an examination of elite consensus towards national

AN EXAMINATION OF ELITE CONSENSUS TOWARDS

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF

GHANA

BY

RUFUS ASHITEY ARMAH

10476125

THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF

GHANA, LEGON IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE

REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF ARTS

IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DEGREE

LEGON JULY, 2019

University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

i


ii

DEDICATION

The work is dedicated to the Almighty God for his abundant grace throughout my life and the

years spent at the University of Ghana, Legon, especially throughout this course. Indeed, God is

the greatest!

I also dedicate this work to my family and friends for their support and contribution to the

success of this work.

To God be the glory!


iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This work started as a thought, and through further observation and deliberation, it became

necessary that it be further developed and investigated in order to ascertain the truth. This would

not have been possible without the ALMIGHTY GOD, whose grace, strength, and unfathomable

wisdom sustained, protected, and guided me throughout this study. I also wish to thank my

patient and loving supervisor, Dr Boni Yao Gebe. His excellent guidance and support made it

possible for me to complete this dissertation successfully.

In the process of adding skeleton and flesh to this study, which involved review of literature and

the conduct of interviews, some notable individuals helped in diverse ways. I would like to

acknowledge the following: the Research Fellows, my course mates and all staff at the Legon

Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) for providing a congenial and

conducive environment which aided in the overall completion of this study. I would also like to

thank Mr. Daniel Bakomora and Mr. Kelvin Ashong for their immense contribution towards the

completion of the study.


iv

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFRC Armed Forces Revolution Council

AU African Union

CDD Ghana Center for Democratic Development

CHRAJ Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice

CPP Convention People’s Party

CRC Constitution Review Committee

EC Electoral Commission

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

FES Fredrich Ebert Stiftung Ghana

GBA Ghana Bar Association

GPRS I Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy

GPRS II Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy

GSGDA Ghana Shared Growth Development Agenda

GJA Ghana Journalists Association

IEA Institute of Economic Affairs Ghana

IMF International Monetary Fund

IPAC Inter-Party Advisory Committee

LECIAD Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy

MP Member of Parliament

MDGs Millennium Development Goals

NCCE National Commission for Civic Education

NCP National Convention Party


v

NDC National Democratic Congress

NDP National Development Planning

NDPC National Development Planning Commission

NHIS National Health Insurance Scheme

NIP National Independent Party

NLC National Liberation Council

NMC National Media Commission

NPC National Peace Council

NPP National Patriotic Party

NUGS National Union of Ghana Students

PHP People’s Heritage Party

PP Progress Party

PNC People’s National Convention

PNDC Provisional National Defence Council

PNDCL Provisional National Defence Council Law

SAP Structural Adjustment Policy

TUC Trade Union Congress

UG University of Ghana

WTA Winner Takes All Politics


vi

Table of Contents

DECLARATION ................................................................................i

DEDICATION ................................................................................... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ................................................................ iii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................... iv

ABSTRACT ...................................................................................... xi

CHAPTER ONE ................................................................................ 1

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 1

1.1 Background to the Study ............................................................................... 1

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem ............................................................. 6

1.3 Research Questions ........................................................................................ 8

1.4 Research Objectives ....................................................................................... 9

1.5 Scope of the Study .......................................................................................... 9

1.6 Hypothesis ....................................................................................................... 9

1.7 Rationale of the Study ................................................................................... 9

1.8 Theoretical Framework ............................................................................... 10


vii

1.8.1 Political Pluralism ................................................................................... 10

1.8.2 Norms of Pluralist Politics....................................................................... 11

1.8.3 Criticisms of Political Pluralism .............................................................. 12

1.8.4 Basis for Political Pluralism .................................................................... 14

1.9 Literature Review ........................................................................................ 14

1.10 Clarification of Key Concepts ................................................................... 21

1.11 Sources of Data ........................................................................................... 23

1.12 Research Methodology .............................................................................. 25

1.13 Limitations of the Study ............................................................................ 26

1.14 Organization of the Study ......................................................................... 26

References ........................................................................................................... 27

CHAPTER TWO ............................................................................. 32

AN OVERVIEW OF ELITE CONSENSUS AND DEMOCRATIC

GOVERNANCE IN GHANA .......................................................... 32

2.0 Introduction .................................................................................................. 32

2.1 Conceptualisation of Elites .......................................................................... 32


viii

2.2 The Relationship between Elite Theory and The Concept of Liberal

Democracy .......................................................................................................... 34

2.3 An Overview of Elite Consensus ................................................................. 35

2.4 The Relationship between Conflict, Consensus and Democracy ............. 39

2.5 Politics in Africa Before the Third Wave of Democratization ................. 41

2.6 The Ghanaian Context ................................................................................ 43

2.7 The Transition Process and the Movement towards Democratic Rule .. 44

2.8 Political Parties in Ghana’s Fourth Republic ........................................... 45

2.8.1 The Regulatory Framework of Party Politics in the Fourth Republic ..... 45

2.8.2 Formation and Activities of Political Parties ........................................... 47

2.8.3 Legal Requirements for Financing Political Parties in the Fourth

Republic ............................................................................................................ 48

2.8.4 Political Parties Operating in Ghana’s Fourth Republic ......................... 48

2.9 Elections in Ghana ................................................................................... 49

2.9.1 Legal Frameworks, International and Regional Commitments ............... 49

2.9.2 The President and Parliament ................................................................. 50

2.9.3 The Electoral Commission of Ghana (EC) .............................................. 51

2.9.4 Role of the Media .................................................................................... 51

2.10 The Legislature in Ghana .......................................................................... 52


ix

2.10.1 Composition of the Parliament in Ghana .............................................. 52

2.11 Political Successions in the Fourth Republic ........................................... 53

2.11.1 Political Succession from 1992 to 2000 ................................................ 53

2.11.2 Political Succession from 2000 till Date ............................................... 54

2.10 Conclusion .................................................................................................. 56

References ....................................................................................................... 58

CHAPTER THREE ......................................................................... 61

AN EXAMINATION OF ELITE CONSENSUS AND NATIONAL

DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA ........................................................ 61

3.0 Introduction .................................................................................................. 61

3.1 Operational Benchmarks for Examining Elite Consensus in Ghana ...... 62

3.2 Elite Consensus in Ghana ............................................................................ 63

3.2.1 At the Level of Political Parties............................................................... 63

3.2.2 At the Level of Elections ......................................................................... 74

3.2.3 At the level of the legislature................................................................... 79

3.3 National Development Planning in Ghana ............................................... 88

3.3.1 National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) .......................... 89

3.3.2 National Development Policies Under the Fourth Republic .................. 91


x

3.3.3 An Analysis of National Development Planning in Ghana’s Fourth

Republic ............................................................................................................ 93

3.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................... 98

References ..................................................................................................... 100

CHAPTER FOUR .......................................................................... 104

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................... 104

4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 104

4.2 Summary of Research Findings ................................................................ 104

4.3 Conclusions ................................................................................................. 109

4.4 Recommendations ...................................................................................... 111

BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................

APPENDIXES ..........................................................................................


xi

ABSTRACT

Consensually united elites are said to be very rare and as such limit the possibility for the spread

of liberal democracy across the world. In Africa, Ghana presents itself as a case in point, not only

because it is one of the most democratic countries in Africa but also the fact that political elites

have been accorded the force behind this success. The study therefore examines the place of elite

consensus in Ghana’s political landscape by examining the political parties, elections, the

legislature and national development planning in the fourth republic. This analysis was made

based on a wealth of knowledge provided by numerous scholars on the topic of elite consensus

and how this concept is connected to democratic development. Within the Ghanaian political

dispensation, based on some operational benchmarks, this study adopted self-perceptions

expressed in qualitative, in-depth interviews with a limited number of political party executives,

think-tanks, parliamentarians, civil servants and National Development Planning Commission

(NDPC) officials. The study found out that political elites in Ghana are very united and as such

depicts a horizontal integration of elites as explained by Higley and Burton. This has accounted

for Ghana’s envious democratic strides. However, this consensus is only on issues affecting

elites and not the citizens which are particularly indicative in Ghana’s legislature and national

development planning since the start of the fourth republic. This finding goes against Higley and

Burton’s vertically integrated elitism, which suggests a great cohesion between elites and the

masses. This then confirms the hypothesis of the study which states that Ghana lacks an enduring

elite consensus which has negatively affected national development. In light of these

conclusions, the study prescribes some remedies in solving Ghana’s deficits on elite consensus

towards national development in the long-run. They include having a third force in Ghana’s

political arena, some constitutional amendments, effective civic education, procuring a national

agenda on national development planning and effective conflict resolution mechanisms.


1

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Over the years, the role of the state has evolved from the mere source of territorial protection

(internal and external) to a system which provides inclusiveness and opportunities (economic,

social, political and cultural) for its citizens (Tanzi, 1997). It has led to the evolution of

democracy, a form of government focused on the people and where citizens are made masters of

not only their destinies but also, the source of power through which leaders gain legitimacy

(Schmitter & Karl, 1991).

Today, democracy has gained massive support as the ideal governance system in resolving the

political and socio-economic challenges of countries worldwide (Kooijmans, 2018). This is in

comparison to a government by the few (for example, the Communist Party in China and Cuba)

or by a single person (such as the dictatorship of the Kim family in North Korea) (Pearson

Higher Education, 2010). To many political thinkers, democracy best protects human rights and

produces rational policies (Pearson Higher Education, 2010).

Nevertheless, democracy remains an aspiration rather than a finished product, according to many

scholars (Pearson Higher Education, 2010). For this reason, democracy must follow three major

benchmarks. These benchmarks include:

• popular sovereignty (government policies reflect the wishes of the people, government

leaders are selected in competitive elections, elections are free and fair, people participate

in the political process, high-quality information is available and majority rules);

• political equity (each person being of equal intrinsic value as other human beings, equal

protection) and;


2

• political liberty(basic freedoms essential to the formation and expression of majority

opinion and its translation into public policies) (Pearson Higher Education, 2010, pp. 7-

11).

Scholars like Higley and Burton have tried to explain the dilemma of unequal democracies

across the world. A popular theory is the structural and actor-centric approaches, postulated by

Higley and Burton (1989). The structural approach considers a country’s wealth as the leading

factor for democracies whiles the actor-centric approach, on the other hand, highlights the

process of elite bargaining and strategic interaction (Higley & Burton, 1989).

The “Third Wave” of democratization, a phrase which Huntington (1991) uses to describe the

global trend that saw more than 60 countries undergo a democratic transition in the late 20th

century, seems to support the actor-centric idea that democracy can thrive in all kinds of settings.

This was particularly evident in Africa, a continent inhabiting some of the poorest countries and

once seen as “unlikely democratizers” (Berman, 2007).

Military regimes and single-party rule characterised post-colonial rule in Africa. The movement

from authoritarianism in Africa acquired momentum from trends and changes on the

international stage. Nonetheless, this situation in itself did not change the trajectory of events.

Thirty-nine (39) heads of state were referred to as autocrats by 1990 (Baker, 1998). They had

truncated the human rights of their citizens and had put a lid on opposition and dissent, even

within their own party circles. More so, there was the abolishment of the individual constitutions

of independent African states and those perceived to be opposed to the ruling government were

abused, arrested and detained without trial. By 1997, nineteen (19) of such leaders had been

ousted and yet twenty (20) of them still relished power (Baker, 1998). Out of the twenty (20),

seventeen (17) were democratically elected although some of the elections were contested; two

(2) lost the elections and orchestrated comebacks through coups d’état while the last one, Mswati

III, King of Swaziland, is a monarch whose monarchy remained resolute (Baker, 1998). The


3

nineteen (19) leaders ousted, were dislodged either through a coup or an election. Some, in

addition, were assassinated and yet others escaped rebel attacks.

In recent years, elites have been regarded as an inherent feature of modern societies (Englelstad,

2010). The legitimacy of elites is indisputably a key requirement in every democracy (Kaina,

2009, p. 400). Ideally, elites must embrace democratic values, rule in conformity with the

preferences of the electorate, and be demographically representative (Hoffmann-Lange, 1986).

Sadly, they fall short of these high expectations in reality. Nonetheless, with several empirical

studies on regime types, it is reasonable to embrace the idea that elites in democracies edge

closer to these values than elites in non-democratic states.

In a series of publications, Higley and Burton (2006); Higley, et al. (1991); Field & Higley

(1980) advanced a comprehensive typology of elite structures and matching regime types. Three

ideal types have been distinguished by them. These include:

• Consensually united elites

• Ideologically united elites

• Disunited elites.

Consensually united elites are made distinctive by “dense and interlocked networks of

communication and influence” (Higley et al., 1991, p. 36). The interaction structure within,

“provides all-important elites with access to central decision-making” (Higley et al., 1991, p. 36).

Using social network analysis, there have been empirical evidence of this structure in Western

democracies such as Germany, Australia and the United States of America (Osei, 2014). Also,

elites within this structure share the basic norms and values of political conduct and acknowledge

bargaining as an acceptable mode of conduct. This consensus on values does not automatically

mean agreement on particular issues. Instead, on the rules of the game, in simpler words, elites


4

must agree to disagree. According to John Higley and Michael Burton, liberal democracy is only

possible with a consensually united elite (2006, p. 2).

Ideologically united elites, on the other hand, are heavily centralised and unified by a distinct

ideology (Higley & Burton, 2006, p. 12). Such structures are usually stable but unrepresentative

systems, like totalitarian regimes or theocracies. Examples of these regimes include Nazi

Germany under Adolf Hitler, the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin, the People’s Republic of

China under Mao Zedong and North Korea under the Kim dynasty (Sampaolo, 2016). Zimbabwe

under Robert Mugabe and Eritrea under Isaias Afewerki are given as examples in Africa

(Drezner, 2003; Kelley, 2015).

On the contrary, disunited elites are neither characterised by dense communication networks nor

a major agreement on the political norms of conduct. Elites here are described as “weakly

integrated” and as such always form unstable regimes that can be representative on varying

scales (Higley & Burton, 2006, p. 19). Present-day Cameroon is given as an example

(International Crisis Group, 2010).

Scholars like Cammack (1990) and Borchert (2010) have criticised Higley and Burton’s concept,

indicating that the views and roles of non-elites (masses) in these structures receive little

attention. To them, the mere existence of elites refutes the idea of equality, which is a

fundamental feature of democracy (Borchert, 2010, p. 24). This argument adds to the larger

debate on the relationship between vertical and horizontal integration.

There are two dimensions pivotal to the relationship between elites and regimes. These are

horizontal integration and vertical integration (Putnam, 1976; Hoffmann-Lange, 1992, p. 35;

Schmidt, 2004). Broadly speaking, there is always some tension between vertical and horizontal

integration (Kaina, 2009, p. 409). Horizontal integration portrays the interrelationship between


5

elites and the level of cooperation amongst themselves. Vertical Integration, on the other hand,

deals with the relations between elites and the masses (Kaina, 2009).

As described by Higley and Burton, a horizontally integrated elite structure enhances mutual

understanding between elites and presents them with a “common language” established on akin

experiences in their socialisation ( Higley and Burton, 2006 as cited in Kaina, 2009, p. 480f).

This elite freedom fosters effective political decision-making but may, in the same vein, broaden

the gap between political representatives and the electorates. On the other hand, strong vertical

integration makes elites more representative and accountable to their electorates but could block

political compromises and hamper the decision-making process (Kaina, 2009, p. 480f).

For the proper functioning of any democratic system, both dimensions are imperative. On this

account, several scholars have advocated for the inclusion of both horizontal and vertical

integration in the examination of elite structures and regimes types (Schmidt, 2004; Roustetsaari,

2007).

As discussed above, Higley and Burton assert that a consensually united elite is a prerequisite

condition for liberal democracy (Higley & Burton, 2006). Even though the authors fail to discuss

the meaning of liberal democracy in that book, their application of the concept implies that it is

synonymous with “consolidated democracy”, a concept they had used in their previous

publication (Higley & Gunter, 1992). Though consolidation is a contested term, it can be inferred

as “the process by which democracy becomes the only game in town, a development which

cannot be easily reversed” (Przeworski, 1991, p. 26).

In Africa, this depicts just a handful of countries (Daloz, 2003, p. 271). Ghana falls within this

bracket, not because it records huge scores in the Freedom House index, but the fact that it has


6

passed Huntington’s two-turnover test (if two peaceful turnovers occur after the founding

elections), which is mostly seen as a benchmark for successful consolidation (Osei, 2014).

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

It has been argued that the Ghanaian democratic scene in the fourth republic exemplifies a

commendable model with regards to the role of elite consensus towards democratic consolidation

and national development (Abdulai & Crawford, 2010; Throup, 2011; Whitfield, 2009; Gyamfi-

Boadi, 2009). Ghana’s present democratic dispensation is a case in point. Ever since the

inception of the fourth republic, Ghana has had seven peaceful and successive electoral cycles,

deemed one of the best in Africa (Frempong, 2017).

Also, the practice of not only an active multiparty system, but the three turnovers and peaceful

alternations of power between the two dominant parties, the National Democratic Congress

(NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) is one to savour (Graham, Gyampo, Pamphilious, &

Yobo, 2017). In addition, Ghana’s three turnovers of power in the fourth republic, even surpasses

Huntington’s (1991) two-turnover test, which says that consolidation of democracy occurs if

“the party or group that takes power in the initial election and at the time of transition loses a

subsequent election and turns over power to those election winners, and if those election winners

then peacefully turn over power to the winners of a later election”. It is, therefore, not surprising

that Ghana has been adjudged the fifth most democratic country in Africa (Gwaambuka, 2018 ).

Moreover, elite consensus in Ghana is said to be one which transcends the period before, during

and the aftermath of elections (Frempong, 2017). Generally speaking, election outcomes in

Africa are mostly open to heated conflicts between winners and losers with some popular

examples of violent post-electoral crisis including, Cote d’Ivoire in 2001 and Kenya in 2007


7

(Osei, 2014). However, not all politicians are “dying to win” as Mueller (2011) reveals. The

aftermath of the 1992 and 2012 presidential elections in Ghana was evidence of such a claim,

particularly with that of the 2012 presidential election where the losing party, the NPP, used the

constitution by petitioning the Supreme Court when it felt the election was rigged (Frempong,

2017). Even when the Supreme Court ruled against the NPP, the flag bearer, Akufo-Addo,

quickly accepted defeat though he disagreed. This “reflects the mutual acceptance of the

legitimacy of the rules of the electoral game” as Frempong puts it (2017, p. 267).

More so, scholars like Anja Osei believes Members of Parliament (MPs) in Ghana have

developed a high level of trust amongst each other and thus are consensually united (Osei, 2015).

This, to her, not only supports Higley and Burton’s claim that elite integration is conducive to

stable democracies but also braces the idea of the actor-centric model of democracy (Osei, 2015).

This again goes further to prove a high depth of horizontal elite integration as described by

Higley and Burton (2006).

Having said that, some scholars have criticised the notion that the Ghanaian situation epitomizes

elite consensus and democratic consolidation. To them, there is a lack of effective representation

of the people in the form of vertical integration as described by Higley and Burton which has

adversely affected national development (Gyampo, 2017). There is a poor connection between

the interests of constituents and the decisions taken by their legislators on their behalf (Gyampo,

2017). This situation has been attributed to the high level of partisanship in Ghana’s legislature.

Also, democratic consolidation and national development are said to be highly threatened by

“Winner takes all Politics” which annuls the claim of elite consensus, according to many

scholars (Gyampo, 2015). It destroys forged cohesion for Ghana’s development with “its

dangers such as the conferment of excessive powers on the president, marginalization of


8

perceived political opponents and the feeling of exclusion from the governance process by those

who do not belong to the ruling government” (Gyampo, 2015, p. 2). Effects of this phenomenon

have been the lack of policy continuity by subsequent governments and the ineffectiveness of

national development planning.

On top of that, adversary politics, in the view of many, nullifies the assertion of elite consensus

and erodes Ghana’s democratic foundation as it undermines the country’s envious electoral

successes (Gyampo, Graham, & Asare, 2017). Political parties are said to be preaching violence

during election periods, do not mostly adhere to the code of conduct developed through

consensus building and even go further to employ the use of vigilante groups in afflicting fear

and panic in rival parties (Gyampo, Graham & Aasre, 2017). Gyampo, Graham and Asare affirm

that “these acts have fuelled polarization in Ghana’s body politic and undermined the nation’s

drive towards democratic maturity” (2017, p. 112).

In light of these arguments made above, this research seeks to investigate the presence or

otherwise of elite consensus (horizontal integration) in Ghana and to understand how it has

affected the consolidation of democracy and national development (vertical integration).

1.3 Research Questions

1. What is elite consensus?

2. What is the connection between elite consensus and democratic development?

3. Does Ghana have elite consensus?

4. How have elite interactions affected democracy (horizontal elite integration) and national

development (vertical elite integration) in Ghana?


9

1.4 Research Objectives

1. To understand what elite consensus entails.

2. To find out the connection between elite consensus and democratic development.

3. To find out if Ghana has elite consensus.

4. To ascertain how elite interactions have affected democracy (horizontal elite integration)

and national development (vertical elite integration) in Ghana.

1.5 Scope of the Study

This study seeks to address the issue of elite interactions towards national development in Africa.

The research is a case study of Ghana and specifically covers Ghana’s fourth republic (1992-

date). It focuses on political elites operating at various levels of political life. These include

political elites operating at the levels of political parties, elections, the legislature and national

development planning.

1.6 Hypothesis

Ghana lacks an enduring elite consensus which has negatively affected national development.

1.7 Rationale of the Study

It is expressed that “consensually united elite” settlements are extremely rare and as such limit

the likelihood for the spread of liberal democracy worldwide (Higley & Burton, 2006, p. 4).

Ghana, however, one of the most democratic countries in Africa, could symbolise one of these


10

rare cases. Though Ghana has encountered a rapid succession of different civilian and military

regimes from its independence until the inception of the fourth republic in 1992, it is today, one

of the most democratic countries in Africa. The positive role played by domestic elite consensus

in the transition process has been emphasised by many scholars (Whitfield, 2009; Svanikier,

2007; Frempong, 2007b) and thus, presents itself as a perfect case study for this research.

This study is to add to the existing literature on elite consensus in the democratization process

and national development in Africa. The rationale of this study is to broaden the discussion by

paying more attention to the various compositions of political elites, their interactions amongst

each other and its dividends on national development, using Ghana as a case study. It goes

further to understand the benchmarks of political elite consensus and its effects on socio-

economic and political development. However, unlike other literature, comprehensive research is

conducted on a broader scope of elite consensus which encompasses political parties, elections,

parliamentarians and national development planning in Ghana.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

1.8.1 Political Pluralism

Political pluralism constitutes the theoretical framework for the study. Robert A. Dahl and Otto

Friedrich von Gierke are the main proponents of this theory.

According to Robert A. Dahl, in his best-known work, Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in

an American City (1961), political power in the United States is pluralistic (Munro, 2018). To

him, pluralism means that a group of like-minded individuals, not the people as a whole, govern

the United States. These organizations which include among others, unions, trade and


11

professional associations, civil rights activists, environmentalists, business and financial lobbies

and informal coalitions of like-minded citizens, influence the making and administration of laws

and policy (Udel.edu, 2010). Here, participants in this process constitute only a tiny fraction of

the populace and the public acts as bystanders.

Otto Friedrich von Gierke, a German legal philosopher and an early proponent of political

pluralism, emphasized the voluntary nature of some associations which have a considerable

effect on pluralist theory. This is especially true in Great Britain, where Gierke’s increasing

desire for national unity was overlooked (Liesangthem, 2019). He believed that the ideal state

was a synthesis of cooperative associations and groups subordinated to an individual imperious

will.

Other scholars like Drah, see tolerance of diverse opinions and political compromise as integral

within the scope of pluralist democracy (1993). To him, the pluralist model is more easily able to

promote and better help to sustain democracy. Pluralist theory is both descriptive and

prescriptive. It is descriptive, in the sense that it tries to explain politics within a democratic state

and prescriptive because it presents a model on how a liberal democratic state should operate.

1.8.2 Norms of Pluralist Politics

For pluralists, a democratic state is not solely controlled by a single group but by multiple groups

(political parties) (David, 2006). Although some groups are larger, well organized and more

influential than others, the ambit of their power is commonly bounded relatively to narrow

interests (Socialstudieshelp.com, 2012). Pluralism invokes the independence of various groups in

the political arena and as such provides a confined structure for them to conduct themselves

appropriately in the political system. Due to the diversity of interests and autonomy of groups,


12

political parties always demand a level playing field. It is, therefore, when these rules of

engagement are broken that instability is hatched which lead to the breakdown of the system.

This instability creates fertile grounds for conflicts which may get very violent if not controlled.

