Journal of Criminal Justice 38 (2010) 1053–1062

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Journal of Criminal Justice

An empirical examination of AMBER Alert ‘successes’

Timothy Griffin ⁎Department of Criminal Justice—MS 214, University of Nevada, Reno, Reno, NV 89557, United States

⁎ Tel.: +1 775 784 6114.E-mail address: tgriffin@unr.edu.

0047-2352/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. Aldoi:10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2010.07.008

a b s t r a c t

The AMBER Alert systemwas designed to recover endangeredmissing children through the solicitation of citizenassistance via swift public announcements. Rigorous empirical support for AMBER Alert's effectiveness has beenlacking, but since its inception program advocates and public safety officials have lauded the system's ability to“save lives”, oftenbasing their optimismonAMBERAlert “success” stories.However, in thispaperquantitative andqualitative analyses of 333 publicized and celebratedAMBER Alert “successes” suggest AMBER Alerts rarely resultin the retrieval of abducted children from clearly “life-threatening” situations, and that most of the publicizedsuccesses involved relatively benign abductors and unthreatening circumstances. The routine conflation of suchapparentlymundane caseswith rare dramatic successes by AMBERAlert advocates suggests popular portrayals ofAMBER Alert are overly sanguine. The potentially negative effects of this and policy implications are discussed.

l rights reserved.

© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction

The horrifying kidnapping and murder of 9-year-old Amber Hager-man in Arlington, Texas in broad daylight in 1996 eventually inspiredthe creation of the AMBER (America's Missing Broadcast EmergencyResponse) Alert system for rescuing abducted children. When a child isreported missing under circumstances authorities deem dangerous,television and radio broadcasters, cellular telephone service providers,and public transportation officials can publicize an AMBER Alert. AnAlertwill typically include information thepublic canuse to identify, andhelp authorities locate, the child, perpetrator or both (National Centerfor Missing and Exploited Children, 2007; Zgoba, 2004). “Plan Amber”began in Texas as a reaction to the perception that Amber Hagerman'slifemighthavebeen saved if authorities couldhavemorequickly elicitedpublic assistance after the girl's abduction was witnessed. AMBER Alertis also inspired by research showing that over 70 percent of kidnappedand murdered children are dead within three hours of their abduction,and that faster official response could save lives in the most menacingabduction cases (Hanfland, Keppel, & Weiss, 1997). The system is nowoperational in every state and is overseen by the US Department ofJustice in conjunctionwith theNational Center forMissingandExploitedChildren (NCMEC).

AMBER Alert exponents have praised it as a valuable tool forrecovering abducted children (California Highway Patrol, 2009b; USDepartment of Justice, 2007). However, the limited available research onthe effectiveness of AMBER Alert suggests it is inherently limited andthat claims of its effectiveness should be sharply qualified (Griffin,Miller,Hoppe, Rebideaux, & Hammack, 2007). The system has been prone to

over- and misuse (Hargrove, 2005) and even successful Alerts are likelyto involve relatively less menacing abductors where recovery time isoften far greater than the three hour window deemed crucial in themost dangerous cases (Griffin et al., 2007; National Center for Missingand Exploited Children, 2008). These sobering findings are probablyindicativeof anumberof inherent constraints toAMBERAlert registeringa “life-saving” success, including the daunting need for immediatecritical information when a child is missing and a rapid synchronizationof the auspicious events necessary to ensure the safe return of anendangered child in a short time span (Griffin & Miller, 2008).

Nonetheless, programadvocates insist AMBERAlert is effective,withsome claiming the system is responsible for routinely “saving lives” oreven “hundreds of lives” (National Center for Missing and ExploitedChildren, 2007; US Department of Justice, 2007). These claims are oftensupported by references to “success stories” where AMBER Alertstangibly assisted in the safe recovery of abducted children, although themanner in which such success stories genuinely demonstrate AMBERAlert effectiveness has never been subjected to rigorous examination.

As an attempt to help address this research deficit, this paperpresents quantitative and qualitative data from a sample of 333publicized AMBER Alert “success stories” to determine the extent towhich AMBER Alerts success contribute to the rapid recovery of anabducted child from an apparently menacing abductor. The resultscan help determine if the AMBER Alert system's actual outcomesmatch the noble but ambitious goals of its designers.

Background

While public safety officials and child advocacy groups are quick tolaud the effectiveness of AMBER Alert, the little rigorous empiricalinvestigation of the system conducted to date has rendered moreambiguous findings. Researchers from the Scripps-Howard news

1054 T. Griffin / Journal of Criminal Justice 38 (2010) 1053–1062

service studied 233 AMBER Alerts from 2004 and found that too manyhoaxes andmisunderstandings led to bogus Alerts, and expressed fearthat authorities were overusing the system (and risking its viability)by issuing Alerts in mundane situations such as when the abductorwas a non-custodial parent (Hargrove, 2005). Similarly, a study of allAMBER Alerts issued in 2007 conducted by the National Center forMissing and Exploited Children reported mixed findings: Of the 227Alerts issued that year, 39 involved hoaxes or non-abductions, onlyforty eight were positively resolved as a direct result of the AMBERAlert, and the time between abduction and recovery was rarely withinthe narrow range of time considered crucial in the most menacingcases (National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, 2008).

An analysis of 275 Alerts issued from 2003 to 2006 revealedadditional clues as to AMBER Alert's limits. In almost a third of thesample cases the Alerts made some contribution to the recovery ofabducted children, but the system was far more likely to be effectivewhere the abductor's motivations were not apparently sinister, suchas when the child was taken by a parent in the midst of a custodydispute (Griffin et al., 2007). Furthermore, even “successful” Alertsrarely worked within the narrow window of time (three hours)generally regarded as crucial in cases involving abductors withperverse and cruel intentions, and were in fact least likely to beeffective in such cases (apparently—a crucial caveat identified by theresearchers is the impossibility of knowing how a kidnapping leadingto an AMBER Alert “would have” ended absent the Alert.)

Subsequent conceptual analysis of AMBER Alert identified severalinherent constraints to its effectiveness. First, in urgent abductionscenarios, there is often a prohibitive need for swift synchronization ofunlikely felicitous events. Besides a short delay between theabduction and the issuance of the Alert, an individual in position toassist with recovery must be both aware of and attentive to therelevant information, which requires both luck and effective observerrecall. This potential weak link in the system's effectiveness issuggested by recent research showing that citizens extensivelyexposed to images of missing children were unable to accuratelyidentify the subjects of interest even when directly asked right afterthe moment of exposure (Lampinen, Arnal, & Hicks, 2009).1

There are additional, possibly insuperable obstacles to AMBERAlert effectiveness. One is the unavoidable tension between the needfor rapid response and conformity to the strict issuance criteria: Ittakes time for investigators to acquire the information that wouldboth justify an Alert and make it effective, but in the worst abductioncases, time is not on investigators’ side. Furthermore, and mostimportant, AMBER Alert might be conceptually flawed in that it isbased on response time as the crucial variable facilitating successfulrecovery instead of perpetrator intension (Griffin & Miller, 2008). Inlight of these concerns it has been argued that AMBER Alert functionsless as an effective response to the highly sensational crimes whichinspired it, and more as “crime control theater”, enabling public safetyofficials to symbolically address the rare but largely intractable threatof child abduction-murder (Griffin & Miller, 2008).

Despite these empirical and conceptual concerns, the assumption ofAMBER Alert effectiveness seems axiomatic in popular discussion. Asmentioned earlier, agencies employing and actively promoting theAMBERAlert systemroutinely affirm its “life-saving” effects. Editorialistshave praised the system and promoted its expanded use, especiallyin the wake of tragic AMBER Alert “failures” (Adler, 2009; SarasotaHerald-Tribune, 2004; TheGuelphMercury, 2009). Public backlash overthe absence or delay of an AMBER Alert in such cases illustrates thepopular presumption of AMBER Alert efficacy—that the unfortunatechild likely “would have” lived had an Alert been quickly issued.

