneswari Parajuli, Hepi Rahmawati and Nisha Shresha

143 The power of localism during the long-term disaster recovery processVictor Marchezini

ISBN 978-1-78973-927-5

Disaster prevention – doing it differently by

rethinking the nature of knowledge

and learning

Guest Editors: John Norton and Terry David Gibson

Quarto trim size: 174mm × 240mm

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

David AlexanderInstitute for Risk and Disaster Reduction,University College London, UK

Djillali BenouarBab Ezzouar University, Algeria

Alonso BrenesFacultad Latinoamericana de CienciasSociales (FLACSO), Costa Rica

Ksenia ChmutinaLoughborough University, UK

Brian CookUniversity of Melbourne, Australia

Zenaida Delica-WillisonAdvisor on ‘‘Community Based Disaster RiskReduction’’, Thailand

Maureen FordhamNorthumbria University, UK

Virginia Garcia-AcostaCentro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores enAntropologia Social, Mexico

Ailsa HollowayStellenbosch University, South Africa

Rohit JigyasuIndian Institute of Human Settlement, India

Ilan KelmanUniversity College London, UK

Victor MarcheziniCentro Nacional de Monitoramento e Alertasde Desastres Naturais, Brazil

Jessica MercerSecure Futures, UK

Dewald van NiekerkAfrican Centre for Disaster Studies, North-WestUniversity, South Africa

Michael PettersonSecretariat of the Pacific Community – SOPAC, Fiji

Anthony RedmondThe University of Manchester, UK

Sandrine RevetCentre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales,France

Hugo RomeroUniversidad de Chile, Chile

Rajib ShawKyoto University, Japan

Ben WisnerUniversity College London (UK) and Oberlin College(USA), UK

Xian XuFudan University, People’s Republic of China

Disaster Prevention andManagement

Vol. 28 No. 1, 2019p. 1

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Guest editorial

Introduction to disaster prevention: doing it differently by rethinking thenature of knowledge and learningThis issue calls for rethinking sources of knowledge and learning for disaster prevention. Itfocuses on practitioners engaged in disaster risk reduction at local level, presenting an actionresearch programme dedicated to strengthening knowledge and learning from practice.

It is in the nature of the disaster prevention “industry” and the wider developmentindustry in which it nests that much learning is “top down” in nature, based on formal andinstitutional studies and frameworks such as the Sendai framework for action on disasterrisk reduction (UNISDR, 2015a). These tend to focus on larger-scale intensive events;however, disaster prevention is concerned with a wide spectrum of hazards and increasingevidence demonstrates that many disasters which impact lives and livelihoods aresmall-scale and recurrent “everyday disasters”. The GNDR’s (2017) “Frontline” programmegathered evidence from over 14,000 local-level respondents who demonstrated theprevalence of diverse, small-scale “threats” and their consequences, examined in Gibson andWisner (2016). UNISDR’s GAR 2013 and 2015 similarly highlighted the substantial impactof attritional “extensive disasters” on lives and livelihoods (UNISDR, 2013, 2015b).

Invaluable experience and knowledge of such disasters is held almost uniquely at local levelreflecting the ways that local people confront diverse, context-specific, small-scale, unpublicised“everyday disasters” alongside better-publicised intensive events. Such events – often configuredby dynamically changing social, political, economic and environmental conditions – underwritethe increasing importance of sharing knowledge between local and non-local stakeholders tobetter understand and address existing and new challenges for a safer and sustainable future. Atthe same time, relatively little learning and knowledge sharing is generated amongst local-levelpractitioners and communities who are typically activists and have limited opportunities toreflect, think critically, capture and record learning or share it peer to peer (Gibson, 2015).

This issue builds on Gibson and Wisner (2016) to investigate qualitatively, through theeyes of local-level practitioners, mechanisms of knowledge and learning which can add to ourunderstanding of disaster prevention. It is founded on the premise that the shared goal ofsecure lives and livelihoods can only be achieved where knowledge and expertise derivedfrom local-level action is respected, shared and mobilised alongside other sources.

The contributions that follow here suggest that knowledge itself has to be understooddifferently and so, too, does the process of learning. This can lead to a greater mutualunderstanding of both one’s own perceptions and those of others, each with their ownvalues and justifications.

As the preparation of this special edition has unfolded, it has changed shape. The initialintention was to gather and compare a set of case studies linked to involvement in“Frontline”. Through collaboration between all contributors and the opportunity to worktogether face to face in this learning journey, an iterative learning process developed, whichexpanded learning from the original case studies.

The overall programmeEight local NGOs, previously involved in Global Network for Disaster Reduction’s (GNDR)Frontline programme, contributed initial accounts of particular case studies of local-level

Disaster Prevention andManagementVol. 28 No. 1, 2019pp. 2-5© Emerald Publishing Limited0965-3562DOI 10.1108/DPM-02-2019-323

The Guest editors are extremely grateful for the financial support of the Global Fund for CommunityFoundations for making it possible for participants to meet together to pursue this work.

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learning, action and barriers towards improving disaster prevention. They mutually analysedeach other’s case studies using a common framework and shared their analysis with allparticipants. Cases were exchanged between participants for peer review. These reviewsformed the focus of a meeting of the contributors and editors of this journal in Kathmandu,Nepal, in October 2017 at which the findings and learning from each case study and fromcomparison between them were discussed and recorded[1]. These discussions were thenanalysed generating comparative learning based on the eight cases and the insights of theparticipants. The method, the cases, group discussions, analysis and final discussion arepresented in this issue, which also includes three cases offered by external contributors.

The processAs noted above, local-level practitioners in disaster reduction and development are typicallyactivists and as such often have limited time for reflection, critical thinking and learningbased on their work. They are also often relatively isolated from other practitioners facingsimilar concerns, which reduces further the possibility of learning and knowledge creation.The Kathmandu workshop challenged participating practitioners to think critically abouttheir own work, to also consider the work of their peers and to apply their experience andinsights to the body of case studies they had created, with the goal of generating learningwhich might improve their action, as well as addressing underlying risk factors beyondlocal level. The process, which evolved during the programme of work, reflects a transitionfrom “first-order” learning – following an established process, through “second-order”learning – adapting the process to “third-order” learning – learning how to learn from actionand as a result to generate new modes of action (Argyris and Schon, 1974).

Overview of articles in this issue“Views from the Frontline and Frontline methodology: critical reflection on theory andpractice” considers GNDR’s “Frontline” and its companion programmes which formed thebasis for the case studies presented below. It examines the organisational structure, datagathering, analysis and data representation methods. It discusses the application of findingsat local, national and international level, and draws together the challenges and questionsemerging from the “Frontline” method and data.

“Developing the CSO case studies” outlines the participative and iterative processthrough which this journal issue was co-authored, focusing particularly on the developmentof the following case study papers through several cycles of editing and peer reviewsculminating in a group workshop. It suggests that this process might form the basis forother collaborative action learning exercises.

Case studies“Traditional Kiribati beliefs about environmental issues and impacts on communities”examines the convergence of traditional knowledge and practices with new ideas andinformation as the islanders address the environmental, social and economic impacts ofclimate change, finding that partnerships and collaboration are a basis for progress.

“Advancing small island resilience and inclusive development through a convergencestrategy in Carles, Philippines” examines an initiative to promote multi-stakeholdercollaboration, addressing the risks faced by the islanders through participative riskassessments, capacity building and actions to strengthen the resilience of the islanders.

“Waiting for politics at the mercy of river: case study of an enduring community” focuses onrisks faced by riverside communities beside the Indus river, South Punjab, Pakistan, highlightingissues of power, powerless and lack of political voice among marginalised communities and thescope for building coalitions to press for action through local advocacy and campaigning.

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Guest editorial

“Social and economic inequality limits disaster prevention amongst the most vulnerablein Vietnam” reflects on experience of DRR work in central Vietnam, arguing that DRR mustfocus on the vulnerability of specific groups, and on the particular risks they face, ratherthan being framed by global or national policies. This depends on knowledge of thesecontexts being considered in national to local DRR planning and implementation.

“Tackling everyday risks through climate adaptive organic farming” considersstrategies to improve farming in a region exposed to increased risk of drought and cropfailure by climate change, showing that approaches have to understand specificenvironmental contexts, and must also engage culturally with the local communities toensure success.

“Citizens of Delhi lead resilience action” is set in a densely populated urban area wherelarge informal settlements have developed as a result of inward migration, leading toincreasing risk resulting from poor services, infrastructure and sanitation. It describesthe establishment of citizen forums to develop bottom-up political pressure for provisionof services.

“Enhancing resilience against floods in the Lower Motowoh community, Limbe,Southwest Cameroon” considers disaster risk reduction in the context of limited nationaland local government capacity. The Frontline process identified priority threats includingtraffic accidents, seasonal flooding and a local community action programme focused onreducing the incidence of flooding.

“Enhancing earthquake resilience of communities: an action by women’s group in Nepal”focuses on an initiative to mobilise women in addressing impacts of small scale earthquakeevents through “non-structural mitigation” measures. In doing so the programmeempowered women and transformed social perceptions.

“Drawing the case studies together: synthesis of case studies and group discussions”considers the case studies comparatively, drawing on detailed records of the workshopdiscussion between the contributors, identifying themes emerging from the individual casesand the comparative discussions.

External companion case studies were invited to complement findings from the above cases:

• “Making communities disaster resilient: challenges and prospects for communityengagement in Nepal” addresses the questions: to what extent existing disasterpolicies in Nepal support and enable disaster resilience of communities? And whatchallenges and prospects do the communities have in responding to disaster risk formaking communities resilient? based on field work among communities affected bythe 2015 Gorkha earthquake.

• “The power of localism during the long-term disaster recovery process” examines thenature of localism in post-disaster reconstruction, taking the case of flooding in aBrazilian town and highlighting the necessity for understanding and dialogue toharmonise local capacities and local culture with external interventions throughemergency services.

• “Local responses to disasters: recent lessons from zero-order responders” discussesthe nature of local, immediate and innovative responses to disasters by localpopulations, arguing that these innate capacities should be recognised alongsidethose of external “first responders”.

“Local voices and action: concluding discussion” establishes a theoretical framework fordiscussion of the findings presented in the issue. It highlights the nature of “everydaypolitics” as an integral aspect of local action and collaboration, and identifies “legitimatesubversion” as a strategy employed in different cases to achieve influence at local and otherlevels to address underlying risk factors.

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Doing it differently by rethinking the nature of knowledge and learning?The key findings, explored in detail in the following papers, concern the process by whichknowledge has been created, and the knowledge created through the process. First, theprocess emphasises the value of creating time and space for critical reflection on action, aprocess which emerged from the collaboration of the participants. We suggest that suchtime and space is too often lacking and that the consequent failure of practitioners to bringlocal-level learning into the DRR discourse is, in part, a consequence of this dogged activism.Second, they concern the knowledge which is created (or re-created, we do not claimoriginality for many of the ideas discussed in this issue, nevertheless they demand restatingand reframing as they are often unheard) which suggests that the nature of complex anddiverse “everyday disasters” represents a body of understanding held at local level, thatlocal capacities are poorly understood and often not harmonised with external interventions,that the role of local partnerships and collaborations in creating a legitimate political voice isundervalued and that local civil society actors often seek to strengthen this as a means ofinfluencing underlying risk factors.

The authors feel that both the findings from the cases presented in this issue, and theprocess through which learning was generated offer insights into how learning from localaction can contribute to wider understanding at all scales of disaster prevention.

John NortonDevelopment Workshop France, Lauzerte, France, and

Terry David GibsonInventing Futures, Macclesfield, UK

ReferencesArgyris, C. and Schon, D. (1974), Theory in Practice. Increasing Professional Effectiveness, Jossey-Bass,

San Francisco, CA.Gibson, T. (2015), “Reflective practitioners: the importance of critical thought for change agents”,

Jamba, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 1-6.

Gibson, T. and Wisner, B. (2016), “ ‘Lets talk about you…’ opening space for local experience, action andlearning in disaster risk reduction”,Disaster Prevention andManagement, Vol. 25 No. 5, pp. 664-684.

GNDR (2017), “Frontline: from local information to local resilience”, available at: www.gndr.org/programmes/vfl/itemlist/category/168.html (accessed 6 August 2018).

UNISDR (2013), “Global assessment review 2013”, United Nations.

UNISDR (2015a), “Sendai framework for disaster reduction”, available at: www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/sendai-framework (accessed 11 May 2018).

UNISDR (2015b), “Global assessment review 2015”, United Nations.

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Views from the Frontline andFrontline methodology: criticalreflection on theory and practice

Terry David GibsonInventing Futures, Macclesfield, UK, and

Nigel ScottGamos, Reading, UK

AbstractPurpose – The purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed account of the “Views from the Frontline” and“Frontline” methodologies, which underpinned the case studies presented in this issue.Design/methodology/approach –Aparticipant observer account of the development of the methods, leadingto a critical discussion of their deployment and impact and a concluding discussion of further work required.Findings – The study found that iterative development of the programmes had improved their ability togather and analyse local experience, knowledge and priorities concerning risk and resilience, but raised aconcern over the means by which this information was able to achieve necessary political influence.Originality/value – This technical paper is a first assessment of the underlying method and application of“Views from the Frontline” and “Frontline” and benefits from the participant observer status of the authors.More work is required on the underlying questions concerning qualitative vs quantitatitive methods, and onthe means of achieving political impact from the work.Keywords Methodology, Qualitative methods, Frontline, Views from the FrontlinePaper type Technical paper

1. Introduction and brief rationaleThis paper forms part of a special issue following from and expanding the exploration ofprogrammes of local-level action presented in an earlier paper (Gibson and Wisner, 2016).That paper promised a deeper exploration of the methodologies it outlined, underpinningthe “Views from the Frontline”, “Action at the Frontline” and “Frontline” action researchprogrammes conducted by a global NGO network, the Global Network for DisasterReduction (GNDR, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017a). These programmes are of interest both interms of their intention of providing information to influence change at all scales, andbecause of the way the energies of a substantial global network were channelled into asubstantial action research programme. This paper presents that deeper exploration,accounting for the emergent structure and methods of the programmes, showing howiterative cycles of action and reflection progressively changed shape of the programme.It examines the organisational structure, data gathering, analysis and data representationmethods, showing how these took account of the particular context for the work. It discussesthe application of findings at local, national and international level, and draws together thechallenges and questions emerging from the programme.

1.1 Phases of the programmeThe evolutionary, and at one point revolutionary development of the programme’s designmethodology and goals, along with the change in name can be confusing to the reader.In summary, the various aspects of the programme are as follows.

1.1.1 Views from the Frontline (VFL). VFL were conducted in 2009, 2011 and 2013 with aglobal reach. Core methodology based on local level one-to-one questionnaires relating toaspects of disaster risk reduction. Main application of findings was International and National.

Disaster Prevention andManagementVol. 28 No. 1, 2019pp. 6-19© Emerald Publishing Limited0965-3562DOI 10.1108/DPM-07-2018-0214

Received 12 July 2018Revised 12 July 2018Accepted 17 July 2018

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:www.emeraldinsight.com/0965-3562.htm

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1.1.2 Frontline. Frontline was conducted 2014–2016 in regional pilots in Latin America,Africa and Asia. Core methodology was based on open-ended consultations with individualrespondents, analysed qualitatively. Main application of findings was national and local.

1.1.3 Action at the Frontline. Action at the Frontline was conducted in 2011–2016.Companion activity was supporting local-level collaboration and action linked to findings fromVFL and Frontline and also yielding qualitative case studies. Not considered in this paper.

1.2 The writersThe writers bring complementary perspectives to this exploration: Terry Gibson led ondevelopment and implementation of the programme over the whole period covered. Nigel Scottsupported the analysis and generation of findings from the data gathered during the studies.Carlos Barahona at “Statistics for Sustainable Development” gave us an outside perspective asan expert and practitioner in research design during the preparation of this paper.

2. Design and design development, iteratively through pilot stagesGNDR has a goal of influencing Disaster Risk Reduction frameworks established by the UNsecretariat for disaster reduction (UNISDR). The frameworks under the consideration includethe Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005–2015 (UNISDR, 2005) and the Sendai Frameworkfor Action (SFA) 2016–2030 (UNISDR, 2015a). Frontline and the earlier VFL programmeresulted from the Global Network for Disaster Reduction (GNDR)’s intention to “ […] roll out alocal level assessment of progress focussed on implementation of the HFA. This bottom upassessment would complement the top down attempt by the UN to monitor implementation ofthe HFA” (Gibson andWisner, 2016). The initial VFL programme conducted in 2009 employed aquestionnaire derived from the five “priorities for action” and “cross-cutting themes” of the HFA(UNISDR, 2005; GNDR, 2009). Addressed in one-to-one consultations with representatives ofthree respondent groups – local government, civil society organisations and communityrepresentatives – it included approximately 40 questions. The number and the precisequestions varied with respondent group. A five-point Likert scale was used for responses.Further questions were posed to identify the individual respondent by age, gender,self-perceived economic status, etc. Each locality was similarly tagged by location and risk zone.This method formed the basis of the studies also conducted in 2011 and 2013. Results wereaggregated and presented at international fora; principally the UNISDR two-yearly GlobalPlatform for Disaster Risk Reduction (GPDRR). Guidelines were also provided by GNDR for thenational level data to be used in national and local consultations.

Reports were impactful in first presentation at GPDRR 2009. The then head of UNISDRsaid subsequently:

Thanks to that report there is now a face, a recognition and an understanding of what yourepresent. Not because you are NGOs or civil society but through what you have done. The workyou have done and you’ve put that forward. My feeling is that you have done something quiteremarkable through that work. (Margareta Wahlstrom: UN Assistant Secretary for Disaster RiskReduction, speaking at Global Workshop 27 January 2010. Gibson, 2012).

Subsequently it appeared that the messages and language of the reports, including the term“Views from the Frontline” and the emphasis on “Local Action” were appropriated byUNISDR, being absorbed into their organisational schema:

Since the last Global Platform in 2009, local action is delivering results and drawing increasedattention. The Making Cities Resilient campaign has signed over 150 to date, illustrating thecommitment and contribution of mayors, local governments and their supporters worldwide. A newCommunity Practitioners Platform for Resilience is being used by policy makers and communityorganizations to build alliances between them. The Global Assessment Report 2011 recognizes localperspectives and incorporates “Views from the Frontline” from civil society organizations.

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But, to what extent do our interventions lead to improved conditions in the places where thevulnerable live and work? Are all our programs and policies targeted enough at supporting localaction and building on local assets? How can we accelerate finance and increase investment in localaction? What do we need to do to make this happen? (Extract from second announcement of UNGlobal Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, 17 November 2010. UNISDR, 2011a. Italics added).

Evidence suggests this appropriation served to blunt the impact of GNDR’s messages bymerging them into their established strategy and messaging. For example, the claim thatUNISDR championed “increased investment in local action” reassured patrons, primarilygovernments, that the challenges of organisations, such as GNDR had been addressed,whereas the behaviour and policy recommendations of the organisation did not shift in linewith the change of language.

At local level, GNDR member organisations faced the challenge of attracting theattention of national and local government to the reports. In many cases, the limitedengagement of the small NGOs predominantly forming GNDR’s membership withgovernment offices created a barrier to this.

Seeking to learn from each iteration of the programme, GNDR conducted “learningreviews” after each. The first (GNDR, 2010) highlighted the local-level engagementstimulated by the process, where one member for example said the consultations had led tomeeting opportunities they had not had previously.

The first, 2009 survey (GNDR, 2009) was based directly on the five priority areas of theHFA, with approximately equal numbers of questions on each:

• Priority 1: ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with astrong institutional basis for implementation.

• Priority 2: identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning.

• Priority 3: use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety andresilience at all levels.

• Priority 4: reduce the underlying risk factors.

• Priority 5: strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.

The detailed narrative of each priority, and therefore the questions devised in the survey,had an institutional focus considering the delivery of priority actions by national and localgovernment, which as time went by led to increasing recognition that local-levelrespondents were not equipped or informed to assess this performance.

Consultations at a global meeting of GNDR members in London, January 2010, suggestedthat the focus of the second study should not repeat the first, both because of concern as towhether respondents could engage with these questions and also as little change would bedetected in a two-year period. They further suggested that from a local-level perspective acritical issue was the quality of governance, and the 2011 survey was therefore shaped aroundthis theme, using a similar questionnaire methodology (Gibson, 2012).

In subsequent reviews concerns were raised about the local relevance of this action.The term “extractive” was used, and one organisation asked how the circle (of returning theinformation for use by the people who provided it) could be completed (GNDR, 2012).These responses highlighted a practical concern about the direct usefulness of the exerciseto the respondents. Responses to the governance questionnaire were markedlyhomogeneous leading to the suggestion that respondents were not equipped to makeassessments of the quality of governance, and were making superficial responses. Moredeeply it was recognised in discussions within GNDR that the method elicited local views onthe HFA framework, but did not allow local articulation of experience and knowledge.A local-level respondent said of similar surveys that they asked “what do you think aboutour framework?” rather than “what do you think?”.

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Discussions within the GNDR membership led to a suggested shift to some form of localrisk mapping focus, thereby emphasising local experience and knowledge. This shiftreflected discussion of the meaning of study findings, and on the scale of disastersconsidered most significant by local-level respondents.

2.1 The meaning of the findingsWhat constitutes a “disaster” depends on viewpoint and perspective. At the simplest levelsomething regarded by an external observer as a disaster, such as a seasonal flood, maybe considered normal and useful at local level. However, local perception may also becomeaccepting of livelihood and life-impacting events as “normal” and intractable, leading toresignation and passivity. Findings from Frontline are based on perceptions (and ofcourse so are many other views) and sense-making of these and complementary externalviews depends on dialogue, rather than taking either an external or a local view asabsolutes.

2.2 Everyday disastersFrontline findings reinforce others (i.e. Petley, 2012; UNISDR, 2015b) in showing that smallscale multi-hazard events, referred to colloquially as everyday disasters, have a moresubstantial influence on lives and livelihoods than has been allowed by global databasessuch as EM-DAT, by international institutions and governments. However, this findingcollides with institutional and political sensitivities. For example, INGOs and governmentsfind it easier to secure funds for, and coordinate response to large, visible intensivedisasters. Governments prefer to focus on “natural” disasters as these do not have politicalimplications (pers.com. UNISDR , 2013). The current American administration, for example,has imposed restrictions on activities related climate change reflecting current ideology,with USAID and OFDA directing that no mention should be made of climate change infunding bids. (Pers.com GNDR, 2017a). An unavoidable component of Frontline wouldtherefore be navigation of political perceptions and ideologies.

The proposal which emerged was for a method of experiential, rather than geographicrisk mapping. Key characteristics of the initial pilot design for this programme, named“Frontline” were:

• based on a conversation and free text responses rather than a questionnaire to enablepeople to articulate their own experience and knowledge;

• focus on “priorities” in terms of people’s responses, to identify the issues theyconsidered most critical;

• framed around “threats”, “consequences”, “actions” and “barriers” to invitearticulation of local experience consequent on threats, as well as local capacitiesand constraints;

• to some extent a “quick and dirty vulnerability and capacity assessment”, designedto be simple to conduct, given the need to roll it out to a wide range of organisationswithout substantial training;

• employing a qualitative analysis method to enable the qualitative material gatheredto be aggregated and analysed at a range of scales; and

• emphasising the local relevance and application of the material, linking it to a companionmethod for local consultation, action planning and action (“Action at the Frontline”).

Based on these characteristics, guidelines for data gathering were produced. Interviewerswere guided to initiate open conversations concerning the threats, consequences, actions

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and barriers the respondent experienced. Previous data gathered at local level by GNDRand emerging assessment’s from other sources (i.e. UNISDR, 2011b, 2013) revealedthat smaller scale multi-hazard events accounted for a substantial proportion of losses atlocal level, and the method was intended to be sensitive to these. The language( for example “threats” and “consequences”) was intended to broaden the discussion from“disasters” – often perceived as large scale and limited to intensive events such asearthquakes, storms, floods, drought, etc., to these recurrent smaller scale events, referredto colloquially as “everyday disasters”.

A table formed the basis for interviewers to capture interviewees’ perceptions as openresponses. To avoid generating huge lists of all possible concerns, interviewees were invitedto prioritise the “top five” threats that concerned them. The table guided the conversation torecord the corresponding consequence, action and barrier for each threat.

Initial piloting in South America suggested that the process was practical and wasyielding useful results. It also showed that interviewers sometimes struggled tounderstand a broader definition of “disasters” and that more guidance and trainingwas needed to help with this. The table format itself tended to encourage interviewersto focus on “filling the boxes” rather than on discussion. Finally, constraining intervieweesto just one consequence, action and barrier for each threat limited their ability tocharacterise these.

A second pilot in Central America followed by a third pilot across Africa and Asia wasbased on redesign of the method to account for the above points, providing furtherdocumentation and videos to support guidance and training, and redesigning the table asseparate sections for each of the five threats nominated, inviting interviewees to identifythree consequences, actions and barriers for each threat.

The possibility of using technology for data recording has been considered at variouspoints. Indeed in 2011, a large scale interactive SMS survey was piloted (Gibson andScott, 2011) and the use of tablets for data entry has also been considered. In theformer case, a major limitation was the lack of personal interaction, limiting responses tomultiple choice style responses, and with limited respondent information. Althoughmobile phone-based surveys enable large sample sizes to be achieved at relatively lowcost, it was not felt that this method was appropriate to the goals of the programme.To date the use of technology such as tablets or smartphones has been constrained bylimited technology access by members and more significantly poor internet access.The situation is changing rapidly and the use of apps on phones or tablets should be keptunder consideration.

2.3 Training and participationIn all interations of the VFL and Frontline studies the role, capacity and training of GNDRmember organisations conducting the studies were critical elements. All iterations weresupported by training guidelines which were rolled out through national workshops atwhich key players were present. Training of local-level participants was delivered through a“training the trainers”model. The scale of the enterprise compared with the limited capacityof the organising network secretariat meant that confidence in the standard of training ofeach individual participant was necessarily limited. In some cases material which wasreturned showed clearly a limited understanding of the method. For example, in some casesreturned surveys were incomplete, or contained surprisingly homogeneous responses.The capacity of individual organisations appeared to have a strong influence on the qualityof data, where high-capacity organisations, sometimes indigenous and sometimes thecountry offices of INGOs were involved there was often greater understanding of themethods employed and greater staff capacity to carry out the work.

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2.4 The role of VFL in influencing international, national and local actorsSubsequent sections of this paper discuss the methods of analysis, representation anduptake of the material gathered, addressing particularly the question of local relevance.Underlying the whole history of development of VFL and Frontline is the tension betweenlocal, national and international uptake of the material. As Figure 1 indicates, concernsabout the international/national focus of VFL leading to it being extractive and havinglimited local relevance led to the development of Frontline, whose focus was more heavilylocal (though global reports were deployed at UNISDR platforms in 2015 at Sendai and 2017at Cancun). The twin goals of international influence, clearly a GNDR goal, and localrelevance, clearly a concern for GNDR and its members, continue to shape the programme,which in a newly emerging iteration, retitled VFL, combines the global level assessmentprocess of the initial iterations with the local-level learning process of Frontline.

3. Methods of data gatheringGNDR enjoys the great benefit, for research purposes, of a wide network of globallydistributed NGO member organisations (approximately 1,000 at the time of writing) whohave valued participating in action research programmes, such as VFL and Frontline.Throughout the iterations of these programmes a common organisational structure hasbeen employed. In each country a “National Coordinating Organisation (NCO)” is identified,an organisation with the capacity to take this role (Approximately 70 NCOs have beeninvolved). This organisation in turn identifies a number of locally based participatingorganisations (POs) (approximately 600 organisations) who undertake the consultations inagreed locations. This structure, in principle, creates a coordinated country-wide effort withgood reach to a range of locations within the country.

In practice, the selection of organisations and localities has a degree of expediency,depending on the breadth of connections that GNDR, and more importantly the NCOs have ineach country. For example, member organisations have reported that they have been excludedfrom participation for various reasons. In some countries, the coverage does not reflect thediversity of risk experience of the population. As noted above, some organisations haveproved not to have the capacity to undertake the work effectively. The GNDR secretariathas a limited ability to assure the quality of all participation due to limited communicationdirectly to the POs and due to the limited capacity of the small secretariat. Finally, fundingnormally presents a challenge. The level of funding required to provide a significantgrant to each of over 600 POs has normally been beyond the reach of GNDR and theprogramme has depended heavily on the commitment and goodwill of these organisations.

Global

National

Local

Extractive Reflective

Frontline

VFL

Figure 1.Comparing context

and character of VFLand Frontline

11

VFL andFrontline

methodology

A deeper issue is the question of “bias” in the data gathering process resulting from this andother factors. This will be discussed in the following Section 3.3.

Despite the above challenges, the programme has successfully gathered data in its firstthree VFL iterations from numbers ranging from 7,200 (2009) to 21,445 (2013) respondents.Although data have shown some clear variation based on locality and organisation(for example, data gathered in Vietnam showed more positive perceptions than othercountries. One explanation is a cultural avoidance of negative views). It is striking that similarpatterns emerge from comparable risk zones in different geographies (see section 3.3).As an example of this similarity the perception of trends in risks is seen as increasingby all but wealthiest respondents in a range of countries, a result described in the reports as“the poorer you are the worse it gets”. More generally as is discussed in section 3.2,it became apparent that comparative discussion was more meaningful between comparablerisk zones than between countries.

3.1 Approaches to respondent selectionWhilst the convenience sampling approach described above has many practical virtues,principally budgetary, it has limitations, some of which are as follows:

• Repeatability: part of the original VFL concept was to track progress, which impliesgenerating time series data in order to draw out trends. In order for any time-basedanalysis to be meaningful, the sampling methodology must be consistent.In principle, this can be achieved if the mix of POs remains constant. This made iteven more important to develop a methodology that yielded value to POs in order tosecure their long-term commitment.

• Aggregating national samples: making comparisons between different types ofthreat involved aggregating data from across countries. However, there is noguarantee that these contexts do in fact have a requisite degree of similarity.Furthermore, any simple analysis was compromised by variations in sample sizesreturned by different countries, i.e. results were biased towards those countriesreturning large data sets. Some country networks were more successful in recruitingmember organisations, or were more enthusiastic in their sampling. Calculatingindies of any sort creates an irrestible desire to make comparisons. The obvious thingto do with average scores is to rank countries, in an attempt to comment on relativeprogress. However, this was problematic, given the variety in types of disastercontexts sampled in different countries.

• Representation: the samples are by no means representative of national populations,but neither need they be, given that GNDR is only concerned with vulnerablepopulations. In some respects, the presence and reach of member organisationsprovided a reasonable sampling frame. What was needed was some consistent frameof hazard zones. However, defining vulnerable context was problematic as that wouldrequire a top down definition of what constitutes a threat.

Random sampling of national populations would require larger scale sampling techniquesthan GNDR can undertake, but a more structured approach to sampling was clearlyneeded. It was decided to adopt an approach based on defining representative risk zonesas the contexts, and a representative range (age, gender, disability, etc.) of respondents.Both locality and respondent selections depend on background understanding andassumptions. Regarding location the “lens” is risk, and disaster risk reduction has adeveloped understanding of the range of risk zones, including both geographies andsocial contexts. Regarding respondents the “lens” is community development, whichrecognises the need to place weight on the voices of women, young and old, the vulnerable

12

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and those with disabilities rather than depending on “the voice of the big man”: those withthe greatest influence.

Training and guidelines, disseminated via the NCOs to POs, include these parameters foridentifying respondents, the process for the interview, referred to as a “structuredconversation” the process for moving towards prioritisation of threats, consequences,actions and barriers and the way that this information is recorded at local level forsubsequent coding and analysis. The data, recorded locally on paper, are input into a simpledata entry tool by the PO and the file produced by this is returned to the NCO, who collatesall the records into one database. The means of aggregating and analysing this data aredescribed in Section 5.

3.2 Data transcriptionThe underlying software used for these processes is Microsoft Excel. Whilst moresophisticated software such as NVIVO can be used to handle qualitative data this would bebeyond the reach of most organisations as they are not typically specialists in qualitativeanalysis, so the approach was kept as simple as possible. Nevertheless, the basic principlesof qualitative analysis are unfamiliar to many and experience showed that more trainingand orientation was required to ensure understanding of this.

Throughout the Frontline evolution, participating member organisations have used penand paper to record interviews. The secretariat has then developed macro-assistedspreadsheets to assist with transcribing data from paper to digital data sets, which wasdone by staff from each NCO.

Free text responses on prioritisation of threats, consequences, actions and barriersare coded by the NCO. This is based on a master code list which has evolved during theFrontline pilots and can be added to by each country. The list of codes (for example“alcoholism”, “damage to homes”, “DRR education” are used to code the free text responsesso that the resulting database can group all responses matching the same code.

The coding process is a critical stage in qualitative analysis, as the quality of this workwill have a huge effect on the quality of the database. Whilst experienced qualitativeanalysts, possibly based centrally, could have been engaged they would understand little ofthe local culture, context or even language and the decision was therefore taken for the NCOin country to do this work. In most cases, these organisations did not have experience in thisform of analysis, so as mentioned above the process was simplified as far as possible andwas based on excel spreadsheets rather than more sophisticated software. Training wasgiven and support offered.

3.3 The validity of qualitative data and the question of biasAs noted above, many are unfamiliar with qualitative research methods, whereas at a basiclevel quantitative methods are widely used and understood. It is often assumed that thelarge scale and numeric basis of such methods is more “scientific”. As many commentatorspoint out, this seeming objectivity masks the fact that the data is interpreted through sets ofassumptions (e.g. Merrifield, 2017). As a result seemingly objective research often masksparticular biases. The Frontline method recognised the strength of qualitative methods inunderstanding complex interactions and local perspectives, as the “everyday disasters”forming a major focus of the research are the result of complex interactions of social,economic, political and environmental factors.

There are several elements of bias arising from the “self-selection” of memberorganisations participating in Frontline. They self-select on the basis of mandate, interestand financial ability. First, the geographical location of sampled communities will bedetermined by the presence and reach of these organisations. A further concern commonlyexpressed is that data depending on local perceptions, gathered by local agencies, can

13

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methodology

introduce an interviewer bias despite careful location and respondent selection. This is anatural effect associated with the expertise and sphere of interest of staff working foragencies with a given mandate.

This can be mitigated to a certain extent by guidelines for the structured conversationprocess. Nevertheless, both explicit and implicit biases on the part of the interviewerconducting the conversation can affect the data. It is clearly impossible to create acompletely neutral conversation and in fact the word “conversation” is the clue. The datawhich are gathered is a result of the conversation between the community member and theNGO member. It is shaped by both of them. Anecdotally it can be seen that, for example,where NGOs place an emphasis on climate related risks these tend to prevalent. While itmay be possible to correct for the influence of the NGO, in the pilots conducted to date suchinfluence has been accepted, and examining the tableau data platform (see below) theinfluence does not appear substantial, as the perceptions of respondents in similar risk zonesfrom different countries show similar trends.

4. Methods of data analysisThe country level database contains records of the location of each response, the risk zoneand the characteristics of each respondent. Additional fields record the perception of trendsin risks, self-perceived economic group and several other fields.

The first pilot showed that this process was a challenge for the NCOs, and there wereseveral iterations of the analysis as it bounced between the NCOs and the centralsecretariat. Questions about sample sizes and about using questionnaires surfaced,suggesting that the NCO had not completely engaged with the method. The coding of thedata seemed to reflect this lack of understanding and engagement, with varied responsesbeing assigned the same code.

For the second pilot, set in Central America, these problems were addressed with awider reaching and intense training session, backed up by expanded guidelines and videos.This – and the third pilot in a range of African and Asian countries – displayed richer datasets with more detailed coding as a result. Nevertheless, questions reflecting a preference forquantitative methods and questionnaires continued to be posed. In social research morewidely weight is still given to seemingly quantitative methods in preference to qualitativemodes, and this creates a continuing challenge.

The purpose of earlier versions of VFL was to generate evidence of changes invulnerability to disasters, as a means of assessing the impact of higher level policydecisions. Data were gathered on questions designed centrally by the Secretariat.The analysis then employed statistical tests to look for relationships of interest arising fromthe data. A subjective metric of how losses due to disasters had changed (in the last fiveyears) was used as the key indicator of change (using a five-point Likert scale). Calculatingaverage scores for this indicator enabled countries to be ranked in terms of “performance”,represented by changing disaster losses. Scores were also disaggregated by a range ofdescriptors (e.g. age, gender and rural/urban context), which gave some interesting insightsinto how different segments of society are affected differently by disasters.

Respondents were also asked to give their own assessment of the threat posed tothemselves by disasters (unspecified). Correlating these scores with scores for change indisaster losses showed that in the majority of countries, things had got worse for peopleliving in more vulnerable communities.

VFL 2011 focussed on local government functions, and data were gathered onperceptions of progress on 20 indicators. The questions were developed by a small workinggroup of disaster reduction practitioners and academics. Similarly, mean scores were usedto rank issues in terms of progress, and to compare and rank countries. Correlating scoreswith the key indicator of change in disaster losses highlighted those aspects of local

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governance that appeared to make a difference. This approach yielded some sensibleresults, e.g., adequate financial resources, local government has adequate expertise, as wellas local action plans.

Whilst this approach did indeed generate findings that were of value to the Secretariatand provided evidence to substantiate debates held at international fora such asthe UNISDR biennial Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, it was not valued by themembership. The process was regarded as extractive, and did not yield findings that couldbe used by member CSOs. One of the strengths of the network is that members have anongoing presence in communities, giving them an opportunity to feedback findings.However, this type of finding was of little value to participating communities as it simplytold them what they already knew.

This was one of the factors leading to the revision of the methodology introduced in theFrontline approach adopted in the 2015 surveys. As has been described in Section 2,this data collection methodology was based around structured “conversations” withparticipants. The primary data collected under this methodology related to the four aspectsof these conversations: “threats”, “consequences”, “actions” and “barriers”. The analysisthen focussed on identifying trends emerging from aggregated data. It started withidentifying most commonly reported threats, making copmarisons between countries andbetween rural and urban areas.

It then used network analysis to explore, for each threat, the most commonly reportedbarriers associated with specific actions taken. This highlighted those actions for which asingle barrier was frequently identified. Note that these actions were not necessarily theactions most commonly taken; neither were the barriers identified the barriers mostcommonly associated with each threat. This approach highlighted actions that couldpotentially be eased by addressing a single (or a limited number of ) barriers. Anotherapproach taken was to identify the most commonly reported barriers, on the basis thataddressing these barriers might have the effect of enabling a wide range of actions.

This approach generated much data that were difficult for members to interpret in anypractical way. The diversity of actions (and barriers) associated with threats onlyemphasised the highly localised nature of disasters, and brought into question the validityof aggregating information from differing contexts on notionally similar threats. It was,therefore, felt that providing a visual representation of the data, along with a means ofinterrogating it for themselves might be of more value to members.

Again the limitations of making comparisons based on geography were recognised, asfor example some cultures, such as in Vietnam, were more positive generally in theirresponses than others.

5. Methods of data representation and accessCritical to the utility of Frontline is access to the information by different users, local,national, international, citizens, communities, government, researchers, etc. Access isrequired first for analysis, and second to present and visualise findings for communication,discussion, action and advocacy.

5.1 AnalysisA range of users need to access the data in order to analyse it, examine priorities in relation todifferent risk zones and respondents and relate these to opportunities for, and barriers foraction. At international level, this role is taken by the GNDR secretariat. At National andsub-national level it is taken by in-country organisations. Both require accessible tools asneither tend to have access to experts in statistical analysis. Tools such as SPSS are notpractical in these contexts. As the pilot was developed a form of “dashboard” was envisaged,providing graphical access, ideally interactively to allow users to explore the data.

15

VFL andFrontline

methodology

Tableau was identified as an online tool which provided a graphical, interactive interface tothe data. The “dashboards” it offered are customisable and formed the basis of online accessto the data sets. They allow users to drill down from global to risk zones, nations, regions andindividual localities, to examine the perspectives of different groups by gender, age, economiccategory, etc., and also to examine relationships between particular threats and associatedconsequences, actions and barriers (www.gndr.org/tableau). Dashboards have been usedby the secretariat to produce global level reports, for example at UNISDR GPDRR 2017Cancun (GNDR, 2017b).

They have also been used by national level member organisations to develop more detailedreports, for example of six risk zones in the Philippines (see www.cdp.org.ph/frontline).

5.2 RepresentationThe reports referred to above also show the process of representation of findingsfrom the analysis. Although Tableau presents graphical dashboards, these do notcommunicate directly to end users, ranging from communities to NGOs, local and nationalgovernment and international institutions. Both the reports cited above demonstrate theuse of info-graphics to represent key findings and further work with GNDR memberorganisations has demonstrated the necessity of this further stage of translationand representation.

6. Applications of data (locally, nationally, etc.)GNDR developed Frontline as a programme to support influence and action for change atall scales. Case studies from South America and Indonesia (Gibson and Wisner, 2016)demonstrate influence on national level policy. GNDR documents impact at local level insix case studies (GNDR, 2017b). These are exemplars for a wider range of case studiesbeing gathered. Further case studies included in the journal issue of which this paper is apart show in several cases the direct influence of Frontline on local-level action. Thecompanion “Action at the Frontline” programme, based on the principle that learning andaction should proceed cyclically, has drawn on Frontline findings in the cases above andin many other cases amongst GNDR member organisations, to promote sustained learningand action.

Influence at an International level, specifically on the UNISDR HFA and SFA, is moredifficult to achieve. The nature of barriers encountered at this scale is discussed in Gibsonet al. (2018, in this issue). They conclude that change agents should consider whether to stepoutside the “system”, while local and national level cases suggest that the original intentionof developing a programme with direct local relevance has been achieved, both this and theearlier VFL programme face more daunting challenges in achieving global level influence.

6.1 Costs and sustainabilityVFL and Frontline are dependent on donor support for deployment and over the variousiterations of the programme financial support has been provided by a range of governmentsincluding Ireland, USA, Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Germany. While thishas supported central costs for development, deployment, training, administration andanalysis the sums offered to the participating organisation have been modest, ranging fromapproximately $6000–$20,000 for the key country level NCOs, with typically no financialcontribution for the local-level POs conducting the surveys and consultations.

For example, the Memorandum of Understanding for NCOs for the 2011 programmeestimated costs as follows:

• National Training Workshop: $7k

• Personnel (Coordinator): $10k

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DPM28,1

• Travel $: 3k

• Consultation/Follow up: $5k

• Total: $25,000

It offered funding of $9,000 towards this figure, with a further $8,000, therefore totalling$17,000, contingent on funding promised but not secured at the time of the project.

The programme is therefore heavily dependent on the in-kind support of GNDR memberorganisations which in turn depended on the value which organisations placed on the actionin relation to their own mandates. In some cases, this value related to the organisation’sadvocacy in campaigning work, in others the experience of action research was valued.Clearly this dependency on the commitment and provision of in-kind support heightened thepressure of the network secretariat to ensure that the action was seen as relevant andworthwhile by participating member organisations.

7. Limitations and challengesLimitations and challenges have been identified in the above sections and are summarisedas follows:

(1) ensuring local-level relevance – avoiding being perceived as extractive andirrelevant by participating NGOs and communities;

(2) achieving understanding and acceptance of the qualitative methods and keyrespondent approach adopted;

(3) achieving high quality in one-to-one structured conversations;

(4) achieving consistency and accuracy in the coding process;

(5) ensuring that the scope of information gathering is appropriate to generatemeaningful data;

(6) ensuring that the organisational structure adopted for the programme meets theneeds of the membership as well as being appropriate to effective data gathering;

(7) dealing satisfactorily with the problem of “bias” and with the practical reality thatthe data reflects a conversation rather than the isolated views of the respondent; and

(8) ensuring that all users are able to access, analyse and represent information andfindings gathered through the process.

8. Further development and further workThe previous section outlined challenges to be considered in further development ofFrontline. Areas to be addressed are also summarised in Gibson and Wisner (2016):

• The coding process, training support and quality management may require furtherexamination.

• The sampling strategy should be reviewed, especially in large, geographically andsocially diverse countries.

• It is possible that larger samples should be produced; the authors found that samplesizes rapidly shrank as they drilled into the Tableau data.

• “Risk zones” should be considered as a possibly more meaningful unit of analysisthan “countries”.

• Limitations of self-reporting by respondents, especially concerning wealth status,need to be considered.

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VFL andFrontline

methodology

• The interpretation of data from Tableau may require further visualisation to make itaccessible to end users.

• AFL case studies should be pursued as a valuable means of triangulating findings.Most of those documented are at early stages, and it will be important to continuedocumenting the progress of these and other cases.

• Criteria for choosing action at the Frontline case studies and their documentationneed to be spelled out.

• A thorough and ongoing discussion of methods used by other researchers attemptingto “give voice” to local people should be launched and sustained.

Underpinning these technical and methodological considerations is a deeper challengereferred to in Section 6. These programmes engage with institutions and politics in pursuingtheir emancipatory goals. In doing so they follow in footsteps treading back over 40 years,from Freire’s (1970) work on mobilising the oppressed poor to change the conditions of theirlives, to Chambers’ (1997) influential works calling to “put the first last” and asking“whose reality counts?” Chambers (1983) and Gaventa’s (1980) work on power andpowerlessness. These and many others argue that emancipatory and transformatorychange depends on giving local people voice and power, counter to a “top down” system.Such a shift in power relations is unavoidably political and as noted above – and argued inmore depth by Gibson et al. (2018) – this is unlikely to be achieved by engaging with the“system” and playing according to its rules. Evidence such as that garnered by VFL andFrontline is important but not sufficient. The ways in which such evidence is deployed tosupport dissensus/disruption are as important as the evidence itself.

Frontline continues to evolve. In its latest iteration, GNDR are attempting to redesign it toretain the local consultation focus, whilst also gathering questionnaire-based informationrelated to the SDG and Sendai targets to provide a local monitoring function. In effect, thisredesign combines the VFL approach with Frontline. This leads to trade-offs, for example, themeans of consultation may be group based rather than one-to-one. The hybrid approach mayaddress the challenge of ensuring both local and international relevance. The discussionabove suggests that an unanswered question is how, given eight years’ experience of failing toexert substantive influence on the system it addresses, this might be achieved.

References

Chambers, R. (1983), Rural Development: Putting the Last First, Longman, London.

Chambers, R. (1997), Whose Reality Counts? Putting the Last First, IT Publications, London.

Freire, P. (1970/1996), Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Penguin, London.

Gaventa, J. (1980), Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley,University of Illinois, Urbana and Chicago.

Gibson, T. (2012), “Horizontal learning and social media in an international development network”,PhD thesis, Manchester University.

Gibson, T. and Scott, N. (2011), “Using ICTs to integrate frontline views into strategic planning forclimate change”, NICCD case study paper, University of Manchester, available at: www.niccd.org/using-icts-to-integrate-frontline-views-into-strategic-planning-for-climate-change-primary-tabs/ (accessed 16 March 2018).

Gibson, T. and Wisner, B. (2016), “ ‘Lets talk about you…’ opening space for local experience, action andlearning in disaster risk reduction”,Disaster Prevention andManagement, Vol. 25 No. 5, pp. 664-684.

Gibson, T., Aka, F., Aretaake, R., Bari, S., Chantry, G., Gupta, M., Molina, G., Norton, J., Parajuli, B.,Rahmawati, H. and Shresha, N. (2018), “Local voices and action: concluding discussion”, Journalof Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 28 No. 1.

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GNDR (2009), “Clouds but little rain”, available at: https://gndr.org/programmes/vfl/vfl-2009.html(accessed 12 March 2018).

