An Exploration and Critical Analysis of the Role ofMemoryin Cold War Historical Interpretation at the Golden GateNational Recreation Area’s Nike Missile Site SF-$8

Greg Shine

The interpretation of our recent past is one of the most controversial aspects of publichistory. More so than the academic, the public historian is forced to run a gauntlet lined bya myriad of potent partisans in an attempt to emerge unscathed and thereby impart a

history free of the bumps and bruises of influence and bias. The public historian employed bythe federal government begins to run the gauntlet only after the additional handicap of beinghamstrung by issues such as direct public and congressional accountability, an antiquated trickle-down hierarchical organization, and an underpaid, undereducated, partisan, and oftentimesvolunteer staff. It should come as no surprise, then, that some federal public history projects,such as the National Air and Space Museum’s Enola Gay exhibit, do not survive the gauntletwithout major concussions. Are there any federal projects that do emerge with only slight bumpsand bruises?

In this paper, I will explore and analyze components of the historical interpretationprogram at the Golden Gate National Recreation Area’s (GGNRA) Nike Missile Site SF-$8L tosee if the New National Park Service (NPS) History has had any influence on the public historyimparted onsite. What is the nature of the Cold War public memory that is established at theNike site?

In order to begin to answer this question, it is important to first outline some of the recentacademic theories on the role of memory in public history. Most historians agree that publicmemory is always selective and often contested. However, the underlying theories differdramatically, though they are not polar opposites.

Historians have applied Michel foucault’s theories of the institutional use of power andcontrol to public history and public memory. These historians argue that the nation-state controlsthe public memory and imposes a nationalistic, patriotic version of history on the public in orderto maintain control.’ Several of these historians have applied this theory to the NPS and its rolein public history.

In a chapter dedicated to the NP$ and its role in creating and maintaining public memory,historian John Bodnar argues that in the 1930s, forces of zealous and belligerent patriotismcombined with the nationalism of early New Deal programs and the focus on national unity andservice (fostered by the acquisition of battlefields and national monuments) to create aservicewide nationalistic ideology as represented by the national heroic narrative. The NPSideology, then, was “to describe and celebrate the process of nation building” rather than focuson vernacular interests.2 Likewise, Jon Wiener, historian and contributing editor to The Nation,decried the 1996 NPS designation of Whittaker Chambers’ farm as a National HistoricLandmark, claiming that institutional conservatives were searching for ways to conmiemoratethe noble cause of Cold War effort. “Today, when American lacks a unifying ideology to replace

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the cold war struggle, conservatives hope to bring coherence to their cause by enshrining the anticommunist crusade in U.S. history."3

A competing theory is represented by the work of historians such as Raphael Samuel and Michael Kamrnen. In Theatres of Memory, Samuel theorizes that history and public memory are a social form of knowledge - "the work, in any given instance, of a thousand different hands. "4

He recommends a more ethnographic approach, similar to that of the Gottingen school of microhistory, which, instead of "focusing on state theatricals, or the figures of national myth . . . might find it more profitable to focus on the perceptions of the past which find expression in the discriminations of everyday life. "5 Kamrnen provides many examples that argue that public memories have not been crafted by the nation-state, but have "emerged from the interaction of social groups in a heterogeneous society."6 In Mystic Chords of Memory, he elaborates on this concept, stating that the transmission of memory and tradition "tends to be decentralized, ad hoc, diffuse, and relatively noncoercive - so long as ritualized observances, national symbols, and local customs are not flagrantly violated."7

In direct application to the NPS, Kamrnen accents the roles of regionalism, ideological populism, bureaucratic opportunism, and individual determination in establishing the NPS as steward of our public memory in the 1930s. He also notes the symbiotic relationship between the NPS and the private sector and partisan groups, noting that NPS officials capitulated often when pressure from these groups was applied, even when it was contrary to agency policy. 8

With this basic knowledge of the recent theories surrounding public memory, one can garner additional background by noting two recent examples of contested historical memory of the Cold War. The first and most well-known is the controversy surrounding the Enola Gay exhibit proposed for the National Air and Space Museum in Washington D.C. Centered around the airplane that dropped the first atomic born� on Japan, the exhibit was designed to explore the creation of the atomic bomb, the decision to use it, its effects on the Japanese people, and the debate surrounding its use. Veterans' groups (including the Air Force Association and the American Legion) led an attack on the draft text of the exhibit as "politically correct" and "anti­American. "9 Under pressure from the military, the press, and eventually Congress, the National Air and Space Museum capitulated and canceled the exhibit. As the criticism snowballed, these groups chided and reviled historians, referring to them as intellectual elites attempting to disparage America, and questioning their work as revisionist speculation. 10

Another example of contested memory surrounds the proposed $100 million Victims of Communism Memorial Museum authorized by Public Law 103-199 in 1993. Proposed exhibits for this museum include artifacts (such as portions of the Berlin Wall and a cell from the Hanoi Hilton) and a database of as many of the alleged "one hundred million victims of communism" as can presumably be identified. Advocates claim that a memorial to those who perished in the "unprecedented imperial Communist holocaust" is long overdue, and will serve to "correct the amnesia" of "how pathologically evil communism has been," and "why we poured so much blood and treasure into fighting the Cold War."11 Critics, including the aforementioned Jon Wiener, claim that the proposed Museum, like the NHL status of the Chambers' farm, is a ploy by conservatives to paint our Cold War efforts as noble and just.12

The importance of the relationship between the study of memory and public history has been well documented in the three and a half years following the cancellation of the Enola Gay

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exhibit. This controversy brought the challenges of public history, the non-academicpromulgation of history, into public focus. For the first time, a large segment of our populationlearned of the process through which interpretive media such as displays, signs, informationalbrochures, and public programs are designed, produced, and exhibited. Judging by the rash ofpublications dedicated to the controversy, it can be surmised that academia also was highlyconcerned. However, as late as 1996, historians continued to lament the lack of an exchange ofideas between scholarship on memory and the federal practice of public history. 13 Why werepublic historians in the federal government viewed as out of touch? Were federal organizationssuch as the National Air and Space Museum and the NPS making any effort to incorporatecurrent trends in academia? An examination of the NPS methods of creating and interpreting ourpublic history may provide some valuable insight.

In examining NPS documents, it is clear that, on a servicewide level, the study ofmemory is an integral component of the New NPS History. The NPS, a bureau of the federalgovernment managed under the executive branch by the Department of Interior, is mandated toprotect and preserve many sites and materials integral to our nation’s natural and culturalheritage. In 1991, at the 75th Anniversary Symposium “Our National Parks: Challenges andStrategies for the 2l Century,” the NPS reviewed its modus operandi and critically revisited themeans through which it sought to meet its responsibilities. Colloquially referred to as the VailAgenda, the assembled experts took to task the NPS thematic framework for history, recognizingthat ethnic heritage and national culture are not mutually exclusive, and stating that the “idea thata single ‘Truth’ exists regarding historical and environmental events has been criticallychallenged.”4 Specifically, the Vail Agenda recommended that the NPS encourage its staff tobetter interpret controversial events and sites and incorporate multiple points of view intointerpretive programs by implementing the following four principles:

1. The examination of controversial events should be on a site-by-site basis. Methodsmight include local conferences, public hearings, and experimental interpretive programs.2 Participants should include both mainstream and radical historians, natural scientists,public educators, park superintendents, and field interpreters.3. The consequences of revisionist history and public controversy over environmentalissues should be thoughtfully considered.4. This ongoing activity should result in the preparation of a policy statement, flexibleguidelines, and useful training materials.’5

As a result of this symposium (and in response to Congressional mandate), the NPS in1993 convened a workshop cosponsored by the Organization of American Historians (OAH) andthe National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History (NCCPH) and supported bythe American Historical Association (AHA). Participants included Page Miller from the NCCPHas project director, fifteen consulting scholars, twelve NPS stafl two advisors, and one observerfrom the House Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests, and Public Lands. This symposium setout to revise the NPS Thematic Framework for interpreting the nation’s history. In a consciouseffort to incorporate the work of academic historians and place the NPS interpretive effortswithin a broader comparative framework than previously provided for, the symposium identified

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eight new themes for NPS historical interpretation: Peopling Places, Creating Social Institutionsand Movements, Expressing Cultural Values, Shaping the Political Landscape, Transforming theEnvironment, Developing the American Economy, Expanding Science and Technology, and theChanging Role of the U.S. in the World. An overlapping circle represented each of these themes,with each circle embracing an inner circle of pre-history and history. Though not represented inthe graphic on the cover and in the text, the three concepts of people, time, and place cut acrossall categories.’6 Shortly after publication in 1996, the NPS distributed copies of this text toemployees responsible for historical interpretation.