AMBER Alert “successes”

Despite the potential questions about AMBER Alert effectivenesssuggested by the scant available research, AMBER Alert advocates

have consistently sought to promote the system's effectivenessthrough, among other means, the publication of “success stories” inwhich Alerts tangibly contributed to the recovery of missing children.A number of state and federal agencies have listed examples of suchsuccess stories (California Highway Patrol, 2009a; National Center forMissing and Exploited Children, 2009; Texas Center for the Missing,2009; US Department of Justice, 2008).

It stands to reason that the purpose of publicizing these successstories is to encourage public support for, and belief in, AMBER Alert,and the motives for such promotion are above reproach consideringAMBER Alert's intended beneficiaries and the category of crime it wasdesigned to prevent. However, to date there has been no systematicand rigorous attempt to critically evaluate these success stories andthe extent to which they genuinely affirm the ability of AMBER Alertto save children from life-threatening abductions. The followinganalysis represents the first effort to fill this gap in the literature onAMBER Alert's effectiveness.

Method

The sample of AMBER Alert success stories used for this analysiscomes from a number of sources. First, 243 success stories for theyears 1998 to 2008 are listed on the NCMEC website. The agencymaintains information on all missing child cases in which an AMBERAlert is issued and has access to the police reports and otherdocuments from which to condense narratives of the cases inquestion. It might seem reasonable to assume these success storiesrepresent the “best of the best” of AMBER Alert successes from allstates, since the presumed purpose of their publication would be toenhance the status and credibility of the system. Nonetheless, anadditional 93 cases were randomly chosen (via systematic randomsampling) from a successive list of additional success storiespublicized by the states of California, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Illinois(California Highway Patrol, 2009b; Illinois AMBER Alert, 2010; Ohio'sAmber Plan, 2004; Pennsylvania State Police, 2010).2 In all, 333success stories in which at least some data of interest were availablewere examined.

Information about the Alerts comes from two basic sources. First,the publicizing agencies usually provided some of the crucial data(identity of the abductor, manner in which the Alert effected recovery,if at all) that could be used in the analysis. Second, case details fromthe publicized success stories (such as relevant dates and locations)were used to find supporting newspaper accounts of the same casesthrough the Lexis-Nexis search engine. Additional details weremore often than not available through these supplemental searches,enabling clarification of ambiguities in the respective agencies’publicized accounts (such as the exact relationship between theabductor and the victim or more specific times and/or duration of theabductions.)

Despite the use of multiple information sources, there remained asubstantial problem with missing data, especially the duration of thedelays between abduction and recovery. It was also often difficult totell the attributes or identity of the abductor from the availablenarratives, although in such cases the “unknown” nature of theabductor was regarded as a feature of the case, not the data, and thusthere are no “missing” data for relationship of the abductor to thevictim.3 Of the 333 cases examined, 143 were missing data on one ormore of the fields of interest.

Variables

Table 1 shows the codings and descriptive statistics for thevariables used in the analysis, with missing-data cases included. Priorresearch on AMBER Alert has shown the importance of the identity ofthe abductor in predicting the likelihood of successful recovery(Griffin et al., 2007), so for each Alert success story, the Relationship of

Table 1Descriptive statistics of AMBER Alert success characteristics

(Percentages in parenthesis include with/without missing-data cases; totalpercentages not always 100.0 because of rounding error)

Alert EffectCitizen tip led to recovery 147 (44.1/50.1)Alert induced offender to release child/surrender 72 (21.6/24.6)Effective police work alone 30 (9.0/10.2)Citizen recovered/discovered child after the fact 27 (8.1/9.2)Other effect 10 (3.0/3.4)Apparently no Alert effect 7 (2.1/2.4)No basis for determination 40 (12.0/[N/A])Totals 333/293 (99.9/100.0)

RelationshipFather or Stepfather 105 (31.5/32.8)Mother's Boyfriend/Fiancé 22 (6.6/6.9)Mother 41 (12.3/12.8)Mother and Father/Mother's Boyfriend 13 (3.9/4.1)Other Family Member 19 (5.7/5.9)Victim's Boyfriend/Ex-Boyfriend 10 (3.0/3.1)Other Acquaintance⁎ 57 (17.1/17.8)Unknown Car Thief 19 (5.7/5.9)Non-Car Thief Stranger 22 (6.6/6.9)Non-abduction 12 (3.6/3.8)No basis for determination 13 (3.9/[N/A])Total 333/320 (99.9/100.0)

Relationship (Aggregated)All Family Members/Acquaintances 267 (80.2/83.4)All Strangers 41 (12.3/12.8)Non-abduction 12 (3.6/3.8)No basis for determination 13 (3.9/[N/A])Total 333/320 (100.0/100.0)

Apparent Threat LevelOffender used non-lethal force/threat 104 (31.2/32.5)Offender used lethal force/threat 64 (19.2/20.0)Offender history of violence/abuse 32 (9.6/10.0)Offender intoxicated or incompetent 29 (8.7/9.1)Offender known sex offender 13 (3.9/4.1)Victim with medical condition 5 (1.5/1.6)Offender romantically involved with victim 4 (1.2/1.3)Ransom demand 3 (0.9/0.9)No clear evidence of threat other than fact of abduction 54 (16.2/16.9)Incident not an abduction 12 (3.6/3.8)Unknown/No basis for determination 13 (3.9/[N/A])Totals 333/320 (99.9/100.1)

Delay between abduction and recovery (Average=15.6 hours)3 hours or less 51 (15.3/22.0)Between 3 and 12 hours 99 (29.7/42.7)Between 12 and 24 hours 51 (15.3/22.0)More than 24 hours 31 (9.3/13.4)No basis for determination 101 (30.3/[N/A])Totals 333/232 (99.9/100.1)

⁎ includes babysitters and neighbors.

1055T. Griffin / Journal of Criminal Justice 38 (2010) 1053–1062

the abductor to the abducted child is coded. The Alert Effect indicatesthe manner, if any, in which the Alert facilitated the recovery of thechild. Recovery Time (time between abduction and recovery) wascalculated or estimated because the perceived need for rapid responsewas one of the crucial factors driving the creation of AMBER Alert(Zgoba, 2004).

An important qualification to the various time spans is they areoften based on crude data. For some cases relatively precise timeswere available for the events of interest, but it was often necessary tomake reasonable estimates based on descriptive language such as“early morning”, “afternoon”, “early evening”, and so forth. This ofcourse compromises the robustness of any of the reported findingsregarding the quickness with which Alerts are issued or recoveriesachieved.4

Nonetheless, in one very crucial estimation procedure extraordinarycare was taken to bias the data in favor of AMBER Alert success: If thespecific time of the kidnappingwas not given orwas unknowable basedon the nature of the case, the abduction time was assumed to be

identical to the time the AMBER Alert was issued (if that informationwas available). It would be difficult to overstate the extent to whichthis favors a finding of AMBER Alert effectiveness. It unrealisticallyreduces to zero thedelaybetweencrimeandAlert issuance (specifically,in 118 of the 218 for which some time information was available)dramatically reducing the average for all cases for both of theseestimates.5

“Alert Effect” indicates the manner, if at all, in which the AMBERAlert contributed to the recovery of the victim(s). AMBER Alert wasdesigned to conventionally work by soliciting citizen tips to assist inlocating the child and/or the abductor, but there are other means bywhich it can succeed. Very often, the abductor becomes aware of theAlert and, apparently feeling the pressure of widespread publicscrutiny, chooses to release the child or surrender to authorities.AMBER Alerts can also be successful when law enforcement officers,responding to information made available by the AMBER Alert, areable to locate the child or the abductor. Less common categories ofAlert Effect include situations where it was eventually determinedthere was no abduction but the Alert still facilitated recovery or a childwas recovered owing to the Alert after an authentic abduction hadalready ended in the victim's freedom for other reasons.