It is, therefore, imperative to practice pluralist politics within any state.

Also, consensus on the rules of the game is another distinctive feature of pluralism

(Socialstudieshelp.com, 2012). In stabilizing democracies, the consensus among groups on the

democratic values and principles within the political arena is considered paramount. Plurality

encourages civility and stresses the safeguarding of rights such as freedom of organization and

expression. As a guiding principle, pluralism ensures the peaceful coexistence of diverse beliefs

and interests as well as the use of the principle of good-faith in conducting negotiations.

Tolerance, especially in respecting differing views during electoral competitions and subsequent

acceptance of electoral results, is inherent to ensure orderly engagement as well as peaceful

coexistence amongst groups within a democratic state. In situations where there are

disagreements, the law court must be the last adjudicator in resolving the conflict. Individuals,

including politicians, must not take the law into their hands since it destabilizes the democratic

state.

1.8.3 Criticisms of Political Pluralism

There are numerous criticisms against the theory of political pluralism but it will be categorized

into two major components: (I) Political pluralism is a faulty description; (II) Political pluralism

is a morally bankrupt system.


13

With political pluralism as a faulty description, a major critique is the fact that the top layers of

society have a distinct advantage (Udel.edu, 2010). E.E Schattscheider, a political scientist,

asserts that “the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong

upper-class accent” (Udel.edu, 2010). Valuable resources tend to be concentrated in the hands of

the rich and already powerful members of society (elites). This leaves those at the bottom with

much less to exploit. Thus, political pluralism rather encourages exactly what it preaches against,

which is inequality. Success in the political sphere is dependent on mobilizing resources and in

this case, a number of groups will always be disadvantaged.

On political pluralism as a morally bankrupt system, the system operates best when ordinary

citizens govern less. As such, the theory has been referred to as “democratic elitism”. This is a

big contradiction, for how can a government of elites, in this situation, be considered

democratic? Sceptics believe 90% to 95% of citizens are left on the sidelines as spectators rather

than active participants. To them, there are no institutions to encourage public involvement and

that, holding leaders accountable is not enough. The people (ordinary citizens) must be

encouraged to formulate the policies which the nation will follow. They must learn to take

decisions on their own and by so doing, take responsibility for these choices. This, in their view,

is the true meaning of democracy. However, with political pluralism, popular participation is

limited to the periodic task of choices in elections. To Davis, this particular participation is, at

best, a pale and rather pathetic version of the active and responsible participation which was the

objective of classical democracy (1964).


14

1.8.4 Basis for Political Pluralism

Within any political dispensation, particularly where democratic rule prevails, there are various

interactions amongst groups. In some instances, this interaction bears misunderstandings which

must be fixed amicably to ensure no group feels resentment towards the other. Political parties

are the basis of any democratic system. An active multiparty system, described by Gyampo and

Gans-Lartey, as “the heart and soul of every democracy”, promotes popular participation and

competition (2017, p. 1). This is a cardinal feature of democracy. For this reason, not only the

existence but also the active participation of political parties are indispensable for a state to be

described as democratic. The study, therefore, seeks to apply political pluralism in explaining the

importance of such interactions within any political system.

1.9 Literature Review

Democracy is not a new concept to Africans and, in practice, it is widely seen as best for citizens

since it focuses on them (Giorgis, 2017). However, democracy’s desired effects on national

development are fated on the role of elites. Consensus on pertinent issues among elites is not

only prerequisite for liberal democracy but by the same vein, the main channel in ensuring

development (Higley & Burton, 2006). This research examines the role of elites in the pursuit of

democratic consolidation and national development in Africa, Ghana to be specific. Many

scholars have written numerous literature on elites, elite consensus, democracy, good governance

and effects of these phenomena on Africa’s development.

In reviewing these literature, it is important to first understand those related to elite consensus

and democracy. John Higley and Michael Burton’s article, “Elite Foundation of Liberal


15

Democracy” (2006), speaks volumes to that effect. This article starts by laying a bold claim that:

“The sine qua non of liberal democracy is a well-articulated, internally accommodative, and

relatively secure political elite…No liberal democracy ever emerged without the formation of

such elite…” (2006, pp. 1-2). To prove this claim, a very large scope of historical cases are

adopted by the authors. It covers revolutionary England and post-Napoleonic Europe en masse to

Columbia and Taiwan during the 1980s and 1990s respectively.

The theoretical content in chapters one and six alludes to the “consensually unified elite” as a

needed condition for a democratic regime to crop up anywhere. To Higley and Burton, elites can

choose to make “real and continuing trouble” and as a group, can be either disunited,

ideologically united or consensually united based on their structural integration which is related

to their collective dynamic density and value consensus degrees (2006, p. 7). This is to say that if

elites want liberal democracy, liberal democracy will be practised. This assertion is very true but

a major problem here is the question of legitimacy which Higley and Burton did not touch on

(Kamis, 2008). Elites and non-elites are interrelated in the sense that the rule of elites must be

accepted by non-elites for it to be effective. Where their rule is not respected, even with a

consensually unified elite, the practice of liberal democracy will be deficient. Nonetheless, with

relation to this research which is against the backdrop of African governance, a consensually

united elite will surely ensure liberal democracy, as explained by Higley and Burton. This is

because many countries in Africa including Ghana, practise democracy and believe in the

legitimacy of a democratic government. As such, the substantial efforts for the effectiveness of

the development agenda in Africa lies with the actions taken by elites.

Political elites are therefore expected to follow the rules of governance enshrined in their

respective constitutions and eschew any act which defeats the purposes of constitutionalism and


16

democratic governance. This is well explained in the book, “Constitutionalism, Democratic

Governance and the African State”, edited by Boni Yao Gebe. Chapter one of this book which is

Vladimir Antwi-Danso’s piece on “Democracy and Good Governance: A Sine-Qua-Non to

Political Stability and Socio-Economic Development in Africa”, provides a conceptual point of

view on good governance and democracy, their impact on development and how it is applied by

African countries (2015). Here, he asserts that Africa’s greatest needs are ‘democracy’,

‘stability’ and ‘development’ (2015, p. 2). However, on this account, Africa’s quest for stability

has been ‘tortuous’ because democracy and good governance has been elusive where governance

is at best ‘neo-patrimonial’ and at worst ‘predatory’ (2015, p. 2). To him, bad leadership by

African leaders coupled with the prescribed one-size-fits-all model of democracy has been

Africa’s downfall. Democracy must allow inclusiveness and participation, so he advocates

constitutionalism and institutionalism as integral in ensuring ‘equity’, ‘probity’ and

‘accountability’ (2015, p. 18).

Moreover, Boni Yao Gebe’s chapter on “Constitutionalism and Democratic Governance in

Africa: towards Enforcement of Policy Instruments”, in the same book, further fortifies Vladimir

Antwi-Danso’s point (2015). He defines the concept of constitutionalism as “the idea that a

political system or government is placed under certain limitations and the power at the disposal

of such authority is legally defined” (2015, p. 24). He argues that post-independent Africa has

been a great failure in the ‘adoption’ and ‘adaption’ of constitutionalism, pluralism and

democratic governance though the various “democratic waves” have highly benefitted this

continent (2015, p. 55). He then scrutinises the existing regional policy instruments and protocols

of the African Union, suggesting ways to extract their strengths for political development. Gebe

ends by admonishing the African Union to be more ‘committed’ and ‘resolute’ in propagating


17

the cause of political development in Africa, else these policies shall still remain dormant (2015,

p. 55). The works of Vladimir Antwi-Danso and Boni Yao Gebe are very relevant to this

research since they marry the idea of good governance and development together. They explain

why there must be limits to the authority of incumbent governments in order to eradicate

marginalization and provide breeding grounds for consensus-building and subsequent

development.

Narrowing the literature to Ghana is Ken Ahorsu’s chapter on “Multi-Party Democracy and

Conflict Management in Africa: The Case of Ghana” from the same book (2015). This particular

work interests this research a lot since the premise made by Ahorsu backed with facts expands on

the keen relationship between multiparty democracy, power politics, elections and conflicts in

Africa. Conflicts have always been the by-product between the synergy of the first three

(multiparty democracy, power politics and elections) in Africa as indicated by him. However,

Ghana’s electoral processes, like that of a select few in Africa, have deviated from that norm.

This, he credits to Ghana’s pluralistic tendency under the fourth republic, thanks to its

constitution in which conflict management is well entrenched (2015, p. 87). This sides with the

theme, elite consensus as investigated in this research. Even so, outside the domain of electoral

processes, he identifies concerns like corruption, the polarisation of national issues along party

lines, the politicization of issues and ethnocentrism as a major dent on Ghana’s democratic

consolidation. These conflicting notions make it difficult for one to earnestly conclude whether

Ghana practises elite consensus or not since agreeing on pertinent issues transcends the scope of

elections to that of the economic, religious, ethnic and cultural issues. This belief is also held by

Ahorsu in his chapter where he states that for Ghana to safeguard its contemporary democratic


18

dispensation, it needs to “improve upon the wider socio-economic and socio-cultural difficulties

in which political pluralism is embedded” (2015, p. 88).

Furthermore, Alex Frempong’s work, “Political Conflict and Elite Consensus in the Liberal

State”, in the book, “Ghana: One Decade of the Liberal State”, edited by Kwame Boafo-Arthur,

gives an interesting twist to this subject-matter (2007b). It provides an in-depth analysis of the

role of elites in Ghana’s first decade of the fourth republic (1993-2003). His findings prove that

the first decade of the liberal democratic experiment had its ups and downs. Some of such downs

are what he refers to as the “rubber-stamping of government policies” which are not in the public

interest and the negative effects posed by parliament’s subservience to the executive (2007b, p.

162). In this respect, he describes the persistent, uncompromising and indiscriminate application

of parliamentary majority as “inherently confrontational and not consensual” (2007b, p. 133).

He ends by giving three (3) conclusions which form the basis of this research. The first is that

there are no quick fixes in transforming institutions and norms of an authoritarian regime to that

of democratic norms and structure as it takes several years to accomplish that. Secondly, the elite

consensus on the rules of the game is important for democratic development. Notwithstanding, a

flawed transition could still take a huge leap to democratic success if political elites subsequently

agree on the basic rules. Lastly, he holds the belief that peaceful democratic transition is possible

in Africa (2007b, pp. 162-163). The most intriguing aspect of this piece is how he relates the

benchmarks of elite consensus, based on the inevitability of conflict in any society, to the

institutions, eras of the two presidents as well as various elections held and its aftermath in

Ghana’s first decade of the fourth republic. This piece is relevant to this research because it is an

objective study which draws conclusions from not only electoral processes but a larger scope

including roles played by the legislature and executive.


19

Some years later, Alex Frempong, in his book, “Elections in Ghana (1951-2016)”, continues by

accounting for the progress made by Ghana in its elections before and after independence to the

latest presidential and parliamentary elections held in 2016 (2017). For the purposes of the scope

of this study which is the fourth republic, elections held from 1992 to 2016 are considered.

During that timeline, there have been seven (7) presidential and parliamentary elections which he

considers as very successful. This reiterates Ahorsu’s point of Ghana’s electoral success,

pluralist tendencies and elite consensus. Frempong attributes Ghana’s electoral success to several

factors. In this book, he identifies the constitution, institutions of governance, inter-party

consensus building, ethno-regional structure, the party system: two-party with active third

parties, uncertainty of elections, turnovers, winners’ attitude, losers’ reaction and resilience, civil

society, history of elections, the Ghanaian spirit and international support as the primal factors

for Ghana’s electoral progress since the beginning of fourth republic (2017, pp. 431-437).

Another scholar whose empirical materials corroborates some findings of scholars like Alex

Frempong and Ken Ahorsu, who argues that change in elite behaviour has accounted for Ghana’s

democratic success, is Anja Osei, in her work, “Elites and Democracy in Ghana: A Social

Network Approach” (2015). She uses social network analysis in testing the main claim of

Higley/Burton’s theory which states that “liberal democracy is impossible without a

consensually united elite” with Members of Parliament (MPs) elected to Ghana’s legislature in

2012. In her piece, empirical evidence shows that MPs in Ghana form “a dense and strongly

connected network” bridging party and ethnic divides (2015, p. 552); also, MPs from different

parties have developed a certain level of trust for one another. These findings, to her, not only

proves there is elite consensus in Ghana but validates Higley & Burton’s claim that democracy

can occur in any setting. This proposition made by Osei is very vital to this research since it


20

opens a new dimension to the study of elite consensus in Ghana, one which moves from

elections to the legislative arm of government. Be that as it may, it could be said that the

yardstick she uses in measuring elite consensus amongst MPs in Ghana, though tangible, is not

substantive enough to draw any valid conclusions from. She fails to take into account, recurring

trends practised in Ghana’s legislature, like those pointed out by Ahorsu and Frempong which

includes polarisation of national issues along party lines and the uncompromising application of

parliamentary majority. This again raises the question of elite consensus in Ghana.

As such, many scholars in their literature have been highly critical of Ghana’s supposed

democratic success and consensus amongst elites. Ransford Gyampo and Franklin Obeng-

Odoom are popular critics. “Dealing with Winner-Takes-All Politics in Ghana: The Case of

National Development Planning”, a piece written by Ransford Gyampo, examines the recent

practice of development planning which is associated with limited participation and policy

discontinuity (2016a). He blames this on the marginalization effects of “Winner-Takes-All”

politics. This work is hinged on the National Development Plan (NDP) recommended by the

Constitution Review Committee (CRC) in 2011 as a vital addition to the constitution but was

later rejected by the government. The plan spells out the role and participation of all stakeholders

as well as incite public interest in the planning process. According to Gyampo, when entrenched

in the constitution, it makes it binding on all successive governments which will lead to policy

continuity, inclusiveness and a rapid increase in the rate of economic transformation. However,

the government’s refusal is mainly because it reduces their power to sabotage the policies of

previous governments to score political points, as explained by Gyampo. This particular piece

provides this research with an insight into a specific case study, explaining the effects of

disunited elites in relation to national development in Ghana.


21

Finally, in another series of his “Winner-Takes-All Politics in Ghana”, Gyampo looks at: “The

Case for an Effective Council of State” (2015). This particular work looks at the excessive

powers conferred on the president and the perceived marginalization of political opponents by

reviewing the performance of Ghana’s current Council of State. He opines that the Council of

State has been highly ineffective in bridling the powers of the executive and checking Winner-

Takes-All politics. In buttressing this point, he refers to the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) -

Winner Takes All (WTA) public consultations held in 2014, where a cross-section of the public

describes the Council as ‘superfluous’, “toothless bulldog”, ‘unnecessary’, “too much attached to

the president” and “not capable of giving independent or meaningful advice” (2015, p. 21). As

far as this research is concerned, Gyampo’s piece expands the horizon to which “Winner-Takes-

All” politics has engulfed Ghana’s public institutions, especially those created for the sole

purpose of serving as a check to that effect.

1.10 Clarification of Key Concepts

Some of the key concepts include:

• Elites: Elites may be defined as persons who, by virtue of their strategic locations in

large or otherwise pivotal organizations and movements, are able to affect political

outcomes regularly and substantially. In every society, there are political, business,

military, religious and traditional elites (Higley & Burton, 1987).

• Elite consensus: Elite consensus is the situation where elites agree on the rule of the

game (agree to disagree) through the political culture of dialogue, bargaining,


22

compromising, accommodation and constitutionalism (Higley & Burton, 2006).

• Democracy: Democracy may be defined as a government in which the supreme power is

vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of

representation usually involving periodically held free elections (Dahlberg, Axelsson, &

Holmberg, 2017).

• Liberal democracy: it is a democracy based on the recognition of individual rights and

freedoms, in which decisions from direct or representative processes prevail in many

policy areas (Chan, 2002).

• Democratic consolidation: Democratic consolidation is a process whose effect is the

maturity of the democracy and very little possibility of an authoritarian regime. It

includes the maturity of both democratic institutions and society (IGI Global, 2011).

• National development: National development is the ability of a country or countries to

improve the political as well as social welfare of the people such as the creation of job

opportunities, safeguarding the rights of the citizenry and providing social amenities like

quality education, infrastructure, electricity, potable water amongst others (Alolor, 2015).


23

1.11 Sources of Data

To achieve the objectives of the study, this research draws on a range of sources. Primary and

Secondary sources of data are used. On understanding elite consensus and its connection with

democratic development (objectives one and two), secondary sources of data are employed.

These are historic narratives extracted from previously published scholarly work. These include

books, peer-reviewed journal articles from the University of Ghana (UG) Balme Library and

Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) Library as well as internet

sources. On finding out if Ghana has elite consensus and ascertaining how these interactions

have affected democratic governance and national development (Objectives three and four), both

primary and secondary sources of data are employed. Primary sources cover raw data collected

from the population interviewed. In order to enhance the findings, materials from expert

interviews are used.

This study adopts self-perceptions expressed in qualitative, in-depth interviews with a limited

number of political party executives, members of parliament (MPs) serving in Ghana’s current

legislature (2017-date), senior civil servants at parliament, Officials at the National Development

Planning Commission (NDPC) and some think-tanks in the field of governance and leadership.

These think-tank respondents are from the University of Ghana (LECIAD and the Department of

Political Science), Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES Ghana) and Ghana Center for Democratic

Development (CDD-Ghana). The names and positions of the respondents are withheld due to

ethical consideration.

The interview guides are divided into four appendixes. Appendix 1, contains a more general

outlook to the study with sections encompassing elite consensus on elections, amongst political


24

parties as well as parliamentarians and national development planning. This guide is shared with

four (4) think-tanks; two from the University of Ghana and one from the FES Ghana and the

CDD-Ghana each. Appendix 2, contains elite consensus amongst political parties and is shared

between three (3) political party executives; each from the NPP, the NDC and the CPP.

Appendix 3, on the other hand, is on elite consensus amongst parliamentarians and is shared to

ten (10) parliamentarians from Ghana’s current legislature in the fourth republic. These

parliamentarians are from the main political parties, the NPP and the NDC, with five (5)

respondents from each side. Three (3) of the MPs interviewed doubles as Ministers of state.

Also, two (2) other senior civil servants working at the parliament are included in this section.

Appendix 4, which contains questions on the effectiveness of national development planning in

Ghana and the role played by political elites in that respect, are directed to two (2) Officials from

the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) of Ghana. In all, this study engages

twenty-one (21) respondents. The study sees the twenty-one (21) respondents acquired as enough

basis to draw well-informed conclusions on the said objectives.

Secondary data used in this section include books, peer-reviewed journal articles, the 1992

Constitution of Ghana as well as reports from institutions such as CDD Ghana, Institute for

Economic Affairs – Ghana (IEA-Ghana), FES Ghana and Commonwealth Observer Group.

Some dissertations and theses from LECIAD as well as the Department of Political Science at

the University of Ghana are also consulted for the study.


25

1.12 Research Methodology

As a case study of Ghana, it is purely qualitative where both primary and secondary data are

consulted. Qualitative research methodology has numerous techniques including structured,

unstructured and semi-structured interviews as well as focus group discussions among others.

Qualitative research methodology is the direct opposite of quantitative research methodology

which employs the collection and interpretation of data using numbers or figures. It covers a

wider scope of respondents and thus, can establish the basis for generalizations. The data used in

quantitative research is derived from statistical findings which go to reaffirm its relevance.

However, in measuring attitude and behaviour, the use of quantitative methodology is

inappropriate. This is because these variables cannot be conveyed in terms of figures and also

due to the fact that they can change at any given point in time under diverse circumstances.

As defined by Strauss and Corbin (1990), qualitative research methodology is a type of research

method that generates results not established by virtue of statistics or any other kind of

quantification. They propose that a qualitative research study involves the analysis of non-

mathematical deliberative procedures inferred from findings acquired from the data gathered.

Qualitative research was found fitting for the study since the aim of the research is to examine

interactions between elites towards national development in Ghana. This methodology proves

useful to the study since it gives comprehensive details on how actions occurred in the past,

occurs presently and will occur in the future as well as why it occurred, occurs and will occur.

The researcher undertakes a semi-structured interview to seek expert opinions in the various

fields under consideration. Data from the interviews are transcribed and analysed using content

analysis. Content analysis is used for all data collected in the study. The study is based on


26

deductive research. Major themes are established on the basis of the responses given by research

participants which are later grouped under operational benchmarks derived by the researcher.

This offers a vivid depiction of all findings.

Purposive sampling is utilized, with the study group comprising of political elites as well as

institutions and personalities associated with the business of governance, leadership and

development.

1.13 Limitations of the Study

Though successfully completed, the study encountered a number of limitations. First, some MPs

were reluctant to participate in the study due to an exposé recently released by the Department of

Political Science at the University of Ghana which to them brought their credibility to disrepute.

Also, it was very difficult accessing political party executives at the time of the study as the

limited voter registration exercise was also ongoing during that time. More so, the location to

offices of some targeted institutions for the study was very problematic. Others, on the other

hand, received the introductory letter sent by the researcher but never gave feedback.

1.14 Organization of the Study

This work is organized into four main chapters:

Chapter One constitutes the introduction;

Chapter Two provides an overview of elite consensus and democratic governance in Ghana;

Chapter Three examines elite consensus and national development in Ghana;

Chapter Four consists of the summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations.


27

References

Abdulai, A., & Crawford, G. (2010). Consolidating Democracy in Ghana: Progress and Prospects? Democratization, 17(1), 26-67.

Ahorsu, K. (2015). Multi-Party Democracy and Conflict Management: The Case of Ghana. In B.

Y. Gebe (Ed.), Constitutionalism, Democratic Governance and the African State (pp. 57-

92). Accra: Black Mask.

Alolor, R. (2015). LinkedIn SlideShare. Retrieved October 15, 2018, from SlideShare:

https://www.slideshare.net/ricoalolor/what-is-the-national-development

Anja, Osei. (2015). Elites and Democracy in Ghana: A Social Network Approach. African

Affairs (114/457), 529-554.

Antwi-Danso, V. (2015). Democracy and Good Governance: A Sine-Qua-Non to Political

Stability and Socio-Economic Development in Africa. In B. Y. Gebe (Ed.),

Constitutionalism, Democratic Governance and the African State (pp. 1-22). Accra:

Black Mask.

Baker, B. (1998). The Class of 1990: How Have the Autocrat Leaders of Sub-Saharan Africa

Fared under Democratization? Third World Quarterly, 19(1), 115-127.

Berman, S. (2007). Lessons from Europe. Journal of Democracy, 18, 28-41.

Borchert, J. (2010). "They Ain't Making Elites Like They Used to": The Never Ending Trouble with

Democratic Elitism. (H. Best, & J. Higley, Eds.) Leiden, Boston: BRILL. Cammack, P. (1990). A Critical Assessment of the New Elite Paradigm. American Sociological

Review, 55(3), 415-420. Chan, S. (2002). Liberalism, Democracy and Development. Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of

the University of Cambridge.

Dahlberg, S., Axelsson, S., & Holmberg, S. (2017). The Meaning of Democracy. Retrieved May

22, 2019, from University of Gothenburg:

https://qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssests/1672/1672839_2017_16_dahlberg_axelsson_holmber

g.pdf

Daloz, J. (2003). "Big Men" in sub-Saharan Africa: How Elites Accumulate Positions and

Resources. (M. Dogan, Ed., & E. C. Power, Trans.) Leiden, Boston: BRILL. David, H. (2006). Models of Democracy. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.



https://qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssests/1672/1672839_2017_16_dahlberg_axelsson_holmberg.pdf


28

Davis, L. (1964, March 17). The Costs of Realism: Contemporary Restatement of Democracy.

Western Political Quarterly, 43.

Drah, F. (1993). Political Parties and Democracy in Ghana's Fourth Republic. Accra: Woeli

Publishing Services.

Engelstad, F. (2010). Democratic Elitism: Conflict and Consensus. (H. Best, & J. Higley, Eds.)

Massachusetts: Brill, Leiden and Boston.

Field, G., & Higley, J. (1980). Elitism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Frempong, A.K.D. (2007b). Political Conflict and Elite Consensus in the Liberal state. In K.

Boafo-Arthur (Ed.), Ghana: One Decade of the Liberal State (pp. 128-163). Dakar:

Codesria Books.

Frempong, A.K.D. (2017). Elections in Ghana (1951-2016). Accra, Ghana: Digibooks Ghana

Ltd.

Gebe, B. Y. (2015). Constitutionalism and Democratic Governance in Africa: Toward

Enforcement of Policy Instruments. In B. Y. Gebe (Ed.), Constitutionalism, Democratic

Governance and the African State (pp. 23-56). Accra: Black Mask.

Graham, E., Gyampo, R., Pamphilious, F., & Yobo, E. (2017). The Third Peaceful Transfer of

Power and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana. Africology: The Journal of Pan African

Studies, 10(5).

