An Impossible Democracy:

Political Clientelism and Corruption in Andalusia

Antonio Robles-Egea Universidad de Granada

Departamento de Ciencia Política y de la Administración C/. Rector López Argüeta, 4

18071-Granada aroblese@ugr.es

José Manuel Aceituno-Montes

Universidad de Granada Departamento de Historia Contemporánea

Campus de Cartuja 18071-Granada

joseaceituno1985@gmail.com

Paper presented to the Panel 2 on “Civil Society and Quality on Democracy in Southern Europe, 1970-2000”, Section 58 “Crisis Zone? State Quality and Democratic Quality in

Southern Europe, ECPR General Conference, Reykjavik, 24-27 August 2011

Introduction

Political clientelism and political corruption are some of the most difficult problems that modern democracies, especially those in Southern Europe, have to deal with. The existence of these social and political phenomena make possible the gradual violation and destruction of the well-functioning of democratic systems by undermining their democratic theoretical principles and the democratic civic culture. Clientelistic and corruptive practices are based on personal relationships within the structure of public institutions and political parties. These relationships between individuals try to satisfy private interests, and not the public interest. Moreover, negotiations involving such practices are always done in the shadow of politics; that is, without witnesses, away from the public proceedings of democratic life (Briquet and Sawiki, 1998; Caciagli, 1996; Cazzola, 1988; Della Porta and Mény, 1997; Eisenstadt and Lemarchand, 1981; Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984; Gellner, 1985; Heywood, 1997; Kawata, 2006; Máiz, 2005; Piattoni, 2001; Roniger and Günes-Agata, 1995; Schmidt, Scott, Landé and Guasti, 1977). This is not in accordance with the main objectives of the democratic State: rule of law, transparency in decision-making processes, fair representation, and the search of the common good. Thus, giving patronage, clientelism and corruption, the question to be asked is: “Is democracy possible?” Although clientelistic and corruptive practices have always existed in the political arena, throughout the centuries and across nations, democracy aspires to make them disappear for the sake of its own survival. Nevertheless, when purifying the functioning of democratic systems the difficulties found are greater than the possibilities for their elimination, spite of the implementation of anticorruption public policies. Democracy is, therefore, a dream and an ideal that will never come true. This paper tries to demonstrate that clientelistic attitudes and behaviors have a tendency towards corruption. It is easy to observe how two types of incentives promote clientelism and corruption. On the one hand, the personal or institutional incentives, which satisfy private interests (individuals or organized groups), such as political parties and their leaders, whose aim is to remain in power as long as possible. For this, they make use of their office position and public resources, that is, all they have access to, in order to ensure a plural political clientele (electors, mass media, professionals, etc.). But it also checks individuals receiving economic and social benefits in exchange for loyalty to politicians in power. At the same time, and as consequence, clientelization processes help the interests of large social groups, who achieve their collective incentives. This paper argues that these practices constitute a form of social cement, which holds the democratic structure with certain fragility. However, when clientelism and corruption come to light on the mass media, the public opinion pulls show firstly a wide disaffection and rejection of the democratic system itself. Secondly, they illustrate a popular ratification of the public policies that have been impregnated of patronage, clientelism and even corruption, being political action targeted by the latter. In both cases, the deterioration of democracy is observable in electoral promises and public policies that try to achieve the individual and group interests, while the general interest is relegated to the background.

The first part of this paper remarks the theoretical peculiarities of this political problem, establishing concepts, pointing out the differences between clientelism and corruption, and showing the negative consequences for democracy. Second, it analyzes the issue in Andalusia, performing a case study of three practices of patronage, clientelism and corruption that have been reported publicly through the media: rural political clientelism, municipal corruption and Employment Regulation Files, Expedientes de Regulación de Empleo (ERE). Finally, there is a conclusion about the implications of these behaviors on political life in Andalusia. Democracy’s limitations through political patronage-clientelism and corruption: a

theoretical normative approach

The search for real democracy, at least the most perfect or the best among those possible, is the hope and the ideal of our time. It is a trail that has been left by modern metanarratives after their disappearance from the collective imaginariness of a global world that integrates countless fragments not easily concordant. This hope is present in the daydreams of political communities which ignore the obstinate imagination of reality, always perpetuating among injustice, inequality, and oppression. Democracy, whatever might be its extension, depth, or quality, is always impossible, because its legitimized fundamentals stem from abstract and universal principles and values. These are weakened, either completely or partially, by economic, social and cultural practices (Brioschi, 2010; Máiz, 1994, 1996, 2005; Gómez Fortes, Palacios Brihuega, Pérez Yruela, Vargas-Machuca, 2010). It is true that, in certain democratic models with high levels of civic education, this vulnerability is lessened. Nevertheless, the existence of personal, clientelistic and corrupted relations still continues to distort the abstract principles of liberty, equality, and justice; and prompts perverse effects in the well-functioning of the democratic system (Della Porta and Vannucci, 1997; Johnston, 1986). One of the main reasons which unable the fullness of democracy is closely linked with processes involving children and youth socialization. The upbringing of their identity in their homes, at school, or within their group of friends is parallel to their identification with the interests of origin’s groups. Within the latter, individuals acquire conceptions associated with the other members of the group regarding good and evil, allies and enemies. These prevent the neutral and disinterested thought needed to create the necessary psychological base for the establishment of democratic bonds between all citizens, and between citizens and rulers. In theory it is possible to think the individual rational interest of all and each one drives to common goods and collective interest. However, this is a false premise for justifying a model of society where will exist inequality and oppression always. The normative theory of democracy never supports this supposition. Spite of the best democratic engineers or constitutional architects designing of perfect models of democracy, the problem remains the same: human beings are conditioned by their bio-psychological structure and social environment. The resolution of political conflicts, as synthesis of many other social problems, has legal processes within the established institutional channels. This should be enough to introduce transparency in political life, but it is known that political actors use all kind of resources, including illegal resources, to take power and to satisfy ideological and personal interests, leaving behind public interests. In this manner, democratic principles