Findings

Table 1 also shows the frequencies for Alert Effect, Relationship,Apparent Threat Level, and Recovery Time. The noteworthy findingfrom the data for Alert Effect is that in over 65 percent of the casesAMBER Alerts were effective through either a citizen tip or where theAlert intimidated the abductor (almost 75 percent whenmissing-datacases are excluded; in the subsequent discussion, both percentageswill be given in tandem, with percentages based on the whole samplegiven first.) The remainder involved other Alert effects, such aseffective police work or other means, and in seven cases the availableevidence suggested the Alert actually played no role in the child'srecovery.6

The data for Alert Effect show that most of these AMBER Alertsuccess stories indeed involved AMBER Alert functioning as intendedby its designers (either through citizen tips or intimidation of theabductors.) However, further examination of the data reveals a morecomplex picture. Over 80 percent of the successes (83.4 percent whenmissing-data cases are excluded) involved abductions by a familymember (most often parents) or other person known to the victim.Only forty one (12.3 percent/12.8 percent) of the abductions werecommitted by strangers, and 19 of these involved thefts of vehiclesoccupied by an incidentally abducted child. Furthermore, while thevast majority of the cases involved some category of demonstrated“threat” broadly defined, in only 13was the perpetrator known to be asex offender either because of prior record or behavior exhibitedduring the abduction. These patterns, even in a list of celebratedAMBER Alert success stories, are consistent with earlier researchshowingAMBERAlerts aremost likely to be effective in cases involvingrelatively benign abductors, such as parents or other persons knownto the victim, not where the perpetrator is an apparently menacingstranger (Griffin & Miller, 2008; Griffin et al., 2007). The data do notappear to demonstratewidespread “success” in the sense AMBERAlertdesigners and advocates explicitly conceived it.

The data for Recovery Delay are similarly revealing. The readershould recall that AMBER Alert is premised on rapid recovery, but theaverage Recovery Delay for all cases for which an estimate was madewas over 15 hours—well over the three-hour window deemed crucialin the worst child abduction scenarios (Hanfland et al., 1997) —andthis includes cases where the delay between the abduction and theAlert was assumed to be zero simply because of lack of information.An accurate estimate of the average time between abduction andrecovery would certainly be significantly higher were better dataavailable. The breakdown of Recovery Delays into ranges affirms the

1056 T. Griffin / Journal of Criminal Justice 38 (2010) 1053–1062

point: Only fifty one (15.3 percent /22.0 percent) of the recoverieswere achieved within 3 hours of the abduction.

In sum, these figures suggest that, even among a sample of casesselected by AMBER Alert advocates to demonstrate the system'seffectiveness, the circumstances and manner of success do notroutinely involve plainly menacing abductions or swift and dramaticrescues. Nonetheless, the descriptive statistics of the overall sampleshed little light on the frequency of particular cases conforming to theintended model that inspired AMBER Alert (rapid rescue of anendangered abduction victim), so more detailed analysis is required.

Categorizing AMBER Alert success stories

To provide a more nuanced analysis of these AMBER Alert successstories, all cases for which relevant data (Alert Effect, ThreatLevel, Relationship, and Recovery Time), were available (N=190)have been assigned to different success categories. (Table 2 showsthe descriptive statistics for this sub-sample.) To give breadth tothis analysis, three different levels of restrictiveness (“least”,“moderately”, and “most”) have been employed in creating theselection criteria to show how increasingly demanding (and, it isargued here, more realistic) criteria affect findings of AMBER Alert“success”. The restriction levels are determined by how twodichotomous case variables are defined: Whether a case is a “routine”or “textbook”7 success, and whether the success was “qualified” or

Table 2Descriptive statistics for AMBER Alert success characteristics (cases with missing dataand non-abductions excluded)

(Percentages in parenthesis; total percentages not always 100.0 because ofrounding error)

Alert EffectCitizen tip led to recovery 98 (51.6)Alert induced offender to release child/surrender 39 (20.5)Effective police work alone 24 (12.6)Citizen recovered/discovered child after the fact 20 (10.5)Other effect 9 (4.7)Totals 190 (99.9)

RelationshipFather or Stepfather 58 (30.5)Mother's Boyfriend/Fiancé 17 (8.9)Mother 18 (9.5)Mother and Father/Mother's Boyfriend 10 (5.3)Other Family Member 10 (5.3)Victim's Boyfriend/Ex-Boyfriend 9 (4.7)Other Acquaintance⁎ 37 (19.5)Unknown Car Thief 15 (7.9)Non-Car Thief Stranger 16 (8.4)Total 190 (100.0)

Relationship (Aggregated)All Family Members/Acquaintances 159 (83.7)All Strangers 31 (16.3)Total 190 (100.0)

Apparent Threat LevelOffender used non-lethal force/threat 65 (34.2)Offender used lethal force/threat 43 (22.6)Offender history of violence/abuse 15 (7.9)Offender intoxicated or incompetent 18 (9.5)Offender known sex offender 10 (5.3)Victim with medical condition 0 (0.0)Offender romantically involved with victim 3 (1.6)Ransom demand 0 (0.0)No clear evidence of threat other than fact of abduction 36 (18.9)Totals 190/100.1)

Delay between abduction and recovery (Average=15.2 hours)3 hours or less 37 (19.5)Between 3 and 12 hours 84 (44.2)Between 12 and 24 hours 42 (22.1)More than 24 hours 27 (14.2)Totals 190/(100.0)

⁎ includes babysitters and neighbors.

“unqualified”. The “routine/textbook” dichotomy refers to thephysical operations of the AMBER Alert—what the Alert accomplishedand how fast. The “qualified/unqualified” dichotomy is determined bythe identity and/or level of apparent threat posed by the abductor.

To qualify as a “textbook” success, the abductionmust have, withinsome limited time window that varies across restrictiveness levels,been resolved as a direct result of the AMBER Alert—either because ofa citizen tip or the pressure exerted by the Alert on the abductor. Allthe restrictiveness levels regard as “routine” the other various AlertEffect types, such as where a citizen located the child after theabduction was already over or where an acquaintance of the abductorsaw the Alert and independently recovered the child or persuaded theabductor to surrender). Included in the “routine” category are caseswhere police, using information from the Alert, were able to locate thevictim or abductor and recover the former.

The exclusion from “textbook” status of cases involving lawenforcement location of child or abductor independent of citizenassistance is compelled by the understanding that police have hadmethods for locating abducted children long before the inception ofAMBER Alert. The argument here is there should be a distinctionbetween the current AMBER Alert configuration and the originalAMBER Alert concept. The premise of AMBER Alert is that publicannouncements with information about abducted children couldresult in citizen participation leading to rescue. (Later, after initialsuccesses, program advocates also touted its ability to intimidateabductors.) However, part of the AMBER Alert process as practiced isthe dissemination of information not just to the public but to policeagencies and officers. The justification for the definitional restriction isthat a “textbook” success for the AMBER Alert concept must notmerely co-opt a function already in place (All Points Bulletins andother communications to police) and rename it.

Some ceiling on recovery time would also seem necessary for anAlert to qualify as a “textbook” success. Program advocates haverepeatedly drawn attention to the importance of rapid response inbringingabout successful recovery in life-threatening situations, asmostmurdered abducted children are dead within three hours of theirkidnapping (Hanfland et al., 1997). Thus, time limits of twenty-four,twelve, and three hours were used for the least restrictive, moderatelyrestrictive, and most restrictive “textbook” criteria, respectively.