Gwaambuka, T. (2018). The African Exponent. Retrieved December 27, 2018, from

https://www.africanexponent.com/post/8848-african-democracy-stagnant-and-uninspiring

Gyamfi-Boadi, E. (2009). Another Step Forward for Ghana. Journal of Democracy, 20(2), 138-

152. Gyampo, R., & Gans-Lartey, E. (2018). Assessing Internal Party Democracy in Africa.

Retrieved 2019 March, from Research Gate Web site:

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ransford_Gyampo/publication/326422749_ASSESSING_I

NTERNAL_PARTY_DEMOCRACY_IN_AFRICA/links/5b4c948545851519b4c10f58/ASSES

SING-INTERNAL-PARTY-DEMOCRACY-IN-AFRICA?origin=publication_detail

Gyampo, R. (2015). Winner-Takes-All Politics in Ghana: The Case for Effective Council of

State. Journal of Politics and Governance, 4(1-4), 17-24.

Gyampo, R. (2016a). Dealing with Winner-Takes-All Politics in Ghana: The Case of National

Development Planning. Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA Ghana).

Gyampo, R. (2017). Assessing the Quality of Parliamentary Representation in Ghana. African

Review, 44, 69.



https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ransford_Gyampo/publication/326422749_ASSESSING_INTERNAL_PARTY_DEMOCRACY_IN_AFRICA/links/5b4c948545851519b4c10f58/ASSESSING-INTERNAL-PARTY-DEMOCRACY-IN-AFRICA?origin=publication_detai



29

Gyampo, R., Graham, E., & Asare, B. (2017). Political Vigilantism and Democratic Governance

in Ghana's Fourth Republic. African Review, 112-135.

Higley, J., & Burton, M. (1989). The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns.

American Sociological Review, 54(1), 17-32.

Higley, J., & Burton, M. (2006). Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Rowman &

Littlefield.

Higley, J., & et al. (1991). Elite Integration in Stable Democracies: A Reconsideration . European

Sociological Review , 7(1), 35-53. Higley, J., & Gunter, R. (1992). Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and

Southern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hoffmann-Lange, U. (1986). Eliten and Demokratie in der Bundesrepublik. (M. Kaase, Ed.)

Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Hoffmann-Lange, U. (1992). Eliten, Macht und Konflikt in der Bundesrepublik . Opladen: Leske +

Budrich . Huntington, S. P. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.

Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

IGI Global. (2011). Retrieved March 5, 2019, from https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/chile-

under-the-government-of-sebastin-piera/41255

Kaina, V. (2009). Eliteforschung. (V. Kaina, & A. Rommele, Eds.) Ein Studienbuch, Wiesbaden :

VS Verlag fur Sozialwissenschaften. Kamis, B. (2008, April 1). Book Review: John Higley and Michael Burton, Elite Foundations of

Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006, 229 pp.): G. John Ikenberry,

Liberal Order & Imperial Ambition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006, 300 pp.). Steven

Slaughter, Liberty beyond Neo-Liberalism: A Republican Critique of Liberal Governance

in a Globalising Age ( Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005, 257 pp.). Millennium:

Journal of International Studies, 36(2), 386-390.

Kooijmans, E. (2018, March 21). Is Democracy the Best Form of Governance? Retrieved March

5, 2019, from New College of Humanities:

https://www.nchlondon.ac.uk/2018/03/21/democracy-best-form-government/

Mueller, S. (2011). Dying to Win: Elections, Political Violence and Institutional Decay in Kenya.

Journal of Contemporary African Affairs, 29(1), 99-117.


https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/chile-under-the-government-of-sebastin-piera/41255



30

Munro, A. (2018, December 13). Robert A. Dahl. (i. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Producer)

Retrieved January 9, 2019, from Encyclopaedia Britannica:

https://www.britannica.com/biography/Robert-A-Dahl#ref1178987

Osei, A. (2015). Elites and Democracy in Ghana: A Social Network Approach. African

Affairs(114/457), 529-554.

Osei, A. (2014). From Conflict to Consensus? Elite Integration and Democracy in Ghana.

Comparative Sociology, 13(4), 503-530. Parry, G. (1969). Political Elite. London: George, Allen and Unwin Ltd.

Pearson Higher Education. (2010, January 10). Democracy and American Politics. Retrieved

February 16, 2019, from Pearson Higher Education:

https://www.pearsonhighered.com/assets/samplechapter/0/2/0/5/0205771297.pdf

Putnam, R. (1976). The comparative study of political elites. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:

Prentice-Hall.

Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern

Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Roustetsaari, I. (2007). Nordic Elite in Comparative Perspective . Comparative Sociology , 6(1-2),

158-189. Schmidt, C. (2004). Theoretische und Praktische Aspekte der Eliteforschung . Hitotsubashi

Journal of Social Studies, 36(1), 29-43.

Schmitter, P., & Karl, T. (1991). What Democracy Is...and Is Not. Journal of Democracy, 2(3),

75-88.

Socialstudieshelp.com. (2012). Retrieved January 1, 2019, from

www.socialstudieshelp.com/APGOV_pluralism.htm

Svanikier, J. (2007). Political Elite Circulation: Implications for Leadership Diversity and

Democratic Regime Stability in Ghana. Comparative Sociology, 6(1-2), 112-135. Tanzi, V. (1997, September). The Changing Role of the State in the Economy: A Historical

Perspective. IMF Working Paper, 1-28.

Throup, D. (2011). Assessing Risks to Stability. Washington DC: Center for Strategic and

International Studies. Udel.edu. (2010). Critique of Pluralism.Retrieved January 1, 2019, from

https://www1.udel.edu/htr/Psc105/Texts/critique.html




http://www.socialstudieshelp.com/APGOV_pluralism.htm

https://www1.udel.edu/htr/Psc105/Texts/critique.html

31

Udel.edu. (2010). Pluralism. Retrieved January 1, 2019, from www1.udel.edu:

https://www1.udel.edu/htr/Psc105/Texts/pluralism.html

Whitfield, L. (2009). "Change for a Better Ghana": Party Competition, Institutionalization and

Alternation in Ghana's 2008 Elections. African Affairs, 108(433), 621-641.



32

CHAPTER TWO

AN OVERVIEW OF ELITE CONSENSUS AND DEMOCRATIC

GOVERNANCE IN GHANA

2.0 Introduction

This research is deeply rooted in the foundation and principles of elite consensus and its effects

on national development in Africa, specifically, Ghana. Per the objectives of this study,

ascertaining the entirety of the scope pertaining to elite consensus and its connection with

democracy is crucial to the outcome of this research. To delineate the truism or otherwise of elite

consensus in Ghana, this chapter provides an overview of elite consensus and its relationship

with conflict in any democratic dispensation. In the context of Ghana’s fourth republic, this

chapter further provides a historical antecedence of democratic governance in the country as well

as the provision of the legal frameworks of some crucial democratic institutions charged with

democratic consolidation and development.

2.1 Conceptualisation of Elites

Elite theories were basically developed in the field of sociology to rationalize man’s behaviour in

a social setting (Bottomore, 1964). However, the elite theory of politics was developed to the

calibre of theory in the field of political science by two Italian sociologists, Vilfredo Pareto

(1848-1923) and Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941) (Parry, 1969). In the field of politics, the


33

significance of the elite theory posed a difficulty in democratic theory, which as a result was

revised by numerous scholars (Parry, 1969).

The root of elitist doctrine is that existing in several societies may be a minority of the

population which takes the main decisions in that society. Considering the fact that decisions

made cover such a wide scope affecting the universal aspect of the society, they are often

referred to as “political decisions” (Parry, 1969). This is so even where the minorities taking

these decisions are not politicians in the general sense of members of a government’s legislature.

As such, in broader terms, the elitist theory reckons that every society constitutes two groupings

of human beings:

a) The elite or the minority within a social collectivity (such as a society, a state, a

religious institution, a political party) which exercises a preponderant of influence

within the collectivity, and;

b) The masses of the majority which is governed by the elite (Parry, 1969).

For some, elites are the decision-makers in a society whose power is not subjugated to control by

anybody in society (Bottomore, 1964). For others, elites are the sole originator of values in the

society or comprise the integrating force in the society without which it may collapse.

Elites have been regarded as a major threat to the very survival of democracy (Bottomore, 1964).

The existence of elites in society is seen as the very denial of democracy. Elites with phenomenal

access to principal positions in society or wielding disproportionate control over crucial and

critical policies can understandably seem to be living conflictions to the concept of government

by the people (Bottomore, 1964). Notwithstanding, other writers see the elite as the citadel of

democracy, protecting it from the menace of totalitarianism.


34

2.2 The Relationship between Elite Theory and The Concept of Liberal

Democracy

Contemporary elite theorists are more receptive to democracy than their classical counterparts.

This may be an act of inevitability rather than rational estimation (Ikpe, 2010, p. 178). It became

fashionable for regimes of all shades and colours to insist on acquiring the power to rule from the

people, hence the resort to democracy.

It is, however, important to note that none of the states that claimed to exercise democracy was

able to satisfy the Greek model conceptualization of people’s direct participation in

governmental business. Yet, there was the need to sustain elite domination in democracies,

especially in the liberal/capitalist states that were encountering the Marxist-socialist challenge

with the likelihood (real or imagined) of proletarian revolutions (Ikpe, 2008, pp. 109-110).

These new elite theorists define democracy from the minimalist angle, which lays down the

criteria of democracy including regular electoral competitions, usually in a multiparty system

and thus, governmental succession by constitutional electoral procedures which guarantees the

rule of law (Qadir, et al, 1993, p. 416 cited in Ikpe, 2010, p. 178).

For instance, the definition of democracy by Joseph Schumpeter, who is largely considered as

the father of contemporary democratic elitism, is obviously elitist. For him, democracy is simply

a tool for constituting and authorizing governments; neither a type of society nor a set of moral

objectives (Schumpeter, 1969).

Equivalently, the conceptualization of democracy by Giovanni Satori is to emphasize democracy

as a political system in which the impact of the majority is assured through elective and

competitive minorities to whom it is entrusted. It is a process in which leaders compete at

elections for the authority to govern. Satori argues that democracy, like any other form of


35

government, depends on the quality of its leaders. Democrats, as Satori cautions, should

acknowledge this fact and safeguard the elite’s leadership of democracies without a sense of guilt

(Satori, 1965, pp. 124-127).

All the same, Robert Dahl, another popular name within the circles of contemporary elitist

theory, detected that the conclusion that elitism directly contradicts democracy is always

ineludible, so as such, a direct linkage between elitism and democracy is not only indefensible

but also unpalatable. Nonetheless, Dahl posits that practically speaking, democracy is elitist in

nature since it is the rule of multiple minorities. Thus, the rule of the elite of numerous groups

within society (Dahl, 1963, p. 133).

In all, the circumstance of mass participation in democracies seems to be proving elite theories

right. Even in nominal and perfunctory undertakings like voting, the masses are still involved

less than the elite, not to talk of more deliberative forms of participation like policy formulation.

2.3 An Overview of Elite Consensus

It is widely argued that the unity of a state’s elite helps to establish the state’s democratic

progress (Gould & Szomolanyi, 1997). Theorists emphasize that a proviso of a stable democracy

is that the parameters of a democratic political system are agreed upon by elites. However, in

situations where they fail to unite behind the concepts of democratic procedures and norms as the

“only game in town”, the feasibility of democratic institutions is jeopardized, creating a case

where elites may endeavour to rule by non-democratic means rather than relinquish their claims

to power (Gould & Szomolanyi, 1997).

According to Burton and Higley, “elites are people who are able, by virtue of their authoritative

positions and powerful organizations and movements of whatever kind, to affect national


36

political outcomes regularly and substantially” (1987, p. 295). The disproportionate power and

influence of elites make them matter most for the consolidation and stability of democracy, not

only in their conduct but also in their beliefs.

Elite norms and beliefs are often important because, primarily, they are more likely to have

detailed systems of political beliefs; more likely to have control over political events and more

likely to be directed in their actions by their beliefs. Secondly, elites also play a critical role in

framing political culture and in indicating what types of behaviour are proper. More so, elites

lead partially by example, good or bad; when they are condescending of the rules and norms of

democracy, their followers are more likely to exhibit same (Diamond & Plattner, 1999, p. 66).

Nonetheless, it must be stressed that the political culture of accommodation, bargaining and

constitutionalism must not be constricted to the elite level; instead, the elites must involve the

masses and to lift their political consciousness, advance democratic practices and marshal

participation (Diamond & Plattner 1999, p. 20).

Elite consensus rates elites by the range to which they share close views and by the extent of

access to pivotal decision-making. At the two sides of the coin are “strongly unified elites” and

“divided or disunited elites” (Burton & Higley, 1987, p. 9). Strongly unified elites are made

distinct, first, by implicitly shared consensus about the codes and rules of political conduct and

subdued partisanship; also, by comparatively effective and reliable access to each other and the

foremost decision-makers. They see politics as a positive-sum game, which when played by the

rules, will bring forth benefits in the long run, even in the midst of problems during elections

(Burton & Higley, 1987). The above-elucidated factors are practically absent among weakly

unified elites. There is neither a shared understanding of the rules of the game nor a reliable and

consistent source to crucial decision-makers. Elites within this particular bracket are either ‘in’ or


37

‘out’. To them, politics is a zero-sum game that must generally be ‘waged’ as aggressively and

brutally as on the battlegrounds. Between the two divergent views, lies an entire scale of varied

motive games and behaviours consisting balance of power, temporary alliances and log-rolling

of interests without regard to the rest of society (Gould & Szomolanyi, 1997).

Scholars of the New Elite Framework further assert that until an agreement between elites is

reached, either by a historic compromise happening once or through gradual change, stable

democracy is not likely. Thus, divided elites must struggle over and agree on procedural

consensus before a prospective sustainable development can be a reality (Frempong, 2007b).

Political opponents under such circumstances, need not necessarily like each other, but there

must be tolerance of one another and the general recognition that each has a crucial and

legitimate role to play. Civility and tolerance in public debate must be encouraged as part of the

ground rules in society. Irrespective of who wins elections in a democratic system, both factions

must agree to work together in solving the common problems of the society. The losers of the

election must have the reassurance that they will not be assassinated or imprisoned. Rather, there

must be an enabling environment for opposition to continue to engage in public life in the

understanding that its role is equally important; and that it is devoted to the basic legitimacy of

the state and to the democratic process itself (Frempong, 2007b). Higley and Burton hit the bull’s

eye when they stressed that “although the groups are forever quarrelling, an operational code of

“give to get” eschews mutually destructive struggles” (1998, p. 98).

The elite pact, courtesy elite consensus, is prerequisite for the transition from an autocratic

regime towards a democratic order. Pacts, as defined by O’Donnell and Schmitter, is “an explicit

but not always publicly explicated or justified, an agreement among a select set of actors which


38

seek to redefine rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the

vital interest of those entering it” (1986, p. 37).

An elite pact may arise as a result of a decrease in the ability of the ruling party to control society

by force or the widened elite realization that the persistent entrenched stances among the elites

serve none of their interest. Most importantly, it attempts to harmonize the core values of

contending parties in society. More so, a pact as such may exhibit undemocratic attributes like

the provision of amnesty to outgoing/incumbent regime, but at the foundation is a negotiated

agreement by core political opponents to abide with the newly designed democratic structure. It

is in regard to these that an elite pact epitomizes an important step towards elite consensus.

Nonetheless, it does not automatically mean that the actual elite consensus has been

accomplished. This is because elites can arrive at a calculated compromise out of mutual self-

interest without harmonizing their core values and beliefs. This merely renders pact as temporary

tactical agreements among elites. Along these lines, while elite settlements or pacts may bear

tacitly contained and definitively restrained practices among contending political elites, they may

continue to cling to their most valued beliefs (Higley & Burton 1998, p. 115; O’Donnell &

Schmitter 1986, p. 37; Gould & Szomolanyi 1997).

The consensus is more than the overall sum of ideas of the individuals in a group. During

deliberations, ideas add up on the next, producing new ideas until the best decision surfaces. This

effect is called the creative interplay of ideas. Creativity plays a substantive role in the discussion

on the best alternative for the group and the more people are committed to this collaborative

effort, the more possibilities and ideas are produced. As such, the indiscriminate,

uncompromising and persistent exercise of a parliamentary majority that is characteristic of


39

many political administrations worldwide impede the growth of elite bond and national

development (Frempong, 2007b).

The objective has usually been winning the vote, no matter the alternative option that might be in

the interest of the larger group; instead of persuasion, it rather resorts to the power of dominion.

When the volition of the majority supersedes the interests of the minority, it is fundamentally

conflictual. Consensus seeks to take into consideration every disagreement and resolve each of

them before a decision is made. More importantly, this practice spurs an atmosphere in which all

contributions are valued and everyone is respected.

2.4 The Relationship between Conflict, Consensus and Democracy

The main premise of liberal democracy is that:

for the management of state affairs, there should be an open and free field for members of society

to compete to exercise the power to control and manage the material resources of the state for and

on behalf of the entire population, irrespective of race, religion, gender or political conviction

(Hagan, 1995, p. 83).

Also, all governments rely on a certain blend of coercion and consent but democracies are

exclusive with the rate at which their stability is dependent on the consent of bulk of those

governed (Diamond, Linz & Lipset, 1995, p. 9).

Significant to this research, is the fact that democracy has as its key paradox, conflict and

consensus. This is exhibited in numerous ways:

• While democracy involves a set of rules for regulating conflict, this conflict must be

regulated within defined limits and generate compromises, consensus or other

concessions that all parties accept as legitimate. An overplay on one side of the equation


40

can endanger the whole undertaking. As such, democracy must discover a system to

mitigate conflict and rift with consensus (Diamond & Plattner 1999, p. xiii).

• Democracy is essentially a system of the institutionalized struggle for power. In the

absence of conflict and competition, there is no democracy. However, any society that

permits political conflict is likely to become so conflict-inflicted that civil peace and

stability can be threatened (Frempong, 2007b).

• In between elections, citizens must be able to impact public policy via numerous non-

electoral means such as social movements and group associations, which constantly

involve competition and cooperation among citizens (Frempong, 2007b, p. 129).

• Democracy is characterized by dissent and division but on the grounds of cohesion and

consent. It demands that citizens assert themselves, but also accept the authority of the

government (Frempong, 2007b, p. 129).

• A democratic society is expected to be committed to citizens who accept the

unavoidability of conflict as well as the exigency for tolerance. To establish a democratic

culture, individuals and groups must be ready, at minimal, to tolerate each other’s

differences, acknowledging that the other side has a well-founded right and a legitimate

point of view (Frempong, 2007b, p. 129).

• More so, coalition building is the basis of democratic actions. It enlightens interest

groups to negotiate with others, accommodate, compromise and work within the

parameters of the constitution. In so doing, all factions with differences learn how to

peacefully argue, how to embark on their goals in a democratic way and climactically

how to exist in a diversified world (Frempong, 2007b, p. 129).


41

• The recent boom of democratic interest in African governance is stimulated by the

acknowledgement that conflict is inevitable and endlessly existent in all societies to some

degree; and that democracy acts as a conflict management mechanism in all societies

(Ahorsu, 2015, p. 58).

The structural elements and their consequences on politics, ambitions of the elite, and the

contingencies of political parties in Ghana are as competitive, vibrant and vitriolic as they are in

other African countries. Nonetheless, Ghana has fixed its electoral predicament effectively and

largely consolidated its democratic dividends (Ahorsu, 2015).

2.5 Politics in Africa Before the Third Wave of Democratization

Baker pinpointed seven tactics used by those African leaders who still clung on to political

power before the third wave of democratization (1998). Some were successful while others failed

in the use of such tactics to hold on to power. These various tactics included buying off the

opposition with state resources or luring them into the ruling party. According to Oquaye, this

strategy was used by Ghana’s former president, Rawlings to infiltrate the Nkrumahists camp

during the 1990s (1995). To him, the Nkrumahists struggled to reorganize themselves majorly

because the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) has penetrated their ranks through

John Tettegah and Kojo Tsikata by the merciless use of state funds.

The second was the containment of the opposition by offering partial concessions to them. This

was executed by dividing the ranks of the opposition, including division along the line of

ethnicity and their representatives; strife in leadership power and inciting distrust of one group to

make a deal with the incumbent. Coercing the opposition using the military and imprisonment of

opposition members on the basis of mere accusations (Baker, 1998).


42

Another tactic used is the forging a stronger support base of the ruling party. This meant

establishing an effective party instrument and forging alliances in addition to bringing forth

younger persons into the limelight and introducing other ethnic groups into the ruling party.

Marshalling one’s own ethnic group was a major gimmick adopted by African leaders to keep

them in power. In this respect, there is a form of client-patron relationship where the client’s

security is catered for by the patron and the client in return pledges support for the patron

(Clapham, 1998). Such a relationship, when needed, is established by the leader with other ethnic

groups for their support.

In Clapham’s view, this type of relationship is deficient in two respects in that there is an

unequal exchange of benefits based on the impartiality of the parties and it may incite ethnic

conflict although it can be handled on ethnic to ethnic bases (1998). This tactic may also amount

to square pegs in round holes. It was argued out differently by Bernheim. According to him, the

client-patron relationship is far better than that of the politician-follower relationship because

citizens can be served better by patrons as clients than followers (Burnheim, 1985). In Ghana,

this relationship has become constricted to a level where clients or followers hold a lot of power

in deciding who is to fill the position of a District Chief Executive (Aidoo, 2008).

Some leaders also intentionally manipulate ethnicity so as to parade multi-party politics as

divisive which can generate instability (Baker, 1998). Others manipulate the rules associated

with multiparty politics. This could result from the intentional procrastination in legitimatizing

and registering opposition parties so that they have very insufficient or no time to coordinate and

partake in the political process. Cameroon’s president, Paul Biya, was successful in

standardizing a one-round election to establish the winner in the presidential elections (Baker,


43

1998). He also formulated a law which forbade political party coalition knowing a little could be

a threat to his reign.

More so, Ghana’s Rawlings lifted the ban on party politics just four months to elections whereas,

in Burkina Faso, it was only five months. Although they cannot be said to be fully democratic,

the few countries that held multi-party elections before 1990 were Zimbabwe, Comoros Islands,

Angola, Mauritius, Botswana, Gambia and Senegal (Baker, 1998).

2.6 The Ghanaian Context

There are several accounts for the liberalization of the political space in Ghana. All the same, it

has been argued that the frame and momentum of Ghana’s transition have been guided by

domestic and international factors (Boafo-Arthur, 1991). The journey of Ghana’s strife towards

the institutionalization of democratic rule begun in the year 1988 when the PNDC government

conducted district assembly elections. However, the year 1990 could be labelled as the turning

point in Ghana’s transition process (Aidoo, 2008). It was at this time that opposition contingents

began to lump pressure on the regime to return the country to constitutional rule. It is worth

noting that the actual transition was dependent on the disposition of Rawlings.

When Rawlings seized power, rises in oil price on the international market caused a severe blow

on the economy of developing countries, including Ghana. Numerous attempts to revive the

economy during the early days of the regime fell short, forcing the PNDC to accept the

Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the

World Bank. The achievements of these measures expedited the lifting of the economy from its

plight. The economy, it must be noted, was in a perilous state and the embracement of such


44

initiative and demands which were subsequently made on the government to better the wellbeing

of the citizens triggered the movement for democracy (Aidoo, 2008).

When the PNDC came into the picture, non-democratic processes and features were not new to

Ghana’s post-colonial politics. However, they became systematic and pronounced during the era

of the PNDC (Oquaye, 1993). There was a perpetual disregard for due process, detention without

trials, arbitrary arrests and post-factum decrees were used to subdue political opponents. The

middle class and the opposition felt resentment for the authoritarian style of leadership of the

PNDC which handicapped civil liberties. Boafo-Arthur has contended that there were “feeble but

persistent calls…to return the country to constitutional rule” (1991). These efforts, however,

“were not backed by any sustained public agitations strong enough to compel the PNDC

government to concede” (Boafo-Arthur, 1991). The broadcast and print media which were to be

the opposition’s mouthpiece were bowdlerized. The media, pro-democratic groups and civil

society organizations including political parties were silenced through legislative and other

illegal means.

2.7 The Transition Process and the Movement towards Democratic Rule

The transition to democratic rule in 1992, is Ghana’s third in the string of transitions from

military rule in history. It first occurred in 1969 when the National Liberation Council (NLC)

relinquished power to the Progress Party (PP) after winning elections held in that year. The

second was from the Armed Forces Revolution Council (AFRC) to Dr Hilla Liman upon the

latter’s victory in the 1979 general elections and the third was from Rawlings’ Provisional

National Defence Council (PNDC) to the National Democratic Congress (NDC) led by Rawlings

(Bluwey, 1998).