GNDR (2010), “Learning review of VFL 2009”, in Gibson: 2012.GNDR (2011), “If we do not join hands”, available at: https://gndr.org/programmes/vfl/vfl-2011.htmlGNDR (2012), “Learning review of VFL 2011”, Gibson.GNDR (2013), “Views from the frontline: beyond 2015”, available at: https://gndr.org/programmes/vfl/

vfl-2013.html (accessed 12 March 2018).GNDR (2015), “Everyday disasters and everyday heroes”, available at: www.weadapt.org/knowledge-

base/disaster-resilience/everyday-disasters-and-everyday-heroes (accessed 16 March 2018).GNDR (2017a), “Frontline: from local information to local resilience”, available at: www.gndr.org/

frontline (accessed 12 March 2018).GNDR (2017b), GPDRR 2017 Cancun, Merrifield publication, London, available at: www.gndr.org/

images/frontlineassets/homepage/14-impact-case-studies/FRONTLINE_PUBLICATION-6.pdf(accessed 12 March 2018).

Merrifield, A. (2017), The Amateur, Verso.Petley, D. (2012), “Global patterns of loss of life from landslides”, Geology, 1 August, doi: 10.1130/

G33217.1.UNISDR (2005), “Hyogo framework for action”, available at: www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/hfaUNISDR (2011a), in Gibson, T.D. (Ed.), Horizontal Learning and Social Media in an International

Development Network, Ph.D thesis, University of Manchester, p. 177.UNISDR (2011b), Global Assessment Review 2011, available at: www.unisdr.org/we/inform/gar

(accessed 15 September 2017).UNISDR (2013), Global Assessment Review, available at: www.unisdr.org/we/inform/gar (accessed

15 September 2017).UNISDR (2015a), Global Assessment Review 2015, available at: www.unisdr.org/we/inform/gar

(accessed 14 February 2018).UNISDR (2015b), Global Assessment Review 2015, GAR, available at: www.unisdr.org/we/inform/gar

Corresponding authorTerry David Gibson can be contacted at: terry.gibson@inventing-futures.org

For instructions on how to order reprints of this article, please visit our website:www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/licensing/reprints.htmOr contact us for further details: permissions@emeraldinsight.com

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Developing the CSO case studiesJohn Norton

Development Workshop France,Lauzerte, France, andTerry David Gibson

Inventing Futures,Macclesfield, UK

AbstractPurpose – The purpose of this paper is to outline the iterative process which led to the productionof the case studies prepared by Civil Society Organisations which are at the core of thisSpecial issue.Design/methodology/approach – The development of the papers has been a process of “case studyauthors” peer group (editors included) exchange and discussed development, in a reactive or “stepwise”process encouraging authors to develop their material to reflect very varied contexts and cases related tocommunity-driven actions and vulnerabilities.Findings – The collaborative process has enabled authors to develop and share both the breadthand depth of complex local issues that address emerging vulnerabilities and barriers tocommunity-driven action.Originality/value – Encouraging local authors to critically explore their local experience and action hasdeepened our understanding of how communities actually assess and address their local reality and thechallenges they face, whether these are locally considered as “disasters” or not, or indeed seen as long-termevolving risks and threats to survival.Keywords CSO, Collaboration, Local experience, Community action, Risk reductionPaper type Research paper

IntroductionThe original impetus for this Special issue followed the publication of a paper entitled“Let’s talk about you […] Opening space for local experience, action and learningin disaster risk reduction” (Gibson and Wisner, 2016) (DPM Journal 2016). Frominvitations sent out in late 2016 by the guest editors to more than 20 Civil SocietyOrganisations (CSOs) with past or ongoing collaboration with the Global Network forDisaster Reduction (GNDR)[1] “Views from the Frontline” and “Action at the Frontline”programmes[2] – which have often served as a catalyst to independent actions – 11 ofthese CSO submitted draft proposals describing a wide range of aspects of, and issuesaround their work that they felt would best illustrate their practical experience of workingwith and encouraging community-driven actions.

In all the cases the suggested material has subsequently needed refining so that theycould develop into coherent papers that focus on issues, successes and barriers which indifferent ways have shaped the outcome locally and at times regionally or nationally. Indoing so, the process has been enriched by considerable collaboration between authors andtheir peer reviewers and to some extent by the guest editors.

Over nearly a year since receiving the initial proposals in early 2017, of the initial 11contributors from Africa, Asia, the Pacific islands and South East Asia, 8 of the CSO authorshave developed their completed case studies.

Telling it how it isFrom the outset, the intended focus of the case studies was firmly on local reality, and notnecessarily on “good news” outcomes. The editors encouraged the authors to write about

Disaster Prevention andManagementVol. 28 No. 1, 2019pp. 20-24© Emerald Publishing Limited0965-3562DOI 10.1108/DPM-07-2018-0210

Received 10 July 2018Revised 10 July 2018Accepted 11 July 2018

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:www.emeraldinsight.com/0965-3562.htm

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their real experience, the good and the bad, and about the barriers they have confronted andhow these experiences have helped them and, in turn, communities, to identify local issues,problems and priorities, and through this process, to collectively define actions to overcomeor reduce the risks they face.

Based on the early drafts from each author, the editors began by preparingfor each author some questions and suggestions on how to take their article forward, so thatit will finally be able to highlight both the success and challenges/barriers the CSO hadfaced, in order that readers and other CSO facing similar situations would be able to learn asmuch as possible from such experience and appreciate the process and the effort that goesinto this.

This began the iterative progression from reporting success stories to increasinglycritically considered case studies.

Exchanges were initially in the form of individual internet communication, and at thisstage there was no attempt to initiate a shared dialogue between all parties. However, asummary of all the case studies was prepared by the editors and shared with all thecontributors.

It quickly became apparent from the revised draft cases that it would be helpful tochannel basic information in each case into common themes or areas of interest or concern,and through this, to provide a degree of structure to the case studies without imposing arigid template. A table was drawn up (Table I) and contributors were asked to present theircase studies at this stage under headings such as “Threats”, “Consequences”, “Barriers”,etc., whilst the same time being encouraged to expand or indeed ignore headings they feltwere not relevant to their experience.

The editors responded to the tables submitted individually by each author withcomments and requests for elaboration or explanation, with the aim of teasing out even atthis early stage commonalities and contrasts between the different cases.

As revised tables with comments were returned to the editors, only at this stagewere they then also shared between all participants, inviting – albeit informally – a firstform of peer review between the authors. Reactions to this were mixed. Understandably,authors were reticent about commenting publically on each other’s submissions,particularly as each described experiences in contexts very different from their own.A sense of “where do we go from here?” crept into the now almost daily exchangesbetween the two editors. They had a strong sense that there was a need to draw outmore detailed material related to these community experiences, and thereby to developmore depth and breadth to the draft case studies so that one could better understand theinteraction of different issues and actors. To achieve this could only be done withdifficulty at a distance by e-mail exchanges and sharing of draft texts. We needed todevelop greater and freer exchange between all the case study authors and to facilitate ifpossible greater discussion.

An ambitious, even unlikely strategy was to try and organise a writers’ workshop thatwould bring together in one place all the case study authors. The problem was how andwhere this could be achieved financially: the geographical spread of the authors seemed aninsurmountable obstacle.

Then came a lucky break. Through a chance meeting, the editors turned to theGlobal Fund for Community Foundations[3] who agreed to fund travel andaccommodation for a writers’ workshop (or “write-shop”) and who suggested this mighttake place in a centre known to them in Nepal. TEWA – Philanthropy for EquitableJustice and Peace in Lalipur (adjoining Kathmandu) could provide ideal workshopfacilities as well as bed and board. Within a month of the GFCF decision to award thisgrant, dates had been fixed and travel arrangements made that would enable us to bringtogether as many of the case study authors as possible for a few days in November 2017.

21

Developingthe CSO

case studies

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Futurechange

and

transformation–

dreamingdreams

Whatisthe

subjectof

theprim

ary

case

stud

yandwhat

second

ary

or supp

ortin

gcasesor

exam

ples

arethere?

Whatarethe

cond

itionsin

which

thecases

aresituated?

Whata

rethethreats

which

localp

eople

face?Theymay

comefrom

many

directions

–econom

ics,clim

ate,

otherenvironm

ental

hazards,political

andsocial

pressures

andothers.Identify

thetoppriorities

Whatshocks

andstresses

dolocal

peopleface

asaresultof

thesethreats?

Identifyone

ormorefor

each

threat

Whatisitthat

prevents

something

being

done

toredu

cethe

effect

ofthe

shocks

and

stresses

resulting

from

the

consequences

you

identified?

Who

arethe

differentactors

who

have

aninflu

ence

oneither

creatin

gbarriers

tochange,orwho

aretaking

action

tomakeachange

toredu

cethe

shocks

and

stresses

resulting

from

the

consequences

youidentified?

Thisisasimple

“stakeholder

analysis”

Whatarethe

actual

orpotential

actio

nsthat

itispossible

totake

locally

,and

how

can

thesebe

achieved?

Where

actio

nshave

been

taken

why

have

they

been

effective?

Local/n

on-localk

nowledg

esharing–

receptiveness/

reticence?

Popu

latio

nstability/

mobility/m

igratio

n?Po

litics,power

orpowerlessness

Collaboratio

nand

influ

ence

Decisionmaking–passive

oractiv

eactors

–(gender/

inequality)?

Learning

from

each

specificandun

ique

situation?

Changing

environm

ents

andclim

ate

Using

tradition

and

innovatio

n…

Cohesive

orpassivelocal

popu

latio

ns?

Inmanycasesthe

actio

nsthat

canbe

takenareabout

coping

with

the

situation,

oradaptin

gto

it.Whatwould

real

“transform

atory

change”look

like,

how

would

itbe

achieved,and

whatactors

would

beinvolved.

Dream

dreams!

Exp

andtheboxesbelow

asrequ

ired

asyoutype

into

them

;get

ridof

theindividu

alboxesin

each

columnifyoudo

notneed

them

!Threat1

Threat2,etc.

Table I.Guidance forstructuring andexpanding casestudy material

22

DPM28,1

In the event, eight managed to attend as did both editors, and a workshop administrator,whilst two authors were unable to participate but have nevertheless contributedto this Special issue’s development. Coincidentally, Nepal provided rich local examples ofcommunities and CSO working together to address the aftermath of earthquakesand the reduction of a variety of other local risks, creating a stimulating backdrop to thewrite-shop.

The write-shop was held from 30th October to 2nd November. To encourageeach author to talk and express more about their case and experience, the write-shop wasstructured round peer reviews. This time, however, each case study was reviewedby two, occasionally three, fellow authors or peer “readers”, each reader being anauthor of another case study paper. Before arriving in Nepal each reader had time toprepare notes and questions on the cases allocated to them. During the write-shop eachreader presented their comments, questions and suggestions to the author and toall the participants, and these were discussed in open session with the authorproviding answers and comments and ending with a collection of written suggestions andcomments provided by all those present. These discussions were subsequently developedby the end of the write-shop into guidance notes to help each author further develop his orher case study. After the write-shop, all eight authors revised their case studies and thesenew drafts were exchanged for a further (and final) peer review by their “readers” and bythe editors.

This very participative write-shop and peer review process generated a rich body ofreflection on both the experiences and how they could best be shared with a widerreadership. For the participants the three days provided a wide ranging discussion thatbrought out detail, unexpected material and thoughts about the people and places and theirproblems they face and the work they have been doing. The effort of getting to Nepal fromfaraway places over several days had paid off.

ConclusionIn developing the CSO case studies, the purpose has been to encourage theauthors to critically explore their own example of “local experience” and to deepen ourunderstanding of how communities actually assess and address their local reality and thechallenges they face.

One could question whether the process of iterative development of the articlesdescribed here carried a risk of influencing the actual content of each contribution. Andyet, with hindsight, given the goal of raising the profile of local knowledge and experience,and of the issues that communities confront but which are sometimes overlooked orignored, the resulting articles would seem to justify the method. The eight CSO articlesmanage to shed fresh light on a diversity of – for a wider readership – sometimessurprising and often insufficiently reported local threats and risks identified byinhabitants with CSO encouragement. They are thus in many respects a too rareopportunity to read and perhaps learn about events, issues and barriers that do not getenough exposure, and written by authors who may not have enough opportunities to tellabout their experience nor receive encouragement to do so. We would indeed argue that ina system that still largely overlooks everyday disasters and small but cumulative eventswhich combined can have major impacts on the well-being and future of localcommunities, more encouragement and opportunity should be provided by practitionersand media to encourage communities and CSO bring their concerns, issues and experienceto the fore.

We would therefore hope that the approach, if not the method itself, could encourageothers to do the same. The steps in the process are set out in Table II.

23

Developingthe CSO

case studies

Notes

1. Global Network for Disaster Reduction (GNDR) is a regionally decentralised network of over800 non-governmental organisations and other civil society organisations in 129 predominantlymedium- and low-income countries.

2. See Paper No. 2 in this Journal on the “Frontline Methodology”.

3. GFCF: a grassroots grant maker working to promote and support institutions of communityphilanthropy around the world.

Reference

Gibson, T. and Wisner, B. (2016), “ ‘Lets talk about you…’ opening space for local experience, action andlearning in disaster risk reduction”,Disaster Prevention andManagement, Vol. 25 No. 5, pp. 664-684.

Corresponding authorJohn Norton can be contacted at: johndwf@gmail.com

Process for development of case studiesStage of process Notes

1. Selection of case study contributors A convenience sampling approach was adoptedbased on previous relationships of the edition editorswith members of GNDR

2. Preparation of an initial case study outline by theparticipant

A challenge from the outset was moving from“success stories” which are often required for fundingbids, etc., to a more critical approach which identifiedchallenges as well as successes

3. Feedback and questions from the editors The process of feedback was intended to help identifykey points of interest for discussion and learning

4. Production of a further draft by the participant It was found difficult to “take a step back” from thecases and this led to design of the step below

5. Invitation to use a table format to “deconstruct”the case study and identify the subject, context,threats, consequences, barriers, key actors,actions, important themes and issues, futurechange and transformation

In order to help contributors “tease out” learning theywere invited to populate a table which broke down thecase into various themes (see Table I)

6. Revision of case study in a common formatdrawing on the analysis in (4)

Material from (4) and (5) was combined in therewritten case. This work was collaborative betweenthe authors and editors

7. Peer review of each case study by other participantsin preparation for the Kathmandu workshop, eachcase being reviewed by 3 or 4 colleagues whoprepared questions based on the review

Each case study was allocated to three or four of theother authors for peer review so that discussion at theKathmandu workshop was based on these triggerquestions, avoiding lengthy presentations of theoriginal paper, which was “taken as read”

8. Discussion of each case study paper between allparticipants at the Kathmandu workshop,initiated by the reviewers’ questions

The “safe space” of the workshop and understandingand trust engendered by spending time togetherformally and informally allowed for rich, open andsometimes provocative discussion, which was recordeddirectly to flipcharts and also recorded to audio

9. Recording of key points made by participants atthe workshop

The records of the workshop were collated in textform in spreadsheets as a basis for qualitativeanalysis, and shared with all the authors

10. Further revision of the case study on the basis ofthe workshop feedback

Authors completed a based on workshop feedback

11. Discussion and amendment of this paper by allparticipants

Final revisions were made in collaboration betweenauthors and editors

Table II.Process fordevelopment of casestudies

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24

DPM28,1

Traditional Kiribati beliefs aboutenvironmental issues and its

impacts on rural andurban communities

Ruiti AretaakeDepartment of Community Development,

Foundation for the Peoples of the South Pacific Kiribati,Tarawa, Kiribati

AbstractPurpose – The purpose of this paper is to report how the encouragement of collaboration betweenlocal stakeholders, communities and the government helps slow the great impact of disaster risksand the impacts of climate change on livelihoods and lives. It also describes how promoting the acceptanceand contributions of traditional knowledge in this effort owing to their accessibility and affordabilityand their cultural compatibility with the community contributes to addressing the challenges inKiribati faces.Design/methodology/approach – Drawing on government and NGO reports, as well as otherdocumentary sources, this paper examines the nature of current efforts and the state of community practicesin Kiribati.Findings – Disaster risks and climate change are currently destroying all facets of I-Kiribati life. It is,therefore, imperative that a holistic form of partnership bringing together both state and non-state actors andthat through this community awareness be implemented within the Kiribati policies and communitydevelopment programs to improve dissemination of prevention and risk reduction programs, whilemaintaining the cultural infrastructure.Social implications – Access to modern technologies and factors which inhibit local utilization of naturalresources as well as traditional Kiribati beliefs about environment issues and impacts on people illustrate thepotential and difficulties of convergence of new ideas with traditional knowledge.Originality/value – The Kiribati “Frontline” project is an activity which has been led by the Foundation forthe Peoples of the South Pacific Kiribati, both stimulated and in part subsidized by the Global Network forDisaster Reduction that provided financial support to work with rural and urban communities on mitigatingdisaster risks and climate change issues.Keywords Collaboration, Cultural competencies, Integrated disaster risks management,Local traditional knowledgePaper type Case study

SummaryDisaster risks and climate change are increasingly affecting the lives of Kiribati islanders.As these impacts are multifaceted, embracing environmental, social and economic issues, apartnership is required to address them, bringing together both state and non-state actors tolearn and act together. This case study demonstrates both the potential and difficulties ofconvergence of new ideas with traditional knowledge through giving an account of theencouragement of collaboration between local stakeholders, communities and thegovernment to reduce the impact of disaster risks and the impacts of climate change onlivelihoods and lives. Traditional knowledge is seen to contribute to addressing thechallenges Kiribati faces. The Kiribati “Frontline” project is an activity which has been ledby the Foundation for the Peoples of the South Pacific Kiribati (FSPK), both stimulated andin part subsidized by the Global Network for Disaster Reduction (see the Paper 2 in thisSpecial Edition for more detail).

Disaster Prevention andManagement

Vol. 28 No. 1, 2019pp. 25-32

© Emerald Publishing Limited0965-3562

DOI 10.1108/DPM-06-2018-0182

Received 6 June 2018Revised 6 June 2018

Accepted 12 July 2018

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:www.emeraldinsight.com/0965-3562.htm

25

TraditionalKiribati beliefs

Subject of the case studyLocal action and learning.

Important themes and issuesLocal and non-local knowledge sharing – receptiveness and reticence.

Threat and consequences faced

(1) The lack of fresh water leads to water contamination, in turn, leading to bouts ofdiarrhea among children and overall loss of local food.

(2) Limited land space leads to overcrowding, increasing crime, relocation of homesfrom coastal areas to inland and land disputes.

(3) The sea level rise leads to land erosion, loss of houses along the sea shore, inlandflooding, limited land space for gardening, narrow bed for underground fresh water,changes in seabed current leading to dying seaweed consumed by fish and fishpoisoning leading to ciguatera.

(4) Increase in temperature leads to unavailability of foods in terms of long period ofdrought or no rain have great impacts on the porous and unfertile soil leading tounhealthy plants with less produce, consequently leading to the adoption of newfarming techniques to planting new vegetable crops. Increase in crabs’ number leadsto them eating these vegetables and unbalanced diet leads to high rates of healthissues so new recipes are developed for cooking nutritious dishes.

(5) Unemployment: leading to sand and gravel minins causing environmental damage,increase in number of out of school attendances by young people leads to more crimesand domestic violence.

The case studyIntroduction“Traditional beliefs about environmental issues and its impacts on communities” is a title thatsuits our Kiribati Frontline program especially when dealing with affected rural communities asa result of disaster risks and climate change impacts. Traditional knowledge which had fadedaway is now being revived to help reduce the causes and impacts of disaster and climate changeissues. Water, food and limited land space have not been a problem with rural and urbancommunities in the past but recently everything has changed in its form and usage. In thepresent environment of living and survival, the Kiribati Frontline program has working withrural and urban communities to integrate modern technologies with traditional knowledge as away forward to better resilience and livelihoods.

The Frontline program stimulated partnerships between relevant government ministries,CSO, NGOs and community groups in different areas to initiate community empowerment,improve water systems and develop food security. Overall, 22 communities on Aranuka andMarakei islands have been involved in the program. Implementing adaptation activities onboth islands has been done in partnership with Island Council officers working on relatedactivities, including agricultural officers, water technicians and village councils. Consultationswith communities include developing a plan and prioritization of issues for each communityas the first initiative for the program as both targeted islands do not have an existing one.Community development plans (CDP) enabled communities to own the plan and become partof the implementation. These plans were done through a process where communities did themapping of their resources and issues identifying their strengths and weaknesses in

26

DPM28,1

combating the issues and utilizing the resources. From this process, they prioritize their issuesto support the goals they have for their community to achieve an outcome of CDP.

The program provides technical support by engaging external service providers from thegovernment ministries as well as community members with traditional knowledge concerningissues such as coastal areas, underground well water and agriculture. In addition to theseissues, the high rates of health issues have led communities to use local medicines from localplants and vegetables they produce.

“The main objectives outlined here reflect those stated in the FSPI MORDI programwhich FSPK is a part” (FSPI, 2017) are to:

• Establish improved linkages with relevant external organizations includinggovernment, private sector, NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) soas to increase access to basic services and increase community resilience to externalrisks and disasters.

• Increase income generating and sustainable food opportunities, especially for ruralwomen and youth.

• Address the lack of access to financial services, markets and related technology andinformation. Assistance during the implementation is targeted at increasingopportunities for both the community as a whole and groups within the community,giving priority to youth and women.

Financial support provided by the program has been regarded as a tool to empowercommunities to become more self-reliant through enhanced social capital, sustained accessto services and increased financial self-reliance. Not all communities are willing to parttake in the program as some might have illiteracy issues; therefore, the program does notexpect everyone to be involved. However, the continuation of community visits andprovision of technical support in areas where there seemed to be ambiguity anduncertainty, communities gradually became involved until they fully understood how theprogram is implemented.

CDP were developed during the community consultations. Communities prioritizedtheir problems and as a result highlighted access to water and development of homegardens. In partnership with the Island Council water technician, communities wereable to identify areas with fresh water for underground well water. Establishing smallworking groups within a community assists the program to gain more interest as thesecommunities were able to communicate directly and share views in smaller groups than ina larger one.

The program has provided training to remote rural communities to enhance their skillsand knowledge with new technologies in gardening to combat the impact of disaster risksand climate change. The poor soils and effects of climate change have led to this trainingbeing conducted by an agricultural assistant based at an Island Council supportingcommunities in new and changed practices.

ContextThe Republic of Kiribati is composed of 33 islands of Kiribati, a remote and low-lyingnation in the Pacific Ocean, which is under threat from climate change. The Republicgained independence on the July 12, 1979. In total, 21 of the islands are inhabited, and thewhole country is divided into three island groups. The highest point on many of theislands such as South Tarawa is just a couple of meters above the sea level. Rising oceanwaters are threatening to shrink Kiribati’s land area, increase storm damage, destroy itscrop-growing lands and ultimately displace its people long before the islands aresubmerged[1] (Figure 1).

27

TraditionalKiribati beliefs

Challenges facedMarakei Island is one of the target islands for the Kiribati “Frontline” project, which thiscase study will focus on. Most of the communities on this island are at risk from theimpacts of sea level rise. Already, most of those living on the coastal area have lost land andhouses have been damaged and some partly collapsed as a result of the coastal erosion. Seawater incursion into underground wells means that the inhabitants have to access freshwater from further inland. The main local food plants such as breadfruit and coconut treesare dying because of salt water from the sea incursions, and food security and incomegeneration are greatly affected. The issue of ciguatera (food poisoning from a toxinaccumulated in fish) has become common on this island and communities have to be carefulon what kind of fish to eat. People who have ciguatera may experience nausea, vomiting andneurologic symptoms[2]. This is a recent phenomenon resulting from the change in climate,the types of seaweed that fish usually feed on have changed too and so it makes eating fishunsafe on this Island. Other changes are taking place: efforts to introduce new crops such asgrowing cabbages to add to local food sources are hampered, because crabs come on shoreand eat such plants.

Action taken in responseFSPK – Kiribati Frontline program is currently engaging an island water technician to workon identifying the areas of fresh water on the target islands in order to retrieve tocommunities in salinity areas. In addition, the water technician and communities haveagreed on using hand water pump as it is a simple method that can be maintained andrepaired by communities. This is a manual system where it only requires manpower whichcan be a form of exercise for youth and women while at the same time it gives them access tofresh water from a remote area. The minimal budget provided by the program does notallow every household to have hand water pump; therefore, four to six households have toshare one hand water pump. This number of household to share a water pump depends onthe closeness between several houses.

Homes along the coastal areas have been affected greatly from the impacts of sea levelrise and, therefore, they have to be relocated to inland which incurred lots of discomfort andinconveniences. Culturally, land distribution among families is always done so the more

Figure 1.Map of Kiribatiislands

28

DPM28,1

people in one family the lesser or small land space each family should get. Limited landspace resulted in inadequate space for gardening and sometimes leads to land disputeamong some families. Reconstructing a new home is another burden as not every family hasthe proper skill and knowledge to build local houses. Communal houses – Maneaba alwaysused as a rehabilitation house for those communities with disabilities while families giveassistance in rebuilding of new homes in safer areas.

Identifying which fish to eat is now another challenge for this island. Communities haveused their traditional knowledge on selecting good fish to eat which now cannot beguaranteed as sometimes the test for good fish is not stable. Therefore, communities on thisisland are very familiar with ciguatera symptoms and are aware of local medicines or treesthat can stop the poison or cure the sickness. The program is able to work with localcommunities to share skills on how to identify good and bad fish to reduce the issue offish poisoning.

Moreover, home gardening is not an easy activity with the communities. The main foodcrops are swamp dalo, breadfruits, banana and papaya and so the introduced vegetableplants such as cabbage, tomato, cucumber, sweet-pepper and eggplant need muchattention and care in planting them. With the porous infertile soil, home gardeningtraining is crucial for these communities in order to sustain the healthy garden producethey need for their daily diets. The training contents provided to the communities includecomposting to supply nutrients to the soil, germinating seeds and cuttings, transplanting,watering and harvesting. An island agriculture officer together with the nurserymanprovide technical support to communities if they have issues with their garden while theFSPK Frontline program provides seeds and cuttings when they are needed.

Planting and eating are two different things and, therefore, communities have thecapability to plant but need support to identify produce that are ready for cooking or eating.Therefore, the program conducted harvesting training which leads to cookingdemonstration on garden produce to allow communities to consume what they get fromtheir garden. Recipe pamphlets are developed and distributed to communities members whoparticipate in the cooking session.

Reflecting on the actionFood security is the main problem on an atoll island such as Marakei. The porous andunfertile soils have led communities to adopt new techniques or revive traditionalknowledge from old people in order to support the planting of indigenous and importedvegetable plants. Plants which were grown previously, including breadfruit, swamp dalo(also known as Giant swamp taro (Cyrtosperma merkusii)), and coconut trees have beenaffected by the change in climate as normal rain seasons are not occurring and increase intemperature as well as sea level rise has prevented plants to get good nutrients from thesoil for their growth. This resulted in poor produce and reduced yields.

Working with partner NOGs and CBOs already involved in innovative work with ruralcommunities is crucial as to support each other for sustained long-term engagement. Thereare limited resources for the expansion and consolidation of successful innovations.Traditional structures are increasingly less stable to act as community safety nets and tocope with the increasing complexity of the issues.

Strengthening the institutional capacity of target communities would help address thesechallenges. Documentation and sharing of learning from best practices and innovationsacross the region could be encouraged. Establishing processes that enable remote ruralcommunities to link with policy and planning processes would enable government toconsider rural communities issues when making decisions or policies. For instance, the CDPthat have been developed by communities are incorporated as part of Island CouncilDevelopment Plan. The issues identified and prioritized in the plans are put forward to the

29

TraditionalKiribati beliefs

concerned government ministry such as Ministry of Internal Affairs to seek financialsupport in cases where the program could not provide this. Bylaws are formulated andregulated to support community’s development plans on food security to provide everyhousehold to have a garden otherwise a fine has to be imposed on those household who donot comply with this bylaw.

Barriers to actionWorking with communities is not an easy task and the program has to find ways to dealwith issues encountered during the implementation. First, with the overcrowding ofpeople who are being relocated to inland, the issue of environmental pollution occurredwhen communities have no proper places to dump their rubbish. An initiative to reuse andrecycle rubbish lead to having a solid waste management activity. Sorting of rubbish intoorganic and inorganic waste brought in an opportunity to reuse inorganic waste such asplastics and bottles where they are used for decorations around the homes or schools andclean bottles for water storage. Organic rubbish are then used for garden compost whichsupport the promotion of home gardening for food security.

The use of underground well water for drinking water requires that it should be boiled asit is not safe to drink directly from the well. In areas where freshwater is not availablewatering a garden is not a priority and, therefore, balancing diets among families is apriority. Mothers and young children have the main task to prepare for family drinkingwater so boiling water every day needs plenty of firewood where income is not good in afamily. However, the high tendency to use light cooking strategies and the use of keroseneor gas increased which is expensive especially on outer island when income depends oncopra cutting and fishing. Women are trained and encouraged to use simple energy renewalsystems that require only little firewood and does not cost money.

Living in an extended family is common in the Kiribati culture. Religions have grownwildly and different denominations have different rules. Family planning is not allowed insome churches especially the Roman Catholic and, therefore, issues of overpopulation inthe homes still exists. Men are regarded as head of families and decision-makers andso children have the least in voicing what they think. Children and women are seen to bethe most vulnerable in the communities and they do not get the rights as men do.Therefore, gender equality is needed to break cultural resistance to enable the change inthe mindset of men.

With the Island Council system, there is no proper land planning management aseveryone in the community is expected to build his home on his inherited land from hisancestors or parents.

Adaptation activities promoted to communities in preventing coastal areas from erosiondoes not work well with the geographical features of the island. Eroded areas are more onthe ocean side and mangrove planting and sea wall construction are always a challenge.With the lack of financial resources, traditional knowledge in building soft sea wallmeasures can only be implemented with people willing to share their skills and knowledge.However, as a custom, families have their own talent that cannot be shared with any otherfamily and, therefore, it is hard for the program to directly engage these talented people.Cost has to incur as an incentive for any community member who is willing to offer or sharethe knowledge to the rest of the communities.

The way forwardTo look into the priorities of the communities stated in the CDP, the program hasidentified two main issues which are mainstreaming of fresh water for consumption toalleviate health issues; and promoting of food security measures to support the lack

30

DPM28,1

of fresh vegetables for balanced diets and supplement the high demand of importedprocessed foods.

The following strategies to support the two main issues stated above will be to:

(1) Identify community meeting places (maneaba) with aluminum iron roofing that can beused for rainwater harvesting and seek financial support to provide water tanks.

(2) Install hand water pump for households to share in order to support them inaccessing fresh water from a remote area. This is a simple and less cost-effectivesystem that does not need or require the technical expertise in fixing ormaintaining the pump.

(3) Establish convenient garden nurseries in between communities to provide easyaccess to seedlings and plants. These nurseries can be supervised byown communities members with the support of the Island agriculture officer andthe nurseryman.

(4) Reprint and distribute pamphlets for recipes and garden guide to encourage ongoinggarden initiative and balanced diets.

Maintaining the good relationship and strengthen working partnership with communities,local Island Council, stakeholders, NGOs and related government department will enable theprogram to sustain the momentum of achieving a successful outcome. These can be done byway of having:

(1) regular meetings with partner NGOs implementing the same activity;

(2) establishing working groups on water and agriculture as to maintain momentum ofparticipation in the program;

(3) sharing best practices on community engagement so as to build self-confidence towork with communities and partners;

(4) providing equal opportunities for gender to participate in the program; and

(5) combining efforts to influence policy makers.

Educating communities is essential on how to deal with daily issues. Strategies throughpromotion and awareness programs can be by way of:

(1) producing newspaper adverts on approved methods of building sea wall;

(2) radio talk back show on the impacts of constructing homes on coastal areas;

(3) disseminating of translated smart solutions into local context to reduce and preventcauses of disaster and climate change issues; and

(4) promoting of human rights to allow citizens to voice their concern in relation to theimpacts of disaster and climate change.

Communities need empowerment and support on developing economic opportunitiesthrough the provision of trainings on income generating such as making handicrafts tosell or exchange for their needs. In this sense, the unfortunate with less coconut trees to cutcopra as a source of income generating can sell handicrafts such as mats, hats, strings, etc.Traditional knowledge sharing such as building canoes for fishing can be transferred toyounger generation so as to maintain the knowledge and skills. Advocacy techniques suchas lobbying and campaigning to key decision-makers as well as within the governmentlevel to seek employment opportunities in other countries to utilize the talents as anexchange for income to support families back in the outer islands.

31

TraditionalKiribati beliefs

Local actorsFSPK Frontline program works in partnership with groups existing within the communitiessuch as women’s group, youth groups, elders (unimane) and church groups. The disaster riskand climate change network in Kiribati include representatives from Meteorological Unit;Office of the Beretitenti; Ministry of Land, Environment and Agriculture Department;Ministry of Education; Tetoamatoa Disability Group; Te Bahai Youth Group; Red Cross;Caritas; KiGenderCC; Betio Town Council communities; South Tarawa communities; Marakeiand Aranuka Islands. Everyone is involved by way of contributing to the implementation ofthe Frontline program in Kiribati.

Notes

1. The Guardian, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/23/waiting-for-the-tide-to-turn-kiribatis-fight-for-survival

2. Harmful Algal Blooms: Ciguatera Fish Poisoning: Home | CDC HSB, available at: www.cdc.gov/NCEH/ciguatera/default.htm

Reference

FSPI (2017), “MORDI program”, available at: www.fspi.org.fj/mordi.html (accessed November 23, 2017).

Corresponding authorRuiti Aretaake can be contacted at: ruriano@gmail.com

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32

DPM28,1

Advancing small island resilienceand inclusive development

through a convergence strategy inCarles, Philippines

Jesusa Grace MolinaTechnical Services Program, Centre for Disaster Preparedness,

Quezon City, Philippines

AbstractPurpose –Various natural, socio-cultural and economic risks confront the people of Gigantes Islands in themunicipality of Carles. The islands’ exposure to these hazards has aggravated poverty in the locality asdemonstrated in the prevalence of unsafe livelihood activities and lack of access to health facilities.The onslaught of Supertyphoon Yolanda in 2013 has led to environmental and economic destruction,which prompted UP Visayas Foundation, Inc. to implement the Rehabilitation for Island Sustainabilityand Empowerment Gigantes Project, a rehabilitation initiative for the islands. The Frontlineprogram contributed in enhancing its implementation through inclusive risk profiling. The paper aimsto discuss this issue.Design/methodology/approach – One of the actions done to promote small island resilience was theinstitutionalization of convergence strategy to consolidate post-disaster and development efforts ofgovernment and non-government organizations at different levels. The formation of Island SustainableDevelopment Alliance, Inc., an umbrella organization of community-based groups involved in disasterpreparedness and natural resource management, has demonstrated the beauty of convergence.Findings – Good relationships, resource mobilization and shared responsibility among stakeholders becameevident as a result of collaboration. Despite challenges on consolidating the barangay development councilsdue to varying priorities, and conflicting interests due to survival, the strategy led to significant impactstoward addressing vulnerabilities and isolation.Originality/value – To sustain the initiative, capacity-building and advocacy efforts are implementedcontinuously on the ground to promote ownership and inclusive development.Keywords Inclusive development, Convergence approach, Multi-stakeholder collaboration,Small island resiliencePaper type Case study

SummaryVarious natural, socio-cultural and economic risks confront the people of Gigantes Islandsin the municipality of Carles. The islands’ exposure to these hazards has aggravatedpoverty in the locality as demonstrated in the prevalence of unsafe livelihoodactivities and lack of access to health facilities. The onslaught of SupertyphoonYolanda in 2013 has led to environmental and economic destruction, which promptedUP Visayas Foundation, Inc. (UPVFI) to implement the Rehabilitation for IslandSustainability and Empowerment (RISE) Gigantes Project, a rehabilitation initiative forthe islands. The Frontline program contributed in enhancing its implementation throughinclusive risk profiling.

One of the actions done to promote small island resilience was the institutionalization ofconvergence strategy to consolidate post-disaster and development efforts of government

Disaster Prevention andManagement

Vol. 28 No. 1, 2019pp. 33-41

© Emerald Publishing Limited0965-3562

DOI 10.1108/DPM-06-2018-0190

Received 17 June 2018Revised 17 June 2018Accepted 12 July 2018

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:www.emeraldinsight.com/0965-3562.htm

The author is grateful for the support of the UP Visayas Foundation, Inc., especially Mr Jorge S. Ebay,Program Manager of the RISE Gigantes Project; cooperation of ISDA members; commitment of differentindividuals and organizations that made the convergence strategy a success in the municipality of Carles;and warmth of the people from the four barangays in Gigantes Islands.

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and non-government organizations at different levels. The formation of Island SustainableDevelopment Alliance, Inc. (ISDA), an umbrella organization of community-based groupsinvolved in disaster preparedness and natural resource management, has demonstrated thebeauty of convergence.

Good relationships, resource mobilization and shared responsibility amongstakeholders became evident as a result of collaboration. Despite challenges onconsolidating the barangay[1] development councils due to varying priorities,and conflicting interests due to survival, the strategy led to significant impacts towardaddressing vulnerabilities and isolation. To sustain the initiative, capacity-building andadvocacy efforts are implemented continuously on the ground to promote ownership andinclusive development.

The case studyCarles and its vulnerabilitiesCarles is a second-class municipality in the province of Iloilo comprised of 33 villages.Located on the northern most tip of Panay Island, Carles is considered a coastal area with its18 barangays consisting of islands and islets. The municipality has a population of 62,690individuals who primarily depend on fishery, trade, agriculture and industry. Specifically,the Frontline research focused on the four barangays of the municipality, which are coveredby the Gigantes Group of Islands. These barangays are Asluman and Granada on GiganteNorte and Lantangan and Gabi on Gigante Sur inhabited by 13,114 people. Gigantes is26 kilometers away from mainland Iloilo and can be accessed via the town of Estanciathrough passenger boats with approximately 1.5–2 hours travel time (Figure 1).

Due to combinations of physical, socio-cultural and economic factors, Gigantes isvulnerable to many risks, which affect the welfare and development of its populace. As asmall island, Gigantes is highly exposed to hydro-meteorological hazards such as typhoon,thunderstorms, halakay (strong winds), monsoon winds and drought. Furthermore, povertyis also an evident risk for its people. In fact, Gigantes has an 80 percent poverty incidencerate, one of the highest in the Visayas Region. The evident poverty in the islands also led tothe proliferation of unsafe livelihood activities such as illegal fishing, which is destructiveto the marine environment, and motorcycles for hire, which cause road accidents.Furthermore, the poverty in Gigantes is worsened by their isolation, which results in otherdetrimental risks, including limited access to health and birthing facilities, markets andpotable water. The island has a malnutrition rate of 30 percent for children between 0 and

Notes: Left: map of the Philippines showing the municipality of Carles; right: map of GigantesGroup of IslandsSources: Libero (2013) (left); Balgos (2013) (right)

Figure 1.Locating GigantesIslands in thePhilippines

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71 months. Majority of the households reside in houses made of light materials,and 70 percent of them also live within the 40-meter no-build zone (danger zone):

When we talked about the issue of isolation before, we thought all the while that the four barangaysare isolated from the mainland. It turned out that the four barangays are also isolated from eachother. They seldom talk to each other. The barangays have varying trusts – some are serious withthe enforcement of policies on fisheries policies, while others are not. Some are more transparent,while others are not. ( Jorge Ebay, Program Manager, RISE Gigantes Project)

The people of the islands are exposed to different layers of vulnerability – sectoral exclusion,cultural inferiority, economic deprivation, isolation from basic services and high exposure tohazards. Such a reality underscores that the everyday hazards affecting Gigantes are assignificant as the large-scale risks challenging its people. If these threats are left unaddressed,achieving resilience and inclusive and sustainable development is impossible.

Convergence strategy: an approach toward resilience and inclusive development

The GNDR, through the Frontline Program, became a vehicle for communities to have a greaterunderstanding of their vulnerabilities. It introduced the concept of small-scale risks, which affectpeople on a daily basis. These threats are not sudden and life changing, unlike what was experiencedin Typhoon Haiyan. They are very slow onset, but their impact is long-term and as debilitating as theeffect of huge disaster events like Haiyan. ( Jorge Ebay, Program Manager, RISE Gigantes Project)

The results of Frontline aided UPVFI, one of Center for Disaster Preparedness’ partners, inenhancing the implementation of RISE Gigantes Project, a post-Typhoon Yolanda[2]rehabilitation intervention launched in 2014 with support from Christian Aid. Frontlineprovided them with a more critical lens on looking at vulnerabilities to further understand theconcept of everyday hazards. Through the inclusive risk profiling process, issues on tourism,illegal fishing and regulation of transport sector were also considered as priorities towardsmall island resilience. To facilitate collective action among stakeholders in addressing theabovementioned issues, the convergence strategy was implemented in August 2015 involvingdiverse humanitarian development actors. The strategy was formally supported by the localgovernment of Carles through the issuance of an Executive Order (EO 58 series of 2015)recognizing convergence as an approach for small island resilience with Gigantes as a model.In fact, the Provincial Government of Iloilo also played a significant role. Gov. ArthurDefensor was the one who initially pushed for the concept of convergence. He saw the need fordifferent stakeholders in Gigantes to come together and talk about common issues andconcerns to prevent overlaps and clarify responsibilities.

UPVFI’s strong dedication to research and extension projects since its establishment in1979 became instrumental in gaining the trust of the government to embrace the initiative.Specifically, the convergence approach intended to develop a clear division ofresponsibilities among stakeholders; reducing duplication and addressing gaps incoverage and quality; and gauging the extent to which needs are being met collectively.Furthermore, at the community level, this strategy was also realized through organizing theISDA, an umbrella organization of 12 community-based groups in Gigantes. ISDA wasformed to establish a platform for dialogue and closer relationships between communitiescritical in achieving resilience and inclusive development.

The convergence approach enabled collaboration among actors from various levels whoare present in Gigantes. It provided an enabling environment to consolidate not only theinitiatives toward rehabilitation but also engagements that aim to promote development in theislands. The approach adheres to the principles of “Build back Better” as it envisions a unifiedand stronger Gigantes. Besides UPVFI as the lead implementer, various community-basedgroups, civil society organizations, donors, and local and regional government agencies

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have supported the convergence strategy and become active allies in resilience building.These organizations have contributed technical, financial and material support to putforward the welfare of the islands. Figure 2 shows the different actors involved in theconvergence strategy.

Convergence strategyPaving the path to resilience: activities driven by the convergence strategyThrough the leadership of UPVFI, the convergence among stakeholders became evident invarious activities implemented under the RISE Gigantes project (Table I). The diverseactivities carried out in the different components of the project created an avenue forcollective action and unity to materialize.

Participatory risk and capacity needs assessments were conducted to gain anunderstanding of the communities’ vulnerabilities and existing strengths that could betapped for promoting safety and resilience. The biggest component of the project wascapacity building and organizing activities; some of these included alternative fooddevelopment training for women and strengthening of Barangay Disaster Risk Reductionand Management Committee (BDRRMC), BDCs and volunteer groups. The provision oflivelihood assistance to disaster survivors also became a priority intervention. UPVFIbelieved that enhancing capacities should go hand-in-hand with increasing local capacitiesfor barangay governance. Isolation of the islands from mainland Iloilo was also a concernthat the project tried to address by looking at the myriad social, cultural, economic andpolitical factors.

CIVIL SOCIETYCOMMUNITY

Barangay development councils (BDCs)Barangay officialsSectoral representatives: women, business, education, and youthResort owners Tour guides

GOVERNMENT

Municipal: Disaster Risk Reduction and Management, Tourism, Planning and

Development, Social Welfare and Development and Agriculture

Regional: Department of Labor and Employment, Department of Environment

and Natural Resources, Department of Tourism, Department of Education, Office of

Civil Defense, Department of Interior and Local Government and Department of

Science and Technology

DONORS

Canada Fund for Local Initiatives Australian Aid-PACAPUNICEFChristian Aid

CONVERGENCE

STRATEGY

Community Development Society of the PhilippinesIloilo Caucus of Development Non-Government OrganizationsPanay Rural Development CenterFoundation for the Philippine EnvironmentSave the ChildrenPhilippine Life SavingABS-CBN FoundationCenter for Disaster PreparednessZoological Society of London

Figure 2.Various actors of theconvergence strategy

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Furthermore, mangrove reforestation was also done as part of the natural resourcemanagement agenda. This became a priority since many mangrove areas in the islandshave already been cleared to accommodate the needs of the increasing population. Puttingup a water system in the area was undertaken so that people could have access to water andperform their daily activities. Moreover, UPVFI invested in advocacy and communityeducation as part of its commitment to document and disseminate the good practices andlessons learned of Gigantes to various stakeholders in the Philippines and beyond.

To have a long-term and more sustainable solution on the threats confronting theislands, mainstreaming disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation into localdevelopment plans and programs was also carried out. UPVFI assisted the four barangaysin crafting their annual investment program and they regard this as one of their mostsignificant accomplishments.

The four communities comprising Gigantes were actively involved in the activities undereach component as leaders, participants and beneficiaries. The project activities do notonly target those who have directly participated but the entire population of the islands.A participatory and inclusive approach was employed in the conceptualization, design,planning and actual project implementation. The various CSO partners of UPVFI engagedin the project provided technical assistance and financial support, which helped in meetingthe set targets.

One Gigantes, one island: the gains and challenges of the convergence strategy

ISDA is guided by their motto – Isda for Gigantes, Four Barangays, One Gigante (Isda para saGigantes, Apat na Barangay, Isang Gigante). It is like having one voice, one beat, one music.The members thought that by doing that, they could, you know, gain better leverage in terms ofadvocacy and seeking support from the outside. They realized that if they are united, they couldhave a bigger voice. ( Jorge Ebay, Program Manager, RISE Gigantes Project)

The convergence approach, as seen in the various activities conducted among stakeholders,resulted in significant outcomes that are fundamental in vulnerability reduction and

Year What happened?

2013 Super typhoon Yolanda struck the Gigantes islands, which resulted in massive damages tohouses, public infrastructures, boats, livelihoods and properties

2014 Implementation of recovery and rehabilitation projects from non-government and governmentorganizations started in GigantesRISE Gigantes Project was launched

2015–2016

Participatory risk and capacity needs assessments were carried outInclusive risk profiling through Frontline program was conductedCapacity building and organizing efforts were initiated in the islands to promote disaster riskreduction, health and sustainable livelihoodConvergence strategy was implemented and institutionalized through an executive order from theLGU of CarlesISDA was formedNatural resource management, biodiversity conservation and eco-tourism were promotedCommunity education and awareness campaign strategies were undertaken

2017 ISDA expanded its reach beyond barangay officials and encouraged the involvement of varioussectoral groups like small-scale fishers, shell divers and major tourism stakeholders like resortoperators, transport groups (both land and sea) and site guidesISDA convenes monthly and receives support from the four barangays and partners to sustain itsoperations and to fund island-wide development and advocacy campaignsRISE Project team became a recipient of Gawad Pangulo Award for Excellence in Public Service, arecognition from the University of the Philippines Office of the Vice President for Public Affairs

Table I.Timeline of key

events and activitieswhich led to resiliencebuilding in the islands

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resilience building. It enabled regional government offices, local government unit, civilsociety, private sector and communities to establish a forum for discussing common andrelevant risks and threats affecting Gigantes. Having a common knowledge on issuesconfronting the communities provided a vehicle for the different actors to clearly demarcatetheir responsibilities. Division of labor was done with ease because they gained betterunderstanding of project goals and objectives. Such understanding has also contributed inenhancing governance mechanisms by promoting the inclusion of vulnerable sectors andgroups in local governance processes. Necessary skills and resources were tapped foreffective and efficient implementation of the targets. The presence of actors from differentbackgrounds and disciplines also facilitated support system and mutual influence, whichare both crucial for collective action to succeed.