Three different standards were also devised for separating“qualified” from “unqualified” successes. Again it is impossible toknow what would have happened if an AMBER Alert had not beenissued in a given case and to what extent a “successful” Alert rescued avictim from imminent harm. However, it is possible to make proxymeasures of threat based on the case narratives. In the least restrictivecategory, the success was considered “unqualified” if there wasevidence of any “threat”. This would include not only cases where theoffender had acted with extreme violence or was a known sexoffender, but also lesser threats, such as where the abductor was aknown drug user or had a history of domestic violence, or where thechild was in need of medical treatment. In the moderately restrictivedefinition of “unqualified” success, cases involving non-car thiefstrangers, sex offenders, or cases involving “lethal violence or threat”were counted as unqualified, and under the most restrictive criteria,only cases involving sex offenders, or strangers where there was anydemonstrated threat were counted.8

Table 3 shows the results of the varying categorization criteriadefended above, and the data are striking. Just over half (98, or 51.6percent) of the 190 cases for which the relevant data were availablefulfilled the criteria for “unqualified textbook” successes under the“least restrictive” selection criteria. This number reduces to 26 (31.2percent) and two (1.1 percent) under the “moderately restrictive” and“most restrictive” criteria respectively. The key issue, of course, iswhat to make of these findings in evaluating AMBER Alert success.

The primary research constraint (it cannot be overly stressed) inevaluating the AMBER Alert system is the impossibility of knowing

Table 3Assignment of success types using different levels of restriction

Restriction Level (percentages in parentheses)

Success Category Least Restrictive Moderately Restrictive Most Restrictive

“Qualified Routine Successes” 14 (7.4) 66 (35.7) 144 (75.8)“Qualified Textbook Successes” 18 (9.5) 60 (31.6) 26 (13.7)“Unqualified Routine Successes” 60 (31.6) 38 (20.0) 18 (9.5)“Unqualified Textbook Successes” 98 (51.6) 26 (13.7) 2 (1.1)Total 190 (100.1) 190 (100.0) 190 (100.1)

Definitions:

Restriction Level

Criteria Least Restrictive Moderately Restrictive Most Restrictive

“Textbook” as opposed to“Routine”

Alert resolved through a beneficial citizen tip oroffender intimidation and victim(s) recoveredwithin 24 hours.

Alert resolved through a beneficial citizentip or offender intimidation and victim(s)recovered within 12 hours.

Alert resolved through a beneficial citizentip or offender intimidation and victim(s)recovered within 3 hours.

“Unqualified” as opposed to“Qualified”

Case involved any apparent “threat”. Case involved a sex offender, a(non-car thief) stranger, or lethalforce/threat.

Case involved a sex offender, or a(non-car thief) stranger associatedwith any threat.

1057T. Griffin / Journal of Criminal Justice 38 (2010) 1053–1062

what “would have” happened in a particular case had no AMBER Alertbeen issued. However, it is reasonable to ask and speculate: Whatprobably would have happened? Answering this less demandingquestion (and by default, surmising what AMBER Alert likely reallyaccomplished in particular child kidnappings) requires qualitativeexamination of specific cases, to which the analysis will now turn.

Qualitative analysis

Table 4 presents brief narrative summaries of cases counted as“unqualified textbook” successes under one or more criteria. CasesOne and Two were included because they satisfied the conditions of“unqualified textbook success” under even the most restrictivecriteria. Cases Three and Four were purposively chosen becausethey are well known to students of the AMBER Alert system and thusworthy of comment in this context. Cases Five through 20 wererandomly chosen (by a random number generating algorithm) fromwithin the remaining cases which satisfied the “moderately” (eighttotal) and “least” (eight total) restrictive criteria.

Cases One and Two, categorized as “unqualified textbook”successes under the most restrictive selection criteria, are thecertainly the type of abduction and rescue scenario AMBER Alert'screators envisioned. In both cases there was evidence of serious threatand swift rescue resulting from the Alert. If the AMBER Alert systemfrequently resulted in rescues of this nature (say at the rate of about20 a year) it would lend tremendous weight to the claims it has saved“hundreds of lives.” However, as one moves down the list of casenarratives, it quickly becomes clear there are very few such cases to befound in the sample, and the success stories become increasinglymundane and less impressive as “life saving” rescues as the morelenient selection criteria are employed to categorize them. Evenamong the stronger examples, the evidence demonstrating AMBERAlert's effectiveness seems mitigated.

Case Three, for instance, was perhaps the most highly publicizedAMBER Alert success ever as it occurred shortly after the implemen-tation of AMBER Alert in California and involved the sensationalrescue of two teenage girls from a known sex offender. The actions oflaw enforcement officials and AMBER Alert functionaries in this casewere both decisive and admirable, as the brief narrative suggests.However, other details from this casemight cast at least some elementof doubt as to whether it was a genuine “life-saving” rescue. Forinstance, it is not clear the offender intended to kill the girls: He hadnot killed their male companions at the moment of abduction, he hadthe girls under his power for well past the crucial three-hour windowwherein most abducted children die, and at one point he evenstopped to buy the victims refreshments, which suggests at least the

possibility of a ‘Stockholm Syndrome’ attenuating whatever murder-ous thoughts he might have harbored. Even when the girls revoltedand attacked him he did not retaliate with deadly force. Of coursethere is no way to know what “would have” happened without theAMBER Alert, but the behaviors of the abductor suggest instability andindecisiveness as much as murderous malice.9

Case Four has similar mitigating factors. The father in this case hadalready killed one of his own children and several other relativesbefore abducting three of his other children and explicitly threateningtheir lives. The AMBER Alert did facilitate the swift rescue of thevictims, but the unavoidable complexity with assuming this was a“life-threatening” situation is that, if the perpetrator had intended tokill his remaining children, he had ample opportunity to do so at thesamemoment he was killing the other victims. What seems at least aslikely as murderous intention toward the abducted children was thedesire to simplymaintain control over them as theywere, after all, his.

Case Seven is also interesting because at first blush it has all theapparent features of a menacing abduction, involving a “sex offender”who was “armed”, and a “rescue” resulting from a citizen tip inspiredby an AMBER Alert. Closer examination of the case facts, however,reveals a number of important qualifications. The victim apparentlyleft voluntarily with the perpetrator (her father) and the “abduction”was apparently intended as an outing—albeit a forbidden one undercourt order owing to the perpetrator's conviction as a sex offenderover a decade before. (Adams, 2007).10

As one moves down the list, one sees other data which commendAMBER Alert's effectiveness in particular situations but also highlightits inherent constraints. In Case 12, for example, there was virtually nodelay between the announcement of the AMBER Alert and the citizentip, but there was obviously some question about the appropriatenessof the Alert, resulting in a six-hour delay between abduction andissuance. In the end, the father's drug abuse history and the inclementweather were deemed sufficient justification to issue (Smith & Elliott,2008). Similarly, in Case 16, state officials in Texas were reluctant tomake the Alert statewide versus merely regional coverage preciselybecause one of the abductors was a parent—a decision questioned bysome (Meritz, 2008).

Case 19 is highly noteworthy because of how the case is portrayedon the NCMEC website, which states the children were “taken” by theabductor, when in fact the girl was romantically involved with thesuspect and the circumstances of the case conformed more to arunaway scenario than a kidnapping (The Associated Press State &Local Wire, 2004).11 The reader should bear in mind that this and therest of Cases 15 through 20 were selected from the pool of successstories which were “unqualified textbook” successes according to atleast the “least restrictive” criteria.

Table 4Qualitative summaries of select “unqualified textbook” successes (recovery times in quotations indicate case where Alert and Abduction were assumed to be identical)

Classification byRestriction Level⁎

Case Case Summary Mst Mod Lst

1 10/3/04; Oxford, WI: 16-year-old girl abducted by registered sex offender and forced into vehicle. AMBER Alert immediately issued,resulting in rapid citizen tip enabling police to pursue suspect. Victim jumped from vehicle during pursuit and suspect committedsuicide when cornered by police. Child recovered within 3 hours.

UT UT UT

2 7/31/03; Louisville, KY: Three armed men kidnapped 16-year old from hotel, resulting in swift AMBER Alert. Abductors saw Alert onTV and released girl within 3 hours. Suspects later captured.