45

As argued by Bluwey, Rawlings was an “unwilling convert” to democracy, who was not

prepared to surrender power to a civilian government (1998). He pinned Rawlings’ change of

mind to surrender power to a civilian regime on changes in the international political economy.

That, along with harsh economic conditions prevailing in the country, forced Rawlings’ hand to

convert to democratic rule.

Although Rawlings was reluctant to return the country to democratic rule, he initiated certain

actions in the early years of his military regime that implied that he would return the country to

democratic rule “within the shortest possible time” (Bluwey, 1998).

2.8 Political Parties in Ghana’s Fourth Republic

2.8.1 The Regulatory Framework of Party Politics in the Fourth Republic

Based on the democratic status of a country, there are different laws regulating the activities of

political parties (Karvonen, 2007). Likewise, laws in Ghana overseeing the conduct of political

parties during the rule of the PNDC government were halted resulting in the inhibition on the

freedom to form political parties. Political parties and their activities were rejuvenated after the

approval of the 1992 Constitution which provided the rules guiding them and their operations in

Article 55 (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). Electoral laws as well had a correlation with the key

conditions for the activities of parties and the conduct of politicians in the political domain

(Grofman & Lijphart, 1986 cited in Karvonen, 2007). It is in the event of competitive elections

that the operations of political parties and politicians are brought to bear on the political

procedure.


46

The 1992 Constitution was to come into force from the day that the referendum was undertaken.

Therefore, the determination of party rules and regulations along with its implementation was

left in the hands of the PNDC government. As reported by Arnon, states that have party laws had

in the past experienced a breakdown of their democratic system (1995). Ghana encountered the

abatement of its constitution in 1960, 1969 and 1979. According to Arnon, a political party law

is therefore inherent to guarantee free association of political parties (1995). At the same time, it

provides the state with the ability to ban parties whose operations might endanger the stability of

the democratic state.

In Ghana, the principal laws guiding the activities of political parties and party politics are

Article 55 and 56 of the 1992 Republican Constitution, the PNDCL 281 of 1992 (amended in

2000), the Representation of the People Law (PNDCL 284) of 1992 (amended in 2000), the

Public Elections Regulations (C.I. 15) of 1996, the Political Parties Law of 2000 (Act 574) and

the Political Parties Code Conduct of 2000 (amended in 2004).

The aim of the code is to direct political parties in their day to day operations, particularly during

election campaign periods (International IDEA, 2007). Article 3(1) of the 1992 Constitution

prohibits Parliament from enacting a law proclaiming a one-party state, by that, bolstering

Article 55 which afforded the state with the foundation for instituting multi-party democracy

(Constitution of Ghana, 1992). This was to forestall a particular party from taking advantage of

its majority in parliament to establish a one-party structure. This is hinged on the lessons from

Nkrumah’s use of the legislature to pass laws making Ghana a one-party state. In such a case,

parliament had developed into a rubber stamp and sheer annexe of the Convention Peoples

Party’s desire to hold onto political power. The 1992 constitution, also outlawed the overthrow

of a democratically elected government in Article 55(2&3) (Constitution of Ghana, 1992).


47

2.8.2 Formation and Activities of Political Parties

In Ghana, the creation of a political party is exclusive to every Ghanaian wielding the franchise

to vote in national elections as stipulated in Article 55(1&2) (Constitution of Ghana, 1992).

Article 55 of the Constitution articulates the provisions for registering a political party. There are

stipulated criteria which must be satisfied before the party can commence its operations. Article

55(7) states that the political party should be broad-based and founding members must hail from

every district of the country (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). The number of districts in 1992 was

110. Presently, the number is 275 (Districts.ghana-net.com, 2019). Article 55(7b) states that the

political party must have branches in each region and be organized in at least two-thirds of the

districts (Constitution of Ghana). More so, neither of the party’s name, colour, emblem, motto

nor any other symbol should have an ethnic, religious, regional or sectional association as

particularized by section 7(c) of Article 55 (Constitution of Ghana, 1992).

To forward democracy, the operations of political parties as laid down in Article 55(3) of the

1992 Constitution of Ghana and the Political Parties Act 1(3) laid out the key goals of political

parties which are: To shape the political will of the people; To annunciate information on

political ideas;, To set sail economic and social programmes which are national in character; To

sponsor candidates for presidential and parliamentary elections (Constitution of Ghana, 1992).

The operations of political parties must not be seen to contradict the constitution of the Republic

of Ghana. As such, the Electoral Commission must make certain that the constitution of a party

satisfies the initial criteria before it is registered.


48

2.8.3 Legal Requirements for Financing Political Parties in the Fourth

Republic

In recent times, political party financing has become a controversial issue in Ghanaian politics.

Political parties are expected to fund themselves with the capital they raise. Within the legal

regulation on party financing, there are no rigorous ways of assessing the source of funding

political parties and their activities. Under the constitution, in Article 55(14a), it is required for

political parties to declare their assets and revenues and their sources to the Electoral

Commission (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). In addition, as stated in Article 55(14b) their audited

accounts are expected to be published annually (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). However,

political parties for unknown reasons have not fully complied to the above directives. They

usually complain of the time constraint in the preparation and integration of such financial

statements from constituency accounts into the national ones (Field Interview, 2019). The

constitution does not specify any punitive measures for violators of this provision. Yet, section

30(1) of the Political Parties Act 2000, made available a provision for the transgression of any

section of the Act. Any violation under this Act is “punishable with a fine not exceeding ten

million cedis or a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years or both”, ACT 574 Section

30(3) (The Political Parties Law, 2000).

2.8.4 Political Parties Operating in Ghana’s Fourth Republic

Currently, Ghana has more than 20 registered political parties, including the 5 most popular

parties (Index Mundi, 2018). These five parties are the National Democratic Congress (NDC),

the New Patriotic Party (NPP), Conventions People’s Party (CPP), the Peoples Progress Party


49

(PPP) and the People’s National Convention (PNC). However, the political party landscape in

Ghana is dominated by the National Democratic Congress (NDC) on one side and the New

Patriotic Party (NPP) on the other (Miessner, 2010).

Both parties have a different programmatic orientation with which they place much emphasis on;

the NPP sees itself as liberal, while the NDC terms itself as social democratic (Miessner, 2010).

Many scholars have stressed the importance of the two core political traditions in the country:

the Busia-Danquah tradition and the Nkrumah tradition (Osei, 2015). These political factions

were the cause of bitter elite struggles between the 1960s and the 1990s but positioned the

foundation for today’s two-party system by framing the political scope into easily recognisable

blocs. The NDC identifies itself with the Nkrumah tradition because of its socialist ideals whiles

the NPP labels itself as the descendant of the Busia-Danquah tradition due to its liberal ideals

(Osei, 2015).

2.9 Elections in Ghana

2.9.1 Legal Frameworks: International and Regional Commitments

Ghana is a party to all the key regional and international commitments and instruments relating

to human rights and the conduct of elections. These include: Universal Declaration of Human

Rights (1948), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979), African Charter on Human

and People’s Rights (1981), International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial

Discrimination (1996), ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance


50

(2001), African Union Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007), The

Commonwealth Charter (2012) (The Commonwealth Observer Group, 2016).

The 1992 Constitution of Ghana guarantees fundamental rights and freedoms, which includes the

freedom of expression, assembly, association and participation in elections.

The major documents containing the legal and regulatory framework for the conduct of elections

are: Constitution of Ghana (1992, as amended by Act 527 of 1996), Representation of the People

Act (1992, as amended), Presidential Elections Act (1992, as amended), Electoral Commission

Act (1993, as amended), Political Parties Act (2000), Representation of the People

(Constituencies) Instrument (2004), Political Parties Code of Conduct (2012), Public Elections

Registration of Voters Regulations (CI 91 of 2016), Public Elections Regulations (CI 94 of 2016)

(The Commonwealth Observer Group, 2016).

2.9.2 The President and Parliament

The President of Ghana is elected into office for a four-year term and can serve a maximum of

two terms (Boakye, 2018). The President is elected in a single national constituency on the

foundation of a majority system. For the candidate to be elected in the first round, he/she needs

to obtain at least 50% - plus 1 of the valid votes cast. Where none obtains such majority, the two

leading candidates compete in a run-off election. Whichever candidate bags the most votes in the

run-off is the winner.

The Parliament of Ghana is made up of 275 members, elected from single-member

constituencies under the practice of the first-past-the-post system (The Commonwealth Observer

Group, 2016). Likewise, the term of a Parliament is four years.


51

2.9.3 The Electoral Commission of Ghana (EC)

The Constitution and the Electoral Commission Act cater to the creation of the EC as an

independent body. Article 43(1) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana stipulates that the EC shall be

composed of seven members – a Chairperson, two deputy Chairpersons, and four other members

(Constitution of Ghana, 1992).

The President appoints the chairperson and other members of the EC, on the advice of the

Council of State for an undefined timeframe.

The major responsibilities of the Electoral Commission are to: compile the register of voters and

revise it as at when it may be determined by law; embark on programmes for the expansion of

the registration of voters; demarcate the electoral boundaries for local and national government

elections; execute and supervise all public elections and referendums; and educate the public on

the electoral process and its purpose (Constitution of Ghana, 1992).

2.9.4 Role of the Media

The 1992 Constitution of Ghana, Article 163, states that “all state-owned media shall afford fair

opportunities and facilities for the presentation of divergent views and dissenting opinions”

(Constitution of Ghana, 1992). Thus, all presidential candidates are entitled to be provided with a

fair share of space on state-owned media during the campaign period.

The National Media Commission (NMC) is requisitioned by law (Article 55(11)) to advance and

ensure the freedom and independence of the media; hold the highest journalistic standards; and,

mediate and settle complaints made against or by the press or other mass media (Constitution of

Ghana, 1992).


52

With the media reporting on election campaigns, there is no election-specific code of conduct for

journalists. Nonetheless, the Ghana Journalists Association (GJA) published guidelines

encouraging journalists to: conduct themselves to the highest standards; report accurately and

without bias, and particularly to ensure that the ruling party of government does not gain unfair

access to the media; enable voters to make informed and intelligent choices during elections;

check facts meticulously; focus on issues; and, not to compromise their integrity by accepting

bribes or other inducements (Atawura, 2017).

2.10 The Legislature in Ghana

2.10.1 Composition of the Parliament in Ghana

The legislative arm of government in Ghana passes bills approved by the president to become the

laws which safeguard the constitutional rights of citizens (Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, 2011).

Article 93 states that elected body comprises of “no less than 140 members” (Constitution of

Ghana, 1992) but currently houses 275 members (Districts.ghana-net.com, 2019). According to

Article 94, “a Member of Parliament must be a Ghanaian and must have attained the age of 21

years and be a registered voter” (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). Article 94 further demands that

“a Member of Parliament must hold current residence in the area he or she represents or has

lived in the area for at least 5 to 10 years preceding his or her election”. In addition, all taxes

must be paid as stated in Article 97 (Constitution of Ghana, 1992).

The Leadership in Parliament includes The Speaker of Parliament, First Speaker of Parliament,

Second Speaker of Parliament, Majority Leader, Minority Leader and Committees of Parliament

(Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, 2011).


53

2.11 Political Successions in the Fourth Republic

2.11.1 Political Succession from 1992 to 2000

The first elections in the fourth republic were undertaken to re-establish democratic rule in the

country. The main competitors were the National Democratic Congress (Progressive Alliance)

led by Rawlings and the New Patriotic Party with Albert Adu Boahen as their leader. Other

political parties in contention were the PNC, led by Hilla Liman, the NIP, represented by

Kwabena Darko, as well as the PHP, led by Emmanuel Erskine. Rawlings won the election with

a final result of 58.4% votes as against the NPP’s 30.3% votes (Atindow, 2018). The

parliamentary election was held on 29th December 1992 with a total voter turn-out of 28.1%. The

NPP boycotted the election with only the NDC, the National Convention Party and Every

Ghanaian Living Everywhere, including independent candidates contesting. The NDC was

victorious, acquiring 189 seats (African Elections Database, 2017). In January 1993, democratic

governance was finally re-established in Ghana. However, doubts and mistrusts about the Interim

National Electoral Commission, not to mention the violence that featured in the 1992 elections

forced the formation of the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) by the EC. This gave

aggrieved parties the chance to voice their grievances as they were brought to the negotiation

table (Frempong, 2007a).

The general elections held in 1996 were less contentious due to the creation of the Inter-Party

Advisory Committee (IPAC). The 1996 presidential election held on 7th December was contested

by three political parties. These parties included the ruling party, NDC (Progressive Alliance) led

by Rawlings, the NPP (Great Alliance) represented by Kufuor and the PNC led by Edward

Mahama. At the end of the election, the NDC (Progressive Alliance) amassed 57.375% with the

NPP (Great Alliance) attaining 39.67%. The parliamentary elections were conducted on the


54

same day with the NDC obtaining 133 seats against the NPP’s 60 seats (African Elections

Database, 2017). The credence of all the major actors in Ghanaian politics were boosted through

the IPAC initiative which bore consensus in many areas of the electoral politics (Frempong,

2007a).

2.11.2 Political Succession from 2000 till Date

During the early part of Rawlings’ second term, a grave political issue cast long and deep

shadows on the political atmosphere. The issue was whether he would live up to the

constitutional term limit and hand over power in 2000. Frempong states that “Rawlings retained

the assets of youth, dynamism and popularity, showed unremitting interest in power and

influence and seemingly had a hold on the security agencies” (2007b). The 2000 election was

conducted in December with the NDC and the NPP as the main contenders. Professor J.E.A Atta

Mills contested on the ticket of the NDC while Mr John Agyekum Kufuor contested on the ticket

of the NPP. This particular election went into a run-off which was held on 28th December 2000.

It ended in a 56.90% victory for NPP as against 43.10% for the NDC. In the parliamentary

elections, the NPP swept 99 seats with the NDC securing 92 seats out of a total of 200 seats

(African Election Database, 2017). This symbolized the first turn-over for Ghana and exhibited

the depth of democracy it has come to cherish. It established Ghana as an example for other West

African countries. From this phase, Ghana began its journey to a de-facto two-party system. The

2004 elections, just like the previous ones, followed a similar pattern.

The 2004 election was largely peaceful with power being retained by the NPP. J.A Kufuor of the

NPP had 52.45% votes in the presidential elections and 128 seats in the parliamentary elections.

Atta Mills of the NDC also had 44.64% votes in the presidential election and secured 94 seats in


55

the parliamentary elections. The PNC and the CPP were the other parties who contested in the

parliamentary elections including one independent candidate (African Elections Database, 2017).

The 2008 elections made witness to the country’s second alternation of power as the incumbent

NPP gave way to the opposition NDC. It also produced another presidential run-off. Atta Mills

of the NDC emerged victorious by a narrow victory of 50.23% of the vote, while the incumbent

NPP’s Nana Addo gathered 49.77%. In the parliamentary elections, the NDC pulled 114 seats

while the NPP obtained 107 seats.

In spite of severe contestation for the presidency, Ghana looked to be deviating from other

African nations who had been involved in conflicts but managed to consolidate the transition.

The 2012 elections also witnessed a ferocious competition between the two de-facto parties. John

Mahama of the NDC retained power with a close 50.63% while Nana Addo of the NPP was

defeated with 47.81%. In the parliamentary elections, the NDC won 148 seats while the NPP

pulled 123 seats (Frempong, 2017). This election resulted in the famous “2012 Election Petition”

that served as a test to the depth and in-grafting of Ghana’s democratic course. The NPP

unhappy with the outcome of the elections sent the case to the Supreme Court for hearing and

verdict. At the end of proceedings, the court ruled in favour of the NDC, with the NPP accepting

the court ruling.

The 2016 election won back power for the opposition NPP after two unsuccessful tries (Graham,

et al, 2017). For the presidential elections, the NPP led by Nana Akufo-Addo got 53.80% while

the incumbent NDC led by John Mahama had 44.40%. In the parliamentary elections, the NPP

had 169 seats while the NDC won 106 seats (Frempong, 2017). This particular election offered a

different scope in Ghanaian elections. Among the candidates who filed for the election was a

woman, Nana Konadu Agyemang Rawlings, who broke away from the NDC to form the NDP


56

(National Democratic Party). This was the first in the history of Ghana, setting another precedent

for elections and democratic consolidation in Ghana (Aryee, 2017).

2.10 Conclusion

From this chapter, it has been established that in making sense of the word, elite, classical elitist

theorists such as Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Robert Michels and Wright Mills, in their

famous works, provide a foundational basis for its conceptualisation. A recurrent theme which

cuts across these works is the assertion that elite minority hold absolute power over the masses

and are not accountable to them. However, with the popular practice of liberal democracy today,

the oligarchical conception of the elite, as portrayed by classical elitist theorists, has

metamorphosed to the contemporary egalitarian viewpoint. Here, the masses are now said to

wield power over elites with the latter bounded within the confines of regular electoral

competition and accountability. It must be noted that some contemporary elitist scholars believe

elites, even though confined within these restrictions, still possess absolute power over the

masses.

Away from the ambit of the correlation between elites and democracy, this chapter sheds

comprehensive light on interrelations between elites under the heading, elite consensus.

Generally, elites may be divided in what is termed as “disunited elites” or united under a

“strongly unified elites”. Strongly unified elites agree on pertinent issues while disunited elites

do not. It is with this knowledge that many scholars posit that for a country to exude democratic

consolidation and enjoy subsequent development, its elites must be strongly unified.

This chapter ends by providing a historical account to the case study of this research, Ghana, in

the context of its fourth republic. This is followed by an overview of the legal frameworks,


57

functions and composition of political parties, elections and the legislature before zeroing in on

the political successions since the start of the fourth republic. Ever since Rawlings agreed to a

shift from military to democratic rule, there have been seven elections so far and three turnovers

between the two dominant political parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the

New Patriotic Party (NPP). Presidents from 1992 to date, in the order of succession, are Jerry

John Rawlings (1992-2001), John Agyekum Kufuor (2001-2009), John Evans Atta Mills (2009-

2012), John Mahama (2012-2016) and currently, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo (2016-date).


58

References

African Elections Database. (2017). Elections in Ghana. Retrieved May 18, 2019, from

http:/africanelections.tripod.com/gh.html


Y. Gebe, Constitutionalism, Democratic Governance and the African State (pp. 57-92).

Accra: Black Mask.

Aidoo, T. M. (2008). Political Stability in Ghana: since the 1992 Re-Democratization Wave.

Germany: VDM & Co.

Arnon, D. (1995). Parties Law in Democratic Systems of Government. Journal of Legislative

Studies, 1, 283-300.

Aryee, J. (2017). Ghana's Elections of 7th December 2016: A Post-Mortem. South African

Journal of International Affairs, 24(3), 311-330.

Atawura, P. (2017). Regulatory Framework of the Media in Ghana. Retrieved June 23, 2019,

from Philipatawura's Blog: https://philipatawura.wordpress.com/2017/05/02/regulatory-

framework-of-the-media-in-ghana/amp/

Atindow, M. (2018). The Journey of Presidential Elections in Ghana from 1992 to 2016.

Retrieved May 18, 2019, from Modern Ghana.

Bluwey, G. (1998). State Organizations in the Transition to Constitutional Democracy. (K.

Ninsin, Ed.) Accra: Freedom Publications.

Boafo-Arthur, K. (1991). The International Community and Ghana's Transition to Democracy.

(N. K.A., Ed.) Accra: Freedom Publications.

Boakye, B. (2018). Electoral Politics in Ghana's 4th Republic (1992-2016) and its Implications

on Future Elections. SSRN Electronic Journal.

Bottomore. (1964). Elites and Society. Great Britain: Penguin Books.

Burnheim, J. (1985). Is Democracy Possible? Berkeley: California University Press.

Burton, M., & Higley, J. (1987). Elite Settlements. American Sociological Review.

Clapham, C. (1998). Third World Politics: Introduction. London and Sydney: Croom Helm.

Constitution of Ghana, 1992.

Dahl, R. (1963). A Perfect Democratic Theory. Chicago: Pheonix.


59

Diamond, L., & Plattner, M. (1999). Democratization in Africa. Baltimore, Maryland: John

Hopkins University Press.

Diamond, L., Linz, J., & Lipset, S. (1995). Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing

Experiences with Democracy. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.

Districts.ghana-net.com. (2019). Ghana Districts. Retrieved June 13, 2019, from

http://districts.ghana-net.com/index.html

Frempong, A.K.D (2007a). Constitution-making and Constitutional Rule in Ghana. In J. Ayee,

Ghana at 50: Government, Politics and Development (pp. 51-76). Accra: Friedrich Ebert

Stiftung.

Frempong, A. K.D (2007b). The Political Conflict and Elite Consensus in the Liberal State. In K.

Boafo-Arthur, Ghana: One Decade of the Liberal State. Dakar: Cordesria Books.

Frempong, A. K.D (2017). Elections in Ghana (1951-2016). Accra: Digibooks Ghana.

Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung. (2011). The Law-Making Process in Ghana: Structures and

Procedures. Accra: Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung Ghana.

Gould, J., & Szomolanyi, S. (1997). Elite Fragmentation in Industry and the Prospect for

Democracy. Intermarium, 1(2).

Graham, E., & et al. (2017). The Third Peaceful Transfer of Power and Democratic

Consolidation in Ghana. Journal of Pan African Studies, 10(5), 99-128.

Grofman, B., & Lijphart, A. (Eds.). (1986). Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences.

New York: Agathon Press.

Hagan, G. (1995). Democracy as a Conflictual System- the Needed Cultural Premise. (M.

Oquaye, Ed.) Accra: Gold Type.

Higley, J., & Michael, B. (1998). Elite Settlement and the Taming of Politics. Government and

Opposition, 33(1), 98-115.

Ikpe, U. (2008). Obsolescence of Citizens: Theory of Democracy in the Age of Globalization?

Unilag Journal of Politics, 4, 104-132.

Ikpe, U. (2010). State-Society Interactions: A Conceptual and Comparative Introduction to

Political Sociology. Lagos: Concept Publications Limited.

Index Mundi. (2018). Ghana Political Parties and Leaders. Retrieved June 22, 2019, from Index

Mundi Website: https://www.indexmundi.com/ghana/political_party_and_leaders.html


60

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. (2007). Political Parties in West

Africa: The Challenge of Democratization in the Fragile States. Retrieved June 2019,

from International IDEA Website: www.idea.intpartiesuploadGhana%20laid%20out.pdf

Karvonen, L. (2007). Party Politics, 13(4), 437-455.

Meissner, K. (2010). Elections and Conflict in Ghana. International Policy Analysis, 1-10.

O'Donnell, G., & Schmitter, P. (1986). Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative

Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins

University Press.

Oquaye, M. (1993). Law, Justice and the Revolution. (E. Gyamah-Boadi, Ed.) Dakar: Codesria.

Oquaye, M. (1995). The Ghanaian Election of 1992 - A Dissenting View. African Affairs,

94(375), 259-275.


Affairs(114/457), 529-554.

Parry, G. (1969). Political Elite. London: George, Allen and Unwin Ltd.

Satori, G. (1965). Democracy Theory. New York: Praeger.

Schumpeter, J. A. (1969). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: Allen and Unwin Ltd.

The Commonwealth Observer Group. (2016). Ghana General Elections: 7 December 2016. The

Commonwealth. London: The Commonwealth Secretariat.


61

CHAPTER THREE

AN EXAMINATION OF ELITE CONSENSUS AND NATIONAL

DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA

3.0 Introduction

After the digestive overview of elite consensus, liberal democracy and the linkages between the

two, as well as the provision of a historical overview of democratic governance in Ghana’s

fourth republic, this penultimate chapter takes the research a notch higher. This time, with much

focus on Ghana.

Elites in the daily execution of their mandated roles interact with each other in numerous ways

and on varying issues affecting national development. In Ghana, just like in any part of the

world, political elites are the major agents of democracy, not to mention, the pivot on which

developmental goals are structured and subsequently achieved. This is to say, their operations,

especially interactions amongst each other, is crucial to the very survival of the state (Field

Interview, 2019).

The prime focus of this chapter is to examine elite consensus and national development in

Ghana. Knowing consensus-building amongst political elites transcends the scope of elections to

the entirety of political engagement, here, a larger scope will be adopted for examination. This

includes different political portfolios such as the executive, parliamentarians and political parties

operating at the levels of partisan politics, elections, the legislature and national development

planning in Ghana. With regards to the executive, national development planning in Ghana’s


62

fourth republic under the auspices of the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC)

will be examined.

3.1 Operational Benchmarks for Examining Elite Consensus in Ghana

The previous chapter provided this study with an exhaustive overview of elite consensus. Based

on this insight and that of think-tank interviewees of the study, the operational benchmarks for

examining elite consensus in Ghana will be derived.