In 1994, a humanities subcommittee of the National Park System Advisory Board,created in response to a request from NPS Director Roger Kennedy, published Humanities andthe National Parks: Adapting to Change. This document recommended strengthening of the NP$history program — especially the research and scholarship components — and strengthening ofties with academic historians.’7 These documents, and the recommendations contained therein,comprised the New NPS History.

At the GGNRA, the New NPS History is being incorporated into interpretive operationsby several interpretive planners and specialists, spearheaded by Brett Banide, GGNRAInterpretive Media Specialist. In the 199$ working draft Long Range Interpretive Plan for TheGolden Gate National Parks, Banide helped develop the site’s proposed interpretive themes,resource significance, existing conditions, desired futures, and implementation strategies inaccordance with the principles of the New NPS History. Four of the five interpretive themesstress the connection of the site to the bigger coastal defense and Cold War picture. For example,the first theme recognizes that the “Nike site is a symbol of the political, military, and socialtensions that troubled the nation and the world during the Cold War era.”18 The documentidentifies five desired futures for historical interpretation at the site. Planners hope that visitors tothe site will be able to 1) have increased access; 2) receive accurate, up-to-date informationregarding programs, activities, hours of operation, safety precautions, and pertinent parkregulations; 3) learn about the role of the Nike Missile System in coastal defense, thetechnological and human aspects of the operation, security procedures, related social and moralissues of the Cold War era, and why the system became obsolete; 4) discover connections withother coastal defense sites throughout the bay Area; and 5) appreciate the efforts and talents ofthe volunteers who preserve and interpret the site.19

Other recommendations note the necessity of an oral history project to document theknowledge and expertise of the volunteers, the development and implementation of a curriculumbased education program for grades 11-12, the limiting of interpretive media to indoor locationsor outside the entrance gate, and the development of audio visual programs for an exhibit roomand a proposed underground missile bay theatre and classroom. These strategies clearly stress theimportance of tying the site to the larger Cold War picture, and specifically recommend thatprograms and exhibits

place the Nike missiles in the context of the Cold War and present some of the strategicand ethical questions and issues surrounding the prospect of nuclear war. This programcould become a springboard for more in depth discussions, and be especially valuable forvisiting school groups?°

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These strategies clearly reflect the influence of the New NP$ History.In viewing these documents, one is easily able to identify common assumptions and

recommendations. But has this major change in thematic focus been incorporated at theindividual sites, or is it an unenforced policy kept within the confines of the beltway and theinterpretive planning offices? What is the public history that is created on-site? How are NPSinterpretive efforts at employing the new framework complicated when applied to topics ofrecent history, such as the Cold War? The preceding pages represent the context, and these arethe questions I have set out to answer.

Background

In the late 1940s, U.S.-Soviet diplomatic relations in no way held the monopoly ondisagreement and rivalry. In fact, the U.S. Department of Defense was suffering from innerturmoil. Following the reorganization of the Mr Force in 194$, a rivalry developed between theAir Force and Army, and each crafted its own separate programs for air defense, includingguided missile systems. The Army worked with Bell Laboratories to develop the Nike Missilesystem, while the Air Force worked with several different contractors in the development of theBOMARC missile system. Army and Air Force officials feuded openly and in public, with theArmy charging as late as 195$ that the Air Force was “planning in World War II terms” with theBOMARC system.2’ Eventually, the BOMARC system was phased out, and the Nike Missilesystem became the most highly deployed system of the time.22

Project Nike was the title of a verbal report presented to the Army by representatives ofBell Laboratories in May 1945, and Nike soon became the name of the missile system. ByAugust 1945, planning had progressed enough for the Army to select the Douglas AircraftCompany to produce the supersonic rocket-powered guided missile, and Bell Laboratories andWestern Electric to produce the missile’s radar system. By 1953, the defense contractors hadproduced the Nike Ajax missile, and construction of missile batteries followed across the nation.The Nike Ajax was specifically created to be a third line of defense against attacking Sovietaircraft. Upon launch, a 34 foot long Nike Ajax would travel at speeds up to mach 2.3 in the 70seconds that it would take to intercept and destroy a Soviet plane a distance of 25 to 30 milesaway. 23

While the Nike Ajax was being deployed throughout the U.S., the Army was developinga more sophisticated guided missile — the Nike Hercules. With a range of more than $7 miles, aspeed in excess of mach 3.5, and the capability of carrying a nuclear warhead, the Hercules wassuperior to the Nike Ajax and was considered to be better able to combat the perceived threat ofSoviet supersonic attack. By 195$, Hercules missiles began replacing Ajax missiles at manysites. The Hercules system was later upgraded to Improved Nike Hercules, and this systemremained in operation for over fifteen years. Although a third Nike, the Nike Zeus was indevelopment, it was phased out in 1963. As the U.S. strategic air defense mission shifted fromantiaircraft defense to Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) due to the development ofIntercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) systems which eliminated the probability of bomber

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attacks, the Nike system bordered on obsolescence. By 1973, phase out of Nike Herculesmissiles had begun, with all sites ordered closed by September 1976.24

Construction ofNike Missile Site SF-$$, in the Mann Headlands north of San Francisco,began in 1954 as a result of a decision by Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens to “establishantiaircraft batteries equipped with Nike Guided Missiles.” The Army selected a gentledrainage ravine near Battery Alexander at Fort Barry as the site of the permanent launchingfacility (later referred to as SF-8$L) and the top ofWolf Ridge at Fort Cronithite as the radar andcomputer-laden control site (SF-8$C). By mid-1955 construction of the permanent undergroundmissile storage magazines was completed at a cost nearing $1,250,000, and the Nike Ajaxmissiles were first positioned. By 1959, after extensive renovations costing over $1.7 million, thesite was adapted to accommodate the new Nike Hercules missiles. The site, when viewed today,reflects very little change since this 1959 renovation. In 1964, the Army demolished the oldbarracks area adjacent to SF-88L and rebuilt a permanent administrative area (SF-$8A) completewith a mess hall, barracks, offices, and other rooms.26

After nineteen years and ten months of activation, the Army deactivated the site onAugust 2, 1974. The Golden Gate National Recreation Area (GGNRA), a unit of the NPS, wassimultaneously acquiring excess Army land, and the Army proposed the Nike site for transfer, tobe “retained as an Historic Memorial to Air Defense — Nike Hercules. Plans are for Armypersonnel to remain on site to explain and demonstrate NIKE operation until replaced byGGNRA personnel.”27 Though the Army planned to turn over to the NPS almost all equipmentin addition to the property, the NPS declined the offer, showing interest in the property at thelaunch and administrative sites only, due to the limited resources of the fledgling park. TheArmy completed final transfer of SF-8$L, SF88-C, and SF-8$A to the NPS in early 1976.2$