lose their real effect and corruption starts off, spreading out progressively over the whole political community. Nowadays, many citizens feel disaffection toward democratic politics, due to the existence of political corruption. However, among the masses, the desire of a “real democracy” is still alive. Democracy is a great ideal and aspiration for men and women, although it is difficult to achieve (Del Águila, 2008), because of the lack of agreement or consensus on its permanent and substantial theoretical and practical concepts. Today this awareness of democratic ideals is substituted by a partial and limited objective: a high-quality democracy (deliberative, participative, strong, deep, etc.). This enables that the best possible democracy and the democratic utopia’s impossibility to walk hand in hand, as it is demonstrated by the practices of some of the so-called democratic countries. The democratic deficit is observed in the aim and in the processes of democracies (constitutions, electoral institutions, representative governments, parliaments, actors), far from the civic and democratic political culture One of democracy’s limitations is the persistence of patronage practices that distort the essence and value of democracy, because they favour the personal interests over collective interests as a result of a dynamic (big bang) of dyadic or triadic exchanges, with reciprocity, reflecting inequality of power between citizens. Hence, the formally recognized principles of freedom and equality of democratic life disguise the anthropological principle of the homo hierarquicus (González Alcantud, 1996 and 1997). From the other side, the absence of a perfect representative system crashes the theoretical foundations of democracy, which should allow the permanent presence of the public opinion in parliament. Likewise, the purity of democracy is swallowed by the existence of a “viscous” political power, which intertwines dominant interests of the political, social and economic institutions, by cancelling, trapping, and immobilizing the alternative and critical thinking of citizenship. This makes the transparency and clarity of democratic processes impossible. For all these reasons, politics based on clientelism lacks of democratic legitimacy in contrast to politics founded on models of participative democracy (Rosanvallon, 2010). The clientelistic practices generate a model of political domination through very different forms of socialization, vision of politics, justification of power, and institutional performance. Thus, from the standpoint of legal and moral normative criteria of civic culture and from the universal and rational justifications for governments and public administrations, political patronage and clientelism are stigmatized, because they are considered backward factors for development, sources of inefficiency in public administrations, and, what is more suggestive, key explanations for moral degeneration and public corruption (Briquet, 1998: 33-34). According to these normative principles, political patronage and clientelism, in the classic typology of the nineteenth century or in the modern type of party’s clientelism, are deviant and disqualified practices in the democratization processes, which are reproduced in the informal spaces of political life. Nevertheless, their logic is completely autonomous, being built by groups and individuals that structure the channels of their relationships with the official and formal political life.

The negative or endogamous social capital of the democratic systems produces the structure of clientelistic networks that prevents the democratic development. The reason is that these networks persecute only their private benefit destroying the public interest. They feed institutions through various forms of patronage and corruption, dominating them to satisfy clientelistic particular interests (Gil Calvo, 2006). Patronage-clientelism and corruption are usually considered as interrelated phenomena, but with their own characteristics. According to Caciagli (1996: 13-15, 49), patronage- clientelism favors corruption, but is not identical. From a legal-cultural perspective, practices of patronage-clientelism, such as discretionary decisions or personal favors, do not necessarily imply misuse or anything illegal, although morally they symbolize the opposite of the universal principles of democratic liberalism and manufacture large spaces of uncertainty and obscurity in politics. The law is respected, but patronage-clientelism acts on the border of the legal and illegal. When it crosses the border line, it goes into corruption. Therefore, patronage-clientelism and corruption threaten democracy when understood as a choice of values. In this same way, Ramón Máiz (2005: 363-364, 381-382) believes that political patronage-clientelism and corruption are perfectly defined concepts, but in reality they are overlapping and merging phenomena. Both form a vicious circle, since they need themselves for reproduction. The exchange of political support, vote and militancy, for personal favors leads, under certain circumstances, to exchanges of money for the same favors, using the institutions illegally for private individual or collective profit. The usual recreation of clientelistic structures for the support of politicians in power and for mobilizing resources to achieve success in the political arena recycles these informal practices becoming pathologies of democracy (Cartier-Bresson, 1997). The complexity of the current policy has modified the classical model of patronage-clientelism based on personal knowledge of patron and client by a new model of organizational patronage-clientelism: distribution of social and economic benefits in exchange for certain political behaviors. These mechanisms promote a corrupt version of clientelism that is widespreaded in countries and regions of South Europe, whose base is the circulation of money and the performance of business politicians. The origin of such activity is, first of all, the increased competitiveness among parties and patronage-clientelism extensive networks, that need to reproduce them at any cost; and, secondly, the processes of decentralization and the loss of efficiency in public administrations. Anyway, this change in patron-client relations has transferred to the legal map what was already ethically reprehensible. Therefore, it hides political practices far from the light and transparency that must prevail in a democratic system. These practices have become illegal under the pressure of the need to gain votes and maintain power. The Machiavellian-Napoleonic logic moves to the democratic logic in the shadows of politics. From other point of view, Jean-François Médard (1998) argues that political patronage and clientelism are not different from corruption, but a form of it. The distinction between patronage, clientelism and corruption responds to the prospect of corruption as a strictly economic practice based on exchange of goods and services, as a simple barter or sale of that which yields a profit. If we consider another kind of corruption, e.g. the social exchange with economic consequences, clientelism becomes an archetype of social and political corruption. Similarly, it may occur also that concealed and organized