Furthermore, as a result of convergence, local capacities were strengthened as evidencedby the experience of ISDA. From solely focusing on recovery and disaster preparednesssince its birth, ISDA is now actively engaged in natural resource management, biodiversityconservation and eco-tourism promotion. The active involvement of locals comprising ISDAin promoting these initiatives is paramount in addressing the underlying causes ofvulnerability such as poverty and inequality. As part of the effort to enhance the work ofISDA, the organization has expanded its reach to encourage the participation of varioussectoral groups such as small-scale fisherfolks and tourism stakeholders like resortoperators, transport groups (both land and sea) and site guides. Targeting a wider groupwould allow harmonized efforts on eco-tourism management. ISDA also works to enhancetourism management systems to guarantee that its benefits are shared fairly in Gigantesand the islands remain protected and preserved. The solid organizing and close mentoringwork of UPVFI, in partnership with groups from the civil society and local government,played a key role in achieving the gains of the convergence strategy by breaking the cultureof isolation and fostering collaboration.

Challenges also confront the convergence approach. One of the challenges identifiedwas the consolidation of BDCs. As a result of the varying levels of trusts, priorities andcultures of BDCs from the four barangays, implementation of initiatives to strengthenthem became challenging. Another issue that surfaced relates to close coordination withthe municipal local government, government agencies, and other development partners.Due to the diversity of these actors, adjustments had to be made to ensure regularcommunication and harmony in working together. Furthermore, addressing broaderdevelopment concerns such as resource management, eco-tourism development andsustainable livelihoods also posed limitations.

Meanwhile, one of the greatest challenges that confront ISDA relates to organizingdifferent groups involved in tourism. The four barangays, in partnership with the LGU andrelevant partners, have just started formulating the island tourism framework and thetourism management systems have been overtaken by the continuous entry of touristssince 2015. Actors who dominate benefits from tourism for the past years, especially themainland-based tour and boat operators, may not be receptive to the agenda of ISDA.Conflict of interest with these actors including some LGU officials poses a serious challengein putting forward small island resilience and development.

Breaking down barriers to convergence: strategies to address the challengesUPVFI has played a primary role in addressing the challenges that confronted theconvergence strategy. As the organizer of ISDA, it led efforts to liaise with differentpartners and mobilize technical and financial resources. This aided the four communitiesin formulating plans and programs related to small island resilience and development.With the help of EO 58, the commitment from convergence partners to augment resourceswas secured and institutionalized. Expertise from the University of the Philippines

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Visayas was also tapped by UPVFI to assist the four communities in achieving resilience.GIS experts helped in risk mapping activities; food technologists trained women inalternative livelihoods; health advocates taught them techniques on food handling andfood preparation. Sound financial management was also part of the technical supportprovided to them.

The continuous conduct of capacity building initiatives for local communities is also apriority of UPVFI with the aim of nurturing community governance, participation andempowerment. The university manifested its commitment to public service and inclusivedevelopment by granting its faculty and staff working in the islands official time andtravel privileges.

To facilitate harmony and unity among stakeholders, pride campaign activities wereorganized to highlight the distinct heritage of the islands and address the issue of culturalmarginalization as a result of their isolation from the mainland. Community-wide religiouscelebrations also served as an opportunity to bring forward advocacy on environmentalprotection and risk reduction. Along with its partners, UPVFI tapped the education andyouth sectors to document the islands’ history and culture and foster a sense of identityand make them feel proud of their heritage. Emphasis on biodiversity conservation andprotection of endemic resources was made in the documentation to highlight itscontribution to sustainable development and resilience.

As ISDA continued its journey in realizing full convergence, the organization employedmechanisms to ensure its active operation. ISDA holds monthly meetings and assists inconsolidating stakeholders for small island resilience. In terms of resources, it depends onthe four barangays and partners such as UPVFI, Foundation for the PhilippineEnvironment, Philippine Life Saving and Iloilo Provincial Government, among others. Apartfrom sustaining its operation, ISDA uses the funds to support island-wide development andadvocacy campaigns. The existing support that ISDA receives from active leaders becameinstrumental in producing desirable results in the following domains: natural resourceprotection and biodiversity conservation; eco-tourism development; community disasterresilience; promotion of healthy communities; and sustainable livelihoods.

Conclusions and recommendationsThe experience of Gigantes Group of Islands in embracing a convergence approach is aconcrete testimony that collective action among stakeholders from various levels is crucialin putting forward the agenda of small island resilience and development. The contributionof each group – local government unit, civil society and communities – was instrumental inrealizing the set goals. Convergence played an instrumental role for dialogues to developand for good relationships to be fostered in the islands. The stakeholders had a betterunderstanding of the objectives they have to fulfill and the shared responsibilities they haveto commit to. Expertise and resources have also been mobilized and this facilitated betterproject implementation. Furthermore, convergence also helped in enhancing governancemechanisms, which is key to sustainability. The support of local leaders at various levelswas generated, which helped in facilitating the inclusion of key sectors and groups indecision making, planning and other local governance processes.

The impacts of the convergence approach in Gigantes could be replicated to other smallislands in the Philippines, which have the same vulnerabilities and commitment inharnessing capacities to transform their at-risk state. Documentation of good practices andlessons learned of Gigantes is done by UPVFI and other partners to share the inspiringexperience of the locals and influence others to replicate the same initiative. To continuouslypave the path toward resilience and development, recommendations were identified andthese include integration of DRR concerns in broader development agenda, developingfurther understanding on the multi-dimensionality of isolation, strengthening support of

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different sectors and groups for convergence to thrive, greater resource allocation formanaging fishery resources, enhancing local capacities for weather and climate forecasting,strengthening small island self-sufficiency, and close mentoring and capacity building forISDA to prosper in executing efforts on environmental protection, tourism promotion andresilience building.

Reflecting on actionThrough the aid of the RISE Gigantes Project and Frontline program, different activitieswere carried out that created an avenue to address the vulnerabilities of the islands whilenurturing collective action at the same time. The inclusive risk profiling done contributed tobetter strategizing and enhanced project implementation.

Among the activities carried out were:

(1) participatory risk and capacity needs assessments to understand communities’vulnerabilities and existing strengths;

(2) capacity building and organizing activities (e.g. alternative food development trainingfor women and strengthening of BDRRMC), barangay development councils andvolunteer groups;

(3) mangrove reforestation was also done as part of the natural resource managementagenda;

(4) advocacy and community education;

(5) putting up a water system in the area; and

(6) mainstreaming disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation into localdevelopment plans and programs.

The activities were successfully and effectively implemented since a participatory andinclusive approach was employed in the conceptualization, design and planning processes.The locals of Gigantes were involved as leaders, participants and beneficiaries. The variousCSOs and government offices engaged in the project provided technical assistance andfinancial support, which helped in meeting the set targets.

The futureA real transformatory change will be realized if the convergence strategy will beinstitutionalized and implemented fully across scales, especially at the community level.Recognizing the important role of ISDA as a lead development actor in Gigantes is alsonecessary to achieve such a change. ISDA has to sustain its active engagement in thefollowing domains:

(1) natural resource protection and biodiversity conservation;

(2) eco-tourism development;

(3) community disaster resilience;

(4) promotion of healthy communities; and

(5) sustainable livelihoods.

Furthermore, addressing the isolation of people living in the islands, not only in terms ofgeographical location, but also in other aspects – economic, political and social – is criticalin achieving transformatory change. Challenging the prevailing political system, which istop-down in nature, has to be continuously done for such change to be realized. The mostvulnerable groups such as women, children and youth, older persons and persons with

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disabilities need an enabling environment to participate and let their voices be heard.This is vital for these groups to claim their rights from relevant duty bearers, especiallythe local government. Participatory and collective process in local governance should bepromoted in the islands to encourage the active and meaningful participation of thevulnerable groups toward inclusive and long-term development.

Given that ISDA is still a young organization, efforts to support its operation andsustainability are necessary. UPVFI, as its organizer, should continue in liaising withdifferent groups and networks to mobilize technical and financial resources. Continuouscapacity-building activities and awareness raising strategies need to be carried fororganizational strengthening of the ISDA.

Apart from UPVFI, actors from various sectors at all levels should continue to worktogether to enrich the gains of the convergence strategy. Individuals from the civil society,government and most especially communities have to actively take part in the differentactivities that aim not only to reduce risks, but also to achieve environmental protection,sustainable tourism and inclusive development.

Notes

1. Barangay is the smallest administrative division in the Philippines; it is the Filipino termfor village.

2. Supertyphoon Yolanda (International name: Haiyan) is recorded as one of the strongest typhoonsthat made landfall in the world in 2013. It had a wind speed of more than 300 kph and storm surgesof over four meters affecting 591 municipalities and 57 cities across 44 provinces in the Philippines.The disaster affected around 16m people (3.4m families), 4m of which were displaced and morethan 6,000 perished. Losses due to Supertyphoon Haiyan were estimated to be at $12.9bn.

Corresponding authorJesusa Grace Molina can be contacted at: jesusagrace_molina@yahoo.com

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Waiting for politics at themercy of river: case studyof an enduring community

Sarwar BariDepartment of Management, Pattan Development Organisation,

Islamabad, Pakistan

AbstractPurpose – The purpose of this paper is to highlight the power of protest in quasi-democratic politics andfeudal societies; consider deep-rooted impacts of illiteracy, inequality, marginalisation and powerlessness onpoor peoples’ behaviour; and analyse how these turn them to believe in fatalism.Design/methodology/approach – The paper narrates 12 years of work with isolated and poorcommunities, which are prone to annual flooding and riverbank erosion. Reflections are based on the years ofNGOs’ workers experiences and conclusions.Findings – Poor governance stems from deep-rooted multiple inequalities – land/resources, religiousknowledge, education, social hierarchies, cultural norms and political power. This leads to fatalism whichdeters the poor from making the powerful accountable. An outside catalyst is essential to break the ice.Disasters do create opportunities to act against injustices.Research limitations/implications – The paper narrates 12 years of work with isolated and poorcommunities which are prone to annual flooding and riverbank erosion.Practical implications – The old community is gone. The Ahmadies constitutionally declarednon-Muslims have rebuilt their village. Meanwhile, other families have gone elsewhere. They may have ahouse of sorts but are landless and have no sustainable income. With spurs, the river may go back and leavetheir land. Reclaiming their land will be a huge task.Social implications – There is a serious need to link civil society based in urban centres with those who livein remote areas, isolated and oppressed, in order to transform a quasi-democracy into a participatory andsocial democracy.Originality/value – When floods hit, erosion accelerates and makes people homeless and landless. Yet,erosion is not considered a disaster. The country lacks public policy to address the issue. This studyhighlights of the urgent issue of riverbank erosion that could shift policy.Keywords Case study, Community-based disaster risk reduction, Pakistan case study, Riverbank erosionPaper type Case study

SummaryDuring the 12 years of the organisation’s work with the people of Basti Rindan – a remotevillage on the right bank of mighty river Indus in the south of Punjab, it confrontedtwo major challenges. First, to convince and mobilise the community to protestagainst criminal silence of the government for not taking any action to stop riverbankerosion as all lobbying and advocacy efforts had failed. For most of the communitymembers, riverbank erosion was the outcome of their sins. Second, they wanted the NGOto do everything for them and this would have undermined its own approach – acting justas a catalyst and let the partners take the lead role. The lack of funding was also achallenge but a minor one. In order to deal with these challenges, it adopted a two-prongedapproach: minimised direct interaction with the community while kept communicationalive with few activists and second, kept raising riverbank issue with relevant officialsand media.

As we often say disasters also create opportunities for improvement and reform. In June2017, a nearby groyne was damaged and inundated large area, which caused huge losses.It transformed the already simmering anger into a huge rage that triggered an officialintervention. Within six months, three spurs were built. On 11 November 2017, the author

Disaster Prevention andManagementVol. 28 No. 1, 2019pp. 42-49© Emerald Publishing Limited0965-3562DOI 10.1108/DPM-06-2018-0187

Received 13 June 2018Revised 13 June 2018Accepted 12 July 2018

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:www.emeraldinsight.com/0965-3562.htm

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held another meeting with the community. There was almost an agreement that protestsdemos made the real impact – it unleashed many factors simultaneously and that pressuredthe government to act. Power of social mobilisation works, said all.

The case study: at the mercy of the riverPrelude“It was an utter failure, believe the members of the NGO”, for not keeping our contact alivewith the disappearing community of Basti Rindan and whose members were forced intopoverty – landlessness, homelessness and voicelessness. Our last contact with them hadtaken place in 2015. While many had left the village, others were preparing to leave as theriver continued to erode their fertile land and the houses. All our efforts to mobilise them forcollective action were failing. Fatalism appeared to have overwhelmed them. We had nofunds to assist them.

And then “reliance on the interviews of a few so-called community leaders blindedus to the visible and invisible realities of the community”. This case study remains awork-in-progress till last minute as new developments continued to take place. The impactof newly built spurs/dikes needs to be recorded: would the spurs push back the river and ifyes, how fast? Will the community rebuild Basti Rindan or not? Answers to these questionscan only be found in the future[1].

But there is a need to mention here NGOs’ similar interventions along riverbanks.In 1993, in the aftermath of 1992 super floods, the NGO had confronted a similar

situation. Basti Bhart had been submerged into river Jhelum due to erosion. When wevisited the site, only few ruins were left. Many people had left the area and some were livingnearby in tents. We had money from Concern International and OXFAM for therehabilitation and reconstruction of houses for the flood-affected homeless families.Some families had already received plots but many did not. We managed to get free landfrom the government for rest of the families. We set up a small office in the area. Thiscreated a huge attraction and brought almost all the displaced people back. Everyone waslisted along with their demographic details. From our side, there was only one condition toreceive the house – the new house shall be a joint ownership of wife and husband. Thehusbands reluctantly agreed, while the women were silently happy. More than 150 houseswere built and handed over within nine months. The village continued to expand. Today, itis one of the safest villages of the area.

15 years onwards, we are facing a similar situation yet again. But we have no moneyfor assistance. Yet, we were in a position to make the community’s miseries public and tobuild pressure on government for support. Reaching out to the scattered people ofBasti Rindan was a herculean task. Information would come in pieces. Gaps were visible;hence, the puzzle persisted.

BackgroundBasti Rindan is situated on the right bank of mighty river Indus in Dera Ghazi Khan district.Though the village was only 35 km away from the district headquarters, the journey theretakes hours due to poor condition of roads and transport[2]. Dera Ghazi Khan is the poorestdistrict of the most developed province of the country – the Punjab. It is the only district of theprovince, which is still controlled by tribal/feudal lords and customary laws.For instance, child marriage and honour killing are still prevalent in the district. Almost allkinds of development are largely reliant on patronage–clientage relationships and thisinfluences voting behaviour of the people. “We vote as our husbands instruct us and they voteas their tribal elders order them and tribal elders follow tribal chiefs” said Sakina Bibi. Theelectoral system visibly reinforces existing economic, gender, social and political inequalities.

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No wonder despite many progressive public policy initiatives, change here remainselusive. The district stubbornly remains at the lowest ranking on the UNDP HumanDevelopment Index[3].

Basti Rindan had around 300 households by the end of 2010. The people of the villagebelong to two Baloch tribes – Rind and Korai. Rinds constitute 95 per cent of the population.A large majority of them would earn their livelihoods from tilling the land, livestock rearingand the riverine sources.

Reportedly, during the 1950s, the Rind tribe converted to Ahmadiat – a Muslim sectdeclared non-Muslim in 1974 by the Parliament of Pakistan. Out of 300 households, only 95did not embrace Ahmadiat. Since they all belonged to the same tribe and were related toeach other, the conversion did not create any sectarian tension. In subsequent years, anothertribe embraced Ahmadiat. In 1974, anti-Ahmadi riots erupted in the country. As a result,many Ahmadis were killed in the country but during this period, the Ahmadis of BastiRindan faced no serious trouble. As stated above, most people identify them with tribes.For Ahmadis, the tribal bond is cemented by religion, thus making religion more importantthan the tribe. Therefore, it may be concluded that no other form of social organisationexists in the area.

Although quality of and access to social services and security (education, health,sanitation and justice) are poor and inadequate, the revenue and police departments areefficiently oppressive.

Pattan’s partnershipOur first interaction with the people of Basti Rindan took place during 2005–2006. Our workfocused mainly on building capacities of female local councillors for aggregating andarticulating their common issues. Our interaction with the community declined in 2008 andintensified again in the aftermath of the 2010 super floods. Since the Basti was situated onthe riverbank, the flood disaster hit them profoundly. The slow riverbank erosion becamefaster too (Table I).

Keeping in view the gravity of the situation, when GNDR launched Action at theFrontline, Pattan decided to include Basti Rindan in the project. We had thought thatthe case study would help highlight the existential threat to the people-riverbank erosion.It did, but made little impact.

Year Activity

2005 Pattan established its link in the area through training of female local councillors2005–2007 Pattan continued working with women councillors2008–2010 Pattan stopped working in the area but sustained communication through women councillors2009 Riverbank erosion accelerated2010–2011 After the August super floods, Pattan visited the area in order to assess the damages and needs

of the affected people along river Indus including Basti Rindan2011 The super floods further accelerated the erosion and the community got desperate2010–2013 The affected families gradually started migrating to safer areas2013–2015 Basti Rindan was involved in VFL and AFL work. Riverbank erosion issue was highlighted

through media. Pattan attempted to motivate community to sustain the protests but failed. MPsand officials were approached. No concrete response came

2016 Pattan withdrew from the area but kept communication with key persons. During this period,Nasirpur colony was built and Ahmadis moved there

2017 In June, groyne washed away and caused huge losses, which triggered protests, and media gavegood coverage to the protests. Chief Ministers visited the site and announced grant for theconstruction of spurs. Spurs were constructed within three months

Table I.Timeline 2005–2017(Pattan–Basti Rindanpartnership)

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History of riverbank erosion and floodsAccording to the local people, the Basti had suffered from riverbank erosion in the early1950s too. After a few years, the river moved back and people filled the vacated land withtheir own resources. Gradually, the displaced households came back and rebuilt theirhouses. Life became normal except the annual flooding which was always considered ablessing. In between 1973, 1988, 1992 and 1997 “we faced severe flooding, but we wouldnever panic as we knew how to cope with floods” said Ramzan, an old man of the village.“The river started moving towards our village in 2008 again and by July 2010 (before thesuper floods), it has already destroyed around 50 houses” remembered Ramzan. Anothervillager shared this “the 2010 floods hit us like a meteor, we had never experienced such adevastating situation, and no-one had informed us in advance about its velocity and volumeof the coming flood. It snatched away everything from us, and had accelerated the erosion,by 2014 as many as 285 houses had collapsed”.

Displacement and settlement patternsAs stated above, the Ahmadis of the village were well knit and organised. Being in minority,the Ahmadi community and its religious leader took care of the needs of its members.Though the Muslims of the village were also organised around tribal structure, they lackedsimilar support mechanism. This difference hugely impacted displacement/settlementpatterns of the two.

Ahmadis were fully benefitted from their organisation – Jamaat-i-Ahmadiya. It boughtsix acres of land to settle the displaced Ahmadi families. This place is only half a mile awayfrom the old village and the land has been given to 208 families. Most of them have settledthere though their houses were still incomplete. This place is called Nasirpur Colony, namedafter one of their caliphs. It is not peculiar as poor families build houses incrementally.We were told that five Ahmadi families have migrated to their headquarters – Rabwah,about 300 miles to the north and eight families, whose heads were government employees,have migrated to Dera Ghazi Khan city. By July 2017, except a few, all the Ahmadi familieshave settled in Nasirpur colony.

Regarding Muslim families, 20 of them have moved to a nearby village – Haji Kamand.But, they call their neighbourhood Basti Rindan. About 50 families have moved to RukhDhol – a so-called Model Village – situated at 7 miles distance.

LivelihoodsSince most people have lost land to the river, they have to find work as labourers.Now they could either work as farm labourers or go out in the search of work.Their reliance on riverine resources has also increased. For instance, due to free access toriver water and wild bushes along riverbanks, they could benefit hugely by raisinganimals. “Animals are like cash for us, we buy young animals, grow them. It costs us justour time as we have free access to a huge grazing area along riverbank. We sell an animalwhen we need to fulfil some other need”, Allah Dewaya an illiterate, a former smalllandowner told us with a huge confidence.

Politics of development: construction of spursTimely construction of spurs, dikes or groynes could have prevented riverbank erosion inthe area. However, despite repeated appeals, the government did not respond when it shouldhave. In June 2016, a groyne situated 3-km upstream of Basti Rindan suddenly broke andcaused massive damage in the area. The people who had already suffered enough came outand held protest demos. The authorities were not expecting spontaneous and angry demos

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and were hugely embarrassed. The media (both print and electronic) gave good coverageto the issue.

What we have been trying to achieve in the last few years suddenly took place.This caused huge ripples.

Chief minister of the Punjab province along with ministers and MPs rushed to theaffected area. The riverine communities exploited this situation and demanded ofthe government that they construct spurs to end further erosion in the area. They advocatedtheir case very well by providing all the previous appeals sent to the officials. The chiefminister promised the protesting people that they would build spurs and dikes. Within acouple of weeks, US$8m were made available for the construction of spurs. Finally, threespurs were constructed up and downstream of Basti Rindan, though local people aresuspecting their quality. In spite of that, apparently, the riverbank has been halted for thetime being.

Interestingly, politics has always played a critical role in post-disaster humanitarian workin Pakistan. All politicians, especially the incumbent MPs, find great opportunity in disastersto consolidate and widen their votebank. We have been observing this trend since 1992 superfloods. This trend has deepened since 2010 mega floods. Mr Imran Khan – former Cricketer,well-established Philanthropist turned Politician – seems mainly responsible for that. He hadlaunched a campaign, first against the allegedly rigged general election 2013 and then againstthe corruption of the incumbent prime minister and his family members in 2015. It is worthstating here that the name of the ruling family has appeared in the “Panama Papers”. Sincethen the Supreme Court has been investigating the alleged corruption of the ruling family[4].

It is worth noting here that the chief minister of the Punjab is a younger brother of theprime minister. They are under tremendous pressure and it seems the best way for theruling family to cope with this pressure is to respond promptly to the needs of disaster-affected people. “Many people of our area who had voted for the ruling party in 2013elections were on the verge of joining Imran Khan’s party. But after the Chief Minister’sarrival to our area and the construction of spurs, peoples’ loyalty to the Muslim League – theruling party – has deepened”, Munzoor told us during our recent visit.

Reflecting on actionFour inter-related barriers prevent the people of the area from taking action againstthe impacts of “naturally” induced phenomena. Since rivers are considered as a part of thenature and for most of the riverine people river is Badshah (emperor), it is like a god.However, this does not mean they do not do anything for prevention or mitigation. In otherwords, there exists a gap between their attitude and practice, which provides some spaceto intervene.

Because of centuries old isolation and tribal/feudal system, the fatalist attitude is beingperpetually reinforced. And the Mullahs – the clergy – play an important role in this regard.However, clergy acts in collaboration with feudal and state officials. Any act that theyperceive could endanger to the status quo is suppressed either through community pressureat best or by coercion at worst. Because of this, the people are highly likely to behave astheir ancestor had. The biggest barriers are as follows:

(1) fatalist attitude of local people;

(2) isolation and marginalisation;

(3) lack of local organisation/leadership that can challenge feudal/tribal lords; and

(4) nexus of corrupt officials and elected representatives.

Two major lessons may be drawn from this case study as well as from our similar work.

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First, based on experiences of a number of similar situations, one may draw somegeneralisations (but never let these generalisations blind you when considering newsituations. Like no two humans looks are alike, no two situations are same). Therefore,understanding local context, class formation, social dynamics, internal politics/actors,cultural practices and attitudes is essential.

For instance, though large landlords do not interfere in the day-to-day affairs ofcommunities, their local supporters keep them informed about critical developments.The same is true of local administration. In this regard, the role of media is extremelycritical. Any coverage in the media could shake both the feudal/tribal chiefs who happen tobe MPs and government officials. And the best way to attract media coverage is by holdinga demo, a sit-in, etc.

After the 2010 mega floods, Pattan organised affected people across Pakistan under thebanner ofTehreek Bahalia Sailabzadgan –Movement for the Rehabilitation of Flood Affectees.

Thousands of people joined the movement, held demos and sit-in in front ofprime minister’s house. When the Supreme Court of Pakistan constituted a Commissionof Inquiry[5], the leaders of this movement were asked to appear for recording theirgrievances. The case study of this movement is being recorded. Regarding reaching to ortaking communities to the tipping point, the role of the external catalyst is essential tounderstand. In my experience, civil society organisations could play the role of a catalyst.As far as this case study is concerned, our role was minimal. The fall of spur and themedia coverage forced the authorities to respond promptly. One may argue that thesituation forced the authorities to a tipping point. In our view, the government officialshad failed to perform their duty.

Second, a more organised and close-knit community is likely to respond to disasters moreeffectively as well as being in a position to influence officials for response. Ahmadis’ quicksettlement is a good example in this regard.

Finally, in the absence of a welfare state, citizens are forced to rely on primordialnetworks, and these networks reinforce customary attitudes – misogyny, tribalism,subservience, etc.

Challenges for NGOsThe availability of funding is essential even for social mobilisation and motivation and forwriting a case study too. Initially, we relied on our local contacts and received brokeninformation from them. Hence, the case study remained incomplete. Finally, we travelledmore than 700 miles to reach to the area. We visited the area along with Pattan staff,observed and discovered new developments.

The futureBased on our 24-year long experience of working in riverine belt and its communities,including the people of Basti Rindan, we could anticipate the following: those who own landwithin the boundaries of the Basti are likely to comeback, as hope has been built with theconstruction of spurs. Those who were landless and poor have already settled or strugglingto settle across the district and some of them have already moved to urban areas. Those whohad some savings or are well connected have bought or obtained houses in Rukh Dhol,a so-called model colony (see Plate 1) situated about seven miles far from the Basti.

Ahmadis – constitutionally declared non-Muslims and highly discriminatedcommunity – have built their own village named Nasirpur Colony, which is only half amile away from the old Basti. In the past, they lived side by side to the Muslims. Hence, theyenjoyed tranquillity. But, this separation (ghettoisation) has weakened that old interactionand reciprocity. In an environment where so much hate against Ahmadis is spread, everyday could make them vulnerable. Since, Ahmadis do not vote in any elections as a protest,

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and the local development and social services are provided on the basis of the weightof a community’s votebank, they may not get social services and utilities for some time.The electricity lines pass through the village but no house has the connection.

Regarding future work, there is a need to undertake transformative conscientisation workin order to weaken fatalist mindset and to build social cohesion across sects and religions.

In order to bring changes in power structures, there is a need to build coalition of allmarginalised groups. The Constitution of Pakistan guarantees equal rights including right tospeech and association to all citizens, and as in cities, marginalised groups have more space toorganise around their rights and media concentration is deeper, building pressure for rule oflaw is relatively easy. Therefore, building linkages with marginalised rural communities isimperative to strengthen a coalition of the oppressed in order to weaken the nexus of thecorrupt officials and the feudal elite and their misuse of clergy including local tribal leadersand this is doable through sustained work. Sadly, all the primordial structures have becometools in the hands of the powerful. Through sustained external intervention and by buildinglinkages with urban-based institutions, primordial structures could be democratised.

Post scriptOn 5 February, after a couple of months of my last visit to the area, yet another group ofcommunities situated just 30 kilometres downstream of Basti Rindan facing land erosion

Plate 1.Protest demo alongriverbank whereerosion is taking placenear. Basti Rindan,held against sittingMPs and landlords

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held a protest rally against the government, local landlords and MPs for not doing anythingto stop the riverbank erosion in their area despite numerous complaints. The rally took placealong the riverbank. A large number of farmers participated in the rally. They also said thatthese chiefs have been in power for many decades, but they have never tried to fulfileducational, health and other development needs of the people. Reportedly, they alsopledged that they would never vote again for tribal chiefs and large landlords in theforthcoming general elections. A couple of local councillors also participated in the protestdemo. The participants also announced a series of dharnay (sit-ins) in front of thegovernment offices, if the authorities fail to respond to their demand.

This worked. The commissioner, the deputy commissioner and chief engineer irrigationvisited the site and promised to build spur. It is worth noting here that the general electionswill take place in August 2018. A “miracle” of elite democracy!

Policy implicationsThough landslide and mudslide are being categorised as disasters in the official list,riverbank erosion is not. Throughout the lengths and widths of all rivers of the country,riverine communities face some form of erosion. Resultantly, hundreds of families aredeprived of homes, land and livelihoods each year. The country also lacks credible data onthe issue. Therefore, there is a serious need to record and document all forms of riverbankerosion and then to formulate a policy to reduce this risk.

Notes

1. After six months in November 2017, the author went back to the area, i.e., talked to the people andvisited spur sites. Moreover, the construction of a spur upstream of Basti Rindan riverbank erosioncontinues, though its speed is being halted.

2. After July 2017, although main road linking the area to district headquarters was paved, the roadto the basti is still in poor condition.

3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_districts_of_Pakistan_by_Human_Development_Index

4. On 28 July 2017, the Supreme Court disqualified and dismissed the Prime Minister Mr Nawaz Sharif.

5. http://pattan.org/v2/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Flood_Report.pdf

Corresponding authorSarwar Bari can be contacted at: bari.sarwra@gmail.com

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Social and economic inequalitylimits disaster prevention

amongst the most vulnerablein VietnamGuillaume Chantry

Development Workshop France, Hue, Vietnam, andJohn Norton

Development Workshop France, Lauzerte, France

AbstractPurpose – Vietnam is historically hit by extensive disasters. However, the most vulnerable populations arefar from being backed by national/local programmes to reduce disaster impacts on their well-being. Inpractice, political and socio-economic top-down organisation, channels efforts and limited resources intowealthier parts of the country. The paper aims to discuss these issues.Design/methodology/approach – Learning from 30 years work in Vietnam, this paper presents how“horizontal” solidarity and networking should be promoted and reinforced to really target the needs ofvulnerable poor communities. Findings on conditions and challenges are based on practical experience, fromfamily/village level to provincial/national administration, in promoting safe housing and safer communitiesand in evaluating the barriers for extending and sharing such practices.Findings – Political environments in South East Asian countries become similar to Vietnamese systems, andshare a common attitude towards DRR (and CCA): official statements reaffirm the need for DRR at all levels,and the CC threats for local development. But year after year, the situation of marginalised or low-income poorfacing disasters does not really see progress.Originality/value – New data collecting methods and technologies are proposed, resilience is quoted ascriteria for development, but the major issue remains: how could communities be “at the frontline” whenreceiving so little “backline” support and resources, compared to benefits from capitalist development sharedby only richer parts of society – not concerned in the same way by disasters? The SFDRR in encouraging non-compulsory Civil Society involvement will remain inadequate faced with the increased vulnerability byVietnam and South East Asian inhabitants.Keywords Housing, Local governance, Disaster risk reduction, AdvocacyPaper type Case study

The case studyThis study draws on Development Workshop France (DWF) 30 years’ work promoting safeconstruction with poor families facing repeated typhoons and floods in Vietnam.

Locally, DWF promotes key principles and action for safer housing and publicinfrastructure. Nationally, DWF has promoted a preventive safe house strengthening policy,including the publication of revised national standards for construction adapted tolow-income populations.

Donor support has come primarily from ECHO/Dipecho, CIDA[1] and numerous partners.The Ford Foundation supported DWF for loans for safer housing, working with the VietnamBank of Social Policy. But local contributions from families strengthening their homes andlocal authorities’ support for safer infrastructure have underlined DWF work in Vietnam.

Cohesive or passive local populations?Given their long history of disasters, the population and each Commune’s People’s Committee(the local authority) face up to disasters with solidarity and cohesion, facilitating rapidshort-term recovery based on community knowledge about those most at risk and in need.

Disaster Prevention andManagementVol. 28 No. 1, 2019pp. 50-59© Emerald Publishing Limited0965-3562DOI 10.1108/DPM-07-2018-0213

Received 12 July 2018Revised 12 July 2018Accepted 24 July 2018

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:www.emeraldinsight.com/0965-3562.htm

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Nevertheless, faced with repeated disasters and climate change, people are passive.Although they could engage in DRR planning and policy in their community, they knowthat their view-points and needs will not be considered outside their very local situation andbeyond very local decisions.

Learning from each specific and unique situation?In Vietnam, good practices are documented (Shaw et al., 2005; DWF, 2007) but lessons areinsufficiently shared.

The political challenge is not to replicate experience on a one-by-one local basis,but to extend proven methods and actions, by providing resources and the stateauthority’s backing.

ContextA growing class divideUnderstanding the risk reduction environment of the poor is easier when considering theevolving socio-economic context of Vietnam over the past 50 years. After the US Vietnamwar, some 70 per cent of Vietnam’s population lived below the poverty line and manysurvived just above it. By the late 1970s, the government’s socialist tradition promotingfairness and standing up for the poor was under severe pressure. Vietnam faced post wartrade and financial embargos led by the USA and its allies (The Guardian, 2015). Internally,as well as the challenge of rebuilding the country, policies for collectivisation of land,produce and state enterprise ownership created an environment where industryunderperformed and peasant farmers had no incentive to produce: the system wasunsustainable. Once again, the country struggled for survival, this time against poverty.

In 1986, liberal socialist party leaders introduced major economic policy changes(Fforde, 1993), known as đổi mới (reform) (Nugent, 1996). Significant reforms enablingfarmers to retain all production beyond a quota given to the Commune People’s Committee.In both agriculture and industry, profit sharing provided a power basis for reform andcommercialisation, enabling an emerging market economy and capitalism(Benefict, 2005). Peasant farmers kept some of the fruits of their labour, as did industry.And the gap between poor and rich grew.

The reforms helped Vietnam achieve remarkable growth over the past 35 years but led tothe social and economic division of the population into four classes: rich, middle income, lowincome and poor. Poverty fell from nearly 60 per cent in the early 1990s to 20.7 per cent in2010 (The World Bank, 2012). This report found that “inequality is back on the agenda”.The income of the poorest 10 per cent dropped by a fifth, and low-income families liveprecariously so that any shock (including typhoons and floods), tip them further intopoverty. Meanwhile, the wealthiest top 5 per cent account for about 25 per cent of nationalincome (The World Bank, 2012). This socio-economic divergence is critical, with imbalancesthat influence state investment priorities.

Hazards, risks and vulnerabilityBy the late 1980s, đổi mới had triggered a process of housing improvement amongst themiddle and lower classes. Rice thatched roofs were replaced with tiled roofs; bamboo wallsreplaced with cement blocks or bricks. Small incremental investment by the poor meant thatby 2000, some 70 per cent of provincial and rural housing had been upgraded (Communestatistics, 2004) using purchased “modern” materials, whereas before almost everything fora home could be gathered locally for free. The “home” took on a monetary value wherebefore it had none. The same commune statistics and visible evidence showed that mostnew houses remained semi-solid, vulnerable to damage from even small disasters.

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Social andeconomicinequality

The paradox of poverty and natural hazards: millions of families invest time and hard-earned savings in a house they believe is much more solid than the previous house. Sadly,limited technical knowledge of materials and lack of skills to build safely, combined withwillingness to reduce costs at the expense of construction quality, results in houses thatrepresent considerable investment but which remain severely exposed to storm and flooddamage (Norton et al., 2008).

For low-income families, the house is the lifetime investment. But houses still regularlylose their roofing and are damaged, repairs are made with salvaged material and nothing isdone to prevent future damage incurring in a cycle of damage and material and financialloss. Recovery can return a family to poverty. The risks are unchanged and families tell oftheir homes being unroofed five or six times in as many years.

Social classes affected differently by “natural” disastersIn Vietnam, the emergence of different population classes with greatly varied priorities andextremely different economic capacity means that different socio-economic groups areaffected in radically different ways by natural disasters. Figure 1, based on 15 years’ datagathering after disasters by DWF, distinguishes the impact of different risks for differentsocio-economic classes in different urban, peri-urban and rural contexts.

The rich are concerned about their assets, businesses and factories, whilst the vulnerablepoor are concerned by everyday disasters and badly affected by major events. The middleclasses are mainly affected in terms of transportation and activity, and again here the poorare faced with critical losses.

The government’s actions reflect these distinctions. The one-party political system relieson the market economy, and reflects the interests of the rich and the emerging middle class,concerned with running business. Conversely, the system takes insufficient account of theinterests or needs of low-income workers – including ethnic minorities (Meding, 2017).

Which hazard context ? RISK IN URBAN CONTEXTRich Middle class Low income Poor Infrastructure

NetworksPublic infrastructure Business and

livelihood

Flood (High>1m, several days) – – – – – – –

Flood (Medium<1m, severalhours) 0 1 2 2 2 0 1

Storm (Up to level 12–13) 0 1 2 3 3 2 1

Storm (Over level 13) 0 2 3 4 4 3 3

Sea-river bank erosion 0 0 0 2 1 0 0

Which hazard context ? RISK IN PERI URBAN CONTEXTRich Middle class Low income Poor Infrastructure

NetworksPublic

infrastructureBusiness

Flood (High>1m, several days) 0 1 3 4 4 2 3

Flood (Medium<1m, severalhours)

0 2 2 3 2 0 1

Storm (Up to level 12–13) 0 1 2 4 3 2 1

Storm (Over level 13) 1 2 4 5 4 4 4

Sea-river bank erosion 1 0 0 2 1 0 0

Which hazard context ? RISK IN RURAL CONTEXTRich Middle class Low income Poor Infrastructure

NetworksPublic

infrastructureBusiness

Flood (High>1m, several days) 0 2 2 5 4 2 4

Flood (Medium<1m, severalhours)

0 1 2 2 2 1 1

Storm (Up to level 12–13) 0 2 2 4 3 2 1

Storm (Over level 13) 2 3 3 6 5 5 4

Sea-river bank erosion,landslide

0 0 2 4 1 0 0

Risk graded by eventcontext and severity

<Nil 0 Very low 1 Medium 2 Significant 3 High 4 Very High 5 Extreme 6

Figure 1.Risk in urban/periurban/rural contextsfor different classesand facilities

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It follows that the authorities support developments such as infrastructure for highways,airports, sea (and indeed golf ) resorts that benefit the ruling classes which help secure thepolitical consensus of the middle class, to the detriment of the poor classes. In this context,resources for a National Community Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) targeting allrural and peri-urban vulnerable communes – accounting for 60–70 per cent of thepopulation – are seriously lacking, despite the cost of these measures being relatively limited(estimated by the government at $58m in 2009). Meanwhile, infrastructure projects costingbillions of dollars to avoid temporary flooding in major cities are funded, benefitting above allthe wealthy urban population – actions that often paradoxically fail to deliver the desiredresult (VietNamNet, 2017). The vision of “Community involvement and participation”promoted by the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) has little chance ofbecoming a reality, whilst politics does not give communities any real capacity to decide withtheir representatives and the Commune People’s Committee what measures to take, except atvillage level, nor the resources to implement these measures. Overall, there needs to be a mixof top down policy and support linked to action reflecting local reality, experience and needs.This is not the case and impacts both on the local appropriateness of national policy and theability locally to address real threats and risks (Figure 2).

The long-term strategy of the government suggests policies that assume that continuedgrowth would ultimately eliminate the problems and vulnerability of the poor. But growth wouldappear to be slowing: reducing poverty is harder than it had been in times of solid growth.

As such instead of being “community based”, CBDRM is more “newspeak” than anaction programme, designed to attract donor funds rather than be a genuine policy to helppoor communities. Locally, communes and villages have scarce access to financialresources, trapped by decision-making levels for investment – including for DRR – startingat the district and province level and higher. These tend to focus on larger projects and noton “local” DRR.

Thus, the political and socio-economic environment of Vietnam is tangible and intangiblebarriers limiting how local ownership and adoption of DRR and CCA actions and strategiescould become part of national applied policy.

“Uniting” local communities and authorities could jointly influence policy at very locallevels to increase local capacity to define adaptation plans for most vulnerable people.

National level government tend not to resource disaster risk reduction for poorer andmore vulnerable sections of the community, concentrating on the upper and middle classes.

DWF in Vietnam – 1989–2019Three periods demark different aspects of DWF activity in Vietnam, from collaboration withlocal communities to almost influencing part of state policy (Table I).

First period – preventive strengthening is possible and viableIn 1989, DWF (DWF/GRET, 1989) was engaged for technical assistance in the first DRRproject in Vietnam – funded by UNDP – after massive typhoon Cecil (1985) to demonstratestorm resistant building techniques on public buildings and involving constructiontechnicians and decision makers. This action lacked opportunities for interaction withinhabitants other than to test locally suited communication ideas publicising the principlesof safer storm resistant construction applicable by poorer families as well by better offhouseholds. It did enable the assessment of how low-income families were investing inmaking their homes better as economic policy change was being introduced.

In 1999, however, when historical floods hit central Vietnam leaving 800 fatalities, DRRstarted to acquire more importance nationally. Various national level initiatives took place,including establishing the multi-sector Disaster Management Working Group, the Committee

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Social andeconomicinequality

PartyGovernment

VerticalorganisationPolicy/Plans/Organisation DRR

Foreign aid and budget for DRRWarningRelief decision

Plan/Organisation and resources for DRRWarningBudget for relief and reconstruction

Relief/Reconstruction

DRR PlanOrders for PreparednessRelief

DRR priorityMost vulnerable groups

Fair Involvement inDRR and responseReal needs

OrganisationManagement resources at local level

PartyGovernment

(Vulnerable) and affected People

Or horizontal networking

Intermediate Authorities(Province, District)

Intermediate Authorities(Province, District)

People People People

Local authorities andMass organisations

(Commune)

Local authorities andMass organisations

(Commune)

Local authorities andMass organisations

(Commune)

Local authorities andMass organisations

(Commune) Horizontalnetworking

Littlecapacity

« Civil society »Private sector

« Civil society »Private sector

Figure 2.Vertical organisationof formal governancevs a desirablehorizontalorganisation oflocal actors

Period Date Objective Content

1st 1989–2005 Popular adoption of disaster resistantconstruction

Collaboration, demonstration,promotion, training

2nd 2005–2011 Sharing practice: Resistant house, safe people,community development, supporting systems

Sharing and dissemination

3rd 2011–2018 Safe housing policy Safe housing principles integrated innational standards and programmes

Table I.DWF in Vietnam

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for Storm and Flood Control (national and provincial levels) and a National Strategy forDisaster Mitigation in Vietnam up to 2020 – a strategy then taking years to implement.

In 2000, funding enabled DWF to work specifically on preventing typhoon and flooddamage to housing in central Vietnam directly with families and commune authorities onhouse-by-house (and some schools) strengthening. There were barriers: senior authoritieswere sceptical that anything could make the homes of the poor safer. But this period hasbeen critical, since through demonstration work with partner families and local builders, the“prevent storm damage” message – and the accompanying promotion of the ten keyprinciples of storm resistant construction – gradually gained respect and popular convictionthrough the visible example that preventive strengthening of the houses of the poor andnearly poor works is viable and affordable. Frequent major storms provided a life-sizelaboratory demonstrating that strengthened houses do resist storm damage. Equallyimportant was the use of public awareness raising campaigns using different popular mediaincluding concerts, boat races, displays of a full size “safer house example” built on a lorrytravelling from village to village. Families contributed substantially to the costs of housestrengthening, deciding with DWF what was required on their home. Local builders weretrained in two day sessions about why buildings are damaged by storms and floods andhow to apply safe construction techniques to houses and small local buildings, integratingthese techniques with local practice and materials. Over years trust in the DWF approachgrew and attracts substantial attention (Figure 3).

Loans for preventive strengtheningA subsidiary initiative has addressed the issue that to make their homes, safer families wereborrowing from relations and from money lenders (often at usurious rates), which createdother household difficulties. In 2002, DWF piloted providing credit to poor families for housestrengthening, based on the model of the farmers’ and women’s unions social lendingprogrammes. This showed that families consider preventive strengthening a worthwhileinvestment, equivalent to investing in income generation activities, since avoiding loss anddamage to the home means avoiding spending scarce resources on costly repairs andrebuilding. In 2008, the Ford Foundation funded DWF to initiate a house strengtheningcredit product with the Vietnamese Bank of Social Policy providing loans to poor families ata monthly interest rate fixed (by the VN government) and capital and interest repaidmonthly over a 48 months. Loans for strengthening have become method/policy for nationalhousing programmes.

Second period 2005–2011: spreading the messageFrom promoting family-based safe housing, DWF encouraged the Communes’ People’sCommittee to elaborate Action Plans for Disaster Prevention based on real local risks andneeds of different components of the population. Not only using small group and publicdiscussions in villages, but also GIS for flood mapping at village level to help peoplevisualise where the risks occurred and how to identify escape routes and very localmeasures such as raising the floor level of the home, or locating refuges.

In parallel, DWF encouraged the People’s Committees to network with other Communes,exchanging experience and expertise about the benefits of the Safer House. It helped affirmsolidarity between people confronting similar problems and achieve better localinvolvement in DRR and knowledge that you can take action to make your situationsafer. Horizontal networking has worked because the Commune People’s Committees are atthe same level in the social/political system.

Unlike this, in sharing ideas about local needs and actions vertically to higher levels ofgovernment, including the district and provincial authorities, it is harder for communityrepresentatives to directly express opinions, or make proposals to their superiors, such as

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for the need to have financial resources invested and managed locally. It highlights aperception that DRR only becomes a real priority when disaster strikes and confirmsrecognition that the actual system for DRR, and CCA is ruled by priorities that local peoplecannot change and even give advice on. And as such, if local risks are not taken intoaccount, neither do they attract budgets to enable solutions.

Figure 3.Ten key points ofcyclone resistantconstruction

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Third period – Recognition, official collaboration with central Government, but still shorton wide-scale national impact.DWF direct support since 2000

2,500 families/houses in DRR programmes and 2,000 families in reconstructionprogrammes after typhoons and floods.

150 commune public buildings or small infrastructure.National: editing the Vietnam construction standards for low-rise building in flood and

storm risk areas of Vietnam.DWF indirect support25,000 families/Government programmes 716 and 48.Internationally, recognition for the house strengthening programme has grown: in 2008 a

World Habitat Award, in 2009 a UNISDR Sasakawa Award Certificate of Distinction forDisaster Reduction and in 2010 a UN/BSHF Urban and Housing development South-SouthTransfer certificate of distinction. As a result, DWF has been invited to share its safer houseand safer schools approach faced with similar risks in other countries. Meanwhile, back inVietnam, the DWF programme coordinator was hailed in the National press as “the foreigntyphoon fighter!”

After many years effort in the communes and provinces, this stage in our long presencein Vietnam might appear to be a success story, and indeed in many ways it has been.But, standing back from specific results and achievement, our reflection is that thereremains not only much to be done but many barriers in the way of wider and accessibleimpact with and for lower income families.

In 2011, DWF published the “Atlas for House Vulnerability and Strengthening forVietnam” for the five main geographically distinct regions of Vietnam. The Atlas indicatesthe risks and impacts of events on housing and construction and identifies who should takemeasures (state, local authorities, households) and what solutions are adapted to local stylesand building practices.

The Atlas attracted attention higher up in the government, with a foreword written bythe Ministry of Construction. This nurtured new collaborations. Between 2012 and 2015,DWF supported National Programme Nos 716 and 48 (Vietnam Government, 2012, 2014) ofthe Ministry of Construction, which targeted 30,000–40,000 poor families in high flood andstorm areas. These government programmes provided technical advice (model andspecifications), subsidies and loans for families to build safe houses.

DWF helped provincial Departments of Construction to survey real local constructionprocesses of building and to identify adapted solutions. In some high flood areas, a proposalto incorporate “above flood level” shelter for animal safety as part of the house – a popularlocal practice – was adopted into provincial guidelines. DWF has also organised trainingsessions to disseminate the results of local survey and design for local technicians, and 11provincial “Atlas” were published in 2013 with the participation of the ProvincialDepartments of Construction. DWF also edited the Atlas of Programme 48, whichsummarises all the housing models in the provinces.

In 2013, the Minister of Construction asked DWF to assist in revising and editing theconstruction standards for low-rise building in flood and storm risk areas of Vietnam. Draftstandards were finalised in December 2015. But for the Ministry of Construction, the processof achieving legal and state ratification is a long process that to be completed before thestandards can be disseminated. For them, the interest to going further is constrained byother pressures. It is an unbalanced playing field, where political priorities can eitheradvance or hinder the passage of changing policy and practice. Thus, the need to ratifylocally pertinent standards for low-rise building in flood and storm risk areas which canhelp the poor may never become the priority that it should be. Other national priorities maymake this never happen.