UT UT UT

3 7/31/0; Lancaster, CA: Two teenage girls abducted from a remote “lovers lane” location by registered sex offender, who subduedthem and their boyfriends with a firearm then bound the boys and drove off with the girls. One boy wrestled free and triggeredAMBER Alert, which resulted in several citizen tips and dramatic rescue of girls within 12 hours. Perpetrator shot to deathby police.

UR UT UT

4 1/8/2004; Calhoun, GA: Man murdered four people including his own infant, abducted his remaining three children, then reportedthe crimes to his estranged wife and made murderous threats. AMBER Alert immediately issued, resulting in tip from citizenwho recognized perpetrator's vehicle and leading to rescue of children unharmed within 3 hours.

QT UT UT

5 4/23/04; Orange County, California: 3-year-old girl abducted by father, who threatened to kill himself and child. AMBER Alertimmediately issued. Off-duty firefighter aware of Alert recognized and reported vehicle. Nearly immediate arrest of perpetratorand recovery of child resulted.

QT UT UT

6 6/12/2004; Lakeland, FL: A 17-year-old mentally challenged female vanished from mall. Subsequent analysis of video tape showedher holding hands with one of four unknown boys. AMBER Alert issued; when boys saw Alert they released victim and left anonymoustip as to her whereabouts within 12 hours.

QR UT UT

7 2/11/07; Inver Grove, MN: 14-year-old girl taken from home by non-custodial, armed, sex-offender father. AMBER Alert issued.Tips from citizens who recognized perpetrator's vehicle eventually led to safe return of child within 20 hours.

UR UT UT

8 3/10/03 Cleveland, OH: A father suggesting he would use deadly force and allegedly possessing a firearm beat his girlfriend andtook their 3-year-old daughter. AMBER Alert issued. After being apprised of Alert by a relative, perpetrator surrendered himselfand child to police safely within “7 hours.”

QR UT UT

9 6/24/2004; West Deer, PA: Father took 10-year-old daughter after allegedly murdering estranged wife. Swiftly issued AMBERAlert led to rapid tip from citizen who recognized suspect's vehicle. Perpetrator arrested and child recovered within 6 hours.

QR UT UT

10 12/20/07; Columbia IL: 14-year-old girl abducted from her home at knife point by unknown burglar, resulting in immediateAMBER Alert. Tip from citizen recognizing perpetrator's vehicle resulted in arrest of abductor and rescue of child unharmedwithin 5 hours.

UR UT UT

11 8/4/06, Gwinnett County, GA: Man killed his girlfriend and took her 4-year-old daughter. AMBER Alert issued when bodydiscovered. Citizen recognized vehicle of suspect; police located and cornered suspect, who committed suicide. Childunharmed and recovered within “12 hours.”

QR UT UT

12 2/10/08; Trotwood, OH: Drug abusing non-custodial father drove off with his poorly clothed 2-month old into extremelycold weather. After decision to issue Alert, nearly immediate citizen tip enabled police to locate perpetrator and childwithin 7 hours.

QR QT UT

13 1/29/07; Reno, NV: Non-custodial parents violently abducted their 1-year-old from her custodial grandparents, possiblyharming her. Immediate AMBER Alert resulted in citizen tip, leading to capture of perpetrators and recovery of babywithin 3 hours.

QT QT UT

14 5/12/04; Ontario, CA: Biological father overpowered mother and fled with their child in her car. Apparently rattled bythe subsequent AMBER Alert, perpetrator surrendered the child to his parents. Safe recovery occurred within 8 hours.

QR QT UT

15 12/29/04; O'Fallon, IL: Non-custodial father, driving a stolen vehicle, abducted his 10-year-old son, resulting in AMBER Alert.Motorist spotted vehicle and alerted police, leading to safe recovery of child and capture of perpetrator within 4 hours.

QR QT UT

16 January 30, 2008; El Paso, TX: Biological mother and her boyfriend “forcibly abducted” her 3-year-old daughter. Abductorand associate observed the AMBER Alert on television, contacted law enforcement, turned themselves in, and returnedthe child safely within 21 hours.

QR QT UT

17 3/19/2007 Altadena, CA: Non-custodial mother and associate abducted 4-year-old boy after shooting and killing his uncle.Perpetrators fled to Nevada where multiple tips enabled police to capture them and safely recover child within 24 hours.

QR UR UT

18 12/21/05; Spartanburg, SC: Teenage girl beat and robbed her grandmother then abducted her 12-year-old sister. SubsequentAMBER Alert resulted in citizen tip and safe recovery of victim and arrest of perpetrator within 4 hours.

QR QT UT

19 3/15/04; Robertson County, TN: 14-year-old girl and her 9-year-old brother ran away with 18-year-old man with history ofmental illness, resulting in AMBER Alert. Citizen tip resulted in location of three and safe recovery of children within “9 hours”.

QR QT UT

20 2/2705; Pittsburgh, PA: A woman's live-in boyfriend assaulted her and then fled with her six-year-old daughter (not his).Subsequent AMBER Alert intimidated abductor into returning child within 7 hours.

QR QT UT

⁎ “Mst”=Most; “Mod”=Moderate; “Lst”=Least.

1058 T. Griffin / Journal of Criminal Justice 38 (2010) 1053–1062

Of course it is ultimately futile to try to definitively extrapolate thebehaviors of perpetrators in these cases. Theoretically, all the childrenin these cases were in life-threatening peril. However, the keyproblem in attributing “life-saving” success to even these cases is anunderlying tautology: Murder requires a murderer. If the perpetratorintended to kill the victim(s) despite ample opportunity to do so in acase where the child survives, then why didn't (s)he? At some point itis necessary to acknowledge behavior as the best indicator ofintention, and the likeliest “reason” the victims in these cases werenot seriously harmed is because there was no serious harmfulintention—especially as the restrictiveness of the categorizationcriteria are relaxed.

In fact, of all the successes in the sample for which complete dataare available, there was only one case in which a child was rescued

from a known sex offender demonstrably within three hours as aresult of an AMBER Alert (Table 4, Case One). This is no trivial finding.If the crime against Amber Hagerman is to be used as the inspirationfor a child protection device premised on rapid recovery to savechildren from the worst imaginable fate, then the paucity of casesestablishing its capacity to do so is remarkable.

Table 5 enables an interesting contrast with the qualitative data ofTable 4 because it provides a random of sample of the cases (drawnusing the same random number algorithm used for Table 4) whichdid not meet the criteria for “unqualified textbook success” undereven the least restrictive criteria, and not surprisingly, most of theindividual cases seem mundane because of the apparent threat levelposed by the abductor and the manner in which the Alert affectedrecovery. Case Three is certainly themost significant rescue, achieving

Table 5Qualitative summaries of select non-“unqualified textbook” successes (recovery times in quotations indicate case where Alert and Abduction were assumed to be identical)

Classification byRestriction Level⁎

Case Case Summary Mst Mod Lst

1 10/15/04; Columbus, Ohio: Armed with gun and threatening deadly force, man abducted baby from ex-girlfriend after a dispute overmoney. AMBER Alert issued. Man eventually left child with a relative. Relative then noticed Alert and notified police. Child safelyrecovered after “18 hours.”

QR UR UR

2 1/10/06 Minneapolis, MN: Woman stole vehicle with engine running from store parking lot. AMBER Alert immediately issued.Alert intimidated abductor into abandoning vehicle, shortly after which she was spotted by police and child was recoveredwithin 90 minutes.

QT QT QT

3 10/2/07 Polk County, FL: 15-year-old lured via internet to rendezvous with registered sex offender. Girl was abducted and sexuallyassaulted. When absence discovered, AMBER Alert issued. Offender apparently intimidated by Alert into releasing child after 35 hours.

UR UR UR

4 6/3/03; Denver, CO: A woman ingratiated herself to a young mother, then abducted her two-week old infant after a ruse and took himto her home. AMBER Alert issued. Abductor's relatives saw Alert and notified police, enabling child to be safely rescued within 25 hours.