John Martini, the GGNRA’s Curator of Military History, recalls his first visit to the sitein late 1974. “Nobody knew what to do with this thing,” Martini remembered.29 Though therewere occasional weekend history walks through the military sites of the Mann Headlands,including the Nike Site, “no maintenance was done -- it was a new park, emphasizing trails, thevisitor center, and land acquisition.”30 The site received only sporadic attention — maintenanceperiodically cut down the weeds and on one occasion provided a “lick and a promise paint job —

over the rust without any prep work.”3’ In 1975, a staff member was able to photo-document thesite exteriors and interiors. Though the park maintenance employees had attempted to make thesite appear more dramatic by hydraulically jacking up a launcher to a 45-degree angle andwelding on struts, Martini recalls that by the late 1 970s the site was “looking neglected. It wasreally, really overgrown, and the paint was starting to peel.”32

Attention to the site diminished in the early 1 980s, resulting in serious damage to theequipment and several mechanical breakdowns. Occasional interpretive walks continued, andother organizations began to tour the area unsupervised. Martini recalls auditing an interpretiveprogram led by employees of the YMCA Point Bonita outdoor education program in 1981: “Theleader had the kids sitting in the (missile) pit with the missiles behind, and told them to ‘envisiona world without these horrible things behind us.”33

The first volunteer program at the site began around 1986, initiated by NPS employeeJohn Ryan. Members of the Military Vehicle Collectors Club (MVCC), a group primarilyinterested in the collection and restoration of military jeeps and trucks, began to perform some

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general maintenance duties such as painting. Though their attendance was sporadic and not wellorganized, Martini remembers about six or seven members attending, many in Army uniforms,each workday. The NPS did not provide any interpretive training or direction to the volunteers,as the activity was considered more of a site restoration project than a primary interpretive site.An annual open house was held at the site in the late 1 980s, and the MVCC members attended.In 1989, several incidents of inappropriate behavior at the open house, including a drunkenmember in a Colonel’s uniform, led to the termination of the relationship with the MVCC. “Wesevered ties with them,” Martini recalled, “after that.”34

Following a year without an active volunteer program, Milton B. “Bud” Halsey, Jr., aretired Army Colonel who had been instrumental in the management of the fort Point andPresidio Historical Association, contacted Martini. Halsey encouraged Martini to become theNPS volunteer manager for a new Nike volunteer program. “By 1992, Bud was at the site fulltime,”35 Martini stated. “More than any one person, he has been responsible for leading thevolunteers on site in the hard and dedicated work of preservation, restoration, andinterpretation.”36 Presently, Halsey serves as the volunteer Site Manager.

Since the spring of 1997, Park Ranger Cathy Petrick has been the NPS volunteer programcoordinator:

Since I’ve arrived I’ve relied on Bud and that’s a program that’s in place. Bud ismanaging the program. Since I was given the management also of the visitor center andthe (Point Bonita) lighthouse programs, and the volunteers associated with thoseprograms, for the first two years I was happy to just let the Nike site function on its own.And it wasn’t really until this past winter.., a year ago I became more involved.”37

Presently, the site has an open house on the first Sunday of each month, and is open to thepublic on Wednesday afternoons or by appointment. Despite the limited hours of visitation, thesite hosts over 20,000 visitors each year. Volunteers have contributed 28,000 hours toward thesite’s restoration and interpretation in the past two years, and Halsey himself has logged anastonishing 39,000 hours (the equivalent of 18 years) of volunteer work in the park.38

Beginning in October 1998, I began my observation and analysis of the Nike site.Focusing on three major components of interpretive media — the means through which the park’smessage is imparted to visitors — I began with the site’s World Wide Web (WWW) pages, andthen visited the site several times and analyzed the site bulletin and interpretive talks presented.

WVW Site

The Nike site boasts its own WWW home page at www.nikemissile.org. The home page,titled “The Last Nike Missile Site,” consists of a photo of the main gate framed by two copies ofthe NPS arrowhead insignia. The home page features eight options for the cybervisitor. The firstoption is a brief site history entitled “The Last Nike Missile Site: $F-88L.” Adorned with theinsignia of the 5l and 61St Air Defense Artillery, this page gives a four-paragraph introductionto the Nike Ajax and Nike Hercules systems and a site orientation, along with four photos fromthe site. The second option provides access to ten short (less than 30 second) video clips,

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courtesy of KTVU-TV’s “Our Town” travelogue. The third option features photos of the VIPsin action, along with brief biographical segments outlining the military service of several. Elevenhyperlinks to other Nike-related Internet sites are offered by the fourth option, and the fifthoption is a Nike Bulletin Board currently under construction and not operational. The sixthoption is the guest book, which allows web site viewers to pose questions and share informationrelating to Nike missiles. A visitor can also contact Halsey directly by clicking on his e-mailaddress budhalsey@nikemissile.org. following a large graphic of the Uncle Sam “I Want You”recruiting poster, the final option allows one to request information about how to become a sitevolunteer by e-mailing volunteer@nikemissile.org. The site is relatively well visited, and thepage’s counter reported in early October 1998 that the web site had had 44,712 visits sinceJanuary 1, 1997. The site is attractive, well organized, and well proofed. It is very colorfi.d, andhas active and updated links.

Analysis

The NPS is very methodical about organization of official web sites. In 1996, the NPSweb presence was overhauled through a contract with Interactive Bureau, Inc., resulting in thereorganization of all public NPS web publications as Park Net: The National Park Service Placeon the Web.39 The ParkNet Publication Handbook is the guideline that includes basic publicationstandards and procedures for web pages, including the HTML code and categories and interceptscript required for each NPS web page. This information is provided expressly to help “NPSauthors to use and develop Web presentations and to maintain a common look and feel acrossParkNet.”4° With this background in mind, one of the most striking features of the site’s webpage is that it was developed without NPS involvement. It therefore stands in stark contrast toother NPS Web sites. Though the recognizable brown arrowhead — the official NPS icon —

frames the home page, there the similarity ends. In fact, though the NPS and the GGNRA websites have links to this page, the web site is not an official NPS web page. Upon closer look at theaddress, <www.nikemisslle.org> it is clear that the NPS server is not used. This conflicts withNPS policy, which states that in order to ensure accuracy and accessibility of officialinformation, the “only way our Web visitors can be sure that they are getting official informationis by hosting that infonnation on ParkNet servers.”41 The site does not include any of the keyelements of ParkNet design, including the ParkNet logo linking to the ParkNet home page, theparchment background, the jagged rule line, the NPS running header, the standard fonts forheadings, the font size and treatment, the intercept script for links, and the 17 point pagetemplate.

The brief historical text in the site’s first option <www.nikemissile.org/nike.html>,entitled “Site SF-$$, “is very general in nature, and provides an adequate introduction to the site.It provides two paragraphs of basic information of the operation and development of the NikeAjax and Nike Hercules missiles, and two paragraphs outlining the general layout of a missilesite. A more appropriate title would be “Nike Guided Missile System” or a similarly general titleto reflect the nature of the information — the text does not describe the historical context or layoutof Sf-88. Four photographs are more helpful. They are presumably photos from SF-8$ used torepresent examples from the text. Noticeably absent is the introduction or examination of

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controversial events associated with the site. There is no reference to the Soviet Union or China(whose bombers were the intended recipients of Nike missiles), no reference to the policies thatled to the Nike’s development and retirement, and no reference to the Cold War. Additionally,perspectives on the Cold War and the arms race that are contrary to the national heroic narrativeare noticeably absent — there is no revisionist or alternative perspective to counter the prevailingnationalistic viewpoint. Thus, the history represented in the web site lacks the influence of theNew NPS History.