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ConclusionDWF actions could be considered as successful, as they demonstrate on a large scale thatsafer housing built by the poor is viable, and this brought into the debate the safe housingissue with adapted practical solutions and methods.

DRR is managed as a key consideration during and just after disasters, but not as anelement of sustainable development. DWF actions in networking between similarcommunities have shown their efficiency in sharing experience, etc. but are essentiallylimited without political and the associated financial support. DWF support at the nationallevel through the revision of the national standards for low-rise housing in flood and stormareas to meet and address local realities and practice is constrained by the interest ofauthorities to consider local DRR as a major priority in the long term.

The DRR/CC community needs to move on from discussing “global” community/city/country resilience and instead seriously explore the vulnerability and well-being of specificclasses of the population, and show how current DRR frameworks or CC Adaptation Plansdo not cover the needs of most vulnerable people, nor address this problem. For example, intyphoon disasters in Vietnam in 2017, some of the main damage was the destruction ofindustrial plantations (rubber tree) or aquaculture (shrimp/fish ponds). But the official data(number of hectares destroyed, number of ponds damaged, etc.) fail to indicate who suffersthe long-term impact of these disasters: the owners of these assets may lose their investmentand profit. Hired labourers who depended on this work lose their daily income, and theirproblem is both the immediate need to support their family and survive, and long-termrecovery and prevention will be not address these issues for these poor households. Thisneeds to change if the gap between rich and poor is to reduce and related policy andpriorities to change.

International networks, including GNDR and ADRRN, need to do more to challenge thedominant UN-led position. A new way has to be found to locate DRR and CCA firmly as ahuman right with corresponding duties, not only merely a commitment by governments andthe international community. SFDRR included the need to fully associate communities, andto rely more on local organisations, but this laudable target remains in practice an aspirationrather than a reality. Repeated huge crises once again show that little progress has beenmade in the international humanitarian system capacity to address the underlying causes ofvulnerability amongst poor families.

To quote Meding (2017) writing in August: “In Vietnam poverty and poor development,not just floods, kills the most marginalised”. As is the case in many other “natural” disasters.

Note

1. Canadian International Development Agency.

References

Benefict, J.T.K. (2005), The Power of Everyday Politics: How Vietnamese Peasants TransformedNational Policy, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, USA.

DWF (2007), Flood and Typhoon Resilient Homes Through Cost Effective Retrofitting – Vaccinate YourHome – Preventive Action to Reduce Damage Caused by Floods and Typhoons in Vietnam, ISDRBuilding Disaster Resilient Communities, Geneva, pp. 52-54.

DWF/GRET (1989), DWF consortium with GRET (Groupe de Recherches et d’EchangesTechnologiques – Paris) for “Disaster preparedness and rehabilitation in Binh Tri ThienProvince/Component C: Demonstration of storm resistant building techniques” – UNDP-UNCHSProject VIE/85/019.

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Fforde, A. (1993), “The political economy of ‘reform’ in Vietnam-some reflections”, in Ljunggren, B.(Ed.), The Challenge Reform in Indochina, Harvard Institute for International Development,Cambridge, MA.

Meding, J.V. (2017), “In Vietnam poverty and poor development, not just floods, kills the mostmarginalized”, The Conversation, 29 August, available at: https://theconversation.com/in-vietnam-poverty-and-poor-development-not-just-floods-kill-the-most-marginalised-82785

Norton, J. and Chantry, G. (2008), “More to lose the case for prevention, loans for strengthening, and‘safe housing’ insurance -the case of central Vietnam”, in Bosher, L. (Ed.), Hazards and the BuiltEnvironment: Attaining Built-in Resilience, Routledge, London and New York, NY, pp. 61-73.

Nugent, N. (1996), Vietnam: The Second Revolution, ISBN 978-1-873047-66-8, Brighton.

Shaw, R. et al. (Eds) (2005), Enhancing Community Capacity to Reduce Vulnerability to Economic LossCaused by Storm Damage to Houses in Central Vietnam, Disaster Reduction and HumanSecurity Case studies and Best practices, UNESCO/Kyoto University, Kobe.

The Guardian (2015), “Vietnam 40 years on: how a communist victory gave way to capitalist corruption”,in Davies, N. (Ed.), 22 April, available at: www.theguardian.com/news/2015/apr/22/vietnam-40-years-on-how-communist-victory-gave-way-to-capitalist-corruption (accessed 12 November 2017).

The World Bank (2012), Well Begun, Not Yet Done: Vietnam’s Remarkable Progress on PovertyReduction and the Emerging Challenges, World Bank, Hanoi.

Vietnam Government (2012), “Pilot solutions to support poor household improving safety condition inshelter, respond flood in the north central and central coast area”, Decision Prime MinisterNo. 716/QD-TTg of 14/6/2012, available at: http://vanban.chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/chinhphu/hethongvanban?class_id=2&_page=1&mode=detail&document_id=160807

Vietnam Government (2014), “Supporting policy for the poor families on building disaster resistanthouse in central Vietnam”, Decision Prime Minister No. 48/2014/QD-TTg of 28/8/2014, availableat: https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Bat-dong-san/Quyet-dinh-48-2014-QD-TTg-ho-tro-ho-ngheo-xay-dung-nha-o-phong-tranh-bao-lut-khu-vuc-mien-Trung-247342.aspx

VietNamNet (2017), “Heavy rains put pressure on 550 million $ drainage system in Hanoi”, stated thatDespite a newly built $550-million water drainage system, Hanoi streets are still inundatedduring heavy rains, 17 July, available at: http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/environment/182144/heavy-rains-put-pressure-on–550-million-drainage-system-in-hanoi.html

Further reading

Decision Prime Minister (2009), “Decision Prime Minister 1002/QD-TTg of 13th July 2009 to approvethe project: ‘community awareness raising and community-based disaster risk management(CBDRM)’ ”, Budget 988bn VN Dongs ($58m), available at: http://vanban.chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/chinhphu/hethongvanban?class_id=1&mode=detail&document_id=88942

DevelopmentWorkshop (2007), “Reinforcement of homes to reduce economic loss from floods and storms,Central Vietnam”, published in “CBDRM Good practices examples” JANI/CCFSC in Vietnam.

Ministry of Construction (2011), “Forward by the Director General of Science, Technology andEnvironment, Ministry of Construction”, Atlas of House Vulnerability and Strengthening,Vietnam, DWF-JANI.

Reports provided to DWF by communes in Thua Thien Hue province, Central Vietnam in 2004.

Corresponding authorGuillaume Chantry can be contacted at: guillaume.chantry@dwf.org

For instructions on how to order reprints of this article, please visit our website:www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/licensing/reprints.htmOr contact us for further details: permissions@emeraldinsight.com

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Tackling everyday risks throughclimate adaptive organic farming

Hepi RahmawatiYakkum Emergency Unit, Sleman, Indonesia, and

Anastasia Maylinda Titi LestariDepartment of Information and Communication, Yakkum Emergency Unit,

Sleman, Indonesia

AbstractPurpose –With the shifting patterns of rain and dry periods as a result of global climate change, the peopleof Gunungkidul have to deal with extreme conditions, such as crop failure, ponds and artificial lakes dryingup at an alarming rate due to high evaporation. The paper aims to discuss these issues.Design/methodology/approach – Participatory disaster and risks assessment and action planningwere carried out to identify how communities perceive risks and identify priorities of actions. Farmersagreed to implement climate adaptive farming which combines organic farming, biological pest control anddrought-resistant seedlings from local varieties.Findings – The processes to adaptation required collective actions, paradigm shift and it also constitutes trialand error processes. Acceptance to innovation is mostly one of the major challenges. Working with “contact”farmers and “advance” farmers is the key to the community organizing strategy for innovation and adaptation.Research limitations/implications – This case study is limited to the adaptation program funded byIndonesia Climate Change Trust Fund in four farmer groups in Purwosari Sub-District, GunungKidul districtand Yogyakarta province, Indonesia.Practical implications – Trainings and direct assistance to climate adaptive farming have benefitted thefarmers that they are able to increase the farming production and reduce the risk of crop failure.Social implications – The demonstration plot has strengthened farmer groups’ social modalities byworking together to shift from traditional into adaptive farming.Originality/value – This case study described how farmers have shifted from traditional practice intoclimate adaptive farming.Keywords Climate adaptation, Food security, Organic farming, Climate adaptive farming,Drought adaptive farming, Smart agriculturePaper type Case study

SummaryGunungkidul district in Yogyakarta province is dominated by karst limestone areas wherethe land is less fertile and suffers long dry periods. With the shifting patterns of rain and dryperiods as a result of global climate change, the people of Gunungkidul have to deal withextreme conditions, such as crop failure, ponds and artificial lakes drying up at an alarmingrate due to high evaporation, which has led to people having to buy water for householdpurposes, and for farming and tending the livestock.

Participatory disaster and risks assessment and action planning were carried out toidentify how communities perceive risks and identify priorities of actions. Farmers agreedto implement climate adaptive farming which combines organic farming, biological pestcontrol and drought-resistant seedlings from local varieties. To address the wider problemon water and livestock feed scarcity, the farmers also conserve the artificial lakes and dolivestock feed fermentation. The processes to adaptation required collective actions,paradigm shift and it also constitutes trial and error processes. Acceptance to innovation isone of the major challenges. Working with “contact” farmers and “advance” farmers is thekey to the community organizing strategy for innovation and adaptation.

Disaster Prevention andManagementVol. 28 No. 1, 2019pp. 60-68© Emerald Publishing Limited0965-3562DOI 10.1108/DPM-06-2018-0201

Received 29 June 2018Revised 29 June 2018Accepted 12 July 2018

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:www.emeraldinsight.com/0965-3562.htm

This case study is based on YEU’s adaptation program funded by ICCTF.

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Subject of the case studyFarmers’ resilience in tackling climate variability in farming.

Important themes and issues

• Local/non-local knowledge sharing – receptiveness/reticence.

• Collaboration and influence.

• Learning from each specific and unique situation.

• Changing environments and climate.

• Using tradition and innovation.

• Cohesive or passive local populations.

• Addressing environmental degradation.

• Organic and adaptive farming.

ContextThe landscape of Gunungkidul district in Yogyakarta province is dominated by karst areaswith distinctive environmental characteristics and where the seasonal calendar isdominated by long dry periods, which are influential in shaping the lives of those whoinhabit the area.

With the shifting patterns of rain and dry periods as a result of global climate change, thepeople of Gunungkidul have to deal with extreme conditions, such as ponds and artificiallakes drying up at an alarming rate due to high evaporation, which has led people to buywater for household purposes, and for farming and tending the livestock.

Crop failures in the area mainly occur due to the failure to predict the turn of seasonsalong with the inability to cope with pests and plant diseases. Government has cropinsurance programs, but these are not fully operational; the requirements for accessing suchinsurance cannot be met by small farmers and rain harvest farmers. Additionally, thegovernment seeds subsidy program is limited and does not reach all small farmers.Water shortages also exacerbate the consequences. There are some underground watersources, but there is no affordable and sustainable technology to pump the water for thecommunity on a long-term basis. During the long dry season, livestock farmers suffershortages of livestock feed which, in turn, forces them to buy fodder or give dried leaves tothe livestock. Farmers are trapped in a vicious circle; whenever there is a shortage of water,they sell livestock, and whenever there is a good harvest, they buy new livestock.

Threat and consequences facedThreat 1Crop failures suffered by small farmers. Consequences are the reduction or loss of incomeof small farmers to sustain their livelihoods. When the land does not yield any crop,they switch to odd jobs and leave the land unattended.

Threat 2Water shortages due to dried up ponds and artificial lakes occurring with increasingfrequency. Consequences are that crops wither and die. Livestock suffers from dehydration.The community does not have sufficient water for household purposes. They face extraexpenditure to buy water, creating an extra burden.

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Threat 3Pests and disease attacks from strains which are more resistant to pesticide, fungicide, etc.Consequences are that crops die in vast areas when attacks are not controlled effectively.

Threat 4Scarcity of livestock feed. Consequences are that livestock is not properly fed, resulting in alow nutrition intake. This drives down the price of livestock when sold. Farmers sell theirlivestock when there is a water shortage, which has a negative impact on their onlyhousehold savings.

Barriers to actionGovernanceGovernment-appointed field facilitators are limited in numbers, their areas of work covermany villages and bear multi-tasking duties.

Information and technologyThe small farmers in the assisted areas are mostly poor and old generation farmers who arenot familiar with newer farming technologies, such as weather forecast, agriculture/farmingapps, dissemination of research in agriculture.

Changing mindsetChemical fertilizers and pesticides are more favorable and user-friendly because it isready-to-use compared to organic fertilizer and bio-pesticides which need to be self-madeand also require trial and error, time, knowledge and labor.

Local actorsGovernmentThe district government has the responsibility for policy making regarding farmingprotection policy.

Government-appointed field facilitators have the responsibility to inform farmers onclimate variability, farming calendar and do field monitoring for pest control.

Rain harvest farmersFour farmers groups have been trained to produce their own seeds and share these amongstmembers and practice inter-groups seed distribution networking.

Four farmers group have been trained on organic farming methods, on controlling thepests and disease and they become facilitators/trainers to other farmers’ groups.

Four farmers groups have been trained on producing alternative livestock feed fromlocally available materials through fermentation or silage.

The case studyContext – what was the challenge faced?The Gunungkidul district of Yogyakarta Province is well-known for its vast karst/limestoneareas which are characterized with barren land and karst hills facing the Indian Ocean andwith peaks reaching 100–300 meters above the sea level. The district is also highlyvulnerable to water and food shortages. The community has experienced long seasonaldroughts; most of the population are of farmers who already have local knowledge on howto cultivate the farm land with limited water resources to sustain lives. Some others have tobuy water during harsh dry season to avoid crop failure.

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Approximately 133,682 hectares (90 percent) of total agricultural land in Gunungkiduldistrict are rain-fed dry land with high dependence on precipitation (Muazam, 2015).Irrigated land is very limited. Rain-fed rice fields are categorized as sub-optimal with lowfertility soil and limited water availability (Prihasto, 2013). According to AgriculturalResearch and Development Agency in 2013, rice production for the whole district wasrelatively low at the range of 3–3.5 tons per hectare and was very unlikely to be improved.However, agriculture remains as the major livelihood in Gunungkidul district with69 percent of the population working in the agricultural sector. Gross domestic product inthe district in 2015 amounted to 13.8342bn rupiah with the largest contribution given by theagricultural sector, amounting for 25.56 percent (BPS, 2017).

The shifting of rainfall and dry seasons, as the direct impact of global climate change,has caused exposure of extreme conditions for the population in the Gunungkidul district.For example, increase in the evaporation rate resulted in more communal ponds drying upat an alarming speed, forcing people to buy water for household and agricultural purposes.Another threat is the high occurrence of crop failures mainly due to failure to predictseasonal change, to pest attack and timing for use of chemical fertilizers, chemical pesticidesand other chemical substances to help grow the plants.

It is customary that during the dry season, when the community finds it difficult toaccess the adequate water supply or when facing crop failure, they switch occupations andbecome handymen. The Food and Agriculture Agency stated that they did not have data oncrop failures since crop failure is defined by the government as a reduction to 11 percent ofthe harvest. In fact, every year there are many small farmers suffering from crop failureor losses due to climate change in individual farm land. This is also one of the findings in theGNDR Frontline Survey[1], where crop failure has been identified as major threat forthe community, especially in rural areas.

The action taken in responseIn 2016, YEU received a grant from the Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund (ICCTF) tocarry out adaptation programs in four villages in the Gunungkidul district of Yogyakarta.The adaptation program was designed to strengthen food resilience in karst (limestone)areas in a way which is practical and applicable for field use. Participatory disaster andrisks assessment was carried out to identify how communities perceive risks.

From the risk assessments, the following have been identified:

• Based on GunungKidul Government’s official data, the level of drought and rainfallin GunungKidul are considered normal. Farmers have local wisdom of traditionalseasonal calendar, but it has been acknowledged that the seasonal calendar is nowinvalid due to climate change.

• Based on the historical analysis, each year farmers are suffering from crop losses orcrop failure due to disasters including landslide, volcanic ashes, long-tailed macaqueattack and climate change leading to drought, long dry seasons, unpredictablerainfall, long rainy season, etc. They also experience secondary impacts from climatechange including pest attacks and environmental degradation.

• Direct losses due to disaster and climate change felt by farmers include: decrease yields,crop failure, lack of green grass for livestock feed and artificial lake water drying up.Aside from economic loss, farmers also suffer from additional expense for buying waterand green grass during long dry season. It is common that they will sell their livestockto buy water and green grass. This practice is so-called “livestock eats livestock.”

• Additionally, the price of seedlings is also high and the in general farmers have nocapacity to make their own seedlings.

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Thus, farmers identified the following adaptation plan:

(1) Climate adaptive farming which combines organic farming, biological pest controland drought-resistant seedlings from local varieties.

For this action, YEU conducted capacity building which covers the following:introduction to and identification of pests and plant diseases and the symptoms,the identification of plant pest organisms (PPO) and the natural enemies of thePPO, making biological pesticide to control the pests and plant diseases whichaffect the rice, and making organic fertilizer a schedule for fertilization and pestcontrol actions.

(2) Conservation of an artificial lake as source of water during long dry season.For this action, the community conducted communal work to build embankments

and plant 425 trees around the lake.

(3) Fermentation of livestock feed to reduce the cost of buying green grass during thedry season.

For this action, YEU facilitated training and practice on how to make fermented livestockfeed from straws, grass and leaves that are available during dry season. Most importantly,the fermented livestock feed is enrich with nutrients.

What happened during the actionThe program was carried out in collaboration with the Food and Agriculture Agencyand with the active engagement of farmers groups. In increasing the capacitiesof farmer groups in organic farming, providing training itself would not be sufficient.It took trial and error processes, therefore the facilitation consists of training (knowledgetransfer), practice (application of new knowledge) and continuation of practice of thenewly gained skills (production of organic fertilizer, biological pesticide and fermentedlivestock feed).

Climate adaptive agriculture program undeniably raised concerns amongst localfarmers on crop failure or decline in crop harvest since they were accustomed to chemicalfertilizers. However, after the introduction of organic practices with close monitoringfrom the agriculture extension officers, the farmers’ groups were strongly committed toapply the practices to reduce the dependence on chemical substances which contributedto the damage of the soil fertility, and reduce any expenditure on buying expensivechemical fertilizers.

In determining the demonstration plot for this, the farmers agreed on specific land ownedby the member of the groups. Once the group decided on the plot, then the landowner shoulddiscuss the land use internally with the family. The decision should come from anawareness that with the absence of volunteerism and sacrifice, no farmer will start learningthe new farming method. In addition, the landowner should secure another land for his ownfarming activity to ensure family income.

During the practice, an evaluation was conducted to monitor the process and results.This practice was repeated until farmers mastered the process and the result is satisfactory.For the continuation of practice, some farmers chose to do it individually and somechose to do it by traditional systems of reciprocal exchange (gotong royong). After thetraining–practice–reproduction was done, the farmers were ready to apply the climateadaptive farming through the demonstration plot.

Aside from climate adaptive farming, to adapt to the water scarcity during dry season,each household has a water reservoir to harvest the rain water. One community in Temonsub-village also conserved an artificial lake called TelagaMakam. The strategies forconservation were formulated through community resource mobilization. Each household in

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the community provided one cubic meter of materials for building 140 cubic meters ofembankment and planting 425 perennial trees, which have been able to slow down theevaporation rate.

What have been effective?Shifting from traditional practice into climate adaptive organic farmingThe trainings and direct assistance to climate adaptive farming have benefitted the farmersas they are able increase the farming production through the following actions:

(1) Using seed variety which is suitable with the geographical and climate conditions inthe Gunungkidul district which is dominated with karst and long dry season.The selected variety also has other qualities such as suitable in rain-fed rice fields,more resistant to pests and disease and has short duration from seeds to matureplants (±103 days).

(2) Composting cow manure, which often becomes the breeding place for endemic pestsuret (Lepidiota Stigma), into organic fertilizers. It significantly reduces the uretpopulation as well as reduces the costs for purchasing chemical fertilizers. Before theprogram intervention, farmers directly sprinkled manure into the field withoutprocessing the manure into organic fertilizers. This practice created risks to the fieldbeing infested with pest (lepidiota stigma) endemic in the area, as uncultivatedlivestock manure invites pests. After the training, the farmers know that the cause ofthe pest is the livestock manure that is not properly processed into organic fertilizer.In addition, during the project period, the farmers also got the experience to treatpest affected fields by flooding/inundating the farm land with water for some time.So now farmers can do prevention and eliminate the pest effectively. Previously, tohandle the pest they did it by trying to catch the pest (lepidiota stigma) in its larvaestage in the ground, and the result was ineffective.

(3) Increasing the crop population by applying seed row spacing by measuring thedistance of the crops, manipulating the nutrient placement, ensuring enoughsunlight and reducing the weed competition. Consequently, there are fewer weedscompeting with the crops for moisture and nutrients. Based on the study conductedby International Rice Research Institute, the findings suggested that “properspacing can increase the yield by 25–40 percent over improper spacing.”

From the demonstration plot, it can be concluded that adaptive organic climate agriculture ifproperly implemented can reduce the risk of crop failure, and increase agricultural yieldsby approximately 60 percent from traditional farming practices commonly practiced byfarmers where they usually use low quality seedlings, cultivated the soil with unprocessedmanure for compost and do not use the row-spacing technique for planting the seeds.With the demonstration plot, the farmers used seed variety which is suitable with thegeographical and climate conditions in the Gunungkidul district which is dominated withkarst and long dry season, composting cow manure into organic fertilizer and applying seedrow spacing by measuring the distance of the crops, manipulating the nutrient placement,ensuring enough sunlight and reducing the weed competition. Consequently, there are fewerweeds competing with the crops for moisture and nutrients (Figure 1).

Strengthening local risk governance and program ownershipTo improve and intensify the agricultural information dissemination to farmers, since1976 the Agricultural Department introduced agricultural extension with trainingmethods and field visits (LAKU method) to help solve various problems faced by farmers.To enable reaching millions of farmers by a limited number of agricultural field

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facilitators, agricultural extension by the LAKU method is carried out in stages throughfarmer groups. There are three grades of farmers in Indonesia: “contact” farmers,“advance” farmers, and “follower” farmers. Contact farmers are farmer opinion leaderswho can bridge the communication between farmer facilitators and the farmer groupmembers. Follower farmers are the slowest group to receive inputs, therefore it is essentialto increase the number of contact farmers and advance farmers. YEU adopted thisapproach during the program implementation, where YEU works with government’s fieldfacilitators of the Agricultural Department in conducting training and monitoring visits tofarmer groups. In decision-making for organic farming, YEU also approaches the leader ofthe farmer groups and head of village government to bridge the communication withgroup members, so that groups are willing to build a shared commitment. YEU alsoidentifies advanced farmers who are the agents of change in a group that lead by exampleby practicing the results of the training independently. As of the end of the project, of the212 trained farmers, there were 35 advanced farmers (7 women and 28 men) whovolunteered to practice the outcomes of the training. The practice of advanced farmers isexpected to be followed by farmers’ followers. One of them is by jointly making fertilizeron a rotation basis.

What challenges, problems and barriers were there?Limitations to government supportOne of the challenges faced by the government is limited manpower – especially thesmall number of field facilitators which are overburdened due to multiple tasking.Government could utilize/recruit “contact” farmers as field facilitators as a strategy foraddressing limited manpower and to use different kind of platform to disseminateagricultural information.

Rice Harvest by the Farmers’ Groups(Before and After the Intervention)

350

300

250

200

59.60%

60.40%

58.54%

60.19%

150

100

50

0GIRIASIH GIRITIRTO GIRICAHYO GIRIPURWO

Harvest in 2015(Cwt/hectare)

Harvest in 2016(Cwt/hectare)

Figure 1.Increased of harvestafter the intervention

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Information and technologyThe Ministry of Agriculture has launched an application called “KATAM” (integratedfarming calendar) which gives information about the right time for farmers in a specificlocation to start farming. This application can be accessed through websites, Play Store aswell as SMS centers. However, old generation and rural farmers are not comfortable withthis application. Dissemination of information is needed to ensure farmers in rural areas canutilize this app. The use of information and technology for farmers should be strengthenedwith continuous assistance to utilization of the appropriate technology and access to sourcesof information in the applied agriculture to increase agricultural productivity.

Changing mindset – acceptance of innovation by farmersIn the beginning, farmers were hesitant to provide large areas of farm land for organicfarming demonstration plots because they were worried that the harvest results would bevery low compared to their traditional practices. Communities feel reluctant to try newideas and innovations due to the difficulties they fear they might face, often focusing onthe hardship or potential failure instead of positive results. Therefore, they need intensiveassistance from transfer of knowledge, application, monitoring and evaluation. NGOsincluding YEU and the farmers facilitators from the Agriculture Department playsignificant roles in this process, to ensure commitment and consistency. Due to thishesitation, the farmers chose to have two demonstration plots, one with pure organictreatment and the other still using chemical fertilizer but with lower amount than theirtraditional practice. Additionally, the farmers tend to wait and see the results ofdemonstration plots before they apply the organic farming knowledge they gained to theirown farm land. The farm land is less fertile, located in the hillside and is also narrow(less than 1,000 m²) which is not ideal for a demonstration plot. However, it represents thetypical farm land in the target areas. After seeing the evidence and results of the pilot,farmers are more motivated to replicate the practice. The community learns from thedemonstration plot, that organic farming can deliver a good harvest and is sustainable.

Reflecting on action

• Experimental learning, strong leadership and social cohesion play significant roles inthe adaptation of new farming techniques processes.

• Peer-learning from those who already learnt the skills, leading to transfer ofknowledge. The government could utilize and recruit contact farmers or advancefarmers as field facilitators as a strategy for addressing limited manpower and to usea different kind of platform to disseminate agricultural information. Government fieldfacilitators also play significant roles to bridge the gaps.

• Seed subsidy is a national program, but the seeds distributed by government mustconsider local risks and conditions. The seeds distributed should not only be avariety for fertile land farm, but also be a variety for rain harvest farming.Community seeds bank have helped to fill in the gap of seeds subsidy shortage, byincreasing farmer capacity in saving local varieties and improving their livelihood.

• The community learns from the demonstration plot, that climate adaptive organicfarming can produce good harvests and is sustainable. In this case study, there arefour farmers groups; each group has two demonstration plots. In this way, thefarmers can learn the good and bad practices in real time.

• The real challenges on the continuation of the production of organic fertilizersare identified with: limited organic materials available in the village to meet

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the demand of more farmers who want to make their own organic fertilizers, theinadequate or under capacity of the support technology in agriculture andthe absence of incentive for the business actors in marketing organic agriculturalproducts. Thus, the government should create enabling environment for a moresustainable organic farming.

Note

1. See Section 3 of this Special issue of the Journal.

References

BPS (2017), “Gunungkidul dalam angka”, Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Gunungkidul.

Muazam, A. (2015), “Sub-optimal performance of land and improvement of regional economic potentialof the fisheries sector Gunungkidul DIY”, Proseding Seminar Nasional Lahan Supoptimal,Palembang, ISBN 979-587-580-9, October 20-21, 2016.

Prihasto, A. (2013), “Model Pertanian Ramah Lingkungan pada Sawah dan Lahan Sawah Tadahhujan”, Raker Balai Besar Litbang Sumber Daya Lahan Pertanian, April 3–6.

Corresponding authorHepi Rahmawati can be contacted at: hepi.rahmawati@gmail.com

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Citizens of Delhi leadresilience action

Manu Gupta, Parag Talankar and Shivangi ChavdaSEEDS, New Delhi, India

AbstractPurpose – The purpose of this paper is to illustrate practical approaches to addressing issues of riskreduction and disaster prevention in urban areas. In addition to exposure to natural hazards, urban areasrepresent complex risks and vulnerabilities together with complicated governance structures.Design/methodology/approach – To address the challenge, SEEDS mobilised a “Disaster Watch Forum” – acitizens’ platform that brought citizens together to proactively engage with the local government. Withhand-holding support from SEEDS, training by domain experts, internal team building and the forum has becomea credible people-based institution addressing issues of risk reduction and prevention.Findings – Urban risk reduction has remained a challenging issue with solutions often sought in highinvestment structural interventions. These have limited impact on the urban poor living in informal areas. Thispaper reveals “bottom-up” people-based approach that is able to engage with the “system” from “outside”. Itreveals how people relate to day-to-day risks that affect their lives, making it the stepping stone to addresshigher order societal risks. Finally, the immense power and energy of youth and children work as local “agentsof change”. Overall, the work aligns with priorities of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.Research limitations/implications – There are three principal implications for further research: with halfthe world now urbanized, urgent solutions are needed for improving disaster risk governance in cities; takinga “whole of society” approach in addressing a wider canvas of risks; and redirecting investments in urbanareas towards managing risks, rather than managing disasters.Practical implications – The model illustrated is replicable in urban areas facing risk. It worked well in apopulation catchment of 50,000 residents; to achieve scale would require enabling a federated structure ofseveral localised forums.Originality/value – The paper presents a hands-on experience in building an alternative approach to urbanrisk reduction. It has required authors to move from “government to governance” model making citizensactive stakeholders in proactively addressing their own underlying vulnerabilities that lead to creation of andexacerbation of risks.Keywords Governance, Urban resilience, Youth engagement, ICT for disasters, Citizens action,Urban risk managementPaper type Case study

SummaryThe city of Delhi, India’s national capital, is exposed to range of risks on account of itslocation in a river basin and proximity to an active seismic fault-line. Risks cover a numberof vulnerabilities – population growth, unemployment, social in-equity, poor quality housingand public services leading to “everyday disasters” that cumulatively contribute to greaterloss and suffering than sudden onset events.

To address the challenge through a comprehensive approach, SEEDS mobilised a citizen’sDisaster-Watch Forum, key influential individuals in the most vulnerable East District of thecity. These individuals comprised representatives of existing local neighbourhoodassociations, academicians living in the area, retired government officials and youth.

The Forum engaged with local government through positive collaboration, and action.As run-up to the engagement process, a number of activities were undertaken,with SEEDS providing technical and hand-holding support. Activities includedbaseline/risk analysis, vulnerability, and capacity assessment followed by developmentof a road map. A number of workshops and meetings were held with different existinggroups, such as women groups, elected leaders, elderly and neighbourhood associations.Community action groups as sub-groups within the Forum were mobilised. These actiongroups would focus on efforts in a smaller neighbourhood or area. A cadre of youth

Disaster Prevention andManagement

Vol. 28 No. 1, 2019pp. 69-75

© Emerald Publishing Limited0965-3562

DOI 10.1108/DPM-07-2018-0228

Received 27 July 2018Revised 27 July 2018

Accepted 6 August 2018

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volunteers was mobilised and provided with special skills on risk reduction tools,including use of ICT.

A bottom-up “pressure” was created on various line departments of the localgovernment through a pro-active approach, where citizens took upon themselves part ofthe civic services. Media, especially social media, was smartly used to confront theGovernment when needed.

The premise of forming the Forum was to facilitate a dialogue between the localgovernment and citizens to bridge the gap between policies and practices at the districtlevel. A healthy partnership is now in place. There are regular interactions leading toimprovement in service delivery, improvement in grievance redressal and mutual supportactivities in public programmes.

It took considerable time for the Forum to take shape and take lead on the agenda.Initially, mobilising citizens to come together for Forum and its objectives was a hugechallenge; this was even more difficult with youth and children. Once the Forum came inplace, the next big challenge was to be able to earn the trust of the local government.Looking back, the process and investment has yielded more than the desired results.Through the citizen’s forum, we have been able to build a strong awareness and interestaround risk reduction issues, even evolving to influence large developmental issues.

The case studyContext – what was the challenge faced?New Delhi, India’s national capital city is a typical microcosm of India’s burgeoning urbanpopulation representing the challenges and opportunities that are associated with adeveloping economy.

The city also has its fair share of exposure to risks on account of its location in a river basinand close to an active seismic fault-line. The definition of risks takes a broader dimension in sucha context, however, as a number of vulnerabilities – population growth, unemployment, socialin-equity, poor quality housing and public services lead to “everyday disasters” that cumulativelycontribute to greater loss and suffering, than, for example, rare sudden onset events.

The city is divided in 12 administrative districts of which the East Delhi District is at highestrisk. This district is highly prone to floods in the River Yamuna. The flood plains, which were a“no-go” area 50 years ago, witnessed rapid development with squatter settlements taking overthe vacant land. Corrupt public systems allowed this to happen until population reachedun-manageable proportions. Currently, the area has among the highest residential densities inthe world; there is no regard to safety in buildings and infrastructure. Public services areinadequate and often overstretched. This has led to poor levels of public health. Every year,there are large number of cases of vector-borne diseases like dengue, malaria and diarrhoea.The high density of population coupled with socio economic backwardness increases thevulnerability towards various disasters. On the other hand, the local governance structure ismade up of a complex web of agencies with overlapping jurisdictions and powers. This hascreated a scenario where response from the public agencies is mired with knee-jerk responses,and pass-the-buck syndromes. The fact that much of East Delhi is “unauthorised” since peoplehad initially settled without “buying” land, becomes an alibi for local government to provide lessthan optimum services. Communities are un-organised, poor and with large scale under-employment. This often reaches tipping points with incidents of crime and abuse (Table I).

Enabling citizen-led action for risk reduction and resilienceFor SEEDS as a non-profit organisation working in the sector, addressing risk-relatedproblems in an urban setting posed a challenge. Unlike urban areas, rural communities,besides being small and defined by geography, are also homogenous and better organised.

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In urban areas, besides complex governance mechanisms, citizens have migrated atdifferent points in time, coming from different locations and prioritise employment at thecost of sub-standard living conditions and associated risks.

Establishing a citizens’ forum to address local risk-related problems was an experiment.It had not been attempted before in the country. The idea took inspiration from successfulelements of community managed disaster risk reduction projects in rural contexts.Also, similar urban examples of “Rotary Clubs” and other such institutions provided someguidance on the distinct nature of organised citizen groups in urban areas.

Moreover, risk reduction and disaster prevention is not an exclusive portfolio ordepartment in local governments. At best, it is counted as a “preparedness” exercise bypublic emergency services.

Hence, setting up a collaboration process between communities and local governmentwas the most logical way to address challenges especially around extensive risks that causeevery day disasters.

In October 2010, following a detailed stakeholder analysis, the “Purvi Dilli ApadaPrehari” (English translation: East Delhi Disaster-Watch Forum), was mobilised byidentifying a few key influential individuals in the East District of Delhi. These individualscomprised representatives of existing local neighbourhood associations, academiciansliving in the area and retired government officials. The venue of the first meeting for theForum was deliberately chosen at the office of the head of the local government.

Thereafter, a series of meetings were organised with other local groups and localgovernment officials to shape the Forum in the district. Continuous efforts were madethrough discussions and interactions with members of the Forum to build a commonunderstanding on risk-related issues and its relevance in society for local actions.Second, efforts were made to build a perspective on building citizen and governmentpartnership for leveraging and directing public resources to minimise locally assessed risks.

In the initial setting-up stages, the following key processes were taken up by the Forum,with technical support from SEEDS:

• Baseline/risk analysis, vulnerability, capacity assessment. This helped in peopleunderstanding that combating risk-related issues provided a strong protection fortheir daily livelihood and living.

• Developing a road-map of actions based on the risk analysis. This was done througha series of action planning workshops.

• Actively seeking involvement of existing women groups, elected leaders, elderly andneighbourhood associations.

Hazards Major occurrences

EarthquakesFloods 1924, 1947, 1955, 1956, 1967, 1971, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1988, 1995, 1998, 2008 and in 2010Fire accident (causes) 2004 (3 incidents), 2005 (7 incidents)LPG cylinder blast 2004 (1 incident)Chemical fire 2004Earthquakes 1992, 1993 (2 incidents) 1994, 2004 (4 incidents), 2007Floods 1980, 2008Building collapse 2008, 2010Epidemics 1955-1956 (Infectious Hepatitis) 1996 (Dengue); cases of Chikenguniya, Diarrhoea,

dengue now reported every yearRoad accidents Current figure not availableMetro mishaps 2008

Table I.Major hazard

occurrences in Delhi

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• Identifying of community action groups as sub-groups of the Forum. These actiongroups would comprise members of a selected small neighbourhood within theEast District, and would focus on efforts in their area, under the larger road-mapdeveloped by the Forum.

• Making citizens aware of risks and how to address them through actions withintheir homes.

• Creating a cadre of youth volunteers and providing special skills on risk reductiontools, including use of ICT.

Overall, the process ensured that there is a positive collaboration between citizens and localgovernment. On behalf of the citizens, the Forum was able to articulate specific needs whererisks were high, and provided credible evidence for the same; the Government on their partcreated a listening and engagement space for such citizen action, and dovetailed theirexisting budgets and programmes to address highlighted needs.

A bottom-up “pressure”was created on various line departments of the local governmentthrough pro-active action, where citizens took upon themselves part of the civic services.Media, especially social media, was smartly used to confront the Government when needed.

A healthy partnership with the local government and citizens is now in place. There areregular interactions leading to improvement in service delivery, improvement in grievanceredressal and mutual support activities in public programmes (Plate 1).

Mobilising the communityWhat was effective. The premise of forming the Forum was to facilitate a dialogue betweenthe local government and the citizens to bridge the gap between policies and practices at thedistrict level. The deliberations through convergence workshops and other bilateraldiscussions have strengthened the connection between the citizens’ forum and the districtgovernment; ensuring inclusive developmental agenda with integrated risk reductionmeasures. The local level actions both by communities and government have set a goodpractice of the local level partnerships and level of complementarity.

Plate 1.Citizens volunteers atwork

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Continuous hand-holding was carried out by the SEEDS team. Technical inputs wereprovided; training workshops were organised with Forum members, for example, on the useof legal mechanisms on accountability, e.g. making use of the Right to Information Act, toextract information from local government on their budgetary allocation for public services.

There have been useful spin-offs as the initiative has helped create an alliance of awarecitizens, who have recognised the need to address underlying vulnerabilities, prioritisingactions that help in reducing stresses. The alliance is benefitting 50,000 citizens in the area.This includes 90 members who are active in the Forum.

The 214 youth volunteers provided the “hands and legs” to Forum’s agenda. Theyquickly absorbed learning from specially organised training programmes on preparednessand prevention. Invisible risks – that of bullying, street-side violence, and even domesticviolence – became part of the discussion. The youth became active providers of crediblegeo-tagged evidence that formed the basis of addressing areas such as poor public servicedelivery and safety and security issues for women (Plate 2).

An app for advocacyLocal youth came together on a virtual platform through a specially adapted mobileapplication. The application served as a social media platform except that it was a closedgroup with membership open to those whose were pre-verified. As a user, they could takepictures of potential high-risk areas in their neighbourhood. Pictures would get geo-taggedautomatically. They could add their notes on what they saw in form of a blog attached to thepicture. Specific time-bound campaigns were carried out to address one type of problem at atime. A successful intervention was around loose hanging electricity wires that had led to anumber of cases of accidental electrocution in the past. When data from a number ofdifferent users in the same area were consolidated – it provided a strong evidence bothvisual and narrative and locations clearly marked. In this case, the city’s electricity companytook it seriously initiating immediate action. And yes, they thanked the youth for bringingthe problem to their attention.

App for youth reportingThe 140 members of the Community Action Groups act as torch bearers to identify localrisks and mitigate those risks in their own localities. These groups include women, childrenand youth; who are the most vulnerable of these communities.

SEEDS team, with funding made available from its donors, provided seed funding to theForum to implement tangible ideas on risk reduction. The Forum came up withdemonstration projects like Closed Circuit Television cameras being installed in publicspaces, to be used for surveillance in neighbourhoods that reported frequent incidents ofviolence against women.

Overall, the bundle of activities carried out with the Forum has helped to bring incohesiveness amongst the communities combating the common problems of urban stresses.Other local organisations have also joined in. Local cultural groups, sports clubs haveassociated themselves with activities of the Forum, reinforcing the credibility and outreachof the Forum and its activities.

Looking back: challenges and lessons learntWhen interacting with communities – a large number of them having migrated to the cityfor work – it has been extremely difficult for the team in SEEDS to mobilise individuals whocould devote time for the community activities. The team made considerable efforts in

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having one-on-one dialogue with key individuals in their homes. This was followed withsmall group meetings, where local influential leaders were invited.

Building bridgesBringing disparate community groups, which have arrived in the city at different points oftime, was a challenging task. For SEEDS team members, it meant having in-numberableone-on-one meetings with locally recognised leaders of each community group. It alsorequired understanding their culture, their preferences and possibilities for cooperation withother groups in the same neighbourhood. We observed that groups came together whenthey realised they had common set of civic problems to share. And that solving a civicproblem that affected them required a larger group effort. Small group meetings led tocreation of a group of committed influential leaders, who became prime mobilisers for agreater citizens’ platform.

Ice-breaking and motivating youth and children was a challenge. A number of socialisingactivities were planned before the project-related agenda could be taken up. Exposurevisits, fun activities, friendly discussions, art and craft workshops were all part of trustbuilding work.

Getting a favourable response from the local government and line departments was achallenge. The public officials would not take efforts by citizens’ seriously until specificengagements and meetings were planned and results demonstrated. Furthermore, withchange of the local government officials, the relationships had to be re-established, thus,delaying further action. Mutual understanding and trust was gradually built when theForum members stepped in to support Government’s efforts where needed. For example,

Plate 2.App used to highlightobserved deficienciesin public services

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crowd control during major public events. This was well received and reciprocated by thepublic officials by recognising citizen efforts.

Citizen pressure and government actionCitizen pressure has led the Municipal Corporation becoming pro-active in their solid wastemanagement and cleanliness programmes in the area; a huge problem otherwise and amajor cause for epidemics such as Dengue and Chikenguniya every year and occasionallyleading to local flooding. Neighbourhoods are cleaner and waste disposal is better managedthis year. SEEDS team provided technical assistance and tools in articulating needs andsolutions. The citizen forum advocated for these needs and offered to jointly monitorattendance and performance of municipal workers in their neighbourhood. The forum evenpublicly recognised and rewarded public officials who performed well. Access to Mayor’soffice and other elected representatives was leveraged to clear bottlenecks in the system andexpedite service delivery. “Naming and shaming” was effectively used to buildaccountability in public service leading to better delivery.

Creating alliance of citizens has been challenged by the reluctance of the citizens to take upownership of the Forum. To continuously maintain their interest requires Forum to prove itsworth through initiatives based on commonly felt needs. Local vested groups played their rolein disrupting unity of the Forum and its actions. There were also fears that the Forum maybecome too political thereby losing its USP as a constructive collaborator with technicallysound credible group of citizens. The Forum required strong and self-less leadership toovercome biases. For this, leadership training was essential part of the hand-holding exercisecarried out by SEEDS. Elections were conducted by the Forum and the new leadership hasbeen much more responsive to needs of the citizens. Lately, the Forum has been able to chargea subscription from its members contributing in part to its financial sustainability. In theprocess, the Forum has evolved as a strong and credible people’s institution that can workindependently, making the role of “outsiders” such as SEEDS redundant.

Reflecting on actionThanks to all the donors and partners who provided resource support, the SEEDS teamcould commit to a necessarily long and slow process. It took some time for the community tomove from “I” to “We” to “Our”.

Creating an environment of positive bottom-up engagement with the government has builtgreater trust and accountability. Citizens used well-documented evidence as the basis, andwell-articulated plans to engage with line departments. This provided legitimacy and credibility.

The power and energy of young citizen volunteers was well harnessed to provide goodoutreach, and practice on the ground.

Overall, we felt that by building awareness on risks to everyday disasters, we are able toget traction on larger intensive risks that require policy approaches and other systemicchanges. Such an approach has also opened the possibility of aiming at broader goals ofsustainable development using resilience, risk reduction and protection as entry points.

Corresponding authorManu Gupta can be contacted at: manu@seedsindia.org

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Enhancing resilience againstfloods in the Lower Motowoh

community, Limbe,Southwest Cameroon

Gaston Buh WungGeotechnology,

Environmental Assessment and Disaster Risk Reduction (GEADIRR),Limbe, Cameroon, andFestus Tongwa Aka

Institute for Geological and Mining Research, Yaoundé, Cameroon andGEADIRR, Limbe, Cameroon

AbstractPurpose – Floods and landslide threats were addressed under the Frontline process in the city of Limbe,Southwestern Cameroon. The purpose of this paper is to present actions undertaken through building localcommunity resilience to floods which are a major threat in the city, with impacts on the local communityranging from death to complete destruction of services and livelihoods.Design/methodology/approach – The actions carried out were informed by the GNDR-supportedFrontline survey conducted in 2015 in which the Lower Motowoh community rated floods as an importantthreat. A series of reflection and learning sessions with the community members was carried out to betterunderstand the problem. Scoping studies on the causes and extent of floods along river Njengele wereundertaken by GEADIRR and the community team.Findings – The findings of this paper indicated that the main problem resulted from river channel blockagecaused by indiscriminate dumping of refuse into the waterway and sediment deposition from upstream.Further reflection and action planning led to preparatory meetings between GEADIRR and ten communityleaders. The unanimous action adopted was to dredge the river. Dredging was carried out in late April andearly May of 2016 using a hired bulldozer.Social implications – Follow-up shows that after many years of misery from floods, often associated withthe loss of loved ones and property, about 500 community residents who benefited from the action did not gothrough this dreadful ordeal again during the rains of 2016 and 2017. People are currently rebuilding on thereclaimed land which was previously abandoned due to flooding.Originality/value – Current challenges include changing the mindset of community members about theadverse effects of indiscriminate dumping of household waste into the waterway. It was also a bigchallenge convincing some members of the community who felt that floods are a natural phenomenonunstoppable by man.Keywords Politics, Local/non local knowledge sharing, Receptiveness/reticence, Collaboration and influence,Power or powerlessnessPaper type Case study

BackgroundCameroon is a West-Central Africa country, with a surface area of 475,440 km2 (Figure 1).It is a middle/lower income food-deficient country (2013 GDP per capita of $2,400) with apopulation (2016 estimates) of ~24.4m, giving a population density of 51 persons per km2.People of 24 years and below constitute about 62 percent of the population. In total,60 percent of the population – projected to reach 40m in the next 30 years – live in cities.This means that the need for largely under-developed services like electricity, water andhousing leads to growth of shanty towns in which people are vulnerable to disasters.Cameroon can be divided into four zones based on climate, geography, vegetation

Disaster Prevention andManagementVol. 28 No. 1, 2019pp. 76-83© Emerald Publishing Limited0965-3562DOI 10.1108/DPM-06-2018-0193

Received 21 June 2018Revised 21 June 2018Accepted 12 July 2018

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and socio-economy. The disaster risk profile of the country reflects these divisions.Common intensive risks are earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and gas explosions from lakes.Extensive risks are floods, landslides, epidemics, urban fires, conflicts, industrial/transportaccidents and social pressures resulting from poverty (Aka et al., 2016). Increasing climatechange and variability exacerbate the situation. Temperatures have generally risenthroughout Cameroon, with an average annual temperature increase of 0.7°C from 1960 to2007, representing an average rate of 0.15°C/decade. Predictions indicate that temperatureswill be up to +4.8°C and+ 3.6°C in 2100, respectively in the northern and southern parts ofthe country. Projections of extreme climate events indicate a further increase in thefrequency and magnitude of droughts, erosion and floods. Mass movements (landslides,mudslides, rock-falls, earth collapses, etc.) will also increase in intensity, particularly inmountainous areas. It is projected that sea level will rise by 9 to 38 cm by the year 2050, andby up to 80 cm by 2100. Consequences of this include disappearance of trees, which willspeed up erosion and cause degradation of mangrove ecosystems. Floods, splashes, storms,sedimentation, soil erosion and sediment load in rivers will increase (Cameroon NationalAdaptation Plan to Climate Change (CNAPCC)).