exchanges of corruption do not have a commercial objective, but a rather social or political one. So, Médard (1998:308) believes that "clientelism is just a form of social-exchange corruption among others, such as nepotism, friendly relations (“amiguismo”), tribalism or ethnicity, that are related, on the other hand, with clientelism”. Analyzed as social exchange corruption, clientelism works for the stability of the social structure with the personal involvement in social relations. However, it is possible through the confusion (illegitimate and illegal) between the public and private spheres, objectively indistinguishable. Clientelism only can be separated from corruption according to the ethical and legal rules. Thus, it is possible to speak of patrimonial practices when there is confusion between the public and the private and, of corruption when the practices are illegal. Therefore, taking ethical and legal considerations, clientelism can be seen as a disturbing phenomenon of social relations based on the rights theoretically recognized in the statements and democratic constitutions, but it is followed by large clienteles or constituencies without generating a determined opposition to its removal. Following the ideas of Médard, Manuel Villoria (2006: 194-196) argues that patronage and clientelism are one type of corruption associated with partisan politics nowadays. First, because in the collective consciousness corruption is defined as the absence of will to serve the public interest by leaders, parties and governments, that is, individuals and institutions that symbolize the ruling class. Likewise, clientelism is considered as a priority in the pursuit of personal interests of employers, individuals and clienteles, in contrast to the second plane of the general interests of citizens. Second, because the patron-client relations and the clientelistic exchanges are governed by specific rules laid down by political patrons and clienteles (either individually or in groups), outside the general rules of the community. Therefore, clientelism is a phenomenon of disaffection towards democratic political processes, seeking to resolve conflicts through the aggregation of different opinions and interests to get the approval of the democratic measures that benefit the entire society. Instead, clientelism discredits democracy itself with its patrimonial selfishness, preventing the participation of individuals and groups in collective action for the common good. From a moral perspective, clienteles and patronage corrupt the human right of the autonomy of human being, legally established in international declarations, because “clientelism establishes a relationship of domination of a human being over another, making invisible the exercise of freedom, especially if this is understood as the absence of arbitrary rule: Clients give up to their freedom in exchange for favours and privileges provided by the patron-client relationship” (Villoria, 2006: 195). Then, it is easy to imagine the destructive potential of clientelism and political corruption on the normal development of democratic principles and processes. But, if in theory the practices mentioned are only an unreal danger, the analysis of reality in Andalusia demonstrates the dire consequences that they have on democracy.

Andalusia, Clientelism and Corruption

Since the years of the political Transition to democracy until today, there have existed many kinds of clientelism and corruption. From a political perspective, we can highlight the cases of clientelism linked to the Rural Employment Program (Plan de Empleo Rural, PER) during the years 1980-2000, the phenomenon of Municipal Corruption in

the decade of 2000, and, finally, clientelism and corruption generated by the recently discovered Employment Regulation Files (Expedientes de Regulación de Empleo, ERE); although a retrospective of the cases leads to an analysis of only the last ten years. The Rural Employment Program (Plan de Empleo Rural, PER) was a financial aid Program for Andalusian municipalities in order to undergo several projects addressing the modernization of such towns. In a parallel manner, it aimed to reduce the level of unemployment and allow employed workers to receive unemployment benefits. Local authorities hired temporary workers, who in turn had to certify that they had been working for a certain number of days in order to receive the subsidies for the unemployed. In these towns, characterized by agricultural economies and seasonal unemployment, these subsidies allowed the subsistence of the worker and his/her family. To achieve this goal, many majors committed legal infractions by signing false day’s stints and agreements of loyalty in order to ensure their electoral clientele. During the last ten years, there has been a substantial increase in the number of cases of municipal corruption linked to town-planning crimes, at least until the burst of the housing bubble in Spain in 2008. When the Aznar’s Government approved the Land/Soil’s Law in 1996, local governments were faced with demands from firms eager to obtain permissions for land planning (licencias de construcción urbanística) and that, in exchange, offered illicit commissions or other type of favors to town majors and councilors. Many politicians gave in to the temptation of profiting from constructing firms’ bribery. For example, two of the most common illicit practices were the signing of licenses, and the granting of permits for construction on specific locations to privileged firms. Recently, there have been scandals regarding the wrongful use of significant sums of money destined to Employment Regulation Files (Expedientes de Regulación de Empleo, ERE). These funds were aimed to help companies in financial difficulties. They tried to ensure that, whenever such companies had to lay off employees, the majority of the dismissed workers were able to receive severance pay and, in some cases, pre-retirement allowances by means of funds allocated to that end in the Andalusia Government’s (Junta de Andalucía) budget. These scandals were made public by the media not long ago, so they are still being investigated by the Courts of Justice. Nevertheless, the data published by the media implicates more than a few individuals politically associated with the governance of the Junta de Andalucía.

An historical precedent: the Rural Employment Program (Plan de Empleo Rural,

PER) and the permanent ghost of political clientelism in rural areas

The historical economic backward of Andalusia has been linked to certain cultural and social characteristics, among which patronage (“caciquismo”) and political clientelism have always stood out. The modernization process of Andalusia during the last three decades has not prevented the persistence of clientelistic practices within democracy, especially clientelism of political parties and Public Administrations such as Andalusian Government (Junta de Andalucía), Provincial Governments (Diputaciones

Provinciales) and Local Governments-City Councils (Ayuntamientos) (Cazorla, 1992, 1996, 1998; Corzo, 2002; Djurfeldt, 1993). Clientelism in rural areas has been the most significant since it affects important population groups and large sums of money. The