A more detailed analysis of the web site’s content can be achieved by applying conceptsfrom deconstruction and language theory to the historical information included on the web site.By reading for what is absent as well as reading for what is present, and by basing our analysison the premise that the meaning of a written source is dependent on the rules of the format — thestructure — as well as the creator, the web site can be analyzed more holistically.

Ostensibly uncontroversial in nature, all statements are authoritatively related, primarilyusing the active voice. Judging by the text, the volunteers either anticipate a visitor with ageneral interest of Nike systems and no interest in the historical perspective or context of thesystems, or seek to direct the visitor’s interest away from these controversial areas. In either case,it is clear that the volunteers have consciously left no room for conflict and ambiguity.

The text stresses that the Nike missile systems were defensive weapons, asserting that theHercules “was developed to provide the air defense system with an improved weapon toaccomplish the task of denying penetration of our defenses.”42 However, the text does not placethe Ajax or Hercules in the larger Cold War perspective. It fails to describe any similar Sovietdefensive equipment or strategy for comparison, any U.S. or Soviet aggressive systems ortactics, the ambiguities of the anns race, or even the potential recipients of the warhead-ladenmissile beyond conceding that the missiles “provided a deadly weapon for use against formationsof aircraft.”43 The text, by not offering the larger perspective or the conflicting accounts ofaggressive and defensive components of the arms race, commemorates the development of theNike Ajax and Hercules programs and contributes to a major chapter in the national heroicnarrative -- the defense of the American homeland. In addition, by not personalizing (or evenrecognizing) the Soviet Union or China as the anticipated enemy, the visitor is denied access tothe primary tools needed to make a well rounded personal appraisal of the missiles, the site, andthe Cold War.

The second option from the home page, “10 short videos of site $F-$$”, provides a smallamount of historical perspective. Selected from a KTVLJ-TV “Our Town” feature story on theNike Site narrated by Gary Kauf, the ten clips describe the missile systems, the equipment, thesoldiers, and the VIPs of the site. Five of the segments offer information about the soldiers whoserved at the site, and provide an interesting perspective on the fear and seriousness that cloakedthe site during its operation. Of particular interest is the attempt to place the site in historicalperspective in the ninth clip entitled “Why they closed — S.A.L.T.” Kaufs narration relates thatS.A.L.T. “abolished all of these bases... but allowed one, just one, to stand in each country as areminder of those Cold War years, when we were this close to nuclear annihilation.” The videothen cuts to a U.S. soldier executing a final countdown, a fmger activating a firing mechanism, amissile launch, and an explosion. This clip’s perspective is firmly in support of the national

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heroic narrative, with a purpose to commemorate the site, and, by extension, the U.S. role in theCold War. Thus, when historical perspective is provided, it is disappointingly partisan.

The site guest book provides an interesting look at who is accessing the web site andwhat their impressions are. By early October 1998, there were 637 visitors who had signed theguest book — over half of whom were veterans or active duty military. The majority of thecomments logged in the guest book are from these military personnel and are queries regardingthe location of former comrades, the status of reunion groups, and reminiscences. However,these provide a fascinating perspective of the impact and perceived nature of the web site and thetopic. As Roger Stevens noted in the August 1998 guest book, “we need to keep these parts ofour past alive and well in order to prevent it from happening again.” This sentiment is echoedagain and again throughout the guest book. “I hope this site stays ‘UP’ forever so that thesoldiers who helped stop a real shooting Nuclear War won’t be forgotten (at least as much asthey have been now),” recommended Jon C. Rogers, also in August y99$•45 The site, at least inthe eyes of those who voiced their sentiments in the guest book, further supports a nationalheroic narrative of America as the defender of democracy and savior from nuclear disaster. Theabsence of any historical perspective and the neglect of alternative perceptions of our nationalstories focuses the cybervisitor on the general “facts” of the site, and denies the opportunity for adialogue to be opened. However, it is interesting to note that even when faced by this largelynationalistic web site the lack of historical perspective does not go unnoticed. Take for exampleTom O’Brien’s contribution to the guest book: “My family visited the area this past summer. Theboys had a great time. They had a ton of questions on why, who were the bad guys, etc.”46Unfortunately, the Nike Missile Site’s web page leaves the O’Briens’ broader questionsunanswered.

Site Bulletin

Upon entrance, I was handed a one-page 8.5” x 11” photocopied document entitled Self-Guided Walkfor Historic Missile Site $F88L Immediately following the title on the documentis the disclaimer, underlined for emphasis, “(t)he missiles you see are inert and cannot befired.”47 The document consists of a hand drawn three dimensional site map with ten numberscorresponding to short feature descriptions for the sentry post, launch control trailer, missile testand assembly building, generator building, Nike Ajax assembly and fueling area and NikeHercules assembly area and warhead building, control area, sentry post, launcher area,underground storage magazines, and kennel area. Since there are not regular guided tours of thesite, this pamphlet is the primary means of directing visitors.

Analysis

While it does provide enough general information to enhance an English-reading visitor’spresence, the pamphlet noticeably lacks the NP$ standardized format. This is due, in part, to thelack of NPS involvement in the bulletin’s design, content, or production. All NPS site bulletinsare required to follow a “standardized graphic design system that reinforces an institutionalidentity for the NPS” and helps the organization of information.48 This system, called unigrid, is

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most easily recognized by a broad black band at the top, with the site name highlighted in largewhite font on a 8.5’ x 14’ sheet folded vertically accordion style or in half to make a four pagedocument.49 All NPS site bulletins are additionally required to provide accessibility informationand safety messages in addition to a map and guide.5° Though the authority for the developmentof site bulletins has been delegated to each park, the NP$ Publications Division of the HarpersFerry center has made available much helpful information, including the servicewide guidelinesfor style and usage in their Editorial Style Guide, available in print or online.5’ No general sitedescription, acknowledgement of the site’s NPS status, or any other identifying introductoryinformation is present.

In analyzing the content of the site bulletin, it is clear that the influence of the New NPSHistory has yet to be felt, despite the structure mandated by the NPS Publications Division:

National Park Service Publications are meant to evoke the spirit of place and toprovoke further exploration of the ideas embodied there. By conveying complexinformation and concepts in vivid and accessible language and dynamic imagery,these publications link the tangible realities of the national parks with the largercontext of intangible ideas that define, influence, and continue to shape us as anation.52

One concern is the fact that the site bulletin does not fit within the NPS structure and does notplace the site in any historical perspective. There is no reference to the purpose of the site, thefunction of the site, the timeframe in which it existed, or the site’s place in the context of theCold War. The document merely names a physical structure and provides basic technicalinformation. Take, for example, the description of the launcher area. The site bulletin outlineshow missiles were moved from the underground storage magazines to the eight above groundlaunchers in eight technical sentences, yet it fails to provide contextual information in the spiritof the New NPS History. What situation would cause the missiles to be launched? What wouldbe the reaction of personnel to a launch situation? Answers to these questions are noticeablyabsent, along with the broader questions that may use the perspective of time to rethink the roleof the launcher area.

What, then, is the structure that the producers of this document applied? The technicaland quantified nature of the site bulletin descriptions provokes the visitors to ask additionalquantitative questions, not linking the tangible site to intangible ideas. While waiting to visit theunderground storage magazines, visitors are kept in the vicinity of the rope entrance area by avolunteer. Of the three questions that were asked in the five minutes that I waited, all three wereasked by visitors with site bulletins in hand, and included questions of rate of missile speed,missile range, and degree of elevation — all presumably provoked in part by the information inthe site bulletin.