The case studyOne important outcome of the VFL program carried out by GNDR and her CSO partnersincluding GEADIRR was that in order to strengthen disaster resilience and policy making,

N

0 10 20 KmMajor settlement Other settlement Hydrology Administrative limit

Idenao

Debundsha

BUEA

LIMBE

Mutengene

TIKO

Figure 1.Location of Limbe

city, Mount Cameroon,the coast and thelower Motowoh

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local knowledge is indispensable. However, views of local people are often not taken intoconsideration enough, so GEADIRR participated in the GNDR initiated-Frontline process inCameroon with the aim to gather local risk knowledge and priorities, support local learningand action, contribute to the national frameworks for policy making and effectiveimplementation, and participate in the global baselines and DRR monitoring mechanisms.

Frontline survey was conducted in Cameroon in 2015. The survey was piloted by sixCSOs and focused on mapping community member’s perceptions on priority localthreats/risks, consequences of each threat, actions undertaken vis-à-vis the threats andbarriers to the actions. The survey targeted 54 communities in eight of the tenadministrative regions of the country with 64 threats identified. Aggregation of the surveydata indicate that the three top threats in Cameroon were traffic accidents, ( first), flooding(second) and fire (third), while the last two were temperature rise and war (as of then).Common threats have both natural and anthropogenic causes. Disaggregation of the resultsper community provides an idea of important threats facing members of those communities,thus providing evidence for engagement with the communities in addressing localizedthreats or undertaking national campaigns such as the ongoing campaign on road safety.This case study presents work carried out in Lower Motowo in Limbe city.

Limbe is located in the southwestern part of Cameroon with a population of ~120,000people, and lies between the Atlantic Ocean coast and the windward foot of active MtCameroon volcano. The city receives very heavy rainfall and is one of the wettest places onEarth. The western slopes of Mt Cameroon receive 6,000–9,000 mm (240–350 in) of rainfall ayear (Encyclopedia of Cameroon Climate, 2015). The period 1981 to 2000 in Cameroon had20–40 percent lower rainfall than from 1961 to 1980, with a roughly 2.2 percent decline inrainfall per decade since 1960, and increasing intensity in some parts of Cameroon(Cameroon National Adaptation Plan to Climate Change (CNAPCC), 2015). Changes inrainfall amount and variability caused a number of landslides and floods in the city ofLimbe. Between 1990 and 2007, landslides and floods killed about eight people every year inthe city (Ayonghe et al., 2002; Ndaley, 2014). Many buildings, roads, bridges and life lineslike electricity and water were damaged. The June 2001 flood and landslide disasters killedsome 30 persons, displaced over 2000, and destroyed property like roads, telephone/waterlines worth thousands of US dollars (Aka et al., 2001; Buh, 2009).

Limbe is dotted with unconsolidated pyroclastic cones formed by the activity of nearbyMt Cameroon. The facts that it is a coastal city, is located near the only petroleum refinery ofthe country (SONARA), and has fertile volcanic soils on which huge oil palm, banana andtea plantations, and agro-industries are located, have all contributed in pulling people to thecity from other regions of Cameroon and other countries. It attracts inward migration forwork in agro-industry and at the oil refinery. The majority of the inhabitants lack regularemployment and are involved in petty businesses. The drainage infrastructure is poor andthere is general lack of institutionalized household waste management. Poverty isconsiderable and most of the inhabitants are low-income earners who live in unplannedsettlements in the low-lying (only 1–2 m above the sea level) areas of the city that areseasonally flooded. The quest for cheap land results in people cutting the slopes of, andbuilding on unconsolidated pyroclastic cones that are prone to landslides and floods.

Within the context of the VFL 2011 local governance in DRR, and the 2013 communityresilience and everyday disaster surveys conducted by GNDR members, and their follow-upFrontline Action initiative of learning, reflection and action, GEADIRR routinely heldmeetings with communities in informal settlements in Limbe prone to landslides and floods(Coconut Island, Unity Quarters, Mile-2, Lower Motowoh, Clerk’s Quarters, Church Street).This was in order to determine their level of awareness to the threats they face, what copingstrategies they have developed to sustain their livelihoods and also how they can strengthentheir capacities to cope and be more resilient. Enhancement of risk reduction in local

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communities requires building local capacity and ensuring that the communities are fullyaware of the local hazards, understand their level of exposure and how to cope with shocks.This does not only require the availability of necessary resources, but also the incorporationof local knowledge and effective planning in the communities (Buh et al., 2012).

In this case study, we highlight work with the Lower Motowo community that facesdamaging (often deadly) seasonal flooding as their most challenging threat. Houses of residentsare inundated every rainy season and their livelihoods destroyed. Their frequent request forsupport from the local government was not heeded because local government does not haveresources allocated for DRR work, and the government system is still heavily centralized.

The challengeThe Cameroon disaster risk profile and Frontline survey results showed Limbe among themost disaster-prone cities in the country, with common threats being floods, landslides,coastal erosion and volcanic eruptions. The challenge was how to ensure the effectiveinvolvement of local communities (i.e. those at the frontline), the civil society and traditionalstakeholders in knowledge creation and decision-making on matters of disaster riskreduction, and to engage local communities through a participatory inclusive approach inbuilding their resilience.

Threats, consequences and actionsA 2015 frontline survey result showed inundation as an important threat to the LowerMotowo community. Other threats include coastal erosion, fire, landslide and poverty. Floodshave impacted on the community over the last 20 years, with increasing intensity.Consequences range from loss of life (death), injury, loss of livelihood (houses, crops/farmlandand animals), destruction of greenery, to disease and complete disruption of the communitylife (Plate 1). Threat drivers were exhaustively identified and range from sediment depositionin the river bed to blockages by household waste. Common community actions over the yearsvary from informing the local government about the problem, to self-efforts through manuallabor. Dredging the clogged waterway causing the flooding was selected and implemented asthe optimal action to reduce vulnerabilities and increase resilience.

The approachFive consultative meetings were organized with the community to better understand thesituation. Reflections on the primordial role of the community members in building theirown resilience were carried out during these meetings. The river course was visited and theextent of blockage assessed. Preparatory meetings involved GEADIR and ten communityleaders. The unanimous action adopted was to dredge the river Njengele that runs throughthe community from Makuka quarters, and causes floods downstream.

This needed the hiring of a caterpillar tracked digger. The cost of hiring and the workplan were agreed upon at a series of consultation meetings. Community leaders coordinatedthe collection of funds from community members which amounted to ~35 percent of thetotal direct cost for hiring the bulldozer, with the Frontline project contributing about65 percent of the cost. The funds were used to hire a digger for undertaking the dredgingexercise at a cost of about ~$2,500.

AchievementsWith contributions from the Frontline project and from the community, NjengeleRiver was effectively dredged (April 29–May 2, 2016) of its mud and rubbish, thusclearing the course for faster water flow and mitigating the flood hazard. June andJuly are the rainiest months in Limbe during which flooding occurs. The frontline

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Njengele river dredging action was completed in early May 2016. Follow-up shows that aftermany years of misery from floods, Lower Motowoh community residents did not have floodsduring the rains of 2016 and 2017. It was a big sigh of relief for the about 500 people whobenefited from the action. Mud removed from the dredged river bed was deposited as leveeson its banks thus reclaiming vast patches of land that had turned into wasteland by beingflooded every year. People are currently rebuilding on the reclaimed land. Despite the fact thatthey had not heeded to the people’s call for help for a long time, local government gotconvinced by the Frontline action results, and sent representatives to the site during thedredging exercise. The local government has also up-scaled the river dredging action furtherdownstream. Community members who had refused to contribute their time for the meetingsand money for the digger finally did so. The effort through this process in bringing localgovernment and recalcitrant community members onboard emphasizes the need for allstakeholders working together in a transparent manner to enhance disaster resilience, reducevulnerabilities and improve community livelihoods.

Plate 1.Flooding, one of thetop threats in Limbeand river Njengeledredging exerciseusing a caterpillartracked digger

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Except of an appreciation letter from the community (May 2016):

On behalf of the population of Lower Motowoh, we are writing to thank you for the massivesupport you gave us by excavating the mud in the main stream that runs from Makuka throughLower Motowoh […]. The population of Lower Motowoh was so grateful that the Mayor of Limbe-ICouncil came in with three members of his technical staff to supervise the job […] […] and somemen of the media. Once more, we say thank you for the support and we pray that you continue tohelp us as we struggle to develop our risk zone […].

In perspective, we hope the dredged waterway will be monitored for sedimentationand refill. This can be done by community-scale enhancement of management, maintenanceand restoration of river banks. The Lower Motowoh case should be up-scaled to othercommunities. Long-term transformation will require the canalization of the riverNjengele from upstream to the ocean. This will provide more free flow and sustainablemitigation of floods.

BarriersBarriers to action include the lack of DRR awareness and education. Some communitymembers think that because floods occur after heavy rains, they are due to unstoppableforces of nature. Inward migration leads to settlement in unplanned and often risk-proneparts of the city, thus increasing vulnerability. Other barriers are the lack of localdisaster risk maps; lack of DRR-sensitive town planning; limited human, material andfinancial resources for DRR activities at the local level; no clear laws at national-leveldefining the role of local government in DRR matters; poor local governance in DRR in thecountry (lack of transparency, and accountability, limited inclusive approach,hyper-centralized government system); lack of environmental awareness; and no DRRincluded in school curricular.

Local actorsActors already taking action to impart positive change:

• Civil society organizations like GEADIRR and its partners who participated in theVFL project (Aka et al., 2016).

• Local community members themselves through organize rudimentary communityactions/efforts like cleaning of waterways, use of sandbags to prevent landslides, etc.

• Universities and research institutions via DRR student projects, workshops, focusgroup discussions (Del Marmol et al., 2017).

• The DRR focal point in Cameroon is the Department of Civil Protection in theCameroon Ministry of Interior. However, DRRM is still very centralized, and basedmore on response and rehabilitation than on prevention and preparedness.

• Development and humanitarian agencies like the International Federation of RedCross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). During the devastating 2001 floodsand landslides in Limbe the local branch of the IFRC was damaged (Rees-Gildeaand Geleta, 2001).

• Agencies such as United Nations Development Program, United Nations EnvironmentProgram, United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction.

Actors who have potential to impart positive change:

• Local communities could and should improve their civic behavior by notinappropriately disposing of garbage that clogs waterways, and in general they

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can help DRR by raising community members’ awareness on good practices andthrough this, enhance cohesion toward the benefit of the whole community.

• Local government should include DRR in their budget, by employing DRR personnelin the local council, and by including DRR in town planning – such as producing local(town/city-level) large-scale disaster risk maps, and raising awareness on DRR indifferent local communities via workshops. In the Limbe context, establishing risksmaps, creating and above all enforcing laws on illegal settlement on risk zones of thecity are important. There is a need to move away from preaching to actuallypracticing good governance.

• National government should decentralize DRR management, ensure inclusive,transparent and accountable governance, and operationalize the national DRRplatform. The decentralization process in the country could be a perfect vehicle inempowering local councils only if it were effective. It can ensure effective engagementof local government in the different stages of the disaster risk management cycle.It can also ensure effective participation of local communities on DRR decision-making and the availability of necessary resources to address DRR issues.

• Development agencies, embassies and UN agencies should consider an inclusiveapproach in addressing issues of climate change adaptation and DRR at the frontlinethrough effective involvement of civil society organizations and local communities,by making available necessary resources to these entities.

DedicationWe dedicate this paper to Chief Enow John and Pa Vando Pius, respectively Quarter Headsfor Lower Motowoh and Unity Quarters who gave us tremendous support since 2009 in ourDRR work with local communities in Limbe. Chief Enow John passed away in March 2016while Pa Vando Pius passed away in Jan 2017.

AcknowledgmentsThe authors thank GNDR, especially Marcus Oxley for his strategic management of thenetwork, Stu Solomon and Lucy Pearson for their valuable guidance during the Frontline.Special gratitude to the ten members who constituted community leadership in LowerMotowoh and facilitated the authors’ engagement with the community. The authors thankDevelopment Workshop France ( J. Norton and C. Gordon), and Inventing Futures(T. Gibson), for inviting the authors to the Kathmandu (Nepal, October 2017) workshop on“Local Voices and Action.”

References

Aka, F.T., Ubangoh, R., Ntepe, N. and Ateba, B. (2001), “The June 2001 catastrophic landslides andfloods in Limbe, Southwest Province”, unpublished report to IRGM, 14pp.

Aka, F.T., Buh, G.W., Fantong, W.Y., Issa, Z.T.I., Djomou Bopda, S.L., Ghogumo, R., Gibson, T.,Marmol, M.A., Sigha, N.L., Ohba, T., Kusakabe, M., Yoshida, Y., Tanyileke, G., Nnange, J.M. andHell, J.V. (2016), “Disaster prevention, disaster preparedness and local community resiliencewithin the context of disaster risk management in Cameroon”, Natural Hazards, doi: 10.1007/s11069-016-2674-5.

Ayonghe, S.N., Suh, C.E., Ntasin, E.B., Samalang, P. and Fantong, W.Y. (2002), “Hydrologically,seismically, and tectonically triggered landslides along the Cameroon volcanic line, Cameroon”,Africa Geosciences Review, Vol. 9, pp. 325-335.

Buh, W.G. (2009), “Geographic information systems based demarcation of risk zones: the case of theLimbe sub-division – Cameroon”, Jamba Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, Vol. 2 No. 1, pp. 54-70.

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Buh, W.G., Aka, F.T., Burnley, C. and Isabella, Z.T. (2012), “Local governance in disaster riskreduction in Cameroon”, Jamba Journal of Disaster Risk Stud, Vol. 4 No. 1, pp. 54-70,doi: doi.org/10.4102/Jamba.v4i1.56.

Cameroon National Adaptation Plan to Climate Change (CNAPCC) (2015).Del Marmol, M.A., Fontijn, K., Atanga, M., Njome, S., Mafany, G., Tening, A., Wantim, M.N., Fonge, B.,

Che, V.B., Aka, F.T., Ernst, G.G.J., Suh, E.C., Jacobs, P. and Kervyn, M. (2017), “Investigating themanagement of geological hazards and risks in the Mt Cameroon area using focus groupdiscussions”, Advances in Volcanology, pp. 1-22, doi: 10.1007/11157_2017_3.

Encyclopedia of Cameroon Climate (2015), available at: www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Cameroon-climate.html#ixzz55vFPGwjb (accessed October 15, 2017).

Ndaley, Y.F. (2014), “Heavy rains beat Limbe, floods put residents in distress”, available at: www.edennewspaper.net/heavy-rains-beat-limbe-floods-put-residents-in-distress/ (accessed June 21, 2018).

Rees-Gildea, P. and Geleta, B. (2001), “Cameroon: floods and landslides in Limbe Cameroon”, InternationalFederation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) Information Bulletin No. 1, available at:www.ifrc.org/docs/appeals/rpts01/cmfllaib1.pdf (accessed June 21, 2018).

Corresponding authorGaston Buh Wung can be contacted at: buhgaston@yahoo.com

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Enhancing earthquake resilienceof communities: an action bywomen’s groups in Nepal

Nisha ShresthaDepartment of Monitoring and Evaluation,

National Society for Earthquake Technology (NSET),Lalitpur Metropolitan City, Nepal, and

Surya Narayan Shrestha, Bhubaneswari Parajuli, Amod Mani Dixit,Bijay Krishna Upadhyay, Om Kala Khanal and Khadga Sen Oli

National Society for Earthquake Technology (NSET),Lalitpur Metropolitan City, Nepal

AbstractPurpose – Nepal is exposed to frequent earthquakes. There is a felt need for promoting disaster riskreduction action at community level, promoting existing community cohesion for use in disaster preparednessand replication of positive experiences. Involvement of women has been identified as one of the effective waysto motivate and mobilize communities to reduce disaster risks and enhance disaster preparedness. The paperaims to discuss these issues.Design/methodology/approach – Frontline program was implemented in the four communities ofChandragiri municipality during 2015 with support from GNDR. Preparing the local risk profile and theaction plans to reduce those identified risk was the main approach of the Frontline program.Findings – During the Frontline survey, the community identified earthquake as the top threat in thecommunity and non-structural mitigation as one of the priority actions. The members of the women networkstarted advocating for earthquake safe communities and implementing the risk reduction measures. This actionhas developed understanding of the process, scientifically and systematically, and boosted their confidence withimportant new technical skills and new leadership roles in their community to mitigate the earthquake risk.Originality/value – This case study records the experience of the women’s group in Nepal using their NSMlearning in their own houses to reduce vulnerability. They started vulnerability reduction with their ownkitchens and bedrooms by fastening their cupboards, frames, freezes, gas cylinders, etc. This led toimplementing the mitigation measures in their locality and outside their community. This has been a steptoward achieving a safer community through safer houses and schools.Keywords Community, Capacity building, Disaster risk reduction, Earthquake risk mitigation,Resilience approach, Women’s empowermentPaper type Case study

SummaryNepal is exposed to frequent seismic events. There is increasing awareness that riskreduction needs to take account of smaller scale events as well as major ones. There is a feltneed for promoting disaster risk reduction (DRR) action at community level, promotingexisting community cohesion for use in disaster preparedness, and replication of positiveexperiences. Involvement of women and women’s networks has been identified as one of theeffective way to motivate and mobilize communities to reduce disaster risks and enhancedisaster preparedness.

NSET’s experiences of supporting and developing the capacity of women’s groups toundertake non-structural mitigation (NSM) illustrates how women’s groups can play a verysignificant role in risk reduction at community level.

This cases study records the experience of the women’s group of ChandragiriMunicipality in Kathmandu Valley using their NSM learning in their own houses to

Disaster Prevention andManagementVol. 28 No. 1, 2019pp. 84-92© Emerald Publishing Limited0965-3562DOI 10.1108/DPM-07-2018-0217

Received 14 July 2018Revised 14 July 2018Accepted 16 July 2018

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:www.emeraldinsight.com/0965-3562.htm

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reduce vulnerability. They started vulnerability reduction with their own kitchens andbedrooms by fastening their cupboards, frames, freezes, gas cylinders, etc. This led toimplementing the mitigation measures in their locality as well as outside their community.The group was trained by NSET on carrying out NSM in 2012.

This has been a step toward achieving a safer community through safer houses andschools. It has developed understanding of the process, scientifically and systematically,and boosted their confidence with important new technical skills and new leadership roles intheir community to mitigate the earthquake risk. The women’s group are now very wellsupported and encouraged by their family members and have been engaged in this newincome-generating activity. This has also helped to improve their social recognition and theeconomic status.

ContextImportant themes and issues

• Collaboration and influence.

• Blending with indigenous knowledge.

• Replication and sustainability.

• Innovation.

• Fertile land.

• A small spark of external support makes a big difference.

Threats and consequences facedNepal has one of the highest risk profiles of natural hazards in the world. Beside frequentseismic events in Nepal, people are exposed to a range of hazards, large and small, and alsosocial, cultural, economic and physical vulnerabilities. These include risks from living in amulti hazard environment, that includes both disaster events, including earthquakes, fire,urban flooding; and issues contributing to vulnerability, of which foremost poverty andassociated conflicting priorities for meeting basic needs such as health, education, nutrition,shelter. There is high physical, social and cultural vulnerability, compounded by fatalismand no change in mind-set based on “orthodox” views about the risks, and overall, a lowlevel of awareness on DRR, low disaster preparedness, and poor capacity to handleextensive (everyday small and frequent) disaster risks.

These threats result in a range of consequencesThese multifaceted disasters can lead to loss of lives and property and have a severe impacton people’s everyday life. In a developing country like Nepal they can trap the people in acycle of poverty, more people will be going below poverty line as they do not have theresources to rebuild their homes and meet other basic needs, making them less able torecover in the long run.

Another most immediate effect of disaster is the population displacement and migration.When hit by earthquakes or other events many people may have to abandon their homesand seek shelter in other regions and countries. Lack of planning and disaster preparednessby both local government and household, may lead to panic response leading to difficulty inhandling post-disaster situations ultimately leading to erosion of confidence.

Barriers to actionThese include low level of awareness resulting to lack of preparedness and confidence tohandle extensive (everyday small and frequent) disaster risks. Of them all, the foremost

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barrier is the poverty and associated conflicting priorities for meeting basic needs, and also,there are both material and governance issues. Non-engineered buildings dominate, as dorisks related to non-structural elements (e.g. domestic objects that can fall and cause injury),and a low priority is placed on disaster preparedness by both local government andhouseholds, that is compounded by the lack of conducive policy and legal environment.

Local actorsA group of women volunteers, mainly housewives who were the members of Thankot MahilaJagaran Bachat Tatha Rin Sahakari (a women’s cooperative) are the implementer of the riskreduction works. 9 schools located in Chandragiri Municipality and two other schools in anothermunicipality were the implementing organizations, along with some households within thecommunity. School children, teachers and other staff of the school got benefitted from theactivity. The activity was supported by NSET and other CSOs like LUMANTI and ENPHO.

Actors impeding progress• Some landlords, and absentee landlords and developers.

The case studyBackgroundNepal has suffered great human casualties and property loss from the past earthquakes.A major cause is the collapse of structures. However, disaster risk including earthquakescan be minimized by risk mitigation measures. Earthquake-resistant constructiontechnology for new construction and strengthening of the existing buildings are the mosteffective strategies to reduce the seismic risk. NSM and preparedness for emergencyresponse are other important aspects for community resilience. Realizing this, variousefforts from awareness raising to policy improvement have been initiated in Nepal by thegovernment, non-government agencies and many other stakeholders.

Involvement of women and women’s groups and networks is one of the effective ways tomotivate and mobilize communities to reduce disaster risks and enhance disaster preparedness.Female population in Nepal is slightly over 50 percent, and is an important community group.Research shows that women are sincere, honest and committed toward their responsibilities.Experiences also reveal that where women’s groups are mobilized they become more effective.Women also play an important role in construction; they are directly engaged in house repairs,adding additional floors or in the construction and purchase of a house, and furnishing it, etc.

Moreover, many women’s groups have been formed in recent years and they are foundworking very effectively and efficiently in various social sectors. However, risk reductionactivities have somehow not been able to focus on women nor mobilize any women’s group.Organizations working in DRR have felt a need to expand DRR activities involving andtargeting such women’s groups. This called for a collaborative approach among organizationsinitiating a dialogue among NSET, LUMANTI and other women’s organizations andnetworks such as Community Women Forum of Chandragiri Municipality and KirtipurWomen’s Group to work together on various aspects of disaster risk mitigation andpreparedness, leading to the formation of a National Network of Women on CommunityResilience (NNWCR) to work together on DRR activities at community level.

The initiativeThe members of NNWCR carry out different DRR activities under this initiative to expandearthquake preparedness and mitigation activities at grassroots level involving andtargeting women’s groups.

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The goal was to make communities safer from earthquake risks through awareness,capacity building and implementation of earthquake-resistant construction, NSM andpreparedness measures. A number of activities such as orientation programs, Training forTrainers, door to door campaigns for promoting earthquake safety, assessment of non-structural vulnerabilities, implementing NSM, production and promotion of earthquakesurvival bag (go bags), assembling of emergency household kits, non-structural item kitsand selling these items and kits in collaboration with local government were conductedeventually making the disaster resilient community a reality. NSM is one of the women ledinitiatives for community resilience.

Overall with the support of NSET and partners, women’s groups of Kirtipur, Thankotand Lalitpur districts have participated in NSM activities in 82 households, 46 schools andfour hospitals; and 113 people have had training of trainers and or on the job training, and6,256 people have benefitted from awareness raising.

Buildings contain structural and non-structural components. Structural component arethose parts that carry self-weight and external load such as beams, columns, load bearingwalls, slab, foundations. Parts of the building other than structural component which do nottake load of the building, but which are needed for the function of the building are non-structural component of the building include:

• architectural components: partitions, ceilings, doors and windows, lighting systems,parapets, etc.;

• building utility systems: water, gas, electric and sewage piping and conduits,chimney, mechanical and electrical equipment and distribution systems, solar panels,elevators etc.; and

• building contents: shelves, cabinets, furniture, computers library stacks, kitchen andlaundry facilities, etc.

Why Non-Structural Mitigation?

• Earthquakes are not always big. Even in small shaking events the non-structural itemscan cause to loss of life, loss of property and loss of functionality of critical services.

• Structural mitigation requires large budgets, which may not be possible in shorttime. NSMs can be done at very low cost sometimes even at no cost.

• NSM is a doable action as it involves a simple technology. Even the housewives cando it easily.

• Changing the mind-set to “we can do it” and inculcating the culture of safety isimportant. NSM can be a doable start for this.

• Its effectiveness has been tested in 2015 Gorkha Earthquake.

The Chandragiri women’s group work on non-structural vulnerability reduction: continuationof the initiative through the Frontline programChandragiri Municipality in Kathmandu is one of the communities where the women’sgroup has been constantly working toward enhancing the preparedness of the communities.

The members of the women’s network were also actively involved in the views from theFrontline program[1] since 2011, 2013 and the 2015–2016, and Frontline program 2015–2017emphasizing local action and learning, coalition building and coordination.

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Chandragiri Municipality is located within Kathmandu Valley in the Bagmati Zone inCentral Development Region of Nepal.

The earthquake risk of Kathmandu Valley is very high and is increasing alarmingly dueto rapid urbanization, poor construction practices, and lack of awareness and preparedness.Located in a highly seismic hazard region, Kathmandu Valley has experienced severaldevastating earthquakes in the past. In Nepal, Community Based Disaster Risk Reductionefforts are crucial to reduce the risks faced by the country.

Chandragiri Municipality is still not much developed despite its location close to thecapital city. The municipality faces the risk of fire, earthquake, landslide, epidemics, andflood (NSET/DesInventar 2015).

With support from GNDR, the Frontline program was implemented in six different riskzones located in different physiographic regions of Nepal, such as (Humla and Kailalidistricts in the Western Region; Saptari and Triyuga in Eastern Region; and Dolakha andChandragiri municipality in Central Region of Nepal). Key factors while considering riskzones were geographic location, accessibility, exposure to risk, urban vs rural realities andcountry risk profile.

During the Frontline survey, the community identified earthquake as the top threat inthe community and NSM as one of the priority actions.

The women’s group of Chandragiri municipality implemented their learning in their ownhouses to reduce non-structural vulnerability, starting vulnerability reduction with theirown kitchens and bedrooms, fastening their cupboards, frames, freezers, gas cylinders,hanging objects, etc. Prior to this they received hands-on training on NSM conducted byNSET in 2012.

Leveraging on prior knowledge and experiences, members of the women’s networkstarted conducting NSM works in their community, leading to implementing mitigationmeasures in their locality and outside their community. They have conducted mitigationworks in 10 different schools in Kathmandu, Lalitpur and Bhaktapur, in some health postsand also in one of the hospitals.

NSM works improve, strengthen, or brace the non-structural building elements to reducedamage, economic losses and casualties in earthquakes. NSM works are very effective inmitigating (reducing or eliminating) a high level of seismic risk and yet are very cost-efficient. Household and families can implement this by themselves with very smalltechnical inputs from experts. Realizing the high risk of earthquake and the possibility oflocal level risk reduction efforts (also indicated by the Frontline results), the members of thewomen network are advocating for earthquake safe communities and implementing the riskreduction measures.

Key activities are as follows:• The Frontline survey conducted in the four communities of the municipality during

August 2015.

• Results identified earthquake as one of the top threats; and identified NSM as one ofthe community level actions that can be undertaken.

• A group of women from the municipality were already trained on carrying out NSMworks through NSET in the year 2012.

• The trained women formed a group and started advocating on the need of riskreduction works.

• The group started advocating to the local government for allocating some fund forDRR and implementing NSM works in the community. Local government endorsedthe initiative and assured for its integration into the Local Disaster Risk ManagementPlan (LDRMP) as well as the annual program of the municipality.

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• The group started convincing the School Management Committees and startedimplementing NSM works in the schools.

• This initiative generated support and buy-in from other organizations also.

The appreciation they received from their family members and the neighborhood on theirwork was the foundation of their endeavor of carrying NSM for earthquake preparedness.After the 2015 Gorkha earthquake, the effectiveness and importance of fixing non-structuralelements in a house was even clearer to the communities.

Activities engaged a wide range of actors: A group of women volunteers; housewiveswho were the members of the cooperative are the implementers of the risk reduction works.Nine schools located in Chandragiri Municipality and two schools in another municipalitywere the implementing organizations, along with some households within the community.School children, teachers and other staff of the school benefitted. It was supported by NSET,LUMANTI and ENPHO.

Building on the prior knowledge, experiences and strong relationship shared between thewomen’s network and NSET, the NSM trained members of the Cooperative network formeda team of eight members to initiate NSM works in the community.

With technical assistance from NSET, the group started fixing the non-structuralelements in their homes. This first step enhanced their skills and boosted their confidence,and they started advocating for risk reduction in their community. The group then went tothe schools in their community; after convincing the School Management Committee, thegroup started implementing NSM works in the schools. They have conducted mitigationworks in 10 different schools of Kathmandu, Lalitpur and Bhaktapur, some health posts andalso in one of the hospitals.

Ms Bindu Shrestha, Member of the Womens Group President, Thankot Mahila JagaranBachat Tatha Rin Sahakari (Cooperative Network) (Plate 1):

We implemented NSM in 9 schools inside our municipality. We had skills, we had contacts but wewere lacking in equipment for carrying out NSM; so through the Frontline program we got therequired drill machine and we carried out the mitigation measures in schools.

Plate 1.Women’s group in

action: fastening thecupboards inside the

school library

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When we went to the school, their first reaction was “why is the women’s group here?” How willthey fix the items? They had no confidence on us, but when we went there with our equipment (drillmachine, hammer, jack saw, etc.) and fastened the cupboards, shelves, notice board of the school infront of them, they were amazed by our work. They appreciated us and told us that they had notexpected women could do this.

We gained the skills through the training which perhaps would remain in our head only if therewas no practical implementation, but through Frontline we could actually implement it in reality, infact we could generate money through this.

Outcomes of the activitiesThis initiative has been a step toward achieving a safer community through safer schoolsand safer houses, helping to acquire a better understanding of the process, scientificallyand systematically.The women’s group is now competent and able to perform the activities such as drillingwalls to tie up cupboards etc.; previously jobs done only by men. This initiative has boostedtheir confidence, empowered them with important new technical skills, and new leadershiproles in their community as they are actively contributing to mitigating earthquake risk.The women’s group are now very well supported and encouraged by their family members.

Women are now engaged in new income-generating activity other than regular sewingand crafting works, improving their social recognition.

The initiative has helped in translating and transferring the technical information at thehousehold level and thus has helped to de-construct science into daily works.

This has led to a transformational change in the society, and credibility for working inDRR has been enhanced.

ChallengesThe initiative is very new to the society and it takes time to get it accepted. It is still verydifficult to convince house-owners on the importance of NSM. People don’t want to fasten theircupboards and furniture, and freezers and gas cylinders to the wall or the ground, they feelthat this technique will ruin their furniture and this is also the case with the schoolmanagement committee. Some of the challenges identified during the process were as follows:

• Acceptance by the community: initially the group was not supported by their family,and there was less trust for their work. Now with continuous efforts and dedication,their family members realize the importance of their work and are supportive tothem. The group still does not get adequate support from the community people norfrom the school management; the reluctance of the house owners is mainly because,according to them, NSM measures spoil the beauty of their room.

• Lack of Confidence and Physical Barrier: the NSM involves the use of tools such as(drills, hammers, hacksaws, etc.) conventionally used by men, therefore in thebeginning women were hesitant and lacked confidence to operate these tools.Further, due to lack of knowledge on proper techniques they faced difficulty whileconducting the physical works such as dragging the cupboards, heavy furniture, etc.

• Limited know-how: there is a limited know-how or limited study on the technology.There has not been any quantification of safety through NSM; more research on thisaspect is required.

Even for the women’s group it was felt that there is a need to enhance theknowledge and skills on specific NSM tasks such as to tie the glass frames and otherequipment at school labs and at homes.

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This can be minimized by additional research, continuous advocacy, awareness-raising andcapacity building activities. Acceptance by the community is the crucial factor which thewomen’s group and NSET are constantly working on.

Mr Kiran Sigdel, Teacher, Bhim Higher Secondary School, beneficiary of the communityimplementing the NSM works:

I am the resident of this community and have known about the works the Women’s Network has beendoing. The things that even an efficient manager of the school has missed, has been identified by oursisters of the Women’s group which is in fact very praiseworthy. We have not thought that thecupboards, shelves in the library, notice boards, and frames have to be fixed to minimize their loss duringearthquakes. Though it is a small thing it can minimize huge loss that may occur during the shaking.

I along with my other teachers of the school am highly obliged with the Women’s group for makingus realize our gaps and helping us to minimize them.

Reflecting on actionThe Frontline process was designed in such a way that it did not only facilitate women tofind out the top five threats but also the potential solutions to the threats. This initiativeempowered the women’s group with new technical skills, and new leadership roles in theircommunity, as they actively contribute to mitigating earthquake risk. This work hasbeen successful in attracting women, who are taking on a job traditionally done by men.Women have now been engaged in new income-generating activities apart from the regularsewing and crafting works. It has thus improved social recognition and the economic statusof female community mobilizers.

Ms Sayatri Shrestha, Housewife, Member of Kirtipur Womens Network:

I was very happy, to buy a gift for my mother on the Mother’s Day for the first time with my ownearned money. It was possible to me only because of my involvement in the NSM work.

The nonstructural mitigation program was found to have a number of benefitsNSM is easy to do and easier to undertake; it is a simple doable action as it involves a simpletechnology. Even the housewives can fix it easily. It is easier to undertake than structuralmitigation measures and can be done at a very low cost. These small inputs lead to highoutputs during the earthquake.

It involves the local people, blends with traditional knowledge, is flexible and henceeasily accepted by the community.

It contributed to the livelihood of the community as it was taken forward as an incomegenerating activity by the women’s group.

It was found to be highly effective and its effectiveness has been tested in 2015Gorkha earthquake.

Since this initiative is the first of its kind in Nepal, the group sees ample opportunities forexpanding their area of work. It has a high potential of replicability since it is cost effective,localized and effective as the simple techniques can reduce risks and minimize injuries,loss of life and property during earthquake.

The need now is to scale up the efforts, shift from demand-based works to developing localentrepreneurship. Additional training to enhance their skills, systematization of the process,training on budgeting and negotiating, liaison with other stakeholders, advocacy, andawareness raising activities are required to enhance and scale-up the initiative are all needed.

The futureTo achieve real transformatory change toward a “non-structural hazard free community”the need has to be felt; and that will require awareness, education and institutionalization at

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campaign level. It has reached at the individual level but it is still episodic now. It stilldepends upon person, chance, and availability of money. But now after recent localelections, it has created a potential for favorable environment and now if the newgovernment and local governments want to do this, they can use the experience as anexample: all the background work has been done. Therefore, it is critically important tobuild links with the government support system and to ensure that budgets are allocated inthe municipality for DRR works.

Note

1. See Paper 2 in the journal about GNDR and the VFL program.

Corresponding authorNisha Shrestha can be contacted at: shresthanisha06@gmail.com

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Drawing the case studiestogether: synthesis of case studies

and group discussionsTerry David Gibson, Aka Festus Tongwa, Sarwar Bari,Guillaume Chantry, Manu Gupta, Jesusa Grace Molina,Nisha Shresha, John Norton, Bhubaneswari Parajuli,

Hepi Rahmawati and Ruiti Aretaake(Information about the authors can be found at the end of this article.)

AbstractPurpose – The purpose of this paper is to individually examine the findings from eight casestudies presented in this special issue and comparatively identify the findings regarding local learningand action.Design/methodology/approach – Underlying research questions regarding power and powerlessnessin regard to addressing underlying risk factors affecting local populations form the basis for thediscussion. Proceedings of a collaborative workshop conducted with the contributing authors are analysedqualitatively to identify learning relating to the research questions emerging from the case studiesindividually and collectively.Findings – A number of strategies and tactics for addressing underlying risk factors affecting localpopulations were identified from the case studies, including collaboration and cohesion. Campaigning,lobbying, communications and social mobilisation in an attempt to bridge the gap between local concerns andthe decision-making of government and other powerful actors. Innovation and local mobilisation to addressshortcomings in government support for disaster reduction and development. Communications as a first baseto influence behaviour of both communities and government. Social change through empowerment of womento act in disaster reduction and development.Research limitations/implications – The outcomes of the action research conducted by the authorsindividually and collectively highlight the necessity for bridging different scales of action through a range ofstrategies and tactics to move beyond local self-reliance to influence on underlying risk factors. The actionresearch process employed may have wider applications in gathering and formalising local-level experienceand knowledge.Practical implications – The case studies and their analysis present a range of practical strategiesand tactics to strengthen local resilience and address underlying risk factors which are replicable inother contexts.Originality/value – Practitioners are activists and do not often engage in critical reflection and analysis.The method presented here offers a means of achieving this in order to generate learning from local-levelexperience. The findings contribute to the consideration of cross-scale action to address underlying riskfactors which impact local communities.Keywords Case study, Disaster risk reduction, Qualitative methods, Community-based disaster risk reductionPaper type Research paper

IntroductionAs part of the programme of work in which case study contributors to this special issueparticipated, all were able to meet through the kind support of the Global Fund forCommunity Foundations in Kathmandu, Nepal, for a workshop to discuss findings from thepapers. The method for this discussion and subsequent analysis is described in this paper,and findings from the analysis of individual case studies, comparisons between them andfrom the case studies taken as a whole are discussed.

Disaster Prevention andManagement

Vol. 28 No. 1, 2019pp. 93-105

© Emerald Publishing Limited0965-3562

DOI 10.1108/DPM-07-2018-0223

Received 25 July 2018Revised 25 July 2018

Accepted 6 August 2018

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:www.emeraldinsight.com/0965-3562.htm

A paper based on the discussion of case studies at a workshop in Kathmandu, Nepal, 30 October–1 November 2017.

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The research questions posed in this studyThe challenge of addressing underlying risk drivers leads to the recognition of two possiblemodes of action, either working within existing structures of power and powerlessness oracting to disrupt them to achieve transformatory change.

Structures of power and powerlessnessLocal actors are affected by underlying risk drivers which are affected by decisions andaction taken beyond local level, nationally, internationally and globally. This is particularlyclear in the context of climate change, as can be seen in the case study from Kiribati, wheremany of the local challenges result from global climate effects. The scale of influence neededto achieve systems change or “transformation” for problems on such a scale is highlightedin the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change special report, requiring …

“The altering of fundamental attributes of a system (including value systems;regulatory, legislative, or bureaucratic regimes; financial institutions; and technological orbiological systems)” (Field et al., 2012, p. 564).

Other risk drivers result from political, economic and environmental factors. Theircharacteristics are often determined by powerful actors. Political influence is closely guardedby institutions (Gaventa, 2005) and institutions tend to protect the status quo (Clemens andCook, 1999). The very complexity of socio-political systems, forming a multi-dimensional“assemblage” militates against changing aspects which affect the lives and livelihoods of thepowerless adversely. This point is discussed further in the final paper in this special issue.

To act within structures of power and powerlessness, or to act “disruptively” throughresistance, campaigning, establishment of alternative systems or other means are choicesfaced in different ways by communities and local NGOs as they engage in “everyday politics”(Kerkvliet, 2009).

The focus of this study is on local-level case studies concerned with social change, actions toachieve change and barriers to change. Examination of these case studies enables thereflection on the possible modes of action referred to above. Two questions are investigatedthrough the discussion and synthesis of the case studies:

RQ1. What understanding of the nature of underlying risk drivers and the structureswhich frame them is brought through this experiential perspective?

RQ2. What proposals for influencing change to address underlying risk drivers emergefrom this experiential investigation?

Co-creation of the case studies as a basis for discussionThe studies at the heart of this special issue focus on local action to address shocks andstresses resulting from everyday disasters, seeking in different ways to address both theimmediate events and the “underlying risk drivers”. The participants collaborated in aniterative “loop learning” process (Argyris and Schon, 1974). The steps of this process arelisted and annotated in Norton’s (2018) Diagram 2, in this issue and summarised below:

(1) selection of case study contributors;

(2) preparation of an initial case study outline by the participant;

(3) feedback and questions from the editors;

(4) production of a further draft by the participant;

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(5) invitation to use a table format to “deconstruct” the case study and identify thesubject, context, threats, consequences, barriers, key actors, actions, importantthemes and issues, future change and transformation;

(6) revision of case study in a common format drawing on the analysis in (4);

(7) peer review of each case study by other participants in preparation for theKathmandu workshop, each case being reviewed by three or four colleagues whoprepared questions based on the review;

(8) discussion of each case study paper between all participants at the Kathmanduworkshop, initiated by the reviewers’ questions;

(9) recording of key points made by participants at the workshop;

(10) further revision of the case study on the basis of the workshop feedback; and

(11) discussion and amendment of this paper by all participants.

Investigation of the case studiesThe eight case studies, along with other examples form papers 4–11 of this special issue.The opportunity for face-to-face discussion of them between the participants, at a workshopin Kathmandu, Nepal was a particularly valuable step in the co-creation method outlinedabove. These rich discussions were captured in peer review notes and audio recordings.

This information formed the basis of a simple qualitative analysis as outlined below:

(1) During the discussions, key points were recorded on flipchart sheets visible to thegroup. A total of 230 points were recorded in free text form (see example in Plate 1).

(2) The flipcharts were transcribed at the close of the workshop.

(3) The transcribed points were imported into a spreadsheet, and coded by developing short(normally one word) codes intended to reflect the theme of each point.For example, “Government responsive on disaster risk reduction” was coded as“locgov” (local government).

(4) Codes were accumulated in a code list. An interative process was employed. If it becameclear that codes were a poor fit, or were redundant, they were modified or deleted.

(5) The process resulted in the 230 points being categorised under 30 codes. Each pointwas also flagged according to the source case study.

(6) Charts were generated showing the frequency of coded points for each case studydiscussion.

(7) A chart was also generated showing the frequency of coded points for all case studydiscussions.

It is important to consider the significance and the limitations of this analysis, which isqualitative in nature and, therefore, the final output charts must be regarded as such. Thefrequencies which emerge are helpful in understanding the flow of discussions, rather like a poll,and are clearly influenced by the interpretation of the researcher (e.g. in coding), as is the case inany research, whether qualitative or quantitative. The researcher asserts that the exercise wasconducted with an open and enquiring mind rather than with a pre-existing conclusion drivinginvestigation. Flyvbjerg (2006), in discussing the value of a case study driven approach, notes:

Researchers who have conducted intensive, in-depth case studies typically report that theirpreconceived views, assumptions, concepts, and hypotheses were wrong and that the case materialhas compelled them to revise their hypotheses on essential points (p. 235).

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For example, the resource constraints of local NGOs are widely recognised as a limitingfactor, for example, driving the “localisation debate” as discussed above, but resources donot appear as a strong theme in the discussions.

The findings from the qualitative analysis are grouped into several pairs, as both theoriginal case studies and the qualitative analysis of the group discussion of them showedstrong commonalities between experience in Kiribati and in Gigantes Island, Philippines,resulting from the small geographical scale of both contexts. They also showed themes incommon between the cases in Vietnam and Pakistan, both concerned with gulfs between localaction and the exercise of politics and power. In East Delhi, India and in rural Indonesia theaction of the local NGO and the application of innovations were common themes. In theremaining two cases, the stories were very particular; that in Cameroon being concernedstrongly with the lack of governance and local capacities, and the case study fromKathmandu,Nepal focussing strongly on transformatory approaches to gender-related participation.

Plate 1.Example of originalflipchart sheet,recording key pointsin discussion of Nepalcase study

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The discussion, therefore, groups the cases as outlined above, and concludes byconsidering the aggregation of significant themes across all case studies.

Discussion of the analysisKiribati Islands; and Gigantes Islands, PhilippinesTwo separate island groups are considered here. Kiribati is composed of 33 Pacific islands,21 of them inhabited, with a total population of approximately 110,000 people. The Gigantesgroup of islands in the municipality of Carles in the Philippines are 26 km away frommainland Iloilo and consist of four villages with a population of approximately 13,000.

The challenges faced in the two localities are quite different. An overarching concern forthe Kiribati Islanders is the direct and indirect effects of climate change. Rising sea levelsand temperatures are affecting both fishing and agriculture negatively. This in turn affectsboth livelihoods and health. Inward migration to the main island of South Tarawa as life onthe outlying islands becomes unsustainable increases social pressures, and activities suchas sand and gravel digging to earn money damage the environment further.

Though less isolated than Kiribati, Gigantes Islands face the effects of isolation in a lackof services compared with mainland communities. Poverty levels are high and this leads toactivities such as illegal fishing. Alongside social and economic pressures are the majorimpacts of typhoons sweeping across the region.

Discussion recognised striking similarities between the responses to the challengesfaced in the two localities. Figures 1 and 2 show the most significant themes arisingin discussion.

The figures show some similarities and some differences. In both cases, collaborationand convergence were identified as significant themes. In the Kiribati case linking disastersand development, innovations and local capacities were also major topics. In the GigantesIslands, the focus was rather on local government role, the pressures of poverty, politicaland cross-scale action through networks and linkages between scales.

The levels of collaboration described in both cases were found remarkable byparticipants, as this contrasted with experience in other localities. In both cases, there werestrong and positive connections between the local people, civil society organisations, localgovernment and technical experts. The emphasis on the political dimension in the Gigantesislands may reflect the fact that such collaboration is a fairly recent phenomenon, drivenpartly by the formation of the ISDA umbrella group and the initiation of the RISE project.

Convergence of different actors

Linkage between disasters and development

Innovations

Collaboration between actors

Local capacity knowledge and action

Effects of climate change

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

Most significant themes identified in the Kiribati case study

Figure 1.Kiribati

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There is a sense in Kiribati that collaboration is driven by the fact that all actors face thesame challenges. Government, for example, is not remote as it is in some cases. Theemphasis on understanding linkages between disasters and development, on innovationsand on engaging local capacities suggest recognition that new approaches are needed toface changing economic and social conditions resulting from climate change. Finally, it isnoted that both localities are small in physical scale and bounded by sea, compared with theother cases considered. We will return to this point.

Basti Rindan, Pakistan; and Central VietnamIn Pakistan, the case study focusses on the impact of both floods and the politics andpower lying behind their management in the village of Basti Rindan on the Indus river inSouth Punjab. The Vietnamese study concentrates on the specific issue of safe housing inCentral Vietnam, and the broader issues of disasters and development as local andnational policy bears on these issues. In both cases, the studies highlight a lack ofconnection between local needs and priorities and the policy and action of decision-makersremote from the local scenes. In both cases, disaster risk reduction tends to be interpretedat government level as a response to crisis rather than as a developmental approach.Figures 3 and 4 showing the focus of discussion on these cases show some commonthemes in both cases.

In the discussion of both cases, the significance of local capacity, knowledge and actionwas highlighted, along with campaigning and lobbying, and the role of NGOs in Pakistan,contrasting with poor governance and legislation in this case. Similarly in Vietnam,political engagement, communication and information and the role of networks reflectedthe concern to influence for change. Resources were a topic of discussion, possiblyreflecting the concern that disaster risk reduction funding does not reach local areasexcept in times of crisis. Local government was also highlighted. The Vietnamese casestudy indicates cohesion at a local level between communities and government, whereaseven this is absent in the Pakistani case study.

Faced with a lack of constructive collaboration between local communities on the onehand and government (and landlords in the Pakistani case study) on the other, discussionshowed a strong focus on the means of influencing for change through political engagement,campaigning, lobbying, communication and information and networking. Though thePakistani case study acknowledges that the NGO had a small part to play and that thetrigger for public unrest and lobbying was a major catastrophe, nevertheless the bridgingrole of NGOs seems significant in both cases. As in the discussion of the Kiribati case it

Collaboration between actors

Role of local government

Consequences of poverty

Benefits of networks

Linkages between scales of action

Political engagement

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Most significant themes identified in the Philippines case study

Figure 2.Philippines

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seems the challenge is engaging decision-makers with disasters as a development issue.The Vietnamese case study concludes by quoting Jason von Meding (2017):

In Vietnam poverty and poor development, not just floods, kill the most marginalised.