Rural Employment Program (Plan de Empleo Rural) has been the mean for the clientelism’s transmission trough the major-patron or party-patron, what has heavily affected local political life in Andalusia. The Rural Employment Program (Plan de Empleo Rural), commonly known as PER, was set up in 19831 as a means to mitigate the effects of high levels of unemployment in the most rural (and depressed, industrially speaking) settings of the country. The PER was designed only for the regions of Andalusia and Extremadura, which were the ones that needed mostly these type of measures in order to lessen the limitations of their rural labor market: transient, low wages, mechanized agriculture, need for emigration, etc. (Herrera González de Molina, 2011: 353-373). Overall, the PER aimed to improve the harsh living conditions in rural areas for workers, who had to survive a whole year with the earnings of seasonal work. With the additional work, usually involving infrastructures, that was provided by the PER and the Agricultural Unemployment Benefit which accompanied the PER (financial aid during the months off-work), it was possible to compensate for the lack of stable annual work. Thus, the agricultural unemployment benefits would come to play a welfare role, of temporary support, to a much-needed social group. However, this mechanism of social support had a problem: in order to be eligible for unemployment benefits, it was (and still is) necessary to have completed a certain number of day’s stints worked per year2. To get a contract of employment in the works included in the PER implies, first of all, a complement to work and income for household economies of rural workers. Secondly, it also gives workers the right to collect six months of unemployment benefit. Therefore, both the PER and the access to agricultural unemployment benefits are for many people in the Andalusian countryside an opportunity that cannot be turned down, since it is a relief for their limited incomes. The clientelistic drift of the PER begins when assigning the authority and responsibility of hiring workers in PER projects and signing the number of worked days. Such task corresponds to the mayors of the municipalities. Then it must take into account the urgent need of temporary workers in agriculture to get the wages needed to obtain unemployment benefits. It is easy to infer that this creates the idyllic conditions to generate clientelistic relations between the local political leader, who acts as patron, and a clientele of temporary rural worker who desperately hope to get a contract with the city council, or alternatively the mayor's signature certifying days worked. The exchange’s relationships that are set by the patron and his/her clientele clearly explain the real issue and its consequences. The clientele might think that the mayor has favored them by giving them, and not others, the opportunity to work.

1 The Rural Employment Program or PER was born in 1983 (Real Decreto 3237/1983 of 28 December), but it had a background, the Program of Community Employment, introduced in 1971. In December 1996, and under the first government of the Popular Party, this first Program was renamed as Agreement for the Employment and the Social Protection in Agriculture (AEPSA). It was implemented in other regions. 2 This quota has been declining over the years. It began demanding 60 days work/wage a year, but today only are required 35 days of contributions. The reason was the impossibility, in many areas, to achieve the working days required according the previously established. On the other hand, this situation could worsen if, for certain conditions such as weather, yields decreased below the normal range.

That is, the mayor would be seen by the clients as the politician in power who has helped them, not as a mediator that handles cleanly the resources that the state put at his/her service, or at the service of the people, for a specific purpose, as it is the performance of the PER program. From the mayor’s perspective, the clients would not be seen as people who regularly obtain their share of PER work (if their employment and administrative status is appropriate), but as voters, which implies a significant political category. Thus, given the need of rural workers to find work and a subsidy, and the politicians desire to remain in power, with the privileged position of access to very limited resources, the patron-client relationship between voters and political leaders could easily become corrupt or fraudulent. Only the existence of fraud in these practices explains situations such as those observed between 1984 and 1990, when the number of people included in the special agricultural social security system rose from 264,178 to 384,835 people (Cazorla, 1994: 9), despite that the agricultural labor force decreased by 2%. In this sense, Cazorla (1994:35) states that

“There exist Andalusian towns where, in certain seasons, the real number of unemployed people is only ten percent of the total people who receive unemployment’s social benefits. As we say, local authorities are collaborators in this fraud to consciously ignore. Some of them have even declared to the press that “they can not become inspectors to see who works and who does not,” or that “this is a problem of conscience”, and similar arguments”. (“Hay pueblos andaluces en que el número de parados reales es sólo del diez por ciento del total de los que cobran el paro, en ciertas temporadas. Como decimos, las autoridades locales se hacen cómplices de este fraude, al ignorarlo deliberadamente. Algunos han llegado a declarar a la prensa que “no pueden convertirse en inspectores para ver quién trabaja, y quién no”, o que “se trata de un problema de conciencia” y argumentos similares”).

The province of Granada constitutes a particularly important example with regard to the alleged fraud of the PER. Professor Corzo (2002: 159) recognizes that the province of Granada

“has been the Andalusian province where there were more complaints because of the Rural Employment Program’s fraud, such as dysfunction and perverse effects (…) Granada has 168 municipalities (the largest number of all Andalusian provinces) that are hosted to the Program, representing 20% of the total Andalusian municipalities (....) Granada has been, and still is, one of the provinces in the last positions of income levels in Spain”. (“ha sido la provincia andaluza donde se han producido mayor número de denuncias sobre el fraude al Plan de Empleo Rural, como disfunción y efecto perverso…. está constituida por 168 municipios (el mayor número de todas las provincias andaluzas) que están acogidos, en su totalidad, a este plan de empleo y que representan el 20% del total de los municipios andaluces….ha sido y es, una de las provincias situadas en los últimos puestos de niveles de renta en toda España”).

Logically, not all cases of alleged frauds are really related to illegal situations. The PER fraud alerts responded largely to a mass-media campaign, from certain media (conservative opinions) specially, in order to wear down the socialist executive.