A look at the power context of the site bulletin can provide further analysis. Thefunctional and technological nature of the information included in the site bulletin reveals muchvaluable information about the Nike volunteers’ perception ofwhat the public wants to hear. Inlooking at the site bulletin, it is clear that the volunteers were anticipating questions of howmany, how far, how fast, and what function. Every sentence of the site bulletin authoritatively

48

tells the visitor that “this is,” “this was,” “these were,” or a simiiariy crafled statement. Suchauthoritative language may also intimidate and discourage more in depth questioning. Inaddition, each statement can be validated easily and without controversy. “The crew inside thislaunch Control Trailer (LCT) monitored an array of electronic consoles and communicationequipment.”53 This statement can be confinned by a visit to the trailer. But are these thequestions that they were anticipating, or is this the direction in which they want to guide thequestions?

Whether done consciously or subconsciously, by not emphasizing ideas and broadercontext, the volunteers have focused the visitors’ interest on questions that can be answeredsafely and without controversy, and away from questions challenging (or even recognizing) theambiguities and contested approaches to the national heroic narrative. For example, onequantifiable question not addressed by the site bulletin is that of cost -- “how much?” The sitebulletin is silent on any matters of cost. Was this question inadvertently or purposefully notanticipated? In either case, this question compromises the power context of the bulletin, and tooeasily leads to the discussion of controversial topics such as defense spending and the financialcost of the Cold War. The site bulletin may provide uncontested information (such as the role ofthe crew in the launch control trailer), but it fails to provide the reader with the larger context ofintangible ideas promoted by the New NPS History.

Presumably, the NPS also noted the need for an improved site bulletin. “It hasn’t beenprinted yet, but it has been revised,” offered Park Ranger Cathy Petrick.54 She mentioned that arevised bulletin would be produced in NPS format, and added that “the effort was made to makeit more interpretive and to give context to a greater extent because... that’s what this one doesn’tdo.”55 In the meantime, the site bulletin created by the volunteers continues to be distributed onsite.

Interpretive Talks

During one visit, I followed a group of about thirty Cub Scouts of Troop 58 from SanFrancisco’s Japantown to five of the staffed areas, and listened to the interpretive talks given.The first stop was the launch site. As I waited my turn to descend into the missile pit, volunteerRon Parshall gave an interpretive talk and answered several questions. He told about thelaunching process and explained that he was the only site volunteer who had served at SF-8$,pointing out that as a volunteer he was staffing the same missile pit to which he had beenassigned while in the Army. Parshall briefly explained the missile’s operation, and thenanswered questions. When asked about his feelings concerning the visitors’ experience on site,he said that it was nice that the Nike site was located in a park, especially because the Nikes werefor defensive purposes. “I don’t think that it would be appropriate for a plane with an atomicbomb to be displayed.”56

The missile soon began its ascent from the pit, fully loaded with visitors — access to thepit is by riding the missile elevator and holding on to the actual missile for security. The ironydid not escape the Cub Scouts -- one commented that these things that “could have blown us up”several decades ago were providing a “cool” and “neat ride.”57 A site volunteer and

49

accompanying adults urged the children to “hold on” to the missile for safety and balance whiledescending.58

Once inside the missile pit, an unidentified site volunteer began a presentation filed withtechnical jargon about velocities and altitudes. No consideration was given to the younger natureof the audience, and no historical context was given. After returning to the surface, I asked thisvolunteer what concepts or ideas he would like all of us to take away from our visit to the site.He replied, “I don’t know. To see a part of history. The U.S. spent billions of dollars developingthese systems in case of attack, and no one ever attacked us.”59

We were then directed to the dog handling area — historically, there were vicious guarddogs on duty at all times on site. At the kennel and training area, we were greeted by sitevolunteer Dwight Minnich, a former dog handler at a different Nike site. He gave a briefintroduction about the use of guard dogs on site, and while doing so referred to the Cold War.This was the first verbal acknowledgement of the Cold War, and naturally some Cub Scoutswere intrigued. One asked, “What is the Cold War?”6° Minnich was clearly surprised by thequestion, and replied that “it is a war without fighting.”6’ He then paused, clearly searching formore information. “Economic loggerheads (pause) and political loggerheads” were then soughtas explanations.62 After an additional pregnant pause, Minnich described it as “When we buildthem but don’t shoot them.”63 The questioning Cub nodded in assent.

The site has several volunteers providing roving interpretation. They have no fixedstation and move in response to visitation patterns. I was approached by site volunteer Al Kellog,who was very eager to be asked and answer questions. Kellog answered each of my questionswith detail and in a dramatic fashion

—by the time I was ready to observe other aspects of the

site, he had attracted a crowd of eight visitors. When asked what ideas he would like site visitorsto take away from the site, Kellog gave several examples. Firstly, he felt that the public needs toknow how supercritical the situation was for the staff on duty. Everyone was constantly seriousand scared, but “scared enough not to fail.M Stress was incredibly high, and the first sign of“cracking” would send a soldier off for psychological evaluations.65 “I was traumatized. I stillcannot play video games or a game of cards,” Kellog admitted, because he immediately begins torelive the stress associated with his service at a Nike site in San Rafael.66 “I want folks tounderstand that it wasn’t a game,” he exclaims loudly, attracting visitors.67 “The Cold War was aname the politicians used. To me Cold War means ‘need to know.’ Need to know!”68 Regardingthe flmction of the site, he said that the site is primarily “something to preserve.”69 He felt that itis hard to describe “the feelings and attitudes without the site to help evoke the feelings, put thefeelings in perspective.”70 I asked Kellog if the site volunteers had benefited from any of thematerials being released from the archives of the former Soviet Union and he responded in theaffirmative, though the information had only supported what he and his colleagues had believedall along -- that the Soviets had received poor training and that their missiles were “crap” incomparison to those of the U.S.7’ Since the Nike system itself bordered on obsolescence shortlyafter its implementation, Kellog’ s comment seems rather ironic.

Analysis

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The content of the interpretive talks was striking in two ways. The fact that the majority

of site volunteers were themselves veterans of Nike sites throughout the U.S. (and de facto

primary sources) provided a fascinating and unique personal perspective. However, the lack ofhistorical or alternative perspective was just as absent as from the web site and the site bulletin.

All interpretive talks, whether formally presented to a large number of visitors or

individually on an informal basis, were technical and quantified in nature. All talks provided

information such as the number of soldiers present on site, the size and speed of missiles, the

number ofmissiles, the time involved in preparing and firing missiles. A noticeable addition was

the question of cost — all site volunteers willingly acknowledged the extensive costs of the Nike

systems specifically and the arms race in general. However, with the opportunity to discuss

alternative perspectives on so ripe a topic, all volunteers toed the line of the national heroic

narrative and insisted that such extensive expenditures were justified to confront the threat of the

Communism. In each instance, the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 19$Os was given as

the example that the Cold War expenditures were justified, and that the U.S. had won the

conflict.A look at the power context of the interpretive talks can also contribute to our analysis.