Gunungkidul District, Indonesia; and East Delhi, IndiaThese cases present contrasting locations in geography and demographics. East Delhidistrict has mushroomed on the lowlands surrounding the river Yamuna, with manyinformal squatter settlements expanding through the inward migration to the city. Apartfrom the regular hazard of flooding, the standard of buildings and infrastructure is poorand ill-managed, and waste and poor sanitation affect health and cause disease to spread.

Role of local NGOs

Campaigning and lobbying

Local capacity knowledge and action

Poor governance and legislation

Collaboration between actors

Communication and information

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Most significant themes identified in the Pakistani case study

Figure 3.Pakistan

Most significant themes identified in the Vietnamese case study

Local capacity knowledge and action

Political engagement

Access to resources at local level

Communication and information

Role of local government

Benefits of networks

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

Figure 4.Vietnam

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Gunungkidul district in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, is rural and has agrarian economy. It is akarst limestone landscape with poor fertility, long dry periods and changing patterns ofrain and drought resulting from global climate change, leading to increasingly extremeconditions with ponds and artificial lakes drying up and regular crop failures.

In both cases, the NGO work described in the case study focusses on innovation toprovoke changes in behaviour and improve lives and livelihoods. Both have had to tacklelimited government engagement; in the Delhi case study because of the local governmentresistance to serving the informal sector, and in the Gunungkidul case because of thegovernment interventions, remote from the local scene, are limited and not closely tuned tolocal needs. In both cases, themes of local capacity, collaboration and innovations emerge(Figures 5 and 6).

Discussion of the Gunungkidul case focussed strongly on innovation and on localcapacities, and also highlighted collaboration, with the backdrop of the effects of climatechange. In the East Delhi district, local capacities, collaboration and innovations weresimilarly highlighted, and the necessity to link disasters and development was alsohighlighted – a theme was discussed in several other cases. Additionally, in discussion of

Innovations

Local capacity knowledge and action

Collaboration between actors

Effects of climate change

Communication and information

Campaigning and lobbying

0 2 4 6 8 10 12

Most significant themes identified in the Indonesia case study

Figure 5.Indonesia

Local capacity knowledge and action

Collaboration between actors

Linkage between disasters and development

Innovations

Role of local NGOs

Campaigning and lobbying

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5

Most significant themes identifies in the India case study

Figure 6.India

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the East Delhi case study, the role of the NGO, campaigning and lobbying, andcommunication and information were highlighted. Further themes were significant ofeveryday risk, the role of youth and pressures of urban informality. The East Delhi casestudy is the only one reflecting life in a mega city, but its lessons are important to a widerdiscourse as over 50 per cent of the global population now live in cities, and over 40 per centof the population live in the informal sector.

Though this experience contrasts strongly with life in the Gunungkidul district the responseto the challenges faced – in both cases predominantly those of small-scale everyday disasters –are similar. In both cases, attempts to drive change are based on local mobilisation and oninnovative approaches and both depend on increasing local cohesion to do so. In East Delhi, thegrowing and fragmented population have been mobilised with a local forum for action “PurviDilli Apada Prehari” (East Delhi Disaster-Watch Forum), by mobilising youth, by use of aninnovative smartphone app to report local problems, and by using these approaches incombination to put pressure on local government for action. In Gunungkidul district, local seedbanks, development of organic agriculture and strengthening of learning based on advancefarmers have created shifts in social behaviour based on strengthening cohesion and throughintroducing innovations. It could be argued that both approaches depend, as in Kiribati andGigantes Islands, on creating cohesive local groupings to exercise influence for change.

Limbe, Cameroon; and Kathmandu, NepalUnlike the cases discussed so far, there are distinct contrasts between the cases in the coastalcity of Limbe, Cameroon and Kathmandu in Nepal. Both face a backdrop of occasional majorgeophysical disasters, in the case of Limbe as it lies close to the slopes of Mount Cameroon, anactive volcano. Kathmandu lies in a highly seismically active area, resulting most recently inthe 2015 Gorkha earthquake. Neither major events, however, are features of the cases, whichconcentrate on addressing everyday disasters. The social and political contexts are quitedifferent. The participant presenting the Cameroon study said in discussion “Compared withNepal, the situation in Cameroon is similar to that in Nepal ten years ago”. In Cameroon, thecapacity of both the government and local people to engage with disaster risk reduction actionis very limited. The study shows that people are often passive and fatalistic, and sometimescontribute to risk creation, for example, through blocking waterways with waste, and bybuilding (of necessity) on unstable land. Kathmandu is clearly a more highly developed citythan Limbe, though creaking under the strain of overdevelopment and the rapidly growingpopulation through inward migration. Faced with these developmental pressures the capacityof the government to address disaster risk reduction issues is limited. Infrastructure andplanning management is limited and laws are often overridden by developers. The NGOsharing the case study here, though technical in origin, has increasingly engaged atcommunity level, recognising the need for mobilisation at this level. Contrasting themesemerged in terms of NGO-facilitated action (Figures 7 and 8).

Strikingly in discussion of the case study from Limbe, a major emerging theme iscommunication and information. This could be seen as “first base” in promoting changes inbehaviour at local level and in decision-making at government level, perhaps addressingother themes discussed including poor governance and legislation, funds siphoned offthrough corruption, and the consequences of poverty. A specific result of communicationsthrough mapping and community mobilisation has been a local action to improve drainagein lower Motowoh district of the city. The specific action has had valuable results inimproving housing and livelihoods, and it also speaks of a broader first step in creating localcohesion and understanding.

Mobilisation in the case discussed in Kathmandu, Nepal, has a specific gender focus.Through the work of the NGO women have picked up hammers and drills and developed abusiness based on providing “non-structural mitigation” measures. The participants

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witnessed this in action on a field visit during their workshop, and saw how the role andagency of women had been transformed in this project. Set alongside other activities alreadyin progress such as retrofitting of structural measures in schools and promotion ofearthquake resistant housing, this case shows a specific facilitating role in changing socialbehaviour in a traditionally male-dominated context.

Both cases are at one level about specific disaster risk reduction interventions, but at adeeper level are about changing social attitudes and behaviour, towards a safer society.

Broader perspectives: learning from comparison and contrasts in the case studiesAs a further means of understanding the workshop discussions the data used in the aboveanalysis were aggregated to present a picture, or at least a “straw poll” of the most dominantthemes discussed over all the case studies during the workshop.

Discussion of the cases shows particular themes emerging, summed up as followsin Figure 9.

Communication and information

Poor governance and legislation

Funds siphoned off through corruption

Consequences of poverty

Local capacity knowledge and action

Limited effort to address everyday risk

0 2 4 6 8 10 12

Most significant themes identified in the Cameroon case study

Figure 7.Cameroon

Most significant themes identified in the Nepal case study

0 2 4 6 8 10 12

Role of women

Local capacity knowledge and action

Linkage between disasters and development

Innovations

Collaboration between actors

Communication and informationFigure 8.Nepal

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It is important to emphasise, as noted earlier, that this analysis is simply a means of depictingmajor themes discussed. It offers a “straw poll” of the flow of discussions. It is notable in thisfigure that “local capacity, action and knowledge” is a widely discussed theme, and othersinclude “innovations”, “collaboration”, “communications and information”, “role of local NGOs”,“Campaigning and development” and “Role of Women”. Making an arbitrary cut-off at thispoint on the figure, these themes are all concerned with aspects of social influence and change.

Summary of themes emerging from case studies:

• collaboration and cohesion in small island contexts to address both disasterreduction and development (Kiribati and Philippines);

• campaigning, lobbying, communications and social mobilisation in an attempt tobridge the gap between local concerns and the decision-making of government andother powerful actors (Pakistan and Vietnam);

• innovation and local mobilisation to address shortcomings in government support fordisaster reduction and development (Indonesia and India);

• communications as a first base to influence behaviour of both communities andgovernment (Cameroon); and

• social change through empowerment of women to act in disaster reduction anddevelopment (Nepal).

Similarly, the themes emerging from the individual cases, summarised above in the list“Summary of themes emerging from case studies”, are concerned with cohesiveness andcollaboration, local capacity action and knowledge, allied with communications,campaigning and innovations, intending to achieve change not only locally but byinfluencing government and other powerful actors at local, district and national levels.

The cases are diverse in their contexts and the discussion of the Kiribati and Philippinescases suggested we would return to the point about the small geographical scale of bothlocalities, which contrasted with the remote, disconnected nature of the government in othercontexts such as Indonesia, India, Pakistan and Cameroon. This leads to the suggestion that

Local capacity knowledge and action

Innovations

Communication and information

Role of local NGOs

Campaigning and lobbying

Linkage between disasters and development

Role of women

Poor governance and legislation

Consequences of poverty

Role of local government

Convergence of different actors

Linkages between scales of action

Significance of everyday risk

Political engagement

Collaboration between actors

Effects of climate change

Benefits of networks

Access to resources at local level

Role of youth

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Most significant themes identified across all case studies

Figure 9.Most significantthemes acrossall case studies

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where a context is not by nature and by its boundedness small in scale, one course of actionis to create cohesive small-scale contexts for action and influence. The work in theGunungkidul district of Indonesia, in East Delhi, in Pakistan and in Cameroon could bedescribed in this light. In Indonesia, strengthening local collaboration around innovationssuch as seed banks and organic farming is a counter to limited and inappropriategovernment action. In East Delhi, a community in a state of change and growth has beendrawn together by the citizens’ forum and the mobilisation of youth. In Pakistan, acombination of facilitation and the impact of a major disaster have led the local communityto cohere for campaigning and lobbying. In Cameroon, the challenge has been to move thecommunity from passivity and risk creation to concerted local action, a “first base” in astory it is suggested is a decade behind that in Nepal, where social norms are beingchallenging in strengthening disaster reduction and development.

The lead author, having worked for a number of years with hundreds of mostly smallNGOs at GNDR, finds it equally notable what is not emphasised. The lifeblood of manyNGOs is project funding to finance their operations, which in turn focusses them typicallyon service delivery activities, often as “sub-contractors” of INGOs and other large agencies.Project cycles, funding bids, service delivery and accountability are often “front of mind” forsmall NGOs. Nevertheless, these themes appear infrequently or not at all in the discussions,where the overarching concerns appear to be both local-level social change and influence ofother scales of governance and power, aimed at addressing disaster reduction as an activityintegrated with development.

References

Argyris, C. and Schon, D. (1974), Theory in Practice, Increasing Professional Effectiveness, Jossey-Bass,San Francisco, CA.

Clemens, E.S. and Cook, J.M. (1999), “Politics and institutionalism: explaining durability and change”,Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 25, pp. 441-466.

Field, C.B., Barros, V., Stocker, T.F., Qin, D., Dokken, D.J., Ebi, K.L., Mastrandrea, M.D., Mach, K.J.,Plattner, G.K., Allen, S.K., Tignor, M. and Midgley, P.M. (Eds) (2012), Managing the Risks ofExtreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation, A Special Reportof Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, CambridgeUniversity Press, New York, NY.

Flyvbjerg, B. (2006), “Five misunderstandings about case-study research”, Qualitative Inquiry, Vol. 12No. 2, pp. 219-245.

Gaventa, J. (2005), Reflections on the Use of the Power Cube Approach for Analysing the Spaces, Placesand Dynamics of Civil Society Participation and Engagement, MFP Breed Network, The Hague,available at: www.participatorymethods.org/sites/participatorymethods.org/files/ (accessed4 May 2011).

Kerkvliet, B.J. (2009), “Everyday politics in peasant societies (and ours)”, Journal of Peasant Studies,Vol. 36 No. 1, pp. 227-243.

Meding, von J. (2017), “In Vietnam poverty and poor development, not just floods, kills the mostmarginalized”, The Conversation, 29 August, available at: https://theconversation.com/in-vietnam-poverty-and-poor-development-not-just-floods-kill-the-most-marginalised-82785(accessed 3 November 2017).

Norton, J. (2018), “Developing the CSO case studies”, Journal of Disaster Prevention and Management,Vol. 28 No. 1.

Further reading

Wals, A. (2007), Social Learning, Towards a Sustainable World, Wageningen Academic Publishers,Wageningen.

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Author AffiliationsTerry David Gibson, Inventing Futures, Macclesfield, UK

Aka Festus Tongwa, GEADIRR, Limbe, Cameroon

Sarwar Bari, Department of Management, Pattan Development Organization,Islamabad, Pakistan

Guillaume Chantry, Development Workshop France, Hue, Vietnam

Manu Gupta, SEEDS, Delhi, India

Jesusa Grace Molina, Technical Services Program, Centre for Disaster Preparedness,Quezon City, Philippines

Nisha Shresha, NSET, Kathmandu, Nepal

John Norton, Development Workshop France, Lauzerte, France

Bhubaneswari Parajuli, NSET, Kathmandu, Nepal

Hepi Rahmawati, YAKKUM Emergency Unit, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Ruiti Aretaake, Department of Community Development, Foundation for the Peoples of the SouthPacific Kiribati, Tarawa, Kiribati

Corresponding authorTerry David Gibson can be contacted at: terry.gibson@inventing-futures.org

For instructions on how to order reprints of this article, please visit our website:www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/licensing/reprints.htmOr contact us for further details: permissions@emeraldinsight.com

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Making communitiesdisaster resilient

Challenges and prospects for communityengagement in Nepal

Chandra Lal PandeyDepartment of Development Studies, School of Arts, Kathmandu University,

Kathmandu, Nepal

AbstractPurpose – Understanding bottom-up approaches including local coping mechanisms, recognizing them andstrengthening community capacities is important in the process of disaster risk reduction. The purpose of thispaper is to address the questions: to what extent existing disaster policies in Nepal support and enablecommunity-based disaster resilience? and what challenges and prospects do the communities have inresponding to disaster risk for making communities resilient?Design/methodology/approach – This paper is based on policy and academic literature reviewscomplimented by field research in two communities, one in Shankhu, Kathmandu district and another inSatthighare, Kavrepalanchowk district in Nepal. The author conducted in-depth interviews and mapped outkey disaster-related policies of Nepal to investigate the role of communities in disaster risk management andpost-disaster activities and their recognition in disaster-related policies.Findings – The author found that existing literature clearly identifies the importance of the community ledinitiatives in risks reduction and management. It is evolutionary phenomenon, which has already been pilotedin history including in the aftermath of Nepal earthquake 2015 yet existing policies of Nepal do not clearlyidentify it as an important component by providing details of how communities can be better engaged in theimmediate aftermath of disaster occurrence.Research limitations/implications – The author conducted this research based on data from twoearthquake affected areas only. The author believes that this research can still play an important role asrepresentative study.Practical implications – The practical implication of this research is that communities need to understandabout risks society for disaster preparedness, mitigation and timely response in the aftermath of disasters.As they are the first responders against the disasters, they also need trainings such as disaster drills such asearthquakes, floods and fire and mock practice of various early warning systems can be conducted by localgovernments to prepare these communities better to reduce disaster risk and casualties.Social implications – The mantra of community-based disaster risk management (CBDRM) is communityengagement, which means the involvement of local people to understand and prepare against their localhazards and risks associated with disaster and haphazard development. CBDRM approaches motivate peopleto work together because they feel a sense of belongingness to their communities and recognize the benefits oftheir involvement in disaster mitigation and preparedness. Clearly, community engagement for disaster riskreduction and management brings great benefits in terms of ownership and direct savings in losses fromdisasters because the dynamic process allows community to contribute and interchange ideas and activitiesfor inclusive decision making and problem solving.Originality/value – This research is based on both primary and secondary data and original in case of itsfindings and conclusion.Keywords Nepal, Community participation, Disaster risks reduction, Local initiativesPaper type Research paper

IntroductionUnder the climate of frequently occurring multifaceted disasters, disaster policies are expectedto enable communities to be disaster resilient and this is particularly the case in Nepal as Nepalis one of the most disaster prone and vulnerable countries in the world. However, studies, policyanalysis and field experience show that community led initiatives of disaster risk resilience arenot well recognized, opting for consultant driven high-tech international and nationalresponse rather than capitalizing local community-based initiative for sustainable resilience.

Disaster Prevention andManagementVol. 28 No. 1, 2019pp. 106-118© Emerald Publishing Limited0965-3562DOI 10.1108/DPM-05-2018-0156

Received 15 May 2018Revised 13 August 2018Accepted 14 August 2018

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:www.emeraldinsight.com/0965-3562.htm

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We argue that communities possess critical local resources, practical skills, and traditionalknowledge and support structures for disaster preparedness, mitigation and post-disasterresponses. Understanding these bottom-up approaches including local coping mechanisms,recognizing them and strengthening community capacities is important in the process ofdisaster risk reduction. This study addresses the questions:

RQ1. To what extent existing disaster policies in Nepal support and enable community-based disaster resilience?

RQ2. What challenges and prospects do the communities have in responding to disasterrisk for making communities resilient?

Background overviewDisasters are serious disruption of the functioning of a community or society causingwidespread human, material, economic or environmental losses, which exceed the ability ofthe affected community or society to cope, using its own resources (UNISDR, 2004). Disastersimpact all dimensions of human existence, including damages to physical infrastructure andnatural ecosystems. Disasters have placed a heavy toll on communities and affected thewell-being and safety of individuals, families, communities in various ways, with women,children and people in vulnerable situations disproportionately (United Nations, 2015).Earthquakes, floods, storms, drought, heat-waves, cold-waves, wildfires, landslides and othernatural hazards cause tens of thousands of deaths, hundreds of thousands of injuries andbillions of dollars in economic losses each year around the world (Dilley et al., 2005).South Asia is one of the highly exposed and vulnerable regions to the impacts of hazardevents. According to EMDAT, South Asia has experienced 1,017 natural disasters that meetthe criteria of EMDAT between 1971 and 2009 (World Bank, 2012). Global assessment reporton disaster risk reduction highlights how intensive disaster risk is disproportionallyconcentrated in lower-income countries with weak governance (United Nations, 2013).

According to DesInventar Disaster Information System, Nepal’s hazard profile between1971 and 2013 indicates that Nepal is prone to a plethora of natural and human inducedcalamities (www.desinventar.net/DesInventar/profiletab.jsp). Nepal, one of the least developedcountries, is highly vulnerable to various types of hazards, which include, inter alia, glacieroutbursts, landslides, mudslides, wildfires, earthquakes, droughts, cold-waves, heat-waves,lightnings, floods, road accidents, drowning accidents, landmines and climate inducedhazards (MoHA and DPNet, 2009; Aryal, 2012). It is one of the most natural disaster-pronecountries in the world as it is located in the seismic vault of the ridge of two giant platesnamely Indian and Tibetan plates ( Jin et al., 1996). Maplecroft (2010, 2016) place Nepal in thehighly risk countries category (Maplecroft, 2010, 2016) recognizing that it is also the fourthmost climate-vulnerable and the eleventh most earthquake-prone country in the world(MoHA, 2015). An average of nearly 300 natural disasters, such as lightning strikes, floods,earthquakes and landslides occur annually in Nepal (Adhikari et al., 2016). Between 1971 and2012, over 28,000 people have lost their lives due to natural disasters (MoHA, 2013).

In fact, Nepal encountered an overall increase of the disasters particularly floods andlandslides from 2013 onwards as haphazard settlement practices and politically-engineeredroad networks were taken as the path for development and prosperity since 1990s. The risein the number of news media and public access to information and communicationtechnology also played important roles to bring any hazards to local, national andinternational news. The floods and landslides that occurred in 2013 in Far Western Regionand landslides in 2014 in Mid-western region were broadcast live to show how frighteningand devastating disasters that caused enormous losses to human lives and physicalinfrastructures (MoHA, 2015). On April 25, 2015, a gigantic earthquake measuring 7.6 on the

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Richter scale struck the country in more than 80 years affecting 31 out of 75 districts.After 17 days, on May 12, 2015, another earthquake measuring 6.8 on the Richter scaleravaged Nepal causing further damages and loss of lives (GoN/NPC, 2015; MoHA, 2015).These earthquakes claimed 8,896 lives, injured seriously 22,303 people and displaced about2m people. The quakes also destroyed 604,930 houses completely and 288,856 housespartially. The post disaster need assessment estimated the disaster damages and losseswere to be an equivalent of $7bn (GoN/NPC, 2015).

Several disasters occurred in Nepal and elsewhere have shown the salience and theneed of effective response mechanisms in pre-disaster, in the immediate aftermath andpost-disaster recovery. Analytical reviews of the disaster events data of the years 2013,2014, 2015 and 2016 evidently show the extreme needs of huge efforts in disaster riskreduction and investment in preparedness to reduce the losses of lives and properties in thefuture (MoHA, 2015). The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR)highlights the role of stakeholders, which include both the State as the primary actor and thenon-state actors as one of the important collaborative actors in disaster risk reduction andmanagement (United Nations, 2015). Within non-state actors, civil society, volunteers,organized voluntary work organizations and community-based organizations focusing onthe roles of women, children, elderly, disabled and indigenous people are encouraged toparticipate locally in collaboration with public institutions. In this context, billions of dollarsin emergency relief and rescue operations, reconstruction loans and humanitarianassistance are expended annually, however, efforts to reduce the risks of natural hazardsremain largely uncoordinated across different hazard types, lack of community levelpreparedness and response mechanism and do not necessarily focus on areas at highest riskof disaster (Dilley et al., 2005).

The government of Nepal through its recently introduced act, policy and strategy highlightsthe roles of “public and private” sectors for “reducing disaster risk with preparedness plan,program and projects and building resilience with the goal of sustainable development” (MoHA,2015, p. xxiii; GoN, 2018a, b). To align with the essence of SFDRR (2015–2030) to widen anddeepen the scope of disaster response from relief, rescue and disaster management to disasterrisk reduction, the government of Nepal has introduced Disaster Risk Reduction andManagement Act 2017 (GoN, 2017), Local Government Operations Act 2017, National Policy onDisaster Risk Reduction 2018, National Strategic Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction2018–2030. These policy, acts and strategy also make reference of voluntarism, andengagement of communities in disaster risk reduction and management. It is also recognizedthat diverse scale disasters occur frequently in Nepal, causing huge damages to properties andlives therefore the national disaster response mechanism needs to be equipped with human,knowledge and capital resources for effective coordination and timely humanitarian assistance(Pandey, 2017; Koirala and Jayasawal, 2015; GoN, 2018a). However, ineffective communityengagement, scanty public awareness, lack of disaster preparedness, bad governance, limitedfinancial resources and insufficient technical knowledge for mitigating the natural disasters canbe attributed to frequent and high level of casualties in Nepal (Tuladhar et al., 2014; Pandey,2017). In this context, the acts, policies and strategies introduced by government of Nepal hashighlighted the role of public and private actors along with the passing reference of engagingcommunities through “Volunteers Bureau” yet it does not vividly articulate how communitiesare better prepared and the roles of citizens, individuals of community and networkedindividuals in community groups in disaster management, which are always, in essence,the first to be affected, and the first response makers (McEntire, 2015).

Community-based disaster managementThe fundamental responsibility of the government in any country and its agencies is toprovide all basic necessary facilities, including lifesaving services to public yet the role and

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importance of people’s participation in this process is vital to its success (Oxfam and ADPC,2014). Historical analysis of disaster management practices robustly indicated that prior tothe existence of statehood system, communities were taking care of themselves throughlogic of collective actions during disasters (Shaw, 2014). With the emergence of statehood,government-based disaster risk reduction programs started but the emerging evidence fromthe grounds showed that they failed to fully serve the needs of the people and communitieson effective and timely manner. It was also realized that the top-down and traditional aidapproaches ignored the potential of local resources, capacities of local citizens, indigenouspeople and communities, which collectively further increase peoples’ and communityvulnerabilities (Victoria, 2012; Fabricius and Koch, 2004).

Community-based disaster risk reduction approach is considered to be an important pillarof disaster risk reduction and disaster management (Sharma, 2012; Victoria, 2012; Fabriciusand Koch, 2004; Jones et al., 2014). Community-based disaster risk reduction is a process inwhich communities at risks of disasters are actively engaged in the identification, analysis,treatment, monitoring and evaluation of disaster risks in order to reduce their vulnerabilitiesand enhance capacities (Asia Disaster Preparedness Center, 2006). This means the people areat the heart of decision making and implementation of disaster risk management activities.The review of literature demonstrated that community-based disaster-related activities/responses are termed with different terminology (Victoria, 2012; Sharma, 2012; Nakagawa,2012; Comfort and Wukich, 2012). In 1990s, United Nations International Decade for NaturalDisaster Reduction highlighted the need for proactive activities of preparedness, mitigationand prevention recognizing the significant role of local communities in disaster riskmanagement to correct the defects of the top-down approach in disaster management anddevelopment planning. This initiated the critical role of community-based approaches orcommunity participation with the names of community-based disaster management (CBDM)or community-based disaster risk management (CBDRM).

The CBDM focuses mainly on disaster management in the line of Hyogo Framework ofAction (2005–2015) whereas the concept of CBDRM focuses on both disaster and risksmanagement and relates to the Sendai Framework of Action (2015–2030). In CBDRM, thecommunity members are the main actors to sustain the disaster risk reduction process andpursue disaster risk management activities (Victoria, 2012). It provides a platform ofinclusive participation for building resilient communities and sustainable communitydevelopment. Oxfam and ADPC (2014) divide CBDRM into five stages, which are adaptedand shown in the Figure 1. Sensitizing the community about their capacity and duty towardDRM process is the initial stage of the process and raising a community which is trained,has system in place and is capable to take on minor localized disasters at their own and canalso trigger and support the government system for prompt action in case of a majordisaster are the other stages identified by Oxfam and ADPC (2014).

In Nepal, the community-based disaster risk reduction and management informalpractices are historical. Only after the enactment with Natural Calamity (Relief ) Act 1982,the government of Nepal started to act as the key actor in disaster management especiallyfocusing on managing post disaster situation highlighting short-term actions such as rescueand relief distribution. The 1982 Act entirely lacked the important components of disasterrisk reduction and management, which include preparedness, response, recovery andreconstruction in addition to short-term responses of rescue and relief distributions.Even after the enactment of the Act 1982, the government was not able to make its presencewhen disaster occurred in various geographical locations of Nepal, which are urban, ruraland extremely mountainous. It was clearly observed during post-earthquakes period in 2015as the government and most NGOs located in urban settings were not able to reachearthquake affected people in rural settings of Gorkha for weeks. Understanding theselimitations of government and NGOs and realizing the prospects of communities, the

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United Nation Development Program (UNDP) and National Society for EarthquakeTechnology-Nepal (NSET-N) formally piloted CBDM Program in various reasons of Nepal.

The UNDP piloted its two-year community-based disaster risk management activities inChitwan, Makwanpur, Sarlahi, Sindhuli, Tanahu and Syangja. This pilot project started as amodel. According to UNDP (2008), local people were trained to enhance their capacity toreduce their risk from natural hazards along with the central and local government levels. Thefocus of these pilot activities particularly appears to be disaster mitigation. The NSET-Nactivities were urban centric in Kathmandu valley. According to NSET-N (2011), the main aimof the project was to enhance disaster safety of selected communities through awarenesscampaigns, trainings and institutionalization of the method in the local governance system.

Although the CBDRM is found to be an integral aspect of disaster risk reduction andmanagement by building the capacity of the communities to increase resilience againsthazards and disasters at community level, it has not well capitalized in both governmentalpolicy and practice aspects except some bits and pieces of practice aspect has been pilotedby a few international organization and non-governmental organizations.

MethodologyThis paper is based on policy and academic literature reviews complimented by fieldresearch in two communities, one in Shankhu, Kathmandu district and another inSatthighare, Kavrepalanchowk district in Nepal. Shankhu lies within Shankharapurmunicipality in Kathmandu District in Bagmati zone and 17 km far away from Kathmandu.Its geographical coordinates are 27° 44′ 48″ North, 85° 30′ 35″ East and had a totalpopulation of the municipality was 4,333 living in 928 households (Central Bureau ofStatistics, 2011). Satthighare lies in Panchkhal municipality in Kabhrepalanchowkdistrict in Bagmati zone. Panchkhal Municipality is situated in Bagmati, Central, Nepaland its geographical coordinates are 27° 39′ 0″ North, 85° 37′ 0″ East and had a totalpopulation of 40,061 with 8,948 households (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011). It is about55 km north-east Kathmandu. The Shankhu community is an urban and the Satthigharecommunity is rural in setting. Both of these case study sites are prone to various human andnature induced disasters which include hazards such as, inter alia, earthquakes, mudslides,water insecurity and climate change.

CBDRMProcess

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Source: Adapted from Oxfam and ADPC (2014)

Figure 1.Community-baseddisaster riskmanagement process

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The primary aim of this research is to explore the local dynamics of CBDM practices inthe two case sites to identify the prospects and gaps of pre-and post-disasterresponses and preparedness in community levels. The rationales for choosing these twolocalities were the intensity of 2015 earthquakes’ impacts causing the total destruction ofboth localities and an immense support needs in post-disaster period. Also, Shankhu wasone of the most earthquakes impacted localities in Kathmandu valley and Saathigare had60 houses standing before the earthquakes of 2015, which completed collapsedafter the quakes. To answer the research questions and primary aim noted above, the useof qualitative data became inevitable; therefore, we employed the Key InformantInterview for data collection. We conducted a total of 14 in-depth interviews, 7 ineach of the research sites. The interviewees were selected through non-probabilitypurposive sampling method, which included members from local community and localcivil society organizations.

We also mapped out key disaster-related policies of Nepal, which included DRRMA-2017,Local Government Operations Act 2017, National Policy on Disaster Risk Reduction 2018,National Strategic Plan for Action 2018 to investigate the recognition of community leddisaster risk reduction and the role of communities in disaster risk management andpost-disaster activities to verify and validate disaster policy effect on the ground – throughinteractive discussion with the community stakeholders in the case study sites. As such themethodology comprises policy review and field verification.

Disaster institutions and governance in NepalDisaster risk is continuously increasing, making more people exposed to disasters aslarger number of people and vulnerable people and assets are located in multi-faceddisaster exposed areas. Traditionally, Nepal used to have a strong community-basedapproach to cope with disasters and these practices are still carried out in many placestoday. Since early 1990s, Nepal shifted to an ad hoc government-based approach indisaster management. In this context, the first disaster-related policy was drafted in 1982,known, as Nepal Calamity Act 1982, which mainly focused on post disaster situation ofrelief and rescue distributions. Until 2017 before the introduction of DRRMA-2017,Ministry of Home Affairs assumed the central role of coordinating the overall disastermanagement activities and the roles of other ministries were constrained within reliefsand rescue responses. It has become immense challenge for making the timely, effective,efficient and coordinated responses for management of disasters in the absence of adedicated institution with authority and resources. Effective and efficient planning andimplementation of preparedness and mitigation measures has often been hampered bylack of institutional coordination between and within government and non-governmentalorganizations (Pandey, 2017). Lack of effective coordination has led to gaps, duplicationand redundancy of response works of various government and aid agencies. Clearly, thefocus of disaster management has still been on relief/response and recovery to supportcommunities struck by disasters largely in an ad hoc basis and in many cases to aninsufficient degree. The priority is still mainly reactive to cover the post-disaster needs –focusing on rescue and relief work and this is a common mindset of people andorganizations working in this sector and because of this mindset, disaster mitigationand preparedness activities have not received sufficient priority in disaster risks reductionand management activities (ICIMOD, 2007).

Koshi flood of August 2008 in eastern lowlands of Nepal, which affected 65,000 peopleand 700 ha of fertile land in Nepal introduced a new era of disaster policy evolution.The flood did not only result into the losses of properties and lives but also put immensepressure on government to expedite the disaster policy changes. More than a dozen rulesand regulations were introduced since 2008 post-Koshi flood in Nepal. For making an

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effective disaster response the Prime Minister Disaster Response Fund Guidelines 2006 hadalso been revised in 2008. The disaster response line ministry funds have been establishedin an attempt of making the response mechanism effective. Likewise, the earthquakesand aftershocks since April 2015 did not only cause the losses of lives of more than9,000 people and immense amount of properties, but they also put second round ofunavoidable pressure upon government of Nepal to introduce disaster policy consistentwith pre-disaster preparedness and mitigation, and post-disaster immediate and long-termresponses in timely manner. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquakes 2015, somepolicy implications including building codes, which had been introduced in 1994 against thepotential earthquake disasters, were revised and implemented throughout the country.Focus was also placed in building resilient communities but without recognizing theimmediate and long-term roles of communities in disaster management. In the immediateaftermath of Koshi floods and earthquakes 2015, it was observed that local people andcommunities were the first responders in the immediate aftermath post-disaster scenariosand long-term recovery processes (Pandey, 2017; Jones et al., 2014). These events weresignificant to showcase the scenario of disaster risk reduction in Nepal yet such innovationsarising from community-based approaches were little recognized and encouraged inexisting disaster-related policies and in the structures of government of Nepal (See GoN,2017 and other existing disaster policies of Nepal).

DRRMA-2017 is the latest disaster policy enacted by the government of Nepal,which clearly states that with the enactment of this new Act, the Natural CalamityAct 1982 has been canceled and not applicable any longer (GoN, 2017). This new Act hasadopted in line with Sendai Framework for Action (2015–2030) recognizing the needs forrisks reductions along with disaster management with an envisioning of six layers ofdisaster management institutions. The top one in the ladder is National Council forDisaster Risk Reduction and Management, which is chaired by the sitting Prime Ministerof Nepal. The key role of the Council is to approve and sanction disaster-related rules,regulations and policies prepared and forwarded by other related institutions and directExecutive Committee for Disaster Risk Reduction and Management led by the sittingMinister of Home Affairs, National Authority for Disaster Risk Reduction andManagement (NADRRM) led by a politically appointed qualified Chief ExecutiveOfficer, Provincial Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Committee chaired by thesitting Chief Minister, District Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Committee ledby Chief District Officer and Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Committee(LDRRMC) led by sitting Mayor of Municipality or Chair of Village Council.The NADRRM is the functional institution that primarily works under direction of theCouncil and Executive Committee for NADRRM of Federal level to implementdisaster-related rules and regulations sanctioned and directed by the two bodies aboveit. But the role of the authority is not clear in relation to provincial and local governmentsexcept that the authority will provide some guidance to these institutions for draftingdisaster-related rules, regulations and policies and there will definitely be the conflicts inrelation to institutional power and authority sharing within and between these variouslevels unless clear terms of references of each institution is prepared and adopted.As presented in the Figure 2, within the six layers of the DRRMA 2017, there has not beenany clear note/discussion of recognizing individual and community initiatives and clearguidelines to capitalize these vital resources in the immediate aftermath of disasters aswell as in normalcy to make community resilient through robust disaster preparednessand mitigation systems (GoN, 2017, p. 15).

Other key disaster-related policies in Nepal include National Policy on Disaster RiskReduction 2018, National Strategic Plan for Action 2018 and Local Government OperationsAct 2017 to develop local policies and execute them in the local levels.

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Interaction between community initiatives and existing disaster policiesExisting literature clearly identifies that the community led initiatives in risks reduction andmanagement is an evolutionary phenomenon, which has already been piloted in history andon a small scale by many institutions over the last few years (McEntire, 2015; Solo et al., n.d.). Institutions like World Bank and countries like the USA and Bangladesh supported byinternational organizations, inter alia, have heavily invested in strengthening the capacitiesof individuals, community and community groups (McEntire, 2015; Solo et al., n.d.). In theUSA, community people are spontaneously involved in a variety of post-disaster activitiesranging from contribution of donations to volunteering in order to perform vital servicesafter disasters. The practice aspects of first responders are the people from communities andemergency managers highly recognize that citizens are some of the first people to respond todisasters when they occur. Valuing this philosophy of recognizing the role of localcommunity and engaging community people as first responders, the USA has trained somecitizens from each USA’s community to be the members of Community EmergencyResponse Teams (CERTs), which is a group of concerned citizens that receive some basictraining about disaster risk reduction and management from local governments to act as thefirst responders in the disaster situation (McEntire, 2015, p. 66).

In Bangladesh, as it is one of the most disaster vulnerable countries in the world, variousnatural disasters occur and cause losses of many lives, infrastructures and resources.The government of Bangladesh considers that it may not be possible to prevent theoccurrence of disasters caused by natural or anthropogenic causes but collective actionthrough proper plan for disaster risk reduction and management can significantly minimizethe impacts of disasters. Prioritizing the collective action inclusive of local communitymembers, the GoB, supported by international organizations, has developed disaster riskreduction and management policies, plans and programs emphasizing the role ofcommunity in disaster management cycle (Hossain, 2013).

The current disaster management approaches of Pakistan also promote partnerships withgovernment and the local communities with a realization that no initiative can achieve success ifcommunities are left out or unwilling to cooperate and participate in them. The CBDRM ofPakistan is the result of this realization and aims to create opportunities and build partnershipswith the communities to establish disaster resilient societies (Oxfam and ADPC, 2014).

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Executive Committee for DisasterRisk Reduction and Management

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District Disaster Risk Reduction andManagement Committee

Local Disaster Risk Reduction andManagement Committee

Figure 2.Institutions

provisioned byGoN (2017)

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Likewise, some gray and academic literature has covered brief stories of communityparticipation in Nepal ( Jones et al., 2014; Asian Disaster Reduction Center, 2011; UNDP,2008; NSET-N), however, how the local community participation can be made moreeffective for preparing communities nationwide against disaster through building localinstitutions to address the issues of disaster preparedness and mitigation, which is analready overdue subject for policy mainstreaming. Nepal’s DRRMA-2017, GoN (2018a, b)are recently introduced act, policy and strategic plan. The GoN (2017) also touches uponthe idea of local volunteer mobilization during the time of emergency. The local levelinstitution provisioned as LDRRMC discusses about making local awareness andenvisions community disaster risk management committee at local level. The NPDRR(2018) conceptualizes the idea of “Volunteers” Bureau’ to expand national disaster riskreduction to local levels. The NSPDRR (2018) also notes that there is a need for engaginglocal stakeholders, and guidelines need to be developed for engaging local stakeholdersincluding non-governmental actors.

The existing disaster policies of Nepal have recognized community participation eitheras “volunteerism bureau” or “one of the local stakeholders” or “an additional element”in disaster management necessary to reverse the worldwide trend of exponential increase indisaster occurrence, losses of lives and properties from small, medium and large-scaledisasters. However, in community levels, various initiatives are seen to be in practice.Examples include, engagement of youth club, mother group (aama samuha), self-motivatedindividuals providing local leadership for immediate post-disaster activities. In relativelyurban settings, teacher trainings, disaster quiz competitions, disaster safety campaigns,among others, are held on ad hoc basis for community knowledge building (Tuladhar et al.,2015) but the distribution patterns of these activities are not symmetrical across thecommunities of the country. Little resources are provided to local initiatives emerging fromcommunity levels for strengthening their capacity to reduce disaster vulnerabilities,damages to lives, property and the environment and to increase preparedness capacities forpreventing or minimizing losses, and minimizing overall human sufferings.

To conduct the field verification about how government and community considercommunity engagement in disaster preparedness and post-disaster local communitysupport and initiatives, as discussed in the methodology section above, we interviewed localcommunity members of Sankhu, Shankarapur Municipality of Kathmandu valley andSaathigare, Panchkhal Municipality of Kavrepalanchowk. In Shankharapur Municipality,we found many community initiatives like youth club, mother group, and community guthis(clubs) but due to lack of disaster-related education, trainings and resources, people do nothave clear and proper insights for disaster preparedness and management. AlthoughShankhu frequently encounters various types of disasters, the earthquakes of 2015 were thebiggest disasters faced by this local community, which caused chaos and disorderassociated with problems of food, medicine, safe drinking water, building of makeshiftsettlements and maintaining personal safety, safety of women, children, elderly andreconstructions (see Pandey, 2017 for details about earthquakes 2015). We found that for theimmediate response in the aftermath of earthquake 2015 disaster, the local communityspontaneously came together to address the local problems although everyone wassuffering from many similar problems. The youths in community were found to be veryactive in collecting food items, clothes and medicine from different areas and distributing tothe needy people[1]. The local youth club also took leadership role in helping people forsearch and rescue and relief distribution of food donated by various organizations. Supportbetween individuals, families and households during rescue and recovery were crucial.Many people from local community helped in the fair and equal distribution of food,medicines, clothes and other necessities provided by individual and many differentorganizations and country[2].

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Prior to the disastrous earthquakes 2015, Satthighare community had many local groupsincluding a youth club, which used to get engaged in various local initiatives includingpost-disaster initiatives but due to collapse of all the 60 houses of the community, most peopleassociated with the local initiative institutions moved into other communities and cities inthe pursuit of livelihoods and employments[3]. Not many community groups were found to beactive in post-earthquakes 2015 in that area due to the lack of disaster education, adequateresources, disaster awareness and health, sanitation and livelihood challenges. Lack ofcommunity participation and attention is also found in relation to disaster preparedness,hazards monitoring, warning and information dissemination. Poor understanding of risks,community at risks and vulnerability, and inadequate resources for disaster education,trainings, and preparedness measures are found to be keys in obstructing communities andlocal initiatives to engage in disaster risk reductions[4].

The local community led initiatives were found to be the most effective mechanisms toplan for disaster preparedness and disaster management to make the nationwide communitiesdisaster resilient, robust and strong. Jones et al. (2014) research highlighted that buildingresilience communities has become one of the mainstays of recent disaster reductionapproaches noted in Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 and Sendai Framework forAction 2015–2030 and this needs to achieve more finely-tuned risk assessment and toempower communities to govern their own disaster avoidance. We also found that the firstresponders were able to save over 22,000 lives whereas 41 international search and rescueteams saved only 19 lives in the aftermath of earthquakes 2015. In these realities and contexts,the government of Nepal and existing disaster policies can develop concrete provisions tofacilitate, train and prepare local communities to be better responders and disaster resilientthrough effective preparedness plans, disaster risk reduction plans and disaster managementplans. Regular disaster drills such as earthquakes, floods and fire drills and mock practice ofvarious early warning systems can be conducted by local governments, who hold primary rolein local disaster management (GoN, 2017). Local governments can also provide soundmulti-hazard preparedness and response trainings to a certain number of communitymembers to be in the group of CERT to meet the long-term mitigation and immediate postdisaster local needs as found in the USA context. Federal Emergency Management Team alsonotes that quick action, proactive recovery planning, community engagement andpartnerships, social networks, effective coordination, inclusive local decision making,management of financial acquisition, organizational flexibility and integration of mitigationand preparedness into recovery are the common features of successful community ledrecovery programs (FEMA, 2011a, b; Czerwinski, 2012). Several training workshops are alsoneeded to sensitize people about risks society for disaster preparedness, mitigation and timelyresponse in the aftermath of disasters (McEntire, 2015; Jones et al., 2014; Mercy Corps Nepal,2009; UNDP, 2008; NSET-N, 2011).

ConclusionCBDRM is an integral aspect of disaster risk reduction and management by enhancing thecapacity of the communities to increase resilience against hazards and disasters at variouslevels of communities. The core philosophy of CBDRM is to make the mass capable ofhandling hazards, absorb shocks and avoid losses of lives and property and response toimmediate post disaster situation as the first responders until, at least, formal supportsystem arrives. The mantra of CBDRM is community engagement, which means theinvolvement of local people to understand and prepare against their local hazards and risksassociated with disaster and haphazard development. CBDRM approaches motivate peopleto work together because they feel a sense of belongingness to their communities andrecognize the benefits of their involvement in disaster mitigation and preparedness.Clearly, community engagement for disaster risk reduction and management brings great

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benefits in terms of ownership and direct savings in losses from disasters because thedynamic process allows community to contribute and interchange ideas and activitiesfor inclusive decision making and problem solving. But community engaged CBDRM fordisaster risk reduction and management is a challenge in many countries.

In Nepal, community led initiatives are found to be historically practiced in post-disastersituation. In the immediate aftermath of 2015 earthquakes, members of communities werefound to be spontaneously and voluntarily engaged as the first responders and were able tosave more lives compared to international SAR teams. International organizations like UNDPand national NGOs like NSET-N have also recognized the importance of CBDRM and piloted itthrough formal trainings and other measures of capacity building in a few wards and districtsof Nepal, however, these initiatives are exclusive and limited in terms of national scope andscale. In this context, the role of government of Nepal and the existing disaster policies, acts andstrategies become crucial institutions in maximally utilizing human resources of communitiesthrough appropriate implementation of CBDRM capacity development programs. The recentlyenacted disaster governance inclusive of DRRMA 2017, NPDRR 2018, NSAPDRR 2018–2030and LGOA 2017 have noted the engagement of local stakeholders and non-governmentalorganizations yet the policy and the acts, which are binding, still lack how they are going tomaterialize the benefits of engaging communities as the first responders in systematic way.The government and newly enacted governance mechanisms need to clearly articulate thepathways to address this gap by providing members of communities various disaster-relateddrills, and trainings and establishing a small local disaster risk reduction and managementarmy of dedicated volunteers in each of the communities of Nepal – nationwide – irrespective oftheir geographical locations. Such initiatives are crucial for disseminating disaster-relatedinformation and engaging community members in preparedness and mitigation plans, andholding a standby local emergency team to respond against multiple hazards and disasters inthe immediate aftermath of their occurrence.

Notes

1. Interview with member of Aama Samuha, Shankhu, December 1, 2017.

2. Interviews with members of Aama Samuha, Shankhu & SVP Youth Club, Shankhu, December 1, 2017.

3. Interview with member of Local Community, December 5, 2017.

4. Interview with member of Kalika Youth Club, December 5, 2017.

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GoN/NPC (2015), “Nepal earthquake 2015: post disaster need assessment, volume B: sector reports”,Government of Nepal/National Planning Commission, Kathmandu.

Hossain, Md.A. (2013), “Community participation in disaster management: role of social work toenhance participation”, Sociology, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 159-171.

ICIMOD (2007), Disaster Preparedness for Natural Hazards: Current Status in Nepal, IntergovernmentalCooperation for Integrated Mountain Development, Lalitpur.

Jin, Y., McNutt, M. and Zhu, Y.-s. (1996), “Mapping the descent of Indian and Euraisian plates beneaththe Tibetan plateau from gravity anomalies”, Journal of Geophysical Research, Vol. 101 No. B5.

Jones, S., Oven, K., Manyena, B. and Aryal, K. (2014), “Governance struggles and policy processes indisaster risk reduction: a case study from Nepal”, Geoforum, Vol. 57, pp. 78-90.

Koirala, P. and Jayasawal, R. (2015), “Emerging trends in disaster management policy in Nepal”,in Dangal, R. (Ed.), Nepal Disaster Report, Ministry of Home Affairs, Kathmandu, pp. 79-91.

McEntire, D. (2015), Disaster Response and Recovery: Strategies and Tactics for Resilience, Willey, NJ.

Maplecroft (2010), Natural Disasters Risk Index 2011, Maplecroft, London.

Maplecroft (2016), Climate Change Vulnerability Index 2017, Maplecroft, London.

Mercy Corps Nepal (2009), Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction: Good Practice, Mercy CorpsNepal, Lalitpur.

MoHA (2013), “Nepal disaster report”, Ministry of Home Affairs, Kathmandu, available at: http://drrportal.gov.np/uploads/document/163.pdf

MoHA (2015), “Nepal disaster report”, Ministry of Home Affairs, Kathmandu.

MoHA and DPNet (2009), “National disaster report 2009: the hazards and vulnerability”, Ministry ofHome Affairs and National Disaster Preparedness Network, Kathmandu.

Nakagawa, Y. (2012), “Community-based disaster management and social capital”, in Shaw, R. andKrishnamurthy, R.R. (Eds), Disaster Management: Global Challenges and Local Solutions,Universities Press, Hyderabad, pp. 365-383.

NSET-N (2011), “Community based disaster management program in Kathmandu valley (CBDMK):Lalitpur sub-metropolitan city”, NSET-N, Lalitpur.