Recurrent themes of elite consensus as illustrated in the previous chapter as well as through the

submissions of think tank interviewees, forming the benchmarks and therefore the basis of this

research are as follows:

• There must be evidence of elite pact, especially during the transformation from

authoritarianism to democratic rule.

• There must be inter-party and intra-party consensus.

• There must be a mutual acceptance of the legitimacy of the rules of the political game –

Implicitly shared consensus about the codes and rules of political conduct.

• There must be the absence of adversary politics – Adversary politics is when there is a

deep and broad disagreement between the main political parties (Tutor2u, 2018).

• Due to the inevitability of conflict, there must be an effective conflict resolution

mechanism well entrenched in the constitution to handle conflicts amongst elites.

• There must be the presence of the elite culture of accommodation, bargaining and

compromises.

• There must be subdued partisanship – Politics must be seen as a positive-sum game;

absence of indiscriminate, uncompromising and persistent use of parliamentary majority.


63

These benchmarks will serve as the general criteria in uncovering the truth to the assertion of

elite consensus in Ghana.

3.2 Elite Consensus in Ghana

Elite consensus is the dominant, organised or philosophical group of thinkers in a society, having

agreed upon an idea of how to lead that society. The point is that elite consensus is best looked at

from deducing the concept of the idea of the state. Do we have any idea of what Ghana is? Where

are we going as a nation? When you take countries like Japan, Britain, Israel and the US, there

are several evidence showing they have an idea of what their states and their stances in the world

are. One analyst made an argument that in the developed world, elite consensus is the

reincarnation of a nation’s will. Can we say the same for Africa or Ghana? – A think-tank

interviewee (Field Interview, 2019).

In the quest to ascertain whether there is indeed elite consensus in Ghana, these benchmarks as

outlined above must be indicative or otherwise in the ascribed roles and dealings amongst

numerous political actors, operating at different levels of political life. These political actors are

politicians operating at the levels of political parties, elections and the legislature.

3.2.1 At the Level of Political Parties

In accordance with the tenets of democracy, there must be rule of law that shall synchronise

freedom of expression, the press and all facets of the democratic state. This synchronism is to

advance the tenets of democratic politics which calls for consensus in diversity. The legal

framework establishing the foundation for the formation of political parties must also guide the

conduct of politicians in the pursuit of political goals that italicise party formation (Jonah, 2005).

Political parties, described by Gyampo and Gans-Lartey (2017, p. 1) as “the heart and soul of

every democracy”, relays the import of their unparalleled usefulness in any multi-party

democracy. One which cannot be overemphasised. In all, the success of not only the democratic


64

benchmarks but also the subsequent national development of a state is highly predicated on the

stability within and amongst political parties as well as the conduct of their politicians. In

essence, political parties in the execution of their day-to-day activities, especially those

pertaining to relations with other parties, must inherently exude consensual tendencies.

In this study, as explained early on, operational benchmarks extracted from the wealth of

knowledge in the previous chapter and the submissions of think tanks will serve as criteria for

determining elite consensus in Ghana. This section, within the scope of elite consensus in Ghana,

pays particular attention to elite consensus amongst political parties.

The criteria to be used in this section include:

• Internal consensus within political parties

• Elite pact and inter-party consensus building

• Mutual respect for the rules of the political game

• Absence of adversary politics

3.2.1.2 Analysis of Elite Consensus Amongst Political Parties in the Fourth

Republic

3.2.1.2.1 Internal Consensus within Political Parties

In the bid to forging a stronger elite bond amongst opposing political camps, it is inherent that

these same tendencies first exist within the parties (Gyampo & Gans-Lartey, 2017). In a situation

where executives, politicians and other key members of a particular political party are engulfed

in gross dispute or divided along various lines, it becomes virtually impossible to build

consensus externally with other parties in the pursuit of national development. This is because


65

political parties pave way for a nationalistic purview on decisions taken for national development

and as such any disruption within one, disrupts the sequence with which these set targets are

achieved.

Political parties in Ghana’s fourth republic have not fallen short of such ordeal. Allegations of

corruption, for one, which damaged the process by which candidates were chosen at the

constituency level went against the democratic tenet of competitive election which is also

contradictory with the provision on internal democratic practice (Afrimap, OSIWA & IDEG,

2007). For example, NDC MPs in the first parliament of the fourth republic were forced to step

down without defeat at the primaries before the 1996 elections. Also, the NDC, in the year 2000,

failed to organise primaries in numerous constituencies in an attempt to retain most of the MPs

from the previous parliament. This position vexed several MPs who later decided to contest as

independent candidates (Afrimap, OSIWA & IDEG, 2007).

Another evidence of lack of internal party consensus can be seen in the popular Swedru

Declaration where Rawlings failed to consult party executives before single-handedly appointing

Prof. John Evans Atta Mills as his successor. This situation angered some party members who

had the dream to contesting that position in the 2000 election (Bokpe, 2010, p. 22).

The NPP has also had its fair share of internal disputes, one with a raging fiery in the course of

the fourth republic (Meissner, 2010). Party primaries have proven to be a major problem for the

NPP, especially when in some cases, seasoned Members of Parliaments (MPs) and other key

figures in the party failed to win. Many business people drained large sums of money contesting

in the primaries for parliamentary candidates with clear expectations of recouping their

investments if they won. In such circumstances, there have been violent and chaotic situations

amongst party members and their supporters with common claims of rigging and corruption. It


66

has been argued that these conflicts have within the years caused an internally outstanding party-

divide which has damaged the party in the periods leading to elections. The 2008 elections, for

example, which the NPP lost was seen as a manifestation of such a problem. (Meissner, 2010;

Frempong, 2012).

The ripple effect of these events has resulted in “…the ‘Pro-Rawlings’ and ‘Anti-Rawlings’

syndicates currently existent in the NDC and even today, in the NPP, we have the Akyem and

the Ashanti factions. As such there is no unity of purpose” – think-tank (Field Interview, 2019).

All political party executive interviewees for this study are in agreement with this assertion. One

even goes further to say, “the most harm done in my party today is not even from relations with

other parties but those within” (Field Interview, 2019).

3.2.1.2.2 Elite Pact and Inter-Party Consensus Building

• Elite Pact

Elite pact as explained in the previous chapter is, in simple terms, a situation in which opposing

elite groups come together in signing a crucial agreement in order to stop an uprising from the

masses or foreseen outcomes which will lead to their destruction and that of the society

(O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). Pacts can be a one-time deal which may happen in a democratic

scene or not and has been instrumental in the transitions from authoritarian regimes to

democracies.

Ghana’s transition from military rule to a democracy in 1992 is an example of an elite pact. This

transition was crucial to the very survival of the elites existing at that time, particularly, those

within the PNDC and the very survival of an increasingly impoverished masses (Gyimah-Boadi,


67

2004; Frempong, 2007b). The PNDC, led by Rawlings, only reluctantly accepted a constitutional

multiparty rule under intense pressure from domestic and external forces in the early 1990s.

On the international front, the popular trend of pro-democracy associated with the post-Cold War

order had begun to have a contagious effect across Africa. Domestically, there were increasing

and persistent demands from various civil society groups including the Ghana Bar Association

(GBA), National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) for

change and political reform (Ninsin, 1998, p. 14; Frempong, 2007a, p. 134). In the end, the

ruling PNDC accepted the demands of the opposition and the country as a whole to hold

democratic elections and made several arrangements to that effect.

Another evidence of elite pact can be seen with the formation of the Inter-Party Advisory

Committee (IPAC) after many controversies surrounding the 1992 presidential election. This was

a recommendation by the Commonwealth Observer Group after their observation of the 1992

presidential election (Commonwealth Observer Group, 2016). According to a think-tank

interviewee, knowing their legitimate hold to power was undermined by such tantrums

surrounding the previous election, the NDC was again forced to sit together with the opposition

parties and the EC in drawing strategic agreements on electoral conduct to ensure election

outcomes are generally accepted (Field Interview, 2019).

Similarly, an integral elite pact worth mentioning is the Accra Declaration, a peace pact, signed

by the presidential candidates of the political parties contesting the 2016 elections. It was

organised by the National Peace Council (NPC) on December 1, 2016, after a series of inter-

party tensions leading to that elections. These candidates made public affirmations against

“electoral violence, impunity and injustice in pursuit of strengthening democracy, stability and

peace in Ghana” (Commonwealth Observer Group, 2016, p. 21).


68

• Inter-Party Consensus Building

There are numerous evidence of inter-party consensus building or otherwise in Ghana’s

relatively long history of elections and party politics in the fourth republic. It must be said that

the start of the fourth republic was not as rosy as many expected. The democratic transition was

‘acrimonious’ as a think-tank interviewee puts it (Field Interview, 2019). He further explains,

the PNDC made a deliberate transition of self-succession,…even Obed Asamoah had indicated

that they wanted to keep the acronym, ‘PNDC’, for the new party, and this is the acronym used

by the former military regime, but on second thought, they settled for ‘NDC’ which later won the

elections in a controversial manner.

The controversies surrounding the presidential election will later force the opposition to boycott

the parliamentary election the next year, 1993. Such an election was unlikely to be free,

transparent and fair (Agyeman-Duah, 2005, pp. 8-9). This particular event generally shows a

great failure on the topic of inter-party consensus building at the start of the new republic.

However, it may be argued that though generally constrictive, it shows, to some extent, inter-

party consensus from a minimalist angle. To some, the mere fact that the opposition in Ghana

around that time could come together, reach an agreement and rally behind the idea of a boycott

in the impending parliamentary election is a sign of inter-party consensus-building (Frempong,

2012).

More so, the opposition was praised for not using a violent approach to vent their frustration but

rather chose a path of “least resistance and demonstrated amounts of tolerance in circumstances

which, elsewhere in Africa, could have easily deepened national cleavages and even lead to war”

(Agyemang-Duah, 2005, p. 11). This happening put pressure on the NDC government to largely

work within the constitution and to seek consensus on some various issues with the opposition. It

later reflects in Rawlings’ inaugural address in which he promised to establish the culture of

tolerance, consultation and consensus-building based on mutual respect (La Verle, 1994).


69

This promise given by Rawlings later gave birth to the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC)

in March 1994. This will become a manifestation of inter-party consensus in the form of an elite

pact. The IPAC will be extensively discussed in the subsequent section on elite consensus on

elections. However on inter-party consensus building, IPAC provided an atmosphere for what a

political party executive interviewee describes as “a medium for parties to come together as one

in discussing some trends they see to be inconsistent with the proper conduct of elections and

thereby after deliberations agree on the rules of the game acceptable to every party” (Field

Interview, 2019).

Notwithstanding, a think-tank interviewee in his submission, though in complete agreement with

what the previous interviewee said, adds that, the IPAC produced much disappointment when the

NPP sent the EC and the NDC to court following the way and manner the EC chairperson by

then, Afari Gyan, conducted the 2012 elections (Field Interview, 2019). “During that time, the

NPP was taken by surprise with the EC declaring No Verification! No Vote!. A requirement

which the NPP said was not discussed at the IPAC level” (Field Interview, 2019).

3.2.1.2.3 Respect for the Rules of the Political Game

…When you talk about consensus, it is whether they (Political elites) are agreeable on the

rules of the game, the basic tenets surrounding the political game. If democracy is practised,

to what extent are political elites agreeable on the tenets of democracy. Democracy is about

conflict and consensus. We agree to disagree. - A think-tank interviewee (Field Interview,

2019).

As argued by Anderson and Mendes (2005, p. 97), it is when losers of an election whelm their

negative experiences and accede to being governed by opponents they disagree with that

democracy endures and blossoms. Losers, however, accept to live with the reality of their defeat

when they believe that they lost fairly and that the electoral procedures and institutions provide


70

the likelihood for their victory in the future (Frempong, 2012, p. 56). Can the same be said for

Ghana?

Ghana, since the commencement of the fourth republic, has witnessed seven general elections

with each outcome accepted by the losers, but with the exception of the 1992 and 2012 elections.

These elections though not accepted by the losers, did not have much adverse effect on the post-

electoral atmosphere at the said times.

Before the 1992 elections, a major conflict in the transition process was agreeing on its

modalities. This was characterised by biases and uncertainties as the PNDC refused to spell out a

clear timetable for the transition. The government was accused of packing the constitution-

drafting Consultative Assembly with pro-government ‘identifiable bodies’ at the implicit

exclusion of those with anti-government viewpoints. Political amnesty to political detainees was

also refused by the government and it is said to have kept a tight lid on the whole process

(Gyimah-Boadi, 1991). For the first time in Ghana’s history, the incumbent military head of state

competed for the presidency. This in effect is what a think-tank interviewee sternly refers to as

“the incumbent regime playing the role of both the referee and a player at the same time” (Field

Interview, 2019). In such circumstances, the opposition and incumbent government at the time

did not agree on the rules of the electoral game so in actual sense, there were no rules of political

engagement to be respected at that time. One party executive interviewee further laments on the

drawing up of the 1992 constitution, stating, “…even though some people from the opposition

were made to help draft it, the government by then undermined some suggestions raised by

them” (Field Interview, 2019).

However, with the subsequent elite pact agreed upon by the political parties and the EC initiating

inter-party consensus building through the IPAC, election outcomes after the 1992 elections will


71

later be accepted and respected by all parties involved. “Afari Gyan (The then chairperson of the

Electoral Commission) after this period successfully mediated numerous electoral conflicts” as a

think-tank interviewee establishes (Field Interview, 2019). This phenomenon, unfortunately, did

not rub off on the 2012 elections.

After the 2012 elections, John Mahama of the NDC was declared president for winning but the

NPP rejected the results, leading to a nine-month petition trial at the supreme court, which

confirmed Mahama’s victory (Frempong, 2017). As already explained above, the NPP disputed

the outcome of the election because it felt the election was rigged. Also, to them, prior to the

election, there was no consensus on some processes initiated by the EC during the of conduct the

elections. This goes against the benchmark on the respect for the rules of the game for elite

consensus to be seen as existent in Ghana. Nonetheless, the fact that even though the NPP, led by

Akufo-Addo, felt jilted by the outcome of the ruling by the Supreme Court, still accepted the

results speaks volumes to the respect for the rule of law and constitutionalism. This “reflects the

mutual acceptance of the legitimacy of the rules of the electoral game” as Frempong puts it

(2017, p. 267).

It must be added that the first alternation in power, where the sitting president gave up power

after the end of his tenure in office was indeed a huge boost on constitutionalism and the respect

for the rules of the political game. This set a precedence which made it difficult for successive

heads of state to deviate from (Commonwealth Observer Group, 2016).


72

3.2.1.2.4 Absence of Adversary Politics

By the way, I would not be a hypocrite. We all do the same thing. We all undermine each

other. That is how the political game is. We are to keep a check on each other. When in

opposition and you are always in tune with whatever the government in power does, one,

they will relax and not do better; Two, to be frank, it tarnishes our image as an opposition

fighting to win back power. Politics is a game, where there are always winners and losers.

No party will like to be on the losing side so must do everything in their power to

undermine the other; and lastly, if we are to all agree on everything then, come on, there

is no need for an opposition. It should be made a de jure one-party state then like it is in

China – a political party executive (Field Interview, 2019).

Deep hatred in the political arena, particularly amongst political parties, has been a major

problem for many developing democracies worldwide (Paalo, 2017). “A recipe for disaster” as

summed up by a think-tank interviewee (Field Interview, 2019). In Ghana’s situation, there are

divided takes on the extent to adversary politics in the country and on how it has, is and will be

affecting democracy.

All think-tank interviewees for this study believe that Ghana’s level of adversary politics will

surely damage its democracy in the near future. One bluntly professes this current situation as a

“time bomb”, with another equating political elite confrontations in Ghana to the manifestation

of “the infighting, selfishness and the parochial elite desires…” (Field Interview, 2019). Another

speaks of the popular use of the threat of violence as a campaign strategy and hallmark of

partisan politics in Ghana (Field Interview, 2019). When asked what he means by the phrase,

“Threat of Violence”, he quickly answers with, to him, a series of rhetorical follow-up questions:

“Whenever it is an election period, are you not afraid? Don’t you hear of people who send their

children abroad? And others gathering foodstuffs at home in case of electoral violence?”. This, in

his view, is because “many politicians proclaim that if they do not win the election, there will be

violence and it is seen anytime election approaches. However, we do not talk much about it since

we have not experienced any election-related wars yet like it is in other countries”.


73

Many instances of adversary politics in Ghana are given by numerous scholars. Prime to

adversary politics in Ghana is political vigilantism which Gyampo, Graham and Asare (2017, p.

115) describe as covering an extensive range of violent acts spanning from dissident violence to

the legal exertion of physical coercion by a government or its representatives. Political

vigilantism is said to have plagued all the three turnovers of political power in the fourth republic

in 2001, 2009 and 2017 (Gyampo, Graham & Asare, 2017). “The incident which characterised

the just ended Ayawaso West Wuogon by-election, where vigilante groups were posing as

members of the National Security, is an example of what political parties are putting the country

through...” as expressed by a think-tank interviewee (Field Interview, 2019). He confidently

adds, “…it was a dress rehearsal for the 2020 elections. It is imminent”. Other instances of

adversary politics in Ghana’s fourth republic include electoral conflicts as ensuing in

Odododiodoo, Bawku and even in Tamale where a CPP Chairman was killed in 2004 (Field

Interview, 2019).

On a tangent with the submissions of the think-tank interviewees, all political party executive

interviewees but one, though acknowledging the presence of adversary politics in Ghana, insist it

is at a minimum and not a threat to democracy (Field Interview, 2019). To add, they

emphatically indicate that, there are various measures being taken to curb that issue, mainly

through inter-party consensus building. One cites the just-ended meeting organised by the ruling

government in conjunction with other political parties in finding ways to combat political

vigilantism as evidence of such measures. Even so, it is somewhat surprising if not contradictory

to have all political party executive interviewees giving a poised ‘No!’ to the question on them

trusting other political parties to uphold electoral and constitutional laws (Field Interview, 2019).


74

3.2.2 At the Level of Elections

The political elites in Ghana do not have consensus on elections because otherwise, I think the

issues surrounding the electoral commission will not be as pronounced as they are. There are

permanently some issues and conflicts surrounding the activities and initiatives around the

electoral commission. We have also seen that in the more recent past, the head of the

commission has been changed twice. I do not think this spells the existence of a consensus and

I do not think it is healthy. The electoral commission should be carried by a strong consensus

among political actors but I don’t see this in Ghana – a think-tank interviewee (Field

Interview, 2019).

The previous chapter provided a concise overview of presidential and parliamentary elections

held since the inception of the fourth republic in Ghana. The preceding section on elite consensus

amongst political parties has already elaborated much on elections in Ghana since contesting and

winning periodic elections are the pinnacles of partisan politics, without which political parties

lose their relevance. This section will continue with the analysis by dwelling much on specific

benchmarks relating to the organisation and aftermath of elections organised in Ghana’s fourth

republic. Some crucial emerging issues relating to elite consensus will be expounded under the

following criteria:

• Mutual respect for the rules of the electoral game

• An effective conflict resolution mechanism, well entrenched in the constitution to handle

electoral conflicts amongst political elites.

3.2.2.1 Analysis of Elite Consensus on Elections in the Fourth Republic

3.2.2.1.1 Mutual Respect for the Rules of the Electoral Game

With regards to mutual respect for the rules of the electoral game, much on this topic has already

been highlighted in the previous section but it is only prudent these points are rehashed.


75

The peaceful alternations in power in 2001, 2009 and 2017 largely demonstrate a high level of

mutual respect for the rules of the electoral game (Abdulai & Crawford, 2010; Throup, 2011;

Whitfield, 2009; Gyamfi-Boadi, 2009). Also, the institutionalisation of the IPAC and its role in

drawing electoral reforms and harnessing the different concerns of political parties into a

uniform code of conduct acceptable by all has indeed been the hallmark of successful successive

elections after its disastrous start in 1992 (Aryee, 1998).

The Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) was established in March 1994 to help the EC to

mediate electoral related disputes arising among and between the various political parties (Aryee,

1998). it was formed on the basis of a recommendation by the Commonwealth Observer Group

of the 1992 elections and comprises of representatives of all operational political parties

(Commonwealth Observer Group, 2016). The committee is chaired by the chairperson of the EC,

who is seen as a neutral person to assist in amicably resolving electoral disputes. It is important

to note that the IPAC only exists as an advisory body to the concerns of political parties and as

such does not have the agency to enforce resolutions (Aryee, 1998).

The role played by IPAC, as not only a conflict resolution mechanism but also a tool in fostering

democratic consolidation in Ghana ever since the bizarre start which eclipsed the 1992

presidential election, has been praised by all and sundry. A think-tank interviewee in his

submission refers to the IPAC as Ghana’s ‘Messiah’ for the democratic laurels chalked in the

fourth republic. “…it is just an advisory board and yet, most of the activities which happen in

periodic elections since 1996 to date is seen as normal. All, would not have been possible if not

for the work of the IPAC” (Field Interview, 2019). He goes on to give examples of these

activities as including, “voting on the same day for both presidential and parliamentary elections,


76

voter ID cards and the formation of party agents at polling centres during the conduction of

elections amongst others”.

In the view of another, the platform given through IPAC does not exist in many African

countries and as such led to Ghana’s upper hand in the jurisdiction of electoral politics in Africa

(Field Interview, 2019). He uses the cases of Ghana and Zambia.

…so let us take Zambia for example. In 1991, they had one of the best transitional elections in

Africa while Ghana’s in 1992 was marred by numerous problems. However, by 1996, when

because of the IPAC, all political parties had agreed to a number of reforms, the electoral outcome will go on to be acceptable by all. Meanwhile, in Zambia, things had gone the other way

and the opposition was going to reject the election results.

Singing the same chorus as the think-tank, are the political party executive interviewees. They all

agree to the magnanimous contributions of IPAC in bestowing on Ghana an envious position

among the best in electoral successes, not only in Africa but the world as a whole (Field

Interview, 2019).

Notwithstanding, these same think-tank interviewees point out recent trends which have

downplayed the once respected rules of electoral engagement. The popular 2012 election petition

is a case in point. In their view, the NPP not accepting the election results partly because they did

not agree with some initiatives passed by the EC during the conduct of that election goes against

the mutual respect for the rules of the electoral game (Field Interview, 2019). However, in as

much as this particular development made it defective, the decision for the NPP to use a

constitutional prerogative in venting their displeasure as against violent options at its disposal is,

otherwise, seen by many as a solidification of the respect for the rules of the political game

(Frempong, 2017).

The turn of events after the 2012 election has put a huge incision into the modalities for the

conduct of subsequent elections. It has gotten to a stage where the relevance of the IPAC is being

questioned. A think-tank interviewee voices out his shock when he heard one of the Electoral


77

Commissioners recently insisting that the IPAC was no longer needed. “…this comment coming

from a political party would have made sense but it coming from an Electoral Commissioner

should alert us on the path we are paving towards subsequent elections…the IPAC was relevant,

is and will forever remain relevant” (Field Interview, 2019). Anyway, in answering a particular

question, an MP interviewee stumbles on this same issue and his remarks may serve as a rebuttal

of a sort. To him, “the problem, the deputy EC has with some IPAC members is that having

agreed on a number of issues at the IPAC level, some go back and do contrary since there are no

laws to hold them accountable”. (Field Interview, 2019). However, he maintains that “we have

gotten far thanks to these political and electoral systems courtesy IPAC and as such the Deputy

EC should not have spoken in that manner”.

3.2.2.1.2 An Effective Conflict Resolution Mechanism Well Entrenched in the

Constitution

The inevitability of conflict in society’s every dispensation suggests the keen association

between conflict and consensus in ensuring harmonious living amongst humans (Frempong,

2007b; Ahorsu, 2015). Owing to this established fact, it is, therefore, obligatory for states to

provide a well-fortified conflict resolution mechanism in their respective constitutions in order to

manage elite conflicts emanating from the execution of their mandates as prescribed by law

(Agyeman-Duah, 2005).

In Ghana, there are many conflict resolution mechanism entrenched in the 1992 Constitution. In

fact, many believe that “the decisive origins of the 1992 Constitution, notwithstanding, its

provisions for governance, guiding principles on policy, checks on governmental powers, and

exhaustive provisions for human rights…” (Ahorsu, 2015, p. 87) made it a progressive conflict


78

mitigation constitution. The creation of mandatory institutions such as the National Media

Commission (NMC), National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), Commission on

Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) and the Electoral Commission (EC)

considerably promoted human rights, furthered the amicable resolution of conflicts and aided in

the consolidation of democracy (Ahorsu, 2015, pp. 75-86). The judiciary has equally been

mentioned among the lots for ably adjudicating political crisis through its traditional jurisdiction

and special arrangements throughout the pre-election to the post-election periods (Kotey, 1995).