With each interpretive talk, the site volunteers actively controlled the information that was

disseminated. When questions were posed that they were unable or unwilling to answer, each site

volunteer rerouted the conversation to one of two topics: technical site information or personal

Nilce site experiences — two areas where the site volunteer held a distinct advantage over the

visiting public. With such a power over the audience, the introduction of historical or alternative

perspectives would decrease the control of the site volunteers, and the power context of the

interpretive talks. Thus, the adoption of the New NPS History could severely impact the

perceived authority of the site volunteers, and could question the national heroic narrative that

these cold warriors strive to impart.Additionally, there was again no reference to any specific enemy, though the destructive

powers of both the Nike Ajax and the Nike Hercules were described in depth. Though the threat

of communism was loosely referred to, there was no mention of who these communists were,

leading one Cub Scout to inquire if the Nikes were used to “shoot down the Japanese.”72 Also, it

is easier to justify the missiles’ existence as general defensive instruments than as specifically

designed to intercept Soviet and Chinese air attacks — especially when the number of immigrants

from both countries has exploded in the United States and, particularly, the San Francisco Bay

Area in the 1 990s. By not personalizing the enemy, the site volunteers steered questions away

from controversial or uncomfortable topics and maintained the power context within the

interpretive talk.Individual personal perspective is one of the most fascinating components of the

interpretive talks. Each of the site volunteers was eager to share personal reminiscences of life at

a Nike site. Description of the everyday life of a soldier is a popular point of discussion. The site

volunteers describe in detail the daily routine at a Nike site, and provide the compelling stories

that are such a part ofNPS Interpretation at military history sites such as Yorktown, Gettysburg,

and Little Big Horn. The only difference is that at the Nike site, the people that are providing the

interpretive talks are the actual participants. This provides a level of knowledge that is difficult to

obtain through interpretive training courses and historical study, but it also raises the opportunity

51

for bias. Ostensible contradictions were also noted in several interpretive talks. Al Kellog, forexample, continuously stressed the seriousness of the situation on site and the lack of any reliefto the stress, but in the same conversation gave equal measure to jokes and games that werecontinuously played by Nike personnel. No attempt was made to reconcile these two themes,though an explanation undoubtedly exists.

The personal component to the interpretive talks is wildly popular. Generally speaking,the public tended to gather to hear personal reminiscences and depart when technical informationwas given. The site volunteers seem to realize this, and adjust their presentations accordingly —

the mark of experienced interpreters. This personal component is successful because it does notcompromise the power context of the interpretive talk — very few people have the knowledgebase or the inclination to question the personal reminiscence of a cold warrior on his own turf.However, with recent studies on the unreliability of the human memory, coupled with the needof cold warriors to justify their former roles in this post-Cold War age, these entertaining andenlightening stories need to be considered cautiously by the public, and complemented byalternative voices.

Conclusion

It is clear that the New NPS History has not yet been incorporated at the Nike MissileSite. Though the operations of the site are generally well introduced, the aforementionedinterpretive media fail to put the site into any historical perspective, and there is very littlereference or link to the bigger picture of the Cold War. Controversial topics, such as the reasonsfor the site’s closure, the site’s role in the arms race, and the costs of the Cold War are notexplored. The work of any academic historians — let alone radical historians or those offeringalternative viewpoints — is nonexistant.

But these failings can not be attributed directly to the volunteers. There are fundamentaldifferences in the perceived role and function of the site, and of the public memory created bythe site, its volunteers, and the NPS. These differences have been unconsciously supported by theNPS through many years of laissez-faire management. Also, the NPS has failed to consistentlyprovide field-level employees and volunteers with the integral elements of the New NPS History.

Halsey is fully aware that the site represents only one specific element of the Cold War.He views the site as a restoration project, and has “no time for the intricacies” of the work ofacademic historians and their perceptions of the Cold War.73 “I want visitors to come and drawtheir own conclusions,” Halsey stated, “and appreciate their history the way it was.”74 He claimsthat there is no room for moralizing at the site, and that he would rather spend his time workingon hydraulics. According to Halsey, four goals drive the work of the volunteers. The first goal isto stop the rust and restore the equipment. Ensuring accountability for the equipment on site isthe second. A third goal is to develop an interpretive program, and the fourth is to train NP$ stafffor when Halsey and the other volunteers are no longer around.75 When asked if he had benefitedfrom the work of academic historians, Halsey mentioned that, to the contrary, he often providedacademic historians with specific site-related information. Since the site is primarily a restorationproject, he does not see the need for academia to contribute to the site “unless they want topaint,” he chuckles. “I’d let a historian do some painting around here.”76

52

This perception of the site as primarily a restoration project and secondly as aninterpretive site is one that has been indirectly supported by the NPS. The volunteers have beenlargely left to develop their own program with themes, goals, and objectives independent ofNPSinput and direction, and Halsey is a very organized and effective leader. “He’s recruiting, hiring,and training his volunteers, and he has a lot of technical skills,” noted Peffick. Halsey franklynotes that the volunteers have not received much support from the NP$. According to him, theNPS has picked up the electric and telephone bills, recently poured concrete and placed awayside exhibit, but not much else. Because of this, the volunteers have provided the majority oftheir own supplies in addition to their time. Halsey attributes this in part to the fact that many ofthe volunteers axe veterans of the Nike system and want to share their experiences with thepublic. “The volunteers represent a different type of preservation ethic,” noted Martini, pointingout that the majority of them come from the enlisted ranks of the military and are “more bluecollar. Their spit-shined and manicured military tradition is the antithesis of the NPS.”77

As a cold warrior, Halsey’s direction and individual determination support the nationalheroic narrative: under his guidance, staff restore, celebrate, and commemorate an air defensesystem of the Cold War era with which they were integrally involved. This involvement of actualparticipants is a double-edged sword: on one hand, their interest in restoration andcommemoration is driven by a unique vested interest. However, this vested interest does notallow the detachment that, in turn, allows conceptions of the past to be revisited and placed inperspective. This complicates the public memory imparted, and denies it balance. While, at firstglance, this may seemingly serve as evidence to the historians who believe that this patrioticpublic memory is imposed by the government in order to maintain control, further analysisshows this to not be the case. Halsey’s program is not institutionally coercive, but is an ad hocresponse to a need that is immediate in the eyes of the cold warriors. In an interesting twist onBodna?s theory, the national heroic narrative at the Nike site is nurtured and fostered by this adhoc work and not the government, which is clearly seeking to revise the narrative throughpromotion of the New NP$ History. In this way, the public history imparted at the Nike Sitemore accurately supports Kammen’s theory reflected in Mystic Chords ofMemory. This is theessence of the public memory created at the site — fascinating but not balanced, ad hoc and notsystematic, micro- and not macrocosmic.

However, it is exactly this high level of organization that has kept NP$ involvement andsupport at bay, and has worked against the sharing of information and the integration of the NewNPS History into the program. Faced with a site run by a reliable cadre of volunteers, parkemployees focused efforts on other areas and activities. “In all honesty I really didn’t know muchabout the Nike site until I was motivated by receiving training from Bud,” Petrick admitted.78“You know, here is this interpretive site within our boundaries that none of us have taken thetime or have felt motivated to learn much about because it was this whole huge area that wasbeing handled by other people.”79 In addition, Halsey has continually stressed historicalrestoration over historical interpretation. “He is also well grounded in the Park Service method of(historical) interpretation,” admitted Petrick. “I don’t know to what extent he is incorporatingmission or interpretive skills into his training because he seems to de-emphasize it... I think thathe doesn’t feel that this is the most important thing for his volunteers to learn.”8° In the meantime, Petrick and Halsey have developed an ad hoc strategy to develop the Nike volunteer

53

program into a more traditional NPS format, including training in the New NPS History. SinceMay 1998, Petrick meets with Halsey “on a bi-weekly basis, and then more recently I’ve startedworking with his volunteers offering bi-montffly training and coordinating involvement ofrangers and interns from the visitor center to go up and help out once a month with the monthlyopen house.”8’ Petrick’ s bi-monthly training sessions for the first year are topics recommendedby Halsey, and include fire extinguisher use, lawnmower safety, and equipment skills. “Myhidden agenda is to work my way up to interpretive skills, and implementation of the mission,and multiple points of view” — all components of the New NPS History.82

It is questionable whether the NPS staff would have been able to impart the New NPSHistory in the first place. When asked, Peftick, several other park rangers, and Halsey had notseen the revised thematic framework for history, which had been allegedly distributed to allemployees shortly after publication. In addition, the major recommendations of the Vail Agendaand Humanities and the National Parks remain to be applied to the site. “I haven’t seen thepublication [Thematic Framework]... but multiple points of view is something that is at the sametime being stressed in the new ‘Interpretive Competencies.’ And within that context, I have heardand been encouraged to interpret in this way — to incorporate multiple points of view whichwould• include different perspectives on history,” admitted Petrick. Recently, interpretiveplanning documents and efforts have begun to bridge this gap, though it may be several yearsbefore the NPS vision for historical interpretation is implemented.