QR QR QR

5 11/24/05; Duval County, FL: Non-custodial father with extensive criminal record abducted his baby girl from the child's mother.Family member persuaded him to turn himself and the child in after seeing the subsequent AMBER Alert.

QR QR UR

6 5/7/06; Pickerington, OH Non-custodial teen mother abducted her 24 and 13-month old children from their foster mother and took themon a “joyride” before leaving them with their grandmother. AMBER Alert issued, and grandmother noticed Alert and called police, enablingchildren to be safely recovered within “six hours.”

QR QR QR

7 10/4/03; Christiansburg, VA: Woman lied to lawful guardian about having permission to take her six-year-old stepdaughter for drive.When truth discovered, AMBER Alert issued. Relative of perpetrator saw Alert and convinced perpetrator to surrender and return childto police, resulting in safe recovery within “six hours.”

QR QR QR

8 10/1/03 Hanover Park, IL: When babysitter did not return with 3-year-old boy in her charge, mother notified police and AMBER Alertissued based on unspecified presumption of threat. Police officer aware of Alert noticed and stopped vehicle and arrested perpetrator.Victim returned safely to parent within 12 hours.

QR QR UR

9 2/12/05; Baton Rouge, LA: Car with engine running and with two toddler brothers inside was stolen outside mother's residence. AMBERAlert issued and astute citizen found car and boys unharmed in it. Safe recovery within “5 hours.” Mother arrested for child abandonment.

QR QR QR

10 3/23/07; Highland Park, MI: Babysitter failed to return seven-year-old, resulting in quick AMBER Alert. Babysitter and collaborator kept childfor 18 hours and attempted to trick pursuers with disinformation to child's parents about locations and times. Eventually perpetrator becameaware of Alert and dropped child off with perpetrators’ uncle, resulting in safe recovery within 18 hours.

QR QR QT

⁎ “Mst”=Most; “Mod”=Moderate; “Lst”=Least.

1059T. Griffin / Journal of Criminal Justice 38 (2010) 1053–1062

“Unqualified” status for all levels of success (the perpetrator was a sexoffender) but the extended delay between abduction and recoveryprevented it from being “textbook” by any definition. The case is alsovery unique in that the “rescue” occurred after some (and perhaps all;again, we cannot know) of the harm was already done.

Case Two was the only one randomly selected for Table 5 whichachieved “textbook” status for any level of restrictiveness but isinteresting for additional reasons. NCMEC indicated the abductor wasintimidated by the AMBER Alert, and no available information directlycontradicted this claim. However, if it can be assumedmost car thieveswould prefer to avoid being charged with kidnapping, it is arguablyodd that the perpetrator in this casewould have been indifferent to thepresence of the toddler in the stolen car until the Alert was issued.Whereas NCMEC reports the intimidated perpetrator dropped off thechild and was later arrested, another account says she was arrested(which suggests the effectiveness of police investigation, not AMBERAlert) and then revealed the location of the vehicle and child (PioneerPress, 2006). The problem is in assuming the Alert and not just thechild was the cause of abandoning the vehicle, and it becomesreasonable to at least question whether AMBER Alert accomplishedanything in this case that would not have happened anyway (seeFootnote 11).

It could be reasonably argued that the lack of “unqualifiedtextbook” successes results in part from the problem of missingdata. The author stipulates this possibility of course, but it seems likelythat better data, on average, would locate far more mundane Alertscenarios than dramatic successes, because even if there is someselection bias as to which cases are associated with useable data, it isprobably toward a finding of AMBER Alert success: Sensational AMBERAlert success stories are far more likely to have extensive mediacoverage from which to derive case data (the crimes involved tend tobe newsworthy and officials are often eager to promote suchsuccesses), and so such cases are less likely to be excluded from thecategorization process because of missing values in the first place. Insum, while the data used in this analysis are inherently limited, theyoverwhelmingly suggests one conclusion: AMBER Alert, while facili-

tating the recovery of many abducted children, very rarely results in theswift and sensational rescue of an abducted child from apparentlyimminent serious harm.

Discussion

Many readers will find these results disappointing. However,reality is indifferent to preference, and a full understanding of thechild abduction phenomenon and the limits of official response makesense of these results. Perhaps the most important limitation toAMBER Alert functioning as originally envisioned is the simple rarityof child abduction-murder, and thus the frequency of qualityopportunities for the system to register “unqualified textbook”successes by any rigorous defintion. Estimates suggest there areapproximately 100 “stereotypical” child abductions per year, but eventhis likely overstates the phenomenon of interest in the AMBER Alertcontext because it includes cases where a child is held for ransom or isdetained against his or her will for more than a day for 24 hours forreasons not necessarily related to sexual assault and murder (Sedlak,Finkelhor, Hammer, & Schultz, 2002). The extensive publicityassociated with heinous child abduction-murders such as that ofPolly Klaas, Megan Kanka, or Amber Hagerman might make themseem common, but there simply are not verymany children in need ofan “unqualified textbook” AMBER Alert rescue in the first place, andthus we should not expect the number of such successes to be high.

Conversely, AMBER Alert's ability to typically register an “unqual-ified textbook” success is also limited by the kinds of cases AMBERAlert does routinely involve. Previous research shows that abductorsin AMBER Alert cases are overwhelmingly parents, other relatives andguardians, and acquaintances of the kidnapped child instead ofstrangers and/or registered sex offenders (Griffin et al., 2007). This isno surprise in that abductions in general are overwhelmingly of thisnature (Finkelhor, Hotaling, & Sedlak, 1992). This is likely why theAMBER Alert success stories provided by NCMEC and other organiza-tions examined also involve these relatively mundane situations, anda realistic assessment of these cases casts doubt on claims that they

1060 T. Griffin / Journal of Criminal Justice 38 (2010) 1053–1062

demonstrate the system's ability to routinely achieve the initial goalsthat inspired it.12

Toward a criminology of AMBER Alert

The discussion above in justifying the assignment of the varioussuccesses to the different categories has already detailed why someoffenders compel lesser levels of presumed menace than others, butthese issues can be further conceptualized. Consider, for example, thesuccess of AMBER Alert in intimidating some abductors into freeingtheir victims or surrendering to authorities. In cases where anindividual might have felt indifferent toward the law or even justifiedin taking the child, it appears AMBER Alert acts as a “game changer”.This might work in a number of ways. First, an AMBER Alert makes anunequivocal statement to the abductor that (s)he is at odds with thelaw and its institutions—a social and legal location most people preferto avoid. Similarly, the publicity can act essentially as a deterrent tocontinuation of the crime; the abducted child becomes a liability andmight be freed in order to facilitate the perpetrator's escape.

A third possiblemechanismbywhich an AMBERAlert could serve asa psychological “game changer” for the kidnapper is in its inherentconfiguration of the abducted child as a sympathetic and injured party.For example, a non-custodial parent might choose to take or fail toreturn a child from a position of (possibly delusional) self-justification,even regarding the act as a “rescue” rather than a “kidnapping.” But anAMBERAlert reconstructs the act as a “crime” and the child as a “victim”,powerfully changing the game and potentially reversing the perpe-trator's perspective toward the kidnapping. Furthermore, an AMBERAlert might have especially strong “game-changing” potential if thekidnapper committed the crime in an emotionally charged context(such as during a fight with the child's other parent or child welfareofficials), but is able to more rationally reflect on the situation by thetime the Alert is issued.13

Future research could cast more light on these criminological andpsychological speculations, but to the extent they are valid theyhighlight a problemwith thinking of the bulk of AMBERAlert successesas “life saving”: In the vast majority of such cases the abductor likelyhas a relatively normal moral compass, understanding of conse-quences, and a familial or social relationship with the child. However,the behaviors of the abductors in stereotypical child abduction-murder cases—the category of crime that inspired AMBERAlert and forwhich itwas originally designed—are not suggestive of either commonmorality or logical thinking. An individual who regards the sadisticviolation and murder of an innocent child as a desirable course ofaction operates in a different moral and cognitive universe than thebulk of perpetrators associated with AMBER Alert successes. Thus, theattempt to conflate successful “recovery” as exhibited in the majorityof the cases examined here with “life-saving rescue” amounts to acutespecial pleading.