Oxfam and ADPC (2014), Handbook: Community-Based Disaster Risk Management for Sindh Province,Pakistan, Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre, Bangkok.

Pandey, C. (2017), “The Nepal earthquake: from rescue to reconstruction”, in William L. andWaugh, Z.H. Jr(Eds), Recovering from Catastrophic Disaster in Asia (Community, Environment and Disaster RiskManagement), Vol. 18, Emerald Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 161-176.

Sharma, A. (2012), “Community-based disaster recovery”, in Shaw, R. and Krishnamurthy, R.R. (Eds),Disaster Management: Global Challenges and Local Solutions, Universities Press, Hyderabad,pp. 352-364.

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Shaw, R. (2014), “Disaster risk reduction and community approaches”, in Shaw, R. (Ed.), CommunityPractices for Disaster Risk Reduction in Japan, Springer, Tokyo, pp. 3-20.

Solo, T., Godinet, M. and Velasco, O. (n.d.), Community Participation in Disaster Management: Reflectionson Recent Experiences in Honduras and Nicaragua, World Bank, Washington, DC, available at:http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLACREGTOPHAZMAN/Resources/ArticlefromTOLIV.pdf

Tuladhar, G., Yatabe, R., Dahal, R.K. and Bhandary, N.P. (2014), “Knowledge of disaster risk reductionamong school students in Nepal”, Geomatics, Natural Hazards and Risk, Vol. 5 No. 3, pp. 90-207.

Tuladhar, G., Yatabe, R., Dahal, R. and Bhandary, N. (2015), “Disaster risk knowledge of local peoplein Nepal”, Geoenvironmental Disaster, Vol. 2 No. 5, pp. 1-12.

UNDP (2008), UNDP Nepal Community Based Disaster Management Practices, 2006-2008,United Nations Development Program, Kathmandu.

UNISDR (2004), Living with Risk-focus on Disaster Risk Reduction, Vol. 1, United Nations, New York, NY.

United Nations (2013), “Global assessment report on disaster risk reduction”, United Nations,New York, NY.

United Nations (2015), Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, United Nations,New York, NY.

Victoria, L. (2012), “Community capacity and disaster resilience”, in Shaw, R. and Krishnamurthy, R.R.(Eds), Disaster Management: Global Challenges and Local Solutions, Universities Press,Hyderabad, pp. 338-351.

World Bank (2012), Disaster Risk Management in South Asia: A Regional Overview, Work Bank,New York, NY.

Further reading

NPC (2015), “Nepal earthquake 2015: post disaster needs assessment”, National Planning Commission,Kathmandu, available at: www.npc.gov.np/images/category/PDNA_volume_BFinalVersion.pdf

About the authorDr Chandra Lal Pandey is Member of Faculty in the Department of Development Studies, School of Arts,Kathmandu University. He has over 15 years of working experience in South Asia, particularly in Nepal,India and Bangladesh. He has an extensive working experience in the fields of community-based disastermanagement, environmental crisis and management, climate change, public policy, and capacity/resiliencebuilding of community, institution and governance. He has also extensive experience in action andtraditional research methods, designs and analysis, institutional analysis, participatory planning,deliberative stakeholder engagement, community development, project management, and partnershipdevelopment with various tiers of government institutions, think tank organizations, NGOs and universities.He has worked on several projects that have focused on the crosscutting themes of disaster management,reconstruction, environment, climate adaptation, water policy, and resilience building of community,capacity building of national and local government institutions, and sustainable development. His coreresearch interests are at the center of community based disaster management, public policy and institutionalchallenges in the domains of environmental affairs, climate adaptation, sustainable development, socialjustice, water security, disaster, reconstruction and resilience building. His track record of high qualitypublication is significant. He co-edited the book Environmental Security in the Asia-Pacific, published in June2015 by Palgrave Macmillan in the USA. His co-authored book Why REDD will Fail published in 2016 byRoutledge studies in Environmental Policy. He has also published several research articles in a number ofleading international peer-reviewed journals focusing on disaster and climate change policies including thejournal Global Environmental Politics. His recent book chapter is on “The 2015 Nepal Earthquake:From Rescue to Reconstruction” published in an edited book entitled Recovering from Catastrophic Disasterin Asia in 2017. He also supervises Masters, MPhil and PhD students in the areas of his expertise.Dr Chandra Lal Pandey can be contacted at: chandra.pandey@ku.edu.np

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Local responses to disasters:recent lessons from

zero-order respondersFernando Briones, Ryan Vachon and Michael Glantz

Consortium for Capacity Building (CCB), Institute of Arctic and Alpine Research,University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, Colorado, USA

AbstractPurpose – The purpose of this paper is to define and discuss the concept of zero-order responders (ZOR). Itexplores the potential lessons and the additive value that assimilation of responses of disaster-affected peopleinto disaster risk reduction (DRR) and disaster risk management (DRM) programs can provide.Design/methodology/approach – In order to support this concept, the authors review two recent extremehydrometeorological events, illustrating how local populations cope with disasters during the period beforeexternal support arrives. Additionally, the authors address their under-leveraged role in the management ofrecovery. The empirical evidence was collected by direct observations during the 2017 El Niño Costero-relatedfloods in Peru, and by the review of press following 2017 hurricanes Irma and Maria destruction in Puerto Rico.Findings – During disasters, there is a window of time before official and/or external support arrives. Duringthis period, citizens must act unsupported by first responders – devising self-coping strategies in order to survive.In the days, weeks and months following a disaster, local populations are still facing recovery with creativity.Research limitations/implications – Citing references arguing for or against the value of documentingsurvivor methods to serve as a testimony for the improvement of DRR programming.Practical implications – DRR and DRM must integrate local populations and knowledge into DRRplanning to improve partnerships between communities and organizations.Social implications – The actions and experiences of citizens pro-acting to pave fruitful futures is avaluable commentary on improvements for DRR and management.Originality/value – This paper proposes a citizen-centered contribution to future disaster risk reducingactions. This approach emphasizes the reinterpretation of local responses to disasters. DRRs and DRMsgrowth as fields would value from heralding ZOR coping and improvisation skills, illustrated under stressfuldisaster-related conditions, as an additive resource to programming development.Keywords Disaster risk management, Disaster risk reduction, Survivors, Improvisation, Victims,Local disasters responsesPaper type Conceptual paper

IntroductionThe fields of disaster risk reduction (DRR) and disaster risk management stumble when itcomes to deploying lasting programs to reduce community vulnerability to foreseeablehazards. Policy, communication and infrastructure are plagued by top–down implementationschemes, which lack feedbacks from the communities for whom the efforts are meant to serve.An implicit goal of this paper is to seek methods of freeing decision-making from this gridlockand discussing alternative DRR and DRM approaches. Here, we propose a broader definitionof a notion introduce by Glantz et al. (2014, p. 78) in order to understand the surviving victims:“In truth, community members caught up in a disaster situation are the real ‘first responders.’We add that the experiences of these individuals provide underutilized yet valuablecommentary on DRR infrastructure and communication pathways.”

By formally identifying zero-order responders (ZOR), we are paving the road for them tojoin the list of vested stakeholders into DRR and DRM development: they are the first to theunfolding events of a disaster, because they live at ground zero. Their testimony to how theysurvived and their perception of pre-existing preventative programming is likely the truestcompass on the clearest path to improvements and the rethinking of measures developeddominantly from the top down.

Disaster Prevention andManagement

Vol. 28 No. 1, 2019pp. 119-125

© Emerald Publishing Limited0965-3562

DOI 10.1108/DPM-05-2018-0151

Received 10 May 2018Revised 17 August 2018

Accepted 18 August 2018

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:www.emeraldinsight.com/0965-3562.htm

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Responders, from first to zeroAfter disasters happen yet before official first responders (FRs) arrive (civil protection,medical help, army or international support) affected population are demanded to facedisasters on their own. As mentioned by Jalali, R. (2002, p. 122), “the local communityundertakes all immediate search-and-rescue-type operations as outside help takes longer toarrive, hence it is their capacity that needs to be strengthened.” In some cases, days weeks ormonths after a disaster, after external help and media attention has moved on, affectedpeople are still improvising to recover. How they undertake these charges plays a large rolein shaping the context of their future risk to similar hazards. Because local populations liveat ground zero of these events, they are by default the real FRs. With FR’s title alreadytaken, people fighting to survive and thrive are better coined ZOR.

Disaster-affected people are usually identified as surviving victims. This idea caninsinuate that they are populations passively waiting for assistance. As victims, outsideorganizations and governments tend to ignore their capacities to cope, improvise andbe creative to survive and recover. This is to their detriment – for these skills are valuableresources to advance DRR and DRM. Here we redefine living victims to be ZOR – valuablenew actors in DRR and DRM missions. In order to uncover their value, we introduce a fewguiding questions: What can we learn from ZOR?What could be the scope and limitations oftheir actions? How can official FRs and organizations partner with ZORs to improvedisaster responses capacities?

“FRs” are professionals (Arble and Arnetz, 2017) obliged to provide human services indisasters (Shepherd et al., 2017). FRs are representatives of the formal structures ofgovernance and civil organizations, like Red Cross or fire fighters, who are the first fromoutside a disaster-affected area to come to the aid of survivors and stabilize growingdamage. This group of stakeholders is imperative to increasing the survival rate andensuing recovery of disaster-affected regions.

A number of reasons can limit FRs from near-immediate arrival on site of a catastrophe.Sometimes epicenters of impact are remote, the magnitude of the emergency is too big forcomplete coverage, or the lack of efficient disaster response slows official and professionalintervention. In these times, local populations must respond by calling upon and devisingtheir own resources and skills. People’s proactive responses to mediate disaster impacts areusually underappreciated or seen as last-ditch efforts. Worse, affected populations are oftenthought of as merely inactive victims. This portrayal is disempowering and portrays themas passive or helpless.

In many situations, the victim ideology could not be further from the truth – indeedcommunities are likely waiting for assistance, but not without undertaking proactivebehavior. They develop on-the-spot life-saving responses through improvisation andinnovation. These actions are often community-centered and unofficial. They reflect theperceptions and understandings of options for survival. Even though they are forced intosurvival mode, individuals take actions to adjust to an unfamiliar and uncertain near-termfuture. It is in their best, after-impact interest to courageously leverage all abilities to helpthemselves, their families and neighbors overcome the devastation and obstacles that mightotherwise overwhelm them. Additional information about the nature of communityresilience is observed during recovery. Resilience, rather than vulnerability, emphasizes thecapabilities and methods of people coping with disasters (Gaillard, 2007).

By understating the disasters as “long-unfolding historical processes involvingco-constitutive interactions between people (with their culturally contingent values, politicalsystems, technologies, and practices) and their material environments” (Faas and Barrios, 2015,p. 289), we want to provide examples about how disasters can also trigger the development ofsocietal skills.Weaknesses and strengths for in-place preventative measures are brought to light,and urgency lends agency to change. People are on the frontline of this learning opportunity.

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As disasters unfold communities to undertake spontaneous acts of survival, guided by shifts innorms and social structure (Granot, 1995). ZOR are intrinsically folded into high levels ofinvolvement, playing active roles in all stages of a post-disaster situation: immediate relief(Quarantelli,1993), surveying of affected areas, regaining livelihoods, rebuilding homes andimplementing effective disaster prevention processes for the future (Archer and Boonyabancha,2011). Their needs, experiences and participation are invaluable commentary on how ordinaryknowledge guides action and influences survival outcomes.

What is more, these qualities are a measure of peoples’ perceptions pre-existing DRR/DRM programming. Indeed, as end users of these measures, survivors’ appreciation andapplication cannot be overlooked. From that point of view, survivors represent relevant andnew agents for steering potent new programming.

We propose that improvisation, learned from ZOR, can be shared with and taught toat-risk communities. By doing so, people can prepare for and improve their chances tosurvive weather disruptions and rebound in their aftermath. New disasters will occur andmany in these communities will improvise as ZOR. However, can we learn from past ZOR toenhance future responses through step-like training in awareness and preparedness?

Lessons from ZORFrom the Yungay avalanche in Peru in 1970 (Oliver-Smith, 1979) trough hurricanes Mitch inCentral America in 1998 (Christoplos et al., n.d.) Katrina (USA, 2005) and 2010 Haitiearthquake (Pyles et al., 2018) examples of ZOR dealing with disasters are chronicled. Andmore emerge today. Recent extreme hydrometeorological events illustrate the value ofrecording ZOR’s activities and underline the need for deeper, event-based research intocitizen responses to disasters. Here we cite two striking, yet early-stage examples of ZORtestimony being leveraged differently for improved DRR programming.

Peru, El Niño Costero, 2107From December 2016 to April 2017, a climatic anomaly related to El Niño[1] manifested inthe Pacific Ocean off the Ecuadorian and Peruvian coast. The oceanic conditions producedextraordinary rains, particularly during March. The rains resulted in massive landslidesand flooding along the Peruvian coastline adversely affecting more that 1.1m people. Over100 casualties were documented and 155,000 people were displaced from their homes(OCHA, 2017). Following the event, a small team of researchers conducted civilianinterviews probing what each did and needed at different stages of the unfolding event. Thedata indicated that a large constituency of people understood a surprising confusionamongst the more traditional DRR stakeholders. Namely, not all parties understood that theterms “El Niño Costero” and “El Niño Southern Oscillation” (Ramírez and Briones, 2017)have the radically differing meteorological outcomes. As a result, vested DRR stakeholdersconducted poorly orchestrated action and even fell into paralysis (Table I).

Puerto Rico, Hurricanes Irma and Maria, 2017On September 6, 2018, Category 5 Hurricane Irma made landfall in Puerto Rico. 175 mile perhour winds crippled the electric grid, leaving 1m people without power. Two weeks later,when 60,000–80,000 people were still without electricity, category 4 Hurricane Mariarepeated high winds and dropped a devastating 30 inches of rain in one day. Public PowerUtility Chief Executive, Ricardo Ramos (Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, 2017), saidthat the electrical infrastructure had been destroyed. What is more, flooding and landslidesisolated from FRs help a large fraction of the island’s population, outside of major cities. Tendays following Hurricane Maria half of the Puerto Rico’s population remained without freshwater. Dire living condition persisted for months. In the months following the hurricanes acomprehensive examination of related media was conducted. Several anecdotal stories

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emerged portraying the innovative and on-the-spot measures survivors took during theevents. The lessons of people’s actions surfaced; however, the unscrutinized methods forharvested data, as described through potentially subjective media outlets, placed theintegrity of conclusions from this research in question (Table II).

Discussion pointsZOR are not hapless victims. They partake in the survival process because they are forcedto take actions to protect their families and neighborhoods. The titling of surviving victimsas ZOR formalizes the recognition of their non-formal and professional expressions ofdisaster management. Above and beyond working within pre-existing DRR programming,they are wielders of improvisation and creativity. This shift in framing acknowledges thatZOR interact with DRR resources and how they do this is a guiding factor in futureDDR development. Other stakeholders in DRR would benefit from recognition of thisreality and change their development schemes to assimilate testimonies from ZOR. Forexample, climate-related forecasts including early warnings should explicitly foster andincorporate its climate information products and especially feedback from the society about

Situation ZOR actions Lesson learned

Extraordinary heavyrains. Lack of clarificationand early warning

Local populations in vulnerable placeschoose to stay in their house or to leave

In risk situations, people’s decisionsmade with immediate and long-lastingneeds in mind

Flash floods andlandslides

Families leave their houses to lookingfor shelter with relatives. In some casesmen stay near home to ensure security

Families and neighbors are perceived asthe first line of support duringemergencies. Community traditions andnorms define the hierarchy of pro-action

Damaged and destroyedhouses

Family leaders returned back to theirhouses to clean up and rebuild

Local population rely on personalexpertise, skills and resources

Damage communityinfrastructure

Locals improvised to produce electricityand procure gasoline

Local volunteers with skills andexpertise (e.g. electricians) dole outcharge for damage repair

Local populationdisplacement to refugeecamps

Local communities self-organizedrefugee camps. Partial help came fromfirst responders (tents formmunicipalities and food supplies formcivil society)People organized their camps by tasksharing: cooking, child care, campmanagement and energy production

Social cohesion and local organizationare the foundation for resourcemanagement and duty assignmentduring disastersTable I.

ZOR actions andlessons learned fromEl Niño Costero,Peru 2017

Situation ZOR actions Lesson learned

Back to back hurricanesdemolishing the alreadyprone electric power grid

Individuals and small business inverteddirect current from cars to alternatedcurrent to run small appliances

Improvisation is used by ZOR to meetprimary and secondary fundamentalneeds

High rains, winds andlandslides wiped outcommunity infrastructure

Transportation of hard goods acrossimpassable rivers was rigged by suspendedshopping carts on high-tension ropes

When pre-existing DRR infrastructureis lacking ZORs immediately innovateto fill in the gaps

Communities becomeisolated from FR andFEMA. In some cases formonths

Without potable water communitiestapped mountain streams and boiledresulting water for sanitation

Threats to community resources areresolving by individual creativityfounded upon community-first values

Table II.ZOR actions andlessons learned fromHurricanes Irma andMaria, PuertoRico 2017

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its warnings. The local communities know their environments; and when acknowledged andbrought into DRR and DRM development planning they will be empowered to take moreinformed, trusted and effective responses.

The two extreme weather examples, El Niño Costero (Peru), and the Hurricanes Mariaand Irma (Puerto Rico) remind us of the urgent need for increased communication betweenmore long-standing or traditional DRR and DRM stakeholders and local communities.We must dedicate resources and research to improve the dissemination of relevantclimate- and weather-related information to disaster-related stakeholders. This means thatwe invigorate, link and balance top–down and bottom–up communications: as Allen(2006, p. 83) mentioned “community-based approaches are a fundamental form ofparticipant empowerment and a compelling mechanism for enforcing the transmission ofideas and claims from the bottom up.” The design and application of DRR and DRM areoften overly dependent on top–down approaches. Besides, ZOR experiences might alsohelp to uncover barriers in post-disaster measures, for example, the lack of communityconsultation in post-disaster relocations (Spiekermann et al., 2015). Organizationsidentifying needs and development for communities around such measures often lackcommunity input, thereby lowering the chances that resulting infrastructure wouldbe effective and sustainable. What is more, unidirectional management undermines thevalue of the users in the process of program development. Top–down strategies mustbe matched with a healthy balance of insights bubbling up from within communities.To fold these dimensions into DRR/DRM design means that we formally integrate ZORinto the alliance of recognized stakeholders.

The two recent extreme weather events cited above illustrate reactions that happen mostof the time there is a disaster: local populations actively engage in what is perceived asnecessary to survive. However, local responses have boundaries, meaning that improvisedsolutions can be bettered, or met with healthier or more effective options. Local or ordinaryknowledge is not a perfect standalone resource that supersedes or overrides DRR and DRMprogramming. The lessons learned from ZOR make up one facet of inspirational andinformed activity to reduce human vulnerability to hazards. Societal flexibility and adaptivecapacities are new resources to fold into DRR and DRM development. Their inclusion shouldinvigorate pre-existing alliance members with new ideas and fresh perspectives.

Survivors are not simply a measure of the success or lack of success for DRR and DRM.ZOR are an underutilized resource, presenting opportunity to catapult DRR/DRM forward:

• First, they are the true end users, leveraging all resources in worst-case scenarios. Thismakes them probably the closest and most authentic test of programs. Individualslimited by cellphones without signal, lack of running water or dysentery outbreaks willreact to use what is in place through the lenses of their priorities and knowledge, andtheir understanding and appreciation for infrastructure in place. Testimony from theirexperiences is one of the simplest guides for honing survival tactics.

• Second, as much as infrastructure or lines of information flow are critical resources inreducing community risk to hazardous events, ZOR command creativity,improvisation and resilience during recovery. It is only logical to interrogate andlearn from the survivors. Their approaches could inform workshops dedicated totraining communities in calculated improvisation in situations of duress.

• Third, the inclusion of survivors, front-liners or ZOR in the host of essential DRR/DRMstakeholders formalizes the integration of community perspectives in the pursuit ofmore effective disaster risk management programs. Many of the bottlenecks orlimitations of preemptive actions to reduce community vulnerability to hazards could besidestepped at least to some extent by the advanced assimilation of ZOR’s perspectivesand knowledge.

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Note

1. El Niño results from anomalous air–sea interactions that enable a warm pool of waterin the Western Pacific to shift eastward toward the Central and Eastern Pacific. Such shifts,associated with El Niño are linked to many adverse and anomalous climate, water, andweather impacts around the globe (Glantz, 2001). The most obvious impacts appear in the formof drought, flood, flash floods and fires each of which has ripple effects in societies andecosystems. Because these impacts tend to recur in many places, they can be anticipated,planned for, and mitigated, if not avoided altogether. However, people often overlook thetruth of traditional EN events as basin-wide events and not limited to warming along theEcuador–Peru–Chile coast.

References

Allen, K.M. (2006), “Community-based disaster preparedness and climate adaptation: localcapacity-building in the Philippines”, Disasters, Vol. 30 No. 1, pp. 81-101.

Arble, E. and Arnetz, B.B. (2017), “A model of first-responder coping: an approach/avoidancebifurcation”, Stress and Health, Vol. 33 No. 3, pp. 223-232.

Archer, D. and Boonyabancha, S. (2011), “Seeing a disaster as an opportunity – harnessing the energyof disaster survivors for change”, Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 23 No. 2, pp. 351-364.

Christoplos, I., Rodríguez, T., Schipper, E.L.F., Narvaez, E.A., Mejia, K.M.B., Buitrago, R., Gómez, L.et al. (n.d.), “Learning from recovery after Hurricane Mitch”, Disasters, Vol. 34 No. s2,pp. S202-S219.

Faas, A.J. and Barrios, R.E. (2015), “Applied anthropology of risk, hazards, and disasters”, HumanOrganization, Vol. 74 No. 4, pp. 287-295.

Gaillard, J.-C. (2007), “Resilience of traditional societies in facing natural hazards”, Disaster Preventionand Management: An International Journal, Vol. 16 No. 4, pp. 522-544.

Glantz, M.H. (2001), Currents of Change: Impacts of El Niño and La Niña on Climate and Society,Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, NY.

Granot, H. (1995), “Proposed scaling of the communal consequences of disaster”, Disaster Preventionand Management: An International Journal, Vol. 4 No. 3, pp. 5-13.

Jalali, R. (2002), “Civil society and the state: Turkey after the earthquake”, Disasters, Vol. 26 No. 2,pp. 120-139.

Oliver‐Smith, A. (1979), “The Yungay avalanche of 1970: anthropological perspectives on disaster andsocial change”, Disasters, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 95-101.

Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (2017), “Statement of Ricardo Ramos Executive Director,Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority before the Committee on Energy and Natural ResourcesUSA Senate”, November 14, available at: www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=E8F3D5BF-DCC5-492C-A3E2-AEA2FB10A9E3 (accessed March 7, 2018).

Pyles, L., Svistova, J., Ahn, S. and Birkland, T. (2018), “Citizen participation in disaster recoveryprojects and programmes in rural communities: a comparison of the Haiti earthquake andHurricane Katrina”, Disasters, Vol. 42 No. 3, pp. 498-518.

Quarantelli, E.L. (1993), “Organizational response to the Mexico city earthquake of 1985: characteristicsand implications”, Natural Hazards, Vol. 8 No. 1, pp. 19-38.

Ramírez, I.J. and Briones, F. (2017), “Understanding the El Niño Costero of 2017: the definition problemand challenges of climate forecasting and disaster responses”, International Journal of DisasterRisk Science, Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 489-492.

Shepherd, D., McBride, D. and Lovelock, K. (2017), “First responder well-being following the 2011Canterbury earthquake”, Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal,Vol. 26 No. 3, pp. 286-297.

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Spiekermann, R., Kienberger, S., Norton, J., Briones, F. and Weichselgartner, J. (2015),“The disaster-knowledge matrix – reframing and evaluating the knowledge challenges indisaster risk reduction”, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, Vol. 13, pp. 96-108.

Consulted websitesGlantz, M., Baudoin, M.-A., Ahmed, A., Pierce, G., Pradhananga, D., Wolde-Georgis, T., Chapsoporn, N.

et al. (2014), “Working with a changing climate, not against it: a survey of lessons learned forresilient adaptation”, available at: www.ccb-boulder.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Lex_Sum_03-17a-14_150p.pdf (accessed March 7, 2018).

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2017), “Peru: heavy rains andfloods summary”, UN Resident Coordinator Situation Report No. 5, Panama City, April 5,available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA_Summary_Situation_Report_Heavy_Rains__Floods_No_5_of_UN_resident_Coordinator_in_Peru-20170406-MR-20485.pdf (accessed March 2, 2018).

Further reading

Farchi, M.U. (2011), “(A12) From a helpless victim to a coping survivor: innovative mental healthintervention methods during emergencies and disasters”, Prehospital and Disaster Medicine,Vol. 26 No. S1, p. s3.

Wisner, B., Blaikie, P.M. and Cannon, T. (2003), At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability andDisasters, Revised, Routledge, London and New York, NY.

Corresponding authorFernando Briones can be contacted at: brionesfernando@gmail.com

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Local voices and action:concluding discussion

Terry David Gibson, Festus Tongwa Aka, Ruiti Aretaake,Sarwar Bari, Guillaume Chantry, Manu Gupta,

Jesusa Grace Molina, John Norton, Bhubaneswari Parajuli,Hepi Rahmawati and Nisha Shresha

(Information about the authors can be found at the end of this article.)

AbstractPurpose – The purpose of this paper is to discuss the findings from the body of case studies offered in theissue, combined with three external perspectives on local voices and action.Design/methodology/approach – Using as its basis the eight key case studies and three external contributionsto the special issue, the paper offers a theoretical framework as a basis for discussion of this material. Through this,it identifies possible modes of action understood through the theoretical framework and elaborated through thespecific cases. It concludes with proposals for further work.Findings – The discussion finds that from a local perspective, the ambitions of local populations and local NGOsto achieve emancipatory change depend on the scope for local collaboration and partnerships to exercise influenceon underlying risk factors. It resolves the suggested tension between operating within, and outside the systemthrough the concept of “legitimate subversion”.Originality/value – It is felt that the original recording of case studies of local level action combined with theprocess of iterative critical reflection on the part of the contributors offers a novel approach to knowledge creationfrom practice, and offers insights bridging theoretical and practitioner perspectives into means of addressingunderlying risk factors affecting local populations.Keywords Qualitative research, Risk governance, Local knowledge, Community-based DRRM, Role of NGO,Underlying risk factorsPaper type Research paper

IntroductionThe underlying purpose of this special issue has been to foreground understandings ofdisaster risk reduction (DRR) from the perspective of local actors, particularly locally basedNGOs, leading to consideration of means through which such actors in combination withother local actors can address “underlying risk drivers”. The study is situated within a bodyof work conducted by members of GNDR under the titles “Views from the Frontline”,“Action at the Frontline” and “Frontline”, all concerned with participative action researchengaging local voices in collaboration with GNDRmember organisations to investigate localperspectives on risk and disaster reduction, taking action on these findings locally and atpolicy levels. The genesis and development of the above programmes is charted in this issuein Gibson and Scott (2018). A majority of the contributors to the case studies at the heart ofthis issue were engaged in the co-creation of these programmes as well as in conductingthem in their localities. These activities influenced their local level work, which is the focusof this special issue.

Norton (2018), in this issue, outlines an iterative process through which contributorscollaborated to develop, analyse and discuss their eight case studies, both remotelyand in a face-to-face workshop. The studies, documented in case study papers 4–11 andanalysed in Gibson et al. (2018) in this issue, describe diverse contexts, actionsand learning.

Reflecting their pedigree in emerging from “Action at the Frontline” programmesintended to promote sustainable and persistent community-level action and learning, thecase studies extend beyond individual short-term “project cycle” interventions and depict

Disaster Prevention andManagementVol. 28 No. 1, 2019pp. 126-142© Emerald Publishing Limited0965-3562DOI 10.1108/DPM-05-2018-0176

Received 31 May 2018Revised 24 July 2018Accepted 25 July 2018

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:www.emeraldinsight.com/0965-3562.htm

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established collaborations between the contributing NGOs and the communities in whichthey work.

They are focussed on current experience and action and therefore, whilst thedynamics of politics and power often emerge as themes, the historical and politicalunderpinnings of the various contexts are not generally considered. They are moreconcerned with what is the case now, and with the “everyday politics” (Kerkvliet, 2009)with which they engage.

In addition, the case studies are concerned with the consequences of “everyday disasters”rather than with intense crisis events. These are events – identified for example in“Frontline” research consulting local people on their own priorities concerning disasterimpacts – which are small scale, recurrent, diverse in nature but which combine to erodepeoples’ lives and livelihoods (GNDR, 2017). In the realm of everyday disasters ofenvironmental, social, economic and political origin, the boundary between disasters anddevelopment becomes blurred and options for action span a spectrum from specific DDR-oriented measures to broader actions concerned with poverty, underdevelopment, powerand powerlessness.

In addressing the overarching question of the study, concerning underlying risk driversand means of addressing them, several key ideas emerge from the individual cases, thediscussion of them and comparisons between them. In addition, complementarycontributions were invited from other sites, not associated with the GNDR programme.Three cases – one from Peru and Costa Rica, one from Brazil and one from Nepal – areconsidered, all focussing on the neglect of local capacities and knowledge in disasterresponse. These will form the basis for the concluding discussion, based on a conceptualbackdrop and theoretical framework elaborated below.

Conceptual backdrop to discussion of the case studies and complementarypapersA major challenge to progress in DRR and more broadly in development, of which it isan aspect, is in addressing what UNISDR (2018) call “underlying risk drivers” which itdefines as “Processes or conditions, often development-related, that influence the level ofdisaster risk by increasing or reducing levels of exposure, vulnerability and capacity”(UNISDR, 2018).

According to Heijmans (2009), the concept of underlying risk drivers emergedfrom the experiential encounters of Fred Cuny as an engineer drawn into crisis response inBiafra and East Pakistan, recognising not only that response was often chaotic andpoorly managed, but also that the impact of disasters was the result of povertyand vulnerability. Maskrey, conducting a risk analysis in Lima, recognised not only thatrisk exposure was the result of political and economic forces pushing the poor intounsafe housing, but that the poor had a voice and rights in addressing these problems(Heijmans, 2009).

Blaikie, Cannon, Davies and Wisner developed the “pressure and release” modelpublished in “At Risk (1994)” capturing the concepts of vulnerability to hazards resultingfrom the chain of fragile livelihoods and unsafe locations, a consequence of dynamicpressures which, in turn, result from root causes, and it is this framing which now sitswithin the UNISDR lexicon.

Addressing dynamic pressures and root causes (which Blaikie et al. acknowledge are toa certain extent interchangeable terms in different circumstances) is a challenge whichcomes into sharp focus at the local level, where studies by GNDR (2009, 2011, 2013, 2017)and UNISDR (2015) indicate that a high proportion of disaster losses result from acomplex mix of “everyday risks” in many cases resulting from such underlyingrisk drivers. The ability of local populations, civil society and other actors to address

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these drivers locally is limited, requiring change at other scales. How can suchchanges, for example, in the actions of governments, corporations and internationalinstitutions, be achieved? This question is particularly important for many civil societyorganisations, such as local NGOs, whose concern as noted above is often a mix of DDR anddevelopment – depending on addressing the “underlying risk drivers” which impede it. Is itpossible to negotiate change within formal institutional structures, or does doing so simplylead to co-option or compromise? Many commentators suggest impotence is indeed aconsequence of increasing embeddedness of civil society actors (see e.g. Baird and Shoemaker,2007; Edwards, 2008; Banks et al., 2015). However, if such actors decide to step outsideinstitutional structures and attempt to disrupt them, theymay become exposed through losinglegitimacy, for example, by registration being withdrawn, through losing resources of fundingbeing withdrawn, and through other repressive acts. Indeed, civil society actors report manysuch challenges to their viability through the “closing of space” for civil society (Civicus, 2017),which may dissuade them from disruptive action.

Faced with this dilemma, how do concerned civil society actors – in this study,local NGOs – proceed? How do they chart a course between engaging with institutionalstructures and risking co-option, or standing outside them and risking disconnection?The eight case studies presented in this special issue and the three external contributionsform the basis for investigation and discussion of this question, individuallyand comparatively.

Theoretical frameworkThere has been growing consideration of the impact of “everyday risks” and “everydaydisasters”. These small-scale shocks and stresses experienced by populations around theworld, when aggregated, account for a surprisingly high proportion of losses at a local level.For example, UNISDR (2015) found that as much as 99 per cent of disaster records areattributed to extensive[1] risks, and “Frontline” local level research found that theseresulted from diverse environmental, social, economic and political factors (GNDR, 2017).The impacts of everyday disasters are disproportionately felt by those in poverty andinformality, not wrapped round with social protection:

The poorer you are the more losses you experience and the less you are able to deal with adversity.(GNDR, 2013, p. 6)

Extensive risk critically erodes development assets. (UNISDR, 2015, p. 94)

Whilst assessments of larger scale risk at national and international scale are highlydeveloped (see e.g. GFDRR, 2014), understanding of everyday risk is much more limited, andoften restricted to local communities where it is held and understood. For example, a WorldBank GFDRR report presents a table of seven modes of risk assessment, of which only oneis relevant to community level. The report further notes that:

[…] success has been comparatively limited in merging community-level understanding of risk with anational or subnational understanding of risk. This is a missed opportunity […]. (GFDRR, 2014)

Institutional efforts tend to be focussed on preparedness and response to large-scale criseswhile everyday risk often lies “under the radar”:

Poverty, illiteracy and powerlessness reduce sensitivity to everyday risks and hence to disasters.In this situation abnormality is normality. Government is too far away, particularly in our part ofthe world.

Since donors like DFID/UKAID and USAID have persuaded our governments to privatise even primaryeducation and primary health care, poor peoples’ relationship with the state has further weakened.

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This dimension needs to be addressed and highlighted aggressively as due to this disconnect linkinglocal with national has become problematic. Sarwar Bari: Pattan Development Organisation, Pakistan(personal communication, 2018)

Donor institutions address the challenge of management and transaction costs for fundingby disbursing funds in large tranches, which connect most closely with large-scaleinitiatives. The organisational status of recipients, their ability to implement projects at thenecessary scale, the reporting and accountability requirements imposed and the very shorttime frames often imposed all militate against funding reaching to local scale:concluded:

Donors have introduced the business model even for development work including human rights,democratic/community development, governance improvement etc. in many countries includingPakistan. Large funding is now channelled through for-profit firms. This tends to lead to a clash ofvalues. Sarwar Bari: Pattan Development Organisation, Pakistan (personal communication, 2018).

The secretary general of Civicus, Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, consulted funders toestablish why less than 1 per cent of aid goes directly to south-based local organisations,and listed five answers (Sriskandarajah, 2015):

(1) lots of southern and smaller CSOs do not have the capacity to fill in all our forms,let alone spend our money effectively;

(2) we do not have the administrative capacity to give smaller amounts of money;

(3) we need to channel money through a few, trusted partners so that we can managerisk and comply with our own rules;

(4) we have strict anti-terror and anti-money laundering rules that make giving directlydifficult; and

(5) we are under domestic political pressure to fund through CSOs in our homecountry.

International organisations such as UN agencies, INGOs and formal NGOs receive much oftheir funding through these channels and are therefore constrained to the goals andtimescales imposed by donors. In some cases, agencies also receive substantial support fromthe public; however, this is often easiest to attract for high profile, newsworthy and emotivecrises and catastrophes. Banks et al. (2015) suggest that:

Donor expectations and their demands for measurable outcomes within short and pre-specifiedtime frames are ultimately incompatible with innovation, which requires a fundamentally differentapproach to development that is “flexible, long-term, self-critical, and strongly infused with a spiritof learning by doing”.

Local NGOs and other civil society entities often find themselves at the end of a “food chain”,which whilst engaging them as “partners” in theory, in practice, sub-contracts them asservice providers (Baird and Shoemaker, 2007; Banks et al., 2015; Cooke and Kothari, 2001;Duffield, 2007; Lister, 2003). Goals and outcomes are externally defined and local actorsare often shackled to project cycles which have limited relevance to the felt priorities of thelocal communities they work with.

Recognition of the gulf between large-scale initiatives and local progress is not anew idea. For example, the UN review of the 1995–2005 Yokohama Framework forDisaster Reduction concluded:

In addition to a lack of systematic implementation, cooperation and reporting of progress to reducerisk and vulnerability to disasters, contributors to the Yokohama Review process have identifiedthe following gaps and challenges. (UN Review of Yokohama Strategy: UNISDR, 2005 p. 19,emphasis added)

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And yet after another decade of the successor framework (The Hyogo Framework forAction (HFA) on disaster reduction), the gulf still remains:

The possibility that disaster losses and impacts would continue to rise even if the HFA was in goodpart implemented is a real one […] Implementation of the HFA is still dominated by a paradigm ofdisaster risk reduction. As such, efforts and resources continue to be concentrated in emergencymanagement and preparedness, and in corrective or compensatory risk management. (Lavell andMaskrey, 2013)

These barriers to change which address local everyday risk and the “underlying riskfactors” challenge “change agents” (Gibson, 2015). By aligning oneself with theinstitutions and organisations shaping policy and practice, it often proves impossible tochange elements of that structure due to the interlocking elements, outlined above,devoted to keeping things as they are. This leads us to the question posed in theintroduction. Is it possible to achieve change from within institutional structures, or doesdoing so inevitably mean becoming compromised, co-opted and losing the ability toachieve change? Through attempting to disrupt institutional inertia, do erstwhile changeagents become exposed through losing legitimacy, losing funding and through otherrepressive acts?

The theoretical lens for this investigation considers the nature of these structures, andoptions for influencing them.

Structures of power and powerlessnessThe title of this section acknowledges Gaventa’s (1980) early work “Power andPowerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley”. Acknowledging hisdebt to Freire’s (1970) analysis of the imposition of power over the powerless extendingto an ability to reframe beliefs and behaviour towards acquiescence of a situationof oppression, Gaventa charted these mechanisms in the coal-mining communities ofAppalachia. Although a rich region, producing 65 per cent of America’s coal in 1974, itspeople lived in grinding poverty. The region’s wealth passed to absentee landlords andGaventa depicts multiple elements of the structures of power, including complicity of localelites, local authorities and even elements of trades unions, along with manipulation of rules,imposition of sanctions and manipulation of the media resulting in eventual acquiescenceand passivity in the face of enduring oppression. The themes of imposition of power to thedetriment of local livelihoods, through multiple elements complicit with external locii ofpower and influence, are very close to our concerns in the present study.

The recognition that power is exercised not through direct binary confrontation betweenpowerful and powerless, but through multiple dimensions, extends back to Gramsci’sanalysis of the role of the “bourgeoisie”, the middle class of politicians, other professionals,business leaders and so on who acted together out of mutual self-interest to maintain apolitical status quo in their favour. Elaborating Marx’s analysis, he argued that in mainlandEurope, the strength of these interrelationships was such that Marx’s anticipatedproletarian revolution was unlikely, and that even if it was to occur, it would be overturned(Cox, 1983). It is this interlocking assemblage of powerful interests which Freire seeks toaddress through “conscientizing” the poor, bringing them to an awareness andunderstanding of the ways in which they are oppressed, and which Gaventa depicts inaction in the Appalachian valleys. Foucault expresses a similar idea in his work, speaking of“technologies” of power which extend beyond simple political acts and enlist many avenuesof life in the service of controlling the powerless:

Central to Foucault’s work, and that of authors that have extended his remarks on governmentality,is the mapping of the role that seemingly nonpolitical technologies such as social work, teaching,

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town planning, and the human sciences play in the operation of contemporary power andgovernance in Western liberal societies. These technologies incite subjects to act upon themselvesand thereby engage in self-production and regulation with certain effects. (Brigg, 2001, p. 241)

For Foucault, these technologies and indeed language itself foster acceptance and passivityamongst the powerless.

In this study, we are considering power and politics from the local perspective, and it isfrom this angle that the recognition of the subtle, multiple dimensions of power is mostkeenly felt. Power is experienced as the imposition of one world view, or “lifeworld”according to Habermas (1987), over another. A lifeworld represents, in Habermas’thinking, the “body of taken for granteds” and the exercise of power is to impose oneparticular body of taken for granteds over another, devaluing the latter, to the extent asFreire and Gaventa argue that the powerless may even learn themselves to devalue theirown perceptions.

Nevertheless, the seemingly powerless may exert power and demonstrate agency in waysunanticipated by external actors. Kerkvliet (2009) offers the case of the imposition of collectivefarming in Vietnam on rural populations by the government, where over a period of years, thesubtle disobedience and return by peasant farmers, covertly and subversively, to moretraditional farming methods whilst still giving the appearance of collectivisation resultedeventually in the government abandoning the collective farming policy. Similarly Long (2001)finds in cases from Zambia, Peru and Mexico that local people display considerable agency inreshaping policy and project interventions in line with their own understanding and priorities,sometimes subverting or resisting planned interventions. Gaventa discusses the politicaldimensions of interactions at such interfaces, recognising that while, in some cases, politicalspaces are clearly closed to participants a more subtle exercise of power is through “invitedpolitical space’s, in which participants are invited, the terms of engagement are determined bythe hosts, often limiting the agency and voice of particular participants. He suggests that it isoften necessary, in order for the powerless to achieve influence, to create new political spaces,opening up new space not under the control of powerful hosts, where participants have equalvoice and influence. This is clearly to some extent a disruptive act but one often necessary toescape co-option and control by powerful authorities (Gaventa, 2004).

Regarding the question initially posed: whether concerned actors attempt to workwithin institutional structures or disrupt them, much of the above discussionsuggests that engaging with formal institutional structures on their terms is likely toconstrain and co-opt people within the goals of the powerful, subsuming them into their“body of taken for granteds” and that therefore disruption of some form is a necessary act.Politics conducted at a local level can be seen as “Everyday Politics”, dynamically andinformally creating spaces and actions, such as created political spaces. Kerkvliet (2009)sees the options, from this perspective, as more nuanced than those of confrontationand advocacy. He emphasises the informality of everyday politics, contrasting withorganised political organisations, movements and actions, identifying four orientations ofeveryday politics:

• support – positive engagement with institutional policies;

• compliance – acceptance without positive endorsement;

• modification and evasion – subtly subverting institutional policies, rules, etc.; and

• resistance – deliberately resisting institutionally imposed policies and rules but not inan organised way.

He acknowledges that the last approach may lead, in turn, to more organised forms ofresistance, such as advocacy, for example.

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The meeting point between this understanding of everyday politics as an emergentcountervailing force against structures of power and our concern to address everydayrisk through tackling underlying risk drivers lies in the recognition that structures ofpower are responsible for these underlying risk drivers, and therefore local level action toaddress them will tend to take everyday politics as its starting point. As boundaryoperators at the interface between different actors at local level and also beyond it, NGOshave a particular interest in understanding how this plays out, which raises a furtherquestion of about the role of local NGOs as actors in local politics. Do NGOs align withlocal populations, or with the external actors with which they also engage? Heijmanns(2009) illustrates these options in the case of different framings of community-baseddisaster risk management (CBDRM) (Heijmans, 2009). One frame explicitly recognises theexercise of power by local and remote elites, creating and maintaining vulnerability.She gives as an example the work of the citizen’s disaster response network in thePhilippines, which explicitly recognised its political dimensions. By contrast, UNISDR’sframing in the HFA, also characteristic of some INGOs, regards CBDRM as a method foraddressing the impact of natural hazards as external events, through physical measures,awareness raising and early warning to restore the status quo as far as possible. In doingso, it depoliticises engagement and action. A critical question as we consider the findingsfrom the case studies, is the extent to which these cases illustrate attempts to achievesocial change, addressing underlying risk drivers or alternatively reflect an acceptance ofan institutional view of CBDRM characterised by projects focussing on education,awareness raising, early warning and physical measures with no intention to addressunderlying risk drivers.

Finally, the everyday politics of NGOs may extend beyond the local context. For exampledebates at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit about increasing the proportion of aidgoing directly to the local level reflected the ability of small South-based NGOs throughtheir membership of networks to press for change in elements of the institutional system(IRIN, 2017). Everyday politics at this scale seems to demand persistence and inventivenessin the same ways as Kerkvliet (2009) argues is the case locally. Keck and Sikkink (1998)argue that transnational campaigns organised by networks of various kinds mayachieve their goals by an appeal beyond their own constituency or location through aninternationalised “boomerang effect” mobilising remote pressure for change. In the casesunder consideration, the action scenes are primarily local, but the involvement of NGOs withGNDR, ADRRN and other networks suggests possibilities for a wider everyday politics.

Discussion of the case studies and complementary papersDrawing on the concept of everyday politics as a means of considering how actors engagewith the structures of power and powerlessness which configure risk and resilience, we turnto consideration of the case studies at the heart of this special issue and to the threecomplementary papers.

Local voices and action case studiesDiscussion of the cases shows particular themes emerging, summarised in the list“Summary of themes emerging from case studies”. These were identified throughconsidering the eight case studies in four pairs reflecting common elements between thecases. This discussion appears in “Drawing the case studies together: synthesis of casestudies and group discussions” in this issue (Gibson et al., 2018).

Summary of themes emerging from case studies:

• Collaboration and cohesion in small island contexts to address both disasterreduction and development (Kiribati and Philippines).

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• Campaigning, lobbying, communications and social mobilisation in an attempt tobridge the gap between local concerns and the decision-making of government andother powerful actors (Pakistan and Vietnam).

• Innovation and local mobilisation to address shortcomings in government supportfor disaster reduction and development (Indonesia and India).

• Communications as a first base to influence behaviour of both communities andgovernment (Cameroon).

• Social change through empowerment of women to act in disaster reduction anddevelopment (Nepal).

A qualitative analysis of the group discussions highlighted particular themes whichappeared most important to discussants across all eight case studies. This was based on therecord of 230 key points initially recorded on flipcharts during the discussionsand subsequently coded and analysed. The method is summarised in Gibson et al. (2018).These are presented in Figure 1.

The list “Summary of themes emerging from case studies” and Figure 1 arecomplementary, the former based on comparative consideration of the recorded casestudies, and the latter highlighting dominant themes in the face-to-face discussions betweenthe case study contributors. Figure 1 suggests that “local capacity, action and knowledge”,“innovations”, “collaboration”, “communications and information”, “role of local NGOs”,“Campaigning and development” and “Role of Women” were dominant themes in theface-to-face discussions. It suggested that these themes are all concerned with aspects ofsocial influence and change. A headline theme in face-to-face discussion which does notappear explicitly as a theme in the list “Summary of themes emerging from case studies” is“role of local NGOs”, though this is implied (or a “taken for granted”) in all the cases.

It is notable that powerlessness and marginalisation are not specifically highlighted.Again, it is suggested that the lifeworld or “body of taken for granteds” of local NGOs andthe communities with which they collaborate includes powerlessness, marginalisationand poverty as “givens”, which form the basis for their work. This is clear (e.g. seeGibson et al., 2018) in the marginalisation of riverine communities described inthe Pakistan case, in the stated context of extreme poverty in the Philippines case, in thediscussion of the neglect of poor populations by government authorities in the Vietnam

Local capacity knowledge and actionInnovations

Collaboration between actorsCommunication and information

Role of local NGOsCampaigning and lobbying

Linkage between disasters and developmentRole of women

Poor governance and legislationConsequences of povertyRole of local government

Convergence of different actorsLinkages between scales of action

Political engagementSignificance of everyday risk

Effects of climate changeBenefits of networks

Access to resources at local levelRole of youth

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Figure 1.Most significantthemes acrossall case studies

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case and in the establishment of citizen forums in East Delhi to give a voice to informalsettlers in the Indian case study. The nature of powerless, marginalisation and poverty isexpressed in actions discussed by the participating NGOs, of which the majority areconcerned with social change rather than technical fixes or project interventions. Even inthe Indonesia case, where the intervention is project-oriented, the programme of workattempts to challenge deficiencies in government support for agriculture in the region andto move farmers from passivity to action.