With this background in the New NPS History and the Nike system, and the siteobservations, what alternative perspectives demonstrate the effective application of the New NPSHistory to the Cold War context? In an effort to define by example, the critic is obliged toexplore and identify credible perspectives.

In the context of the Nike site, we can answer the question by looking at what the publicwould find most interesting. My observations show that visitors do not find discussion of whowas at fault in the Cold War interesting. Overwhelmingly, I observed that visitors wanted toknow about the perceived enemy and threat, and about the costs associated with the site.Interpretation delving into the perceived Soviet bomber threat, the site’s obsolescence andclosure, and the actual costs footed by the U.S. taxpayers for the nuclear program (all keycomponents of the Nike controversy) will help to more holistically relate the Nike story andplace it into the broader story of how the Cold War was waged.

The perceived threat of Soviet bombers contributed to and drove development of theNike missile system. What type of Soviet aircraft did the Army anticipate? What was the Sovietstrategic doctrine, and how did it change? Was the Nike system capable of defending against aSoviet offensive? Answers to these and other questions provide compelling alternativeperspectives.

Following World War II, the Soviets developed and deployed the Tu-4 Bull bomber.Easily capable of reaching the United States via the North Pole route, the Bull allowed theSoviets a direct means of nuclear attack. At the 1954 May Day parade, the Soviets presentedtheir first bomber capable of striking the U.S. mainland and returning: the Mya-4 Bison. In avisit to Tushino Airport the following year, an American Embassy attaché reported that twice asmany Bisons existed than estimated by U.S. intelligence sources. However, recent scholarship

54

points out that the Soviets deceived the U.S. attaché by creating the impression of a much largerforce; they presented the same Bisons in multiple flybys, mixed with additional aircraft.84

The perceived Soviet threat intensified in the late 1950s with the introduction of the Tu20 Bear long-range bomber. Amidst talk of a bomber gap, military intelligence estimated that by1959 the Soviets would have 600 to 700 strategic long-range bombers in operation. In a recently-translated official Soviet memorandum, “On the Possibility of Reinforcing Cuba by Air,” 6September 1962, an appendix provides detailed specifications of the Tu-95 Bear, Mya-4 Bison,Tu-16 Badger, and IL-2$ Beagle long-range bombers, and outlines their individual nuclearcapabilities. These aircraft represented the full range of Soviet long-range bomber aircraft in1962.85

However, recent scholarship based on Soviet documents shows that Soviet strategicdoctrine changed in the mid-1950s. The Soviets began to scale down their long-range bomberprogram and shifted resources toward other projects -- specifically ICBM and IRBMdevelopment. The Soviets reasoned that missiles, not bombers, would be the most effectiveoffensive weapons, since missiles were faster and more illusive and expedient.86 On 21 August1957, the Soviet Union launched the world’s first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Thisand the subsequent launch of Sputnik raised the perceived threat of Soviet attack to a levelbeyond the capabilities of the Nike system, although it would take almost two decades for theSoviet policy change to affect site Sf-88. In 1974, Captain Roy Rant, the commanding officer forNike site SF-s8, explained that “the Department of Defense has decided that there is no longer aserious threat to the continental United States from manned aircraft. The real threat is fromintercontinental ballistic missiles, and that job is beyond the capabilities of the Nike Herculesmissile.”87

In the 1 960s, Soviet tactical planning presented the Nike sites with a more direct threat.Soviet strategic strike plans called for suppression of antiaircraft capability, of which the Nikesystem was a major component. Though the Soviets did not develop any new long rangebombers in the late 1960s, they established a new class of Soviet nuclear-powered submarinesarmed with SS-N-6 Sawfly nuclear missiles. With a range of 1,300 miles, these missiles targetedU.S. coastal strategic areas, including Nike sites, which were powerless to stop the newtechnology.28 Thus, discussion of the perceived Soviet threat causes one to rethink the issue ofNike obsolescence. Was the Nike system tactically and technologically obsolete by the late195Os? If it was, why would the Soviets target it? Recent scholarship answers yes to the formerquestion, leaving room for additional discussion of the psychological role of deterrence and theSoviet perception ofU.S. defenses.

Discussion of the cost of the Nike missile system is equally provocative. How much did itcost to create $F-88? How much was invested in the Nike program? How much was spent on theU.S. nuclear weapons program during the Cold War era? Answers to these questions providecompelling alternative perspectives.

As previously related, costs of construction for underground missile storage magazinesand subsequent renovations at site SF-88 reached almost $3 million.89 From 1962 through 1979,Nike Hercules Battalions cost U.S. taxpayers over $7.04 billion (in 1996 dollars).9° TheDepartment of Defense spent over $331 million (in 1996 dollars) from 1962 through 1971 forNike targets alone. Funding was not limited to operational programs; the experimental (and later

55

scrapped) Nike Zeus project received over $3.18 billion (in 1996 dollars) in funding from 1962through 1971.’

A recent study by the Brookings Institute reveals that since 1940, the United States hasspent almost $5.5 trillion (in 1996 dollars) on nuclear weapons and weapons-related programs.This amount represents 29% of all military spending and almost 11% of all governmentexpenditure from 1940 through 1996. Factoring in $320 billion in estimated future costs forstorage and disposal of toxic and radioactive wastes and $20 billion for dismantling nuclearweapons systems and disposing of surplus nuclear materials, the total incurred costs exceed $5.8trillion.92

The data’s editor, Stephen Schwartz, acutely sums up the interpretive role of this data. InAtomic Audit, he hopes that

once policymakers understand the actual costs of nuclear weapons and the oftenbureaucratic and arbitrary forces influencing the size and composition of U.S.nuclear forces, they may plan for the future in realistic fashion, free of cold warbiases and myths.9

This interesting and highly-desired fiscal information provides the opportunity to opendiscussion of controversial components of the Cold War and the arms race, and perhapsinfluence future planning as Schwartz suggests.

Professional Recommendations

My exploration and analysis points to several key recommendations.

1. The GGNRA should begin a more active management of the interpretive operations of theNike Missile Site, drawing on the strong relationship between Petrick and Halsey.

2. The NPS needs to ensure that copies of the documents comprising the “New NPS History:the Vail Agenda,” the Thematic framework, Humanities and the National Parks, and theworking draft of the Long Range Interpretive Plan are made accessible to all interpretivestaff and Nike volunteers.

3. In order to present a more holistic public history at the Nike Site, a tactful integration of thelong term historical interpretive planning strategies (managed by Banide) and the fieldinitiatives (begun in May 1998 by Petrick and Halsey) is essential.

4. A symbiotic relationship of sharing resources, knowledge, and ideas should be establishedand nurtured between Bay Area academic historians and the Nike Missile Site staff andvolunteers.

This relationship can be twofold. The Bay Area boasts many academic institutions, with some ofthe leading Cold War scholars. By establishing links with one or many of these academics, thepark can benefit from current scholarship, and can provide a living example and technicalinformation in return. This relationship could take on several different forms — from a “Scholaron Call” to review materials and provide new information from papers and archives, to a more

56

active and regular involvement including regular site visits, training, public programs, andperhaps even the painting that Halsey jokingly recommended.

In addition, the active use of Bay Area graduate students through collegiate internshipprograms can help the NPS develop specific projects that staffing and funding would notnormally permit. For example, San Francisco State University (SFSU) offers classes in archivesor historical agency internship. Petrick and Martini are well aware of this opportunity, and havecrafted a draft position description for an intern. By contacting the SFSU course coordinator andrecraffing their draft to meet the requisites of the class, they will be better apt to attract aninterested and qualified graduate student.