However, individual cases of fraud have existed in the province of Granada: "From a total of nine sentences for nine municipalities, a total of six mayors have been charged; the rest have been acquitted, that is, three mayors and ninety-six affected individuals."(Corzo, 2002: 201). According to Cazorla (1992: 34-45)

“Only in the province of Granada (...) the Employment National Institute official data indicate that are only about 600,000 stint days a year in the total of 168 municipalities. Around 2,300,000 stint days are signed without work, to permit rural workers to receive unemployment social subsides. Some employers tend to "sell" their signature for 1,000 pesetas a day (daily wage is 2,775 pts.). As employers pay only 300 pesetas per signature to Social Security, they pocket the remaining 700 pesetas, which may suppose around 800 million pesetas a year, according to complaints the Workers Unions. If these wages days were true, it would mean 6,500 million pesetas a year”. (“sólo en la provincia de Granada (…) las cifras oficiales del INEM indican que en sus 168 municipios sólo se dan alrededor de 600.000 jornales al año. Quedan alrededor de 2’3 millones de jornales que se firman sin que se trabajen, con el objetivo de que los parados cobren el subsidio. Ciertos empresarios suelen “vender” estas firmas a mil pesetas el jornal (que es de 2.775 ptas.). Como ellos sólo pagan a la Seguridad Social 300 pesetas por firma, se embolsan las restantes 700 pesetas, lo que puede suponerles unos 800 millones de pesetas al año, según denuncian los sindicatos. En caso de ser reales esos jornales supondrían 6.500 millones de pesetas anuales”).

That is, if one accepts Cazorla’s view, not only workers and mayors, but all employers who have signed wages without working days taking place should also be held liable for fraud and corruption. In these cases, the trail of fraud emerged from the existing clientelistic political relations could be lost. Research on concessionary and labor political patronage in Spain reflect the abundance of these practices during the years 1980-1992. The research project financed by the Volkswagen Foundation and directed by Cazorla analyzed 300 headlines, corresponding to 42 cases, which were the most mentioned in the media due to their national significance (Cazorla 1996: 308-309). This was no more than a scaled reflection of what was happening in Andalusia at that time and during the years after. There were many cases of party’s clientelism in rural areas. Specific examples of towns in the nineties that were known due to PER fraud are Itrabo (Granada), Víznar (Granada), Pinos Puente (Granada), Andujar (Jaén), Yunquera (Málaga), where local laborers paid 250 pesetas to the City Council for each of the day’s stints that the mayor signed for them; and Moclinejo (Granada), where the charged mayor received between 600 and 800 pesetas for signing false day’s stints3. Focusing on the impact of patronage practices in electoral processes, we can check the maintenance and increase in the number of votes received by parties that controlled the local authorities in small municipalities, and also the employment of workers and the signing of day’s stint in projects funded by the PER. As says Nadales Porras (1990, 1994), the apolitical vote is decided always by the immediate interest and the culture of 3 The source of this information comes from the press of the nineties (El País, El Mundo, Ideal), especially prone to uncover irregularities in the implementation of Rural Employment Program.

acceptance of power, especially if that power will benefits the voter with adequate policies. Increasing the scope of this strictly local clientelistic relationship to higher levels of government, we can see how this patronage between voters and the major of a town has implications for a more general voting behavior. Also, subsidized workers link the payment of aid to governments in higher institutions, resulting in a gliding vote to parties in power, in the case of Andalusia it has always been the Socialist Party. In fact, it was the government of President Gonzalez the one to introduced the PER in 1983, but it was also maintain by the Popular Party’s government from 1996 to 2004. The situation of structural unemployment in Andalusian rural areas is still unchanged, because there is still this large social group that, beyond the cases of fraud, remains dependent on the PER and the unemployment benefit to survive. Therefore, the problem has not disappeared yet. There are many cases in the news that demonstrate the continuity of these fraudulent practices in hiring and election processes. If such drama would not exist, it would be impossible to explain the general attitude of resignation, and without complaints, that a 69-year-old woman sick of osteoarthritis showed to work as a building worker for the Andalusian Employment Service (El Mundo, May 14, 2011). It can then not be unreasonable to think that having a massive amount of unemployed workers, always dependent on the publicly provided unemployment subsidies, is politically profitable. Such schemes ensure a source of votes almost captive in favor of the party in power, precisely because these people depend on governments, whether local, regional or state. In fact, the captive vote remains due to the stability of a seasonal unemployment in the region of Andalusia, especially in rural areas. The perverse consequences and vicious circles of this situation have already been clearly explicit in many other studies (Christopoulos, 1998, Della Porta and Vannucci, 1997, Della Porta, 1997; Jablonski, 2005; Johnston, 1986; Kawata, 2006; Corn, 2005; Médard 1998; Piattoni, 2001). The reference to the Andalusian case serves to emphasize the limitations of democracy to resolve certain socio-economic problems. The political implications of these issues cause mismatches between democratic theory and the functioning of the system in the reality. A quality democracy, which must be an objective, is incompatible with the patronage-clientelism and corrupt practices as observed in Andalusia, without having been effective in their elimination the ruling parties and the opposition, and civil society itself.

Another type of Clientelism: Municipal Corruption

It would not be presumptuous, nor exaggerated, to say that in the more recent years there has been an unimaginable growth of corruption, which has been dramatically reported by the media, alerting the public opinion. Beside the major political corruption webs known by the Spanish citizens in recent times, such as the Malaya case (plot of municipal corruption in Marbella’s city council), the Gürtel case (different types of corruption in the environment of the Popular Party)4, or the Brugal case (business networks in Alicante that benefited from grants and contracts from municipalities); there are hundreds of cases of political corruption within the regional and local

4 This case has even provoked the resignation of the president of the Community of Valencia, Francisco Camps, after having obtained the electoral victory (absolute majority) in recent regional elections of May 22, 2011.