AMBER Alert effectiveness and popular discourse

Despite the dubious basis for identifying the majority of AMBERAlert successes as “life-saving rescues”, the data provided here showthat is exactly the conflation being made by AMBER Alert proponents,and the reason seems obvious enough: People want to believe inAMBER Alert. The system was hastily conceived and implemented inthe context of “moral panic” over the socially constructed problem ofchild-abduction murder (Zgoba, 2004). Program proponents, sincere-ly wishing to help children like Amber Hagerman, most likely did notforesee the inherent obstacles to AMBER Alert “success” as originallyconceived. There have been a few genuinely remarkable successes,but most child abductions do not involve apparently life-threateningcircumstances, and those which do often expose AMBER Alert'sinherent constraints. Thus, in constructing the program as a life-saver,advocates are forced to make Procrustean conflations of mundane

retrievals with sensational rescues such as the few identified in thispaper.

Somemight argue this is neither conspiratorial nor damaging, thatthe point of the program is to do whatever good it can for howevermany abducted children it might (advocates have often said AMBERAlert is “worth it if saves just one life”). If AMBER Alert makes peoplefeel better about child abductions in general and solves some specificabductions (however relatively benign) in the process, then what isthe real harm in exaggerating its effectiveness?

The answer appears to be, much. First, widespread claims of“hundreds of lives” saved and so forth are simply unsubstantiated, andrecklessly (and probably unethically) reduce popular discourse onserious criminal matters to shallow hearsay. At some point publicdiscussion of crime and its solutions needs to be rigorous and honest.Besides, if it is true AMBERAlert is “worth it” if only one abducted childis “saved” (setting aside the ambiguities in what this means and theability of the data to demonstrate it) there should be no need fora theatrical conflation of mundane AMBER Alert successes with“unqualified textbook” rescues. If “saving one life” is enough then itis unnecessary to dubiously claim AMBER Alert has saved “hundreds.”

Second, AMBER Alert's popular appeal has often backfired againstlaw enforcement. The expectation that it can save endangeredchildren creates an onerous dilemma in missing child cases whereclear information is lacking. If authorities issue an Alert hastily inwhatturns out to be a misunderstanding or even a hoax, they can look sillyand be criticized for frivolous use of the system. On the other hand, ifofficials hold fast to the restrictive issuance criteria and elect not toissue an Alert in a case where the victim is eventually harmed ormurdered, they can appear incompetent or heartless. This lattercategory of issuance “error” is of course relatively rare because so isthe category of associated crime (child abduction-murder), but suchcases can generate intense backlash against authorities when theyoccur. The Heather Guerrero, Carlie Brucia, Brooke Bennett, ToriStafford, and Sandra Cantu abduction-murders are notable examples.In all these cases a young child was reported missing but authoritiesdeclined to immediately issue an AMBER Alert because the caseattributes did not conform to the standard criteria. Yet all these casesended tragically, resulting in anguished and enraged second-guessingat official decision making. The AMBER Alert system has inadvertentlyput authorities in an awkward position where they do not have manyserious abductions to solve in the first place and an overrated methodfor solving them when they do occur.

A third major problem with the overselling of AMBER Alert is themanner in which it distorts public discourse about how crimes againstchildren are effectively addressed. Most murdered American childrenare not victims of abducting strangers, but abusive or incompetentguardians (Boudreaux & Lord, 2005). Addressing the dysfunctionsassociated with these murders (poverty, drug addiction, mentalillness) requires a deep investment of social will and resources.However, the sensational “quick fix” of AMBER Alert can mislead usinto believing we are saving children when in fact most imperiledchildren will never be in circumstances that could trigger an AMBERAlert.

Conversely, the effectiveness of “qualified routine” successes canbe misleading if the popular inference is made that AMBER Alert canbe a mainstay against parental or other less alarming abductions.There might be as many as 200,000 familial abductions per year(Hammer et al., 2002) and it is unrealistic to think an AMBER Alertcould be issued in every such case. As with the problem of overallviolence against children, the underlying social ills associatedwith thevast majority of familial abductions (dysfunctional and abusiverelationships, impractical custody arrangements, ineffectual familycourts) are not amenable to any simple public response. When asymbolic “solution” such as AMBER Alert is eagerly embraced itdiminishes hope of honest discussion about the level of publicinvestment needed to address such problems.

1061T. Griffin / Journal of Criminal Justice 38 (2010) 1053–1062

Finally, overselling AMBER Alert is bad for AMBER Alert. The cavalieracceptance of a particular crime control policy stifles potentially fruitfuldiscussion as to how that policy can be improved. It is the subject ofanother paper andmore knowledgeable voices, but theremight well bea number of procedural, technical, and even philosophical adjustmentsthat could make AMBER Alert better or its goals more achievable. Suchchanges will never occur as long as AMBER Alert's portrayal is moresanguine than rigorous.

It is because of these concerns that AMBER Alert has previouslybeen identified as a potential example of “crime control theater”,a socially constructed solution to a socially constructed crime (Griffin& Miller, 2008). It is a lauded symbolic response precisely becauseserious child abductions, while rare, are sensational media eventswhich engender powerful public sentiments and calls for officialaction but are not easily amenable to any straightforward remedy, andthe analysis of AMBERAlert successes provided here is consistent withthis view.

Policy recommendations

Academic criminologists are want to lament the disconnectbetween rigorous scholarship and crime policy (Barak, 2007; Currie,2007; Griffin & Stitt, 2010), and there is no guarantee this soberinganalysis of AMBER Alert successes and its implications will ever seethe light of public discourse outside the confines of the academy.Nonetheless, at least two clear (even if possibly trite) public policyimplications emerge from the findings provided here.

First, advocates and system officials associated with AMBER Alertshould honestly consider and evaluate these and other extantempirical analyses of the system's effects. It is of course easier toendorse this recommended course of action than to take it; the publicagencies managing the AMBER Alert system probably regard it as apowerful source of institutional prestige and might instinctivelyregard as threatening any suggestion that it is less effective at itsintended goals than they are commonly claiming. However, thisobservation simply explains the problem of distorted public discourseabout AMBER Alert; it does nothing to solve it. It is the author's frankcontention that public agencies owe it to the citizens they serve tohonestly embrace and publicly acknowledge the empirical realitiesabout the services they provide, and it might well be in their ownbetter interests. It is easy to praise AMBER Alert to reap the seductivepublic approval it garners. However, as argued above, in the long runhonesty might really be the best policy for officials confronting theinevitability of AMBER Alert “failures”.

Second, and related to this, leaders in public agencies chargedwith overseeing AMBER Alert should consider whether their purposemust include rigorous program evaluation at least as much as programpromotion. The problem with missing and/or inadequate dataconfronted in this and other analyses of AMBER Alert highlights theneed for rigorous research of this popular program, and no one is ina better position to conduct it than the federal and state agenciescharged with its implementation. However, the unfortunate implica-tion of the analysis of acclaimed AMBER Alert successes provided inthis paper is that public officials are viscerally driven by a converseperception of their mission: AMBER Alert “successes”, howeverdubious as examples of “rescue” from “life-threatening” circum-stances, are routinely and glibly promoted as demonstrating thesystem's success at “saving lives.” Again, the author recognizes theobstacles to reforming entrenched public agencies, but it does notchange the serious implication for public policy. The key questionneeds to be asked: Should a “memorial crime control” policy such asAMBER Alert be evaluated through the emotional lens of sympathythat any decent person would feel for the victimwho inspired it, or onits own merits? From a political perspective, the answer might seemambiguous, but from a social science perspective, that question mightwell answer itself.