Gregory Paynter Shine is a graduate student in US. history at San Francisco State University. Hisinterests include public history, local history, and the history ofmemory. Greg received a Bachelor ofArtsdegree in US. history (cum laude) from Wabash College in 1990. In 1992, he wasfinally able to answerthe gnawingparental question, “What are you going to do with a history degree?” after landing ajob as aprofessionalpublic historian and educator with the National Park Service at Fort Point in San Francisco.Greg worked as a Park Ranger, researching andpresentingpublic history programs throughout theGolden Gate National Recreation Area, before movingfully into park management in 1998. In 1997, Gregco-instructed the upper-division geography course ‘Management ofNational Parks andNatural Areas” atSF$U Greg looksforward to a long career with the National Park Service.

‘David Glassberg, “Public History and the Study ofMemory,” The Public Historian 1$ no. 2 (1996), 12.2 John Bodnar, Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 204.Jon Wiener, “Pumpkin Patch Perdu,” The Nation (18 November 1996), 6-7.‘ Raphael Samuel, Theatres ofMemory: Volume One: Past andPresent in Contemporary Culture (London: Verso,1994), 8.5lbid., 17.6 Michael Kammen, “Public History and the Uses ofMemory,” The Public Historian 19, no. 2 (1997), 51.Michael Kammen, Mystic Chords ofMemory: The Transformation ofTradition in American Culture (New York:Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 14.8lbid., 469-473.Edward T. Linenthal and Tom Engethardt, History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other Battlesfor the American Past(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1996), 4.‘° Ibid., 4, 135.“Jeff Jacoby, “To the Victims of Communism, Lest We Forget,” The Boston Globe, 7 December 1995.12 Wiener, “Pumpkin Patch Perdu,” 6.13 Glassberg, “Public History and the Study ofMemory,” 8.14 U.S. Department of the Interior. National Park Service, National Parksfor the 2P’ Century: The Vail Agenda,NPS D-726 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1992), 88.15 Ibid., 89.16 U.S. Department of the Interior. National Park Service, Revision ofthe National Park Service’s Thematicframework (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996) 1-14..‘ Dwight T. Pitcaithley, “The Future of the NPS History Program,” Cultural Resource Management 20, no.7(1997), 6.‘ U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Long Range Interpretive Plan, Golden Gate NationalParks, Working Draft, March 1998 (San Francisco: National Park Service, 199$), 42-3.‘9lbid., 43.20Ibid., 44.

57

21 John A. Martini and Stephen A. Hailer, What We Have, We Shall Defend: An Interim History and PreservationPlanfor Ni/ce Site Sf-88L, fort Barry, Calfornia (San Francisco: U.S. Department of Interior, National ParkService, 1998), 7.22 Ibid 5-9.‘Ibid., 11-16.24 Ibid., 17-18, 54-55.25Ibid., 13.26 Ibid., 67-78, 117.27 Fran M. Roberts, “Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Operations Concise/Outline of Real Estate Actions,Presidio of San Francisco,” ADPWE-6, Box 1, folder 3, PARC, GOGA, 25 February 1974; quoted in Martini andHailer, What We Have, We Shall Defend,, 82.28 Martini and Hailer, What We Have, We Shall Defend, 82-3.29 GGNRA Curator ofMilitay History John Martini, interview by author, 7 November 199$, San Francisco, notesfrom telephone interview.30Ibid.‘ Ibid.32 Ibid.Ibid.Ibid.ibid.36Mini and Hailer, What We Have, We Shall Defend, iii.GGNRA Park Ranger Cathy Petrick, interview by author, 1 November 1998, Mann Headlands Visitor Center,

tape recording.38 GGNRA Volunteer Milton B. “Bud” Halsey, Jr., interview by author, 4 October 1998, Nilce Missile Site, notesfrom interview.39U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, ParkWet Publications Handboolc, available fromhttp:/www.nps.gov/htdocs 1/cave/wwwhbook.hUn; Internet; accessed 13 October, 1998.40 Ibid.4! Ibid..42 GGNRA Nike Missile Site Volunteers, Site SF-88; available from http://www.nikemissile.or&nike.html: Internet;accessed 11 October 1998.Ibid.“ GGNRA Nilce Missile Site Volunteers, Guesibook; available fromhttp://www.nikemissile.org!guestbook/Auust98.hlml; Internet; accessed 11 October 1998.Ibid.

46Ibid.‘“GGNRA Nike Missile Site Volunteers, Self-Guided Walkfor Historic Ni/ce Missile Site Sf88L.48 U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, NP$ Publications: What We Do; available fromhttp://www.nps.gov/publications/pubs-1 .htm: Internet; accessed 11 October 1998.U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, NPS Publications: Site Bulletins; available from

http://www.nps.gov/publications/pubs-2.htm; Internet; accessed 11 October 1998.° U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, NPS Publications: What We Do.Ibid.

52 Ibid.GGNRA Nike Missile Site Volunteers, Self-Guided Walkfor Historic Nike Missile Site SF88LPetrick, interview by author.ibid..

56 Ron Parshall, interview by author, 4 October 1998, Nilce Missile Site, notes from interview.57Unidentified Cub Scout #1, San Francisco Troop 58, comments noted by author, 4 October 1998, Nilce MissileSite, notes from conversation.

5$

Unidentified Cub Scout chaperone, San Francisco Troop 5$, comments noted by author, 4 October 1998, NilceMissile Site, notes from conversation.Unidentified Nilce Missile Site Volunteer, interview by author, 4 October 199$, Nilce Missile Site, notes from

interview.‘4Unidentified Cub Scout #2, San Francisco Troop 5$, comments noted by author, 4 October 199$, Nilce MissileSite, notes from conversation.61 Dwight Minnich, comments noted by author, 4 October 199$, Nike Missile Site, notes from conversation.62Jbid63 IbkI‘4Al Keilog, interview by author, 4 October, 199$, Nilce Missile Site, notes from interview.‘4Ibid.66

67 Ibid6$ Ibid.

° Ibid.71 Ibid.72Unidentified Cub Scout #3, San Francisco Troop 5$, comments noted by author, 4 October 199$, Nike Missile

Site, notes from conversation.n Halsey, Jr., interview by author.Ibid.Ibid.76iMartini, interview by author.Petrick, interview by author.

79mw.° Ibid.‘ Ibid.$2 Ibid.Ibid.

‘4John Newhouse, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), 110.R. Malinovsky, “Memorandum: On the Possibility of Reinforcing Cuba by Air,’ 6 September 1962 (Cold War

International History Project).$6 William Burr, “Soviet Cold War Military Strategy: Using Declassified History” (Cold War International HistoryProject).Martini and Hailer, What We Have, We Shall Defend, 57. Gaddis, We Now Know, 23$.

$$ Martini and Haller, What We Have, We Shalt Defend, 24.89Thid., 67-78, 117.90 Stephen I. Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences ofUS. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 199$), available online at<http://www.brook.edulscripts/projects/nucwcostlnuke_all.pl>. This number includes manpower authorizations,peculiar and support equipment, necessary facilities and the associated costs specifically identified and measurable

to the following: Direct Support Maintenance Units, General Support Maintenance Units, Air Defense Brigades

Headquarters and Headquarters Batteries, Headquarters and Headquarters Batteries Air Defense Artillery Missile

Batteries, Air Defense Group Headquarters and Headquarters Batteries. It excludes Technical Service Support, SAM

Fire Coordination Systems, and Missile Training.91 Ibid., available online at <http://www.brook.eduIFPIPROJECTS[NUCWCOSTflntroduction.HTM>.92 Ibid.Ibid.