The EC, in particular, has quintessentially and creatively, through its inter-party dialogue

programme, been instrumental to the peaceful resolution of electoral crisis in unexpected ways

(Meissner, 2010). The role played by the EC in the creation and execution of the IPAC

exemplifies such amicable feat. In addition, the media, security sector and civil society groups

have all been credited for Ghana’s success in conflict resolution as enshrined in the 1992

Constitution, especially during the election seasons.

From the above, it is clear that conflict resolution mechanisms in Ghana’s 1992 Constitution are

well entrenched. Yet, their effectiveness have been questioned by many scholars and citizens

alike. “In terms of the institutions, they are there….but they are highly ineffective in many

respects….take the NMC for example, they do not have control of sensitive content running

through the media which can cause high levels of tension during election periods…” (Field

Interview, 2019). “What is the relevance of CHRAJ today? It is an epiphany of our digression on

the topic of rule of law” (Field Interview, 2019). Another think-tank interviewee hits at the

progress made by the NCCE,

…many citizens of voting ages today do not even know why they vote. They have no idea what

voting means to them, their families and the country as a whole. They are not given the necessary

information to help them make informed decisions when voting and the manifestation of such a

problem is the large number of rejected ballots during each election (Field Interview, 2019).


79

He then reveals, “ you will be surprised to know that many politicians do not even have civic

education”. This assertion is later denied by the political party executive interviewees, with all in

unison as they address the issue of civic education as a major problem but not to their respective

politicians. One suggests “…the education on civil rights and responsibilities must not only be

limited to the NCCE but to all political parties” (Field Interview, 2019).

Many reasons are given for the ineffectiveness of these institutions but chief among them is the

lack of funding which one think thank interviewee deems as “a deliberate attempt by the

government to make them financially handicapped” (Field Interview, 2019). In addition, these

institutions are said to have lost their independence to the government. Another, though in praise

of the achievements of the judiciary especially in handling electoral related cases, advises “ not

to accept things on the face value. You have to ask yourself if, for example, the appointment of

the supreme court judges and their vote is based on an objective basis or they vote for those who

appointed them” (Field, Interview, 2019).

3.2.3 At the level of the legislature

The legislative arm of government, which is the lawmaking body of any democratic state, wields

the major push in spurring national development agendas (Gyampo, 2016b). Policies enacted by

the executive will have to be passed by the legislature. Likewise, a nation’s budget must be

approved by this body before it finally takes effect. This is to show how powerful the legislature

is as depicts the true meaning of the popular expression, “government of the people, for the

people and by the people” (Whitfield, 2009).

In this respect, a contravening legislature ostensibly equals a waning state. As such, consensus-

building must be subscripted to the daily activities within the parliament in ensuring a uniform


80

approach to developmental issues. Aside from partisan affiliations, the legislature in Ghana’s

fourth republic also has a dense ethnic cleavage (Osei, 2015) which means twice as much

consensus-building efforts will be needed to bridge these divides (Ahorsu, 2015).

In assessing elite consensus between parliamentarians in Ghana’s fourth republic, the following

criteria will serve as a yardstick. There must be:

• the presence of the elite culture of accommodation, bargaining and compromises;

• subdued partisanship.

3.2.3.1 The Presence of the Elite Culture of Accommodation, Bargaining and

Compromises

In its strictest sense, the legislature is supposed to be an arena for exhibiting and advancing the

traits of accommodation, bargaining, compromises and tolerance in the pursuit of national

development (Gyampo, 2016b). Where these aforementioned traits are inexistent in any

legislature, laws and policies passed will not be nationalistic in nature and not disposed to a

uniform outlook to national development issues. It is therefore incumbent on all parliamentarians

to develop a level of trust for each other, be open-minded on issues discussed on the floor of

parliament and be ready to make compromises when need be with the general public in mind.

Only when these requirements are fulfilled, would a nation’s drive to development thrive.

A common deficiency of most developing democracies, particularly in Africa, is the lack of trust

amongst parliamentarians (Osei, 2014). In situations where parliamentarians, especially those

from opposing camps, do not trust each other, the subsequent consensus-building eminent to

every legislature is said to be defeated. Simply put, the purpose of the legislature which is to

reach a consensus on national issues is defeated.


81

In the Ghanaian dispensation, the word ‘trust’, as used in the everyday sense, is understood and

applied differently in diverse walks of life. Some believe trust is simply having “a hundred

percent confidence in someone or something” while others see it to mean having “an appreciable

level of confidence or faith in someone or something” (Field Interview, 2019). In effect, the

latter agrees to the possibility of having trust in someone or something, whereas the former holds

on to the exact opposite. Actually, definitions of trust as defined in many works have keywords

and phrases like “confidence in someone or something”, “honesty and integrity of a person or

thing”, “reliability of a person or a thing’, ‘truth’ as well as “firm belief in a person or a thing”

(Ozer & Zheng, 2017; Robins, 2010). In view of such subjectivities, this study found it wise to

provide an operational definition of ‘trust’ within the context of parliamentarians which was later

communicated to the respondents. This was in order to provide informed answers to questions

enveloping such parameters.

Trust, therefore as used in this study, is the belief that a parliamentarian is honest, will not do

anything to harm a fellow colleague or the national agenda, can be relied on in providing

objective analysis on issues and commands integrity.

On that note, think-tank interviewees on the question of trust amongst parliamentarians in

Ghana’s fourth republic share similar views. Generally, they all believe that at a personal level,

parliamentarians have a high level of trust for each other but on national issues, there is none

(Field Interview, 2019). One starts by referring to the question of trust amongst parliamentarians

as ‘ambivalent’ and in explaining, he says, “when the press is gone and there is no party issues or

votes to be conducted on the basis of party, they are very united” (Field Interview, 2019).

Another stresses, “they sympathise with each other and do a lot of favours for each other”. In

expatiating, he gives an instance where an MP in opposition lobbied through a minister for an


82

acquaintance of his to be employed by one of the ministries. This was at a time when it was

announced that there was no vacancy there. In this light, the statement, “A fellow MP’s problem

is yours”, which an MP interviewee makes, corroborates this example. Contrarily, although

believing in the assertion of a personal cohesion amongst parliamentarians, another think-tank

interviewee believes there is no trust in the actual sense of their job description since “they go

the extra mile to undermine each other on the floor of parliament” (Field Interview, 2019).

On the same topic of trust, most MP interviewees claim they trust their opponents in parliament

with only two (2) saying otherwise. It must be noted that a chunk of the MP interviewees who

claim to trust their opponents give answers like “Yes, to some extent”, “Yes, to a greater extent”

and “Yes, but not entirely”. Just like the think-tank interviewees, they see the rapport shared with

their counterparts as more on a personal level than on national issues with some giving

comments such as “most of us are classmates from university”, “I know them without their party

colours”, “it depends on the policy on the floor” among others (Field Interview, 2019). When

asked if they believe their counterparts in parliament trust them, there were mixed responses

including “I hope so”, ‘no’, ‘yes’, “I think so”, “To a greater extent” and “that, I cannot tell”.

On the question of consensus-building in the deliberation of issues in parliament, think-tank

interviewees share a similar point of view. To one, “if the issues are not thorny or controversial

and are not partisan, they all agree…however, issues that are normative or intrinsic like the Right

to Information bill, there is no form of consensus” (Field Interview, 2019). He goes on to refer to

such a situation as “Benign consensus” since all sides in parliament “tacitly agree not to push it

for their sakes and not the country as a whole”. Another, driving home his point, cites “gender

issues and issues on MP loans as well as ex gratia” as examples of concerns parliamentarians

have consensus on.


83

Asked how these deliberations have affected national development, all think-tank interviewees

assert that deliberations amongst parliamentarians have not brought about the right policies for

development (Field Interview, 2019). A think-tank interviewee refers to some of the boycotts in

parliament on issues like National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) and others have been

detrimental to development.

Contrary to the take of think-tank interviewees on deliberations of issues in parliament, a senior

civil servant interviewee in parliament believes there is largely consensus-building on issues of

national importance. He argues that “at the committee level, they agree on all issues…however,

on the floor of parliament, they show their partisan colours in order to put on a good show for

their supporters”. (Field Interview, 2019). In answering why it is so, he reveals that “ at the

committee level, deliberations are away from the public eye unlike on the floor of parliament so

as such they are free to express their views, listen to that of their counterparts and later reach a

consensus after some compromises”. He ends by stressing that the scenario created by these

parliamentarians are not unique to only Ghana but in all democracies, even developed ones. To

make his point clearer, he uses Canada as an example, “I have witnessed it there before”.

Another civil servant interviewee cites the example the Office of Special Prosecutor Bill, which

was largely agreed on at the committee level as a manifestation of the true consensus building in

parliament as he reiterates, “you will be amazed how the two political parties worked together to

get that passed” (Field Interview, 2019).

In tune with his submission, those given by the MP interviewees align with the idea of consensus

building and compromises in parliament though many believe there are numerous challenges

(Field Interview, 2019). Before diving into these issues, the study found it relevant to first ask

respondents some traits they like or dislike about their counterparts in parliament which then


84

form the basis for subsequent questions. Interestingly, the traits liked and disliked from each

camp were much alike if not the same. Many describe their opponents as ‘resolute’, “passionate

about national development issues”, “serving as a good check on the incumbent”, “highly

knowledgeable” and ‘professionals’. “I believe what I have noticed is that we all have love for

Ghana” is one’s response while another speaks of how “...resolute they are in the decisions they

take, whether right or wrong and are prepared to bear the consequences whether good or bad…to

me that is a mark of leadership” (Field interview, 2019). Another in expressing the same point

uses a stronger word in the form of ‘belligerence’ which he quickly explains, “….and it is not in

the sense that they like to fight each other but the fact that they strive and push themselves to the

limit to get things done though they go a bit too far sometimes”.

On traits they hate about their counterparts, most referred to their “uncompromising nature” on

the floor of parliament, as others describe them as “…not open-minded on issues discussed” and

“being too partisan” (Field Interview, 2019).

Now, with the topic on deliberations in parliament, some make known that through meetings,

negotiations and discussions, especially at the leadership and committee levels, deadlocks are

broken and consensus subsequently achieved on major issues (Field Interview, 2019). One cites

“external funding for specific projects” as one area where there is consensus since both majority

and minority agree on the projects needed as a nation. Another cites “pre-sitting at the leadership

level…where the minority concerns are also tabled for discussion”. “Even when we deliberate on

an issue and there is a stalemate, the speaker calls for a leadership consult. They go out, consult

and consensus is reached by the time they walk back in”, an MP interviewee explains (Field

Interview, 2019).


85

However, on many occasions, where issues are ‘thorny’ and ‘partisan’ in nature as many MP

interviewees describe, consensus on such issues have been difficult to reach (Field Interview,

2019). In most cases, these deadlocks are broken with a vote and as such the majority always

carry the day, as they all put it. One goes further to say, “in many cases, the opposition either

boycotts the voting process or stages a walkout to vent their displeasure”.

Finally, with the main question on whether parliamentarians are divided or united, all MP

interviewees firmly believe they are united though they all qualify this unity. On a more general

basis, fitting the specific context, they all assume to be divided or united (Field Interview, 2019).

“Politically, because of our ideological differences, we cannot be together but generally, we are

all friends and relate as such”, as one puts it. Another in exhibiting the tight bond between

parliamentarians extends an invitation to “…the coffee shop. Your first round of drinks is on me.

come here and see for yourself…we are very good friends…”.

In providing much elaboration on their key differences on national development issues, an MP

interviewee gives an analogy to be considered by this research. “It is like embarking on a journey

to Kumasi. One may think passing through Koforidua will be better while another may believe

the route through Nsawam is best. The destination is Kumasi and getting there is the mission of

both parties though the approach is different. It is the same for us”, he accents (Field Interview,

2019).


86

3.2.3.2 Subdued Partisanship

Well, by logic, we have a rubber-stamp parliament, so when it comes to passing policies and

laws, parliament is not making much difference so the bus stops with what is coming out of the

executive. So when it comes to moving development forward in terms of policies and laws, the

cabinet or the government is the deciding factor. – a think thank interviewee (Field Interview,

2019).

It has been argued that the level of partisanship in Ghana’s legislature, in the fourth republic, is

beyond reproach (Gyampo, 2016b). Many have criticised the practice of majoritarian rule in

Ghana’s parliament as being a major impediment to development since the views of the minority

on such issues are sidelined. Others speak of other problems like the subservience of the

legislature to the executive as well as the continual practice of the whip system as factors stifling

consensus building and the advancement of the genuine concerns of the electorates (Gyampo,

2017). All the above-mentioned factors are touched on by the respondents for this study.

In the earnest view of a think-tank interviewee, “ the constitutional provision of having a

majority of ministers from parliament is creating a problem for this country. It has fizzled out the

objective analysis of parliamentarians on national issues and the inability to reach a consensus

with the minority” (Field Interview, 2019). To him, this provision encourages MPs from the

ruling government to undermine the genuine concerns of the minority on primal issues and has

“initiated the contest of “who shouts loudest in agreement to government policies” as a candidate

for a ministerial appointment”. Another think-tank in accord with this submission, concludes by

saying, “a scenario like this, always ends with boycotts or staging walkouts by the minority and

this affects consensus building” (Field Interview, 2019). He continues, “unfortunately, we have

never had a hung parliament (a parliament with no majority) to see how that situation would

have panned out…who knows, the ruling government under such circumstances will be forced to

build some sort of consensus with the opposition”.


87

Historical factors are a major reason given for the legislature’s subservience to the executive. “

Due to the numerous coups in this country since the first in 1966, legislatures have been

abolished till the start of a new republic whiles the executive arm still stays. This has diminished

their importance in that sense, hence, it playing second-fiddle to the executive” (Field Interview,

2019).

This brings the topic of “the whip system” into the limelight. When asked if they are influenced

by their political parties in their decision-making, all MP interviewees but three, say yes (Field

Interview, 2019). Various reasons are given for responding with the affirmative, yet, the practice

of the whip system cuts across all answers. “The whip system allows parliamentarians to tow the

lines of their parties. It is expected”, one MP interviewee affirms. In their views, this system has

its pros and cons. For pros, an MP interviewee who sounds like a strong advocate for the whip

system argues, “sometimes, individual MPs have wrong perceptions or inadequate information

on certain policies so as such towing the party line is best since it is collective minded”.

Likewise, one insists, “some of us came to parliament recently so lack knowledge on how some

similar policies fared in the past. Therefore, towing the party line in such cases is best for the

country since it has a historical ring to it”. “...we don’t understand but we have faith”, another

confesses (Field Interview, 2019).

For the cons, some express their deep frustration with the system when one reveals, “on some

occasions, I walk out or give excuses just to avoid voting on issues I personally would not have

voted for but for party sake, I must” (Field Interview, 2019). In another’s view, “as a party, we

must think of the whole population and not party sympathisers or supporters but sadly that is the

situation we find ourselves”. He adds, “…I will not blame political parties for this situation


88

though because the constitution we work with has provided breeding grounds for such things,

especially with the majoritarian rule”.

On the topic of majoritarian rule, one MP interviewee discloses, “this system we have adopted

today makes it difficult for MPs, both majority and minority, to reach crucial agreements since

deadlocks are broken with special votes and with that the majority always wins” (Field

Interview, 2019). “…well, I must add that there have been some few instances where the

majority has lost a vote”, he intersects. The reason he gives for these instances is that

“sometimes, MPs from the majority in parliament intentionally seclude themselves by not

attending that fateful sitting”, though he admits, “it rarely happens”.

It is also important to mention that all political party executive interviewees confirm their

influence on parliamentarians when asked if they do (Field Interview, 2019).

3.3 National Development Planning in Ghana

There have been numerous pathways to development in Africa. For years, these tendencies have

been tailored toward particular ideologies such as capitalism, socialism or to some extent African

socialism (Blair, 1993). In the search of the factors impeding Africa’s development, Achille

produces two factors responsible for inhibiting development in Sub-Saharan Africa:

First and foremost, there is a persistent structural constraint, which impedes the sustained growth.

Secondly, there is a lack of leadership more explicitly, lack of development behaviour-oriented

leadership and good governance to catalyse the process. In fact, good leadership envisions

development and endeavours, sound public finance management; hence public expenditure

management as a tool to attain its development vision, with efficiency and discipline in the best

interest of the country (2007, p. 54).

Similarly, Ghana, ever since the start of her existence, has had similar issues with development

up to now (Gyampo, 2016a). Ghana, before and after her birth, has experienced a very long

history and tradition of national development planning from the time of the British Governor, Sir


89

Guggisberg, to the era of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) and now, the latest

under the fourth republic (Vordzorgbe & Caiquo, 2001; Amoako-Tuffour & Armah, 2008).

Before independence, two major development plans had been undertaken in the country, “The

Guggisberg Development Plan (1919-1929)” and “The Burns Development Plan (1950-1960)”.

After independence, there were other plans such as the Nkrumah’s Developmental Plans (1951-

1966), The Two Year Development Plan of the National Liberation Council, The One Year

Development Plan of the Progress Party, The Five Year Development Plan of the National

Redemption Council and The Provisional National Defence Council’s (PNDC) Economic

Recovery Programme (Killick, 2010; Tandoh-Offin, 2013). With the inception of the fourth

republic, developmental plans under each regime include, Vision 2020, the Ghana Poverty

Reduction Strategy (GPRS I, 2002-2005), the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II,

2006-2009), Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda I (GSGDA I, 2010-2013), Ghana

Shared Growth and Development Agenda II (GSGDA II, 2014-2017) and currently the seven-

year Coordinated Programme of Economic and Social Development which started from 2018

(Field Interview, 2019).

3.3.1 National Development Planning Commission (NDPC)

3.3.1.1 Legal Framework Underpinning the Establishment of the Commission

The 1992 constitution of Ghana in Article 36 (5) specifies that “within two years after assuming

office, the President shall present to parliament a coordinated programme of economic and social

development policies including agricultural and industrial programmes at all levels and in all

regions of Ghana” (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). Correspondingly, various presidents in the


90

fourth republic have presented before the floor of Parliament a document containing their social

and economic development policies under a couched theme.

The National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) was set up under Article 86 and 87 of

the 1992 Constitution as part of the Executive. The National Development Planning Commission

Act, 1994, (Act 479) and the National Development Planning (System) Act, 1994, (Act 480),

gives the core legal framework for the setting up of the commission and the execution of its

functions (NDPC, 2015). Other laws of relevance to the commission’s work are: the Local

Government Act (Act 462) 1993, Local Government Service Act (Act 656) 2003, Petroleum

Revenue Management Act (Act 815) 2011, Civil Service Act (PNDC Law 327) 1993, and Ghana

Infrastructure Investment Fund Act, (Act 877), 2014. (NDPC, 2015).

3.3.1.2 Composition and Functions of the Commission

Article 86 of the 1992 Constitution states that the National Development Planning Commission

(NDPC) shall consist of the following (Commissioners):

• A chairman who shall be appointed by the President in consultation with the Council of

State;

• The Minister responsible for Finance and such other Ministers of State as the President

may appoint;

• The Government Statistician;

• The Governor of the Bank of Ghana;

• One representative from each region of Ghana appointed by the Regional Coordinating

Council of the region; and


91

• Such other persons as may be appointed by the President having regard to their

knowledge and experience of the relevant areas and roles pertaining to development,

economic, social, environmental and spatial planning (NDPC, 2015).

In accordance with the provisions under Article 87 of the Constitution, the core mandate of the

commission is to “advise the President on development planning policy and strategy” and “at the

request of the President or Parliament, or on its own initiative,” execute the following:

• Study and make strategic analyses of macro-economic and structural reform options;

• Make proposals for the development of multi-year rolling plans taking into consideration

the resource potential and comparative advantage of the different districts of Ghana;

• Make proposals for the protection of the natural and physical environment;

• Make proposals for ensuring the even development of the districts of Ghana by the

effective utilisation of available resources; and

• Monitor, evaluate and coordinate development policies, programmes and projects

(NDPC, 2015).

3.3.2 National Development Policies Under the Fourth Republic

3.3.2.1 Ghana’s Vision 2020

Under constitutional provisions, Ghana’s first president of the fourth republic, Jerry John

Rawlings, in 1995, presented to parliament the first policy framework for a long-term national

development plan called, Ghana-Vision 2020 (The First Step: 1996-2000). The aim of this plan

was to transform the country into a middle-income one in 25 years. More so, the framework set a

precedent on the Coordinated Programme of Economic and Social Development Policies, where


92

the Directive Principles of State Policy expects every president to hand into Parliament within

two years of assuming office (NPDC, 2015).

A medium-term plan, together with a “Programme of Action for the First Medium-Term Plan

(1997-2000)”, was subsequently generated. However, both experienced delays in production,

with the Programme of Action being released late in June 1998. With the change in government

in 2001, general long-term plan, Vision 2020, was abandoned. The main reason given by the new

government for the cancellation of the plan was that there were persistent and extensive

disparities between plan goals and the actual performance as amongst other reasons.

3.3.2.2 Beyond Vision 2020

Vision 2020 was replaced by the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I, 2002-2005) and

thereafter the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II, 2006-2009) (NDPC, 2015). The

substitution of ‘Ghana’ with ‘Growth’ in GPRS II was informed by what an NDPC interviewee

describes as “…a needed redistribution of resources and focus since it was realised that there was

increasing inequality even with reduced poverty” (Field interview, 2019).

With the change in government in 2009, GPRS II was replaced by the Ghana Shared Growth and

Development Agenda: 2010-2013 (GSGDA I), which was succeeded by the Ghana Shared

Growth and Development Agenda: 2014-2017 (GSGDA II) (NDPC, 2015). The emphasis on

“shared growth” was established on the new government’s belief that elevated growth by itself

would not reduce or end poverty unless it is followed by policies to make growth inclusive or

‘shared’ (Field Interview, 2019). As such, the GSGDAs showcased a combination of principles

of equity and the standards of high rates of economic growth that characterised GPRS I and

GPRS II, respectively. Today, the new government has replaced GSGDA II with the seven-year


93

Coordinated Programme of Economic and Social Development which started in 2018 (Field

Interview, 2019).

3.3.3 An Analysis of National Development Planning in Ghana’s Fourth

Republic

When asked about Ghana’s approach to national development planning since 1992, a

commissioner at the NDPC in answering states, “We have been trying to use a participatory

approach with all sections of society. The government sector, civil society, and academia are all

mobilised towards our national development” (Field Interview, 2019). Contrary to this view, in

his “Winner-takes-all” series, Gyampo in his analysis partly equates the issues with Ghana’s

development planning today with the “…limited public awareness and low participation of

opposition parties and civil societies” (2016a, p. 4). As reported by him, “even though there is a

mechanism that promotes inclusivity in development planning, it exists mostly in theory”

(Gyampo, 2016a, p. 3). He then quotes an interviewee in his work, a Planning Analyst at the

NDPC, who says, “we do not have resources to meaningfully organise seminars and workshops

and the few that are organised, the quality of participation is always poor and nothing to write

home about” (Gyampo, 2016b, p. 4).

With the question on whether Ghana’s vision of development has been balanced, both

interviewees from the NDPC believe it is, with one making reference to the “Directive

Principles of State Policy” which in his view, “…makes sure that we cover all aspects of

development so it is balanced” (Field Interview, 2019). With regards to “The Directive

Principles of State Policy”, Article 34 (6e) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, states that “the

State shall take appropriate measures to ensure that whenever practicable, a government shall


94

continue and execute projects and programmes commenced by the previous government”. Also,

in Article 36 (1),

the State shall take all necessary action to ensure that the national economy is managed in such a

manner as to maximise the rate of economic development and to secure the maximum welfare,

freedom and happiness of every person in Ghana and to provide adequate means of livelihood

and suitable employment and public assistance to the needy” (Judicial Service of Ghana, 2019).

Now, where it gets interesting is on the issue of continuity in policies championed to drive

Ghana’s development. All interviewees in this section, both the NDPC commissioners and the

think-tanks, are of the view that there has been no continuity in policies with regards to national

development planning in Ghana (Field Interview, 2019). A think-tank interviewee indicates, “ on

continuity of policies, it is more than obvious that there is none and history is witness to that fact.

One which calls for no debate on this issue”. However, an NDPC commissioner, despite vexed

on the problem of continuity, adds, “but it has been changing with the seasons”. In explaining

this point, he insists that with specific policies like it was with the vision 2020 and the

subsequent ones, with the exception GPRS I which was later changed to GPRS II, the various

governments who brought their policies stuck with them. “However, true, in respect to

intergovernmental continuity there is none”, he admits (Field Interview, 2019).