(provincial and municipal)5 administrations. In fact, this increase in the number of cases of corruption, which has affected mayors and councilors of different municipalities, is related to the boom of the urban construction sector that swept Spain after the passage of the law liberalizing public land in 1996 by Aznar’s first government. Since then until the bursting of the housing bubble in 2008, most of the municipal political corruption can be explained by the impact of the real estate boom. However, to this combination of municipal political corruption and the rise of urbanistic construction we should add a third item that led to the general extension of municipal corruption: the inefficiency or lack of legal and political control mechanisms in activities carried out by city councils (Jiménez Sánchez, 2008). The press has discovered, and made public, about a hundred cases of municipal corruption, which have been involved at least a councilor or a mayor6. In the compiled news, politicians accused in various cases of corruption are alluded to. Other times, the least, we find news reporting final judicial decisions declaring guilty the politician involved. And even fewer news refer to a municipal politician who, having been accused of corruption, has eventually been acquitted of all charges of corruption. Perhaps, given the great disparity in the number of the three types of cases, we should think that the media are mainly interested in the scandal before the trials (Corzo, 2011: 246-248), and far less in the final outcome. Moreover, it is quite common that the same crime of municipal corruption implies for the accused the attribution of various types of charges: bribery, breach or graft embezzlement, misappropriation, etc. The relationship between the different types of crime is evident, and in many cases inevitable. For instance, the mayor who decides to allow a breach of the municipal urban development plan may have taken such a decision once a construction entrepreneur, interested in being allowed such a breach, has given him a gift or a bribe. Well, in a case like this, which might have occurred in many occasions, the mayor could be accused of bribery, a crime against the planning of the land, crime against the environment, corruption, and so on. It would therefore be a mistake to think that only one type of crimes of those mentioned below would correspond to each of the considered corruption cases it. Each case of corruption could be involved, thus, in various types of crime.

Table 1 shows the different types of crimes related to corruption that are considered in the research, and are associated with the number of total cases reported in the media. The remaining columns refer to the number of verified cases in which politicians are accused and the total number of known cases in which there is a conviction of guilt.

5 It is difficult to find rigorous sources for the treatment of this subject. The court’s records of cases of corruption can only be viewed by certain people and they are spread by different courts. Neither does the judiciary administration provide general listings of cases that have been reported, processed and sentenced, and which can sometimes be appealed. 6 In this study we have taken into account digital articles published in press, whether for statewide newspapers (El Pais, El Mundo, ABC) or digital newspapers at the regional and local levels, that have become the more important source for the study of the past ten years corruption .

Table 1

Types of crimes and number of cases

TYPE OF CRIME CASES IMPUTED

PEOPLE

GUILTY

PEOPLE

BRIBERY 16 13 3 BREACH OR GRAFT 58 47 11 MONEY LAUNDERING 4 2 2 FRAUD 5 4 1 FORGERY 6 4 2 INFLUENCE PEDDLING 9 7 2 MISAPPROPRIATION 2 2 EMBELEZZMENT 11 10 1 NON SPECIFIED URBAN DEVELOPMENT CRIME

16 14 2

CRIME AGAINST THE ENVIRONMENT

3 3

CRIME AGAINST URBAN DEVELOPMENT PLANNIG

8 8

OTHERS 13 10 3 TOTALS 151 124 27 According to Figure 1, the crime of breach or graft (resolution made by a public official of manifested injustice, knowingly or with inexcusable ignorance) is presented, by far, as the most common analyzed type of corruption in municipal politics (58 / 151). It is followed by bribery (bribery of public officials) with 16 cases, and non-specified urban development crime with another 16 cases (whose mentioning in the news has not specified any particular offense). Meanwhile, the group of others, which also takes into consideration diverse and different number of cases, such as tax fraud or illegal recruitment, accounts for 13 cases. At a certain distance, we find embezzlement (11), influence peddling (9), crime against urban planning (8), forgery (6), fraud (5),

money laundering (4), crime against the environment (3), and, finally,

misappropriation (2).

The low incidence of cases of proven guilt (at least comparing these figures with those relating to the merely accused) is shown in Figure 2. It is unknown if it is because in most cases their legal proceedings are still open, so that it has not been able to dictate whether the defendants are guilty or innocent; or merely because the media have a tendency not to pay much attention to the start and the ending of such court cases, as stated above. The top of the bars marked with different colors displays the number of cases in which it has finally been possible to prove the guilt of the accused politician.

In addition to a classification by type of crime, there have been other measures to check the differentiation by provinces in the number and percentage of municipal corruption cases that have affected each of them. Thus, Figure 3 shows the number of municipalities that have been affected by corruption.

Meanwhile, Figure 4 shows the proportion of municipalities affected by political corruption in each province. When comparing them, we can observe some differences. However, since not all provinces have the same number of municipalities, the provincial level of actual corruption is better represented by the classification shown by Figure 4, in which Cadiz appears as the province with the highest proportion of municipalities involved in a case of corruption in recent years (27.27% of municipalities). In the second group, with percentages between ten and twenty percent, we can rank in ascendent order Sevilla, Malaga, Almeria, and Jaen. The provinces that show the lowest proportion of municipalities stained with cases of corruption during the last years are Granada (7.74%), Huelva (6.33%), and Córdoba (2.67%).

Finally, Figure 5 shows the extent to which each province is involved (not by the proportion of internal corruption that presents, but by the number of cases when compared with the total amount in Andalusia) of the overall calculation of municipal political corruption in the Andalusia during recent years. This table reflects the same provincial classification as that of the Figure 3, except that Figure 5 shows the percentage with which each province contributes to global computing of Andalusian municipal political corruption. It is also worth remembering that Huelva and Cordoba are the provinces with less number of municipal corruption cases, by far, and that they are also the two provinces which, internally, have the lowest proportion of municipalities affected at all by corruption.