Conclusion

Inspired by the tragic murder of Amber Hagerman in 1996, theAMBER Alert system is designed to quickly publicize information aboutabduction victims to enlist citizen support in rescuing missing children.Rigorous empirical analysis of AMBER Alert is rare, andwhat little thereis suggests it is inherently limited and more likely to succeed inrelatively less menacing abductions, such as where the abductors arenon-custodial parents. However, system officials and proponents havepointed out numerous “success stories” to establish the system'seffectiveness in rescuing imperiled children. For this paper, data weregathered for 333 of these publicized Alerts to provide the first empiricalevaluationof howwell theydemonstrateAMBERAlert's ability to rescuegravely endangered children. The descriptive statistics of these Alertsshowed the vastmajority did not apparently involve dramatic “rescues”from “life-threatening” circumstances. Most perpetrators were relatedor otherwise known to the victim, and rarely did the Alerts bring aboutsuccess within the three-hour window deemed crucial in the worstabduction episodes. Categorizing a subset of these caseswith nomissingdata (N=190) showed very few to be “textbook successes” undermorerestrictive and realistic criteria (evidence of serious threat; rapidrecovery owing to the Alert). Qualitative analysis of 30 of these casesrevealed the inherent limits to the system and why AMBER Alert“successes” do not typically conform to the ideal promoted by thesystem's supporters. While the desire to believe in AMBER Alert isunderstandable, exaggerating its effectiveness canbe detrimental to lawenforcement officials who must deal with the backlash when theoverrated system “fails”. It is also arguably an example of the need formore rigorous research into AMBER Alert's effectiveness as well ashonesty in the public discourse about crime and its effective remedy.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank an anonymous reviewer and theeditorial staff at the Journal of Criminal Justice for their exceptionalassistance and insight into the improvement of this article.

Notes

1. The applicability of thesefindings toAMBERAlert could be reasonably questionedon the grounds that AMBERAlert, already promoted as an important child-saving deviceand being actively engaged through electronic media in specific cases, might inherentlyengender more alarm and thus more attentiveness and potentially effective recall thanmissing child posters. Nonetheless the author would like to thank an anonymousreviewer for pointing out this research and its relevance to this subject.

2. Originally 100 cases from these additional state-level sources were selected butno useable information was found for seven of them.

3. It is impossible to distinguish between cases where the identity of theperpetrator was literally unknown to anyone at the time of the abduction and caseswhere the data simply did not record it, so for simplicity all such cases were recordedas perpetrator “unknown.” This is different from, for example, recovery time, becauseobviously someone present at the incident, if so inclined, could have noted the time,but that none of the information sources provided the data, and thus in such a case theinformation was regarded as “missing.”

4. An anonymous reviewer expressed concern that the author acted as sole datacollector, and thus no triangulation of the data through multiple collectors and inter-coder reliability ratings is possible. The point is well taken. However, the data used aredefensible for a number of reasons. First, they are, at least where available, very simpledata to collect. Second, and related to this, most of the data coded leave little room forsubjectivity. If the available narratives say the abductor is the father of the child andwas captured by police before the Alert had any alleged effect, it is hard to imaginemultiple coders would have widely divergent interpretations of this. Third, futureresearchers can use the same public information and examine the exact same publiclycelebrated AMBER Alert successes as the author in order to assess the validity of theanalysis provided here, if they so choose. Finally, the results are consistent with thefindings from every other available scholarly examination of AMBER Alert. In all, it isdifficult to imagine any extensive corruption of data occurred during coding.Nonetheless, the author can provide the extant documents on which specific casefacts were coded upon request.

5. These cases do not include those in which there was evidence the alert andabduction were nearly simultaneous and thus the Alert Delay was counted as zero.This too biases the data in favor of AMBER Alert success (obviously the abduction and

1062 T. Griffin / Journal of Criminal Justice 38 (2010) 1053–1062

the Alert cannot literally be simultaneous) but less so. A more detailed explanation ofhow the various event times were coded and converted into the durations shown isavailable from the author upon request.

6. The publicists’ misinterpretation of these cases as demonstrating an effectiveAMBER Alert seemed sincere. Furthermore, the author welcomes examination andeven reinterpretation of these cases by outside reviewers and can provide a list ofthem along with extant data upon request.

7. In fact the language of “textbook” success has been used by law enforcementspokespersons in cases where there was little evidence of serious threat to theabducted child or children. What these officials appeared to mean is the operations ofthe system and the fact of citizen involvement were “textbook” in a sense very close tothe term as employed here.

8. The reader should be apprised that an anonymous reviewer questionedwhether abductor identity should be considered in the definition of “unqualified”. Itis a subjective point, but the author's use of the term is strictly for analysis, and if“unqualified” should through future popular discourse on AMBER Alert come toexclude the issue of abductor identity, then some other term would be substituted inthis context. The author contends that, given the category of crime that inspiredAMBER Alert, at some point the system's effectiveness needs to be evaluated usingsome term that examines the nature of the abductor—whatever that term is.

9. For more discussion of this case and references for its narrative see Griffin et al.,(2007) and Griffin and Miller (2008).

10. During revision of the manuscript and subsequent analysis of this case it wasrevealed that the father in fact sexually assaulted thevictim. At one level this could seem tojustify the use of the AMBER Alert in this case and lend credibility its apparent success. Onthe other hand, the crime obviously was not impeded; unless we can assumemurderous,and not just incestuous, intent, its sadly possible the Alert prevented little if anything.

11. In another example, one case was originally randomly selected as an“unqualified textbook” success under the moderately restrictive criteria, but wasexcluded and recoded after detailed subsequent analysis. It had been originallymiscoded because it was reported by NCMEC as an example of the Alert pressuring theabductor to return the child, but it was later revealed the suspect had actually plannedto release the child to her grandparents in any event, apparently driven by a quixoticdesire to “save” her from her mother's risqué lifestyle as an exotic dancer. The casewas dutifully coded as “unqualified” for all levels of restrictiveness (although theabductor knew of the girl and mother he was a stranger to them and had threateneddeadly force) but it was also “routine” because the effect of the Alert was merely infacilitating recovery after the child's safety was no longer in doubt. The case illustrates(1) apparent perpetrator intention and not an AMBER Alert is the key factordetermining the prospects for successful recovery; (2) how easily AMBER Alert'seffectiveness and importance can be overstated by system advocates.

12. This is certainly not to imply familial abduction is not a serious problem. Ananonymous reviewer expressed concern that the article could be read as suggesting asmuch, and that if in fact it contributes to resolving such abductions, “AMBER Alert is agood thing.” The author certainly does not dispute this, and is fully aware familialabductions can be extremely traumatic events both for children and custodial parents(Greif, 1998, 2000; Hammer, Finkelhor, & Sedlak, 2002). However, three issues need tobe considered. First, even if AMBER Alert does help resolve many familial abductions, itis questionable how much it has really added to addressing this category ofkidnapping, because most of them are resolved swiftly and positively anyway (Plass,Finkelhor, & Hotlaing, 1995). Second, parental abductions are extremely common, andAMBER Alert cannot realistically be employed to address them on a large scale,precisely because system officials want to conserve the attention it garners for themost serious cases. Finally, while it is reasonable in general to regard AMBER Alert as a“good thing” based on whatever successes it achieves, the question pertinent to thisanalysis is, “What kind of good thing?” The research question here is not whetherAMBER Alert succeeds at all (the analysis, after all, is an examination of cases alreadyidentified as successes), but whether the nature of those successes conforms to thevision that originally inspired the system. The data strongly suggest it does not—regardless of how readers choose to evaluate AMBER Alert's other achievements.

13. In fact, in many of the listed successes where the Alert had allegedly inducedthe abductor to liberate the child shortly after it was issued, there was often someelement of doubt as to whether the Alert was really the reason (consider the casedescribed in Footnote 11 and Case Two from Table 5). It appeared in such cases just aslikely that the abductor simply regained composure and returned the child.Nonetheless supplemental documents only rarely contradicted the agencies’ accounts,so their claims were taken at face value absent refutation.

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