In the list “Summary of themes emerging from case studies”, themes specific to the casestudies included cohesiveness and collaboration, local capacity action and knowledge,allied with communications, campaigning and innovations, intending to achieve change notonly locally but by influencing government and other powerful actors at local, district andnational levels.

For the “participant observers” contributing the case studies, the need for resources didnot appear as a headline issue. This is surprising as in other for a, NGOs do highlightresource issues, for example, through demands for localisation of funding made at theWorld Humanitarian Summit. Their overarching concerns were with local-level socialchange and influence of other scales of governance and power, aimed at addressingdisaster reduction as an activity integrated with development, many of the actionsdescribed reflect a depth of relationship and perseverance over time in the communitieswith which they engage, contrasting with the short-term project cycles typical of manyINGO interventions.

An overarching suggestion from the synthesis paper was that the mode of action ofNGOs depends on engaging with and strengthening relationships between localstakeholders, either in geographically constrained contexts or through creating cohesivesmall-scale contexts for action and influence.

Complementary papersThree complementary studies by Briones (2018), Marchezini (2018) and Pandey (2018)contributed to this special issue, providing an additional perspective on the theme of localvoices and action.

Zero-order responders (ZORs): Peru and Costa Rica (Briones, 2018)Those faced with disasters often have to deal with the immediate consequences without outsidesupport from “first responders”. The study demonstrates that far from locally affectedpopulations being victims they are the initial or “zero order responders”. He draws on examplesfrom communities experiencing El Niño Costero in Peru and Hurricanes Irma and Maria inCosta Rica, both in 2017. Communities faced with dramatically changed situations after adisaster responded cohesively and with understanding of the specific contexts they faced.They employed creativity, improvisation and resilience in the solutions they adopted, includinginverting power from car batteries to power appliances where power is lost, and usingsuspended shopping trollies sliding across dead high tension lines to transport goods acrossimpassable rivers. Their expertise as ZORs would improve the currently top-down approachesto DRR if they were recognised as stakeholders in disaster management programmes.

The power of localism during the long-term disaster recovery process(Marchezini, 2018)A study of the experiences of local people – in Luizenses – after the 2010 flooding of theParaitinga River which struck São Luiz do Paraitinga town, São Paulo State, Brazil,highlighted the important question “whose voices are heard”? It showed that local ZORs,for example, rafters who were not highly respected before the flood, saved lives before the

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emergency services arrived. Ironically when these services took control, even overriding themunicipal authorities, soldiers had to be rescued themselves from the river by the locallyre-named “Rafting Angels” after the soldiers’ boats capsized. Nevertheless, the official andmedia narrative was of powerless and vulnerable locals and competent authorities. Luizenseshad no voice even in consultations, where authorities at the front held the microphone, and didnot hand it to local people. Their countevailing actions, for example, publishing their ownnewspaper and reinstating the church remains as a centre of community reflected everydaypolitics in action. The study concludes that more effective response demands taking localismseriously, empowering local voices, knowledge and action.

Community engagement in Nepal (Pandey, 2018)The recognition of the role of communities in DDR has been slow being assimilated intoDRR legislation in Nepal, according to Pandey (2018). He shows that despite a history ofcommunity action to deal with small and large disasters in the country and the emphasisplaced on community participation in international frameworks, there is still an emphasis ontop-down approaches in the country. Disaster events such as the 2008 Koshi flood and the2015 Gorkha earthquake have led to fundamental revision of the governance of DRR in thecountry, but this still fails to recognise the value of community capacities. In some cases,disasters have been so devastating that even this capacity is eroded, and Pandey suggeststhat stronger local government recognition of community-based DRR and support forbuilding local capacity is needed to counter this and recognise and strengthen the ability ofpeople locally to prepare and respond.

These studies all illustrate limitations of interfaces between local and other scales ofgovernance and action. In all three cases, these interfaces appear dysfunctional. Failure toacknowledge the role of local ZORs is discussed in Briones’ cases set in Peru and Costa Rica.Marchezini’s (2018) study gives striking illustrations of this failure to acknowledge andengage with the local. The emergency teams override not only the local people but localgovernment, failing to acknowledge local capacities, culture or history, and failing to allowthe locals to speak in consultations. Pandey (2018) focusses at a national level in Nepal,showing that despite new DRR legislation local capacities continue to be neglected bynational government.

Discussion: the risks which are faced and the options for addressing themTo reiterate the research questions at the outset of this discussion:

RQ1. What understanding of the nature of underlying risk drivers and the structureswhich frame them is brought through this experiential perspective?

RQ2. What proposals for influencing change to address underlying risk drivers emergefrom this experiential investigation?

Underlying these questions was the observation that change agents are faced with theoptions of acting in concert with existing institutional structures or challenging them.The idea of “everyday politics” was used as conceptual framing for this observation. Thelocal level case studies and the further contributions offering cases of local level action andconstraints provide the basis for exploring these questions.

The nature of underlying risk drivers and the structures which frame them?In addressing the first research question, we consider what the cases and their discussionadd to our understanding of “underlying risk drivers” – those factors beyond local influence.The discussion of the cases shows a range of such external drivers, including climatechange, the grinding economic force of poverty, inward migration to cities, poor governance

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and allocation of resources at local and national level, and consequent passivity and fatalismat local level. What it also shows, importantly, from the perspective of these case studies anddiscussions surrounding them, is that these underlying risk drivers are far more dominantthemes than those of the intensive mega-disasters which often form the focus of DDR policyand practice. Despite the fact that Limbe lies next to a volcano and that Kathmandu lies on afault line, the concerns in both cases are with the underlying risk factors, political andeconomic, which affect peoples’ lives and livelihoods.

In several of the discussions, the links between DDR and development have beenemphasised, and it has been argued that government often fails to recognise this link,reproducing a focus on large-scale disasters, preparedness and response rather than onaddressing underlying risk factors as a means of driving development. The first questionasks, further, what understanding is brought of the structures of power which frame theseunderlying risk drivers. As suggested above, several of the cases suggest that thecontinuing and pervasive emphasis on large-scale disasters, preparedness and response tothem is a characteristic of this structure.

In several cases, for example, in Cameroon, Indonesia and Kathmandu, the limitedcapacity of government to look beyond emergencies at disaster reduction as a developmentissue is documented. A particular issue in East Delhi is the resistance of government toserving the needs of those in the informal sector as they do not pay taxes and do not vote.The political structure therefore militates against inclusive development. Similarly, inVietnam, the political system and priorities militate against inclusive development.In Pakistan, institutional behaviour seems to nakedly protect the interests of the rich andpowerful and therefore neglects DDR and development, except where the pressure ofcampaigning and publicity becomes too great. Set against this, in Kiribati and Philippines,the proximity of all actors in these small-scale contexts appears to strengthen the ability toconduct “everyday politics” leading to greater recognition by the local government of theneed to address the development needs of their populations.

Disasters are a development issueIn summary, the cases suggest that addressing underlying risk drivers becomes critical ifdisasters are regarded as a development issue, as an alternative to a focus restricted tolarge-scale disasters, addressed through preparedness and response Heijmanns (2009)contrasts these conceptions of disaster risk management at a community level (Figure 1).The cases suggest the failure of institutions to move from disaster response to disasters as adevelopment issue reflects factors including the disconnect between government and localpopulations, the limited capacity of governments to act, lack of preparedness to strengthencross-scale connections and understanding and resistance to inclusive development,corruption and a desire to hold onto power. The idea of ZORs (Brione, 2018) and itsexemplification in the case of São Luiz do Paraitinga (Marchezini, 2018) demonstrate thisdisconnect between local and other scales of knowledge and action, and Pandey (2018)demonstrates that in the case of the Nepalese Government, there is a failure to integratecommunity capacities into DRR legislation. These cases emphasise the challenge of creatingeffective cross-scale linkages of knowledge and action.

What proposals for influencing change to address underlying risk drivers emerge?Faced with this analysis, what is seen in the cases and their discussion regarding the secondresearch question – “What proposals for influencing change to address underlying riskdrivers emerge”?

First, what is not on the table, at least in these particular cases and their discussion, is anemphasis on service delivery. Whilst some NGO action, for example, in Gunungkidoldistrict, Indonesia, is framed in project terms, it is concerned with changing behaviour

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rather than with providing services. Other programmes, in Kiribati, Philippines, Vietnam,India, Nepal, Pakistan and Cameroon, are all concerned with achieving social change andpolitical influence. This point is notable as at the INGO level, a shift towards project cyclesand service delivery has been charted by many commentators (see e.g. Baird andShoemaker, 2007; Banks et al., 2015; Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Duffield, 2007; Lister, 2003).Whilst as noted above, this approach ripples down to local NGOs, often “sub-contracted” byINGOs, it is resisted in these cases, possibly reflecting the local connectedness andinvolvement in everyday politics of local NGOs.

What methods are these NGOs using to influences in structures which configureunderlying risk drivers, and are these based on engaging institutions or on mechanisms ofsubversion? It can be argued from the aggregation of themes discussed during the workshopthat a starting point is the local. Local capacity, knowledge and action are widely discussedand form the focus of the cases, so this observation is tautological to an extent. Accepting thislocal focus, it has been noted above that local action is not focussed on service delivery but onaspects of change. Again, reading off Chart 9, innovations, collaboration between actors,communication and information, the role of NGOs, campaigning and lobbying and linkagebetween disasters and development are major themes, appearing regularly in the particularcases. As means of achieving structural change, many of the actions fall in the realm ofeveryday politics, with many of the cases depend on strengthening local collaborationbetween actors. Innovations are often employed, ranging from technical to social andincluding gender empowerment. Communications and information, providing new ideas andpossibilities are an aspect of local social mobilisation. Local NGOs often have a role inmobilising these local-level collaborations in more formal ways to exercise influence at otherscales, through joint action in Kiribati and Philippines, through information and lobbying inIndia, and through campaigning and demonstrations in Pakistan, for example. In disasterresponse, the innovative capacity of local people, creating sources of electrical power wherethe grid has failed and improvising means of shifting good across swollen rivers (Brione,2018), has been demonstrated.

Underlying local action, growing local collaborations, communications and campaigningis a view that DDR is about much more than preparedness and response to major disasters.It is seen as intimately linked to development and the nature of the shocks and stresseswhich form the focus of such an approach are those small, “everyday” events whichconstantly erode lives and livelihoods. Pandey (2018) highlights the failure to achieve thislinkage in current DRR legislation in Nepal. The “underlying risk drivers” which maintainand increase these events are often poorly understood by governments, and the option forchange appears to be that of increasing local voice through the everyday politics ofcollaborations, communication and campaigning to influence and change governmentbehaviour, or, in other words, “handing over the microphone” (see Marchezini, 2018).

Returning again to the observation about the Kiribati and Philippines case studies,it appears that creating relatively small-scale and cohesive social structures is a startingpoint for this process of collaboration, communication and influence. In other contextssuch as Indonesia and India, the programmes of work have created such cohesion inparticular localities.

On the basis of this set of case studies and the discussion of them by the participants, itappears that there is a deep concern to address underlying risk factors, regarding DDR anddevelopment as intimately linked, seeing a starting point for influence and change in localcollaborations and regarding these as a basis for influencing other scales of governance.

Legimate subversion?How does this approach position NGOs and the communities they work with? In relation tothe research question, are they attempting to underlying risk factors? How? And is their

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activity based on engaging with or subverting structures and institutions? The discussionabove argues that NGOs and the collaborations of which they are a part are concerned withchange. Through linking DDR and development, they are attempting to address theunderlying risk factors, beyond local control, which lead to much of the small-scaleeveryday risks faced by local populations which impedes development. Their mode ofaction in attempting to address is described as “everyday politics”, starting with the localand attempting through collaborations, innovations, communication and campaigns tostrengthen local voice to influence underlying risk factors. In doing so, their actions may beseen as subtly but legitimately subversive, apparently operating within existing structuresin most cases, but in fact attempting, through social change, to create influence to changethem. Subversion is implied in Kerkviet’s (2010) categories of modification/evasion andresistance, but legitimacy is also critically important to NGOs as losing their status, oftenlegally defined and therefore their legitimacy, disables them from their boundary role.

The evidence of success in these attempts is varied. In East Delhi, for example, the caserecords significant milestones in influencing government behaviour. In Pakistan, it is only atipping point resulting from a major disaster that influences government behaviour.In Cameroon, the government capacity is very limited and attempts to influence behaviourare at early stages. In Vietnam, the government is relatively highly developed but alsohighly resistant to inclusive development, while local populations are restrained by thepolitical system from challenging this. In Nepal and Indonesia, particular innovations formthe basis of social change. In Philippines and Kiribati, small-scale, island bounded contexts,have led to relatively greater collaboration for change. Though the situations are diverseand the outcomes to date varied, it is suggested that in all cases, the approaches adopted areultimately political rather than technical in nature, attempting to achieve social change andpolitical influence through various degrees of legitimate subversion, based on creating localsocial constructs potentially capable of exercising an everyday politics and exerting politicalinfluence. Small examples of this can be seen in the account of local actions in São Luiz doParaitinga, where publication of a local paper, reinstatement of the church bell andother steps were intended to encounter the erosion of the local by the emergency services(Marchezini, 2018). Faced with the pervasive passivity achieved by powerful actors in localpopulations, the role of local NGOs can be seen as one of changing path dependency(Pelling and Dill, 2010) but at a local rather than institutional level in a cyclical way,through experiences of collaboration, modification/evasion and resistance which we havedescribed as “legitimate subversion” strengthening everyday politics and increasing itsvoice and influence.

ConclusionThis study opened with discussion of the UNISDR term “underlying risk factors”. It issuggested that UNISDR, governments and other institutions and agencies prefer to regardDDR as a programme focussed primarily on large-scale disasters, preparedness andresponse, rather than addressing underlying risk factors (see e.g. GNDR, 2013,demonstrating that according to UNISDR’s own monitoring, progress in addressingunderlying risk factors had been extremely limited). In contrast, an underlying theme of thecase studies and discussions has been that disasters are a development issue; disasters anddevelopment are intimately linked; and therefore it is of primary importance to addressunderlying risk factors impeding development through social change. It is suggested thatthe practical mechanisms relevant to local-level NGOs for achieving progress in this,illustrated in the case studies, are based in varying degrees on legitimate subversionthrough creating local collaborations, stimulating action through innovation,communication and information, and strengthening local voice to influence differentscales of governance to address underlying risk factors impeding development.

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Further workThe process of critical reflection on action underpinning this special issue has theintention of providing insights to practitioners to employ in their work as “change agents”.One contributing organisation, SEEDS India, fed back on the initial version of thisdiscussion paper:

There is often an internal debate on the approach to be taken for our projects. Often we have tomake a choice and consider implications. The paper has illustrated this very well throughthe various case studies. This itself is very useful for us. Legitimate subversion is anotherinteresting concept. We did not realise it until it was articulated so well in the paper. I guess thisshould form an important part of our future project narratives. (Personal communication, e-mail:14 April 2018)

This feedback provides encouragement that the process has, at least with this organisation,had such an effect. Further work based on these studies and their discussion might take tworoutes: “forensic” and “creative”.

ForensicThe studies and their analysis and discussion raise a number of proposals for means of“legitimate subversion” based on the more detailed observations emerging from analysis.These, in the nature of qualitative case study work, are rooted in a limited numberof cases. A forensic investigation of the validity and relevance of the findings could bebased on a carefully designed, structured consultation with a wider group of NGOs.Other stakeholders, for example, local government officers, relevant national governmentdepartments and relevant international agencies, could also be consulted to find to whatextent they recognise the findings put forward. Such work would serve to modify or evenquestion these findings. If they survived such a falsification process, it would add to theirweight in future discourse.

CreativeAn action research approach might share and discuss the findings through platforms such aspractitioner forums and invite organisations, as SEEDS India have suggested they might, toexperiment with applying them in their work, testing them through active experimentation.

Both approaches should be considered. In the spirit of the work done duringdevelopment of this special issue, the authors gravitate naturally towards the creativeapproach, but the forensic approach is also important both in refining and adding weight tothe findings, and in engaging a wider body of practitioners in the discourse.

Note

1. “Extensive disasters” are defined by UNISDR as resulting from localised, repeated or persistenthazards of low intensity.

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Brigg, M. (2001), “Empowering NGOs: the microcredit movement through foucault’s notion ofDispositif”, Alternatives, Vol. 26, pp. 233-258.

Briones, F. (2018), “Local responses to disasters. Recent lessons from zero-order responders”, Journal ofDisaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 28 No. 1.

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Civicus (2017), “People power under attack: findings from the civil society monitor”, available at: www.civicus.org/images/CM_Findings_7Oct_v1.pdf (accessed 12 March 2018).

Cooke, B. and Kothari, U. (Eds) (2001), Participation: The New Tyranny?, Zed Books, London.

Cox, R. (1983), “Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay in method”,Millennium – Journalof International Studies, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 162-175.

Duffield, M. (2007), “Development, security and unending war”, Polity, pp. 32-64.

Edwards, M. (2008), “ ‘Have NGOs ‘Made a Difference?’ From Manchester to Birmingham with anElephant in the Room”, GPRG Working Paper No. 28, available at: www.gprg.org/pubs/workingpapers/pdfs/gprg-wps-028.pdf

Freire, P. (1970), Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Penguin, Revised ed., 1996, London.

Gaventa, J. (1980), Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley,University of Illinois, Urbana and Chicago.

Gaventa, J. (2004), “Towards participatory governance: assessing the transformative possibilities”, inHickey, S. andMohan, G. (Eds), Participation, fromTyranny to Transformation, Zed Books, London,pp. 25-41.

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Gibson, T. (2015), “Reflective practitioners: the importance of critical thought for change agents”,Jàmbá: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, Vol. 7 No. 1, p. 6, available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/jamba.v7i1.128

Gibson, T. and Scott, N. (2018), “Frontline methodology”, Journal of Disaster Prevention andManagement, Vol. 28 No. 1.

Gibson, T., Aka, F., Ruiti Aretaake, R., Bari, S., Chantry, G., Gupta, M., Molina, J.G., Norton, J.,Parajuli, B., Rahmawati, H. and Shresha, N. (2018), “Drawing the case studies together: synthesisof case studies and group discussions”, Journal of Disaster Prevention and Management,Vol. 28 No. 1.

GNDR (2009), Clouds but little rain, available at: www.gndr.org/programmes/vfl/itemlist/category/168.html (accessed 13 August 2018).

GNDR (2011), If we do not join hands, available at: www.gndr.org/programmes/vfl/itemlist/category/168.html (accessed 13 August 2018).

GNDR (2013), Views from the frontline: beyond 2015, available at: www.gndr.org/programmes/vfl/itemlist/category/168.html (accessed 13 August 2018).

GNDR (2017), Frontline: from local information to local resilience, available at: www.gndr.org/images/frontlineassets/homepage/14-impact-case-studies/FRONTLINE_PUBLICATION-6.pdf(accessed 13 August 2018).

Habermas, J. (1987), The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2, Blackwell, London.

Heijmans, A. (2009), “The social life of community-based disaster risk reduction: origins, politics andframing”, Disaster Studies Working Paper No. 20, Aon Benfield UCL Hazard Research Centre,London, available at: www.abuhrc.org/Publications/Working%20Paper%2020.pdf (accessed12 July 2018).

IRIN (2017), “Hunting for the Grand Bargain”, available at: www.irinnews.org/analysis/2017/03/21/hunting-grand-bargain (accessed 12 March 2018).

Keck, E. and Sikkink, K. (1998), Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics,Cornell University Press, New York, NY.

Kerkvliet, B.J.T. (2009), “Everyday politics in peasant societies (and ours)”, Journal of Peasant Studies,Vol. 36 No. 1, pp. 227-243.

Lavell, A. and Maskrey, A. (2013), “The future of disaster risk management”, available at: www.unisdr.org/files/35715_thefutureofdisasterriskmanagement.pdf

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Lister, S. (2003), “NGO legitimacy: technical issue or social construct?”, Critique of Anthropology,Vol. 23 No. 2, pp. 175-192.

Long, N. (2001), Development Sociology: Actor Perspectives, Routledge, London.

Marchezini, V. (2018), “The power of localism during the long-term disaster recovery process”, Journalof Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 28 No. 1.

Norton, J. (2018), “Developing the CSO case studies”, Journal of Disaster Prevention and Management,Vol. 28 No. 1.

Pandey, C. (2018), “Making communities disaster resilient: challenges and prospects for communityengagement in Nepal”, Journal of Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 28 No. 1.

Pelling, M. and Dill, K. (2010), “Disaster politics, tipping points for change in the adaptation ofsociopolitical regimes”, Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 34 No. 1, pp. 21-37.

Sriskandarajah, D. (2015), “Five reasons donors give for not funding local NGOs directly”, available at:www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/nov/09/five-reasons-donors-give-for-not-funding-local-ngos-directly

UNISDR (2005), “Review of the yokohama strategy and plan of action for a safer world”, available at:www.unisdr.org/2005/wcdr/intergover/official-doc/L-docs/Yokohama-Strategy-English.pdf(accessed 17 June 2011).

UNISDR (2015), “Global assessment report”, UNISDR, New York, NY.

UNISDR (2018), “Terminology”, available at: www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology#letter-u(accessed 31 January 2018).

Further reading

Argyris, C. and Schon, D. (1974), Theory in Practice: Increasing Professional Effectiveness, Jossey-Bass,San Francisco, CA.

Christensen, C. and Raynor, M. (2013), The Innovator’s Solution: Creating and Sustaining SuccessfulGrowth, Harvard Business Review Press, Boston, MA.

Clemens, E.S. and Cook, J.M. (1999), “Politics and institutionalism: explaining durability and change”,Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 25, pp. 441-466.

Foucault, M. (1980), “ ‘The confession of the Flesh’ interview”, in Gordon, C. (Ed.), Power/KnowledgeSelected Interviews and Other Writings, Random House, New York, NY, pp. 194-228.

Gibson, T. (2017), “NGOs doing disaster risk reduction including climate change”, in Kelman, I., Mercer, J.and Gaillard, J.C. (Eds), The Routledge Handbook of Disaster Risk Reduction Including ClimateChange Adaptation, Routledge, Oxford, pp. 352-362.

Ostrom, E. (2010), “A polycentric approach for coping with climate change”, Background paper to the2010 World Development Report, World Bank, Washington.

Pelling, M. (2010), Adaptation to Climate Change: From Resilience to Transformation,Routledge, London.

Rancière, J. (2004), The Politics of Aesthetics, Continuum, London.

Author AffiliationsTerry David Gibson, Inventing Futures, Macclesfield, UK

Festus Tongwa Aka, Institute for Geological and Mining Research, Yaoundé, Cameroon andGEADIRR, Limbe, Cameroon

Ruiti Aretaake, Department of Community Development, Foundation for the Peoples of theSouth Pacific Kiribati, Tarawa, Kiribati

Sarwar Bari, Department of Management, Pattan Development Organisation, Islamabad, Pakistan

Guillaume Chantry, Development Workshop France, Hue, Vietnam

Manu Gupta, SEEDS, New Delhi, India

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Jesusa Grace Molina, Technical Services Program, Centre for Disaster Preparedness, Quezon City,The Philippines

John Norton, Development Workshop France, Lauzerte, France

Bhubaneswari Parajuli, NSET, Kathmandu, Nepal

Hepi Rahmawati, YAKKUM Emergency Unit, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Nisha Shresha, NSET, Kathmandu, Nepal

Corresponding authorTerry David Gibson can be contacted at: terry.gibson@inventing-futures.org

For instructions on how to order reprints of this article, please visit our website:www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/licensing/reprints.htmOr contact us for further details: permissions@emeraldinsight.com

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The power of localism duringthe long-term disaster

recovery processVictor Marchezini

Department of Research and Development,CEMADEN – National Early Warning and Monitoring Centre of Natural Disaster,

São José dos Campos, Brazil

AbstractPurpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze some barriers and the “drivers of localism” during thelong-term disaster recovery process. The main question is: what types of discourses and practices aboutlocalism are being heard and revealed in the frontline?Design/methodology/approach – Fieldwork, which was conducted from January 2010 to June 2013,consisted of participant observation and qualitative data collection. The authors opted for an approach thatprivileges narrative and observation, dialoguing with participants to gather local knowledge and information.Data were analyzed in light of the disaster recovery literature, focusing on disaster recovery as an expressionof power relations.Findings – Localism has been framed in diverse ways according to the interests of social groups placed incontextual meanings and, sometimes, in different phases of risk and disaster management. One important driver oflocalism is disaster narrative framing that allowed identification of how localism is composed, by whom and how.Research limitations/implications – One important aspect that needs further research is longitudinalstudies to investigate how the barriers are changing between the generations, and how intergenerationaldialogues can be promoted to sustain long-term participation and localism.Originality/value – This study recommends the need to identify who is talking about the importance oflocal and how localism has been framed in policy and action. It is important to empower localism in order toprovide ways for local people sharing what is going on in the frontline. But it is also essential to providefunding and means of implementation for local initiatives regarding advocating, researching and proposingdisaster recovery interventions led by people.Keywords Localism, Resistance, Disaster recovery, Social science, Disaster framingPaper type Research paper

[…] Now we are fighting fiercely, claw and faith

Together with the little that there is, to put the city back on its feet […]

The smile hides the tears, the tight heart

But luizense are strong, they bring the origins of the past […]

Our culture is alive; the water did not carry it away […]

People’s kindness, this the flood did not remove […]

Our city is enchanted, still has much beauty (Virgílio, D. (2010), Poema da Enchente (Flood Poem),São Luiz do Paraitinga, SP, Brazil. Permission was granted for the author to translate the poeminto English).

1. “Were voices really being heard?”This important question was posed in the article “Let’s talk about you” (Gibson andWisner, 2016), and finds an echo in the context of São Luiz do Paraitinga town, São Paulo Disaster Prevention and

ManagementVol. 28 No. 1, 2019

pp. 143-152© Emerald Publishing Limited

0965-3562DOI 10.1108/DPM-05-2018-0150

Received 10 May 2018Revised 25 July 2018

Accepted 7 August 2018

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:www.emeraldinsight.com/0965-3562.htm

Funding for this research was provided by the Foundation for Research Support of the State ofSão Paulo (FAPESP). The opinions, hypotheses and conclusions or recommendations expressed in thismaterial are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of FAPESP.

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state, Brazil, where the voices of local residents – luizenses –were evoked in the flood poemcited above[1]. The town experienced extensive floods in 1863, 1967, 1971 and 1996.But the worst case occurred in January 2010, when the Paraitinga River reached 12 mabove its normal level, submerging nearly 80 percent of its urban area, including the entirehistorical center of the town, and half of the luizenses (5,000 persons) were made homeless.Several external governmental agencies and different social actors were present inSão Luiz. These included external government agencies from the federal level (the Army,National Historical and Artistic Heritage Institute-IPHAN) and from the state ofSão Paulo (Civil Defense, Military Fire Department, São Paulo Council of CulturalHeritage – CONDEPHAAT, Secretariat for Habitation). The different social actorsincluded officers, journalists, tourists, experts and volunteers. The external social actorsinteracted with the locals, trying to impose their ideas, rules and techniques, and thereforemarginalizing locals’ perspectives.

Long-term listening to what is going on in the frontline of disasters’ aftermath isimportant to avoid social abandonment and protracted crisis (Breunlin and Regis, 2006;Barrios, 2014; Zhang, 2016). In São Luiz do Paraitinga, at the beginning of January 2010,I began to follow the disaster not as a natural event but as a process (Hewitt, 1983;Lavell, 1993), adopting a concept of disaster that is focused on the social experiences thattake place in a social time frame (Oliver-Smith, 1998). Fieldwork, which was conductedfrom January 2010 to June 2013, exceeded the emergency phase, and did not represent thetime-line of disaster recovery period. I visited the temporary houses of the luizenses andconducted semi-structured interviews with 50 participants (1 percent of the 5,000 affectedpeople), including men and women, young and elderly, who were selected usingconvenience sampling methods. I opted for an approach that privileges narrative andobservation, dialoguing with participants to gather local knowledge and information(Oliver-Smith and Hoffman, 2002; Freire, 2005). I analyzed qualitative data in light of thedisaster recovery literature, focusing on disaster recovery as an expression of powerrelations embodied in discourses and practices that are catalyzed by social actorsgathered in the local disaster scenario (Adams et al., 2009; Barrios, 2010; Brodine, 2011).This paper complements some previous works related to the identity of luizenses andtheir expressions of cultural resistance in the disasters’ aftermath (Marchezini, 2015a),where power dynamics, discourses and practices of biopolitics of disaster take place(Marchezini, 2015b).

In this paper, I share some findings related to the barriers and the “drivers of localism”during the long-term disaster recovery process of São Luiz do Paraitinga. Localismcan be framed as citizens having the right and the ability to challenge their politicaland economic leaders, about the decentralization of power and responsibility tofrontline public service staff, service users, smaller local organizations and local business(Padley, 2013).

Localism can also be conceived as a “discursive boundary object” (Dunbar-Hester, 2013),sufficiently malleable to accommodate different institutional and interpretativeperspectives, but also sufficiently robust to maintain an identity across these boundaries(Star, 2010). The main question is: what types of discourses and practices about localism arebeing heard and revealed in the frontline?

Section 2 explores some barriers that the community faced during the different phases ofa disaster: from the emergency phase to long-term recovery.

Section 3 discusses these findings in the light of other “drivers of localism” in Latin America.Finally, we conclude that local community, practitioners, researchers and policymakers

must build a dialogue-oriented nexus approach to reduce some barriers, improvinglong-term efforts to promote and sustain bridging values such as citizen science, actionresearch and citizen-science-policy interface.

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2. Barriers to… and drivers of localismDuring the long-term disaster recovery process of São Luiz, several discourses and practicesexpressed the conflicts and barriers between the locals and the “outsiders,” but there werealso discourses and practices that help luizenses to resist and cope with day-to-day stresses.However, different social groups responded differently to the long-term disasterrecovery and to the possibilities of being luizense. Some examples can highlight thesesocial dynamics.

2.1 Who are the heroes? Framing local (in)capacity during emergency rescuesDisasters can attract media coverage during the emergency phase or be neglected by them.Disaster narratives tend to reinforce hegemonic forces of society, so the construction of“disaster” through semantics and numerology is highly political (Wisner and Gaillard, 2009;Kondo et al., 2011; Button, 2012). The way public and private institutions, media and othersocial actors define and frame the disaster is important because definitions orient practicesand policies. They define what are classified as “social problems” and shape thesolutions fabricated by institutions to solve them (Dombrowsky, 1998). Numbers, words andimages matter in the field of cognitive battles and the warriors do not have the samequantity and forms of capital for the making of social reality (Bourdieu, 1991).

In São Luiz do Paraitinga, the external media came to the city and produced a disasternarrative that highlighted the activities of external governmental agencies. Categories andtarget populations were established. The locals were classified by the external agencies ashelpless victims, homeless, incapable and vulnerable people who needed to be rescued byexternal heroes (Marchezini, 2015b). Alongside the disaster narrative episodes, discourses ofexpert knowledge – geologists and civil protection agents – circulated, emphasizing thelogic of victimization of local people and inspiring dramatic speeches. The Army andMilitary Firefighters were represented as heroes, emphasizing the amount of material andhuman resources used – the numbers of soldiers, boats and helicopters. This interestinggame of numbers also counted people rescued and provided immediate data for mediacoverage. Everything was framed as “under control,” thanks to external actions. As AgênciaBrasil (2010, p. 4) reported on January 4, 2010: “[…] 300 civil defense professionals,firefighters, military police officers, health workers, and geologists are in the Paraíba Valley,helping the locals affected by the rains. Until yesterday, the government said 3,520 peoplehad been rescued by the fire department.”

The testimonies of the local people in the scene are selected, and information is ordered intime, producing a narrative that guides what is said about the disaster, identifying heroesand victims who enter the scene and how they act. However, there are other local discoursesand practices that do not appear in the official storyline, and can become visible when thelocals, who hold other interpretations of the disaster narrative, are listened to (Breunlin andRegis, 2006; Barrios, 2014). In São Luiz do Paraitinga, over several days the local raftingteam rescued people, luizenses sheltered neighbors and relatives, collected donations andprepared meals for families in garages. According to the luizenses, the Army and othermilitary agencies arrived too late, i.e., after local people had already organized and takenaction for rescue and protection.

The power of localism was also reinforced. Army personnel rejected the help of a localrafting team, familiar with the river. Many of these officers’ boats capsized as theyattempted rescue operations, and these official “heroes” had themselves to be rescued.The local disaster narrative is that there were no fatalities thanks to the work of local raftersthey came to call “the Rafting Angels.” The history of the Rafting Angels did not gainvisibility in external newspaper Folha de São Paulo, but it was recalled in ReconstructionNewspaper, a magazine created by locals to give voice to their disaster recovery process, toexpress their localism and resistance (Scott, 1985; Brodine, 2011; Dunbar-Hester, 2013).

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In late March 2010, the journal featured an article titled “Angels and heroes of rafting.”The article read: “the flood that was extensive became violent. An elderly lady had the wholehouse affected, but soon she met the rafting guys. She said, ‘They were real angels and hadall the care in the world to help us. They said words of confidence, asking us to believe inwhat they were doing’ ” (Prefecture of São Luiz do Paraitinga, 2010, p. 4).

In the city, Rafting Angels was a category of local change. It represents not only aconfrontation against the external narrative of “firefighters and military heroes,” but also areclassification of the rafting jobs’ status in São Luiz do Paraitinga’ society, adding the valueof religiosity to them – they became angels. Before the 2010 flood, some luizenses classifiedlocal rafting instructors as lazy because they only worked on weekends when tourists werein the town. After the flood, when the outsiders came to the city, another local classificationemerged, showing how localism has a contextual meaning (Dunbar-Hester, 2013),reinventing itself in relation to the symbolic power of outsiders’ language. In the words ofEduardo, the municipal director of tourism and one of the Rafting Angels: “Before the 2010flood, the rafting in São Luiz do Paraitinga […] you can ask any local rafting instructor […]people said we were lazy people because we didn’t work during the week. After the flood, webecame known as Rafting Angels” (author field notes, November 2011).

Legal localism which is fixed by local government laws (Troutt, 2008) is also challengedduring disasters, when a state of emergency may be declared and the law can provisionallysuspend the constitution (Agamben, 2005). In São Luiz, the local government authority wasquestioned and disputed by external governmental agencies, especially by the military,which invaded the city. The Army and other military agencies arrived with their practicalelements of governance (weapons, boats and organizational strategies) and symboliclanguage (organized in troops, serious faces and highly visible weapons) (Marchezini,2015b). In São Luiz, the military tried to take over the local actions already taken byresidents – for the armed officers did not matter if they were from local government “and/or”civil society. The luizenses, however, challenged the orders of the outside command. Sandra,a local resident and social worker in the municipal government, recalled the conflict:“The coming of the Army was too late […] one day after the flood. We were already rescuingand bringing food […]. And they come up and say ‘stop everything! Now we command’ […]No! We’re going to give our opinion too. We did everything before you arrived” (author fieldnotes, December 2011).

2.2 What for, how and by whom the city should be “built back better”?The main Church in São Luiz (built 1830–1840) collapsed during the 2010 flood. The churchand the central plaza are places of collective practices such as public gatherings, religiousand cultural festivals that enabled the creation of the city (Agier, 2011).

In the major floods of 1863, 1967, 1971 and 1996, the third step of the church stairs wasthe highest level reached by the Paraitinga River. During the 2010 flood, this historical markwas exceeded. Citizens sought refuge first in the high school, then in the Matriz[2] church,subsequently evacuating both tangible heritages listed by CONDEPHAAT as signs ofimminent failure appeared. A few hours later, the sacred place was flooded and collapsed.The fall of this revered site brought a profound sense of loss to the community. In the wordsof the local priest, “It was an unexpected thing […] while our houses were being devastatedby the waters, we felt there was still the house of God and, therefore, in a certain manner,transmitting strength. From the moment in which the house of God fell to the ground, it wasas if a hole had been opened, a complete vacuum” (author field notes, November 2011).

Local people and tourists witnessed the fall of this tangible cultural heritage asset,awakening emotions described as a collective pain. “We had a collective pain that was themoment that the Matriz church fell down. The population was silent, each one closed in tohimself and no one complained of the damages, because they saw that the damage was

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total,” recounted an elderly man. The feelings of collective grief and loss of identity expressthat the Matriz church was a great point of reference for the locals. As stated by Fabiane, anelderly woman (author field notes December 2011):

[…] [the feeling] of the loss of identity was very present in all of the luizenses at the time that weentered the city. We didn’t know that the Matriz Church had fallen […] you see that culturalheritage all fallen, around which we had a very large identity, because the luizense has a lot ofculture, is very tied to their culture, to see everything destroyed […] it seems that you will never seeyour city back again.

In the case of São Luiz, the first days after the 2010 flood were marked by the silence of thebells, by the absence of bread in the bakeries, and all surrounded by mud, debris andthe stench of rotting meat. However, the resistance of the luizenses also marked this period inthe form of daily practices of recovery. They created networks of neighbors, friends andworkers in order to clean and remove debris from houses and commercial establishments,removing mud from churches and searching for images of saints, books and photographs.They were remaking their city (Agier, 2011) and recovering their way of being luizense(Marchezini, 2015a) – their localism – and the flood poem expressed their fight to berecognized as luizense: “But luizense are strong, they bring the origins of the past […] Ourculture is alive; the water did not carry it away […].”

Luizenses resisted other forms of social suffering, barriers and conflicts. Benedito, anelderly artist from his home, on the hill of Cruzeiro, saw the Matriz Plaza covered by ruins.Grabbing his camera he went to capture some images of the disaster. At the Plaza, an armyofficer reprimanded him and pulled the camera out of his hands. Meanwhile, outsiders, ordisaster “tourists,” circulated around the ruins of the Matriz church, taking clay bricks fromthis nineteenth century historical site. He felt violated because the symbols of his city werebeing violated by outsiders and locals did not have control over their city.

The Matriz church is very important for luizense’s identity (Marchezini, 2015a) and totheir place-making practices (Breunlin and Regis, 2006). It is also an expression of localism,since the rebuilding of this tangible heritage asset provoked several conflicts betweenCONDEPHAAT’s architectonic parameters and the way luizenses want to “build backbetter” with the Matriz church. Most historical dwellings surrounding the traditionalPortuguese colonial style square plaza of the Matriz church just collapsed with the flood,leaving elderly residents homeless. According to CONDEPHAAT, historical dwellings mustbe reconstructed and restored following technical standards; the local owners, however, didnot have any resources to accomplish this. In order to prevent them from accessing theirruined dwellings, CONDEPHAAT built fences, thus preventing home owners fromrecovering their household routines. Baptisms, weddings and cultural festivals, no longerexisted. A survivor who lost his father after the flood stated: “We are passing through avery great trial […] no one died in the flood, right? […] And after? The quantity of peoplewho died afterwards, of sadness, of suffering, of depression, it was a lot of people […]”(author field notes, November 2011). These new threats identified by local people in thefrontline were not incorporated in the disaster recovery plan and/or inserted in the disaster’snumbers and statistics and/or reported by newspapers. As stated by Kishore et al. (2018),indirect causes of death resulting from delayed health care or from worsening of chronicconditions (Adams et al., 2009) are difficult to be attributed to disasters in order to define thescale and severity of the crisis and to targeting interventions for recovering.

Such as reported in other disaster scenarios (Breunlin and Regis, 2006; Barrios, 2014;Ugarte and Salgado, 2014), many displaced families faced the threat of homelessness andunemployment in São Luiz. Many moved out to another city. According to luizenses, about250 people left and were classified as “fake luizenses” by local people who expressed “morelocalism.” The luizense’s “way of being” is clearly connected to staying in the city, to

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resisting in it and with it, and to seeing the city as a constituent of its own history. Pedro, alocal resident, states: “People believe, therefore, that the city will only really have completelife when the Matriz church is inaugurated, one of the principal works of the city […] thatwill already begin now [December 2011, 23 months after the flood]. Then it’s this, I think thatwe didn’t lose strength, I think that who wasn’t from the city went away, and we stayed here[…] you are not going to move your feet from that which is yours, that is your history, thusit’s this, I think that the same feeling that was mine was that of everybody here, themajority” (author field notes, December 2011).

The ethnography of disasters (Brodine, 2011; Barrios, 2014, Zhang, 2016) also revealsdifferent barriers in the bureaucratic procedures of legal and emergency measures ofdifferent governmental agencies with their jurisdictions and inconsistent agendas, such asCONDEPHAAT’s regulations for the reconstruction of the historical center in São Luiz doParaitinga. In the midst of these power struggles, the luizenses also lost their capacity tospeak for themselves and to define their future. External governmental agencies organizedpublic hearings to “give a voice to the local people,” expressing the valuable discourse oflocalism. However, public hearings were only informative. Luizenses could not give theirsuggestions for creating recovery policies for their own city. The individuals who held themicrophones and who sat in front of the table were mostly external agents. They usedtechnical and scientific terms that disregarded any values that luizenses had about their city,river and culture. During a public hearing, an external engineer showed how to constructwalls along the Paraitinga River to protect local people from floods. Suzana, a resident ofthe city, noticed that very few fellow residents were consulted about their opinions. For her,the Paraitinga River is a part of the culture of São Luiz; the river was a part of the luizenses’life, including the floods. Roberto, a local owner, recounted the subtle ways in which this“public” hearing silenced the locals:

They [external authorities] organized the roundtable and held the microphone. When you had justasked something, the person who was controlling the microphone went away from you. On theroundtable, an authority answered something completely different from your question. And did notgive you the right to reply. So you had to scream. But if you screamed, it would be considered acontempt of authority (Author field notes November 2011, emphasis added).

Roberto was also outraged with these forms of subordination to the external agents.For him, residents were apathetic, silencing themselves amid the expert discourses ofexternal agents who spoke for luizenses, identified what was the best for them and definedwhat ways the reconstruction processes should proceed. In the voice of an elderly woman:“São Luiz was invaded by outsiders. Outsiders draw up plans for the properties. Outsidersformulate the governmental policies. Outsiders say how we should build our houses […] ourfuture is not defined by ourselves. We are not the protagonists of this town anymore, saysAdriana” (author field notes, December 2011).

But luizenses also expressed their localism through several acts of resistance. Little bylittle, they began to come to the Plaza of the Matriz church as a socializing space.A temporary structure was reconstructed to reinstall the church bell. The bell helped torecover a sense of community. Luizenses created a local disaster recovery committee called“Ceresta” (Centro de Reconstrução Sustentável de São Luiz do Paraitiga). People maintainedmorale by conducting masses in adapted spaces or having religious rituals in the streets.They also sought for other religions that allow the circulation of faith and by organizedsociocultural manifestations such as the Feast of the Divine Saint Spirit and Carnival.Such popular festivities constituted a deep expression of resistance and localism. Even withinnumerable losses in 2010, luizenses collected offerings to organize the afogado, atraditional food made of stewed beef, served with manioc flour and rice and eaten togetherin the city market place during the Saint Spirit Festival. Art manifestation, such as painting

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the marks of levels reached by the flood waters on some historic mansions show an aestheticexpression chosen by the inhabitants in order to speak about the disaster andalways remember. Moreover, close to the Matriz a poet announces his Flood Poem whenevera tourist or researcher asks something about the 2010 disaster, using his voiceas the instrument to express the confrontation of adversities and to resist in the process ofsocial recovery.

3. DiscussionLocalism has been framed in diverse ways according to the interests of social groups placedin contextual meanings and, sometimes, in different phases of risk and disastermanagement. This paper pointed out some confronting discourses and practices of local andexternal agents during the long-term disaster recovery process of São Luiz do Paraitingatown, Brazil.

One important driver of localism is disaster narrative framing that allowed identification ofhow localism is composed, by whom and how. The discursive battles are important to createspaces for advocating and researching in risk and disaster situations. Risk and disasterframings, terminologies, databases, indexes, approaches and metrics are always influenced byideologies (militarism, nationalism and neoliberalism), history and culture (war and post warfragility, traditions and religions, colonial and post-colonial heritage), and social and economicstructures (distribution of power, wealth and resources) (Wisner et al., 2004). São Luiz doParaitinga had particular words that synthetized barriers and conflicts, such as “raftingangels,” luizenses, outsiders and “fake luizenses.” These words from the frontline express theconflicts between military and civil order, the external agents’ choreographies of governanceand local acts of resistance, and the diverse and even conflicting expressions of localismbetween the locals. Views from the frontline (VFL) methods (Global Network of Civil SocietyOrganizations for Disaster Reduction, 2013; Botha and Van Niekerk, 2013) are an importantmechanism of resistance that can be used in several ways, including the monitoring of thelong-term disaster recovery process, especially in regions where the political and economicinstability is high. In Americas, for example, several cases of human rights violation andthreats in the long-term aftermath of disasters were reported (Breunlin and Regis, 2006;Briones Gamboa, 2010; Barrios, 2014; Marchezini, 2014; Ugarte and Salgado, 2014), showingthat sometimes the disaster recovery process was only a promise, and never a reality.

Are such threats and violations being heard by institutions responsible for theimplementation of resilience strategies? Protests have been used as a weapon (Scott, 1985) tolift the invisibility of neglected disasters, protracted crisis and hidden long-termcatastrophes (Barrios, 2014; Marchezini, 2014). In São Luiz do Paraitinga, there wereother expressions of resistance, such as the local newspaper created to talk about thedisaster recovery process, the cultural festivals of Divine and Carnival, the poems and musicabout the disaster, the paintings, the creation of the Ceresta – the local committee fordisaster recovery – and the local NGOs. Other expressions of resistance and activisminclude parades, street arts and acts of memorialization (Breunlin and Regis, 2006; Barrios,2010; Brodine, 2011).

One important aspect that needs further research is longitudinal studies to investigate howthe barriers are changing between the generations, and how intergenerational dialogues canbe promoted to sustain long-term participation and localism. It is also important to ask howlocal capacity can be maintained for future generations when they in turn have to facedisasters. In São Luiz do Paraitinga, my research analysis about disaster recovery processended in June, 2013. One year later, we started a pilot citizen science educational project withthe local high school and ran 12 workshops to promote participatory early warning systems(Marchezini et al., 2017). Two of these workshops – entitled “Workshop for the Future” – weredesigned to create a Committee for Disasters Prevention and the Protection of Life

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(Com-VidAção) at the local high school. Using a participatory methodology, we dividedstudents, teachers and civil defense agents into four groups. Each group envisioned acollective dream (wish tree) for a disasters safe community, identified the main barriers (rockson the way) for making their dream real and planned (bridge of actions) ways to overcomebarriers. Interestingly, all four groups stated their distrust of authorities and identifiedcorruption and lack of information as the main obstacles for reaching their collective dreamfor a community safe from disasters.

4. ConclusionsThis paper highlighted how discourses and practices were performed by external actors inorder to maintain control of the place during emergency and disaster recovery phases andthe way locals cope with this top-down approach. One important recommendation is theneed to identify who is talking about the importance of local and how localism has beenframed in policy and action. It is important to empower localism in order to provide ways forlocal people sharing what is going on in the frontline. But it is also essential to providefunding and means of implementation for local initiatives regarding advocating,researching and proposing DRR interventions led by people, typically once they havedemonstrated a collective capacity during disaster recovery.

Researchers, policymakers, local community and practitioners must build a dialogue-oriented nexus approach to reduce some barriers, improving the long-term efforts topromote and sustain bridging values such as citizen science, action research andcitizen-science-policy interface. In the research field, it is important to find ways to includeVFL methods and extend integrated research on DRR to meet educational and extensionobjectives, such as those pointed out by the forensic investigations of disasters framework(Oliver-Smith et al., 2016). Views and voices from the oppressed people in the frontline – suchas expressed in the flood poem – are important to avoid social abandonment, but it is alsoessential to dialogue about the root causes and dynamic pressures that create vulnerabilityand the ways safety and sustainability can be enhanced (Freire, 2005).

Notes

1. The poem was video-taped and is available in Portuguese: www.youtube.com/watch?v=2uGmySvki34

2. Matriz, from the Latin, means the Mother Church. We use this name throughout the text for SãoLuiz’ main church.

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