This then begs the question on the effectiveness of the NDPC. In mentioning some remarkable

achievements for Ghana’s vision to development, some strides like “ poverty reduction,

especially when we started the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is a huge achievement.

Ghana was one of the first countries to reach that target”, an NDPC commissioner projects (Field

Interview, 2019). The other, also speaks of the “National Health Insurance Scheme as a great

feat”. He pinpoints this achievement as “…a policy subsequent administrations after Kufuor’s

regime continued so there is some consensus of sorts on that”.


95

All think-tanks but one on the subject of the effectiveness of the NDPC, share a common answer

(Field Interview, 2019). Three (3) of them maintain that the NDPC is not effective while the

other is of the opposite view. The main reason given for their ineffectiveness is the lack of

continuity. According to one,

Rawlings’ PNDC era saw a lot of local government reforms carried to the letter. He got people

who could do the job for him, however, ever since democracy came into the scene in 1992,

which policies have you seen to be successful? In the first year, the government will talk of

austerity measures, in the second year, no money so nothing happens, the third year, somehow

they start releasing something and the election year, which is the fourth year, the market is

flooded. As such, there is no long term planning like Kwame Nkrumah had and during Chairman

Rawlings’ time as well (Field Interview, 2019).

On another’s account,

I think Ghanaians and the larger society are losing out on many benefits because projects are

stopped…There are lots of examples. I travel to Ho quite often and during the late days of the

Mahama administration, finally, the renovation on the last stretch of road leading to Ho was

started but work stopped again for a number of years which has recently been started again. I do

not see the rationale behind that.

However, still, on this same topic, the dissenting think-tank makes a compelling argument,

…I do not know whether it is on the basis of laws that establish the NDPC and the roles they are

supposed to play. If that is the case, I think they have lived up to their mandate. They do national

development planning from national, regional to local levels. They have set up a mechanism of

accountability to ensure that those plans are respected. They collate views which are then turned

into policy in the short, medium and long terms for the country.

He continues,

After they have done that, the other part is where the problem lies. The question now becomes

how effective have the new governments made the NDPC in terms of policy continuity. These

(NDPC) are bureaucratic elites who are minded to development issues and public policy. If others

(governments) come and they want to change the set targets of the commission, how is it the

NDPC’s fault?

The analogy given is confirmed by the NDPC commissioners, who shift the blame on the

ineffectiveness of national development planning to subsequent governments (Field Interview,

2019). This brings the question of how political elites have affected national development to

light. Here, an NDPC interviewee makes the point, “I think most of our visions have been


96

politically motivated rather than technically motivated” (Field Interview, 2019). He further

enunciates this point by providing some examples,

For example, the last two regimes, Atta Mill’s “Better Ghana Agenda”, I will say was superficial

since it lacked any comprehensive meaning. Does adding one borehole make Ghana better in the

larger sense? Also, on Akufo-Addo’s “Ghana Beyond Aid”, it came out of his own political

vision, and not nationally motivated. In fact, how can we be talking about “Ghana Beyond Aid”,

when aid is the country’s lifeline presently?

Although in agreement with him, the other NDPC interviewee speaks of some recent efforts

made in the hopes of achieving consensus on national development planning between the

political parties.

Some few years ago, we tried to formulate a national 40-year developmental plan. What we tried

to do was to bring representatives from all political parties to form a group to go around the

country to have a census on what kind of future we want for ourselves. That approach was critical

that we try to bring in all the various political parties so they have a common agenda….it is

something the Constitutional Review Committee in their findings, recommended (Field

Interview, 2019).

The outcome of the recommendation given by the Constitutional Review Committee (CRC),

particularly on national development, is what Gyampo refers to as “one palpable feature and

result of Winner-takes-all politics” (2016a, p. 2). “Winner-Takes-All” politics, in his definition,

“connotes an extremely divisive and partisan sub-culture that excludes all other citizens who are

not part of the ruling party from national governance and decision making in a manner that

polarises the nation and dissipates the much needed talents and brains for national development”

(2016a, p. 2).

Even though the government accepted the recommendations made by CRC for “a comprehensive

long term, strategic multi-year rolling National Development Plan”, it did not side with the

provision for the development plan to be well entrenched in the constitution. The reason given by

the government was that the effects of those propositions would lead to “a command model of

development planning and tie the hands of successive governments to ideological interests and


97

policies of a particular political party” (Gyampo, 2016a, p. 1). Gyampo makes the case that, “ an

entrenched plan can promote inclusive governance, policy continuity and accelerated national

development” (2016a, p. 1).

On a related note, according to a think-tank interviewee, there is a growing phenomenon where

political parties come with their manifestos into government and are immediately transferred into

public policy. “…so you will see a lot more of ‘ticking’ by any political party for the last 6-7

years when it comes to policy implementation” (Field interview, 2019), he declares. ‘Ticking’,

as used in his submission, refers to “the actual tick to show they are meeting their manifesto

promises”. “…to an extent where there are no promises to suggest the continuation of all

government projects and you see a lot of variations”, he concludes.

In another’s view, they stick to their manifestos but “ I think that on economic issues, there is

some form of a little bit consensus”. This consensus, to him, is seen in situations where

“governments come into power and decide to continue some commitments already signed with

international institutions like the IMF by the previous governments…they even extend it in many

cases” (Field Interview, 2019).

The study is then hit with another twist stemming from a controversial argument raised by a

senior civil servant interviewee at the parliament. He argues, “this analogy goes to invalidate the

question of elite consensus in Ghana since the consensus being reached is with supranational and

international organisations on their programs and not ours as Ghanaians. Are those policies

formulated by our governments?” (Field Interview, 2019). He goes on further,

to me, the question of elite consensus on national development issues should not be judged on

consensus reached by subsequent governments but between subsequent governments and

international institutions since our policies ever since the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966, has

been based on underlining conditions existent in the international system at any given point in

time. Form the NLC, which unlike Nkrumah, ascribed to liberal standards dictated by the USA in

a cold war period, to a socialist PNDC government which was forced to swallow the bitter pill of

policies emanating from the Bretton Woods institutions in the form of Structural Adjustment


98

Programme (SAP). This was due to the defeat of the Soviet Union and the institutionalisation of a

unipolar world with the USA as the superpower. Now, these same institutions tell us not to recruit

in the public sector, reduce public spending which we call “our policies” and you talk of elite

consensus on developmental issues? Come on! Let us cut a clear line between rhetoric and reality.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter starts with the provision of some operational benchmarks for examining elite

consensus in Ghana’s fourth republic. In total, these benchmarks are six (6) and are spread across

the examination of elite consensus at the levels of political parties, elections and the legislature.

At the level of political parties, the benchmarks used are internal consensus within political

parties, elite pact and inter-party consensus building, mutual respect for the rules of the political

game as well as the absence of adversary politics. At the level of elections, mutual respect for the

rules of the electoral game and an effective conflict resolution mechanism well entrenched in the

constitution to handle electoral conflicts amongst political elites, are the benchmarks used. With

the section dedicated to elite consensus in the legislature, the benchmarks used are the presence

of the elite culture of accommodation, bargaining and compromises as well as subdued

partisanship.

The next section looked at was national development planning in Ghana. Here, a historical

overview of development planning in Ghana is given. This starts by touching on development

planning from the time of Guggisberg in 1919, through to the PNDC era, but with much focus on

the planning initiated ever since the start of the fourth republic in 1992.

In evaluating elite consensus amongst subsequent governments in the fourth republic, the NDPC,

an institution, part of the executive arm of government which advice, plans and implements

national development policies, is examined. But first, the composition and functions, as well as a

brief historical overview of national developmental policies of each regime under the


99

commission, are established. These include the Vision 2020 of the Rawlings administration,

before the GPRS I & II, GSGDA I and GSGDA II as well as the Coordinated Programme of

Economic and Social Development of the Kufuor, Atta Mills, Mahama and Akufo-Addo

administrations respectively. Finally, with the analysis of national development planning in

Ghana’s fourth republic, focus areas like the approach to development in the fourth republic, the

balanced nature of Ghana’s vision to development, the issue of policy continuity, the role of

political elites in developmental planning and the effectiveness of the NDPC are discussed under

this section.


100

References

Achille, T. (2007). Sub-Saharan Africa Strategy for Sustained Growth to Breakthrough in the

21st Century: Revisiting the Development Literature and Paving the Way Ahead.

Retrieved July 14, 2019, from A World Bank Institute Working Paper:

http://www.worldbank.org

Afrimap, OSIWA, & IDEG. (2007). Ghana: Democracy and Political Participation. Dakar:

Open Society Initiative for West Africa and Institute for Democratic Governance.

Agyeman-Duah, B. (2005). Elections and Electoral Politics in Ghana's Fourth Republic. Critical

Perspectives (18).


Y. Gebe (Ed.), Constitutionalism, Democratic Governance and the African State (pp. 57-

92). Accra: Black Mask.

Amoako-Tuffour, J., & Armah, B. (2008). Poverty Reduction Strategies in Africa: Perspectives

and Lessons from Ghana. Lexington, Kentucky: Lexington Books Publication.

Anderson, C., & Mendes, S. (2005). Learning to Lose: Election Outcomes, Democratic

Experience and Political Protest Potential. British Journal of Political Science, 35.

A Political Party Interviewee. Personal Interview. Party Executive. National Democratic

Congress (NDC). Accra. Thursday, July 4, 2019.

A Political Party Interviewee. Personal Interview. Party Executive. New Patriotic Party (NPP).

Accra. Thursday, July 4, 2019.

A Political Party Interviewee. Personal Interview. Party Executive. Conventions Peoples Party

(CPP). Accra. Wednesday, June 26, 2019 A Think-Tank Interviewee. Personal Interview. Senior Research Fellow. Legon Center for

International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD). University of Ghana. Tuesday, June 18, 2019.

A Think-Tank Interviewee. Personal Interview. Senior Lecturer. Department of Political Science.

University of Ghana. Friday, June 21, 2019.

A Think-Tank Interviewee. Personal Interview. Researcher. Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES

Ghana). Accra. Wednesday, July 3, 2019.

A Think-Tank Interviewee. Personal Interview. Researcher. Ghana Centre for Democratic

Development (CDD-Ghana). Accra. Friday, July 12, 2019.

Aryee, J. (1998). The 1996 General Elections. In J. Aryee, Democratic Consolidation in Ghana.

Accra: University of Ghana, Dept. of Political Science.


http://www.worldbank.org/

101

Blair, T. (1993). The Poverty of Planning. London: Redwood Press Limited.

Bokpe, S. J. (2010). The Price of Breaking Away. Africa Watch, p. 22.


Frempong, A.K.D (2017). Elections in Ghana (1951-2016). Accra, Ghana: Digibooks Ghana

Ltd.

Frempong, A.K.D.(2012). Electoral Politics in Ghana's Fourth Republic: in the Context of the

Post-Cold War Africa. Accra: Alex K. D. Frempong.


Ghana at 50: Government, Politics and Development (pp. 51-76). Accra: Friedrich Ebert

Stiftung.

Frempong, A.K.D. (2007b). The Political Conflict and Elite Consensus in the Liberal State. In K.



Review, 44, 69 Gyampo, R., & Gans-Lartey, E. (2018). Assessing Internal Party Democracy in Africa. Retrieved 2019 March, from Research Gate Web site: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ransford_Gyampo/publication/326422749_ASSESSING_INTERNAL_PARTY_DEMOCRACY_IN_AFRICA/links/5b4c948545851519b4c10f58/ASSESSING-INTERNAL-PARTY-DEMOCRACY-IN-AFRICA?origin=publication_detail Gyampo, R., Graham, E., & Asare, B. (2017). Political Vigilantism and Democratic Governance

in Ghana's Fourth Republic. African Review, 112-135.



Gyampo, R. (2016b). The State of Political Institution in Ghana. Tema: Digibooks Ghana Ltd.

Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1991). Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery. Boulder, Colorado:

Rienner.


https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ransford_Gyampo/publication/326422749_ASSESSING_INTERNAL_PARTY_DEMOCRACY_IN_AFRICA/links/5b4c948545851519b4c10f58/ASSESSING-INTERNAL-PARTY-DEMOCRACY-IN-AFRICA?origin=publication_detail



102

Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2004). Africa: The Quality of Political Reform. In E. Gyimah-Boadi,

Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of Progress (pp. 5-27). London: Lynne

Rienner.

Jonah, K. (2005). Inter-Party Dialogue in Ghana. Accra: Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA).

Judicial Service of Ghana. (2019). The Directive Principles of State Policy. Retrieved July 14,

2019, from Judicial Service of Ghana Web site: https://judicial.gov.gh/index.php/the-directive-

principles-of-state-policy

Killick, T. (2010). Development Economics in Action: A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana.

New York: Routledge Publishers.

Kotey, N. A. (1995). The Supreme Court and Conflict Resolution in the Fourth Republic. In M.

Oquaye, Democracy and Conflict Resolution in Ghana (pp. 277-280). Accra: Gold Type

Ltd.

La Verle, B. (1994). Ghana: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress

Meissner, K. (2010). Elections and Conflict in Ghana. International Policy Analysis, 1-10.

NDPC. (2015). Introduction to National Development Planning Commission. Retrieved July 13,

2019, from National Development Planning Commission: https://s3-us-west-

2.amazonaws.com/new-ndpc-

static1/CACHES/PUBLICATIONS/2017/10/24/NDPC_Final_Brochure.pdf

Ninsin, K. A. (1998). Ghana: Transition to Democracy. Dakar: Freedom Publications.


Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University

Press.

Osei, A. (2014). From Conflict to Consensus? Elite Integration and Democracy in Ghana. Comparative Sociology, 13(4), 503-530.


Affairs(114/457), 529-554.

Ozer, O., & Zheng, Y. (2017). Trust and Trustworthiness. In K. Donohue, E. Katok, & S. Leider,

The Handbook of Behavioral Operations (pp. 287-312). Wiley.

Paalo, S. (2017). Political Party Youth Wings and Political Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: A

Case of Ghana. International Journal of Peace and Development Studies, 8(1), 1-14.

Robins, B. G. (2010). What is Trust? A Multidisciplinary Review, Critique and Synthesis.

Sociology Compass, 10(10), 972-986.


https://judicial.gov.gh/index.php/the-directive-principles-of-state-policy


https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/new-ndpc-static1/CACHES/PUBLICATIONS/2017/10/24/NDPC_Final_Brochure.pdf



103

Tandoh-Offin, P. (2013). Development Planning in Ghana Since 1992: Implications for the

Decentralization . Journal of International Relations and Diplomacy, 1(2), 93-107.

Ten (10) Members of Parliament. Personal Interview. Ghana’s Current Legislature (2017-Date).

Accra. Thursday June 13, 2019 – Monday July 15, 2019.



Tutor2u. (2018). Adversary Politics. Retrieved July 14, 2019, from Tutor2u:

https://www.tutor2u.net/politics/reference/adversary-politics

Two (2) Senior Civil Servants. Personal Interview. Parliament of Ghana. Accra. Monday 15, July

2019.

Two (2) Officials. Personal Interview. National Development Planning Commission (NDPC).

Accra. Wednesday July 17, 2019.

Vordzorgbe, S., & Caiquo, B. (2001). Report on Status Review of National Strategies for

Sustainable Development in Ghana. Accra.

.



104

CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Introduction

This final chapter provides a summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations of the

study. It collates the findings derived from chapters one to three and based on the study’s

research objectives, draws some conclusions. This goes to ascertain the validity of the study’s

hypothesis.

4.2 Summary of Research Findings

This research aimed to ascertain if there was elite consensus in Ghana and how their interactions

affected democracy and national development so it became imperative that we understood what

elite consensus involved in relation to democracy.

Previous chapters implied that elite consensus is a broad agreement on how to govern a society

by those with societal influence and power with the focus on those operating at the levels of

political parties, elections, the legislature and national development planning under Ghana’s

fourth republic. In any democratic dispensation, elites agree and respect all the tenets of

democracy, of which Higley says are the desiderata of liberal democracy, and this is affirmed in

all the primary and secondary data used in the study.


105

The study also highlighted operational benchmarks used to gauge whether Ghana has elite

consensus or not, and how this affected national development with the National Development

Planning Commission (NDPC) of the fourth republic under the microscope. Respondents who

participated were think-tanks, political party executives, parliamentarians, and officials of the

NDPC. Below is the summary of research findings per the benchmarks used:

Elite Consensus at the Level of Political Parties

• Internal Consensus within Political Parties

The study confirmed that internal conflicts within political parties were a big issue which is seen

in the cases of both the NDC and NPP. The corruption allegations, the undemocratic practice

during parliamentary primaries and the lack of consultancy in decision-making and the chaotic

nature of party primaries caused by key party figures losing elections are examples of internal

conflicts of the NDC and NPP respectively. These have caused deep party divides within the

NDC and the NPP.

• Elite Pact and Inter-Party Consensus Building

There are numerous evidences of elite pacts in Ghana’s fourth republic such as the agreement

reached by the PNDC government and the opposition in reinstalling democratic governance in

1992, the institutionalization of the IPAC after the chaos surrounding the 1992 elections and the

Accra Declaration, where presidential candidates of the 2016 elections signed a peace pact to

eschew electoral violence before and after elections.

The failure of the opposition in accepting the 1992 presidential election results and the

subsequent boycott of the parliamentary elections the next year were signs of failure in inter-


106

party consensus building. However, some saw the above examples as a score for inter-party

consensus since the opposition parties united to boycott the impending parliamentary election.

This led to the birth of the IPAC, which chalked up successes until the infamous 2012 elections

when the NPP refused to accept the election results.

• Respect for the Rules of the Political Game

This section provided us with evidence of politicians respecting the rules of the political game,

although at the beginning of the fourth republic (1992), this was not so- the failure of the 1992

elections due to disagreements between the incumbent government and the opposition on

transition modalities. This led to the creation of IPAC in 1994, which has often been credited as

the brain behind Ghana’s electoral successes since 1996. Its basic shortfall came during the 2012

elections when the NPP refused to accept the results on the grounds of misinformation and

disagreements. However, the NPP accepted the verdict of the Supreme Court after the

disagreement which is seen as great respect for the rules of the game. Also, the peaceful

transition of power from President JJ Rawlings qualifies as an instance where respect was given

to the rules of the political game.

• Absence of Adversary Politics

Both the think-tanks and political party executives interviewed acknowledged the existence of

adversary politics but were divided on the issue of how it affected democratic consolidation in

Ghana. The think-tanks and one political party executive interviewee believed it dented politics

in Ghana which could have a snowball effect on democracy if not curbed. Adversary politics in

the form of political vigilantism was cited as a major threat to Ghana’s democratic development.


107

The rest of the political party respondents believed otherwise because according to them much is

being done in the form of encouraging inter-party consensus, anti-vigilantism campaigns, among

others.

Elite Consensus at the Level of Elections

• Mutual Respect for the Rules of the Electoral Game

The peaceful transition in power since the inception of the fourth republic demonstrated a high

level of mutual respect for the rules of the electoral game. Also, the creation of the IPAC which

collates the differing views of political parties into electoral reforms acceptable by all is seen as

an electoral feat in Ghana’s fourth republic. The IPAC has received praises in publications of

numerous scholars and respondents of this study.

However, the aftermath of the 2012 elections is said to have marred their integrity and cast

doubts on their reliability and relevance in subsequent elections.

• An Effective Conflict Resolution Mechanism Well Entrenched in the

Constitution

There are numerous conflict resolution mechanisms entrenched in the 1992 Constitution of

Ghana which include the Electoral Commission (EC), National Media Commission (NMC),

National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), Commission on Human Rights and

Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) and the Judiciary. These institutions promote human rights, aid

in the amicable resolution of conflicts and in the consolidation of democracy.

However, their effectiveness have been questioned. The NMC is said to be highly inefficient

since contents on the media are not well regulated. CHRAJ is described as not checking leaders


108

who abuse their power while the NCCE is said to have failed in the promotion and advocacy of

civic education. The main reasons given for their ineffectiveness are lack of capital and their

subservience to the ruling government.

Elite Consensus at the Level of the Legislature

• The Presence of the Elite Culture of Accommodation, Bargaining and

Compromises

On the topic of ‘Trust’ amongst parliamentarians in Ghana’s legislature, all the think-tanks

interviewees believed parliamentarians trust each other only at a personal level, not on national

issues.

However, all senior civil servant interviewees believed there is trust among parliamentarians at

both personal and national levels. This assertion is corroborated by a majority of the MP

interviewees. However, just like the thoughts of the think-tanks, they believed it to be at a more

personal level than on national issues.

On consensus building on national issues, all think-tanks believed there is no consensus on issues

of national importance but rather issues that benefit MPs collectively and not on those affecting

the masses. The MPs, on the other hand, claim there is consensus on national issues, especially at

the committee and leadership levels. Notwithstanding, when issues in parliament are thorny and

partisan in nature, deadlocks are not broken by consensus but with a vote and the majority

always wins. This is according to the MP respondents.

• Subdued Partisanship

Many argue that the level of partisanship in Ghana’s legislature is very high. This is said to be

evident in the subservience of the legislature to the executive and political parties through the


109

practice of majoritarian rule and the whip system. Genuine minority views on such issues are

undermined since the majority always carries the day in this system and as such negatively

affects consensus building in parliament.

National Development Planning in Ghana

The study found out that there is no policy continuity with regards to national development in

Ghana. Subsequent governments in the fourth republic have been blamed for not continuing the

policies of their predecessors which has led to the inefficiency of the NDPC.

4.3 Conclusions

The study started with an aim, which was to investigate elite consensus in Ghana and its effects

on democratic and national development. To reach this goal, some research questions and

objectives were developed to guide this study. After the acquisition of knowledge and evidence,

there are enough bases to make some key conclusions. These conclusions are arranged in order

of the research questions and objectives of the study.

• Elite consensus is indeed the agreement between the influential actors in society to obey

the rules of conduct governing their interactions with each other.

• A democracy can only be developed and consolidated with a consensually united elite.

• Political parties in Ghana’s fourth republic lack consensus within their parties.

• Elite consensus amongst political parties is at an appreciable level, mainly because IPAC

is currently losing its relevance.

• Elections have been highly successful in the fourth republic partly due to IPAC’s efforts

and elite consensus in elections.


110

• Ghanaian parliamentarians trust each other hence fall into the category of horizontal

integration and this corroborates the findings of scholars like Anja Osei.

• Ghanaian parliamentarians have a strong consensus at a personal level and not on

national issues and thus score low on the scale of vertical integration.

• On national development planning in Ghana, there is no consensus amongst elites on the

best policies for the country and as such led to policy discontinuity between subsequent

governments of the fourth republic.

The study portrays the topic, elite consensus in a country, as not exclusive to a single aspect of

the political life but only possible within a larger framework. This is proven by the study since

the findings suggest a keen association between consensus building from the levels of political

parties, elections, the legislature to national development planning. They are all interconnected in

the sense that they bear overlapping tendencies. Here, a lack or abundance of consensus in one

inherently affects consensus in another. As such, elite consensus in a country cannot be

generalized if consensus within an aspect of political life is deficient.

In light of the above conclusions, the findings generated confirm the hypothesis of the study.

Indeed, Ghana lacks an enduring elite consensus which has negatively affected national

development.


111

4.4 Recommendations

The fact that there is a strong bond among elites in Ghana on the general principles of

governance but not on national development issues hold two major implications on the country’s

future socio-political landscape.

Politically, it is going to be difficult to break the current political system in Ghana’s fourth

republic. This is because there is a tight grip on constitutionalism by the political elites, unlike

the preceding republics. The large consensus on the principles of governance means democratic

laurels as enjoyed by Ghana will continue to thrive.

However, socio-economically, since elite consensus in Ghana has not yet translated into national

development, it will be difficult to change the current plight of citizens. From the study, it is seen

that the periodic exercise of changing political leaders every four years has had less effect on

changing the current developmental problems. This is because the root of Ghana’s woes is the

existing structure (systems of governance like the constitution) and not the agency (political

power wielded by politicians). The structure inhibits political leaders to be accountable to the

masses. With a stable political atmosphere like it is in Ghana’s fourth republic, there will be no

viable reason to instigate any revolution like it ensued in its previous republics since harmony at

the top trickles down to the masses. Thus, the continuous inverse relationship between

democratic development and national development.

Nonetheless, the researcher puts forward the following recommendations based on the findings

of the research:

• A Third Force in the Political Arena: There is the need for a third force in Ghana’s

political arena. Ever since the start of the fourth republic, the dominance of the NDC and

the NPP has portrayed Ghana as a two-party state and as such made it possible for the


112

phenomena of majoritarian rule and the whip system to thrive. With an active third party

in parliament, the structure within which such phenomena thrives will be highly unstable.