This type of municipal corruption, often urban-based, also has a clientelistic structure. It is not extensive labor clientelism, but a clientelism involving the political and business elites. The networks established by local elites (political office and Administration, construction professionals and entrepreneurs) allow them to control the entire process of decision making within the town through a patron-client game. This includes exchange of favors and benefits of all kinds, sometimes outside the law (Cartier-Bresson, 1997; Christopoulos, 1998; Máiz, 2005; Corzo, 2011). The effect is the absence of a true democracy, because the popular will is not heard, and if so, is not accepted, except when there is a match between the interests of the elites and the majority of the population.

The Scandal of Fraudulent Employment Regulation Files (“Expedientes de

Regulación de Empleo” EREs7)

To the existence of rural political patronage-clientelism and municipal corruption we should add the scandal of Fraudulent Employment Regulation Files (Expedientes de Regulación de Empleo, EREs). In the year 2001, the Ministry of Employment of the Andalusian Government (Consejero de Empleo de la Junta de Andalucía) and the Centre for Fomentation of Andalusia (Instituto de Fomento de Andalucía, IFA) signed an agreement that planned to rescue directly and immediately firms with economic difficulties. They created a special fund (647,000,000 euros) to subsidize companies that apply for financial aid and comply with the necessary conditions, which could include layoffs of workers with unemployment benefits and early retirement programs. However, under the new legal framework, and during the implementation of the Plan, it has been highlighted the lack of control over the granting aids. Everything seems to indicate that politicians and public administrators in charge have acted arbitrarily and illegally when granting these economic subsides. The EREs are a formula agreed upon the ending of employment contracts between the companies involved, their laid-off workers and the Government of Andalusia, which is the public institution that financed these layoffs in order to reorganize the companies. However, it was discovered that some of the funds were not devoted to the described cause, but instead they were provided without any control, following the criteria of personal interest of certain politicians of the Department of Employment, especially a former Employment Minister8 and two former General Director of Labor9. This network of corruption, which is under judicial investigation, has several aspects to be considered. The first is the irregular giving of grants to individuals; the second is the provision of subsidies to firms with losses; and the third is the funding of municipalities with financial problems. In the three aspects mentioned above, the discretionary, and without control, use of public monetary resources suggests that a part of that money has been used in favor of those who manage grants, or for the benefit of families and friends

7 We try to explaining the nature of this political scandal trough the analysis of the information that the press has been publishing since February to July 2011, especially El País, El Mundo and ABC in their online editions. 8 Antonio Fernández, Ministry of Employment between the years 2004 and 2010, charged in this scandal, who as President of the Centre for Fomentation of Andalusia (Instituto de Fomento de Andalucía, IFA) signed the agreements which permitted the creation of the economic funds for companies in crisis. 9 Francisco Javier Guerrero, General Director of Employment between the years 1999 and 2008, and Juan Márquez, at the same position between May 2008 and May 2010.

of these, or in favor of party comrades managing city councils. According to data provided by the Andalusian Government, of the total 647 million euros that integrated the funds for EREs, approximately 9 million euroshave been defrauded, which would be 1.39% of the total, only in the budget dedicated to false pre-retirement. 1. Irregular Aids to Individuals or false Retirements. The politicians managing the Files have included public authorities, trade unions members, clients and friends as beneficiaries of the policies of the ERE by the connivance of the insurance agencies, consultancies and political elites of the Ministry of Employment of the Junta of Andalusia, without the legal recognition. This Ministry, after the approval of the General Direction of Labor gave the money through the Centre for Fomentation of Andalusia (Instituto de Fomento de Andalucía, IFA), now Agency for Innovation and Development of Andalusia. 183 cases have been detected as “irregular”. On the one hand, we have identified 72 "outsiders", people who never worked in companies for which they were receiving ERE assistance. Many of them were related directly, or through family members, with Socialist Party elites, which has been the ruling party of Andalusia since 1982. On the other hand, it has been defined a group of 111 people who, having worked in the destined company to collect the ERE subsidies, felt into other administrative irregularities10 that would have prevented them to receive aids legally; nevertheless, they received it. 2. Aids to Companies. As in the former aspect, when granting aids to firms, politicians have committed illegal practices within the administrative processes and the goals of the Plan with the intention of favoring friends and party comrades, some of them former public authorities. It is remarkable that the accused individuals in these cases are located in a small geographical area: Seville, its surroundings and neighbouring provinces. But it is also significant that most of the aids were granted without a study of the economic viability of the company and without control, a posteriori, over the purpose of the money awarded. In addition, it still arouses curiosity that some of these aided companies were linked to people who held office in the socialist public administration or they were directly related to people in that situation.

10 The former Minister of Employment, Antonio Fernández, was included in an ERE of the firm González Byass, according to which this person would have worked in the company since the day of his birth. The aim of this was to get the greater amount of early retirement granted by the ERE in accordance to the greater seniority.

3. Aids to Municipalities. Another part of the resources devoted to the EREs Program went to certain municipalities and city councils. This type of aid enables us to obscure again the particular decisions made when choosing local corporations. First, it was found an uneven geographical distribution of the benefited city councils. From thirteen municipalities that received aid, ten were located in the province of Seville (Los Palacios, Guadalcanal, Alcolea del Río, Coria del Río, Camas, Puebla del Río, San Nicolás del Río, Santiponce, Villanueva del Río and Minas, and El Pedroso), two belonged to the province of Cádiz (Chiclana and La Barca de la Florida, administrative entity in the municipality of Jerez) and one was located in Jaén (Guarromán). These thirteen municipalities share a common characteristic: the Socialist Party ruled the public institutions at the time when it was agreed exceptional aids for them, without legal regulation of any public announcement11. The procedure for awarding financial aid lacked also any legal or political control. It only consisted of a collaboration agreement signed by the Centre for Fomentation of Andalusia (Instituto de Fomento de Andalucia) and the selected municipality, without requiring explicit justification of municipal spending.