This will force a lot of compromises and consensus building amongst parliamentarians as

well as between themselves and the executive. With time, a third party in the political

arena will dilute and eliminate majoritarian rule and the whip system in parliament.

• Constitutional Amendment: From the study, the recent trends of adversary politics is

seen as a threat to subsequent elections. More so, in recent times, decisions taken at the

IPAC level is not adhered to by some political parties since those decisions are not bound

by law. This is an imminent threat not only to electoral politics in Ghana but democracy

as a whole. As such, the IPAC must be made constitutional so decisions taken become

legally binding. This will force all political parties to respect the mutually accepted

decisions emanating from discussions and compromises reached through this platform.

With that, subsequent elections will continue to be successful. Also, the constitutional

mandate which allows a majority of ministers to be taken from parliament must be

scrubbed off. This provision serves as a luring mechanism for political parties and the

executive to ensure parliamentarians tow party-lines. With the eradication of this

provision, parliamentarians will be allowed to give objective analyses on policies during

discussions and deliberations in parliament.

• Effective Civic Education: The lack of civic education is undoubtedly a major problem

in Ghana. Many Ghanaians are not well informed about their rights and responsibilities as

citizens. This has created apathy and the dwindling sense of patriotism, especially among


113

the youth. Civic education must not only be limited to the NCCE but also political

parties, schools and every public institution. They must be tasked with educating citizens

on what it means to be a Ghanaian. This will make citizens well informed when making

some critical decisions like voting and provide a better understanding of the country’s

goals. In the long run, patriotism will be uplifted and apathy eschewed.

• Procuring a National Agenda on National development Planning: As revealed by the

study, there have been recommendations for a national agenda with which subsequent

ruling governments must refer to in enacting policies for national development. However,

these recommendations have not been considered by the respective governments. It is

imperative for the constitution to harbour a long-term national development plan for

Ghana. One which spells out what Ghana is, who Ghanaians are, what the values of the

country are, what the national goals are locally and in the international system and with

this knowledge, draw up a long-term national development plan from which political

parties will draw for their manifestos. The NDPC, along with the various political parties

in the country must meet and come out with this holistic plan. This will not only ensure

policy continuity but also engage the right policies needed for a uniform ethno-regional

development.

• Effective Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: The ineffectiveness of conflict resolution

mechanisms like the NCCE, CHRAJ AND NMC has been associated with the lack of

capital. These institutions are primal to the very survival of Ghana’s democracy and as

such must be accorded such importance. They must be highly resourced in order for them


114

to judiciously execute their mandate as prescribed by law. In providing requisite funding,

it makes them more effective and as such better poised to safeguarding Ghana’s

cherished democracy.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. BOOKS/ BOOK SECTIONS

Afrimap, OSIWA, & IDEG. (2007). Ghana: Democracy and Political Participation. Dakar:

Open Society Initiative for West Africa and Institute for Democratic Governance.


Y. Gebe (Ed.), Constitutionalism, Democratic Governance and the African State (pp. 57-92).

Accra: Black Mask.

Aidoo, T. M. (2008). Political Stability in Ghana: since the 1992 Re-Democratization Wave.

Germany: VDM & Co.

Amoako-Tuffour, J., & Armah, B. (2008). Poverty Reduction Strategies in Africa: Perspectives

and Lessons from Ghana. Lexington, Kentucky: Lexington Books Publication.

Antwi-Danso, V. (2015). Democracy and Good Governance: A Sine-Qua-Non to Political

Stability and Socio-Economic Development in Africa. In B. Y. Gebe (Ed.), Constitutionalism,

Democratic Governance and the African State (pp. 1-22). Accra: Black Mask.

Aryee, J. (1998). The 1996 General Elections. In J. Aryee, Democratic Consolidation in Ghana.

Accra: University of Ghana, Dept. of Political Science.

Blair, T. (1993). The Poverty of Planning. London: Redwood Press Limited.

Bluwey, G. (1998). State Organizations in the Transition to Constitutional Democracy. (K.

Ninsin, Ed.) Accra: Freedom Publications.

Boafo-Arthur, K. (1991). The International Community and Ghana's Transition to Democracy.

(N. K.A., Ed.) Accra: Freedom Publications.

Bottomore. (1964). Elites and Society. Great Britain: Penguin Books.

Borchert, J. (2010). "They Ain't Making Elites Like They Used to": The Never Ending Trouble

with Democratic Elitism. (H. Best, & J. Higley, Eds.) Leiden, Boston: BRILL.

Burnheim, J. (1985). Is Democracy Possible? Berkeley: California University Press.

Chan, S. (2002). Liberalism, Democracy and Development. Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of

the University of Cambridge.

Clapham, C. (1998). Third World Politics: Introduction. London and Sydney: Croom Helm.


Dahl, R. (1963). A Perfect Democratic Theory. Chicago: Pheonix.

Daloz, J. (2003). "Big Men" in sub-Saharan Africa: How Elites Accumulate Positions and

Resources. (M. Dogan, Ed., & E. C. Power, Trans.) Leiden, Boston: BRILL.

David, H. (2006). Models of Democracy. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Diamond, L., & Plattner, M. (1999). Democratization in Africa. Baltimore, Maryland: John

Hopkins University Press.

Diamond, L., Linz, J., & Lipset, S. (1995). Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing

Experiences with Democracy. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.

Drah, F. (1993). Political Parties and Democracy in Ghana's Fourth Republic. Accra: Woeli

Publishing Services.

Engelstad, F. (2010). Democratic Elitism: Conflict and Consensus. (H. Best, & J. Higley, Eds.)

Massachusetts: Brill, Leiden and Boston.

Field, G., & Higley, J. (1980). Elitism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Frempong, A.K.D. (2017). Elections in Ghana (1951-2016). Accra, Ghana: Digibooks Ghana

Ltd.

Frempong, A.K.D. (2012). Electoral Politics in Ghana's Fourth Republic: in the Context of the

Post-Cold War Africa. Accra: Alex K. D. Frempong.


Ghana at 50: Government, Politics and Development, Accra: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Frempong, A.K.D. (2007b). The Political Conflict and Elite Consensus in the Liberal State. In K.


Gebe, B. Y. (2015). Constitutionalism and Democratic Governance in Africa: Toward

Enforcement of Policy Instruments. In B. Y. Gebe (Ed.), Constitutionalism, Democratic

Governance and the African State, Accra: Black Mask.

Grofman, B., & Lijphart, A. (Eds.). (1986). Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences.

New York: Agathon Press.

Gyampo, R. (2016b). The State of Political Institution in Ghana. Tema: Digibooks Ghana Ltd.

Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1991). Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery. Boulder, Colorado:

Rienner.


Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2004). Africa: The Quality of Political Reform. In E. Gyimah-Boadi,

Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of Progress, London: Lynne Rienner.

Hagan, G. (1995). Democracy as a Conflictual System- the Needed Cultural Premise. (M.

Oquaye, Ed.) Accra: Gold Type.

Higley, J., & Burton, M. (2006). Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Rowman &

Littlefield.

Higley, J., & Gunter, R. (1992). Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and

Southern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hoffmann-Lange, U. (1986). Eliten and Demokratie in der Bundesrepublik. (M. Kaase, Ed.)

Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Hoffmann-Lange, U. (1992). Eliten, Macht und Konflikt in der Bundesrepublik . Opladen: Leske

+ Budrich Huntington, S. P. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.

Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Ikpe, U. (2010). State-Society Interactions: A Conceptual and Comparative Introduction to

Political Sociology. Lagos: Concept Publications Limited.

Killick, T. (2010). Development Economics in Action: A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana.

New York: Routledge Publishers.

Kotey, N. A. (1995). The Supreme Court and Conflict Resolution in the Fourth Republic. In M.

Oquaye, Democracy and Conflict Resolution in Ghana, Accra: Gold Type Ltd.

La Verle, B. (1994). Ghana: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress

Ninsin, K. A. (1998). Ghana: Transition to Democracy. Dakar: Freedom Publications.


Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University

Press.

Oquaye, M. (1993). Law, Justice and the Revolution. (E. Gyamah-Boadi, Ed.) Dakar: Codesria.

Ozer, O., & Zheng, Y. (2017). Trust and Trustworthiness. In K. Donohue, E. Katok, & S. Leider,

The Handbook of Behavioral Operations, Wiley.

Parry, G. (1969). Political Elite. London: George, Allen and Unwin Ltd.


Putnam, R. (1976). The comparative study of political elites. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:

Prentice-Hall.

Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern

Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Satori, G. (1965). Democracy Theory. New York: Praeger.

Schumpeter, J. A. (1969). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: Allen and Unwin Ltd.

B. JOURNAL ARTICLES

Abdulai, A., & Crawford, G. (2010). Consolidating Democracy in Ghana: Progress and

Prospects? Democratization, 17(1).

Agyeman-Duah, B. (2005). Elections and Electoral Politics in Ghana's Fourth Republic. Critical

Perspectives (18).

Arnon, D. (1995). Parties Law in Democratic Systems of Government. Journal of Legislative

Studies, 1.

Aryee, J. (2017). Ghana's Elections of 7th December 2016: A Post-Mortem. South African

Journal of International Affairs, 24(3).

Baker, B. (1998). The Class of 1990: How Have the Autocrat Leaders of Sub-Saharan Africa

Fared under Democratization? Third World Quarterly, 19(1).

Berman, S. (2007). Lessons from Europe. Journal of Democracy, 18.

Bokpe, S. J. (2010). The Price of Breaking Away. Africa Watch, p. 22.

Boakye, B. (2018). Electoral Politics in Ghana's 4th Republic (1992-2016) and its Implications

on Future Elections. SSRN Electronic Journal.

Burton, M., & Higley, J. (1987). Elite Settlements. American Sociological Review.

Cammack, P. (1990). A Critical Assessment of the New Elite Paradigm. American Sociological

Review, 55(3).

Davis, L. (1964, March 17). The Costs of Realism: Contemporary Restatement of Democracy.

Western Political Quarterly, 43.


Gould, J., & Szomolanyi, S. (1997). Elite Fragmentation in Industry and the Prospect for

Democracy. Intermarium, 1(2).

Graham, E., Gyampo, R., Pamphilious, F., & Yobo, E. (2017). The Third Peaceful Transfer of

Power and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana. Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies,

10(5).

Gyampo, R. (2015). Winner-Takes-All Politics in Ghana: The Case for Effective Council of

State. Journal of Politics and Governance, 4(1-4).




Review, 44, 69.

Gyampo, R., Graham, E., & Asare, B. (2017). Political Vigilantism and Democratic Governance

in Ghana's Fourth Republic. African Review.

Gyamfi-Boadi, E. (2009). Another Step Forward for Ghana. Journal of Democracy, 20(2).

Higley, J., & Burton, M. (1989). The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns.

American Sociological Review, 54(1).

Higley, J., & et al. (1991). Elite Integration in Stable Democracies: A Reconsideration .

European Sociological Review , 7(1).

Higley, J., & Michael, B. (1998). Elite Settlement and the Taming of Politics. Government and

Opposition, 33(1).

Ikpe, U. (2008). Obsolescence of Citizens: Theory of Democracy in the Age of Globalization?

Unilag Journal of Politics, 4.

Kamis, B. (2008, April 1). Book Review: John Higley and Michael Burton, Elite Foundations of

Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006, 229 pp.): G. John Ikenberry, Liberal

Order & Imperial Ambition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006, 300 pp.). Steven Slaughter, Liberty

beyond Neo-Liberalism: A Republican Critique of Liberal Governance in a Globalising Age (

Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005, 257 pp.). Millennium: Journal of International Studies,

36(2).

Karvonen, L. (2007). Party Politics, 13(4).

Mueller, S. (2011). Dying to Win: Elections, Political Violence and Institutional Decay in

Kenya. Journal of Contemporary African Affairs, 29(1).


Oquaye, M. (1995). The Ghanaian Election of 1992 - A Dissenting View. African Affairs,

94(375).

Osei, A. (2014). From Conflict to Consensus? Elite Integration and Democracy in Ghana.

Comparative Sociology, 13(4).


Affairs(114/457).

Paalo, S. (2017). Political Party Youth Wings and Political Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: A

Case of Ghana. International Journal of Peace and Development Studies, 8(1).

Robins, B. G. (2010). What is Trust? A Multidisciplinary Review, Critique and Synthesis.

Sociology Compass, 10(10).

Roustetsaari, I. (2007). Nordic Elite in Comparative Perspective . Comparative Sociology , 6(1-

2).

Schmidt, C. (2004). Theoretische und Praktische Aspekte der Eliteforschung . Hitotsubashi

Journal of Social Studies, 36(1).

Schmitter, P., & Karl, T. (1991). What Democracy Is...and Is Not. Journal of Democracy, 2(3).

Svanikier, J. (2007). Political Elite Circulation: Implications for Leadership Diversity and

Democratic Regime Stability in Ghana. Comparative Sociology, 6(1-2).

Tandoh-Offin, P. (2013). Development Planning in Ghana Since 1992: Implications for the

Decentralization. Journal of International Relations and Diplomacy, 1(2).

Whitfield, L. (2009). "Change for a Better Ghana": Party Competition, Institutionalization and

Alternation in Ghana's 2008 Elections. African Affairs, 108(433).

C. REPORTS/ PAPERS/ DOCUMENTS/ DISSERTATIONS

Adenyikor, Priscie D. “The Consolidation of Africa’s Contemporary Democratic Dispensation:

The Case of Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire”. Diss. University of Ghana, 2018.


Danso, Sampson. “Ghana’s Vision for Development: A Case Study of Ghana Vision 2020 and

the GPRS I and II”. Thesis. University of Ghana, 2014.


Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung. (2011). The Law-Making Process in Ghana: Structures and

Procedures. Accra: Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung Ghana.

Jonah, K. (2005). Inter-Party Dialogue in Ghana. Accra: Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA).

Meissner, K. (2010). Elections and Conflict in Ghana. International Policy Analysis.

Tanzi, V. (1997, September). The Changing Role of the State in the Economy: A Historical

Perspective. IMF Working Paper.

Tetteh, Patrick K. “Partisan Politics and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana’s Fourth Republic”.

Thesis. University of Ghana, 2011.



Vordzorgbe, S., & Caiquo, B. (2001). Report on Status Review of National Strategies for

Sustainable Development in Ghana. Accra.

D. Internet Sources

Achille, T. (2007). Sub-Saharan Africa Strategy for Sustained Growth to Breakthrough in the

21st Century: Revisiting the Development Literature and Paving the Way Ahead. Retrieved July

14, 2019, from A World Bank Institute Working Paper: http://www.worldbank.org

Atawura, P. (2017). Regulatory Framework of the Media in Ghana. Retrieved June 23, 2019,

from Philipatawura's Blog: https://philipatawura.wordpress.com/2017/05/02/regulatory-

framework-of-the-media-in-ghana/amp/

African Elections Database. (2017). Elections in Ghana. Retrieved May 18, 2019, from

http:/africanelections.tripod.com/gh.html

Alolor, R. (2015). LinkedIn SlideShare. Retrieved October 15, 2018, from SlideShare:


Atindow, M. (2018). The Journey of Presidential Elections in Ghana from 1992 to 2016.

Retrieved May 18, 2019, from Modern Ghana

Dahlberg, S., Axelsson, S., & Holmberg, S. (2017). The Meaning of Democracy. Retrieved May

22, 2019, from University of Gothenburg:


Districts.ghana-net.com. (2019). Ghana Districts. Retrieved June 13, 2019, from



http://www.worldbank.org/

https://philipatawura.wordpress.com/2017/05/02/regulatory-framework-of-the-media-in-ghana/amp/

https://philipatawura.wordpress.com/2017/05/02/regulatory-framework-of-the-media-in-ghana/amp/




Gwaambuka, T. (2018). The African Exponent. Retrieved December 27, 2018, from


Gyampo, R., & Gans-Lartey, E. (2018). Assessing Internal Party Democracy in Africa.

Retrieved 2019 March, from Research Gate Web site:

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ransford_Gyampo/publication/326422749_ASSESSING_I

NTERNAL_PARTY_DEMOCRACY_IN_AFRICA/links/5b4c948545851519b4c10f58/ASSES

SING-INTERNAL-PARTY-DEMOCRACY-IN-AFRICA?origin=publication_detail

IGI Global. (2011). Retrieved March 5, 2019, from https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/chile-

under-the-government-of-sebastin-piera/41255

Index Mundi. (2018). Ghana Political Parties and Leaders. Retrieved June 22, 2019, from Index

Mundi Website: https://www.indexmundi.com/ghana/political_party_and_leaders.html

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. (2007). Political Parties in West

Africa: The Challenge of Democratization in the Fragile States. Retrieved June 2019, from

International IDEA Website: www.idea.intpartiesuploadGhana%20laid%20out.pdf

Judicial Service of Ghana. (2019). The Directive Principles of State Policy. Retrieved July 14,

2019, from Judicial Service of Ghana Web site: https://judicial.gov.gh/index.php/the-directive-

principles-of-state-policy

Kooijmans, E. (2018, March 21). Is Democracy the Best Form of Governance? Retrieved March

5, 2019, from New College of Humanities:


Munro, A. (2018, December 13). Robert A. Dahl. (i. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Producer)

Retrieved January 9, 2019, from Encyclopaedia Britannica:


NDPC. (2015). Introduction to National Development Planning Commission. Retrieved July 13,

2019, from the National Development Planning Commission: https://s3-us-west-

2.amazonaws.com/new-ndpc-

static1/CACHES/PUBLICATIONS/2017/10/24/NDPC_Final_Brochure.pdf

Pearson Higher Education. (2010, January 10). Democracy and American Politics. Retrieved

February 16, 2019, from Pearson Higher Education:


Socialstudieshelp.com. (2012). Retrieved January 1, 2019, from

www.socialstudieshelp.com/APGOV_pluralism.htm








https://www.indexmundi.com/ghana/political_party_and_leaders.html









http://www.socialstudieshelp.com/APGOV_pluralism.htm

Tutor2u.com. (2018). Adversary Politics. Retrieved July 14, 2019, from Tutor2u:


Udel.edu. (2010). Pluralism. Retrieved January 1, 2019, from www1.udel.edu:


E. INTERVIEWS

A Think-Tank Interviewee. Personal Interview. Senior Research Fellow. Legon Center for

International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD). University of Ghana. Tuesday, June 18, 2019.

A Think-Tank Interviewee. Personal Interview. Senior Lecturer. Department of Political Science.

University of Ghana. Friday, June 21, 2019.

A Think-Tank Interviewee. Personal Interview. Researcher. Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES

Ghana). Accra. Wednesday, July 3, 2019.

A Think-Tank Interviewee. Personal Interview. Researcher. Ghana Centre for Democratic

Development (CDD-Ghana). Accra. Friday, July 12, 2019.

A Political Party Interviewee. Personal Interview. Party Executive. National Democratic

Congress (NDC). Accra. Thursday, July 4, 2019.

A Political Party Interviewee. Personal Interview. Party Executive. New Patriotic Party (NPP).

Accra. Thursday, July 4, 2019.

A Political Party Interviewee. Personal Interview. Party Executive. Conventions Peoples Party

(CPP). Accra. Wednesday, June 26, 2019.

Ten (10) Members of Parliament. Personal Interview. Ghana’s Current Legislature (2017-Date).

Accra. Thursday, June 13, 2019 – Monday, July 15, 2019.

Two (2) Senior Civil Servants. Personal Interview. Parliament of Ghana. Accra. Monday 15, July

2019.

Two (2) Officials. Personal Interview. National Development Planning Commission (NDPC).

Accra. Wednesday, July 17, 2019.




APPENDIXES

APPENDIX 1

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THINK-TANKS

This interview is undertaken by Rufus Ashitey Armah to solicit information on the topic; An

Examination of Elite Consensus towards National Development in Africa: A Case of Ghana.

This is an academic exercise for the award of Masters’ degree at LECIAD (University of Ghana).

You are assured of your confidentiality and any information that you may give. Please, give your

utmost cooperation and assistance.

Name……………………………………………………………………….

Institution…………………………………………………………………

Office/Position…………………………………………………………

Main Business: Elite Consensus, Democratic Consolidation and National Development in

Ghana – Interview Guide for Think-Tanks

Questions:

1. In your view, what does elite consensus mean?

OR

How would you describe elite consensus?

2. What are the necessary factors or benchmarks for elites to be seen as unified and not

divided?


3. Based on the benchmarks given, can activities of political parties in Ghana be described

as consensual or confrontational? Why?

4. Do you believe Ghana has elite consensus in the area of elections? Why?

5. Is there a conflict resolution mechanism well entrenched in the constitution? If yes, how

effective has it been?

6. In your opinion, do parliamentarians trust each other?

7. Is there consensus-building in the deliberation of issues in parliament? Why?

8. How has that affected national development?

9. Within the scope of the ruling governments, has there been continuity in the national

development policies and projects started by previous governments?

10. Generally speaking, does Ghana have elite consensus?

11. How have the answers given above affected democratic consolidation in Ghana?

OR

How have elite interactions affected Ghana’s democratic consolidation since the

inception of the fourth republic?

12. How have elite interactions affected national development in Ghana?

13. Do you see the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) as effective? Why?

14. Are there any recommendations you can give to forging a much tighter elite bond and

national development in Ghana?

Is there anything more you would like to add?

Thank you.


APPENDIX 2

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR POLITICAL PARTY EXECUTIVES






Name………………………………………………………………………...

Institution…………………………………………………………………

Office/Position…………………………………………………………


Ghana – Interview Guide for political party executives

Questions:

1. What rules (documents) govern the conduct of politics in the country, in your party as

well as relations between your party and other political parties?

2. Do the party executives and members adhere to such rules?

3. What is your party’s stance on those who break constitutional and electoral laws?

4. Are they punished?

5. Are party members and executives in particular informed about the party’s constitution

and electoral laws?


6. What do you think about constitutional and electoral laws in relation to interparty

consensus building?

7. Are they adequate, need change or addition?

8. What challenges do you face in the implementation of the laws?

9. Which active role did your party play in the institutionalization of democratic rule in the

wake of the fourth republic?

10. Do you trust other political parties to uphold constitutional and electoral laws?

11. In your opinion, is there consensus-building between political parties in Ghana? Can you

give instances of such a claim?

12. How would you describe your party’s relationship with other political parties?

13. Does your party influence its members during the decision-making process in parliament

and in government?

14. In your opinion, do other political parties do the same?

15. What accounts for the nature of party politics we are experiencing now?


Thank you.


APPENDIX 3

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS






Name………………………………………………………………………...

Institution…………………………………………………………………

Office/Position…………………………………………………………


Ghana – Interview Guide for Parliamentarians

Questions:

1. Do you trust your opponents in parliament?

2. Do you believe these opposing counterparts in parliament trust you?

3. How will you describe your relationship with other parliamentarians from different

parties? How do you relate with each other both in and outside parliament?

4. Have you ever been influenced by your party to make decisions you would have

otherwise not made?

5. In your opinion, are parliamentarians in your party and in opposing camps influenced by

their political parties to take certain decisions?


6. If any, what are some traits you like about your opposing counterparts in parliament?

7. If any, what are some traits you dislike about your opposing counterparts in parliament?

8. In parliament, have these traits mentioned above influenced your decision-making in any

way?

9. Has there been any occasion where there have been compromises between

parliamentarians during a deadlock in parliament?

10. If yes, how was the deadlock broken? If No, what was the reason for that failure, in your

opinion?

11. In your opinion, generally speaking, are MPs in parliament divided or united?

12. In your opinion, how have decisions made in parliament affected national development in

Ghana?

13. Are there any recommendations you can give to forging a much tighter elite bond and

national development in Ghana?


Thank you for your time.


APPENDIX 4

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

PLANNING COMMISSION






Name………………………………………………………………………...

Institution…………………………………………………………………

Office/Position…………………………………………………………


Ghana – Interview Guide for National Development Planning Commission.

Questions:

1. What has been the approach to planning Ghana’s development since 1992?

2. Would you say that Ghana’s vision for development has been balanced or in other words,

do the country’s visions for development cover the aspects thus political, social and

economic?

3. Is there an element of continuity in policies championed to drive Ghana’s development?

4. What are the processes involved and the outcomes of Ghana’s vision for development?


5. What are some of the remarkable achievements of Ghana’s vision for development?

6. What are some of the challenges that have impeded Ghana’s vision for development?

7. Have political elites affected the realization of these policies positively or negatively?

Why?

8. Should political parties in government be the chief architects of the country’s vision for

development? Why?

9. What will you recommend for Ghana to be able to achieve its desired objective of

national development?

10. Are there any useful lessons Ghana can draw to inform better development

policymaking?


Thank you.


an examination of elite consensus towards national

Documents