11 ABC de Sevilla, 19/4/2011, “Empleo financió ferias a alcaldes del PSOE con el fondo de los ERE”.

At the moment, Justice is considering only the aspect of the network for false early retirement, so that to know the true scope of this web of corruption it will have to wait a while, until the Courts consider the two remaining parties (direct aid and assistance to companies and to municipalities so-called "friends"). But one thing seems clear, a significant portion of money from a public budget has been used by public leaders within the Andalusian Administration to promote those who they considered appropriate. For now, we only know some of the people involved, but it is possible that this web of corruption extended to higher individual and institutional positions. In any case, the power to favor friends and party comrades seems a common pattern in the cases reported. The truth is that there has existed a total lack of administrative control over motivation and destination of these aids. The budget of the EREs, originally designed only to assist laid-off workers and companies in financial difficulties, became a huge "catch-all" box for multiple uses, which has allowed discretionary and arbitrary decisions by some upper charges of the structure of the Andalusian autonomous political power for using these funds.

These cases of corruption, specified in diverse legal, political and moral crimes, have violated the democratic principles of mutual interest, equality, justice and responsibility within the political structures of Andalusia. The discovery of immoral clientelism and corruption in the upper levels within the ruling party and the population itself, have caused great shock in the conscious citizenry. Another element that justifies the progressive abandon of the radical democrats of formal democratic institutions, which deepens much more the lack of trust in parties, parliaments, governments and leaders.

The Andalusian government has reacted ambivalently. On the one hand, it has announced its desire to clarify and punish corruption12. But, on the other hand, it has hindered investigations: refusal to create a parliamentary commission of inquiry and repairs to give to the case’s judge the records (actas) of the Governing Council. In essence, the party’s interest tries to minimize costs of this "affair" of internal corruption (party-government) when facing the public opinion. Hence the few decisions such as the expulsion of militants involved and the statements of good intentions, made seek to blur the responsibilities of high elites and leaders. Private interest dominates the political parties, preventing the transparency in decision-making processes and the transparent information to citizens, in addition to the neglect of the required purity of democratic procedures, as in the upward phase of government formation, as in the declining phase of implementation of public policies (Della Porta and Meny, 1997).

Conclusions

By studying these three types of patronage, clientelism and corruption in Andalusia (Rural Employment Program, Municipal Corruption and Employment Regulation Files) from a perspective of the lack of quality or the non-existence of democracy, we have observed the intersection of three phenomena, without having a clear separation between them in reality. Another issue is that conceptually patronage, clientelism and corruption can be delimitated (Caciagli, 1996 Corn, 2005). As argue Médard (1998) or Villoria (2006), by establishing relations between politicians and citizens in order to satisfy particular interests are corrupt relationships, for its immorality and illegality. Either way, the identity and confluence of patronage, clientelism and corrupt behaviours lies in the distortion of the public administration functions practiced by those who serve them. Violating the principles of legality, rationality, impersonality and general interest, public managers and politicians commit political and common crimes satisfying the interests of persons, parties, networks, etc. The irresponsible behaviour of those involved is based in the use of secret information, collusion with businessmen, influence peddling, arbitrary use of bureaucratic power, etc. The conditions of the political system and party system, such as the coming to power of a new party, the long stay in power by one party and the lack of a critical public opinion, contribute to root theses ballasts for democracy. Consequently, policy based on patron-client relations and its corrupt sliding has a high cost for political integration through democratic means. Even, the interventionist tendencies of the state will maximize its capacity for the public decision making, the decentralization of powers and responsibilities for several local administrations and the gaps in control processes on governments and public administrators, allowing discretionary and arbitrariness, increase the danger to democracy. According to Della Porta and Meny (1979: 179) political corruption undermines and endangers the functioning of democracy through various mechanisms: the proliferation

12 The Andalusian Government reported the case to the prosecution and created a investigation internal committee, coming up with this to self-satisfaction as evidenced the statements of Manuel Recio (http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=208413845836574 of March 23, 2011: "we are demonstrating transparency in this process, I think is beyond doubt" and "I intend to recover every penny that has been able to collect irregularly in this matter") and Mar Moreno ( Remarks at Press Conference February 8, 2011) also came to say categorically that the intentions of the Junta of Andalucia were "getting to the final whoever falls".

of political businessmen or businesswomen, the invasion of social life and the market for the political parties as guarantors of corrupt exchanges, the transformation of citizens into customers, the partisanship of the government, the growth of the darkness and secrecy, etc. Although the majority of people believe that democracy is the best possible political system, and the desire to improve the quality of our democratic politics is extended, it is hard not to see its limitations and imperfections, magnified in the context of crisis of values, of trust at parties and leaders, and of economic principles. In these contexts, corruption, that is in fact an endemic problem, increases exponentially. That is what is verified in recent years and everywhere (Bull and Newell, 2003, Della Porta and Meny, 1997; Heywood, 1997; Cazzola, 1988, 1992, Gómez Fortes et alli, 2010; Kawata, 2006; Villoria, 2006; Vidal-Beneyto, 2010). Andalusia is not one exception, as we have seen above. Therefore, we can think that democracy is an impossible ideal, a moving horizon in democratic ideology, because leaders and citizens forget very often the democratic virtues that must govern the political community, in order to personal enrichment.

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